Calcutta High Court
Surendralal Girdharilal Mehta vs Union Of India & Ors on 17 May, 2018
Author: Arijit Banerjee
Bench: Arijit Banerjee
In the High Court At Calcutta
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Original Side
WP 322 of 2015
Surendralal Girdharilal Mehta
-Vs.-
Union of India & Ors.
Before : The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee
For the petitioner : Mr. Ratnanko Banerjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. D.N. Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Ratnesh Kr. Rai, Adv.
Mr. A. Basu, Adv.
Ms. Urmila Chakraborty, Adv.
Mr. Srinjay Bhattacharya, Adv.
For the respondents : Mr. Ranjan Kr. Roy, Adv.
Heard On : 29.07.2015, 25.08.2015, 23.09.2015,
14.10.2015, 18.11.2015, 08.11.2016,
24.02.2017, 27.04.2017, 22.06.2017,
21.07.2017, 06.09.2017, 12.09.2017.
CAV On : 03.05.2018
Judgment On : 17.05.2018
Arijit Banerjee, J.:-
(1) The petitioner prays for quashing of a show cause notice dated 14 January, 1991 issued by the Special Director, Enforcement Directorate, Government of India on the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the adjudication arising out of the said show cause notice causing worry, anxiety, expenses and disturbance to his vocation and peace of mind. As stated in paragraph 3 of the writ petition, the petitioner has not gone into the merits or demerits of the show cause notice and has limited his challenge to the arbitrary conduct of the adjudication proceeding under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (in short "FERA").
(2) Case of the Petitioner:-
A show cause notice was issued against Girdharilal Mehta (since deceased) and against one S.C. Mehta under Section 50 of the FERA calling upon the noticees to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed on them under the said Act for alleged contravention of Section 8 (1) of FERA read with Sections 64(2) and 51 thereof. There is no one by the name of S.C. Mehta in the petitioner's family. However, the notice was sent to the address of the petitioner who is S.G. Mehta. The petitioner reasonably assumed that S.C. Mehta was a mis- description of the petitioner.
(3) Prior to issuance of the show cause notice, on January 15, 1990, the premises of Thomas Duff Company were searched under Section 37 of FERA and some documents were seized by the authorities. A further search was undertaken on January 18, 1990. The statements of G.L. Mehta and S.G. Mehta (writ petitioner) were recorded on February 12, 1990. The petitioner gave his reply to the show cause notice vide letter dated February 15, 1991.
(4) Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the adjudication proceeding under Section 51 of FERA has not proceeded since then. The entire proceeding is at a nascent stage. The respondent no. 2 issued letters in connection with the proceeding in 1993, 1999, 2000, 2005 and 2015. Upon receipt of each letter, the petitioner made a written request for supply of documents which were relied upon for the purpose of issuance of the show cause notice. In spite of receipt of such written requests, the respondent authorities remain silent until issuance of the subsequent letter after several years.
(5) No further step beyond issuance of the show cause notice has been taken by the respondent authorities. There is no adjudication and no hearing has been held in connection with the proceeding. This has been put on record by the learned advocates of the petitioner in their letters dated 17 May, 2005, 27 February, 2015, 10 March, 2015 and 11 March, 2015.
(6) During the pendency of the proceeding, Mr. G.L. Mehta, one of the noticees passed away on July 4, 1998. Hence, the proceeding has abated against him. The FERA has been repealed with effect from June 1, 2000 with a sun set clause for two years which came to an end on June 1, 2002. No proceeding can be initiated under FERA after May 31, 2002. The adjudication is yet to start. The proceeding does not survive also by reason of repeal of FERA.
(7) In the Affidavit-in-Opposition filed on behalf of the respondent authorities, it is admitted that no document has been supplied to the petitioner. There is absolutely no explanation as to why there has been a delay of 26 years in proceeding with the adjudication process.
No case has been made out even prima facie as to why the show cause notice should be proceeded with against the writ petitioner. The challenge in the writ petition is to the inordinate delay in proceeding with the show cause notice causing immense prejudice to the writ petitioner and also for quashing of the proceeding on the ground that it is an abuse of the process of law. The authorities have failed to disclose or supply to the petitioner copies of relevant documents forming the basis of the show cause notice. An unnecessary show cause notice is being pursued against the petitioner who is presently 80 years old. When the show cause notice was issued, the petitioner was 54 years old. He has suffered for long 26 agonizing years with the proceeding hanging over his head like the Sword of Damocles. The said proceeding has become harrasive in nature and is contrary to the ends of justice. It also amounts to deprivation of the constitutional right of the petitioner to speedy investigation and trial for an offence alleged to have been committed at a point of time prior to 1991. The respondents have violated the petitioner's right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India by keeping the proceeding pending for 26 years. (8) Mr. Banerjee, relied on the following decisions:-
(i) State of Andhra Pradesh-vs.-N. Radha Kishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833.
