Himachal Pradesh High Court
Mrs. Meenakshi vs Shri Rajinder Kumar & Ors on 31 May, 2018
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
C.R. No. 132 of 2005 a/w .
C.R. No. 120 of 2007 Reserved on: 21.05.2018 Date of decision : 31st May, 2018.
_________________________________________________________________ C.R. No. 132 of 2005 Mrs. Meenakshi ...Petitioner Versus Shri Rajinder Kumar & Ors. ....Respondents C.R. No. 120 of 2007 Mrs. Meenakshi r Versus Shri Rajinder Kumar & Ors.
to ...Petitioner
....Respondents
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. R. K. Bawa, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Rajeev K. Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent No.1 : Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Sr. Advocate, with Ms. Poonam Gehlot, Advocate.
Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge The petitioner filed an eviction petition against the respondent on the ground of bonafide requirement of the premises which though was allowed by the learned Rent Controller, however, on an appeal being preferred by the respondent before the learned appellate authority, the order passed by the learned Rent Controller came to be set aside.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 22. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned appellate authority, the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition under .
Section 24 (5) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short the 'Act') and is being subject matter of Civil Revision No. 132 of 2005.
3. The petitioner sought eviction of the respondent from the tenanted premises consisting of three rooms, kitchen, bath and toilet in 'Amar Niwas', The Mall, Shimla (for short the 'premises').
4. The eviction of the respondent was sought on the ground that the petitioner required the premises bonafidely for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family. It was averred that the premises, in question, alongwith the premises in occupation of Indian Coffee Workers Corporation Society Limited were required by the petitioner for the aforesaid purpose. According to the petitioner, the premises had fallen to her share after the death of her father late Shri Amar Chand Sood. The petitioner alongwith her family members was residing in a rented accommodation at Chandigarh and she intended to settle permanently at Shimla but due to non-
availability of accommodation she was unable to do so. Her family consisted of herself, husband and two school going children. She prayed that respondent be ordered to handover the vacant possession of the premises in question to her.
5. The respondent contested the petition by filing reply wherein he raised preliminary objections that there is no relationship ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3 between landlord and tenant between the parties; that the eviction petition on the ground of personal requirements was not .
maintainable; that petition lacks material particulars and that the petitioner was estopped from filing the petition by her own acts and conduct etc.
6. On merits, it was alleged that at the time of taking the premises in question on rent, the respondent was carrying on business and the premises were being used for residential as well as for running head office of the business of transport and allied business, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. It was further averred that the petitioner was not landlady of the premises in question. He denied that the premises were bonafidely required by the petitioner for own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of her family members, as alleged. It was also denied that the premises in question had fallen to the share of the petitioner after the death of her father. It was averred that immediately after the death of Shri Amar Chand Sood, his wife Urmil Sood, Shri Vijay Kumar Sood alleged themselves to be the owners of the premises and filed eviction petition against the respondent on the ground of non-
payment of rent and in those proceedings the petitioner never asserted her rights vis-a-vis the premises in question at that juncture.
It was also averred that the petitioner is permanently residing at Chandigarh alongwith her family and the present petition had been ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 4 filed in connivance with Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, who were, in fact, the owners of the premises. It was also averred .
that the present petition has been filed with an ulterior motive to force and coerce respondent to accede to the unwarranted demand of the owner to enhance rent from Rs.160/- per month to Rs.1000/- per month. It was further averred that there are five storeys in the building in question and late Shri Amar Chand Sood was in occupation of two storeys of the said building and the said building was having accommodation of more than ten rooms. Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood were also in occupation of one more set consisting of three rooms which was earlier in occupation of M/s Sanjay Traders.
The respondent prayed for dismissal of the petition with cost.
7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the petitioner bonafide requires the demised premises for her personal and also for use and occupation family members as alleged?OPA
2. Whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?OPA
3. Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged in preliminary objection No. 2?OPR.
4. Whether this petition lacks material particulars as alleged? OPR.
5. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing this petition by her act and conduct as alleged?OPR
6. Relief.::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 5
8. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the eviction petition was allowed by the learned Rent Controller and the .
respondent was directed to handover the vacant possession of the premises in question within a period of 60 days from the date of this order. However, aforesaid order was assailed by the respondent by filing appeal before the appellate authority, who vide its order dated 08.08.2005 allowed the appeal and consequently the eviction petition filed by the petitioner was ordered to be dismissed.
9. It is against the order of the appellate authority that the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition on the ground that the findings recorded by the learned first appellate authority are perverse as it has not considered the pleadings and the evidence available on record in the right perspective and thereby reached at a wrong conclusion.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case.
