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[Cites 34, Cited by 0]

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 04.07.2025 vs Cbi on 29 July, 2025

2025:HHC:24709 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 467 of 2022 .

                                              Reserved on: 04.07.2025





                                              Date of Decision: 29.07.2025





    Tara Chand                                                                   ...Appellant.
                                          Versus





    CBI                                                                      ...Respondent.


    Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

    Whether approved for reporting?1                   No.

    For the Appellant                           :      Mr. S.K. Banyal, Advocate.


    For the Respondent                          :      Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,
                                                       Special Public Prosecutor.




    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge





The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 4.5.2022 and order of sentence dated 6.5.2022, passed by learned Special Judge (CBI Court), Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)

(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 2

2025:HHC:24709 Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 471, 467 and 468 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced as under: -

.
Under Section 13(1)(d) of PC To suffer rigorous imprisonment Act, punishable under for four years, pay a fine of Section 13(2) read with ₹50,000/- (₹Fifty Thousand only), Section 120B of IPC. and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six r months.
Under Section 419 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only), and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.
Under Section 420 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only), and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.
Under Section 467 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment read with Section 120B of for seven years, pay a fine of ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:24709 IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only), and in default of payment of fine, .
                                   to    further      undergo           rigorous





                                   imprisonment for a term of six
                                   months.





Under Section 468 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only), and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.
Under Section 471 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only), and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.
The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:24709
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the CBI had filed a report before the learned Trial .

Court asserting that the accused S.D. Bodh joined Punjab National Bank (PNB) as Clerk-cum-Cashier on 30.3.1981 at Akhara Bazar, Branch, Kullu. He remained posted as Branch Manager in PNB, Sultanpur Branch, Kullu between 20.10.2008 to 2.7.2011. He was also functioning as a Director, Rural Self Employment Training Institute (RSETI), PNB, Dhalpur, Kullu.

Simanchal Sahu (PW5) joined PNB as Agriculture Officer on 25.8.2008 and remained posted as Agriculture Officer (LBO), PNB, Kullu, between 11.2.2010 to 28.5.2011. PNB was issuing Kisan Credit Card (KCC) to agriculturists for cultivation, maintenance and marketing of various crops. The requirement for the sanction of a loan under KCC is that the borrower should have the land, and he should return the amount within one year with interest. The rate of interest was 7% per annum for loans up to ₹3.00 lacs and 12.5% per annum for loans above ₹3.00 lacs.

The loan was sanctioned on the basis of the land possessed by the borrower. Bank's lien/charge is created in the revenue record. The documents of the land issued by the concerned Patwari and other documents are to be submitted for obtaining ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:24709 the loan. The Loan Officer obtains a search report/Non-

Encumbrance Certificate (NEC) from the empanelled Advocates .

who have to carry out proper verification before issuing the certificate. The documents of the land are sent to the Tehsildar for recording the lien of the Bank. Tehsildar forwards the documents to the Patwari, who makes an entry of the loan in the record. A Field Officer/Appraising Officer/Recommending Officer processes the loan application, and a Manager/Senior Manager/Chief Manager sanctions the loan. The Field Officer has to carry out the survey of the villages and submit the recommendation. It was found that 26 crop loans (KCC) of ₹1.12 crore were sanctioned to various borrowers based on fake/bogus revenue documents and non-encumbrance certificates. In one such case, Tara Chand (present accused) impersonated himself as Jagdish Kumar and availed KCC Loan of ₹3.5 lakhs from PNB, Sultanpur Branch, based on a fake/forged Jamabandi, dated 22.4.2011, showing the ownership of 12-04-00 bigha in the name of Jagdish Kumar. A fake charge creation report, fake Voter ID Card and Ration Card were submitted with the application. Chuni Lal Sharma (PW15) was the empanelled Advocate. A Non-Encumbrance Certificate dated 23.4.2011, ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:24709 stated to have been issued by him, was also produced. The loan was proposed and appraised by Simanchal Sahu (PW5). The .

