Gujarat High Court
Mehsana District Co-Operative Milk ... vs State Of Gujarat Through on 1 March, 2013
Author: Akil Kureshi
Bench: Akil Kureshi
MEHSANA DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS' UNION LTD....Petitioner(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT THROUGH SECRETARY C/SCA/13609/2010 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13609 of 2010 With SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13610 of 2010 With SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14790 of 2010 With SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8759 of 2012 With CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1480 of 2012 In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13609 of 2010 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI and HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ================================================================ MEHSANA DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS' UNION LTD....Petitioner(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT THROUGH SECRETARY & 2....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: Mr. Kunal Nanavati with Mr. K.S.Nanavati, Sr. Adv for the petitioner MS MAITHILI MEHTA, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1 - 3 NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 1 RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2 - 3 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI and HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI Date : 01/03/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI) These petitions involve identical facts and law. They have, therefore, been heard together and would be disposed of by this common judgement. For the purpose of this judgement, we may record facts as stated in Special Civil Application No. 13609 of 2010.
Petitioner is the District Co-operative Milk Producers Union and is engaged in collection of milk and manufacture of milk products.
The petitioner has challenged the action of the respondents in not extending an exemption from the payment of value added tax on milk powder and the vitaminised infant milk foods from a part of the tax payable on such commodities for the period between 01.04.2006 to 01.08.2006. The petitioner has, prayed for a direction to the respondent authorities to exercise power under Section 49 or Section 8(5) of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The petitioner has also challenged a communication dated 28.10.2010 under which, the representations for granting exemption for the said period came to be turned down. The petitioner has also challenged a demand notice dated 13.09.2010.
Under a notification dated 01.04.1997, issued by the Government of Gujarat, in exercise of powers under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the Government of Gujarat had provided that on the commodities mentioned in the said notification, which included whole milk powder and skimmed powder, there shall be a tax of 2% to be paid by the dealer having his place of business in the State of Gujarat in the course of inter-state trade of commerce. Such description (whole milk powder or skimmed milk powder) came to be substituted by a notification dated 13.06.1997 by the following description:
A. Milk Powder-Whole or Skimmed;
B. Vitaminised Infant Milk Foods sold in sealed container Thus, by virtue of the said two notifications, milk powder-whole or skimmed and vitaminaized infant milk foods, invited sales tax at the rate of 2%, instead of, as we are informed 4%, which was otherwise applicable to other commodities of like nature.
Undisputedly, such exemption continued right upto the year 2006, when on 31.03.2006, the Government of Gujarat issued a notification in exercise of powers conferred under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 rescinding as many as 70 different exemption notifications issued under the Central Sales Tax Act. At serial No. 64, we find exemption notification No. GN-7/CST dated 01.04.1997. Thus, on 31.03.2006, partial exemption granted on milk powder-whole or skimmed and vitaminised infant milk foods sold in sealed container, stood withdrawn.
In the said notification dated 31.03.2006, it is stated that the Government of Gujarat having been satisfied that it is necessary to do so in public interest, the Government rescinded notifications mentioned in the schedule. The said notification was issued in view of the fact that the State Sales Tax Acts were replaced by the whole new tax regime under the Value Added Tax system. The Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 replaced the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 w.e.f. 01.04.2006.
Since the exemption notification was withdrawn, the petitioner and other co-operatives made a concentrated effort to convince the Government to reintroduce such concession. On 10.06.2006, Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd., an apex body, which included the petitioner-co-operative society as one of its members, made a representation to the State Government. In such a representation, it was pointed out inter alia that the milk marketing societies have been enjoying concessional rate of tax at 2%. In the new tax regime, such concession has been withdrawn without any substitution. Such concession was granted in the interest of farmers of the State. It was pointed out that, if full duty at 4% is collected, the manufacturers of milk powder in the State would not be able to stand in competition against multinational companies. It was therefore, requested that w.e.f. 01.04.2006, duty be levied at concessional rate.
On 02.08.2006, the Government of Gujarat issued a fresh notification in exercise of powers in Sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 and reintroduced concessional rate of duty at 2% on whole milk powder or skimmed milk powder. In the notification, it was stated that the Government of Gujarat having been satisfied that it is necessary to do so in public interest, such exemption was granted.