10. Before I proceed to consider the relative merits of the case, it would be noticed that during the pendency of this petition, the respondent filed an application for additional evidence that was registered as CMP No. 643 of 2009 whereby he sought to place and prove on record the records of the Tax Inspection list for the period 1995 to 2006 from the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Even though this application was contested, however, vide order dated ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 6 30.09.2010, the application came to be allowed and the respondent was permitted to prove the documents as referred to in the .
application while reserving liberty to the petitioner to lead evidence to rebut the additional evidence. The case subsequently came up for the final hearing on 06.10.2016, when this Court noticed that an application being CMP No. 19238 of 2013 for leading secondary evidence filed by the respondent under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 151 CPC was still pending. The arguments of this application were heard and the same was allowed and the respondent was permitted to lead secondary evidence to prove the contents of the alleged rent agreement dated 01.04.2004 executed between Smt. Urmil Sood, Vijay Kumar Sood and The Tribune Trust, Chandigarh and liberty was reserved to the petitioner to lead rebuttal evidence.
11. It is, thus, clear that this case not only requires to be decided on the basis of the material that was before the learned Rent Controller, but this Court would also be required to consider both oral and documentary evidence that have been led by the parties before this Court.
12. Adverting to the oral evidence that has been led before the learned Rent Controller, the petitioner appeared as PW1 and deposed that her father Shri Amar Chand Sood was the owner of the five storeyed building who died intestate and on his death the ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 7 building in question was inherited by his legal heirs including his five daughters, his widow Smt. Urmil Sood and son Shri Vijay Kumar Sood.
.
She further stated that in the family settlement, the building in question was partitioned among all legal heirs of Shri Amar Chand Sood and the premises in question i.e. third floor had fallen to her share. She further stated that she had been residing in Chandigarh with her husband and two school going children and she was running a Yoga teaching classes at Chandigarh. She stated that she alongwith her family wanted to settle permanently at Shimla and also start yoga classes, but due to non-availability of accommodation she was unable to do so.
13. PW-2 Smt. Urmil Sood, the mother of the petitioner and proforma respondent deposed that previously her husband Shri Amar Chand Sood was owner of the building in question who died intestate in the month of December, 1991. Upon his death, the building was inherited by his legal representatives including the petitioner. She further stated that in the family settlement the building was partitioned among the legal heirs and the premises in question had fallen to the share of the petitioner. She further stated that the petitioner alongwith her family resided at Chandigarh in a rented accommodation. Lastly, she stated that the petitioner wanted to settle permanently at Shimla, therefore, required the premises in ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 8 question for own use and occupation as well as for use and occupation of her family.
.
14. PW-3 Smt. Mridula Sood, sister of the petitioner, deposed on the same line as PW-2 Smt. Urmil Sood.
15. To similar effect is the statement of PW-4 Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, brother of the petitioner.
16. Adverting to the evidence led by the respondent, RW-1 Shri Vijay Kumar deposed that he had been visiting the premises in question which was in occupation of the respondent were being used for residence and one front room was being used for office purpose.
He further stated that previously the respondent was running business of transport and thereafter he started business of saw-mill and orchard. In cross examination, this witness admitted that he was co-brother (sadu) of the respondent.
17. One Surat Ram, an employee of the respondent, appeared as RW-2 and deposed that he had worked as Clerk with the respondent from 1971 to 1980 and at that time the respondent had been running business of saw-mill at Narkanda and he was using one room in the premises as his office.
18. Respondent appeared as RW-3 and deposed that he was inducted as tenant by late Shri Amar Chand Sood. The building consisted of five storeys and two complete storeys were in occupation of Smt. Urmil Devi and Vijay Kumar Sood and other legal heirs/ ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 9 members of the family. One set in the building was vacated by a tenant in the year 1995-96. The rent of the premises was Rs.160/- per .
month and these premises were situated in a commercial locality. He also stated that he had been using one room of the premises for office purpose as previously he was running business of transport and later on started business of saw-mill and orchard etc. in Narkanda and Matiana and had been managing his business from premises in question. He further stated that after the death of late Shri Amar Chand Sood, his wife Smt. Urmil Sood and son Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, had filed a petition against him on the ground of arrears of rent for the period from August, 1990 to November, 1999 and he had tendered the rent in the Court. He further stated that Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood asked him to increase rent but he declined their requests, therefore, this petition had been filed in connivance with Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood. He further stated that late Shri Amar Chand Sood had given an undertaking that he would sell the premises in question for him to Rs.2,00,000/- but later on the deal could not be finalised due to death of Shri Amar chand Sood. He also stated that all the daughters of Shri Amar Chand Sood were married and out of these three daughters were living abroad. He further deposed that petitioner alongwith her family members had permanently settled at Chandigarh. He lastly deposed that petitioner ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 10 has sufficient accommodation in the building in question for her residence.
.
19. As regards the evidence led before this Court in the application for additional evidence, the respondent examined Ramesh Chand, Clerk, Tax Department, Municipal Corporation, Shimla as AW-
1, who stated that he had been working in the Tax Department for the last two years and has brought the summoned record. He proved on record tax inspection reports Ext. AW-1/A-1 to AW-1/A-9. He further deposed that these reports find mention the name of owners, tenants and the rent being paid. Lastly, he deposed that assessment of the tax of the building was being made on the basis of its rental value and as per the record and the payment of tax in respect of building had been made regularly by the owners. In cross-examination this witness stated that the entries in the register had been made after spot inspection though he had not prepared any such spot inspection.
