Delhi District Court
Sanjiv Kumar Vashist vs State And Ors on 24 March, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. PURSHOTAM PATHAK, ASJ-05,
SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS : DELHI
DLST010017072019
Cr Rev/108/2019
SANDEEP BHALLA Vs. STATE
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 14.03.2019
ARGUMENTS HEARD ON : 24.01.2025
Sandeep Bhalla,
S/o late Sh. I. P. Bhalla,
R/o A-221, Chattarpur Enclave,
Phase-I, New Delhi ..... REVISIONIST
Vs.
1. The State of NCT of Delhi
2. Mr. S. K. Sharma,
S/o Late Sh. Bhagwat Prasad Vashisht
R/o 362, Chirag Delhi,
New Delhi-10017 ..... RESPONDENTS
AND
DLST010055052019
Cr Rev/291/2019
SANJIV KUMAR VASHIST Vs. STATE AND ORS.
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 17.08.2019
ARGUMENTS HEARD ON : 24.01.2025
SANJIV KUMAR VASHIST
S/O LATE SHRI B. S. VASHIST
R/O H. NO. 362, CHIRAG DELHI,
NEW DELHI ......... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
1. THE STATE N.C.T. OF DELHI
2. SANDEEP BHALLA
S/O LATE I.P. BHALLA,
R/O A-221, CHATTARPUR ENCLAVE,
PHASE-1, NEW DELHI ....... RESPONDENTS
Digitally signed
by
PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 1 of 23 PATHAK
Date:
2025.03.29
16:57:59 +0530
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 24.03.2025
JUDGMENT
1. Vide this common judgment, I shall decide instant two criminal revisions wherein revision bearing no. 108/2019 titled as 'Sandeep Bhalla Vs. State' has been filed by Sandeep Bhalla, the complainant and the revision bearing no. 291/2019 titled as 'Sanjeev Kumar Vashist Vs. State & Anr'. has been filed by accused Sanjeev Kumar Vashisht, both challenging the order dated 18.12.2018, whereby Ld. Magistrate summoned the accused namely Mr. S. K. Sharma for offence under section 384 IPC, while declining to summon him for offence u/s 468 IPC.
2. For the sake of convenience, I would be referring to the parties as per their nomenclature before the Ld. Trial court.
3. Before moving to the merits of the revision petition bearing no. 291/2019, at the outset, it is pertinent to mention here that this revision has been preferred by the accused, after a delay of about 5 months after the expiry of limitation period from the date of order dated 18.12.2018. Accused has filed a separate application explaining the reasons for delay in filing of this revision petition. It is stated, in the application, that no delay was caused by him but same was caused as he was suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and in the month of June and July 2019, his health deteriorated because of rise in pollution and change of atmosphere. Further, he was not Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 2 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:16 +0530 having any knowledge of impugned order and he came to know about it when he appeared before the Ld. Trial Court on 23.05.2019. It is averred that, upon knowledge of the said impugned order on 23.05.2019, he prepared the accompanying revision and filed the same without any loss of time. It is stated that if the delay is not condoned, the very purpose of filing appeal would get defeated. Ld. Counsel for the complainant has contended that there is delay of about 8 months and the accused has not been able to give any plausible reason for condoning the delay. Hence, the revision petition filed by accused is liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay.
4. The plea raised by the appellant is that he came to know about the impugned order dated 18.12.2018 on 23.05.2019 and filed the revision on 17.08.2019 within 90 days of date of knowledge. From perusal of record it transpires that the accused was summoned on 18.12.2018 and he appeared before the court on 23.05.2019. There is nothing on record to show that accused was aware of the impugned order prior to his appearance in court on 23.05.2019. If the 90 days time period is calculated from the date of his appearance i.e. 23.05.2019, the revision was to be filed before 22.08.2019, which the accused has filed on 17.08.2019 i.e. within the period of 90 days. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any inordinate delay in filing the revision petition or that the revisionist would have gained any unfair advantage by the delay caused in filing the revision. I do not find any deliberate attempt on part of the accused in avoiding the filing of Digitally Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 3 of 23 signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:19 +0530 revision. In the totality of circumstances and in substantial interest of justice, application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act is allowed and delay in filing the appeal, if any, is condoned.
5. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to the filing of the revision petitions are that the complainant filed a joint complaint case along with R. K. Gaur, titled as 'Sandeep Bhalla & Anr v. S K Sharma & Anr' u/s 200 Cr.P.C. before Ld. MM -02, South, Saket Court, against Sh. S. K. Sharma and his mother for summoning them as accused for offences punishable u/s 468/384/506/34 IPC. The complainant claimed himself to be a contractor who in the year 2006-2007 had undertaken renovation work of Sh.
Mahesh Sharma @ Bille on contract basis in house no. 365, Chirag Dilli, New Delhi. He alleged that while the repair work was in process, Sh. S.K. Sharma with his mother approached him and in an effort to extort money for construction, alteration / renovation in their area/ locality, extended threat of making complaint to police, MCD and courts, so as to cause delay and damage to work done. Complainant told all this to Mahesh Sharma who tried to pursue them but failed and had to part with an amount of Rs.85,000/- in fear of threats of false implication in criminal and false cases.
6. Complainant who had by that time already invested a handsome amount in renovation work, talked to the other villagers about the illegal demands of the accused no. 1 and his mother and came to know that accused and his Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 4 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:23 +0530 mother are in habit of making such illegal demands. He claimed to have made certain payments on 5-6 occasions to the accused on his demand and at two times, payment was made in front of Surender Singh Sehrawat. He also claimed to have records of his conversation with the accused on the accused's mobile, in which the accused has admitted having received money and making further illegal demands from the complainant. But despite having proof against the accused he could not proceed further as some local residents advised him that in case he takes any action, he will be inviting trouble as the accused is a lawyer by profession.
7. The complainant has also referred to an order dated 15.03.2012, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in bail application no. 336/2012, wherein the CD containing the copy of the aforesaid telephonic conversation/ recording was referred to and it was observed by Hon'ble High Court that IO will take action but no action was taken by police.
8. Complainant has also claimed that as many as 93 residents of village Chirag Dilli made a complaint dated 14.12.2009 against accused and his mother to SHO, PS Malviya Nagar with similar allegations and copy of which was sent to higher authorities of police, but no action was taken. He also send a copy of it to DCP Crime to take action against accused and his mother. He has alleged that respondent and his mother kept on making illegal demands and ultimately filed a writ petition (Civil) No. 4322/07 Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 5 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:27 +0530 titled as Sh. S. K. Sharma vs. MCD and Ors. in which the complainant and Mahesh Sharma were alleged as parties. In said petition the accused filed two complaints addressed to the monitoring committee of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, complaining about unauthorized construction and encroachment. Both the complaints were purportedly signed by one 'Pushpa' in English and Hindi and in both the complaints her residential address was shown as C/o Seat no. 29 PS Rathi Block, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi and also at House No. 362 Chirag Delhi, New Delhi. Complainant has claimed that he has sufficient evidence to show that 'Pushpa' is a fictitious person and it was the accused who had forged signature of some dummy 'Pushpa'. Complainant had also got compared the signature of said dummy 'Pushpa' with the handwriting of accused from handwriting expert whose report point out that the accused had forged the signature of dummy character 'Pushpa'. Further the complainant no. 2 also made a complaint dated 20.03.2011 against accused no.1 and his mother to police authorities regarding allegations of extortion and threat. However, when no action was taken by police officials, the complainant filed the complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. before Ld. MM on 08.03.2013 and matter proceeded for PSE.
