Delhi District Court
Parvez Ahmed vs State on 17 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-006879-2020
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 162/2020
PARVEZ AHMED,
S/o. Shri. Iqbal Ahmad,
H. No. 3107, Gali Vakil Wali,
Kucha Pandit, Hauz Qazi,
Delhi-110006. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 16.10.2020
Date of institution : 17.10.2020
Date when judgment was reserved : 26.02.2026
Date when judgment is pronounced : 17.04.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code')/pari materia with Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS') against the judgment dated 14.07.2020 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-02/Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. ACMM') in case bearing; 'State v. Javed & Ors., CIS No. 298773/2016', arising out of FIR No. 73/2011, PS. Hauz Qazi, under Sections 186/332/353/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), convicting the appellant, namely, Parvez Ahmed (hereinafter referred to as the 'appellant') and co-accused persons, namely, Javed and Naved (hereinafter referred to as the 'co-accused persons'; hereinafter C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 1 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:52:50 +0530 appellant and co-accused persons are collectively referred to as the 'accused persons') for the offences under Sections 186, 332 and 353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and the consequent order of sentence dated 16.07.20201 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, inter alia sentencing the appellant with rigorous imprisonment for a period of 03 (three) months for the offence under Section 186 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for a period of 06 (six) months for the offence under Section 332 IPC; and rigorous imprisonment for a period of 06 (six) months for the offence under Section 353 IPC, sentences to run concurrently. Correspondingly, the appellant was directed/sentenced to pay a compensation to a tune of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) to the victim/complainant, ASI Shri Krishan, in default of payment of which, it was directed that the appellant would undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 03 (three) months for the said offences. Further, the appellant was directed to be entitled to the benefit of the provisions under Section 428 Cr.P.C./pari materia with Section 468 BNSS (hereinafter the impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred to as the 'impugned judgment and order').
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is that on 03.09.2011 on receipt of PCR call vide DD No. 7A, the concerned police official(s) reached at the spot, i.e., near H. No. 3107, Gali Vakil Wali, Kucha Pandit, Hauz Quazi, Delhi 1 Notably, the instant appeal was filed during the period when covid-19 restrictions were ongoing and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C) No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022 had directed for exclusion of period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation inter alia holding, "*** I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. *** III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply..."
(Emphasis supplied) C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 2 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.04.17 14:52:55 +0530
(hereinafter referred to as the 'spot'), where it was determined that a quarrel had ensued with the Assistant Sub Inspector/ASI and that he had been shifted for JPN Hospital. Consequently, the concerned police official(s) proceeded for the said Hospital, where the victim/complainant, namely, Shri Krishan (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant/victim') was found under treatment vide MLC No. 137347. Notably, under the said MLC, the concerned Doctor had inter alia recorded, "...CLW over Lt. eyebrow 1*0.5 cm...swelling below Lt. eye... pain & swelling nose... bleeding from nose... pain & swelling occipital region...", which injuries were subsequently opined to be, "... simple from clinical point of view...".
2.1. Congruently, statement of the complainant was recorded wherein he/the complainant inter alia proclaimed that at the relevant point in time, he was working as ASI in PS. Hauz Quazi and was engaged in emergency duty from 09:00 p.m. to 09:00 a.m. on 02/03.09.2011. Correspondingly as per the complainant, at around 12:30 a.m. on the said day, i.e., on 03.09.2011, DD No. 2A, regarding playing of Disc Jockey ('D/J' for short) in Gali Vakil Wali, was marked to him. Consequently, as per the complainant, Ct. Rajesh and he/the complainant, proceeded for Gali Vakil Wali, Kucha Pandit and it was determined that a D/J instrument was playing in a loud voice, below H. No. 3107, Gali Vakil Wali, Kucha Pandit, Hauz Quazi, Delhi/spot and persons present there were acting in a loud as well as unruly manner (House No. 3107 के नीचे D/J बज रहा था और काफी लड़के शोर शराबा व हुकदंग बाजी कर रहे थे). It was further avowed by the complainant that he asked for said D/J instrument to be stopped. Thereupon, as per the complainant, music/noise was ceased and C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 3 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:52:58 +0530 most of the people, who were acting in rowdy/unruly manner, dispersed. However, it was further proclaimed by the complainant that only a few people remained present at the spot and after some time, Parvez and Javed, whom the complainant knew from before, reached there. Further, as per the complainant, immediately on reaching at the spot, Parvez and Javed enquired from the persons present there as to the reason for stopping the music and Parvez switched on the D/J instrument in high volume (जिन्होंने D/J को बन्द कर दिया जो लड़के शोर शराबा व हुरदंग बाजी कर रहे वो वहां से डिसप हो गये वहां कु छ लड़के खड़े रह गये तथा परवेज व जावेद उसी वक्त अन्दर से आये जिनको मैं पहले से अच्छी तरह जानता था और वहां खड़े हुये लड़कों को कहने लगे कि D/J बन्द क्यों कर दिया है और परवेज ने D/J की दुबारा ऊं ची अवाज में चालू कर दिया). Upon this, the complainant is asserted to have protested to Parvez, informing him that a complaint regarding high volume of noise was already received at the police station and that as per the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, playing of music at high volume was not permitted, post 10 p.m. However, undeterred, Parvez is stated to have increased the volume of the D/J instrument, further. Thereafter, as per the complainant, he asked Ct. Rajesh to arrange for a rickshaw so that the D/J instrument may be removed from the spot and Ct. Rajesh, consequently, proceeded to arrange for the same. In the meanwhile, as per the complainant, Parvez and Javez called their other two associates to the spot, while proclaiming that they would teach a lesson to the complainant for stopping the music ("...aaj ise D/J ko band karne ka maza chakhate hain..."; परवेज व जावेद ने अन्दर से अपने दो साथी और बुला लिये और कहने लगे कि आज इसे D/J को बन्द करने का मजा चवाते हैं और चारों मेरे साथ मार पिटाई करने लग गये). Consequently, all four said persons started to beat up the complainant. Further, as per the complainant, Javed grabbed and tore the collar of his C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 4 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:53:02 +0530 uniform, whilst, Parvez punched him/the complainant with an iron 'punch-like' object which he was wearing on his right hand at that point in time. As per the complainant, Parvez inflicted injuries/punches on his face with the said object, leading to the complainant's sustaining injuries on his eye and nose (जावेद ने मेरी गिरेबान पकड़ कर खींच सी जिससे मेरी पहनी हुई वर्दी की शर्ट कट गई और परवेज ने अपने दाहिने हाथ में लोहे का पन्चनुमा चीज़ पहनी हुई थी जिसने मेरी दाहिनी आं ख नाक पर घूंसे मारे जिससे मेरे खून निकलने लग गया), whilst the other associates of Parvez, inflicted kicks and punches on the complainant. However, in the meanwhile, Ct. Rajesh returned to the spot, while raising and alarm and on seeing him, the perpetrators are asserted to have withdrawn/fled from the spot, while also taking D/J along with them.
2.2. Markedly, under said facts and circumstances, the instant FIR came to be registered, and investigation ensued.
Notably, during the course of ensuing investigation, site plan of the incident spot was prepared and statements of various witnesses were recorded. Correspondingly, the accused persons, namely, Parvez Ahmed, Javed and Naved were apprehended/arrested. However, the identity of the fourth accused could not be determined. Thereafter, opinion on the nature of injuries of the complainant/victim was determined, which, as aforenoted, was determined to be 'simple'. Noticeably, on conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed before the concerned court/Ld. Trial Court.
