Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Bashir Ahmad Mir vs State Of Jk & Ors on 22 October, 2019
Author: Ali Mohammad Magrey
Bench: Ali Mohammad Magrey
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT
SRINAGAR
SWP No.1775/2016
MP No.01/2016
Reserved on: 17th of October, 2019.
Pronounced on: 22nd of October, 2019.
Bashir Ahmad Mir
..... Petitioner(s)
Through: - Mr Hamza Prince, Advocate.
V/s
State of JK & Ors.
..... Respondent(s)
Through: - Mr B. A. Dar, Sr. AAG
CORAM:
Hon'ble Mr Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey, Judge.
Whether approved for Reporting in Press/ Media? YES.
Whether approved for Publication in Digest/ Journal? YES.
JUDGMENT
Ali Mohammad Magrey; J:
01. By medium of this petition, the petitioner is seeking a 'Writ of Certiorari' for quashing order bearing No. Estt/52/2016/18726-38 dated 13th of October, 2016 insofar as it relates to the petitioner as also the charge sheet and show cause notice issued to him. A 'Writ of Mandamus' is also sought by the petitioner in the name of the respondents commanding them to continue the petitioner in service without any disturbance therein with all consequential benefits and also treat the period of dismissal as on duty accordingly.SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 1 of 14
02. The precise factual background leading to the filing of the instant petition, as emerges from the study of the petition of the petitioner, is that the petitioner claims to have been appointed in the respondent Department in the year 1992. It is stated that ever since the appointment of the petitioner in the respondent Department, he discharged his duties with all dedication and sincerity. It is stated that during the intervening night of 7th and 8th of May, 2016, when the petitioner was posted as one of the Incharge Constabulary Guard in the minority pickets at Adjin, Kulgam, an unfortunate militancy related incident took place at the guard post. The militants initially intended to kill the petitioner and other police personnel, after overpowering them, but later confined to forcible snatching away of the assigned weapons from the guard post leading to registration of FIR No. 51/2015 at Police Station, D.H. Pora, Kulgam, under Sections 452/392 of RPC, 7/25 Arms Act, 03 PEOP and 30 Police Act. Soon after the incident, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 10th of May, 2016. The order aforesaid provided that a full-fledged charge sheet was required to be issued as against the petitioner and enquiry to be conducted by the Enquiry Officer. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer clubbed the charge sheet and enquiry findings together, without recording his reasons as to how he had drawn such conclusions against the petitioner. The petitioner replied the charge sheet and denied all the allegations levelled against him, however, without having any regard to the said reply submitted by the petitioner, the respondents, in hot haste, issued show cause notice dated 11th of October, 2016 to the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 2 of 14 petitioner replied the said show cause notice, too, but, as stated, same was also not considered by the respondents and only after a day from the issuance of the show cause notice, the petitioner was dismissed from service in terms of order dated 13th of October, 2016.
03. Mr Hamza Prince, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that in the impugned show cause notice dated 11th of October, 2016, the respondents have observed that the petitioner exhibited cowardice while performing his duties and, accordingly, gave two days' time to the petitioner to reply the said show cause notice which the petitioner replied on 13th of October, 2016, but on the same date itself, the impugned order was passed meaning thereby that the said reply filed by the petitioner was not considered at all by the respondents while issuing the order impugned. The learned counsel further submits that the respondents have not only violated the procedure prescribed for conduct of departmental inquiries with impunity, but have also held the principles of natural justice in breach while issuing the severe punishment of dismissal to the petitioner. It is stated that no proper opportunity of hearing, as prescribed under the relevant rules/ law, was given to the petitioner before inflicting the major punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner. The learned counsel pleads that the representations/replies filed by the petitioner have not been discussed at all, muchless considered, by the respondents and only what has been stated is that the said reply could not "convenience" the Enquiry Officer. It is argued that the mention of the word "convenience" instead of "convince", itself, depicts non-application of mind on the part of the respondents in issuing the impugned order. The learned SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 3 of 14 counsel has proceeded to state that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is not only grossly disproportionate, but also extremely harsh as well and cannot withstand the test of judicial scrutiny.
