Delhi District Court
State vs . Kulwant Singh; Fir No 331/03; Ps Patel ... on 6 May, 2019
IN THE COURT OF MS. BHAWANI SHARMA
ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (WEST)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
(Judgment by Metropolitan Magistrate u/s 355 Cr.P.C)
Serial/CIS Number of the Case 64313/2016
FIR No 331/2003
Police Station Patel Nagar
Date of Commission of Offence 7.8.2003
Date of Institution 23.2.2004
Name of Complainant (if any) Sh. Raj Kumar
Name of Accused Person and his Kulwant Singh
Parentage and Residence s/o. Late Sh Bachan Singh
r/o. H NO B353 Sudarshan Park
Moti Nagar Delhi
Offence Complained or Proved 279/304A IPC
Plea of accused and his Pleaded Not Guilty.
examination (if any) Claimed to be innocent and stated
that he had not committed such
offence.
Final Order Acquitted
Date of such Order 6.5.2019
State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 1/20
1.ALLEGATIONS The story of the prosecution is that on 7.8.2003 at about 2.05 PM at Shadipur Flyover on the road towards Moti Nagar, Delhi accused, while driving a car bearing NO. DL 2CU 0270 in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others struck against one stationery car bearing NO. DL 9CB 5830 from behind which in turn hit one pedestrian Master Ranjeet Singh and caused his death not amounting to culpable homicide and committed offences punishable u/s. 279/304A IPC.
2. FIR On the basis of above facts an FIR bearing No. 331/2003 was registered in the PS Patel Nagar against the accused. Statement of witnesses were recorded, site plan was prepared and after completion of all necessary investigation challan U/s 173 Cr.P.C was presented in the court for trial on 23.2.2004.
3. CHARGE The accused was summoned by the Court to face the trial. Copy of challan as required under section 207 Cr. P.C. was supplied to accused.
On hearing arguments and on perusal of record, prima facie allegations for the offences under section 279/304A IPC was made out against the accused. Accordingly, charge was framed against accused on 30.6.2005. The same was served & read over to the State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 2/20 accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, case was fixed for prosecution evidence.
4. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION 4.1 The ingredients to prove the offence punishable under section 279/304A IPC are as follows: • That the accused voluntarily drove the car in rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others.
• That the accused caused caused death of one child not amounting to culpable homicide.
5. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE In order to prove the above said allegations, the prosecution has cited as many as 8 witnesses, out of which only 10 witnesses have been examined as under: PW1 Raj Kumar@ Raju Eye witness PW2 Pritam Eye witness PW3 Kamlesh Jain Travelling in Maruti 800 PW4 Ct. Jai Pal Joined investigation with IO PW5 Retd ASI Devender Kr Mechanical Inspector PW6 SI Sant Lal Duty Officer PW7 Retd ASI Sudesh Pal Investigating Officer PW8 Raj Kumar Eye witness/driver of PW3 PW1 Sh Raj Kumar claimed to be eye witness who was having tea at tea stall at the spot. PW1 deposed that on 7.8.03 at about 2.00 PM, State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 3/20 45 children were going from Kathputli Colony towards Shadipur and were crossing the road. He further stated that at that time there was no traffic movement and one Maruti Car bearing NO. DL 9CB 5830 was standing at the road. PW1 further stated that another car bearing NO DL 2CU 0270 driven by accused came in rash and negligent manner and hit the stationery car which in turn hit against the child who was crossing the road and the child fell on the road and his statement was recorded by police in the hospital.
PW2 Sh. Pritam also claimed to be eye witness. PW2 deposed that on 7.8.03 at about 2.00 PM he was present at Shadipur Depot to pick his nephew near the bus stand. PW2 similarly stated that one Maruti Car bearing NO. DL 9CB 5830 was standing at the road when another car bearing NO DL 2CU 0270 driven by accused came in rash and negligent manner and hit the stationery car which in turn hit against the child who was crossing the road and the child fell on the road and his statement was recorded by police in the hospital.
PW3 Smt. Kamlesh Jain is another witness who was present at the spot in Maruti Car 800 being driven by PW8. She further stated that at about 2.00 PM after crossing Shadipur Depot then they reached near Kathputli Colony, 4 children were crossing the road and on seeing this her driver stopped the car. She further stated that as her car was stationery, she suddenly felt a jolt and she came to know from her driver that another car had hit her car from behind. She further State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 4/20 stated that due to the said jolt, her car in turn hit a child who was crossing the road. She further stated that thereafter they also rushed to the hospital alongwith the injured.