(ii) The State of Madhya Pradesh-vs.-Bani Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1308.
(iii) P.V. Mahadevan-vs.-M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, AIR 2006 SC 207.
(iv) Government of India-vs.-Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 483.
(v) R.M. Mehrotra-vs.-Enforcement Directorate and Others, 2009 (246) ELT 141 (Del).
(vi) Pankaj Kumar-vs.-State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117.
(vii) State of Haryana-vs.-Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.
(viii) Unreported Supreme Court order dated January 10, 2017 in SLP (Cri.) No. 7085 of 2012 (S.M. Dutta & Anr.-vs.-State of U.P. & Ors.)
(ix) A.R. Antulay-vs.-R.S.Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225. (9) Mr. Banerjee, finally submitted that the respondent authorities have acted with arbitrariness and perversity. No explanation has been given for the inordinate delay in proceeding with the adjudication. In view of the breach of the constitutional right of the petitioner embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution, the reliefs claimed by the writ petitioner should be granted and the show cause notice should be quashed.
(10) Case of the Respondents:-
Mr. Rai, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that the show cause notice was issued well within the sun set period provided in the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (in short "FEMA"). He referred to Rule 3 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1974 framed by the Central Government in exercise of power under Section 79 of FEMA. He submitted that prior to holding an adjudication proceeding, a notice is to be issued requiring the person concerned to show cause as to why adjudication proceeding should not be initiated against him. After considering his reply to the show cause notice, the authority is required to form an opinion as to whether or not adjudication proceeding should be commenced against him. In the present case, the show cause notice was issued well within the prescribed time. Hence, the contention that the show cause notice does not survive the repeal of FERA has no merit. Prosecution or adjudication commences when the concerned authority takes notice of the violation of law and issues notice to show cause calling for explanation. In this connection, learned advocate relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer-vs.-M/s. Videocon International Limited & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1213. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that cognizance of the offence under FERA had already been taken by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai on May 24, 2002 I.e., within two years of FEMA coming into force on June 1, 2000, the period prescribed by Section 49(3) of FEMA. Hence, the High Court was wrong in quashing the proceeding on the ground that the same was time-barred.
(11) Learned Advocate then submitted that the petitioner has not challenged the proceeding on merit and the same indicates that there is sufficient merit in the assertion of the Enforcement Directorate and the prosecution is legitimate and rightful.
(12) It was then submitted that the petitioner has replied to the show cause notice on the basis of the documents supplied with the notice and did not indicate in his reply that he required inspection of any other document. Whenever notices for hearing were issued, the petitioner raked up the issue of inspection of documents or supply of copies thereof just to stall the proceeding.
(13) The petitioner prays for quashing of the show cause notice only on the ground of delay in proceeding with the adjudication. However, no representation was ever made by the petitioner to the authorities to expedite the proceeding.
(14) Learned counsel finally relied on the following decisions in support of his submission that simply on the ground of delay a prosecution cannot be quashed:-
(i) State of Rajasthan-vs.-Ikbal Hussen, 2004 AIR SCW 5196.
(ii) P. Ramachandra Rao-vs.-State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856.
(iii) Standard Chartered Bank-vs.-Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2006 SC 1301.
(15) On the basis of the aforesaid submission learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
Court's View:-
(16) Before expressing my opinion, it would be helpful to briefly discuss the decisions referred to by both the learned Counsel. (17) In State of Andhra Pradesh-vs.-N. Radhakishan, (Supra), a disciplinary proceeding was challenged on the ground that there was delay in concluding the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and has to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceeding should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when the proceedings are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceeding, the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against the employee. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its own course as per relevant rules, but then, delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceeding. Ultimately, the Court has to balance these diverse considerations. (18) In State of Madhra Pradesh-vs.-Bani Singh & Anr. (Supra), disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the concerned employee more than 12 years after the irregularities were allegedly committed by him. The tribunal quashed the proceeding on the ground of delay and laches. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld such order holding that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and it would be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at that stage. (19) In P.V. Mahadevan-vs.-M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (Supra), the charge memo was issued against the concerned employee 10 years after he committed the alleged irregularities. The matter being carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was held that allowing the respondent employer to proceed further with the departmental proceedings after such a long lapse of time would be very prejudicial to the appellant employee. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned.
Protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. The mental agony and sufferings of the employee due to the protracted disciplinary proceeding would be much more than the punishment. (20) The decision in Government of India-vs.-Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras & Ors., (Supra), in my opinion, is not very relevant to the facts of the present case. in that case, Rule 12 of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Rules, 1956 fell for consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It was held that although Rule 12 did not prescribe any period of limitation for recovery of any duty, that by itself did not render the said Rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation, every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of each case.
(21) In R.M. Mehrotra-vs.-Enforcement Directorate and Others (Supra), a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner in February, 1995 for alleged violation of certain provisions of FERA. The hearing commenced on November 29, 2004. The petitioner challenged the show cause notice and the notice of hearing on the ground of delay in commencing the proceeding. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition striking down the show cause notice and quashing the proceeding holding that there was no explanation on the part of the authority for the delay in the adjudication process. It was further held that the writ Court should exercise jurisdiction as it would be unfair to relegate the petitioner to the remedy available under the relevant enactment.
(22) In Pankaj Kumar-vs.-State of Maharashtra, (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases.
In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for the conclusion of trial. In that case, the First Information Report was recorded on 12 May, 1987 for the offences allegedly committed in the year1981. Charge-sheet was submitted on 22 February, 1991. Nothing happened till April, 1999 when the appellant approached the writ Court for quashing of the proceedings before the Trial Court. Being unsuccessful before the High Court, the appellant carried the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed and the criminal proceeding was quashed solely on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay.
(23) In State of Haryana-vs.-Bhajanlal, (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave, by way of illustration, a few categories of cases wherein the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
(24) Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court Order dated 10 January, 2017 passed in SLP (Cri.) No. 7085/2012 (S.M. Dutta & Anr- vs.-State of U.P. & Ors.), whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the complaint in question observing that the same had been filed way back in the year of 1994 and was still at a nascent stage after almost 22 years.
(25) In A.R. Antulay-vs.-R.S. Nayak, (Supra), a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that it is both in the interest of the accused as well as the society that a criminal case is concluded soon. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent but this determination must be arrived at with reasonable despatch. Since it is the accused who is charged with the offence and is also the person whose life and/or liberty is at peril, it is fair to say that he has a right to be tried speedily. Correspondingly, it is the obligation of the State to respect and ensure this right. The very fact of being accused of a crime is cause for concern. It affects the reputation and the standing of the person among his colleagues and in the society. It is a cause for worry and expense. It was, however, observed that the only consequence of infringement of the right to speedy trial is not quashing of the charges and/or conviction. In a given case, the facts including the nature of offence may be such that quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. Every offence, more so, economic offences those relating to public officials and food adulteration is an offence against society. In cases, where quashing of charges/conviction may not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the Court to pass such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances of the case. The Hon'ble Court went on to lay down certain guidelines to be followed in deciding whether there has been inordinate delay in proceeding with a criminal case and whether the accused has been so prejudiced by such delay not occasioned by him that it would be unfair to allow the prosecution to continue, warranting quashing of the criminal proceeding. (26) Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the State of Rajasthan-vs.-Ikbal Hussen, (Supra), for the proposition that no time period can be laid down within which a criminal trial must be completed. Hence, a criminal proceeding cannot be quashed merely on the ground that there was a delay in concluding the trial.
In the said decision at paragraph 4 of the reported judgment, paragraph 29 of the judgment in A.R. Antulay's case has been quoted as the finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, from the reported judgment in A.R. Antulay's case it appears that paragraph 29 (SCC) records the submission of Mr. Jethmalani, learned Counsel appearing for the State of Bihar in one of the appeals. Further, it is nobody's case that a criminal trial or an adjudication proceeding must be completed within a stipulated period of time. This case, in my opinion, has no relevance to the facts of the instant case. (27) In P. Ramachandra Rao-vs.-State of Karnataka, (Supra), a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused the Court cannot device and almost enact bars of limitation beyond which the trial shall not proceed and arm of law shall lose its hold though the Legislature has not chosen to do so. Bars of limitation, judicially engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the problem of protracted trials. But a solution of this nature gives rise to greater problems like scuttling a trial without adjudication, stultifying access to justice and giving easy exit from the portals of justice. Such general remedial measures cannot be said to be apt solutions. For two reasons, such bars of limitation are uncalled for and impermissible: first, because it tantamounts to impermissible legislation - an activity beyond the power which the Constitution confers on judiciary, and secondly, because such bars of limitation fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay's case and, therefore, run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy. Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which the Trial Court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused, amounts to legislation which cannot be done by judicial directives and is not within the arena of the judicial law- making power available to constitutional Courts.