04. Counter Affidavit stands filed on behalf of the respondents resisting and controverting the averments made by the petitioner in his petition. It is stated that during the intervening night of 7th and 8th of May, 2016, some unknown gunmen entered into the Minority guard post Adijan, Kulgam, where the petitioner, besides other police personnel, was posted and took away the service weapons from the guard personnel without facing any resistance from any of the guard personnel. It is contended that none of the guard personnel, especially the petitioner, being the in-charge guard, fired even a single round and, instead, surrendered their weapons before the militants. It is pleaded that the petitioner exhibited negligence, carelessness and cowardice while performing duty, which has been established beyond any doubt against the petitioner. It is further submitted that since the petitioner was a trained Police official and properly equipped with arms/ammunition, therefore, it was his mandatory responsibility to retaliate the action of the unknown gunmen, but the petitioner, without any resistance and retaliatory action, choose to surrender before the said gunmen and provided them safe escape from the spot, which has not only resulted in loss of arms/ammunition, but this act of cowardice of the petitioner has encouraged the militants as well. The respondents have proceeded to state that the petitioner was put to face the departmental enquiry in which he could not prove his innocence in any SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 4 of 14 manner. Furthermore, Mr Dar, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, in order to buttress the case of the respondents, has relied upon two judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported as '(2011) 14 SCC 692' and '(1192) 4 SCC 54'. In the end, the respondents have prayed that the petition of the petitioner be dismissed.
05. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the matter.
06. Rule 359 of the J&K Police Rules, 1960, running under the caption 'Procedure in Departmental Enquiries', provides as under:
"359. Procedure in Departmental Enquiries - (1) The following procedure shall be followed in departmental enquiries: -
a) The enquiry shall, whenever, possible be conducted by a Gazetted Officer empowered to inflict a major punishment upon the accused officer. Any other gazette officer or an Inspector specially empowered by the Minister I/C Police Department, to hold departmental enquiries (Vide order No. 636-C dated 27-6-1945) may be deputed to hold an enquiry or may institute an enquiry on his own initiative against an accused police officer who is directly subordinate to him, except that in the case of a complaint against a constable the enquiry may be conducted by an Inspector. The final order, however, may be passed only by an officer empowered to inflict a major punishment upon the accused police officer.
(2) The officer conducting the enquiry shall summon the accused police officer before him and shall record and read out to him a statement summarizing the alleged misconduct in such a way as to give notice of the circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be recorded.
(3) If the accused police officer at this stage admits the misconduct alleged against him the officer conducting the enquiry may proceed forth with to record a final order if it is within his power to do so or a finding to be forwarded to an officer empowered to decide the case.
Whenever a serious default is reported and the preliminary enquiry is necessary before a definite charge can be framed, this is usually best done on the spot and might be carried out by the Sub-Inspector of the particular Police Station in the case of head constables and constables serving under him or by the Inspector of the circle in the case of Sub-Inspectors within his charge. At the same time it must be left to Superintendent of Police to select the most suitable officers for the purpose or to do it themselves when such a course appears desirable.
SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 5 of 14When the preliminary enquiry indicates a criminal offence, application for permission to prosecute should at once be made to the authority competent to dismiss the officer and permission should be promptly granted if that authority agrees that there is prima facie case for prosecution.
(4) If the accused police officer does not admit that misconduct the officer conducting the enquiry shall proceed to record such evidence oral and documentary in proof of the accusation as is available and necessary to support the charge. Whenever possible witnesses shall be examined direct and in the presence of the accused who shall be given opportunity to cross- examine them. The officer conducting the enquiry is empowered, however, to bring on to the record the statement of any witness whose presence cannot in the opinion if such officer be produced without undue delay and expense or inconvenience if he considers such statement necessary and provided that it has been recorded and attested by a Magistrate and is signed by the person making it. The accused shall be bound to answer questions which the enquiring officer may see fit to put to him, with a view to elucidating the facts referred to in statements or documents brought on the record as herein provided.
(5) When the evidence in support of the allegations has been recorded, the enquiring officer shall -
a) if he considers that such allegations are not substantiated either discharge the accused himself if he is empowered to punish him, or recommend his discharge to the Superintendent or other officer who may be so empowered, or
b) proceed to frame a formal charge or charges in writing, explain them to the accused officer and call upon him to answer them.
