Punjab-Haryana High Court
Shrimati Usha Adlakha vs The State Of Haryana And Ors. on 7 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)113PLR407
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. These petitions are being decided by a common order because the main prayer made in all the petitions relates to a challenge to the legality of notifications dated 1.6.1976 and 16.2.1977 issued by the Government of Haryana Under Sections 4 and 6 of the Lands Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the award dated 3.7.1981 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector.
2. A brief reference to the facts of each of these petitions is necessary for the purpose of deciding the cases.
CWP No. 4263 of 1984:
Petitioner, Smt. Usha Adlakha, entered into an agreement with M/s. Punjab United Forge Limited on 21.12.1979 for purchase of land measuring 2.65 acres situated at Ballabgarh. This land is said to have been subjected to acquisition in the year 1958 by the then Government of Punjab for Indian Metallurgical Industries Pvt. Ltd. The Haryana Financial Corporation which had given loan to the Indian Metallurgical Industries Pvt. Ltd., filed a Civil Suit No. 132 of 1984 in the Court of District Judge, Gurgaon. The property was auctioned on 4.5.1975 in pursuance of the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge but that process was stayed by the High Court in a revision petition filed against the order of the District Judge. Later on, in pursuance to the order of the High Court, the property was once again put to auction. The auction sale was confirmed in favour of the Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation. Out of this land, 2.65 acres of land was transferred to the Punjab United Forge Limited by the Punjab Industrial Development Corporation and the petitioner entered into an agreement for purchase of the land with the Punjab United Forge Limited. The petitioner says that after purchase of the property, she applied for permission to raise construction in the form of a shopping centre and the Chief Administrator, Faridabad Complex Administration, Faridabad granted permission to her.
However, when she started construction, the Haryana Urban Development Authority interfered with the same compelling her to file a civil suit for injunction in the Civil Court at Faridabad. The suit was contested by the Haryana Urban Development Authority on the ground of bar contained in Section 50(2) of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977. The Petitioner says that on 1.6.1976, the Government of Haryana issued notification Under Section 4 of the Act and despite the objections raised by the Haryana Financial Corporation etc. Under Section 5-A of the Act, the Government issued notification dated 16.2.1977 Under Section 6 of the Act for acquisition of the land. Proceedings of acquisition have been challenged by the petitioner on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Act and absence of public purpose. The petitioner says that due to non-publication of notification, objection could not be filed by her as envisaged by Section 5-A of the Act and the Government published notification Under Section 6 of the Act in hot haste.
In reply, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have pleaded that the acquisition proceedings have been finalised and the award has been made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 3.7.1981 and further that the possession of the and has been taken over by the Estate Officer, Faridabad. It has also been pleaded by these respondents that the writ petition has been filed after a long delay and the petitioner who has purchased the property after initiation of the acquisition proceedings does not have any locus standi to challenge the acquisition.
In reply filed on behalf of M/s. Royal Industries, Ballabgarh (respondent No. 7), the objection of delay and laches has been repeated. It has also been asserted that C.W.P. No. 6042 of 1981 (Dan Singh alias Rajbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.) involving challenge to the impugned notifications was dismissed on 6.1.1988 an the Special Leave Petition has also been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 11.12.1992 and, therefore, no writ should now be issued to quash the acquisition. It has also been stated that the possession of the property was taken over as early as on 3.7.1981. Reference has also been made to CWP No. 1587 of 1981 (Indian Core Oil Pvt. Ltd. Faridabad v. State of Haryana and Ors.) decided on 3.12.1981 and CWP No. 23 of 1983 (Haryana Export Corporation v. State of Haryana and Ors.) decided on 29.4.1983. Respondent No. 7 has also relied on an order passed by the Apex Court in CWP No. 2602 of 1982 which was decided on 26.11.1982 and a direction was given to respondent Nos. l to 3 to allot a plot in Sector 5, Faridabad, to respondent No. 7 or to allot any suitable area in the same vicinity at the price prevalent at the time of payment of earnest money by this respondent.
A replication to the reply of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 has been filed by the petitioner some time in November, 1995 wherein she has stated that the possession of the property still continues with her. She was also reiterated her plea regarding absence of the publication of notification Under Section 4 and that although her interests are vitally affected by the impugned proceedings, the respondents have not given any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before seeking to deprive her of the property rights. It is, however, significant to mention that in the verification of this replication, the petitioner has stated that the contents of paras 1 and 2 of the preliminary objections are based on legal advice and are true and correct. Contents of other paragraphs have been stated to be correct without any indication whether they are based on the personal knowledge of the petitioner or the information derived by her from any source.