Again, in my respectful opinion, this case is not germane to the present case since the question that arose in that case is not involved in the present case.
(28) In Standard Chartered Bank.-vs.-Directorate of Enforcement, (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the FERA authority from proceeding with the adjudication under Section 50 of the FERA. It was observed that it was for the appellants to put forward their defence before the concerned authority and it was for that authority to decide the relevant aspects while deciding to impose or not to impose any penalty on the appellants. The appellants had a right of appeal under Section 52 of the FERA to the Appellate Board and a further right of appeal to the High Court under Section 54 of the FERA. It was for the appellants to put forward their defence before the adjudicating authority and pursue the same in accordance with law.
(29) Coming to the facts of the present case, the show cause notice was issued on 14 January, 1991. It was replied to by the petitioner on 15 February, 1991. In the reply the petitioner specifically stated that at no material point of time, he had any connection with the affairs of Thomas Duff Company which is alleged to have acquired foreign exchange to the tune of U.K. One Lakh pounds. The petitioner also requested the authorities to disclose the documentary evidence relied upon by them to justify the petitioner's involvement in the transaction. There does not appear to be any response to the said reply to the show cause notice. By a letter dated 1 March, 1996, the petitioner's Advocates again requested for copies of the relevant papers and documents. The first notice of hearing was issued on 19 November, 1999 i.e., almost 9 years after issuance of the show cause notice. The petitioner's Advocates by a letter dated 9 December, 1999 sought for adjournment of the hearing on the ground that the learned Advocate who was handling the case was out of India and would return in end December, 1999. This was followed by a letter dated 12 January, 2000 whereby request was made to give inspection and supply copies of the relevant documents. This was followed by a letter dated 24 January, 2000 to similar effect. By a letter dated 7 February, 2000 as corrected by a letter dated 9 February, 2000, the petitioner's Learned Advocate communicated to the Authorities a list of documents that the petitioner required to effectively deal with the charge brought against the petitioner. There are correspondence on record in the form of letters written by the petitioner's Advocates to the respondent authorities in 2005 asking for inspection of documents and copies thereof. After a long lapse of 16 years another notice of hearing dated 13 February, 2015 was issued by the authorities. In response, by their letter dated 27 February, 2015 the petitioner's Advocates put on record that they had not yet received copies of the documents relied upon by the authorities. A further notice of hearing was issued on 4 March, 2005. By its letter dated 10 March, 2015 the petitioner's Advocates informed the authorities that without copies of the relevant documents, it would not be possible for them to proceed with the hearing. By a letter dated 11 March, 2015 the petitioner's Advocates put on record that they had deputed a person to collect the documents from the office of the respondents pursuant to the discussion held with Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, in the presence of the Joint Director on 4 March, 2015 but that no documents were handed over to such person. The writ petition was filed on 17 March, 2015.
(30) It will be seen from the facts noted above that the first notice of hearing was issued almost 9 years after issuance of the show cause notice. The petitioner contended that unless copies of the relevant documents relied upon by the authorities were supplied to him, he would not be able to defend himself meaningfully at the adjudication proceeding. There is nothing on record to show that the authorities supplied such copies to the petitioner. There is not even such an averment in the affidavit filed by the respondents in this proceeding. The respondents remained completely silent after issuance of the notice of hearing. Several letters were written by the petitioner or his Advocates between 1999 and 2015. There is nothing on record to show that the same were replied to by the authorities. 16 years after 1999 a notice of hearing dated 13 February, 2015 was issued. Upon the petitioner expressing his inability to attend such hearing in the absence of copies of the relevant documents, a further notice of hearing dated 4 March, 2015 was issued by the authorities. The conduct of the authorities makes it amply clear that they were never serious about the adjudication proceeding against the petitioner. Nonchalance is writ large on the demeanor of the respondents. As on the date of filing of the writ petition, 24 years had elapsed since issuance of the show cause notice. Not a single hearing was held in connection with the adjudication proceeding. In the event, the authorities perceived that the petitioner was avoiding the hearing, nothing prevented the authorities from proceeding ex parte after recording that the petitioner was indulging in dilatory tactics. The authorities did not do so. There is no explanation in the affidavit filed by the respondents regarding the inordinate delay in commencing the adjudication proceeding. The only statement made is that each time a notice of hearing was given, the petitioner contended that hearing should be adjourned because copies of the relevant documents had not been supplied by the respondents to the petitioner. This, in my opinion, did not amount to any dilatory tactics on the part of the petitioner. He was well within his rights to ask for copies of documents which the respondents intended to rely upon to connect the petitioner with the impugned transaction allegedly undertaken in violation of the provisions of FERA. It was equally an obligation on the part of the respondents to supply copies of such documents to the petitioner before any hearing took place to enable the petitioner to meaningfully defend himself at the hearing. This is nothing but a basic requirement of the principles of natural justice.