(6) The accused officer shall be required to state the defence witnesses whom he wishes to call and may be given time in no case exceeding 48 hours to prepare a list of such witnesses together with a summary of the facts as to which they will testify. The enquiring officer shall be empowered to refuse to hear any witnesses whose evidence he considers will be irrelevant or unnecessary in regard to the specified charge framed in which case he shall record the reason for his refusal. He shall record the statements of those defence witnesses whom he decides to admit in the presence of the accused, who shall be allowed to address questions to them the answers to which shall be recorded, provided that the enquiring officer may cause to be recorded by any other officer not below the rank of Inspector the statement of any such witness whose presence cannot be secured without undue delay or inconvenience and may bring such statement on to the record. The accused may file documentary evidence and may for this purpose be allowed access to such files and papers except such as form part of the record of the confidential office of the Superintendent of Police as the enquiring offices. The supply of copies of documents to the accused shall be subject to the ordinary rules regarding copying fees.
(7) At the conclusion of the defence evidence or if the enquiring officer so directs at any earlier stage, following the framing of a charge the accused shall be required to state his own answer to the charge. He may be permitted to file a written statement and may be given time not exceeding one week for its preparation but shall be bound to make an oral statement in answer to all questions which the enquiring officer may see fit to put to him arising out of the charge, the recorded evidence or his own written statement.
SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 6 of 14(8) The enquiring officer shall then proceed to pass orders of acquittal or punishment if empowered to do so or to forward the case with his finding and recommendations to an officer having the necessary powers.
(9) Nothing in the foregoing rules shall debar a Superintendent of Police from making a causing to be made a preliminary investigation into the conduct of a suspected officer. Such an enquiry is not infrequently necessary to ascertain the nature and degree of misconduct which is to be formally enquired into. The suspected police officer may or may not be present at such preliminary enquiry as ordered by the Superintendent of Police or other gazette officer initiating the investigation but shall not cross- examine witnesses. The file of such a preliminary investigation shall form no part of the formal departmental record but may be used for the purposes of sub-rule (4) above.
(10) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation.
(11) (1) As laid down in Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, no officer shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No police officer shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause orally and also in writing against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, provided that this clause shall not apply :-
a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge,
b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove an officer or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause; or
c) where the Sadar-i-Riyasat is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give to that officer such an opportunity.
(3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any officer an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2) above, the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such officer to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final."
What comes to the fore from the perusal of the above Rule is that the procedure for imposing the major penalty, i.e. the order of dismissal here in this case, involves:
i. The delivery of a charge sheet;
ii. Appointment of an enquiry officer;
iii. Providing opportunity to the delinquent official to submit his defence and to be
heard;
iv. The enquiry where oral and documentary evidence is produced by both sides;
SWP No. 1775/2016
MP No. 01/2016 Page 7 of 14
v. The preparation of a report after the conclusion of the enquiry and forwarding
of the same to the disciplinary authority (where the disciplinary authority is not itself the enquiring Authority);
vi. Action on the enquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority; vii. Notice to the delinquent official to show cause on the penalty proposed;
viii. Meaning of the order imposing penalty; and ix. Communication of the orders.
The aforesaid rule position clearly specifies that the inquiry has to be conducted by the officer authorized to inflict major punishment upon the accused officer/ official and in the present case the Superintendent of Police was the Competent Authority who was supposed to conduct the inquiry, however, in the case on hand, inquiry has been entrusted to Additional S.P., Kulgam, and, thereafter, the impugned order has been passed by S.P., Kulgam, on the basis of said inquiry. The inquiry can be conducted by any other Gazetted Officer only if he/ she is specially empowered by the Minister concerned, which has not been done in the case of the present petitioner. The petitioner has been thrown out by an order of dismissal without following the due procedure of law, with a premeditated design to divest him of his right to participate in the enquiry. An opportunity of being heard is the 'sine-qua-non' of every enquiry and in case of any dismissal, reasons justifying so have to be spelt out. The principles of natural justice appear to have been violated with impunity in this case. The defense of the petitioner has been shut by deception and the conduct of a full dressed enquiry has been given a complete go by.
07. Justice is not only law and its administration, but is, in most cases, above law and is done to safeguard an individual from whatever he/she seeks protection. Our country generally and our State in particular aims at the goal of achieving a welfare State where everyone is/ has to be, as far as possible, SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 8 of 14 looked after. The principles of natural justice are imbibed from the Constitution itself. These are of paramount importance and nobody can be condemned unheard.
08. In 'AIR 2005 SC 2090'; Canara Bank v. V. K. Awasthy, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the extent and scope of the principles of natural justice, held as under:
"10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what commonly known as audi alter am par tem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vacate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, [1963] 413 ER 414, the principle was thus stated:
"Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam", says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat".