2.3. Remarkably, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. Trial Court took cognizance of the offences, as specified under the chargesheet vide order dated 15.05.2012 and issued summons to the accused persons. Subsequently, on compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C., arguments on the aspect of C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 5 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:06 +0530 charge were addressed by/on behalf of the accused as well as State. Consequently, on considering the material brought on record, in light of the arguments addressed, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 01.11.2012, directed framing of charges under Sections 186/332/353/34 IPC against the accused persons inter alia under the following observations;
"...Both the parties heard on charge. Entire material on record perused. Prima facie an offence punishable u/s. 186/353/332/34 IPC is made out against all the three accused. Charge under the same section is framed accordingly. Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
Put up on ... for PE."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Pertinent to reproduce the charges framed inter alia against the appellant on 01.11.2012, as under;
"...I ***, Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, do hereby charge you (1) Parvez Ahmad (2) Javed Ahmad (3) Naved all s/o Iqbal Ahmad as under
That on 03.09.2011 at about 12.40 am (in the night) at H. No. 3107, Gali Wakil Wali, Kucha Pandit, Hauz Qazi, within the jurisdiction of PS Hauz Qazi you all in furtherance of common intention had voluntarily obstructed complainant-
ASI Srikishan (public servant) in discharge of his public function and thereby committed offence punishable u/s 186/34 IPC and within my cognizance.
Secondly, on the aforesaid time, date and place you all in prosecution of your common intention used criminal force against complainant in execution of his public function in order to prevent him from executing their lawful duties and thereby committed offence punishable u/s 353/34 IPC and within my cognizance.
Thirdly, on the aforesaid date, time and place you all in furtherance of common intention voluntarily caused hurt to the ASI Srikishan a public servant while discharging his official duties as public servants and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 332/34 IPC and within my cognizance.
C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 6 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:10 +0530
And I hereby direct you to be tried by this Court for the aforesaid offences..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.5. Relevantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 11 (eleven) witnesses/prosecution witnesses, who deposed in their respective testimonies, regarding the following;
Prosecution Particulars of Description witness no. the witness PW-1 Ct. Rajesh Deposed inter alia regarding him, accompanying the complainant to Kucha Pandit, Gali Vakil Wali, where certain persons were found playing music in a loud voice. PW-1 further deposed of seeking the complainant in an injured state, being surrounded by some boys and he/PW-1 identified accused Javed and Naved as the said persons/boys.
PW-2 ASI Shri Complainant/Victim, who inter alia Krishan deposed of the incident as well as identified the accused persons before the Ld. Trial Court.
PW-3 HC Raman Deposed of having received rukka
Dass from Ct. Rajesh on 03.09.2011 at
around 03:25 a.m. as well as of
registration of FIR on the basis
thereof.
PW-4 Dr. Ravinder Deposed inter alia regarding
(erroneously Kumar preparation of MLC of the
renumbered victim/complainant bearing no.
as PW-3) 137347 by Dr. Naveen, Junior
Resident, as well as proved Dr.
Naveen's and his/PW-4's signatures
on the said MLC.
PW-5 Ct. Narender Testified inter alia regarding him
joining the investigation along with IO/SI Sakir Khan and participating in the arrest proceedings of the accused persons as well as of the recovery proceedings of the punch, at the instance of accused Parvez Ahmed.
PW-6 ASI Ramesh MHC(M) at relevant point in time.
Chander Proved the entries in register no. 19, regarding deposit of case property in malkhana on 03.09.2011 and 04.09.2011.
PW-7 HC Rajesh Proved DD No. 2A, recorded by C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 7 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:53:14 +0530 Kumar him/PW-7 on 03.09.2011 at around 12:30 a.m. PW-8 ASI Murli Deposed inter alia regarding him, Singh responding to DD No. 7A/8A and meeting the complainant in JPN Hospital; obtaining the MLC of the victim; subsequently, recording the statement of the complainant;
preparing rukka on the basis thereof; getting the FIR registered; seizing articles; and subsequently handing over the articles seized/investigation further to IO/SI Sakir Khan.
PW-9 ACP (Retd.) Deposed inter alia regarding him Ram Kumar making a complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C., on receipt of complaint from ASI Shri Krishan and proved the said complaint as Ex. PW9/A. PW-10 SI (Retd.) Md. Investigating Officer/IO of the case, Sakir Khan who deposed inter alia regarding the investigation conducted in the present case; arrest of accused persons; depositing the case property in malkhana; etc. PW-11 HC Prakash Deposed inter alia regarding him Chand joining the investigation and participating in the arrest proceedings of the accused persons.
2.6. Pertinent to note here that the aforenoted witnesses/prosecution witnesses further exhibited/proved the following documents/material objects, during the course of their respective evidence;
Exhibit Description of Exhibit Proved no./Material by/Attested objects by/Exhibited by Ex. PW1/A Statement/complaint of the PW-1/Ct. Rajesh complainant/victim. and PW-2/ASI Shri Krishan Ex. PW1/B Site plan of the place of PW-1/Ct. Rajesh occurrence.
Ex. PW1/C Seizure memo of articles in PW-1/Ct. Rajesh pullanda and sample seal.
Ex. PW2/A DD No. 2A, dated 03.09.2011. PW-2/ASI Shri Krishan Ex. PW2/B Arrest memo of the accused, PW-2/ASI Shri Javed. Krishan Ex. PW2/C Arrest memo of the accused, PW-2/ASI Shri C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 8 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:20 +0530 Parvez Ahmed. Krishan Ex. PW2/D Arrest memo of the accused, PW-2/ASI Shri Naved. Krishan Ex. PW2/E Personal search memo of the PW-2/ASI Shri accused, Javed. Krishan Ex. PW2/F Personal search memo of the PW-2/ASI Shri accused, Naved. Krishan Ex. PW2/G Personal search memo of the PW-2/ASI Shri accused, Parvez Ahmed. Krishan Ex. PW2/H Seizure memo of punch, stated PW-2/ASI Shri to be recovered at the instance of Krishan the accused, Parvez Ahmed.
Ex. P2 Punch, produced by MHC(M) PW-2/ASI Shri and stated to be used at the time Krishan of commission of offence Ex. P2 Shirt, produced by MHC(M) and PW-2/ASI Shri stated to be worn by the victim Krishan at the time of incident Ex. P3(Colly.) Shirt and pant produced by the PW-2/ASI Shri MHC(M) stated to be worn by Krishan accused Javed on the date of incident.
Ex. PW3/A Copy of FIR No. 73/2011, PS. PW-3/HC Raman
(OSR) Hauz Qazi Dass
Ex. PW3/B Endorsement on rukka at points PW-3/HC Raman
X to X Dass
Ex. PW3/C Copy of DD No. 6A, dated PW-3/HC Raman
(Colly.) (OSR) 03.09.2011; DD No. 7A, dated Dass
03.09.2011; and DD no. 8A,
dated 03.09.2011
Ex. PW3/A MLC No. 137347 of the PW-4/Dr.
(erroneously complainant. Ravinder Kumar
numbered as
Ex. PW3/A
instead of Ex.
PW 4/A)
Ex. PW6/A Copy of entry at Serial No. 1668 PW-6/ASI
in register no. 19, on 03.09.2011. Ramesh Chander Ex. PW6/B Copy of entry at Serial No. 1670 PW-6/ASI in register no. 19, on 04.09.2011. Ramesh Chander Ex. PW8/A Rukka. PW-8/ASI Murli Singh Ex. PW9/A Complaint under Section 195 PW-9/ACP Cr.P.C. (Retd.) Ram Kumar 2.7. Markedly, subsequently, to the conclusion of prosecution evidence on 23.09.2019, separate statements of the appellant and the co-accused persons, in terms of the provisions C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 9 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:27 +0530 under Section 281/313 Cr.P.C. were recorded on 22.10.2019, wherein the appellant denied his involvement in the present case and opted to lead defence evidence. Consequently, upon the accused persons' leading their defence/DW-1 Mohd. Akram, DE was closed on 10.01.2020. Thereafter, the matter was taken up/listed for arguments and on conclusion of arguments by/on behalf of the State and the appellant as well as co-accused, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and order, while inter alia holding the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 186/332/353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, sentenced him in the manner, as noted hereinabove.
3. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant outrightly contended that the impugned judgment and order are contrary to the basic tenets of law and principles of criminal jurisprudence. As per the Ld. Counsel, impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court, failed to consider the real facts of the case as well as various improvements, contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of various prosecution witnesses, while erroneously reaching a finding of appellant's guilt. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that there are material contradictions in the deposition of the witnesses which puts a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution against the appellant. Correspondingly, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court did not appreciate the material available on record, especially the fact that no recovery has been effected either from the appellant or from the co-accused in the instant case. In this C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 10 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:31 +0530 regard, Ld. Counsel vehemently asserted that the said fact was also admitted by the Ld. Trial Court that the alleged of recovery of punch from the appellant, was doubtful. Ergo, under such circumstances, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court ought to have consider the material aspect regarding recovery of punch and to confer benefit of doubt in favour of the appellant. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the prosecution stands demolished by the testimonies of various prosecution witnesses, which have proved to be completely unreliable/unworthy of credence, accentuating the frivolity in the case put forth against the accused persons. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment passed by the Ld. Trial Court in utter disregard of the material brought forth and contrary to the settled judicial precedents/law, making the same liable to be outrightly set aside. 3.1. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant vehemently reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly convicted the appellant, despite the fact that there were many/several material and substantial contradiction, improvements and variations in depositions of prosecution witnesses. Ld. Counsel further submitted that even the material brought on record belies the version put forth by the prosecution, in as much as despite the assertion of the complainant that he was beaten by the accused persons and that the complainant had bled owing to his injuries, no evidence was brought on record to demonstrate the clothes of the accused persons had any blood stains. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, while reaching a finding of accused persons' guilt, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to consider that DD Nos. 2A and 6A were forged, bearing several manipulation as to date C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 11 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:53:39 +0530 and month, creating significant doubt over the case put forth against the accused persons. Correspondingly, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that there are also several material omissions/manipulations in the alleged MLC of the complainant, with respect to the age of the victim, name of the relative as well as the timings. It was further submitted that even on a plain reading of said MLC, it is noted that the same does not bears the signature and/or thumb impression of the victim/injured and several spaces are left blank, creating significant doubt in the said document. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the prosecution has not proved the alleged place of recovery of the punch, besides the complainant gave a different description of the punch, as a wooden device, in variance to the metal device/punch produced before the Ld. Trial Court. 3.2. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the instant case, there are numerous cavernous holes in the case put forth by the prosecution and that the prosecution's story does not inspire any confidence. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court decided the matter in a mechanical manner and in an utter haste, without appreciating the evidence/material brough forth on record. It was argued by the Ld. Counsel, that while reaching the finding of appellant's guilt, the Ld. Trial Court erred in not considering the settled law that where on the basis of evidence on record, two views are possible, one favouring an accused and other against him, the one favouring an accused should always be accepted. Congruently, it was reiterated that the deposition of prosecution witnesses lack reliability, as the deposition of PWs are such a nature, as are C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 12 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:53:44 +0530 uninspiring of confidence, entitling the appellant to be granted/conferred with a benefit of doubt in the instant case. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that not only did the Ld. Trial Court fail to consider the truth of circumstances and passed its judgment/decision in haste, rather, the Ld. Trial Court also did not properly appreciate/examine the facts of the present case, wrongly holding the appellant guilty of the aforementioned offence(s).
3.3. Even otherwise, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant that the order of sentence was also passed by the Ld. Trial Court, whimsically, while failing to appreciate that the appellant was of young age at the relevant point in time, as well as responsible for the look after and take care of his family members. Ld. Counsel further vehemently argued that the punishment/penalty must not be retributive in nature, rather, humanizing, considering that sentencing the appellant with severe sentence would subject his family members to grave depravity. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, substantial time has lapsed since the incident in question and in case relaxation/leniency is not afforded to the appellant, serious/severe repercussions would ensue to their physical and mental well-
being. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order be set aside.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment and order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents.
C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 13 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.04.17 14:53:48 +0530
Ld. Addl. PP for the State further submitted that the testimonies of various witnesses placed on record, including that of the complainant/victim and other witnesses, unambiguously prove the commission of the offences by the appellant and co-accused. It was further contended by Ld. Addl. PP for the State that the deposition/testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have not only been consistent, rather, unblemished as well as lucidly point towards the only inference of accused persons' guilt. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the facts and circumstances put forth as well as the evidence placed on record, unerringly point out towards the guilt of the accused persons and that no fault can be attributed to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, which is based on proper appreciation of facts as well as law. Concomitantly, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that no ground of any indulgence or relaxation even in the sentence granted to the appellant or to even co-accused is made out. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset, as grossly malicious and devoid of merits.
5. The arguments of Ld. Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard and the records, including the Trial Court Record, written submissions filed by/on behalf of the appellant and the other material, thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it pertinent to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction. In this regard, this Court it is pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 14 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:53:53 +0530 621, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the 'scope and ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction inter alia noted as under;
"2. ... It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court..."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785, iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"3. This Court has in a series of judgments held that a court exercising appellate power must not only consider questions of law but also questions of fact and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts of the case as particularly when the offence alleged is of a serious nature and may attract a heavy punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the aforenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal extends to reappreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 15 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:54:00 +0530 court(s), while exercising appellate power is not required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law2 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Needless to reemphasize that the appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court.
9. Ergo, being wary of the aforesaid principles, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, germane for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"21. "Public servant"-The words "public servant"
denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:-*** *** *** *** Eighth- Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience;
*** *** ***
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention-When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
*** *** ***
186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions-Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 2 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.
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three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
332. Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty-Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty-Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both..."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably, from a perusal of the above, it is outrightly observed that the provisions under Section 34 IPC recognize the principle of vicarious liability3 in criminal jurisprudence, attracting culpability against an individual for an act/offence, not committed by him but by another person with whom he shared the common intention. It is a settled law4 that Section 34 IPC does not provide for a substantive offence, rather, envisages culpability on the part of an accused only upon the proof of two conditions, i.e., "(1) common intention, and (2) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence." Quite lucidly5, 3 Suresh v. State of U.P., (2001) 3 SCC 673.
4Nagaraja v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 277.
5Jasdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 545.
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mere common intention on the part of any such accused, per se may not attract the provisions under Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance thereof. Strikingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Naresh v. State of U.P., (2024) 1 SCC 443, while explicating the contours of the provisions under Section 34 IPC inter alia remarked as under;
"7. A reading of Section 34 IPC reveals that when a criminal act is done by several persons with a common intention each of the person is liable for that act as it has been done by him alone. Therefore, where participation of the accused in a crime is proved and the common intention is also established, Section 34IPC would come into play. To attract Section 34IPC, it is not necessary that there must be a prior conspiracy or premeditated mind. The common intention can be formed even in the course of the incident i.e. during the occurrence of the crime.
*** *** ***
11. Assistance has been taken of para 26 of the decision of this Court in Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka [Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 7 SCC 521: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 192], which is reproduced herein below: (SCC p. 537) "26. Section 34 IPC makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the offence, equally liable on the principle of joint liability. For Section 34 to apply there should be common intention between the co-perpetrators, which means that there should be community of purpose and common design or prearranged plan.