On 11.08.2006, the Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd. requested the Government to include, milk powder-whole or skimmed and vitaminised infant milk foods sold in sealed container in the exemption notification 02.08.2006 to avoid any confusion in future. Such request was accepted by the Government and a fresh notification was issued on 18.10.2006 suitably substituting the description of goods in the exemption notification dated 02.08.2006 to include:
A. Milk Powder-Whole or Skimmed;
B. Vitaminised Infant Milk Foods sold in sealed container In absence of any exemption notification, for the period between 01.04.2006 and 01.08.2006 the petitioner would have to pay duty at full rate. Several representations were therefore made by the Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd. requesting the Government to cover the said period also for exemption. One such representation was made on 21.11.2006. It was followed by series of subsequent representations. Finally, under impugned communication dated 28.10.2010, it was conveyed that such request cannot be accepted. Hence, the petition.
2. Respondents have filed replies and opposed the petition contending interalia that the exemption was rescinded in public interest for creating uniform tax policy on the value added tax system coming into force. It was pointed out that as the rates of central sales tax were being gradually phased out, it was thought fit to withdraw all concession/exemption notifications under the Central Sales Tax Act so that such taxes may remain uniform. It was pointed out that the Cabinet Sub Committee comprising of Ministers, on representations made by the Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd., recommended in July 2006, to grant the concessional benefits, which ultimately resulted into the notification dated 02.08.2006 being issued. It is stated that:
6. I say and submit that such type of concessions does not confer any right upon the beneficiary, and these cannot be allowed to continue for all times to come. Circumstances may sometime and for some period warrant grant of exemptions from or concession in the payment of tax at the statutorily prescribed rates of tax. But such phenomena may not always exist and continuance of such benefits may not always go well in the public interest as, ultimately, such benefits do cast a burden on the State Exchequer. I, therefore, say and submit that the petitioner cannot claim continuance of such concession as a matter of right as there never was a promise extended to him by the Government that his products in question, would always be allowed to be sold at a concessional rate of tax.
8. I say and submit that the petitioner has unnecessarily raised the contention that while granting the said concession, public interest was considered and it was absent while withdrawing the said concession. As stated and submitted earlier, the reason for rescinding such concession on 31.03.2006 was not only that w.e.f. 01.04.2006, a new system of taxation was coming into being in which the modalities of such concessions were going to be altogether different than what they were in the outgoing Sales Tax System, the reason was also that as the rates of Central Sales Tax are being gradually phased out, it was a conscious decision of the Government to do away with the exemptions. Concessions, that were being given under the said Act.
On the basis of such facts, learned senior counsel Shri K.S.Nanavati for the petitioner vehemently contended that the action of the respondents, not covering the period between 01.04.2006 and 01.08.2006 for exemption, is wholly arbitrary. He submitted that previously partial exemption was granted in public interest. The Government, therefore, had issued notification in exercise of powers under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act way back in 1997. This exemption continued right upto 01.04.2007 till it was rescinded by the notification of the even date. Upon representation of the petitioner, such concession was reintroduced vide notification dated 02.08.2006. If there was public interest in granting exemption prior to 01.04.2006 and such public interest was found to be existing from 02.08.2006, upon representation made by the petitioner, it is difficult to appreciate how it can be stated that no such public interest existed in between the said period. The thrust of the argument was that even for withdrawing the concession already granted, there must exist a public interest. In the present case, since no such public interest is demonstrated, the action of the respondents must be held to be wholly unreasonable and arbitrary.
In this respect, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of W.P.I.L. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut, U.P. reported in 2005 (181) ELT 359 (S.C.) wherein, it was observed as under:
16. In view of the consistent policy of the Government of exempting parts of power driven pumps utilized by the factory within the factory premises, it could not be said that while issuing notification No.46/94 of March 1, 1994, the exemption in respect of said item which was operative was either withdrawn or revoked. The action was taken only with a view to rescinding several notifications and by issuing a composite notification. The policy remained as it was and in view of demand being made by the Department, a representation was made by the industries and on being satisfied, the Central Government issued a clarificatory notification No.95/94 on April 25, 1994. It was not a new notification granting exemption for the first time in respect of parts of power driven pumps to be used in the factory for manufacture of pumps but clarified the position and made the position explicit which was implicit.
We may however, notice that in the said case, the Apex Court held certain notification to be clarificatory in nature. In other words, it was held that such notifications only clarified the position and made it explicit which was otherwise implicit.
Learned counsel, Mr. Nanavati also relied on following decisions:
M/s.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 State of Rajasthan and anr Vs. Mahaveer Oil Industries reported in (1999) 4 SCC 357 V.V.F. Ltd. and anr Vs. Union of India and anr reported in 2010 (2) GLR 1166
6. In case of Damodar Enterprises Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Audit 2), Mysore and ors.
reported in [2011] 45 VST 554 (Karn) wherein, learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court observed that omission of the goods from the First Schedule w.e.f. April 1, 2007 followed by subsequent notification dated May 15, 2007 exempting the tax is a strong indication of absence of public interest to support withdrawal of that concession.