PW4 Ct. Jaipal Singh had accompanied the IO to the spot where they came to know that the injured had been shifted to hospital and they went to RML Hospital where they collected the MLC of injured who was declared 'brought dead". Thereafter, he went to the PS for registration of the FIR and thereafter the accused was arrested vide memo Ex. PW1/D and the offending car and other car were seized vide memo Ex. PW4/B and Ex. PW4/D. PW5 Retd ASI Devender Kumar was the mechanical inspector and had proved the mechanical inspection report(s) Ex. PW5/A and Ex. PW5/B. PW6 SI Sant Lal was the duty Officer who received the rukka and registered the FIR i.e. Ex. PW6/A. The witness proved the endorsement on rukka as Ex. PW6/B, DD NO 10A and 12A as Ex. PW6/C and Ex. PW6/B. PW7 Retd ASI Sudesh Pal is the investigating officer and proved various documents namely statement of the complainant Ex. PW1/A; tehrir Ex. PW7/A; disclosure statement of accused Ex. PW1/C; arrest memo of accused Ex. PW1/D; seizure memo of offending car Ex.
State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 5/20 PW4/B; seizure memo of DL of driver Ex. PW4/C and seizure memo of RC of car Ex. PW4/F; site plan Ex. PW1/B. PW8 Raj Kumar was the driver of the Maruti car 800. PW8 deposed that when they reached at Shadipur Flyover, his car was stationery at the crossing, TATA Indigo car came from behind and hit his car which in turn hit the students who were crossing the road. PW8 further stated that the driver of Indigo car was driving in high speed and was driving negligently.
6. On 25.10.18 statement of the accused was recorded u/s 281/313 Cr.P.C. wherein he denied the allegations of prosecution, claimed innocence and preferred to lead evidence in his defence, however failed to do so and closed defence evidence on 9.4.2019.
I have heard the Ld. APP for State and Ld counsel for accused and have also carefully perused the entire record and the relevant provisions of the law.
7.1 PW2(Raj Kumar); PW2(Pritam); PW3(Smt. Kamlesh Jain) and PW8(Raj Kumar) were the witnesses who were present at the spot at the time of accident. The testimony of these witnesses is reproduced for ready reference:
"PW1: ON 7.8.03 I was sitting near Shadipur Flyover at tea shop and drank tea. At around 2pm because of holiday children were going to there house and 45 children were going State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 6/20 from Kathputli Colony towards Shadipur and crossing the road. At that time there was no traffic movement and on a road from where traffic was coming from Patel Nagar side one Matuti car DL 9CB 5830 coloure green was standing in the frond of that road. At around 2.05 pm one car Indica NO DL 2CU 0270 which was driven by the accused (sardarji) who is present in the court and is correctly identify by the witness, in the rash and negligent manner and hit the Maruti car bearing NO DL 9CB 5830 which was standing on the road. Consequently that Maruti car hit the child who was crossing the road and the child fallen down on the spot(road). I speedly ran and picked the child. After enquiry I knew the name of driver of Indica i.e. Kulwant Singh s/o. Late Bachan Singh r/o. H NO B353 Sudharshan Park, Delhi. At the spot many people stopped the vehicle of the accused and said that 'gadi se neeche utro aur bachhe ko aspatal lekar jao' accused was not coming out from his car and try to run away by speeding the accelerator but because of crowed he could not run away. I on the spot with the help of few peoples went to RML Hospital in the same offending vehicle i.e. Indica Car. In the hospital doctor declared the death of child. One ASI Sudesh Pal came to the hospital and recorded my statement......... "
"PW2: On 7.8.03 I went to Shadipur Depot for picking my nephew who were coming from school. At around 2pm I was standing near bus stand for picking my nephew on the road of Patel Nagar side. At that time some children were crossing the road and there was no movement of traffic on the road. One Maruti Car DL 9CB 5830 colour green was standing in the front on the road. At that time one car Indica bearing NO DL 2CU 0270 which was driving by the accused(sardarji) who is present in the court and is correctly identify by the witness, in the rash and negligent manner and hit the Maruti car bearing NO DL 9CB5830 which was standing on the road. Consequently that Maruti car hit the child who was crossing the road and the child fallen down on the spot(road). Rajkumar(who was State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 7/20 drinking tea at the nearby tea stall) speedily ran and picked the child. At the spot many people stopped the vehicle of the accused and said that 'gadi se neeche utro aur bachhe ko aspatal lekar jao'. Accused was not coming out from his car and try to run away by speeding the accelerator but because of crowd he could not run away. Raj kumar alongwith me went to RML Hospital in the same offending vehicle i.e. Indica car. In the hospital doctor declared the death of child whose name was Ranjeet Singh s/o. Lal Babu Singh r/o. 527 Prem Nagar Delhi. At that time the age of the child was around 11 years. The death of child was due to rash and negligence driving of the driver who is accused in the present case by hitting the Maruti Car from behind....."