He further deposed that it is only Form-C that is required to be filled-
up on the option of the owner but had not brought any such form at the time of his examination.
20. Amit Sharma, Head Legal and Administration, The Tribune Trust, appeared as AW-2 and stated that he had been working with the said Trust since 01.03.2012. He stated that he had brought the summoned record and as per record the Tribune Trust had rented premises situated in the building in question. The premises were let ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 11 out to the Trust in April, 2004 and rent agreement to this effect was entered into between the landlords and the Tribune Trust on .
01.04.2004. He further stated that he only possessed photocopy of the agreement in terms whereof the original agreement had been handed over to the Trust but the same was not in possession of the Trust. Rent agreement had been signed by the landlords Smt. Urmil Sood, Shri Vijay Sood and had also been signed by the General Manager on behalf of the Tribune Trust. The photocopy of the rent agreement was exhibited as Ext.AW-2/A though the same was objected to by the petitioner. He further deposed that rent agreement was renewed on 02.04.2009. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that the agreement Ext.AW-2/A had not been entered into between the parties in his presence as he was not in the service of the Trust at the relevant time. He further admitted that he had not dealt with agreement in any manner and had no personal knowledge about the executants of this agreement. He further stated that he had seen the building where the premises were situated but not aware about the number of owners of the building. He was also not aware as to whether the owners had mutually partitioned the property amongst themselves. He feigned ignorance about Smt. Urmil Sood being the power of attorney holder of Smt. Brij Bala Sood and Smt. Mridula Sood. He further feigned ignorance about Smt. Brij Bala Sood and Smt. Mridula Sood residing outside the country. He admitted that he ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 12 had not seen Smt. Urmil Sood and was not aware whether she was the mother of Smt. Brij Bala Sood and Smt. Mridula Sood. He admitted .
that the Tribune Trust had various tenanted premises in its occupation. He volunteered to state that Trust would normally keep the original of the rent agreement and in some cases second copy of the rent agreement. He admitted that he had not seen the original agreement Ext.AW-2/A and further stated that these rent agreements are dealt with by the Senior Clerk in the Administration Department of the Trust. He admitted that he had not dealt with the rent agreement in the year 2004 as he was not in service in the office of the Trust.
21. Now adverting to the evidence led by the petitioner, she herself appeared as RW-1 and stated that late Shri Amar Chand Sood was her father and owned the building named as 'Amar Niwas' and after his death the building devolved upon her mother Smt. Urmil Sood, brother Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, sisters Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood, Smt. Manju Sood, Smt. Neerja Sood and herself and all the aforesaid persons had settled the possession of the property whereby Shri Vijay Kumar Sood was residing on the top floor;
her mother in the fourth floor and it was decided that the third floor would go to herself, second floor would go to Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood and first floor would go to Smt. Neerja and Smt. Manju. She further stated that Smt. Brij Bala Sood was permanent resident of Canada and was residing there for the last more than 45 ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 13 years, whereas Smt. Mridula Sood was widow and was residing in India as well in United States. Their properties were being looked after .
by her mother and brother and such arrangement had been mutually worked out by her sisters alongwith her mother and brother.
22. In cross-examination, this witness stated that the settlement as was referred to in examination-in-chief regarding the possession of different legal heirs had been orally worked out and no document qua the same had been executed between the parties. She admitted that no intimation regarding the settlement was given to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. She further deposed that Smt. Brij Bala Sood did not have a bank account in Shimla whereas Smt. Mridula Sood had a joint account with her mother. She admitted that the office of the Tribune was there in the building and located in the second floor from the bottom and the said floor fell to the share of Smt. Mridual Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood. This office was firstly let out somewhere in the year 2003-04 and an agreement of lease to this effect had been entered into but she had not read the terms thereof.
She identified the signatures of her mother and brother on agreement Ext.AW-2/A. Likewise, she identified her signature on document Ext.
RX. She further deposed that the office of the Tribune was still located in the premises. She denied the suggestion that there was no settlement as aforesaid entered into between the legal heirs and late Shri Amar Chand Sood. She denied the suggestion that the story ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 14 regarding family agreement had been cooked up only to seek eviction of the respondent. She further denied the suggestion that the legal .
heirs of late Shri Amar Chand Sood were still joint owners of the entire building.
23. Smt. Urmil Sood, the mother of the petitioner appeared as RW-2 and stated that Amar Niwas had been divided between various legal heirs of late Shri Amar Chand Sood whereas top floor had been given to Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, fourth floor to Smt. Urmil Sood, third floor to Smt. Meenkashi, second floor to Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood and first floor to Smt. Manju and Smt. Nirja Sood. Smt. Brij Bala Sood had been residing in Toronto whereas Smt. Mridula Sood was residing in India as also in United States. The floor belonging to Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood were being looked after by her, even though no document to this effect had been executed as the same was only oral settlement entered into between them. She further deposed that Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood occasionally came to visit her. Lastly, she stated that the premises in possession of the Tribune Trust had been given by her as Smt. Mridual Sood had given authority to this effect vide Special Power of Attorney Ext.R1.