However, this does not mean that co-perpetrators should have engaged in any discussion, agreement or valuation. For Section 34 to apply, it is not necessary that the plan should be prearranged or hatched for a considerable time before the criminal act is performed. Common intention can be formed just a minute before the actual act happens. Common intention is necessarily a psychological fact as it requires prior meeting of minds. In such cases, direct evidence normally will not be available and in most cases, whether or not there exists a common intention has to be determined by drawing inference from the facts proved. This requires an inquiry into the antecedents, conduct of the co-
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participants or perpetrators at the time and after the occurrence. The manner in which the accused arrived, mounted the attack, nature and type of injuries inflicted, the weapon used, conduct or acts of the co-assailants/perpetrators, object and purpose behind the occurrence or the attack, etc. are all relevant facts from which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the ingredients of Section 34IPC are satisfied. We must remember that Section 34IPC comes into operation against the co-perpetrators because they have not committed the principal or main act, which is undertaken/performed or is attributed to the main culprit or perpetrator. Where an accused is the main or final perpetrator, resort to Section 34IPC is not necessary as the said perpetrator is himself individually liable for having caused the injury/offence. A person is liable for his own acts. Section 34 or the principle of common intention is invoked to implicate and fasten joint liability on other co-participants."
12. A plain reading of the above paragraph of Krishnamurthy case [Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 7 SCC 521: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 192] reveals that for applying Section 34 IPC there should be a common intention of all the co-accused persons which means community of purpose and common design. Common intention does not mean that the co-accused persons should have engaged in any discussion or agreement so as to prepare a plan or hatch a conspiracy for committing the offence. Common intention is a psychological fact and it can be formed a minute before the actual happening of the incidence or as stated earlier even during the occurrence of the incidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Markedly, from the above, it is noted that in the instances where the provisions under Section 34 IPC are proposed to be invoked by the prosecution against accused persons, it is not mandatory to demonstrate that there such persons engaged in any prior discussion or agreement so as to prepare a plan or hatch a conspiracy for committing the offence. On the contrary, common intention may be formed at a spur of moment, even during the commission/occurrence of incident, C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 19 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:54:16 +0530 which is to be discernible from the facts of circumstances of each case. Correspondingly, it is also a settled law that for proving formation of common intention by accused persons, direct evidence may seldomly be available, yet, in order to attract the provisions under Section 34 IPC, prosecution is under a bounden duty to prove that the participants had shared a common intention6. Reference, in regard the foregoing is further made to the decision in Virendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 407, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, elucidated as under;
"38. The vicarious or constructive liability under Section 34 IPC can arise only when two conditions stand fulfilled i.e. the mental element or the intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with another or others; and the other is the actual participation in one form or the other in the commission of the crime.
39. The common intention postulates the existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds. It is the intention to commit the crime and the accused can be convicted only if such an intention has been shared by all the accused. Such a common intention should be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime, but may also develop on the spot when such a crime is committed. In most of the cases it is difficult to procure direct evidence of such intention. In most of the cases, it can be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances. Therefore, in inferring the common intention under Section 34 IPC, the evidence and documents on record acquire a great significance and they have to be very carefully scrutinised by the court. This is particularly important in cases where evidence regarding development of the common intention to commit the offence graver than the one originally designed, during execution of the original plan, should be clear and cogent.
40. The dominant feature of Section 34 is the element of intention and participation in action. This 6 Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Khalid B.A. v. State of Kerala, 2021 SCC Online Ker 11875 , in this regard, remarked; "72. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of the individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances." (Emphasis supplied) C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 20 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:54:19 +0530 participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert.
*** *** ***
42. Section 34 IPC does not create any distinct offence, but it lays down the principle of constructive liability. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In order to incur joint liability for an offence there must be a prearranged and premeditated concert between the accused persons for doing the act actually done, though there might not be long interval between the act and the premeditation and though the plan may be formed suddenly. In order that Section 34 IPC may apply, it is not necessary that the prosecution must prove that the act was done by a particular or a specified person. In fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and on the facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under that section read with Section 34."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In as much as the provisions under Section 186 IPC and Section 353 IPC are concerned, it is noted that both the said provisions are aimed to protect public servant and safeguard his authority by prescribing punishment for causing obstruction to discharge of his official duties. In this regard, law is trite7 that while Section 186 IPC envisages culpability for mere obstruction to a public servant in the discharge of his public function, in contrast, the essence of Section 353 IPC is the causation of assault or use of criminal force against the public servant, with an intent to deter him from discharging his official duties. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa, 1966 SCC Online SC 58, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while accentuating the difference 7 Mohd. Bin Saeed Bin Kileb v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 1 HCC (Bom) 286.
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Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17
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+0530
between the provisions under Section 186 IPC and Section 353 IPC inter alia noted, as under;
"5. *** It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under s. 353, Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under s. 186, Indian Penal Code but it cannot be ignored that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under s. 353, Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Pertinent at this stage to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Kailash Vijayvargiya v. State of W.B., 2024 SCC Online Cal 10451, wherein the Hon'ble Court, explicated the ingredients of offence under Section 332 IPC, as under;
"20. ***Ingredients of offence-The essential ingredients of the offence under Sec. 332 are as follows:
(1) Hurt was caused to a public servant; (2) It was caused while such public servant was acting in the discharge of his duty as such; or (3) It was caused to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as such public servant; or C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 22 of 50 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.04.17 14:54:28 +0530 (4) Such hurt was in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such public servant in lawful discharge of his duty."..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Correspondingly, reference is made here to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Tripura in Sundar Ali v. State of Tripura, 2021 SCC Online Tri 184, wherein the Hon'ble High Court, while accentuating the common ingredients of the offences under Sections 332/335 IPC, expounded that while causation of 'hurt' is essential to bring home, culpability under Section 332 IPC, however, the same is not a mandate for attracting culpability under Section 353 IPC. Relevant extracts of the said dictate are reproduced as under;
"31. The common basic ingredients of Sections 332 and 353 are that in both cases the victim must be a public servant and he must be in the execution of his duty as such public servant at the time of the commission of the offence to him. Punishment provided for the commission of offence under Section 332 is graver than the punishment provided for offence under Section 353 IPC. For offence under Section 332, the convict shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend 3 (three) years, or with fine or with both whereas the imprisonment provided under Section 353 may be of either description for a term which may extend to 2 (two) years or with fine or with both. Commission of "Hurt" is essential to constitute an offence punishable under Section 332 IPC whereas under Section 353 IPC, it is not essential that the hurt should be caused to the public servant."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder observed, this Court would now proceed with the appreciation of the evidence and material placed on record to determine, 'whether from the material placed on record, charge(s) under Sections 186, 332 and 353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC can be said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 23 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:54:32 +0530 herein?'. In particular, to determine as to, 'whether the Ld. Trial Court committed any error/illegality in convicting as well as sentencing the appellant for the offences under the said provisions?'. Remarkably, in order to determine the said issues/aspect, this Court deems it prudent to outrightly make a reference to the testimony of the victim/complainant/PW-2/ASI Shri Krishan, who inter alia deposed regarding the incident in question as well as the role of the appellant. In this regard, it is apposite to note that the complainant/PW-2 inter alia deposed that on 02.09.2011 from 09:00 p.m. to 09:00 a.m. on 03.09.2011, he/PW-2 was posted in emergency duty at PS Hauz Qazi and that vide DD no. 2A, dated 03.09.2011 (Ex. PW2/A), he received a call at around 12:30 a.m., that someone was playing D/J during late night hours at Kucha Pandit. Consequently, as per PW-2, he/PW-2 along with Ct. Rajesh proceeded for the spot, i.e., Kucha Pandit where, D/J was being played below H. No. 3107 and several public persons were gathered and making noise. Further, as per PW-2, he requested the said persons not to make noise and play D/J, whereupon D/J was stopped and the crowd dispersed, except 03-04 boys, who continued to remain at the spot. Congruently, PW-2 asserted that at that time, accused Javed and Parvez reached at the spot, from inside the gali and asked him/PW-2 as to the reason why he/PW-2 had stopped the D/J. Thereafter, as per PW-2, the accused persons started to play D/J again and they/accused persons, called two more persons from inside the gali. PW-2 also avowed that when the accused persons did not deter, he/PW-2 asked Ct. Rajesh to fetch a rickshaw so that the D/J instrument may be removed from the spot. Consequently, Ct. Rajesh left the spot, however, in the C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 24 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:54:36 +0530 meanwhile, Javed and Parvez abused PW-2. Further, as per PW-2, accused Javed held his/PW-2's shirt and tore it, while accused Parvez/appellant gave a fist blows on the complainant's nose and right eye with some wooden object, which the appellant was wearing on his finger. Correspondingly, as per PW-2, the oher two associates of the said accused persons also slapped and gave kick blows to him/PW-2. It was further deposed by PW-2 that in the meantime, Ct. Rajesh returned to the spot and on seeing the incident, he/Ct. Rajesh raised hue and cry, whereupon the accused persons fled from the spot, while also removing D/J. As per PW-2, he was taken to Hospital by Ct. Rajesh and thereafter, HC Murli reached at the Hospital and recorded his/PW-2's statement (Ex. PW1/A). PW-2 further asserted that after taking treatment, he returned to the police station and on 04.09.2011, he joined the investigation, which was handed over to IO/SI Sakir Khan in the meanwhile. Consequently, as per PW-2, he proceeded with the said IO, Ct. Prakash and Ct.