Since then the principle has been chiseled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond."
09. In the case titled 'Jehangir Ahmad Mir v. State of J&K', reported in '1998 SLJ 134', this Court had the occasion to examine the range, limits and the scope of Rules 337 and 359 of the Jammu and Kashmir Police Rules read SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 9 of 14 with Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and Article 311 of the Indian Constitution and it held as under:
"It is a matter of common knowledge by now that no member of a State service or a person holding post under the State can be removed from service save otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Section 126(2) of the State Constitution read with Article 311 of the Indian Constitution which contemplates conveying the specific charges to the delinquent and providing him a reasonable and adequate opportunity of being heard and then his removal from service after an enquiry. Section 126(2) of the State Constitution provides for an additional safeguard of a second show cause notice regarding the proposed punishment to be imposed.
This position is supplemented by the police Rules, Rule 359 whereof prescribes procedure for conducting departmental enquiry against police personnel. Similarly Rule 336 lays emphasis on the suitability of punishment and cautions the Authority to be careful by taking in regard the character of the delinquent and his past service. Similarly Rule 337 places a constraint on the exercise of the power of dismissal and illustrates the cases though not exhaustively wherein this power was exercised, regard being had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. All this pointed to the checks imposed by law for exercise of the power of dismissal against a delinquent police employee.
Under Rule 359, the enquiry officer is required to summon the delinquent officer before him and read out a statement summarizing his alleged mis-conduct in such a way as to give him full notice of the circumstances in regard to which evidence was required to be recorded in the matter. Thereafter depending upon the denial if any made by the delinquent, the enquiry officer was required to proceed to record such evidence as would be available and necessary to support the charge. The witnesses were required to be examined in presence of the delinquent and after this he was granted an opportunity to lead his defence evidence or to file his documentary evidence and to state his own answer to the charge. The enquiry officer was then to submit the recommendations or topics order of acquittal or punishment, if he was competent to do so."
10. An almost the same view has been repeated and reiterated by this Court in the case of 'Ghulam Mohammad v. State of J&K', reported in '1998 SLJ 273', the relevant excerpts of which are reproduced below, verbatim et literatim:
"Rule 359 of Police Rules postulates two-fold stages of the enquiry, one preliminary and another after framing the charge. As regards preliminary enquiry, the Enquiry Officer is required to follow the procedure as laid down under sub-rules (1) to (5) of Rule 359 of Police Rules. Perusal of the chargesheet does not depict the names of the witnesses who have been examined during the preliminary enquiry, so much so it does not even depict SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 10 of 14 as to whether he was ever summoned, recording and reading out a statement of summary of allegations, is therefore, ruled-out. The chargesheet depicts that a communication was sent to the petitioner and was provided an opportunity to question the witnesses which he did not but it does not indicate that the basic requirement was observed which makes it obligatory upon the enquiry officer to summon the petitioner and read out the statement of summary of allegations to him and after observing the said requirement question, of recording evidence would arise. Having failed to follow the mandate of rule, the preliminary enquiry vitiates, for, same has not been in accordance with the mandate of Rule 359 of Police Rules and on this count the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
The procedure which the Enquiry Officer has to follow after framing the charge is envisaged in sub-rules 6 and 7 of Rule 359 of Police Rules. Sub rule 6 makes it obligatory upon the enquiry officer to provide an opportunity to the accused official to give a list of such witnesses whom he would like to produce in defence and record their statements. It further provides that the statements of such witnesses can be recorded even at the places of their availability, of course, for the reasons detailed in the sub- rules. The said sub-rule further provides that even access to the files, excepting the confidential record, can also be permitted and the object is to allow sufficient opportunity of defence to the delinquent official/ officer.
After receiving the evidence, oral and documentary, yet another opportunity is to be made available to the delinquent official at conclusion of the defence evidence under sub-rule 7 to make a statement in reply for the charge, so much so the delinquent official can seek permission to file a written statement in his defence after the conclusion of the evidence in defence."
11. In view of the aforesaid enunciations of law, the condition precedent for initiating a disciplinary action against a police officer/ official is not only the conduct of an enquiry, but it should also appear that due adherence and strict compliance to the manner and procedure as laid down under Rules 337 and 359 has been followed in its letter and spirit and any deviation thereof will render the order imposing penalty bad and liable to be set aside.