"PW3: I am Reader at Maitri College. On 7.8.03 I was going from my college to mt residence. I was in my car maruti 800 being driven by my driver Raj Kumar. At about 2 pm after crossing Shadipur Depot when we reached near Kathputli Colony, 4 children were crossing the road. On seeing it my driver stopped the car. Two children had already crossed the rod and the remaining two were in the process of crossing it. As my car was in stationery position suddenly felt a jolt and in inquired from my driver that what has happened. My driver told me that our car is hit by another car from behind. Because of this impact our car was moved and it hit a child that was crossing the road at that moment. I got down from the car and asked my driver to take care of the child and thereafter I saw that one Indica that was carrying school children had hit our car. That car was of Maroon colour. I saw one sikh person standing near the Indica car and I complained him that you have damaged my car by hitting it from behind. Thereafter the injured child was removed to RML Hospital in Indica car and we also rushed to the hospital alongwith them in our own car. There the doctor after examination declared the child as dead....."
"PW8: ON 7.8.03 I was working of the driver of Smt. Kamlesh Jain who State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 8/20 used to teach in Maitri College. ON that day, I was driving her car Maruti 800 and picked her from her home and was driving to the abovesaid college. When we had reached Shadipur flyover and were waiting at the crossing on the road, accused Kulwant Singh who was driving TATA indigo car came from the backside and hit our car from the back. Due to this our car hit the students who were crossing the road at that time. At that time the driver of the said Indigo car was driving in High speed and was driving negligent. I was first in the queue at the crossing when the said Indigo car hit my car from the back. When I had tried to came out from the car, the driver of the Indigo car again hit my car from the back in order to escape from the spot. I immediately get out from the car and asked the driver why he has hit my car despite the fact that I stopped at the crossing, at this time, public persons had also gathered at the spot and took the injured children to the hospital. I had also gone to the hospital where police officials had also arrived and enquired from me about the accident......"
It is perused that none of these witnesses supported the case of the prosecution. PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW8 made certain contradictory statement in their evidence at one stage or the other thereby made their testimony unreliable and unworthy of credence and in the absence of special circumstances, no conviction can be based on the evidence of these witnesses. Material contradictions which have been interpreted in favour of the accused are as follows:
A1 PW1(Raju Kumar@ Raju) in his examination in chief deposed "that there was no traffic movement. Further in his cross examination, he deposed that there was no other vehicle on the road except a maruti car. The witness stated that "there was no other traffic except the State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 9/20 said maruti car". The witness also deposed "there was only one man sitting in the maruti and there was nobody except him in the said car." However, PW2(Pritam) deposed that the traffic was slow at the site where the accident took place. The witness further deposed that "there was heavy traffic in the side of Shadipur Depot and 23 people were in the maruti 800 car." PW2 further deposed that the "Indica car which was driven by accused was empty except accused who was driving the car." Whereas PW3(KamleshJain) deposed that "67 school children were sitting in the Indica car". PW3 Kamlesh Jain deposed that "I was going from my college to my residence". Whereas PW8 deposed that "on fateful day, I was driving her(Kamlesh Jain) car make Maruti 800 and picked her car from home and was driving to the college". In AIR 1979 SC 1408 in SurajMal vs. The State(Delhi Administration) it was held that "where witnesses make two inconsistent statement in their evidence either at one stage or at two stages the testimony of such witnesses becomes unreliable and unworthy of credence and in the absence of special circumstances no conviction can be based on the evidence of such witnesses."
A2 It is admitted fact that the victim was crossing the road not from the zebra crossing as PW1 in his cross examination deposed "it is correct that there is no zebra crossing at the spot where the accident took place. Vol. There was a way from which pedestrian cross the road and the said way was made after removing the gauze present there." PW2 in his cross examination also deposed that, "no zebra crossing is at the place from where the said deceased was crossing State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 10/20 the road. Vol. Several public persons gathered and collectively cross the road from that point". PW3 also deposed that, "the red light from the spot of accident may be about one KM. It is correct that there is no crossing or red light where the accident took place. Witness further deposed that the "bus stand is at a little distance from the place of the accident". It has not been clarified by the prosecution how the accused was rash and negligent in driving and causing accident of the victim who was himself crossing the road not from a designated place i.e. zebra crossing. A person who is not using the zebra crossing is expected to foresee remote possibility of accident himself.