Narender to H. No. 3107, Kucha Pandit, where all the accused persons, namely, Javed, Parvez and Naved were found and arrested by the IO, at the instance of PW-2. PW-2 further asserted that the punch in question was seized by the IO from possession of the accused persons vide seizure memo Ex. PW2/H. needless to mention that during the course of his deposition, PW-2 not only proved the arrest memos and personal search memos of the accused persons, rather, also the recovered punch, seized clothes of the complainant/PW-2 and accused Javed, as well as the accused persons. However, it is pertinent to note that the complainant/PW-2 failed to correctly name the accused persons before the Ld. Trial Court.
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Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17
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+0530
16. Relevantly, upon being cross-examined by/on behalf of the appellant (and co-accused), the complainant/PW-2, asserted as under;
"XXXXXX Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for all the accused.
I had left the PS immediately after receiving the DD entry No.2A on 03.09.2011. At the said time, PS: Hauz Qazi was operated from its old building. I had reached at the spot of incident from the PS on a scooter. Constable Rajesh was also on the same scooter with me. We had reached at the spot within 5- 7 minutes. There was a heavy crowd on the spot when we reached there and about 150-200 persons were present. I had told the IO that accused Javed and Parvez had come from a gali on the spot after the DJ was stopped.
I had told the IO that the accused persons, after reaching at the spot, had asked me as to how I could get the DJ stopped. It is wrong to suggest that I had not told any such fact to the IO. It is correct that in my statement Ex.PW1/A, no such fact is mentioned. I had sent Constable Rajesh to get a rickshaw after 10-15 minutes of our reaching at the spot. Ct. Rajesh had returned at the spot after 10.15 minutes. I had not told the IO that accused Javed and Parvez had abused me. It is wrong to suggest that my shirt was not torn from any spot on the said date. Accused Parvez had hit me not with a wooden object but with an iron object which he was wearing on his fingers. It might be a typographical error in my previous statement that accused Parvez had hit me with some wooden object. It is wrong to suggest that I had not suffered any such injuries which might have been caused to me by any iron object. It is wrong to suggest that I was under influence of liquor on the relevant day. It is wrong to suggest that I had suffered the injuries in question by falling on the ground under the influence of liquor. PCR officials had taken me to the hospital from the spot. Vol. Ct. Rajesh was also with me. I do not know who had taken my scooter from the spot after the incident. No DD entry was recorded regarding receiving of my scooter from the spot after the incident. The IO had not recorded any statement of any PCR officials in my presence. I do not remember whether my signature or thumb impressions were taken on the MLC in the hospital or not. I had not C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 26 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:54:44 +0530 seen my MLC.
I do not know the name of the associate of the accused persons who was also with them on the relevant day. The IO had recorded my supplementary statement when I had identified accused Naved. It is wrong to suggest that I had made false allegations against the accused persons to implicate them in a criminal case.
I had visited the house of the accused persons on 04.09.2011 along with IO SI Sakir Khan. Two constables were also with us. I had not entered into their house. The punch was not recovered in my presence. Vol. However, it was brought outside after recovery and it was shown to me. I do not know whether the IO had made any DD entry before leaving for the house of the accused persons on 04.09.2011, however, I had not made any such DD entry. We had reached at the house of the accused persons at about 9:30 a.m. Public persons were present in the locality and in the gali when we reached there. No lady police officials was with us. I do not know whether the IO had taken any permission from Sr. Officers to conduct search at the house of accused persons. The IO had not asked any public persons in the locality in my presence to join the proceedings of the search in the house of the accused persons.
*** *** *** I do not know whether a punch is available in open market or not. It is wrong to suggest that no punch was recovered as stated by me. It is wrong to suggest that the said punch had been planted upon the accused persons in the PS. My shirt was seized in the hospital which was damaged in the incident. I do not remember whether there were any blood stains on my vest or not. It is wrong to suggest that no blood had fallen on my shirt and that the blood was arranged later on to create false evidence. It is wrong to suggest that I myself had broken the two upper buttons of my shirt to create false evidence. It is wrong to suggest that no damage was done by any of the accused to my shirt.
The IO had not seized clothes of any of the accused in my presence. I do not remember the colour of the clothes which the accused persons were wearing at the time of incident in question.
It is wrong to suggest that none of the accused had caused any injury to me. It is wrong to suggest that false complaint was made against the accused C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 27 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:54:59 +0530 persons as the accused persons had refused to pay illegal protection money to me for running their small shop of eatable items on the ground floor of their house. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Here, it is further pertinent to refer to the testimony of PW-1/Ct. Rajesh, who inter alia deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 03.09.2012, he/PW-1 was posted as Constable at PS Hauz Qazi and on that day, he along with ASI Srikrishan went to Kucha Pandit, Gali Wakil Wali, Hauz Qazi vide PCR call. Further, as per PW-1, when he reached at the said spot, D/J was being played and around 10 (ten) to 12 (twelve) boys were dancing on the same. As it was around 12.30 am, as per PW-1, ASI Srikrishan told them that it was not the time for playing D/J, whereupon the said boys switched off the D/J and went here and there. Correspondingly, as per PW-1, ASI Srikrishan, then, instructed him to fetch a rickshaw so that the D/J system could be kept in the same and taken to the police station. Consequently, PW-1 went outside to fetch rickshaw and when he returned, he/PW-1 saw that blood was oozing out of the face of ASI Srikrishan and two boys had surrounded him. PW-1 further avowed that he raised hue and cry and on listening his/PW-1's voice, the said two boys ran away from the spot, who were identified by PW-1 under his deposition as co-accused, Javed and Naved, before the Ld. Trial Court. Concurrently, as per PW-1, he made a call in the PS and requested that some more staff should be sent at the spot. Thereafter, as per PW-1, around 3-4 police officials reached at the spot and he/PW-1 took ASI Srikrishan to the Hospital. PW-1 further proclaimed that HC Murli reached at JPN Hospital who recorded the statement of ASI Srikrishan vide C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 28 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:55:04 +0530 Ex. PW1/A. Thereafter, as per PW-1, rukka was handed over to him/PW-1 by HC Murli and he/PW-1, consequently, got the instant FIR, registered. Further, as per PW-1, directions were given to him by the SHO that further investigation would be conducted by SI Shakir Khan and that he/PW-1 should assist SI Sakir Khan in the said investigation. Consequently, as per PW-1, he returned to the spot with a copy FIR and original rukka, which were handed over to HC Murli. Remarkably, during the course of deposition of PW-1, it was asserted by Ld. Addl. PP for the State that he/PW-1 was resiling from his earlier statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and was consequently, cross examined by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Relevantly, upon being so cross examined, PW-1 inter alia proclaimed as under;
"XXXXXXX by Ld. APP for the State.