CWP No. 4264 of 1984 :
Petitioner, Punjab United Forge Limited, has referred to its agreement to sell entered with Ms. Usha Adlakha in regard to 2.65 acres of land at Ballabgarh. Other averments made in this writ petition are almost identical to the averments made in CWP No. 4263 of 1984 and the prayers made by the petitioner are also identical to the prayers made in CWP No. 4263 of 1984. Replies filed by the respondents are also on the same lines and, therefore, detailed reference to the same is not necessary.
CWP No. 703 of 1986:
Petitioners, Inderpal Singh and others, have come out with a case that land measuring 23 kanals 5-marlas situated in village Mujessar, Ballabgarg, was owned by M/s. GHR Industries through its partners Gian Singh, Harbans Singh and Raghubir Singh, who had 1/3rd share each. Gian Singh is said to have died on 10.8.1984 and his 1/3rd share devolved on his four grand sons, namely, Inderpal Singh, Gajinderpal Singh, Pearl Kanchan Singh and Surinderpal Singh. Gajinderpal Singh filed a suit for permanent injunction in respect of this land against Harbans Singh and others. That suit was a decreed on 11.3.1980 and in terms of the decree, the plaintiff became entitled to get a part of the land. Accordingly, mutations were sanctioned on 3.11.1982. Thereafter Inderpal Singh (petitioner No. 1) is said to have flied a suit against his father. That too was decreed on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties and in terms of that decree, mutations were sanctioned. The petitioner has further stated that out of the total 7-kanals and 15 marlas of land falling in Khasra Nos. 35/21(3-19) and 22/1 (3-16) half was owned by him and the remaining 1/2 share belonged to Harbans Singh, Kanchan Singh and Surinderpal Singh. The petitioner has also stated that the aforementioned piece of land is already developed as it was owned by the GHR Industries. The acquisition proceedings have been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that no notice whatsoever was served on him or his father Shri Harbans Singh or his grand father Shri Gian Singh and the only notice which came into his hand is dated 16.3.1978 issued in the name of Gian Singh son of Bhagwan Singh and further that Gian Singh had already died on 10.8.1984. The petitioner has also challenged the transfer of land in favour of the Haryana Urban Development Authority by alleging that it is a Company and no land could be acquired for a Company without compliance of the procedure laid down in Chapter-VII of the 1894 Act. Allegation of mala fide has also been levelled by the petitioner even regarding the enactment of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977. Another plea of the petitioner is that no notice Under Section 9 or Section 12(2) has been served upon the interested persons.
Respondent No. 4 has filed a reply. In addition to the preliminary objection of delay and laches, the respondent No. 4 has stated that the acquisition made by the Government has already been upheld by the High Court and in fact directions have been given to the Haryana Urban Development Authority to make allotment of plots from the acquired land. Reliance has been placed on various orders passed by the High Court as well as the order dated 26.11.1982 (Annexure R-5) passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2602 of 1982 filed by the respondent No. 4. Respondent No. 7 has stated that he was allotted plot Nos. 9 and 10 in Sector 5 and he is in occupation thereof. It has also been stated that a suit filed by Raghubir Singh for permanent injunction against the respondent No. 4 has been dismissed by the Additional Senior Sub Judge, Faridabad, on 7.8.1954 for want of prosecution and, therefore, now the petitioner cannot question the legality of the acquisition.