No genuine efforts have been made to make independent person as witness of the accident. Admittedly, the place was heavily crowded as there was heavy rush of vehicle at the time of accident making the availability of the independent witnesses, however no genuine effort was made to array them as PWs nor they have been examined as such. PW1 deposed that the place where the accident took place is a small market and the tea shop where he was having his tea was occupied by other persons sitting in the shop. Witness further deposed that in his presence police officials had not inquired any person from the said market. PW2 also deposed that the public persons were present at the spot who stopped the Indica car of the accused and there was heavy traffic jam which took place after the accident. However, in his presence statement of no other person was recorded by the police officials. Same was the testimony of PW3 and PW8.
State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 11/20 It is not out of place to mention that the case of the prosecution is that the death of the victim was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver by hitting the Maruti Car from behind. The mechanical inspection was conducted of both the vehicles, however the details of mechanical inspection of taillight of both the aforesaid car was not mentioned in the report Ex. PW5/A and Ex. PW5/B, making it unclear as to how the vehicle of the victim(Maruti 800) which received jolt from back, was not damaged from the taillight nor any damage on the front side of the offending vehicle shown in the said report.
Nowhere in the whole testimony of these witnesses it is clarified how and in what manner the accused was rash and negligent in his driving. The term; 'negligence' as used in this section does not mean mere carelessness. The rashness or negligence must be of such nature so as to be termed as a criminal act of negligence or rashness. Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code provides; 'nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune and without any criminal knowledge or intention in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by a lawful means and with proper care and caution'. Neither section 279 nor 304A of Indian Penal Code punishes for mere accident, misfortune or error of judgment. It is absence of such proper care and caution, which is required of a reasonable man in doing an act, which is made punishable under this section. It is the degree of negligence, which really determines whether a particular act would amount to a rash and negligent act as defined State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 12/20 under this section. It is only when the rash and negligent act is of such a degree that the risk run by the doer of the act is very high or is done with such recklessness and with total disregard and indifference to the consequences of this act, the act can be constituted as a rash and negligent act under this section. Negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise reasonable and proper care, and precaution to guard against injury, either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which a reasonable man would have adopted. (See SN Hussain v. State of AP AIR 1972 SC 685). In Madhukar Bhausaheb Mhaske v. State of Maharashtra, (Bombay)(Nagpur Bench) 2006 CriLJ 3700 it has been observed in para 9 of the judgment, "The speed of the vehicle is only one of the several other factors which determine whether the act is rash or negligent. Negligence is the absence of due care and caution, whereas culpable rashness results from lack of circumspection." In Sarjeet Singh v. State 2012(2) JCC 1338 the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has observed, "PW6 and PW3 have stated that the Petitioner was driving the vehicle at a very high speed but because the vehicle was being driven at a high speed does not mean it was being driven in a rash and negligent manner." In Mohan Shyam v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2012(3) JCC 1523 the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has observed that, "In order to prove the act of negligence and rashness, it must be shown that the act was done without proper regard to its consequences and without any precautions taken for ensuring the safety of others."
State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 13/20 In the present case from the materials on record it cannot be inferred that the accused was driving the car in wanton fashion or by flouting any traffic rules or in a reckless manner.
Assuming that the accused was in fact driving the car at very high speed then, it may also be noted that in the deposition of aforesaid witnesses there is nothing to indicate as to what exactly was the speed of the car to classify it as 'very high speed.' The very high speed of PWs may not be even high speed at all from other's perspective or objectively speaking. Further only driving a vehicle at 'very high speed' per se is not either rash or negligent act. In given set of facts even driving slowly also could be a negligent act (for example where the minimum speed on the road has been fixed). It has not been clarified by the prosecution by examining witnesses as to what was the condition of the road, traffic and other things which in combination of 'very high speed' of the bus of the accused could have made the act of driving of the bus at that particular speed a rash or negligent act. From the deposition of PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW8, it could not be said that the prosecution has proved it even on the balance of probability that the accused was rash and negligent while driving the bus with which the fatal accident had occurred.