money was transferred to the account of Jagdish Kumar on 29.4.2011. Budh Ram, Patwari (PW12), stated that he had not issued any Jamabandi or charge creation report. Tehsildar, Kullu, stated that he had not put the endorsement and signatures on Form-VI (1). The handwriting of accused Tashi Funchong was found on the Jamabandi and Charge Creation Report by the handwriting expert. Anjana Mahant (PW19), Panchayat Sahayak, stated that Ration Card in the name of Jagdish Kumar was fake and was not issued by Gram Panchayat, Neul. Teja Singh (PW20), posted in the office of Electoral Registration Officer, stated that signatures on Voter ID Card were not put by him. Chuni Lal Sharma also denied the issuance of NEC. Simanchal Sahu stated that he had recommenced the proposal in good faith at the instance of S.D. Bodh, who said that he had verified the revenue record and inspected the land physically. In this manner, the loan was wrongly obtained and disbursed. Offences punishable under Section 120-B, 419, 420, 467, and 471 of IPC and Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:24709 of the PC Act were committed. Hence, the final report was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law.

.

3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused Tara Chand with the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of IPC and Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. CBI examined 27 witnesses to prove its case. Rajiv Kumar Khanna (PW1) made the complaint to the CBI. Rohit Thakur (PW2), Ajay Kumar (PW6), Rahul Kaushik (PW7), Bal Krishan Verma (PW8), Rajesh Bodh (PW9) and Vivek Gupta (PW10) are the witnesses to the taking of the specimen signatures. K.C. Raink (PW3) proved the procedure for disbursing the KCC loan and furnished the documents to the CBI during the investigation. Rajiv Vaidya (PW4) produced various documents and identified the signatures on various documents.

Simanchal Sahu (PW5) was posted as Agriculture Officer in the PNB, who identified the signatures of the accused. Budh Ram (PW12) and Shyam Chand (PW14) were posted as Patwari, who stated that they had not issued Jamabandi and other documents.

::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 8

2025:HHC:24709 Thakur Dass (PW13) stated that his signatures were forged on 15 documents out of 26 shown to him. He also explained the .

procedure for making an entry of the charge. Chuni Lal Sharma (PW15) is an Advocate, who stated that NEC was not issued by him. Ram Krishan (PW16) and Anju Kumari (PW18) identified the signatures of S.D. Bodh on various documents. Ram Kishan also identified the accused, Tara Chand, as the person who had visited the Bank as Jagdish and submitted various documents.

Hari Shankar Acharya (PW17) explained the procedure of issuance of the crop loan. Anjana Mahant (PW19) was posted as Panchayat Sahayak and stated that Ration Card was not issued by the Gram Panchayat in which she was working. Teja Singh (PW20) proved that the Voter ID Card issued in the name of Jagdish was fake. Mahesh Kapoor (PW21) explained the duties of Agriculture Officer. Anoop Sood (PW22) advanced ₹1.50 lacs to Tashi Fun Chong, and Tashi Fun Chong returned the amount with the help of a cheque issued by Jagdish. Madan Lal (PW23) and Krishan Chander (PW24) conducted the investigation. Anil Kumar (PW25) produced the documents. Rakesh Kumar Sharma (PW26) issued the prosecution sanction. Dr. Ravinder Sharma (PW27) is the Handwriting Expert, who analysed the ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:24709 handwriting and signatures on the admitted signatures and questioned documents and issued a report.

.

5. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's version was duly established on record. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were corroborated by the various documents on record. It was duly proved that Tara Chand had impersonated himself as Jagdish. Documents were forged by Tashi Fun Chong and S.D. Bodh had conspired with them.

Therefore, the accused were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the appellant/accused Tara Chand filed the present appeal, asserting that learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing him. The various provisions of IPC were not properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that the petitioner had impersonated Jagdish Kumar. Many formalities have to be completed before disbursal of the loan.

