Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
J.R. Ramesh Kumar @ Rameshji vs N. Prabhakar Rao on 5 September, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(6)ALD796, 2000(6)ALT727, AIR 2001 (NOC) 1 (AP), 2001 A I H C 213, (2001) 1 RENCJ 438, (2001) 1 RENCR 277, (2001) 1 RENTLR 406, (2000) 6 ANDHLD 796, (2000) 6 ANDH LT 727
Author: I. Venkatanarayana
Bench: I. Venkatanarayana
ORDER
1. Revision petitioner is the landlord. He filed RC No.355 of 1980 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller, Secunderabad for eviction against the respondent-tenant under Section 10(2) (i) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, i960 (for short 'the Rent Control Act') on the ground that the tenant committed wilful default, unauthorised sublease of a portion of the petition schedule premises and also on the ground of bona fide requirement of residential portion of the petition schedule premises for personal occupation and also on the ground that the landlord requires the non-residential portion for the purpose of business which he is carrying on as on the date of application.
2. For the sake of convenience the revision petitioner would be referred to as 'landlord' and the respondent as 'tenant'.
3. The factual matrix leading to the filing of the revision petition is set out as hereunder:- The revision petitioner is the landlord of the building bearing Municipal Assessment No.7-3-181 to 183 and 209 situate at Ghasmandi, Secunderabad. A portion of the said building comprising of Municipal Assessment No.7-3-183 consisting of four rooms is leased out to the tenant and the tenancy is month to month. The landlord filed the eviction petition in RC No.355 of 1980 on the file of the Principal Rent Controller under Section 10(2)(ii)(a), (3)(a)(i)(b) and 10(3) (iii) (a) of the Rent Control Act. The grounds of eviction are that the tenant committed wilful default, unauthorized sub-lease of a portion of the petition schedule premises and that the landlord requires the non-residential premises for the purpose of his business, which he is carrying on, as on the date of the application.
4. The eviction petition was resisted by the respondent-tenant and the contended that he was not committed wilful default and the landlord refused to receive the rent and he sent the rent by money order and finally the landlord accepted the money order and hence there is no wilful default. On the question of sub-leasing the premises the tenant took the ground that Vijaya Chit Fund Company is not a sub-leassee and this business was commenced for the benefit of his son (PW3) and hence there is no subletting as contended by the landlord. Adverting to the question of bona fide requirement the tenant resisted the plea on the ground that the landlord has filed RC No.34 of 1979 against another tenant Subba Rao for eviction from a residential portion of the first floor of the petition schedule premises and the order of eviction was finally confirmed by the High Court and the tenant vacated the premises. The landlord did not occupy the premises vacated by the said tenant and therefore the plea that the premises is required for his bona fide requirement is unsustainable.
5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court has addressed itself to the issues as to whether the tenant committed wilful default and whether the tenant has sub-let the petition schedule premises and whether the landlord requires the premises for his bona fide requirement. The parties were put to trial and based on the oral and documentary evidence the Rent Controller by his order dated 31-12-1990 has held that the landlord requires the front two rooms of the petition schedule premises for his business purpose and dismissed the petition on other grounds. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller the landlord filed a statutory appeal in RA No.97 of 1991 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad. The appellate authority received documentary evidence by way of additional evidence both from the landlord and the tenant and got them marked as Exs.A13 to A18, Ex.C1 and R23 to R27 and the landlord did not press the ground of wilful default and also the ground of subletting the premises. Hence the only ground before the appellate Court was whether the demised premises is required for the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The appellate Court also addressed itself to the issue on the maintainability of the eviction petition when the lease is of composite lease. Following the judgments of the Apex Court, the appellate Court has held that the eviction petition is maintainable and reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on this issue. The appellate Court took into consideration the fact that the landlord is in occupation of a portion of the upstairs portion after evicting Mr. Subba Rao under Ex.R26 and he located the office of Ramyasri Builders in the said premises. The appellate authority also found that the landlord can as well locate his film business in the same portion. The appellate authority further found that since it is in evidence that the landlord is a builder he can construct one premises for himself and that he has a house in Bolaram (Cantonment area) along with his brothers. The Court further took into consideration of the fact that his first wife has constructed a house at Kavadiguda with non-residential shops. The appellate authority held that the premises is not required for his bona fide occupation and dismissed the appeal by its order dated 12-7-1996. Aggrieved by the order of the appellate Court the landlord filed the present revision petition.