CWP No. 821 of 1994 :
Petitioner, M/s. Star Wire (India) Ltd., is a Public Limited Company having its registered office at 11, Clive Row, Calcutta (West Bengal). I is said to be engaged in the business of manufacturing of iron and steel products. The petitioner is said to have purchased land measuring 107 kanals 4 marlas from M/s. Globe Motors Ltd. vide registered sale deed was got registered at Delhi. The petitioner has stated that after about four to five years of the purchase of land by it, respondent No. 5, M/s. Royal Industries, started making claim over a portion of the land comprised in Khasra No. 52/1 and, therefore, it filed a civil suit in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Faridabad, which was decreed on 15.5.1982. The learned trial Court passed a decree to the effect that although the plaintiff (petitioner herein) was a trespasser over Rect. No. 52/1/2 but it was owner of the remaining property and it could be dispossessed from the disputed property only after following the procedure established by law. Aggrieved by this decree, the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed as time barred on 10.9.1993. Undeterred by the dismissal of the appeal by the first Appellate Court, the petitioner filed Regular Second Appeal No. 2380 of 1993 and the same is pending before this Court. The petitioner has stated that in the stay application filed by it along with the Regular Second Appeal, the High Court has passed order of status quo on 3.11.1993. The petitioner says that during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court, it was revealed that the Government of Haryana issued notifications Under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act for acquisition of the land. According to the petitioner, these notifications are illegal because the same have been issused without following the procedure prescribed in the Act. Reference has also been made by the petitioner to the suit filed by Shri Bee Narain and others for possession of land measuring 6-kanals 17-marlas out of Khasra No. 52/1. This land is said to have been sold to M/s. Royal Industries through its sole proprietor Shri Suresh Kumar Gupta vide registered sale deeds dated 22.1.1993 and 29.1.1993. The petitioner has challenged the sale deeds by filing a suit against Bee Narain and Suresh Kumar Gupta in the Court of Sub Judge First Class, Faridabad, and in that suit an order of interim injunction has been passed restraining the purchaser from further alienating the property.
Further assertion of the petitioner is that while these proceedings were going on in the Court, the Estate Officer issued notice to it for eviction and passed order dated 12.8.1993 for ejectment. Against that order, an appeal has been filed by the petitioner but hearing of that appeal has been stayed sine die till the decision of the civil suit. The petitioner further says that it has filed Company Application No. 1168 of 1993 in Company Petition No. 33 of 1968 pending in the High Court of Delhi and on the application filed by it, the High Court of Delhi has passed order dated 26.8.1993 restraining the Haryana Urban Development Authority, its servants, employees or agents from dispossessing the petitioner from the portion of the property measuring 1-kanal 3-marlas comprised in Khasra No. 52/1/2.
3. The acquisition proceedings have been challenged by the petitioner on the ground of non-compliance of the requirement of publication of the notification Under Section 4 and also on the ground that the proceedings have not been finalised even after expiry of long period of time.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that due to non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the 1894 Act, the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. All the learned counsel submitted that the notification issued Under Section 4 has not been published in the locality concerned and no notices have been served on the landowners and in most arbitrary and whimsical manner, the respondents have sought to deprive the petitioners of their property. Learned counsel argued that the issue of notice Under Section 4(1) constitutes a condition precedent to a valid acquisition and as no such notices have been given to the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest, the impugned notification should be quashed. Shri Mehta laid emphasis on the fact that father of the petitioner was suffering from cancer and was being treated at Bombay and, therefore, no notice can be said to have been served by the respondents. He also placed reliance on the Standing Order issued by the Financial Commissioner prescribing the procedure for finalisation of the acquisition proceedings and argued that as the proceedings were not finalised within six months period, specified in the Standing Order, all the actions taken by the respondents should be quashed, Shri Mehta further argued that when an industry was already existing on the land belonging to the petitioner, there could be no justification to acquire the land for the avowed purpose of establishing an industrial area.
5. Shri Sarin argued that the petitioner, M/s. Star Wire (India) Ltd., has established an industry over 107-kanals and 4-marlas of land after purchasing the same in the auction proceedings held under the directions of the Court and, therefore, it cannot be deprived of that property on the basis of an unlawful acquisition proceeding held in 1976 and 1977. Shri Sarin further argued that the Haryana Urban Development Authority itself came into existence in the year 1977 and, therefore, it cannot claim any right over the disputed land which was acquired prior to the creation of the Haryana Urban Development Authority. In order to explain the delay in the filing of the writ petition, the learned counsel submitted that several cases were pending between the parties and, therefore, failure of the petitioners to file writ petition immediately after the issue of the notification can- not be a ground to deprive them of the property. Shri Sarin emphasised that the sale certificate issued to the petitioners was rectified in the year 1992 and in fact the possession of the property continued with the petitioners and, therefore, the delay should not be made a ground to decline relief to the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions :-
1. Rajender Prashad v. Punjab State, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 185;
2. Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana (1982)84 P.L.R. 743;
3. Smt. Ranjit Kaur v. State of Punjab 1983 P.L.J 164;
4. Dehri Rohtash Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 802; and
5. S. Mohan Singh v. Financial Commissioner (Revenue), Punjab, (1967)69 P.L.R. 377.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that challenge to the notifications issued in the years 1976 and 1977 through the writ petitions filed in the years 1984, 1986 and 1994 should be thrown out only on the ground of laches. They also argued that most of the petitioners have purchased the property after 2 to 4 years of the issue of the notification Under Section 6 and, therefore, they cannot complain of the alleged non-compliance of the provisions of the 1894 Act. Shri Chhibbar laid stress on the fact that total silence on the part of the petitioners to question the legality of the acquisition proceedings for long period of time shows that the petitioners do not have any real grievance.