Tara Chand is an illiterate and simpleton person. He could not have forged the documents. There is no evidence to show forgery by Tara Chand. Provisions of Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:24709 do not apply to Tara Chand because he was not a public servant.

Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and .

the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

7. I have heard Mr. S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI.

8. Mr. S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the appellant/accused is innocent and was falsely implicated. There is no evidence that the accused had forged the documents. The learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The report of the handwriting expert is a weak type of evidence and should not be relied upon to record the conviction. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that an excessive sentence was imposed. The accused is in custody, and the period already undergone by the accused be treated as the period of imprisonment.

::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 11

2025:HHC:24709

9. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent-CBI, submitted that the learned .

Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence. It was duly proved on record that Tara Chand impersonated himself as Jagdish. He produced the documents stated to have been issued by Patwari, electoral officer, and Panchayat Secretary; however, they denied that any document was issued by them. Therefore, all the ingredients of the commission of offences were satisfied, and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

11. Simanchal Sahu (PW5) stated that he had recommended the loan case of Tara Chand. This loan was sanctioned by Branch Manager, S.D. Bodh. The signatures on the Schedule under Section 6(1), (Ex.PW1/J), transfer voucher (Ex.PW5/C to Ex.PW5/D3) were put by S.D. Bodh. Rule Based Landing Model (RBLM) (Ex.PW5/E), Proposal Form (Ex.PW5/F), Ration Card and Voter ID Card were signed by S.D. Bodh. He ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:24709 checked the record in the year 2014 and found that Devi Chand had introduced one of the loanees. He contacted Devi Chand and .

searched for Jagdish Kumar. He found Jagdish Kumar, who identified himself as Tara Chand. He stated in his cross-

examination that he had recommended 18-19 cases out of 26.

The specimen signature/handwriting of S.D. Bodh was not taken in his presence. He had not made any complaint regarding the role of S.D. Bodh. He admitted that it was his duty to fill up the form. He found that Tara Chand had impersonated Jagdish Kumar in May 2014. He admitted that it was his duty to visit the spot and evaluate the land. He volunteered to say that this duty is also discharged by the Branch Manager.

12. Nothing was suggested to this witness as to why he should be making a false statement. He positively identified as Tara Chand, who was introduced to the Bank as Jagdish Kumar.

13. Ram Krishan (PW16) corroborated his version. He stated that he was posted as Bank Officer in PNB, Sultanpur Branch from December 2010 till July 2011. S.D. Bodh was posted as Branch Manager in PNB, Sultanpur. His duty was to assist the customers in opening a savings bank account. Account Opening ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:24709 Form (Ex.PW3/B25) bears the signatures of S.D. Bodh. This account was opened by Jagdish. Voter ID Card and copy of family .

register were submitted with the form, and the borrower had put his signatures on these documents in his presence. S.D. Bodh directed him to attest the copies of Voter ID Card and copy of Ration Card. He also attested the photocopy of Election Voter Card and copy of Ration Card. Account holder had not brought the original documents, and he attested the photocopies in good faith. He identified Tara Chand as the person who had appeared before him as Jagdish. He also identified the signatures of Jagdish on various documents.

14. He stated in his cross-examination that KYC documents attached to a loan file are verified when the original is brought by the borrower. He denied that Tara Chand had not opened the account in the Bank.

15. His testimony regarding the signatures of Tara Chand on the Account Open Form and various documents is corroborated by the statement of Dr. Ravinder Sharma (PW27), who stated that the person who wrote S-115 to S-119 (Tara Chand) and purported signatures A-55 to A-64 (Jagdish ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:24709 Kumar), wrote Q-115 to Q-117, (application for agriculture credit) (Ex.PW3/B), Q-118, (Interview-cum-Assessment), Form .