6. Sri P.M. Gopala Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner assailed the orders of both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority and contended that they failed to appreciate and understand the concept of bona fide requirement' as intended by the statute. He elaborately contended that the bona fide requirement has to be viewed from the convenience of the landlord and nor based on the necessity of the tenant. The Court must look into the need, extent and convenience of the landlord while considering the plea of bona fide requirement. He further submitted that the Rent Controller having found that the landlord is entitled to possession of two rooms ought to have ordered eviction of the petition schedule premises for carrying on his business. The learned Counsel further contended that the fact that the revision petitioner is owning a joint family house at Bolaram and his wife is having property at Vasavi Nagar, cannot be taken into consideration since those properties are located in Cantonment Board. It is his submission that those properties are in the jurisdiction of the Board which is in the Union List of the Constitution of India. In short, it is his submission that Act 15 of I960 has application only to the municipal areas of the State and hence the aforementioned factors cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the issue on bona fide requirement. It was further submitted that the respondent-tenant emboldened by" the order of the appellate authority has converted the petition schedule premises into a hotel, called 'Sri Raghavendra Tiffin and Snacks' causing grave inconvenience and nuisance by discharging used water on the rear side. The respondent did not obtain any licence from the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for running the hotel. Taking into consideration the subsequent events into consideration the revision petitioner filed CMP No.8458 of 1998 under Order 41, Rule 47 of the Civil Procedure Code to receive a document as additional evidence. That document relates to the correspondence where the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad Medical authorities informed the petitioner that no licence was issued for running the Tiffin Centre and that a notice has been served on the respondent.
7. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel for the respondent supported the findings of the lower Court and contended that the landlord has other premises, residential and non-residential, and he being a builder himself can always arrange to establish his business in one of the premises of his choice. He further contended that this Court can take into consideration the subsequent events into consideration for deciding the issues under the Act. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, for the afore-mentioned proposition. By way of affidavit the respondent has stated that he reliably understands that Flat No.110 in Gayatri Apartments is allotted to the landlord. A counter was filed by the landlord denying the averments and contended that the said shops are sold by the developers/builders to various persons through various registered sale deeds.
8. Taking into consideration the rival submissions the only question that falls for consideration is whether the petition schedule premises is required for bona fide occupation of the petitioner for carrying on his business which he was carrying on as on the date of application. I will first consider the submission that the landlord's wife has a building in Vasavi Nagar and that the respondent is a partner in Ramyasri Builders. The landlord contended that he has no proprietary rights and the firm has executed registered sale deeds in favour of the purchasers. In short it is his contention that unless he is in occupation of the premises it cannot be contended that he can occupy the premises for his requirement. The Supreme Court had an occasion to decide the expression "possession which he is entitled" in a recent judgment reported in G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas, . It was held as follows:
"The provisions of Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 are in puri material with the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Act. The expression "to the possession which he is entitled" does not mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the Act. It is not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that since the respondent is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, he cannot seek eviction of the appellant. It is not disputed that other conditions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. There was no reason to take any different view other than that taken by the High Court'.
From the afore-mentioned judgment it is clear that the landlord must own and possess the premises as absolute owner. In another important judgment the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the effect of subsequent events for deciding the issue of eviction. In a judgment reported in Martin & Harris Ltd v. VI Additional District Judge, , the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that landlord's wife was having an undivided interest in the building and held that subsequent event can have no effect on the merits of the claim of the landlord because the landlord cannot be compelled to stay as a licensee with his wife. Hence the submission of the tenant that the landlord's wife has a separate building and that he is a partner in a builders firm cannot be sustained. In another significant judgment reported in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, , the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a situation where the landlord was already in possession of a non-residential premises in the very same town on lease hold basis and held that does not prohibit him from seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal occupation even if other members of the family of the landlord possess non-residential premises. The Apex Court has also held that ullimately the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and he has complete freedom in the matter. The Supreme Court observed as follows :
"The landlord is the best Judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court was rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. That was a look out of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is nothing to show that she had any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of the family friend. On the other hand she was there merely by sufferance. There is no law, which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances".
9. From the afore-mentioned reasoning of the Apex Court it is clear that the Courts have to look into the bona fide requirements of the landlord more so when it is established that he requires the premises for running his own business. The landlord cannot be deprived of the benefits of enjoying his or her property. A Division Bench of this Court in the recent judgment reported in P. Rajeswari v. T. Anasuyamma, , has held that the landlord having more buildings than one and occupying one such building can seek eviction of the tenant for bona fide requirement of additional accommodation. The Court cannot adopt a narrow or pedantic approach and further restrict the rights of the landlord to recover possession when the landlord is not in a position to accommodate all the members of his family in one building and to say even then he has no right to recover another building can never be the intention of the Legislature. It can never be the intention of the Legislature to encroach upon the liberty of the landlord to take possession of his own building for his requirement or need. Legislature certainly would not impose such restrictions on anybody in securing sufficient accommodation cither for residential or commercial purpose more so to the landlord. The right of the landlord to have sufficient accommodation is a matter of fundamental right.
10. From the afore-mentioned discussion and in view of the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court, I hold that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. The approach of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority towards the concept of 'bona fide requirement' is totally misdirected. I, therefore, set aside the order of the appellate Court passed in RCA No.97 of 1991 dated 12-7-1996 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and also the order of the Principal Rent Controller in RC No.355 of 1980 dated 31-12-1990 and allow RC No.355 of 1980 and order eviction of the respondent-tenant. The respondent-tenant is given six months time to hand over vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the petitioner-landlord on the condition that he continues to pay the rent regularly.
11. The civil revision petition accordingly allowed with costs through out.