In case of Kishorkumar Prabhudas Tanna and anr Vs. State of Gujarat Through Secretary and ors.
reported in 2009 (1) GLR 683 wherein, Division Bench of this Court had held that recession of the concession/exemption notifications cannot be stated to be in public interest only on the ground that such steps were taken in view of introduction of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act. We may however, notice that said observations were made in the background of the question of applicability of the principles of promissory estoppel which had arisen in the said decision.
8. On the other hand, learned AGP, Ms. Mehta opposed the petitions contending that concession cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Government had previously granted such concession after due consideration in public interest. However, when the entire tax basis had to undergo material changes, it was necessary to revisit the exemption notifications. Subsequently, representations of the apex body of the milk producing co-operative were taken into consideration and exemption was reintroduced. However, the petitioner cannot insist that the same should be done with the back date.
9. Learned AGP has relied on following decisions in support of her contentions:
1. In case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 193.
2. In case of State of Haryana and ors. vs. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 778 wherein the Apex Court observed that withdrawal of exemption in public interest is a matter of policy and the courts should not bind the Government and its policy decisions.
3. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Rajasthan and anr Vs. M/s. Mahaveer Oil Industries and ors.
reported in AIR 1991 SC 2302 wherein, in the context of principle of promissory estoppel, it was observed that though the State may be held bound by the promise held out, it does not preclude the State from withdrawing the benefit prospectively even during the period of a scheme if public interest so requires.
10. Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties, we find that the facts are virtually undisputed. Previously, by virtue of notification dated 01.04.1997, the products in question enjoyed partial exemption from payment of sales tax. Such exemption was granted by the Government of Gujarat in exercise of powers under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, the Sales Tax on such goods payable under Section 8(1) of the said Act by any dealer having his place of business in the State in the course of inter-state trade or commerce, was to be paid at the concessional rate of 2% of the sale price of such goods, instead of otherwise exigible 4% tax. Such notification along with several other notifications was rescinded by notification dated 31.03.2006 issued also in exercise of powers under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act. This was done in view of the repeal of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and substitution thereof by the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act,2003 w.e.f. 01.04.2006. Resultantly, any sale of goods on inter-state movement would invite tax at the rate of 4%, instead of concessional rate of 2%. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd. thereupon approached the Government for reintroduction of the concession. The request was accepted and a fresh notification was issued on 02.08.2006. Further request of Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd. for covering the entire intervening period was however, not accepted.
11. Short question therefore, is whether the petitioner can insist that such exemption must be provided also for intervening period between 01.04.2006 to 01.04.2008, when there was no exemption granted by the Government. In this context, it would be necessary to examine the petitioner s contention that the withdrawal of the exemption by notification dated 31.03.2006 itself was illegal and invalid.
12. By now it is well settled that the courts recognize considerable latitude in framing fiscal policies in the field of tax collection. In particular, the courts do not interfere especially when the wisdom of certain tax policy is questioned before the Court. The fact that the Government did have the power to grant exemption partial or complete from payment of tax is not in dispute. Equally, by virtue of Section 22 of the General Clauses Act, such power would also include the power to withdraw any exemption already granted, was never doubted. The question therefore is, was such power exercised bona fide and reasonably? If answer to this question is in the affirmative, surely the petitioner cannot claim any vested right in getting exemption from payment of tax.
13. Before us, as already noted, the main thrust of the petitioner s argument was that, when such exemption was offered for a long period of time upto 31.03.2006 and when the same was reintroduced quickly thereafter by notification dated 02.08.2006, a strong presumption would arise that public interest existed during the period falling between the said dates also. It is therefore contended that the withdrawal of the exemption notification itself was illegal and not in public interest. We would like to examine this contention more closely.
14. As we have recorded, exemption notification dated 01.04.1997 providing concession on payment of tax was rescinded by virtue of notification dated 31.03.2006. This notification rescinded not only the above noted exemption notification but several other exemption notifications. This was necessary in view of repeal of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and its substitution by the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act. It is pointed out that rescinding of the notification was for creating uniform tax policy in the country on the basis of value added tax system. Such uniform tax policy was found in the interest of public at large. It is pointed out that the rates of central sales tax were being gradually phased out. It was therefore, thought fit to withdraw all notifications granting concessions or exemptions under the Central Sales Tax Act so that the central sales tax rates remain uniform.