24. In cross-examination, this witness stated that late Shri Amar Chand Sood died in the year 1991 and thereafter the building in question was orally divided between the parties and no written ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 15 document to this effect was executed by them. She admitted the suggestion that no authority had been given to Shri Vijay Sood to deal .
with the property of Smt. Mridula Sood and Smt. Brij Bala Sood and said authority had only been given to her. She did not remember when the Tribune Trust was inducted as a tenant in the premises and stated that an agreement to this effect may have been executed though she did not remember about the same. She admitted her signatures on the agreement Ext.AW-2/A but feigned ignorance about the exact tenure of the lease but stated that the same was executed after every 3-4 years as and when there was an increase in the rent amount. She admitted her signature on document Ext. RX, however, stated that she was not in a position to read the contents of this document because of her poor eye sight. She admitted that in the year, 2014, a fresh agreement had been entered with the Tribune Trust and identified her signatures appearing in agreement Ext. RY.
She admitted that no intimation regarding the aforesaid settlement had been given to Municipal Corporation, Shimla and further admitted that no such intimation had been given to the Revenue Department.
She denied the suggestion that the story regarding family partitioned had been cooked up and made up only to seek the eviction of the respondent.
This in entirety is the evidence led by the parties.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 1625. The object of the Act is to provide for the control of rent and evictions within the limits of urban areas in the State of Himachal .
Pradesh. The existence of the landlord and tenant relationship is inevitable for the Rent Controller to exercise its jurisdiction. The Rent Controller is constituted to resolve the dispute falling within the special, narrow and circumscribed zone i.e., the disputes between the landlords and tenants regarding liability for eviction under Section 14 of the Act. If the landlord - tenant relationship in respect of a building within the limits of the urban area exists and the claim for eviction is under Section 14, then and then alone the Rent Controller shall have jurisdiction.
26. The Rent Control Act is a special enactment conferring certain special rights and imposing certain special obligations upon landlords and tenants. The Rent Control Act imposes restrictions on the right of landlord to evict his tenants on the ground other than what is specified in the Statute.
27. Under the Rent Act, the existence of landlord-tenant relationship is must to attract the jurisdiction of Rent Controller in respect of particular premises. The jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain any suit or proceeding is barred if it relates to eviction of tenant from particular premises to which the Rent Act applies.
28. It is, however, true that even in a suit which is within the purview of the provisions of the Act, a landlord in spite of the tenant's ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 17 denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant, may prove such a relationship and contend that such a defence is not bonafide and/or a .
mere pretence and in fact there exists such a relationship.
29. It is also well settled that once such a relationship is admitted or established a tenant would be estopped or precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general law, makes himself liable for eviction on that ground alone.
30. It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant. In case the tenant denies relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and himself, then the court has to examine the materials available and come to a conclusion whether the said denial, or a dispute as to the title of the petitioner was bonafide or a mere pretence.
31. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession of any premises by a landlord from tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is permissible on one or more of the specified grounds. One such ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 1832. What is bonafide requirement is not defined in the Act.
The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a certain degree of want .
with a thrust within demanding fulfillment. 'Need' or 'requirement' qualified by word 'bonafide' or 'genuine' preceding as an adjective is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. 'Bonafide or genuine need' of the landlord or that the landlord 'genuinely requires' or 'requires bonafide' an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same meaning.
33. In Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, while dealing with the case regarding bonafide requirement of the landlord, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean 'in good faith :genuine'. The word 'genuine' means 'natural : not spurious : real : pure : sincere'. In LawDictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean 'good faith, without fraud or deceit'. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 19 honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord .
claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 2015. A few decided cases apposite to the point may be .
referred. A Division Bench of Madhya Bharat High Court in Motilal v. Badrilal, ILR 1954 Madhya Bharat 1 interpreted clause (g) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat, 2006 whereunder a landlord was entitled to eject a tenant if he "really needs a house for himself and he possesses no other accommodation belonging to him elsewhere". It was held that the landlord was made the sole arbiter of his own requirements but he must prove that he in fact wants and genuinely intended to occupy the premises. His claim would no doubt fail if the Court came to the conclusion that the evidence of "want" was unreliable and that the landlord did not genuinely intend to occupy the premises. As to alternative accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession it was held that it must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the accommodation he was claiming. This statement of law was cited with approval before a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Damodar Sharma v. Nandram Deviram, AIR 1960Madh Pra 345. Pandey, J. recording the majority opinion emphasised the distinction between the expressions 'genuinely requires' and 'reasonably requires' and said :-
"It is wrong to say that "genuinely requires" is the same as "reasonably requires". There is a distinction between the two phrases. The former phrase refers to a state of mind; the latter to an objective standard. "genuine requirement" would vary according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he lives and thinks. Reasonable requirement belongs to the "knowledge of the law" and means reasonable not in the mind of the person requiring the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual facts. In my opinion, in this part of Sec. 4 (g) , the landlord is ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 21 made the sole arbiter of his own requirements but he must prove that he, in fact, wants and genuinely .
intends to occupy the premises. His claim would no doubt fail if the Court came to the conclusion that the evidence of "want" was unreliable and that the landlord did not genuinely intend to occupy the premises. "
16. As to impact of availability of another vacant accommodation with the landlord it was held in Damodar case (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 345) (FB) (supra) that it must satisfy the test of suitability for satisfying the need of the landlord.r
17. The abovesaid Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was cited with approval before this Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemi Chand, 1965 Jab LJ 973 (SC).
19. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, AIR 1988 SC 1422 this Court has held that :-
"The need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that, further, the Court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it and that, that desire tobecome a "requirement" in law must have the objective element of a "need". It must also be such that the Court considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or whittled down".::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 22
34. In G.C. Kapoor vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR 2002 SC 200, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted as follows:
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"It is settled position of law that bonafide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish."
35. Ordinarily, it is for the civil court to determine whether and if so what jural relationship exists between litigating parties. The Tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have to function within the limits of the Statute creating them. But within the provisions of the Act, the Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings, like a separate application in execution proceedings. Mere denial of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot oust the jurisdiction unless it is specifically provided in the Statute. If the Rent Controller finds that the opposite party is not a tenant of the landlord, he must dismiss the landlord's application for eviction, but if he finds that such a plea by the opposite party is not true and that the opposite party is a tenant of the landlord, then, if the ground of eviction is proved, he must order eviction.
36. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, this Court would first be required to go into the question and determine as to whether the respondent is the tenant of the petitioner and then further go to ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 23 the question whether the petitioner is the exclusive landlord or one of the co-landlords and then its effect on the present litigation.
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37. Shri R. K. Bawa, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would contend that the premises in question have fallen to the share of the petitioner in the oral settlement/partitioned arrived at between the parties and it is not open for the tenant to question said partition.
At the same time, it is also not necessary that such transaction be reduced into formal document which is intended to be the evidence of the partition. In support of his contention, he placed strong reliance on the following judgments:-
1. Nani Bai vs. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge, AIR 1958 SC 706.
2. Karpagathachi & ors. vs. Nagarathinathachi, AIR 1965 SC 1752.
3. S. Sai Reddy vs. S. Narayana Reddy and ors., (1991) 3 SCC 647
4. Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhary vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate (1996) 6 SCC 373
5. Bhakhtawar Singh vs. Gurdev Singh and anr. (1996) 9 SCC
370.
6.Ram Narain Singh vs. The Special Judge, (1999) 37 ALR 220.
7.Yogesh Dattaram Pathak vs. Shrikrishna Shriram Joshi (2003) Mah LJ 684.
8.Hans Raj Agarwal and anr. vs. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and ors. (2003) 2 SCC 295
9. Vijay Kumar vs. Sushil Kumar (2005) 1 RCR (Rent) 336.
10. Naresh Kumar vs. Lalit Mohan, (2005) 1 RCR (Rent) 459.::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 24
38. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the proposition as canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, but at the .
same time, it has to be remembered that it is always open to the tenant to show that the partition was not bonafide and was a sham transaction to overcome the rigor of the Act, which protected eviction of tenant except on special ground set out in the relevant Statute (Ref.:- Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhary vs. Gundappa Ambadas Bukate, AIR 1997 SC 998).
39. It would be noticed that the specific case of the tenant is that the petitioner is not the landlord (landlady), therefore, in order to determine this question, it would be necessary to first determine as to who is the landlord under the Act.
40. Section 2(d) of the Act defines landlord as follows:-
The definition of the word 'landlord' is comprehensive and is wider then its literal meaning. It includes not only the real owner(s) but also the agent of the landlord entitled to receive rent from the tenant on behalf of his principal. The co-owner is equally a landlord within the meaning of this definition.
41. As per the aforesaid definition, one of the co-owners can maintain eviction petition against the tenant being one of the landlord even without impleading other co-owners in case the ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 25 other co-owners have no objection and they also want eviction of the tenant. The consent of other co-owners could be assumed as taken .
unless it was shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement as was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwala, 2004 (3) SCC 178, wherein it was observed as under:-
"6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by co-
owners. (See Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (1976) 4 SCC 184 and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16). This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution of the suit, the only exception being whebn by virtue of a subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of law."::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 26
42. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, there is no gainsaying that the petitioner being one of the co-owners of the .
premises could have maintained the eviction petition against the respondent-tenant, more particularly, when all the other co-owners had been joined as parties in this petition and had no objection and also wanted the eviction of the tenant.
43. However, once the petitioner introduces the plea of family arrangement or partition and claims herself to be the exclusive owner of the premises in question, then it would be incumbent upon her to prove her status before an order of eviction can be passed.
44. At this stage, it would be necessary to mention that the appellate authority has dismissed the petition for eviction only on the ground that the petitioner had failed to prove that there was family arrangement or partition amongst the co-owners and had rather cooked up a false story to seek eviction of the respondent-tenant.
45. For arriving at such conclusion, the appellate authority referred to the statement of the petitioner who appeared as PW-1, wherein she has stated that third floor of the building had been given to her in family partition and this fact came to her knowledge in the year 2000. He referred to another part of the statement where the petitioner herself stated that partition matter was finalised in July, 1999 and thereafter the co-owners continue to talk and it was finalised in 2000. On the basis of such statement, it was concluded ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 27 that the family settlement took place in the year 1999 or beginning of the year 2000.