9. On 15.04.2013 complainant no. 2 R K Gaur was examined as CW-1 and Ombir as CW-2. On the NDOH i.e. 28.09.2013 complainant no. 1 Sandeep Bhalla was examined as CW-3. Thereafter on 29.11.2013, Surender Singh was examined as CW-4 and matter was fixed for Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 6 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:31 +0530 21.01.2014. However, on 08.01.2014 file was taken up and after recording the statement of complainant no. 2 R K Gaur that he wish to withdraw his complaint and the pre-
summoning evidence, matter was dismissed as withdrawn. The order dated 08.01.2012 was challenged and vide order dated 02.04.2014 same was set aside by Ld. revisionist court, giving right to complainant no. 1 to prosecute the complaint further. Thereafter, the complainant examined Vijay Singh Chandel SHO, PS Malwiya Nagar as CW-5, Deepak Jain handwriting expert as CW-6, Nand Kishore record Klerk from building department SDMC, South Zone as CW-7, Inspector Jarnail Singh as CW-8 , HC Rajesh Kumar as CW-9 and HC Hanish Suri as CW-10.
10. Thereafter, pre-summoning evidence was closed on 30.11.2016 and the case was fixed for arguments on the point of summoning the accused persons. Accordingly, Ld. MM after hearing arguments vide impugned order dated 10.12.2018 on not finding any material against accused no.2, summoned only the accused no.1 S K Sharma for offence u/s 384 IPC.
11. The relevant para of impugned order dated 18.12.2018 are reproduced below:-
"(7) At this stage of passing the order on summoning it has to be seen whether a prima case warranting summoning of the accused for the offence alleged is made out. In so far as the allegations of extortion are concerned, from the statements recorded of the complainant/ CW-3 and the witnesses CW-2 Sh. Ombir and CW-4 Sh. Surender Singh and also the CD accompanied with the certificate u/s 65 B Evidence Act, it appears prima facie that the alleged no. 1 S. K. Sharma intentionally put the complainant Sh.
Sandeep Bhalla in fear of injury and dishonestly induced him to deliver an amount of approximately Rs. 1 Lakh to him. There is Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 7 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:35 +0530 sufficient material on record to summon the alleged no. 1 S. K. Sharma for answering to the allegations for the offence punishable u/s 384 IPC. However, there are no specific allegations against the alleged no. 2 Vijay Laxmi nor are there any allegations that she received any money from the complainant or any other CW in pursuance to purported extortion.
(8) In so far as the allegations of forgery are concerned, it is the complainant's own case that the alleged forged documents were filed in the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. There is no averment to the effect that the alleged offence or any part thereof occurred within the jurisdiction of this court and therefore for lack of territorial jurisdiction the merits of the allegations of forgery are not be considered by this court. The complainant is at liberty to file the separate proceedings regarding the allegations of forgery before the court of appropriate territorial jurisdiction as per law. (9) In view of the aforesaid discussion, let the summons be issued only to the accused S. K. Sharma for answering to the allegations for the offence u/s 384 IPC on filing of PF by the complainant. As there is no sufficient material available on record against the alleged no. 2 Vijay Laxmi so she is not being summoned."
12. Being aggrieved by the order dated 18.12.2018, the complainant has filed the revision no. 108/2019, assailing the impugned order on various grounds which can be summarized as under:-
(a) that the impugned order passed by Ld. Trial court has been passed on surmises and conjectures without considering the evidence on record and therefore, the finding of Ld. Trial Court is perverse.
(b) Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider the evidence available on record to the effect that the offence of forgery was committed by the respondent no. 2/ accused within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar.
(c) Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence and further ignored complainant's testimony to the Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:40 +0530 Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 8 of 23 factum of forgery having taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court.
(d) Ld. Trial court erred by ignoring the averment to the effect that alleged offence of forgery occurred within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
(e) Ld. Trial court has not given correct findings as there is alarming evidence on record attracting 468 IPC having been committed by respondent no. 2 herein/ accused no. 2 and therefore, the same calls for examining of the record as to the correctness, legality and propreity of the impugned order to the extent of not summoning the accused for offence u/s 468 IPC.