It is correct that when I was asked by ASI Srikrishan to fetch a rickshaw, at that time accused Parvez along with his brother Javed again started playing the DJ. It is also correct that the said accused persons then called two more boys to the spot and all the four of them had quarrelled with a ASI Srikrishan and had also injured him. I know only two of them i.e., Parvez and Javed. Both of them are present in the Court today and correctly identified by the witness. It is correct that HC Murli after coming at the hospital obtained MLC of ASI Srikrishan and after that recorded statement of ASI Srikrishan vide Ex. PW1/A. It is correct that I was taken to the spot by SI Sakir Khan and at my instance site plan Ex. PW1/B was prepared by him. It is correct that IO thereafter conducted search of accused Parvez, Javed and his associate, but none of them was found. It is correct that HC Murli handed over the pulanda and sample seal to IO in my presence and the same was seized by him vide seizure memo Ex. PW1/C, It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely with respect to identity of accused Naved as I have been won over by the accused persons."
(Emphasis supplied) C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 29 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:55:09 +0530
18. Strikingly, during the course of his cross- examination by/at the behest of the accused persons/appellant and co-accused, PW-1, avowed as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused persons It is correct that alleged quarrel had taken place in my absence when I had gone to fetch a rickshaw. It is wrong to suggest that accused were not quarrelling with ASI Srikrishan when I came back to spot. Vol. Accused Parvez and Javed were grappling with ASI Srikrishan.
*** *** *** I knew accused Parvez and Javed prior to the incident. The accused Parvez and Javed were not present in the group of 10 to 12 boys who were playing the DJ when I along with ASI Srikrishan reached there. None of the accused has been arrested in my presence. SI Sakir Khan or any other police official was not present at the hospital when I reached back with copy of FIR.
It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Correspondingly, reference is here made to the testimony of PW-4 (erroneously marked as PW-3)/Dr. Ravinder Kumar, CMO, Lok Nayak Hospital who inter alia proclaimed that he had seen the handwriting and signatures of Dr. Naveen, Junior Resident, as he had worked under his/PW-4's supervision, where he/PW-4 was working as Chief Medical officer/CMO at the relevant point in time. Further, as per PW-4, on 03.09.2011, Dr. Naveen had prepared MLC 137347 of injured Shri Kishan (Ex. PW3/A), bearing signatures of Dr. Naveen at point A and that his/PW-4's signatures on the said MLC at point B. Pertinently, PW-4 was not cross-examined by/on behalf of the accused persons, despite opportunity. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to make reference to the deposition of PW-3/HC Raman Dass, who inter alia avowed that on 03.09.2011, he was C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 30 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:55:14 +0530 posted at PS Hauz Qazi as Duty Officer/DO from 01:00 a.m. to 09:00 a.m. and on that day, at around 03:25 a.m. he/PW-3 received a rukka from Ct. Rajesh, sent by HC Murli. Further, as per PW-3, on the basis of the said rukka, he registered the present FIR (Ex. PW3/A) and thereafter, handed over a copy thereof to SI Shakir. Correspondingly, PW-3 asserted that DD No. 6A, dated 03.09.2011, PS Hauz Qazi; DD No. 7A, dated 03.09.2011 and DD No. 8A, dated 03.09.11, PS Hauz Qazi were all, recorded by him/PW-3 and proved as Ex. PW3/C (Colly.). Needless to mention that PW-3 was also not cross examined by/on behalf of the accused persons, despite opportunity.
20. Germane for the purpose of the present discourse to further refer to the deposition of PW-7/HC Rajesh Kumar, who inter alia deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 03.09.2011, he/PW-7 was posted at HC at PS Hauz Qazi, and working as Duty Officer from 05:00 p.m. to 01:00 a.m. Further, as per PW-7, in the intervening night of 02/03.09.2011 at around 12:30 a.m., he/PW-7 recorded DD No. 2A, which was proved as Ex. PW2/A. Appositely, PW-7 was not cross examined by/on behalf of the accused persons, despite opportunity. Correspondingly, reference is made to the deposition of PW-9/Retd. ACP Ram Kumar, who testified that on 03.09.2011, he/PW-9 was posted as ACP, Sub- Division Kamla Market and on the said day, he made a complaint under Section 195 of Cr.P.C., after receiving complaint from ASI Sri Krishan, which was proved as Ex. PW9/A. Pertinently, PW-9 was also not cross examined by/on behalf of the accused persons, despite opportunity.
21. Conspicuously, in light of the foregoing, this Court would now proceed with the evaluation of the material placed on C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 31 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:55:19 +0530 record, in light of the arguments addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and by State. However, before proceeding further, this Court deems it pertinent to deal with the contention of Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant inter alia to the effect that the conviction of the appellant could not have been premised on the deposition of the complainant/PW-2 in the instant case, without any corroboration. However, in this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that the superior courts have persistently avowed8 that there is no legal hurdle in convicting a person on the testimony of a single/sole eyewitness/victim, if his version is clear and reliable, for the principle of law/rule of evidence is that the evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367, wherein the Hon'ble Court in unambiguous terms, remarked as under;
"9. *** This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time- honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise..."
(Emphasis supplied) 8 Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680.
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22. Correspondingly, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the principles to be kept in mind, while appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness, as under;
"26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the courts are required to be kept in mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.
26.2. Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.
26.3. The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 26.4. The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. 26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence. 26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.
27. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence.
In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 33 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:55:29 +0530 the value which a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Here, this Court deems it apposite to further note that the law is no longer res integra9 that conviction of an accused can be premised solely on the evidence of police officials, if the same is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625, wherein the Hon'ble Court, expressed similar sentimentalities, in the following terms;
"25. In our judgment, the above proposition does not lay down correct law on the point. It is well settled that credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is quite possible that in a given case, a court of law may not base conviction solely on the evidence of the complainant or a police official but it is not the law that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police official as any other person. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of police officials merely because they belong to police force. There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of police officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if the court is convinced that what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such evidence."9
Sathyan v. State of Kerala, (2023) 13 SCC 767.
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(Emphasis supplied)
24. Correspondingly, this Court deems it further apposite here to note that mere because prosecution opts not to produce other public witnesses, asserted to be present or would have been present at the time of commission of incident, cannot, in the considered opinion of this Court, be always read against the prosecution in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200, wherein the Hon'ble Court, unambiguously observed;
"34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and its importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. Onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Pertinently, Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant has further strenuously contended that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the contradictions, variations and/or improvements, in the testimonies of various prosecution witnesses while pronouncing the impugned judgment. However, in order to appreciate the said contention, this Court deems it apposite to iterate and explore the judicial precedents governing the law of contradictions in the testimony of the witness. In particular, in this regard, this Court deems it apt to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, wherein the Hon'ble Court inter alia observed as under;
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"10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper- technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross- examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having examined the evidence of this witness, a friend and well-wisher of the family carefully giving due weight to the comments made by the learned counsel for the respondent and the reasons assigned to by the High Court for rejecting his evidence simultaneously keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of this witness by the trial court, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in rejecting the testimony of witness Nair whose evidence appears to us trustworthy and credible."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Similarly, in this regard, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rammi v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649, noted as under;
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 36 of 50 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.04.17 14:57:37 +0530 some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Evidently, from the conspectus of the above, it is clearly deduced that minor discrepancies, which do not go into the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, cannot be permitted to be annexed with any undue weight. In fact, it is trite law10, the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution and those which emanate due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance and must necessarily be discarded. The rationale behind the same is quite obvious, as elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324, inter alia recording as under;
"30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and 10 Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241 C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 37 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:57:43 +0530 record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.