.
46. Reference was thereafter made by the appellate authority to the statement of PW-2 Smt. Urmil Sood, mother of the landlady, who admitted that her three daughters were married and residing in foreign countries. One daughter had come to Shimla in July, 2001 and left in September, 2001. She further admitted that she was not having power of attorney of her daughters and conceded that her eldest daughter Smt. Brij Bala Sood was in a foreign country and in December 1999 came to India only in July, 2001. Whereas her younger daughter Smt. Manju Sood came in July, 2001 and left in September, 2001. Her third daughter Neerja Sood came in December, 1999 and thereafter in November, 2000 and did not return thereafter.
47. On the basis of both these statements, the first appellate court concluded that even though the petitioner while appearing as PW-1 had claimed that the family settlement arrived at between the co-owners in late 1999 and early 2000, but three of the co-owners, as referred to above, had never participated in such negotiations as they were abroad. It further found that there was no linking or evidence that the consent for family settlement was obtained telephonically or otherwise or they had authorised the other co-owners to settle the matter of partition amongst all the co-owners which would be binding upon them.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 2848. The first appellate authority further took note of the attempt made by the witnesses to prove that late Shri Amar Chand .
Sood himself during his life time has expressed and desired that third floor of the building should go to the petitioner and it was held that this was only a wish and nothing more. The first appellate authority further took note of the fact that the family arrangement or partition appeared to be doubtful as it was never reported either to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla or to the revenue agency. It took further note of the fact that no notice of the alleged partition or becoming landlord (landlady) of the demised premises was ever given to the tenant.
49. In addition to the above, the first appellate authority also took into consideration the act and conduct of the mother of the petitioner Smt. Urmil Sood (PW-2) and her brother Shri Vijay Kumar Sood ( PW-4), whereby both of them conceded that they had earlier filed an eviction petition against the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent. However, since the rent had been tendered by the tenant the eviction petition was dismissed. Even though this witness tried to prove that the rent so recovered was paid to the petitioner, however, it is conceded that the petitioner was not even a party to those proceedings.
50. On the basis of the evidence come on record, the first appellate authority concluded that had there been partition or family ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 29 arrangement qua the demised premises, then neither PW-2 Smt. Urmil Sood nor PW-4 Shri Vijay Kumar Sood could have jointly filed .
eviction petition against the tenant rather such petition was required to be filed by the landlord i.e. petitioner nor her other co-owners, which belies the claim of the petitioner qua partition.
51. The theory of family settlement or partition was discarded by the first appellate authority as being un-consciousnable and not inspiring confidence because as per the alleged family partition, the other four daughters had jointly been given two floors i.e. ground floor to two sisters and first floor to two other sisters and it was, therefore, not possible to have given the entire floor to the fifth sister i.e. petitioner.
52. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue that the findings as recorded by the first appellate authority are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside.
53. What is 'perverse' was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:-
"26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 30 the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined `perverse' .
as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right;
turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English -
International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3128. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 .
"8...We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3230. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, .
Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para
7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law."
54. What is 'perverse' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled 'Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:-
"25..... A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law.::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 33
26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant .
material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law.
27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse.
28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated."
55. Thus, it can be taken to be settled that the judgment can be said to be perverse if the conclusions arrived at by the learned Court below is contrary to the evidence on record, or if the Court's entire approach with respect to dealing with the evidence or the pleadings is found to be patently illegal or unreasonable or based on erroneous understanding of law and of the facts of the case. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would have arrived at. Therefore, unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration, the findings cannot be said to be perverse.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3456. Judged in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, no exception can be taken to the findings so arrived at by the first .
appellate court to conclude that the family arrangement or partition were not believable or inspiring confidence because admittedly, the three of the co-owners were not even present when such agreement alleged to have been arrived at between the co-owners. Not only this, there is no evidence led by the petitioner to show that a consensus amongst the co-owners had been arrived at over telephone or through any correspondence.
57. That apart, it has specifically come on record that immediately on the death of Shri Amar Chand Sood, his wife Smt. Urmil Sood and son Shri Vijay Kumar Sood had instituted eviction proceedings against respondent No. 1 on the ground of arrears of rent and once this fact is admitted then obviously the essential consequences that follows out of such admitted position is that either the property had not been partitioned and in case it had been partitioned then the same fell to the share of only Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood and not to the share of the petitioner and, therefore, she cannot be considered the landlord (landlady) of the premises and is, therefore, not entitled to file and maintain the eviction petition.
58. Importantly, it has come on record in the statement of PW-2 that she had directed to call upon the tenant to repair the ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 35 premises in occupation. In what capacity she issued these directions is well understood, as admittedly she is neither the power of attorney .
holder of the petitioner nor she placed any document on record which may show that she had been instructed to do so by the petitioner.