13. On the other hand the accused has preferred the revision petition bearing no. 291/2019, seeking setting aside the impugned order on following grounds:-
(a) that the Ld. MM has completely overlooked that there is no cogent and reliable evidence regarding the alleged money transaction to the accused and just on the basis of uncorroborated verbal testimony of interested witnesses, the accused ought not to have been summoned to reply to the allegations of extortion against him.
(b) that Ld. MM has erred in concluding that there is sufficient material on record to summon the accused for answering to the allegations for the offence punishable u/s 384 IPC.
Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 9 of 23 PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:43 +0530
(c) that the Ld. trial court has failed to scrutinize the evidence properly as from the evidence available on record no offence of extortion is made out against the accused.
(d) that while taking cognizance, the court has to record the reasons that prima facie case is made out and that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused for that offence, however, the trial court has failed to do so.
(e) that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider that the maximum period of punishment provided for the offence of extortion punishable u/s 384 IPC is 3 years and the maximum period of taking cognizance for the said offence is also three years, which in the present case has elapsed long back as the complaint in question has been filed after five years.
(f) that the Ld. MM has failed to consider the fact that no specific date and time of the alleged offence has been given in the complaint or in the statement made by the respondent no. 2/ complainant.
(g) that the condonation of delay has to be dealt prior to the taking of cognizance and if cognizance is taken without condoning the delay it shall be hit by provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C.
(h) that the impugned order clearly lacks the reflection of application of judicial discretion because it is incorrect, illegal, and improper since all the ingredients Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 10 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:46 +0530 of offence of extortion are not present in the complaint, statements and evidence recorded.
14. I have heard the rival submissions advanced by accused and the Ld. counsel for the complainant. I have also gone through the written submissions/reply filed by parties and perused the record.
15. Ld. counsel appearing for the complainant argued that the revision filed by the accused is barred by limitation as same has been filed after a long delay without any justification for seeking extension of period of limitation. He further submitted that the hand writing expert Deepak Jain has given his report, observing that writing on the forged documents are of one and same person Sanjeev Vashisht @ S K Sharma. He argued that accused forged the signature of Poonam, who had not filed the W.P. no. 3388/2010 and also signed letters in the name of Pushpa which he filed as annexures in CWP no. 4322/2007. He submitted that the documents were prepared at Chirag Delhi by accused in his handwriting and same falls within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar. He further submitted that in the two complaints dated 21.01.2007 and 12.05.2007, purportedly signed by one Pushpa, the address mentioned is 362, Chirag Delhi, New Delhi which squarely falls within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar. Further the Writ petitions (Civil) No. 4322/07 and 1710/08 were filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 23.05.2007 and 10.02.2008, whereas, the complaint dated 21.01.2007 and 12.05.2007 were Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 11 of 23 PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:49 +0530 signed earlier and later on filed along with the writ petition. He submitted that same clearly shows that the offence of forgery was not committed at Delhi High Court but at H. No. 362, Village, Chirag Delhi, New Delhi. He argued that merely because the said complaints were filed before Hon'ble Delhi High Court, does not conclusively go to show that offence of forgery was not committed within the jurisdiction of the Ld. MM. Ld. counsel for complainant has argued that the non summoning of the accused for a serious offence would not entitle the accused to get benefit of the reduced period of limitation and to contend that the cognizance was taken beyond the period of limitation. Ld. Counsel for the complainant has relied upon judgment i.e. Amrit Lal Vs. Shanti Lal Soni and ors. Criminal Appeal no. 301 of 2022 decided on 28.02.2022, (2022) 13 SCC 128.
16. Per contra, accused refuted the said contentions by arguing that there is no averment in the deposition of witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant to the effect that the alleged offence u/s 468 IPC or any part thereof occurred within the jurisdiction of the court which passed the impugned order. He submitted that for lack of territorial jurisdiction the Trial Court has rightly not considered the allegations of forgery. He further submitted that the alleged document is a complaint made to the Dy.