7. In order to decide - whether this Court should interfere with the impugned acquisition in the writ petitions, which have been filed in the years 1984, 1986 and 1994, it is necessary to take notice - of these facts :-
i) The notifications Under Section 4 and 6 were issued on 1.6.1976 and 16.2.1977 respectively. From the dates of the issue of the notification Under Section 4, the writ petitions have been filed after a period of 8 years, 10 years and 18 years whereas from the date of issue of notification dated 16.2.1977, the writ petitions have been filed after 7 years, 9 years and 17 years.
ii) The award was passed on 3.7.1981. With reference to that date, the writ petitions have been filed after 3 years 5 years and 13 years.
iii) Possession of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Collector on 3.7.1981 and it was handed over to the Estate Officer, HUDA, Faridabad, on that very date. Annexures R-3 and R-4 filed along with the reply of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in CWP No. 4263 of 1984 provide ample evidence of possession having been taken over by the Government after due advertisement. Although the petitioner, Smt. Usha Adlakha, has tried to dispute this fact, her affidavit filed with the replication is singularly laconic to prove that these two documents are fake or fictitious.
iv) The acquisition proceedings were challenged by Dan Singh and 77 others in CWP No. 5042 of 1982 and the same was dismissed on 6.1.1982 by this Court. That order has been upheld by the Supreme Court while dismissing Civil Appeal Nos. 3746-47 of 1984 (Chander Bhan and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.) decided on 19.12.1991.
v) The land in dispute has been allotted to several parties and in some cases - allotments have been made in compliance of the orders passed by the High Court an the Supreme Court (Annexures R-5, R-6 and R-7.) These orders show that the High Court and the Supreme Court have accepted the claim of the petitioners for issue of mandamus to the Government of Haryana, Director of Industries and the Estate Officer, HUDA, Faridabad, to allot plots to the petitioners.
vi) Petitioners, Smt. Usha Adlakha and M/s. Star Wire (India) Ltd. have admittedly purchased the property after the issue of the notifications Under Sections 4 and 6. M/s. Star Wire (India) Pvt. Ltd. has purchased the property much after the passing of the award.
8. The abovementioned facts show that the rights of third parties have intervened between the date of issue of the notifications, passing of the award and filing of the writ petitions and quashing of the proceedings at this juncture would result in unsettling of the rights of those persons who are not even before the Court.
9. No doubt, Article 226 of the Constitution or the Rules framed by the High Court do not specify a period of limitation for filing of a writ petition and the High Court can in appropriate case grant relief even though the petition may have been filed after a lapse of considerable time. However, that is possible only if the Court is satisfied that the petitioner has offered a reasonable explanation for the delay. Absence of explanation for the delay in the filing of the writ petition can legitimately lead to an inference that the petitioner is guilty of laches. Time and again the Courts have recognised the delay and laches as one of the factors which can appropriately be taken note of to refuse relief in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The idea underlying this principle is that stale claim should not be entertained by the High Court because that would unsettle the settled position and the rights of third parties would be adversely affected. Another reason for not entertaining the delayed writ petition is that the delay defeat the equity and while exercising equitable jurisdiction, the Court would always require the parties to invoke its jurisdiction at the earliest and no indulgence would be shown to those who sit over the reference for a long time and then challenge the action of the public authorities. No hard and fast rule can be laid down and no strait-jacket formula can be prescribed as to when the High Court should entertain and when it should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves the Court after a considerable lapse of time. However, in each case the Court will have to keep in mind the factor of delay while exercising its equitable jurisdiction. The Court should be extremely slow to interfere where the petitioner does not approach the Court expeditiously.
10. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1006, a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution should ordinarily be dismissed on the ground of laches if it has been filed after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit. Some of the observations made by the apex Court are quite instructive and the same are quoted below :-
"It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
The provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. However, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable."