(Ex.PW3/B1), Q-122 to Q-126, signatures on Hypothecation Agreement (Ex.PW3/B7), Q-122 to Q-125, Q-126 (declaration regarding agriculture loan) (Ex.PW3/B-24), Q-128, Q-129 (Letter of Consent) (Ex.PW3/B23), Q-130, Q-132 (Proposal Form for Kisan Crop Card Holder) (Ex.PW5/A), Q-134 Rule Based Lending Model (RBLM) (Ex.PW5/E), Q-137, Q-138, Q-140, (Schedule Declaration under Section 161 (Ex.PW5/B), Q-149 Jamabandi (Ex.PW12/A), Q-157 (Copy of Ration Card) (Ex.PW16/A), Q-160 (Voter Identity Card) (Ex.PW20/A). He stated in his cross-examination that it is difficult to give an opinion when the signatures are illegible. He volunteered to say that signatures were very clear in the present case. He admitted that the science of handwriting is a progressive science.

16. It was submitted that the statement of the handwriting expert is not sufficient and cannot be used for recording conviction. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Kamalakkannan v.

State of T.N., (2025) 4 SCC 487: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 476 that the Court need not act with an initial suspicion while examining the ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:24709 opinion of a handwriting expert. The Court should carefully probe the reasons for the opinion, and if there is no reason to .

doubt the testimony of the handwriting expert, conviction can be based upon the statement of the handwriting expert. It was observed:-

"13. The locus classicus on this issue is Murari Lal v. State of M.P. [Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980 SCC (Cri) 330], wherein this Court laid down the principles with regard to the extent to which reliance can be placed on the evidence of an expert witness and when corroboration of such evidence may be sought. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow: (SCC pp.
707-709, 711-12, paras 4, 6 & 11) "4. We will first consider the argument, a stale argument often heard, particularly in criminal courts, that the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted upon without substantial corroboration. We shall presently point out how the argument cannot be justified on principle or precedent. We begin with the observation that the expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for condemning his opinion evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insisting upon corroboration. True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses
-- the quality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witnesses -- but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:24709 conclusion. The more developed and the more perfect the science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of fingerprints .
has attained near perfection, and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect, and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, however, the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. ...
***
6. Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the Evidence Act, and where the court has to form an opinion upon a point as to the identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person "specially skilled" in questions as to the identity of handwriting is expressly made a relevant fact.
... So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of a handwriting expert, and there need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard-and-fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.
***
11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:24709 of law, that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon unless substantially corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the .
approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts, and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this Court are often flaunted." (emphasis supplied)

17. Therefore, the Court cannot start with the presumption that the statement of a handwriting expert is to be discarded. In the present case, nothing was elicited in the cross examination of the handwriting expert to show that his statement is unreliable. Therefore, learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon the evidence of Tara Chand and the handwriting expert to hold that Tara Chand had impersonated himself as Jagdish.

18. The specimen handwriting of Tara Chand was taken in the presence of Rajesh Bodh (PW9). He stated that specimen ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:24709 signatures and handwriting of borrower Tara Chand (S-115 to S-119), consisting of 05 sheets (Ex.PW9/C), were taken in his .

presence. He identified the signatures of Tara Chand. He was not cross-examined on behalf of accused No.2, and the cross-

examination made on behalf of accused No.1 was adopted.

Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that no suggestion was given to this witness that Tara Chand had not put his signatures in his presence.

19. Inspector Mohan Lal (PW23) also stated that he had taken the specimen signatures of Tara Chand (Ex.PW9/C) collectively on 21.9.2015. Again, no suggestion was made to him that Tara Chand had not given any specimen signatures in his presence. The only suggestion which was given to him was that Tara Chand never impersonated Jagdish Kumar. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1:

(2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4 and it was held at page 34:
::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 19
2025:HHC:24709 "58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such .

questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies, and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18: 50 hrs, therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19: 00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ext. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2- 9-2014 at 14: 30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time i.e. 17: 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014.

Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such an argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18: 50 hrs is not tenable.

59. The House of Lords in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)] considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:24709 his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under:

"Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to .
me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross-
examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling."