(31) In view of the aforesaid submission, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the delay in the adjudication proceeding. It is indifference, disinterest and lack of diligence on the part of the respondents that has caused the inordinate delay. The petitioner has spent the last 26 years with the adjudication proceeding hanging over his head like the proverbial Damocles' sword. This is very likely to have caused worry, anxiety and unpeace of mind to the petitioner.
(32) Mr. Rai, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner never demanded that the adjudication proceeding be expedited and completed at an early date. Hence, he cannot complain of the delay and cannot ask for quashing of the show cause notice and the adjudication proceeding on the ground of delay alone. In this connection, reliance of the learned Counsel on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ikbal Hussen's case (Supra) is misplaced. As noted above, in the judgment in that case, paragraph 29 of the judgment in A.R. Antulay's case was quoted. Paragraph 29 of the judgment in A.R. Antulay's case merely recorded the submission of Mr. Jethmalani learned Counsel representing one of the appellants. He had submitted that an accused cannot raise the plea of delay if he has never made a demand for speedy trial and a plea that proceedings against him be quashed on the ground that delay has taken place is not sustainable if the record shows that he acquiesced in the delay and never asked for an expeditious disposal. Mr. Jethmalani had submitted that in India the demand rule must be rigorously enforced and no one can be permitted to complain that speedy trial was denied when he never demanded it. This submission of Mr. Jethmalani was rejected by the Constitution Bench as recorded in sub-para 7 under paragraph 86 of the judgment in A.R. Antulay's case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases".
Thus, it is irrelevant that the petitioner did not ask for speedy conclusion of the adjudication process. It was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to diligently proceed with the adjudication and come to a conclusion at an early date. A charge of a criminal or quasi- criminal nature cannot be allowed to hang over the head of a citizen indefinitely without the concerned authority coming to a conclusion as to whether or not there is substance in the charge. Just as a person against whom a quasi-criminal charge has been brought is liable to be punished if the charge is proved, equally, he is entitled to be exonerated of the charge if the charge cannot be established with proper evidence. Either way, the decision must be reached within a reasonable period of time. This is in public interest and is essential to preserve public confidence in the adjudication process. The prejudices that a charged person suffers by reason of undue long pendency of a proceeding against him are many fold as noted in some of the decisions discussed above. In the facts of the present case by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the delay that has been caused in the adjudication process is reasonable and absolutely no explanation has been furnished for such delay. The charges against the petitioner are of a quasi-criminal nature and the right of the petitioner to have a speedy disposal of the adjudication proceeding has been infringed by the respondents in the facts of this case. On this ground alone the impugned show cause notice is liable to be quashed.
(33) The show cause notice also does not give sufficient details on the basis of which the charge of violation of the provisions of FERA has been brought against the petitioner. No doubt economic offences are offences against the society at large and should be curbed. However, if the respondents had sufficient incriminating materials against the petitioner they would have surely supplied copies thereof to the petitioner in compliance with the principles of natural justice and would have proceeded with the adjudication process. The very conduct of the respondents raises a strong suspicion in my mind that the respondents have no such material which would establish the charge levelled against the petitioner. This is one of the reasons why I am of the opinion that it will not be to the detriment of public interest or contrary to the interest of justice if the impugned show cause notice is quashed. 'Justice delayed is justice denied' is not a cliché. (34) For the reasons aforestated, the impugned show cause notice dated 14 January, 1991 is quashed along with the notices of hearing. The adjudication proceeding stands dropped against the petitioner. (35) W.P. 322 of 2015 is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
(36) Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.
(Arijit Banerjee, J.) Later:-
After judgment is delivered, prayer is made for stay of operation of the judgment and order. Such prayer is considered and refused.
(Arijit Banerjee, J.)