"9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility."... Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited..."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Ergo, to recapitulate, in order to disregard the testimony of a witness, it is imperative that the same is replete with material improvements, contradictions and variation. In contrast, law provides for due concession to marginal variations and normal discrepancies in the statement/testimony of a witness, which are bound to occur due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Congruently, this Court further records that in as much as the contention of Ld. Counsel for the appellant pertaining to hostility of PW-1 is concerned, it is apposite to note that the superior courts have persistently avowed11 that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded in its entirety, rather, relevant parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in C. Muniappan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, enunciated the law as under;
11Selvamani v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, MANU/SC/0403/2024.
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"82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, (1996) 10 SCC 360] this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543], Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516], Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P.,(2006) 2 SCC 450], Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360] and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462.
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.
*** *** ***
85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. Vide Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2007) 12 SCC 381, Prithu v. State of H.P., (2009) 11 SCC 588, State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar, (2009) 9 SCC 626 and State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Consequently, being wary of the foregoing, when the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in the instant case are analysed, this Court finds itself difficult to be convinced with the C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 39 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 14:58:21 +0530 contention of the Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant that there are any material contradictions to belie the testimonies of the said witnesses. On the contrary, it is seen from a conscientious scrutiny of the testimony of the complainant/PW-2 that he consistently deposed of the incident in question, as well as inter alia of the involvement of the appellant. In particular, on a scrupulous analysis of the material brought on record, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the presence of PW-1/Ct. Rajesh and the complainant at the spot at the relevant point in time, stands duly proved not only from the testimonies of the said witnesses, rather, also from the record of DD No. 2A (Ex. PW2/A), proved by PW-7/HC Rajesh Kumar, who inter alia deposed that in the intervening night of 02/03.09.2011 at around 12:30 a.m., he/PW-7 recorded DD No. 2A, regarding the incident of playing of D/J in Gali Vakil Wali, Kucha Pandit, Chawri Bazar, as well as of marking of the said DD to the complainant/ASI Shri Krishan and Ct. Rajesh, who proceeded for the spot. Correspondingly, this Court finds itself further in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. was proved by PW-9/Retd. ACP Ram Kumar, as Ex. PW9/A in respect of the incident that transpired with the complainant. Consequently, from the said fact, not only is the factum of the complainant acting in the capacity of public servant at the relevant point in time proved, rather, as aforenoted, it is established that the complainant/PW-2 and PW-1 had proceeded to the spot in capacity as public servant to execute public duty, i.e., maintain law and order by ensuring that the noise of D/J was curtailed at late night hours, which was causing C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 40 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:59:09 +0530 public nuisance. Here, it is pertinent to further note that the complainant attributed specific roles qua the accused persons, including the appellant, besides explicitly proclaimed that the appellant had inflicted injury on his person/on the complainant/PW-2, while he was stopped by the complainant/PW-2 from creating nuisance. Concomitantly, PW-2 asserted that co-accused Javed, held his/complainant's shirt and tore the same, while their other associates continued to inflict kicks and punches on the complainant. Pertinently, the factum of complainant's sustaining injury on the said date, stand duly corroborated from his MLC No. 137347 (Ex. PW3/A), duly proved by PW-4/Dr. Ravinder Kumar. Needless to reiterate that the complainant's MLC specifically records that he/PW-2 had inter alia sustained, "...CLW over Lt. eyebrow 1*0.5 cm... swelling below Lt. eye... pain & swelling nose... bleeding from nose... pain & swelling occipital region...", which injuries were subsequently opined to be, "...simple from clinical point of view...".
30. Congruently, even this Court unambiguously records that the complainant's MLC (Ex. PW3/A) specifically chronicles his alleged history of, "...physical assault at around 12:40 a.m. near Kuncha Pandit on 3/9/11 as told by Pt...". Concomitantly, DD No. 6A and Ex. PW7A (Ex. PW3/A (Colly.)), record that the complainant had be assaulted by some boys and that the Javed and Parvez had assaulted the complainant, respectively. Clearly, the incident in question was promptly recorded in the instant case, and in the said documents, it was specifically noted that the complainant was attacked/injured by some boys, specifically named under DD No. 7A as the appellant and co-accused Javed.
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Needless to mention here that under the MLC of the victim (Ex. PW3/A), name of Ct. Rajesh had been recorded as the person, who brought the complainant to the Hospital, corroborating the version put forth by the said witnesses. Conspicuously, this Court further records that the complainant duly identified the accused persons as the perpetrators of offence, though, may have confused their names during his/PW-2's deposition. In fact, in this regard, this Court further finds itself, in alignment with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that mere failure of the witness/complainant/PW-2 to identify the accused persons, including the appellant by his name would not efface the intrinsic value of such identification. Needless in this regard to record that not only PW-1 correctly identified the co-accused and the appellant during the course of his deposition, rather, even in the considered opinion of this Court, the mistake on the part of the complainant in identifying the accused/appellant with wrong name is inconsequential, as even if a complainant is not aware about the names of the accused persons he can identify the accused as the culprits.
31. In as much as the defence put forth by the appellant is concerned, in the considered opinion of this Court, same has not been duly established by the appellant/accused persons from either the material brought on record or even from the deposition of DW-1/Mohd. Akram. In this regard, it is specifically noted that it is the defence of the accused persons that the complainant was under influence of liquor on the relevant day and that he had suffered injuries, due to a fall on the ground, whilst being under the influence of liquor. However, in this regard, it is noted that nowhere under the MLC of the complainant/victim, is there any C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 42 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:59:35 +0530 mention of the complainant being under any intoxication or influence of alcohol. Needless to mention that PW-4/Dr. Ravinder Kumar was neither cross-examined on either the aspect of injuries sustained by the complainant or the reason thereof or that the complainant being under any intoxication, as contended by the appellant/accused persons. Needless to further mention that even the suggestion to the said aspects is even wanting under the cross examination of PW-4. In fact, as aforenoted, the accused persons, opted not to cross examine PW-4, despite being afforded an opportunity.
32. Markedly, it is further the defence of the accused persons that the complainant had falsely implicated the appellant and co-accused in the present case as they refused to pay illegal protection money to the complainant for running their small shop of eatable items on the ground floor of their house. Significantly, in order to prove the said aspect, the accused persons/including the appellant, adduced DW-1/Mohd. Akram as a witness in their defence. However, upon a contentious perusal of the deposition of DW-1, it is noted that nowhere under his deposition, DW-1 deposed that he had actually seen such demand of illegal gratification by the complainant to the accused persons, rather, it was proclaimed by DW-1 that on asking from the staff of the Hotel, he was apprised that the police official used to regularly take money every month and that an altercation had ensued on the same. Needless to further mention that DW-1 specifically deposed that he had reached at the spot, only on seeing the crowd and that only upon inquires being made by him, he/DW-1 was apprised of the said fact. Quite evidently, DW-1 neither witnessed the incident of 'so called' altercation or that of demand C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 43 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:59:40 +0530 of money by the police officials from the accused persons, clearly, making the evidence of DW-1, a mere hearsay. Appositely, upon being cross examined by/on behalf of the State, DW-1 specifically avowed that he could not recall the time, in evening when he had reached at the spot or even recollect the names of the persons, from whom he had made such enquiry. In fact, DW-1 affirmed that he had made no complaint against any police official regarding the said act. Ergo, under such facts and circumstances, this Court finds itself difficult to be convinced that the appellant has been able to successfully prove his defence or cast any dent in the case put forth against him by the prosecution. Needless to further observe that during the course of recording of his/appellant's statement under Section 281/313 Cr.P.C., the appellant further inter alia asserted that he was not present at his home when the incident had taken place and that he was present at the house of his wife at that point in time. However, despite such assertion, the appellant failed to adduce any witness/evidence, to corroborate his said version. Further, it is noted that though, the appellant has vehemently asserted that the DD entries bearing nos. 2A, 6A, 7A and 8A were fabricated/concocted, however, no cross examination and/or suggestion is forthcoming on the part of the accused persons either to PW-3/HC Raman Dass or PW-7/HC Rajesh Kumar to the said effect, except such general assertion.