12. In 'Ghulam Ahmad & Ors. v. Sr. Superintendent of Police', reported in '1988 JKLR 1367', although a departmental enquiry was conducted into the alleged callousness in duty on the part of the petitioners, who were Police Constables, yet the Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of Rule 359 of the Rules of 1960 had not been complied with while conducting the SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 11 of 14 enquiry and, therefore, the Court opined that the impugned order imposing penalty of dismissal upon the petitioners was unconstitutional, illegal and bad in law.
13. In 'Bashir Ahmad Dar v. State of & Ors.', reported in '2013 (4) JKH 264(HC)', where a Constable, having 8 years of service to his credit, had been discharged from services in pursuance of Rule 187 of the Rules of 1960 without conducting any enquiry, the Court came to the following conclusion:
"12. Perusal of record would reveal that procedure laid down in the aforementioned Rule has been observed in breach. The record does not indicate that an enquiry was directed into the matter. The officer, if any, asked to conduct enquiry, summon the petitioner, read to him the statements summarizing the alleged misconduct, record oral and documentary evidence in proof of the accusation, allow the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses or to examine witness and produce documents in his defense. The record also does not indicate that any formal charge was framed against the petitioner and the petitioner given an opportunity to furnish the list of defense witnesses or examine such witnesses, or allowed to file written statement. The petitioner has not been given an opportunity to show cause orally and in writing against the action proposed to be taken against him. It is pertinent to point out that the petitioner was not removed on his conviction of a criminal charge nor was satisfaction recorded by the respondents that giving him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action would not be reasonably practicable.
13. In the circumstances the procedure mandatorily to be followed before making the impugned order, was not followed by the Competent Authority. The impugned order, therefore, has been passed in a violation of mandate of Rules of 1960 and in particular Rule 359 of the Rules of 1960. The order thus cannot stand legal scrutiny."
14. The pleadings placed before this Court does not provide even an inkling of how and in what manner the enquiry was conducted into the matter of the negligence and carelessness of the petitioner. Not even a murmur has been made to state that any evidence was recorded in the case. The procedure laid down for conducting the enquiry as laid down in the rules cited above does not appear to have been followed at any stage, as a consequence of which, the order of dismissal cannot survive and sustain in the eyes of law.
SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 12 of 1415. Looking at the instant case from yet another perspective, it, needs, must be said that the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the petitioner has been concluded by the respondents oblivious to the mandate of Rules 336 and 337 of the J&K Police Rules, 1960. Rules 336 and 337 provide as under:
"336: Suitability of punishment-- The suitability of a punishment should be carefully considered. Punishment should fit the default and be deterrent without being harsh. In inflicting punishment, the general character of the officer affected and his past services should be taken into consideration.
337: Dismissal-- Dismissal shall be awarded only for the acts of misconduct e.g. fraud and dishonestly, corruption and all offences involving moral disgrace as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for Police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claims to pension."
The authorities in the respondent Department appear to have paid almost no attention to the mandate of Rules 336 and 337 while awarding punishment of dismissal from service against the petitioner. The respondents have not only failed to notice that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the lapse attributed to him, but they have also not realized that the misconduct alleged against the petitioner was not of the kind envisaged by Rule 337 of the J&K Police Rules, 1960.
16. The judgments referred to and relied upon by Mr Dar, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, being distinguishable, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
17. Viewed in the above context, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner, being contrary to the law and reason, cannot be upheld, as a corollary to which, the petition of the petitioner is allowed in the following terms:
SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 13 of 14I. The impugned order bearing No. 293 of 2016 dated 13th of October, 2016, issued by the Superintendent of Police, Kulgam under endorsement No. Estt/52/2016/18726-38 dated 13th of October, 2016, alongwith the impugned show cause notice dated 11th of October, 2016 issued by the same authority, is quashed;
II. The respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to resume his duty forthwith;
III. The quashment of the impugned order, as above, shall not entitle the petitioner to claim any salary/ remuneration/wages during the period he was out of service. The respondents shall deal with this issue in accordance with the rules governing the field.
18. Writ petition disposed of as above, alongwith all connected MP(s).
19. Bench Secretary of this Court to return the records to Mr Dar, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, with utmost dispatch, of course, against proper receipt.
(Ali Mohammad Magrey) Judge SRINAGAR October 22nd, 2019 "TAHIR"
SWP No. 1775/2016 MP No. 01/2016 Page 14 of 14 TAHIR MANZOOR BHAT 2019.10.22 12:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document