15. To our mind, the logic for rescinding the concession/exemption notifications is impeccable. By virtue of repeal of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and introduction of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, the entire tax regime was undergoing substantial changes. The principal idea was to bring uniformity in the central sales taxes. If in furtherance of such object, the State Government decided to rescind large number of concession/exemption notifications which held the field during the currency of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, it cannot be said that the action was not in public interest.
16. Simply because shortly after withdrawing such concessions/exemptions in case of a particular commodity such exemption was brought back by issuance of fresh notification, by itself cannot give rise to a presumption that the withdrawal of the exemption was either not bona fide or not in public interest. At the time, when the Government issued general notification dated 30.03.206 withdrawing large number of exemptions granting total or partial waiver of tax, the logic was to make the tax rates as uniform as possible across the country. In furtherance of such object, individual exemptions granted by the State to various categories of goods were withdrawn.
17. After due consideration and prompted by representations from the apex body of the petitioner co-operative society, if the State Government yielded to the belief that such exemption in the present case was required to be reintroduced, in our opinion that does not imply that the withdrawal of the notification was not in public interest. The Government having bestowed its attention to the relevant facts if found that it would be in public interest to reintroduce such partial exemption, it was open for the Government to do so with effect from a suitable date. In the present case the same was done and from 02.08.2006. Such concession granted or as in the present case reintroduced does not create any vested right in the petitioners to insist that the same should also be done with retrospective effect.
18. If the partial exemption enjoyed by the petitioner was withdrawn mechanically and reintroduced shortly thereafter, the question of examining the petitioner s grievance in the context of the submissions made before us would arise. In the present case, however, we notice that such withdrawal was also based on public interest.
19. In case of In case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors. (supra) the Apex Court observed as under:
41.
By virtue of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, when a power is conferred on an authority to do a particular act, such power can be exercised from time to time and carries with it power to withdraw, modify, amend or cancel the notifications earlier issued, to be exercised in the like manner and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise of the power. It would be too narrow a view to accept that chargeability once fixed cannot be altered. Since the charging provision in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 is subject to the State Government's power to issue notification under Section 49 of the Act granting rebate, the State Government, in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, can always withdraw, rescind, add to or modify an exemption notification. No industry can claim as of right that the Government should exercise its power under Section 49 and offer rebate and it is for the Government to decide whether the conditions are such that rebate should be granted or not.
42. There being nothing repugnant to raising of public revenue in exercise of sovereign power of State to impose and collect taxes including electricity duty, in any provision of the Act of 1948 or the policy statement made in the notification granting rebate, the raising of public revenue by withdrawing or reducing exemption, cannot be said to be against the provisions of any statute. It is relevant to notice that the new industrial units, which were being established in the hill areas, could not have compelled the Government to exercise power under Section 49 of the Act of 1948 in their favour, for grant of rebate/concession in electricity tariff. Powers under Section 49 normally would be exercised by the State Government for industrial growth of an area and to generate employment opportunities for those who are residing in the area. However, on change in the circumstances, the Government can always re-consider the matter and can either curtail or withdraw the benefit granted earlier.
20. In case of State of Haryana and ors. vs. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court observed as under:
27. In cases where the Government on the basis of material available before it, bona fide, is satisfied that public interest would be served by granting, withdrawing, modifying or rescinding an exemption already granted, it should be allowed a free hand to do so. The withdrawal of exemption in public interest is a matter of policy and the courts should not bind the Government in its policy decision. The courts should not normally interfere with fiscal policy of the Government more so when such decisions are taken in public interest and where no fraud nor lack of bona fide is alleged, much less established.
28. An exemption is nothing but a freedom from an obligation which an assessee is otherwise liable to discharge. In a fiscal statute, an exemption has been held to be a concession granted by the State so that the beneficiaries of such concession are not required to pay the tax or the duty they are otherwise liable to pay under such statute.
The beneficiary of a concession has no legally enforceable right against the Government to grant a concession except to enjoy the benefits of the concession during the period of its grant. The right to exemption or concession is a right that can be taken away under the very power in exercise of which the exemption was granted.