Commissioner of MCD and to monitoring committee of Hon'ble Delhi High Court and what has been filed in the High Court is photocopy of the complaint made by Ms. Pushpa and not the original complaint. He submitted that Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 12 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:55 +0530 the complainant never made a complaint to Dy. Commissioner, MCD or the monitoring committee that the alleged complaint is false and frivolous or it bears forged signature. He further submitted that the observations of handwriting expert can not be relied upon as neither the original handwriting of accused or of Ms. Pushpa or the original complaint was before him for comparison. He submitted that the Place where document was signed is specifically mentioned as New Delhi and it can not be read as South Delhi or Chirag Delhi. He also submitted that no complaint of any forgery was made by Ms. Pushpa that her signature has been forged. He submitted that the petition which was filed by the accused was supported with an affidavit, which is signed and attested at Delhi High Court. He submitted that all the public witnesses who have deposed during the pre-summoning evidence are interested witnesses being the relatives, neighbours of the complainant having their personal grudge against him. It is further submitted that there is no documentary proof regarding the alleged phone number to suggest that who made the call to whom from which number. The allegations of complainant that the accused used to threat the villagers of Chirag Dilli on pretext of making complaint against them and thereby extorted money from them is totally baseless and false.
17. The accused has relied upon following judgments:-
i. M/s. Pepsi Foods vs. Special Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128, ii. Paul George Vs. State 2002 Crl. L. J. 996, Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 13 of 23 Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:58:58 +0530 iii. S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, iv. Anita Malhotra Vs. Apparel Export Promotioin Council (2012) 1 SCC 520, v. Mehmood UI Rehman Vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Ors (2015) 12 SCC 420, vi. Raj Kumar Agarwal Vs. State of UP and Anr 1999 Cr.LJ 4101, vii. S. W. Palanitkar and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Another, AIR 2001 SC 2960 that Cr.P.C.
S. 203, viii. R. S. Nayak vs. A. R. Antulay & Anr. passed on 17 April 1986, ix. State of Maharashtra Vs. Sharadchandra Vinayakdongre and Ors, AIR 1995 S.C. 231 x. P. K. Choudhury Vs. Commander 48 BRTF (GREF) 2008 (3) Scale 575 decided on 13th of March 2008 xi. Krishan Lal Chawla & ors. Vs. State of U. P. & Anr.
xii. Balbir Singh & Ors. Vs. The state Govt of NCT of Delhi. Crl. M. C. 4620/2017 & Crl. M.A 18409/2017, xiii. Raja @ Rajendra Prasad Swain @ Rajendra Pratap Swain Vs. Union of India, R.P.F, Crl M.C. 2818 of 2021, xiv. Vikas Thakur vs. State of NCT of Delhi, Crl. M. C. No. 6619 of 2023 and xv. Mrs. Sarah Mathew Vs. The Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease Criminal Appeal no. 829 of 2005.
18. Having heard, Ld. Counsel for both the parties, the first issue to be decided is what offences are committed by the accused in the present case. The complaint under section 200 CrPC was filed alleging the offences Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 14 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:02 +0530 punishable under 468/384/506/34 IPC. The accused was ordered to be summoned for the offence under section 384 IPC alone and not for the offence under section 468 IPC which involves more severe punishment. The counsel for the complainant had submitted that the accused be summoned for offence under section 468 IPC for committing forgery. The accused, however, has agitated that no offence of forgery is made out against him and therefore, the court has no jurisdiction to try the accused for section 384 IPC also as the same is barred by limitation.
19. Therefore before deciding the issue of limitation, it is essential to adjudicate first upon the issue that whether on the facts as stated, the Ld. Magistrate was having the jurisdiction for trial of accused for offence under 468 IPC or not, because this issue will be the decisive factor in deciding the contention raised by accused in regard to limitation.
20. Section 468 IPC is reproduced here under;
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating;-.
"Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
21. Complainant has challenged the impugned order alleging that accused in order to achieve his purpose has forged the signature of some dummy 'Pushpa' at Chirag Delhi, PS Malviya Nagar and filed these documents as Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 15 of 23 Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:07 +0530 annexures in Writ Petition Civil No. 1710/08 titled as 'Sh. S.K. Sharma Vs. MCD & Ors'.
22. At this stage, it will be apt to refer to the relevant provisions for deciding the jurisdiction.
23. Section 177 of the CrPC speaks of ordinary place of inquiry and trial. It reads as follows:
Section 177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial "Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed".
24. Section 177 CrPC enjoins that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such offence was committed. Thus the jurisdiction of the Court is decided only on the basis of the place of commission of the crime.
25. If the commission of the crime is partly within the local area of one Court and partly in another Court, as provided under section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it may be enquired or tried by any one of the Courts having jurisdiction over any such local area.
26. According to section 179 CrPC, if an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence can be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
27. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 16 of 23 PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:11 +0530 100, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed is the general rule. But if no part of cause of action for initiation of proceedings against accused arose within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate, he had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
28. In cases involving forged documents, the offence shall be tried by that court only within whose jurisdiction the forgery was committed or where the forged document was used. The complainant has alleged that the complaint dated 21.01.2007 and 12.05.2007, bearing signature of Pushpa, were signed earlier and later on filed alongwith the Writ Petition as annexures, so it makes it clear that offence of forgery was not committed at Delhi High Court but at house no. 362, village Chirag Delhi. Admittedly, the alleged forged documents bearing the signatures of Pushpa were used in Delhi High Court as annexures in Writ Petition Civil No. 1710/08 titled as 'Sh. S.K. Sharma Vs. MCD & Ors', so the court in that location may have the jurisdiction to try the case and not the Magistrate having jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar, in whose jurisdiction same was not used. Now the issue arises whether the documents were signed/ prepared by the accused, and if so, whether they were signed/ prepared in Chirag Delhi. The complainant has claimed that the forgery was committed within the jurisdiction of Ld. MM as the accused signed the documents in the name of Pushpa and prepared it in Chirag Delhi. The complainant in support of his contention Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 17 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:15 +0530 that documents were signed and prepared by accused has relied on the evidence of CW-6 Sh. Deepak Jain, the handwriting expert. CW-6 was a private handwriting expert, who as expected, supported the case of his client i.e the complainant. Further, he has not examined the original document and only the photocopy was compared. Merely because the documents bearing the name and signature of 'Pushpa' were filed alongwith the Writ petition filed by complainant and that his signatures matched in a comparison made by a private handwriting expert, that itself does not in any event point to the accused being the maker of those documents.
29. Moreover, the location where the person signed the document is not the sole determining factor for territorial jurisdiction. The court has to consider the location where forgery was committed, which may be different from the place of signature. Only that the accused lives in Chirag Delhi and the documents were filed along with the writ petition filed by him in High Court is not sufficient to presume that same were prepared in Chirag Delhi.
30. Therefore, in the present case, I agree with the observation made by Ld. Magistrate that there is no averment to the effect that the alleged offence or any part thereof occurred within the jurisdiction of Ld. MM.
31. In view of above discussion, the revision bearing no. 108/2019 being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed.
Digitally
signed by
Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 18 of 23 PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
PATHAK Date:
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16:59:31
+0530
32. In the complaint filed by the complainant the offence under section 506 IPC is also stated to have been mentioned apart from other offences. Needless to say, this offence is not made out in the facts of the present case. Now left with the offence of extortion under section 384 IPC.
33. As far as section 384 IPC is concerned, accused has relied upon section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code to show that the cognizance was barred by limitation. The relevant provisions are referred as under:-
Section 468 of CrPC. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in subsection (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be-
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
[(3). For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.] Section 469 of CrPC. Commencement of the period of limitation.
(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence,-
(a) on the date of the offence; or Digitally signed by Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 19 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:34 +0530
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.
34. Section 468 CrPC clearly mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation of three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
35. Section 469 CrPC also makes it amply clear that the period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence on the date of the offence.