33. Remarkably, as aforenoted, Ld. Counsel/Ld. Amicus Curiae for the appellant has strenuously contended that the recovery of punch in the instant case is doubtful and that the benefit of the same must enure in favour of the appellant. However, in this regard, this Court concurs with the finding of C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 44 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 14:59:45 +0530 the Ld. Trial Court that the complainant consistently deposed of him being hit by the appellant on his face and nose, which fact is also corroborated from the injuries sustained by the complainant under his MLC (Ex. PW3/A) and the deposition of PW-1 and PW-2, who consistently deposed that the complainant had sustained injuries and bled, consequent thereto. Needless in this regard to note that law is trite12 that mere non-recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal to the prosecution case, if there are direct reliable witnesses. In so far as the fulfilment/establishment of ingredients of offences under Section 186, 332 and 353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant is concerned, this Court further coincides with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, under the impugned judgment in as much as the complainant/PW-2, whilst acting in discharge of his public duty/functions, as duly proved by the deposition of various witnesses and the complaint (Ex. PW9/A), was obstructed by the accused persons and attacked as well as assaulted by the accused persons. Needless to reiterate that in the said process, the complainant sustained various injuries on his person, which were duly corroborated under his MLC (Ex. PW3/A). Needless to further mention that the deposition of the complainant/victim has not only been consistent, rather, credit worthy and truthful. Further, as aforenoted, the accused persons have failed to attribute any motive on the complainant and other witnesses to falsely implicate them/appellant in the present case.
34. Conclusively, in conspectus of the above and inter alia keeping in view consistent testimonies of the complainant/PW-2/ASI Shri Krishan and other witnesses, i.e., 12 Gulab v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 677.
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PW-3/HC Raman Dass, PW-4/Dr. Ravinder Kumar, PW-7/HC Rajesh Kumar, and PW-9/ACP (Retd.) Ram Kumar, as duly corroborated with the deposition of PW-1/Ct. Rajesh as well as considering the other material on record, including DD Nos. 2A, 6A, 7A and 8A, arrest and personal search memos of the accused persons, etc., the only conclusion which can be unambiguously arrived at in the facts and circumstances brought forth is that the prosecution has been able to prove its case 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the appellant for the offences under Section 186, 332 and 353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. On the contrary, the appellant has failed to raise a probable defence/defence by 'preponderance of probabilities' in his favour and/or to belie the case put forth by the prosecution for the reasons, hereinunder, observed.
35. In so far as the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellant is concerned, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly observe that though the penal provisions under law, prescribe for penalties to be imposed for offences, however, do not lay down any set guidelines for the same. Nonetheless, the persistent avowals of the superior courts13 have laid down certain guidelines, which may be considered by the courts, when confronted with conundrum regarding such determination. Undoubtedly, the inclination of courts is usually tilted towards the reformation and rehabilitation of the accused, however, at the same time, court have incessantly cautioned that sentencing should be adequate as undue sympathy, by imposing inadequate sentence may result into causing more harm to the justice system. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble 13 'X' v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1; and Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2014) 4 SCC 375.
C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 46 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.04.17 14:59:56 +0530
Supreme Court in Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516, wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as under;
"17. ...We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Concurrently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC 380, while iterating the objective behind sentencing enunciated as under;
"9. ...Punishment is the just desert of an offender. The society punishes not because it has the moral right to give offenders what they deserve, but also because punishment will yield social useful consequences: the protection of society by incapacitating criminals, the rehabilitation of past offenders, or the deterrence of potential wrongdoers...The purposes of criminal sentencing have traditionally been said to be retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. To these there may now perhaps be added: incapacitation (i.e. putting it out of the power of the offender to commit further offences) and the maintenance of public confidence..."
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Apposite to further observe that besides the tenacious affirmations of the superior courts, inclined towards the grant of just and appropriate sentence, there has also been a cautionary word14 that mere long pendency of case is no ground to award lesser sentence. However, this Court is equally cognizant that the superior courts have incessantly asserted that 14 State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh, (2003) 8 SCC 13.
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Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17
15:00:02
+0530
while determining the quantum of sentence, courts cannot be oblivious to the mitigating circumstances, which are required to be accorded due weightage, alongside aggravating factors. In fact, law is settled15 that the discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by court(s), after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. Further, as per the superior courts16, a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up at such a stage and while doing so, "the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised." In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 6 SCC 631, wherein the Hon'ble Court while delving into the aspect of award of sentence/sentencing, enunciated as under;
"20. It is thus well settled, "the court would consider the cumulative effect of both the aspects (namely, aggravating factors as well as mitigating circumstances) and it may not be very appropriate for the Court to decide the most significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to one of the classes completely ignoring other classes under other heads and it is the primary duty of the Court to balance the two". Further, "it is always preferred not to fetter the judicial discretion by attempting to make excessive enumeration, in one way or another; and that both aspects, namely, aggravating and mitigating circumstances have to be given their respective weightage and that the Court has to strike the balance between the two and see towards which side the scale/balance of justice tilts". With these principles in mind, we now consider the present review petition."' (Emphasis supplied) 15 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 16 Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 48 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2026.04.17 15:00:15 +0530
38. Ergo, being cognizant of the aforenoted judicial dictates and considering that the co-accused persons were already sentenced by the Ld. Trial Court for the period undergone; the appellant has already undergone a period of 19 (nineteen) days of imprisonment in the present case; the appellant is presently of 48 (forty eight) years of age, asserted to be liable to look after and/or take care of his family members; further, as per the recent nominal roll of the appellant dated 15.04.2026, he is not found to be convicted in any other offence, as well as further being cognizant of the fact that the appellant has not been not demonstrated to be involved in any other case at present, ends of justice, in the considered opinion of this Court, would be met, if the substantive sentence of the appellant is confined to the period already undergone.
39. Conclusively, in light of the foregoing discussion, the present appeal disposed of as partly allowed, is so far as while upholding the judgment dated 14.07.2020 passed by Ld. ACMM-02, Central, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi in case bearing; 'State v. Javed & Ors., CIS No. 298773/2016', arising out of FIR No. 73/2011, PS. Hauz Qazi, convicting, the appellant for the offences under Sections 186, 332 and 353 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, the impugned order of sentence/order dated 16.07.2020, passed by the Ld. Trial Court is modified to the extent of period already undergone, in so far as the substantive period of sentence is concerned. However, the appellant would be liable to pay a fine to a tune of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only), to be released as compensation to the victim/complainant, ASI Shri Krishan, and in default of payment of which, the appellant would be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 03 C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 49 of 50 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.04.17 15:00:22 +0530 (three) months. As requested, fine be deposited by the appellant before Ld. Trial Court within a period of fifteen days from today.
40. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order/judgment, for record and compliance. Copy of this judgment be also given dasti to the appellant. Further, compliance of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 1 has been carried out.
41. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
GOYAL 2026.04.17
15:00:27
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 17.04.2026. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi C.A. No. 162/2020 Parvez Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 50 of 50