Apart from these there was no other material/eye witness. The remaining witnesses were only formal/police witnesses to whom the matter was reported after incident was over and whose testimony cannot be made basis for conviction of the accused. In "P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka" AIR 2002 State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 14/20 SUPREME COURT 1856 ( Coram : 7 S. P. BHARUCHA, C.J.I., S. S. M. QUADRI, R. C. LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE, DORAISWAMY RAJU, Mrs. RUMA PAL, A. PASAYAT, JJ.) the Honorable Supreme Court while commenting upon the right to speedy justice observed:
"22. Is it at all necessary to have limitation bars terminating trials and proceedings? Is there no effective mechanism available for achieving the same end? The Criminal Procedure Code, as it stands, incorporates a few provisions to which resort can be had for protecting the interest of the accused and saving him from unreasonable prolixity or laxity at the trial amounting to oppression. Section 309, dealing with power to postpone or adjourn proceedings, provides generally for every inquiry or trial, being proceeded with as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same to be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Courts finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following days to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Explanation 2 to Section 309 confers power on the Court to impose costs to be paid by the prosecution or the accused, in appropriate cases; and putting the parties on terms while granting an adjournment or postponing of proceedings. This power to impose costs is rarely exercised by the Courts. Section 258, in Chapter XX of Cr.P.C., on Trial Summons cases, empowers the Magistrate trying summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaint, for reasons to be recorded by him, to stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, to pronounce State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 15/20 a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, having effect of discharge. This provision is almost never used by the Courts. In appropriate cases, inherent power to the High Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciously exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercised their jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of first information report and investigation, and terminating criminal proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay's case referred to such power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was clear that even apart from Article 21, the Courts can take care of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matters or proceedings if they remain pending for too long and putting to an end, by making appropriate orders, to further proceedings when they are found to be oppressive and unwarranted." (emphasis supplied) "30. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) (1996 AIR SCW 2279 : AIR 1996 SC 1619 : 1996 Cri LJ 2380) (as modified in Common Cause (II) 1997 AIR SCW 290 : AIR 1997 SC 1539 : 1997 Cri LJ 195 (1998 AIR SCW 3208 : AIR 1998 SC 3281 : 1998 Cri LJ 4596) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) (1999 AIR SCW 3522 : AIR State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 16/20 1999 SC 3524 : 1998 Cri LJ 4541), the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold: (1) The dictum in AR Antulay's case is correct and still holds the field.
(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in AR Antulay's case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.
(3) The guidelines laid down in AR Antulay's case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the factsituation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The timelimits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma Case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay's case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 17/20 unwarranted. Such timelimits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and a mandatorily obliging the court of terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.
(5) The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary - quantitatively and qualitatively by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act." (emphasis supplied) In "Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra" AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 3077 (Coram : 2 C. K. THAKKER AND D. K. JAIN, JJ.)the Honorable Supreme Court, while relying upon the aforesaid judgment, observed:
"16. Notwithstanding elaborate enunciation of Article 21 of the Constitution in Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), and rejection of the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy trial for laying down timelimits as bar beyond which a criminal trial shall not proceed pronouncements of this Court in "Common Cause" A Registered Society Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., "Common Cause", A Registered Society Vs. Union of India and Ors., Raj Deo Sharma Vs.State of Bihar and Raj Deo Sharma II Vs. State of Bihar gave rise to some State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 18/20 confusion on the question whether an outer time limit for conclusion of criminal proceedings could be prescribed whereafter the trial court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused. The confusion on the issue was set at rest by a sevenJudge Bench of this court in P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka. Speaking for the majority, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) while affirming that the dictum in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) is correct and still holds the field and the propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in the said case adequately take care of right to speedy trial, it was held that guidelines laid down in the A.R. Antulay's case (supra) are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the factsituation of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, the criminal courts should exercise their available powers such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of CrPC to effectuate the right to speedy trial. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. The outer limits or power of limitation expounded in the aforenoted judgments were held to be not in consonance with the legislative intent."
(emphasis supplied) 7.3 Accordingly, in the opinion of the court, in the light of the above cited judgments, the court needs to exercise its power under section 258 Cr.P.C qua offences u/s 279/304A IPC to make the ends of State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 19/20 justice meet.
8. FINAL ORDER 8.1 Taking into consideration all above said facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to bring home guilt of the accused. Accordingly, accused is acquitted of offences u/s 279/304A IPC. 8.2 As per section 437A of the Cr.P.C, as inserted vide the Amendment Act, which came into force on 31.12.2009, personal bond and surety bond already filed in sum of Rs.10,000/ is further extended for a period of 06 months.
File be consigned to Record Room after necessary compliance.
Digitally signedANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT BHAWANI by BHAWANI SHARMA ON 6th of May, 2019 SHARMA Date: 2019.05.17 16:33:02 +0530 (BHAWANI SHARMA) ACMM:WEST):THC
Certified that this judgment contains 20 pages and each page bears my signatures.
(BHAWANI SHARMA) ACMM:WEST):THC State vs. Kulwant Singh; FIR NO 331/03; PS Patel Nagar 20/20