36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Mohan Vikal vs. Ascharaj Lal Chopra (1978) 2 SCC 403 observed as under in the respect of Section 468 CrPC:-
"8. It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 468 which prohibits every court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case."
37. Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. K. Choudhary vs. Commander 48 BRTF (GREF) (2008) 13 SCC229 held Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 20 of 23 PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:39 +0530 that a Court cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. It was also held that if the delay is not condoned, the Court will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance. The relevant part of the decision reads thus:-
"...15. As an option to get the appellant tried in a ordinary criminal court had been exercised by the respondent, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that all the prerequisites therefore in regard to the period of limitation as also the necessity to obtain the order of sanction were required to be complied with. A court of law cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. Delay in filing a complaint petition therefore has to be condoned. If the delay is not condoned, the court will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance. Similarly unless it is held that a sanction was not required to be obtained, the court's jurisdiction will be barred."...
38. Therefore, under clause (b) of section 468 Cr.PC, the period of limitation is three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three year. The offence u/s 384 IPC is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years and therefore, the period of limitation shall be three years from the date of commission of offence. As per section 469 of Cr.PC, the period of limitation in relation to an offender shall commence on the date of the offence.
39. Having once come to the conclusion that the offence which the petitioner can be accused of or tried is punishable under section 384 IPC only, there was no option open to the Magistrate than to resort to the provisions of section 468 Cr.P.C. As sub-clause (c) of Sub- Section (2) provides that the period of limitation shall be three years, if the offense is punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year but not exceeding three years.
Digitally
signed by
PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29
16:59:43
Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 21 of 23 +0530
40. Merely in the complaint certain offences are such, cognizance for which is not subject to any limitation does not mean that the court is empowered to take cognizance beyond the period of limitation for the offence which is found to have been actually committed. The Court is required to peruse and scan the material and the facts of the case to arrive at conclusion which particular offence is made out for the purpose of summoning and trial and not to follow blindly as to the offence referred to or resorted to in the complaint filed.
41. The Ld. Magistrate has observed that in the present case the complainant no. 2 withdrew his complaint and so the testimony of complainant no. 2 / CW-1 Sh. R. K. Gaur is not being considered and the complaint, allegations only so far as they pertain to the complainant no. 1's case are being considered. Thus, the accused has been summoned for offence u/s 384 IPC based on the allegation made by the complainant Sandeep Bhalla in his complaint and the deposition of witnesses examined on his behalf.
42. The date and time of offence as per complainant Sandeep Bhalla is of the year 2006-2007. Admittedly, the complaint was filed on 08.03.2013 i.e after more than 5 years. Therefore, the criminal complaint is barred by the period of limitation because as discussed above the offence committed is only of extortion.
43. The law provides certain procedural advantages to any accused, the accused cannot be deprived of them. Otherwise the purpose of this benedictory provision for Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 22 of 23 PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.03.29 16:59:50 +0530 accused will become otiose simply by mentioning any offence in the complaint which may on merits and after hearing the accused may not found to exist.
44. That being so and the fact that offence punishable under section 384 IPC is barred by limitation, the revision no. 291/2019 is allowed, thereby setting aside the impugned order.
45. In view of the aforesaid, the revision petitions are disposed of.
46. TCR alongwith a copy of this judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court.
47. One copy of judgment under signature of undersigned be placed in Crl. Rev. No. 108/2019 and digitally signed copies be placed in Cr Rev No. 291/2019.
48. Copy of the judgment be given dasti.
49. The revision files be consigned to the Record Room Digitally signed after due compliance. by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date: 2025.03.29 16:59:54 +0530 ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT (PURSHOTAM PATHAK) TODAY ON THIS ASJ-05(SOUTH) 24th DAY OF MARCH, 2025 SAKET COURTS: N.D (This judgment contains total 23 signed pages) Crl. Rev No. 108/2019 & Crl. Rev No 291/2019 Page No. 23 of 23