59. As regards the factum of partition or family arrangement, it is not even disputed by the petitioner that the factum thereof was not even brought to the notice of the revenue agency or Municipal Corporation, Shimla so as to have the records corrected and updated.
60. Apart from above, the petitioner has not even denied that notice of alleged partition was ever given to the tenant.
61. Now dealing with the question regarding the records of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla having not been updated on the basis of the alleged family partition, this assumes importance because during this intervening period a part of premises have been let out to the Tribune Trust and the same have allegedly been given by Smt. Mridula Sood, who as per the case of the petitioner has given power of attorney to her mother Smt. Urmil Sood. As per the rent agreement Ext. RY, the premises have been let out at a rental of Rs.34,785/- per month only including municipal taxes. How the premises were let out by Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, who was not even the General Power of Attorney or Special Power of Attorney of Smt. Mridula Sood?
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3662. Once there had been a partition or family settlement as alleged, then obviously the erstwhile co-owners are not expected nor .
would they pay the municipal taxes of the premises let out to the Tribune and would have definitely got the so called partition or family settlement incorporated in the municipal record, so that they are not unnecessarily burdened with the liability to pay the municipal tax.
63. As per the tax inspection reports Ext. AW-1/A to AW-1/9 which pertain to the entries dated 01.07.2005 and 06.07.2007, respectively, the aforesaid premises shown to have been let out in favour of the Tribune Trust at the rental of Rs.2,70,000/- but the same has not shown to be in the ownership of Smt. Mridula Sood.
64. Another aspect which has been taken note and rightly so by the appellate authority is the plea of family partition set up by the petitioner whereby four daughters have jointly been given two floors i.e. ground floor to two sisters and first floor to two other sisters, whereas the entire third floor has been given to the fifth sister i.e. petitioner, which appears to be unconscious and does not even otherwise inspire confidence specially when no reason for the same is forthcoming from the side of the petitioner.
65. Moreover, it is not only admitted but the specific case set up by the petitioner herself that no Will was executed by Shri Amar Chand Sood, so the property essentially has to devolve by way of succession.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 3766. Apart from above, the plea of family partition has not even been specifically set up by the petitioner in her application for .
eviction filed by her under Section 14 of the Act and the only plea as to how the petitioner can maintain this petition is mentioned initially in paragraph 18(a), the relevant portion whereof reads as under:-
"The premises in question, alongwith the adjoining premises occupied by the Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Limited have been fallen into the share of the petitioner after the death of late Amar Chand Sood, who was the father of the petitioner."
67. Similar plea is thereafter contained in para 19, which reads thus:-
"That the building where the premises, in question, is situated was owned by late Amar Chand Sood and after his death the petitioner as well as proforma respondents being the legal heirs of late Shri Amar Chand Sood, became the co-
owner of the building and as the disputed premises alongwith the premises under the occupation of Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Limited, have been fallen into the share of the petitioner. Thus, she is legally entitled to file an eviction petition against the respondent alongwith Indian Coffee Workers Co-perative Society Limited."
68. It would be noticed from the paragraphs extracted above that the petitioner has not stated as to how the premises in question have fallen to her share. Noticeably, there is no mention of there ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 38 being any partition or family arrangement or any settlement having been arrived at between the parties.
.
69. At this stage, this Court needs to bear in mind the object of the rent law to balance the competing claims of the landlord on the one hand to recover the possession of the building let out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary increase of rent or arbitrary eviction. This issue has been considered in detail in the judgment of learned Division Bench of this Court, authored by me, in Chaman Lal Bali and others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, 2016 (2) SLC 1593, wherein it was observed as under:-
Object of the Rent Act:
"12. The relationship between the landlord and the tenant was earlier governed by the general law under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rent legislations were brought about as a socio-legal response to certain historical developments, namely, the acute shortage of housing in the aftermath of the world war-II, the great influx of refugees in a number of States of the Union following the partition of the country and the massive migration inside the country from rural areas to the urban areas as a result of rapid urbanization. The timing of all these developments was roughly the same and, therefore, the law of supply and demand leaned totally in favour of the landlord. The need of that hour, therefore, was to protect the tenant, who would otherwise have been left completely at the mercy of the landlord. It is then that the legislature of various States intervened and brought in the Rent Acts, severely restricting the grounds for enhancement of rent and for eviction of the tenant from the rented premises, thus regulating the ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 39 relationship between the landlord and the tenant beyond the general law by a special law.
.
13. The Courts from 1950s to early 1990s leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. However, a different trend is reflected in the later judgments and this fact is duly noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 28, wherein it was held as under:
"12. Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to observe that there has been a definite shift in the Court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the Courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant - Mohinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 221, Prabhakaran Nair vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1987) 4 SCC 238, D.C. Bhatia vs. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 104 and C.N. Rudramurthy vs. K. Barkathulla Khan (1998) 8 SCC 275. In these and other cases, the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments."
14. The view expressed in Satyawati Sharma's case (supra) was thereafter re-affirmed by a Bench of Hon'ble three Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and another vs. Super Max International Private Limited and Others (2009) 9 SCC 772 and at the same time it was also clarified that there was a need for a more balanced and objective approach to relationship between landlord and ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 40 tenant as would be evident from para-71 thereof, which reads as under:
.