21. In case of Union of India and ors Vs. M/s. Jalyan Udyod and anr. reported in AIR 1994 SC page 88 it was observed as under:
21. The above analysis of sub-section (1) shows inter alia that an exemption granted may be an absolute one or subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the notification and further that the conditions specified may relate to a stage before the clearance of goods or to a stage subsequent to the clearance of goods. Section 25(1) is a part of the enactment and must be construed harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act. The power of exemption is variously described as conditional legislation [see Jalan Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1967 SC 691 and Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554] and also as a species of delegated legislation. Whether it is one or the other, it is a power given to the Central Government to be exercised in public interest. Such a provision has become a standard feature in several enactments and in particular, taxing enactments. It is equally well settled by now that the power of taxation can be used not merely for raising revenue but also to regulate the economy, to encourage or discourage as the situation may call for the import and export of certain goods as also for serving the social objectives of the State. [Vide Elel Hotels and Investments Ltd. v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 698:
(AIR 1990 SC 1664), Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCC 643: (1992 AIR SCW 899) and Subhash Photographic v. Union of India, (1993) 4 J.T. (SC) 116:(1993 AIR SCW 2871)] Since the Parliament cannot constantly monitor the needs of and the emerging trends in the economy and is in no position to engage itself in day-to-day regulation and adjustment of import-export trade accordingly, power is conferred upon the Central Government to provide for exemption from duty of goods, either wholly or partly, and with or without conditions, as may be called for in public interest. We see no warrant for reading any limitation into this power. If the public interest demands that the exemption should be absolute, the Central Government can do so. Similarly, if the public interest demands that exemption should be granted only subject to certain conditions it can provide such conditions. Then again if the public interest demands that conditions specified should relate to a stage subsequent to the date of clearance it can do so. The guiding factor is the public interest.
22. We fail to see how the petitioner can bring in the element of promissory estoppel. It is not the case of the petitioner that on the basis of the exemption granted, it altered the position to its disadvantage. It was suggested that the petitioner had not passed on burden of the differential duty for the intervening period. Even if it was so, this can hardly bind the Government into granting the exemption for such period. In any case, the petitioner s stand that the differential duty was not collected from the purchasers due to ignorance of withdrawal of exemption also appears to be one of doubtful proposition. We may recall, soon after the exemption was withdrawn, the Gujarat Co-operative Milk Market Federation Ltd., an apex body of the milk producing co-operatives had, on 10.06.2006, made a detailed representation before the Government to reintroduce the exemption. The stand of the petitioner that they were not aware about the withdrawal of the exemption, therefore, is not borne out from the record.
23. The decision of this court in case of Kishorkumar Prabhudas Tanna and anr Vs. State of Gujarat Through Secretary and ors.
(supra) and the observations made therein were in the background of applicability of principle of promissory estoppel. In the present case, no such issue arises. Furthermore, in the facts of that case the Court had come to the conclusion that the exemption was rescinded without any justification or reason. Only argument or submission or justification offered was that the sales tax act to be repealed and replaced by value added tax act. In any case, neither the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and ors Vs. M/s. Jalyan Udyod and anr. (supra) was cited nor the decision in case of State of Haryana and ors. vs. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd.(supra) and Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.(supra) were available for the benefit of the Bench.
Decision in case of V.V.F. Ltd. and anr Vs. Union of India and anr reported in 2010 (2) GLR 1166 is based on the principle of promissory estoppel. It was the case wherein Central Government granted excise duty exemption to the new units set up in the Kutchh area for a period of five years from the date of commencement of commercial production in respect of industrial units set up not later than 31.07.2003. Central Government, however, issued subsequent notification on 27.03.2008 and the very parameters of earlier exemption notification were changed. Such changes were held to have retrospective effect. On a reference to a third learned Judge in view of difference of opinion between two judges of the bench, it was held that on the principle of promissory estoppel, the same was impermissible. It was observed that such changes would adversely effect the units which had altered that position by making investments. Apparently, the facts being different the ratio laid down therein would not apply in the present group of cases.
25. In case of W.P.I.L. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut, U.P. (supra) the Apex Court had held that a subsequent notification was only clarificatory in nature. It merely clarified the position and made explicit which was implicit. It was, therefore, held that under the new notification, exemption was not granted for the first time.
26. In case of State of Rajasthan and anr Vs. Mahaveer Oil Industries (1999) 4 SCC 357 (supra), the Apex Court confirmed the decision of the High Court quashing the withdrawal of exemption observing that the Government was unable to support the action on the ground of the public interest by producing any material to support the action and to indicate that the withdrawal of the benefit was in public interest.
27. The decision in case of M/s.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra) is of course well known judgement in the field of promissory estoppel. Since we have held that this is not a case where such principle can be applied, we do not find it necessary to discuss the issue any further.
28. In the result, for the reasons stated above, petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged. I.R. stands vacated.
In view of dismissal of main petition, civil application does not survive. The same stands dismissed.
04.03.2013
29. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for extension of interim relief, previously granted in these matters, for a reasonable period to enable them to file further appeal. At his request, interim reliefs in all matters shall stand extended till 15.04.2013.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (MS SONIA GOKANI, J.) Jyoti Page 21 of 21