11. In Ravinder Nath Bose v. Union of India, 1970(1) SCC 84, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that "even a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be dismissed on the ground of laches. It has further been held that no relief should be given to the petitioner who, without any reasonable explanation, approach the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after an inordinate delay. The highest Court of the country has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and it could not have been intended that this Court would go into stale demands after lapse of years. It is settled that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not flow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay."
12. In State of Mysore v. V.K. Kanyan A.I.R. 1975 SC 2190, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. While upholding the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, their Lordships held that delay of even two years in challenging the land acquisition proceedings was unreasonable. In that case, the notification Under Section 4 was published on 13.4.1967 and the notification Under Section 6 was published in the gazette on 19.10.1968. The writ petition was filed some time in July or August, 1969. While holding that the writ petition was belated, their Lordships observed :-
"We do not think that the respondent was entitled to challenge the validity of the notification Under Section 4 of the Act as the writ petition challenging the notification was filed after an unreasonable lapse of time. A public notice as required by Section 4 of the Act was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification Under Section 4, but the appellant should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification."
(Underlining is mine)
13. In Aflatoon and Anr. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, A.I.R. 1975 SC 2077, their Lordships relied on some of the observations made in Ravinder Nath Bose v. Union of India (Supra) and Tirlok Chand Moti Chand v. H.B. Munshi, A.I.R. 1970 SC 898, and held as under:-
"A valid notification under S.4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification Under Section 4 and the declaration Under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners."
14. A similar view has been taken in State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. Krishnan and Ors., JT 1995(8) SC 1. In that case, notifications issued on 8.5.1975, 29.8.1975 and 19.2.1975 were challenged in the High Court on the ground of absence of public purpose. While reversing the judgment of the High Court of Madras, the Supreme Court held that the petitions which were filed in the year 1982-83 to challenge the declaration made Under Section 6 some time in the year 1978, should not have been entertained because of delay. Their Lordships held :-
"There is yet another and a very strong factor militating against the writ petitions. Not only did they also failed to act soon after the declarations Under Section 6 were made. As stated above, the declarations Under Section 6 were made in the year 1978 and the present writ petitions were filed only some time in the year 1982-83 when the awards were about to be passed."
(Underlining is mine)
15. In Improvement Trust, Faridkot v. Jagjit Singh, 1987 Supp. SCC 608, and State of Punjab v. Hariom Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., 1987 Supp. SCC 687, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the High Court should not have quashed the land acquisition proceedings which have been completed several years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. In both these cases, the Supreme Court has noted that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana (supra) has already been disapproved by the apex Court.
16. In Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murari, JT 1995(8) SC 494, their Lordships have held that the High Court should not interfere with the exercise of power by the Government Under Section 4(1) at a belated stage. In that case the writ petition had been filed after about three years of the issue of notification for acquisition and taking over of the possession. The High Court held that the action of the Government to dispense with the enquiry as envisaged in Section 5-A was unlawful. However, their Lordships held that the interference by the High Court at a belated stage was not justified.
17. In State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh 1996(1) Indian Civil Cases 323, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the land acquisition proceedings and the award dated 19.4.1984 in a writ petition filed on May 13, 1985. Their Lordships held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the notification Under Section 4(1) or the declaration issued Under Section 6.
18. In Pawandeep Sandhu v. State of Punjab, (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 52, a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member, held that the delay of two years in filing of the writ petition was fatal to the entertainability of the writ petition involving challenge to the acquisition. In that case, notification Under Section 4 was issued on 18.3.1992 and the petitions were filed on 23.5.1994. While upholding the objection of delay, the Court observed as under :-
"Having refrained from lodging any protest against the acquisition proceedings and having kept silence for a period of two years before filing the petitions seeking nullification of the acquisition made in the year 1992, the Petitioners have clearly disentitled themselves from claiming any indulgence by this Court. In our opinion, failure of the petitioners to move the Court immediately after the issue of the notification is fatal to the entertainability of the petitions. The petitioners are clearly guilty of laches. During the intervening period rights of third parties have been created. A period of two years is too long to be ignored by the Court in a matter involving challenge to the land acquisition particularly when the purpose of the acquisition is to bring about industrial development of the area. An interference by the Court at this belated stage would cause injury to the public interest as well as to the individuals who may have invested money for the purpose of securing allotment of land and for preparing infrastructure for settling up of industrial units. Therefore, in our opinion, petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of laches as well."
19. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court show that in the matters involving challenge to the land acquisition proceedings, the Court should be extremely slow to interfere where the petitioner does not approach the Court expeditiously. The Supreme Court has reversed several decision of this Court where interference was made with the acquisition proceedings in writ peti- tions filed after long delays. The apex Court has laid particular emphasis on non-interference by the High Court after the passing of the award-. If the principles laid down by the apex Court are applied to the facts of these writ petitions, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioners are guilty of laches and they are not entitled to the relief in the petitions filed after 7, 8 or 17 to 18 years against the notifications Under Sections 4 and 6 and 3, 5 and 13 years of the passing of the award. As early as in the year 1982, this Court has dismissed a writ petition challenging the validity of the two notifications and, therefore, it is an additional reason for rejecting the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Court should interfere irrespective of the delay in filing of the writ petitions.
20. Now a few words about the two judgments of this Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of their claim that delay should not be made a ground to dismiss the writ petitions. In the first judgment in Rajender Prashad v. State of Punjab (supra), a Five Judges Bench has done nothing more than to reiterate the well, established principle that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and that it is the matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court. Applying that principle to these cases, it must be held that the petitioners are guilty of laches and there is no justification for quashing of the acquisition proceedings at this belated stage, more so, when a similar challenge was negatived by this Court about a decade ago. Reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench in Radhey Sham Gupta v. State of Haryana (supra) was wholly unjustified. Learned counsel for the petitioners ought not to have made that judgment as basis of their argument because their Lordships of the Supreme Court have categorically disapproved the Full Bench judgment in Radhey Sham Gupta's case (supra) as is evident from the decisions of the apex' Court in Improvement Trust, Faridkot v. Jagjit Singh (supra) and State of Punjab v. Hari Om Co-operative House Building Society (supra). Even otherwise the exposition of law made by the Full Bench cannot be treated as correct in view of catena of judgments of the apex Court holding that delay in challenge to the acquisition proceedings should by itself be sufficient to dismiss the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court cannot blindly follow the Full Bench judgment which stands specifically disapproved by the Supreme Court and which contains an enunciation of law contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court.
21. Before concluding, I deem it proper to refer to one more aspect of the matter, namely, that a person, who purchases the property after issue of notification Under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, is not entitled to question the legality of the acquisition proceedings.
22. In State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Umashankar Rajabhau, JT 1995(8) SC 508, it has been held that the person purchasing the property after the making of award is not entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings on the ground of lack of publication of the notifications. The apex Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court quashing the proceedings of acquisition at the instance of purchaser.
23. Similarly, In Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan, 1995(1) Indian Civil Cases 284 and Smt. Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., 1996(1) Indian Civil Cases 325, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have unequivocally held that alienation of the land after the publication of the notification Under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. In the first case, the notification Under Section 4(1) was pubished on 17.10.1963. Declaration Under Section 6 was published on 1.1.1991 after the finalisation of the improvement scheme.
Appellant purchased the property on 15.7.1970. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of delay in the publication of the notification and held :-
" We do not find any substance in any of these contentions. It is seen that long after the notification Under Section 4(1) was published in the Gazette, the appellant had purchased the property and constructed the house thereon. Therefore, as against the State his purchase was not lawful and it could not be used against the State to clothe it with a colour of title as against the State. It is an encumbrance against the State and when the acquisition was finalised and the possession is taken, the State Under Section 16 is entitled to have the possession with absolute title free from all encumbrances. The appellant cannot get any little much less valid title to the property."
24. In the second case, the Supreme Court held that if any subsequent purchaser acquires land, his/her right would be subject to the provisions of the Act.
25. In the U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd JT 1996(1) SC 954, the Supreme Court once again held that purchaser of the property after issue of notification Under Section 4(1) does not have any right to challenge the validity of the notification etc. The observations made in this case are quite significant and, therefore, they are quoted below :-
"That apart, since M/s Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land after the notification Under Section 4(1) was published, this sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration Under Section 6 was published."
26. Similarly, in Bhoop Singh v. State of Haryana, (1995-3) 111 P.L.R. 495, this Court has held that the petitioner who purchased property after initiation of the proceedings under the Act could not be heard to say that he had spent money on the land and, therefore, equity should be settled in his favour.
27. In view of the above discussion, I hold that all the writ petitions suffer from laches and they are liable to be dismissed only on that ground that it is not necessary to deal with other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
28. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petitions are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.