"71. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharma and emphasise the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant.
This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate need of the Court's protection under all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq.ft. in a building situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs. 5236.58, plus water charges at the rate of Rs.515.35 per month more than amply highlights the point.)".
15. In a recent judgment rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sidhharth Viyas and another vs. Ravi Nath Misra and others (2015) 2 SCC 701, it was once again reiterated that the object of Rent Act is to balance the competing claims of the landlord and tenant as would be evident from para 10 of the judgment which reads as under:
"10. The object of rent law is to balance the competing claims of the landlord on the one hand to recover possession of building let out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage of accommodation. Though, it is for the legislature to resolve such competing claims in terms of statutory provisions, while interpreting the provisions the object of the Act has to be kept in view by the Court. Unless otherwise provided, a tenant who has already acquired alternative ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 41 accommodation is not intended to be protected by the Rent Act."
.
70. Having failed to establish her title as exclusive owner of the premises in question, the petitioner obviously cannot seek eviction of respondent No. 1 on any grounds much less the grounds as taken in the petition.
71. This Court in its revisional jurisdiction can interfere with finding of facts arrived at by the appellate authority only if it finds that the findings of the appellate authority are perverse or arbitrary.
This is not the case in the instant revision petition.
72. Section 24(5) of the Act deals with the revisionary power of jurisdiction, which reads thus:-
"(5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit."
73. Identical provisions came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the entire law on the subject held that none of the Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:53 :::HCHP 42 of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from .
the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. It shall be apposite to refer the relevant observations, which reads thus:-
"43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:54 :::HCHP 43 court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such .
finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity."
74. Evidently, the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority is neither perverse nor has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence and such findings cannot be said to be no evidence or misreading of the evidence and also cannot be termed grossly erroneous. Therefore, such findings of fact in the given case cannot be interfered by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:54 :::HCHP 4475. In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving .
the parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
CR No. 120 of 200776. The result of this revision petition is directly dependent upon the outcome of Civil Revision No. 132 of 2005, as this petition was filed by the petitioner for eviction of respondent No. 1 on the ground that he was a chronic defaulter in making the payment of rent despite repeated requests and demands and he was still in arrears of rent as under:-
a) Rent from 1.12.99 to Rs.5,600.00
31.10.2002 i.e. 35 months @
160/- p.m.
b) Municipal Taxes @ 8% on (a) Rs. 448.00
above
c) Interest at the rate of 9% p.a. Rs. 756.00
on the arrears of rent i.e. (a)
above.
Total Amount (a+b+c) Rs. 6804.00
77. The respondent No. 1 contested the petition by filing reply wherein he raised various preliminary objections regarding maintainability, estoppel, like there being no relationship of landlord and tenant, petition being liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the CPC. On merits, it was averred that no detail has been given by the petitioner that as and when and under what circumstances she ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:54 :::HCHP 45 became the owner of the premises. It was averred that the premises were non-residential in nature. It was further averred that at the time .
when the premises were taken on rent, rent note was executed by the respondent in favour of the original landlord and the same was in possession of respondents No. 2 and 3 i.e. Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood and the said rent note was intentionally not placed on record.
78. In addition thereto, the petition was contested on various other grounds as otherwise taken in the earlier eviction petition being subject matter of Civil Revision No. 132 of 2005.
79. The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent and as such the petitioner is entitled for eviction of the respondent, as alleged?
OPP
2. Whether there exist no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?OPR
3. Whether the present petition is liable to be stayed under the provisions of Section 10 of the C.P.C.?OPR
4. Whether the present petition is not maintainable?OPR
5.The petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition? OPR
6. Relief.
80. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned Rent Controller allowed the petition and held the respondent No. 1 in arrears of rent @ Rs.160/- per month w.e.f. 01.12.1999 ::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:54 :::HCHP 46 alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum till date and respondent was ordered to be evicted from the premises within a .
period of 30 days from the date of order. However, it was clarified that this order of eviction would be not executable in case the respondent would deposit the entire arrears of rent in the Court within a period of 30 days.
81. Aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, more particularly, findings regarding the petitioner being the landlord (landlady) of the premises, respondent No. 1 filed the appeal before the appellate authority, who vide its order dated 05.06.2007 allowed the appeal and consequently the petition as filed by the petitioner was ordered to be dismissed.
82. The learned appellate authority while allowing the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 took note of the earlier eviction petition that had been filed by Smt. Urmil Sood and Shri Vijay Kumar Sood, which had attained finality. That apart, he also took into account the order passed by the appellate authority in the earlier case being subject matter of Civil Revision No. 132 of 2005, whereby the appeal of the respondent -tenant had been allowed.
83. This Court has already upheld the petitioner not to be the landlady of the premises, in question, for the reasons stated in that revision petition, which shall be read as mutatis mutandi to this petition.
::: Downloaded on - 31/05/2018 23:03:54 :::HCHP 4784. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own .
costs.
31st May, 2018. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
(sanjeev) Judge
r to
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