60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under:

"My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:24709 the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give .
them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to."

61. This Court in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], quoted from Browne [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)] to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under:

(Nahar Singh case [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13) "13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court.

Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned:

(1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:24709 (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him .

to a penalty or forfeiture."

62. This Court, in a judgment reported as Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana [Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268], laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) "15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-

examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-

examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat [Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906]. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440]

16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai [Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:24709 60], it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of .

Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian [A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359] has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram [Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra [Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683] has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff."

20. Thus, the learned Trial Court did not err in holding that the accused, Tara Chand, had put his signatures in the presence of the CBI and the witnesses.

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21. It was submitted that the signatures were put by Tara Chand during investigation, and Section 73 of the Indian .

Evidence Act only authorises the Magistrate to take the specimen signatures. Therefore, these signatures are inadmissible and no reliance can be placed upon the same. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Boota Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 31, that taking of the signatures by the police during the investigation is not violative of the Constitution of India. It was observed:-

41. Reference to the evidence of expert PW 32 Shiv Ram Singh would show that all these signatures fully tallied with the specimen signatures of the respondent Boota Singh taken during the investigation, and the signatures of J.P. Singh are Exs. Ka-53 and Ka-54. Thus, the prosecution has adduced conclusive evidence to prove that the car seized by the Police at Bombay was the same which was hired by the respondent Boota Singh and others from PW 2 Inder Singh at Dehra Dun. This fact is proved both by oral and documentary evidence discussed above, and a very well-reasoned finding on this point has been given by the Sessions Judge, which runs thus:
"In Ex. Ka-2 agreement entered into between Lal Singh and Jasbir Singh of Auto Linkers Financiers, the particulars of the car are given as Fiat 1100, 1962 Model, Chassis No. 950261. These particulars are identical with those of UPM-3236 seized by the Bombay Police. Thus, the prosecution has been able to establish that the car seized by the Bombay Police was the one which the accused Boota Singh, along with his companions, hired from Punjab Taxi Service.
::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 25
2025:HHC:24709 The learned Sessions Judge has also pointed out that the original plate Ex. Ka-51 had been recovered by PW 18 Vikram Singh from the Car UPM-3236 and sent to PW 26 Shariq Alvi, who found that there was tampering with the .
number of the plate. Brij Kishore of R.T.O.'s office Bareilly stated that UPM-3236 was a fake number inasmuch as it related to a station wagon belonging to a Junior Government High School, Pakkwara, District Moradabad. Harcharan Singh, Inder Singh and Mahendra Kaur have also identified the car in question to be the same car which was hired by the respondent Boota Singh on December 8, 1963. These facts have not been challenged by the defence. Even the High Court has not reversed the finding of the Sessions Judge on this point. Before closing this part of the case, we might advert to an argument advanced before us by Mr Mulla, regarding the specimen signature of the respondent Boota Singh taken by the police during investigation. Mr Mulla submitted that the act of the investigating officer in taking the specimen signature of the respondent Boota Singh was hit by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also amounted to testimonial compulsion to violate the guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
The matter is no longer res integra and is concluded by a decision of this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1962) 3 SCR 10 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856] where the Court observed as follows:
"That is why it must be held that by giving these impressions or specimen handwriting, the accused person does not furnish evidence against himself. So when an accused person is compelled to give a specimen handwriting or impressions of his finger, palm or foot, it may be said that he has been compelled to be a witness."

It cannot, however, be said that he has been compelled to be a witness against himself. It was also held that merely taking a specimen handwriting does not amount to giving a statement so as to be hit by Section 162 of the CrPC. In ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 26 2025:HHC:24709 view of this decision of the Court, Mr Mulla did not pursue the point further.

22. This position was reiterated in State (NCT of Delhi) v.

.

Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, wherein it was observed:-

222. Another item of purchase was a motorcycle of the Yamaha make bearing Registration No. HR-51-E-5768.

PW 76 stated that on 18-12-2001, the accused Afzal took the investigating team to Gupta Auto Deals at Karol Bagh, from where the said motorcycle was purchased, and he pointed out the shopowner, PW 29. The memo of pointing out is Ext. PW-29/1. This conduct of Afzal is relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. PW 29 deposed that four persons, including a lady, came to his shop at noon to see the motorcycle. After taking a trial run, they went away, and in the evening, two persons came and purchased the motorcycle for Rs 20,000. As already noticed, the said motorcycle was found at A-97, Gandhi Vihar and the same was seized by the IO. The witness handed over the book containing the delivery receipt (Exts. 29/2 and 29/3) to the police, which were filed in the court as PW-29/2 and PW-29/3. The witness identified Afzal and Shaukat in court and the deceased terrorist, Mohammed, from the photograph (Ext. 29/5). He was, however, unable to identify the lady in view of the fact that she was at a distance. The High Court rightly took the view that, in view of what was narrated by the witness, the identification of the accused and the deceased terrorist was quite probable. It was not a case of "fleeting glance". This is a discrepancy between the seizure memo (PW-29/4) dated 19-12-2001 and the statement of PW 29 under Section 161 CrPC that he handed over the papers on 18-12-2001. This apparent contradiction was not pointed out to the witness, and no question was asked about it. The next important circumstance against the accused Afzal is his association with Mohammed in purchasing the Ambassador car with Registration No. DL 3 CJ 1527 ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 27 2025:HHC:24709 from PW 20. The fact that the said car was used by the slain terrorists for entering Parliament with arms and explosives is not in dispute. PW 20, after hearing the news that the car with the said number was used by the .

terrorists, went straight to Parliament Street Police Station along with the copies of documents. Having learned that the SHO was at the Parliament House, he went there and met the SHO at the gate and passed on information to him that the car was sold by him on 11-12- 2001 to one Ashiq Hussain Khan. He identified the car, which was lying at Gate No. 11, then, he handed over the documents pertaining to the car, which were seized under the memo Ext. PW-1/7. The documents were later filed in the court. PW 20 correctly identified the accused Afzal as the person who had come with Ashiq Hussain Khan for the purchase of the car. The delivery receipt of the car issued by Ashiq Hussain Khan is Ext. PW-1/6. The delivery receipt was signed by Afzal as a witness. The signature of Afzal on the delivery receipt is proved by the analysis of his handwriting by an expert, PW 23. This is apart from the testimony of PW 20. In the course of examination under Section 313 CrPC, Afzal admitted that on 11-12-2001, he accompanied Mohammed to the shop of PW 20 for purchasing a second-hand car, but later he denied it. It is also worth noting that Afzal did not let the amicus put a suggestion that he had not visited the shop of PW 20. PW 20 deposed that he had taken a photocopy of the identity card and a coloured photo of Ashiq Hussain Khan, which are Exts. PW-25/4 and PW-20/3. PW 20 further deposed that the dead body lying at Gate No. 1 was of the same person who had introduced himself as Ashiq Hussain Khan while purchasing the car. When he was shown Ext. PW-4/3, which is the identity card in the name of Ashiq Hussain Khan, recovered from the deceased terrorist Mohammed, PW 20 confirmed that it was the same identity card that was shown to him. The High Court held that the evidence of PW 20, who was an independent witness, was in no manner tainted and held that Afzal was involved in the purchase of the car used by ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:24709 the terrorists to enter the Parliament House. This conclusion was reached by the High Court even after excluding the evidence of PW 23, Principal Scientific Officer, who confirmed that the signatures on the delivery .

receipt, Ext. PW-1/6 tallied with his specimen signatures. In this context, a contention was raised before the High Court that in view of Section 27 of POTA, specimen signature should not have been obtained without the permission of the court. In reply to this contention urged before the High Court, Mr Gopal Subramanium, the learned Senior Counsel for the State clarified that on the relevant date, when the specimen signatures of Afzal were obtained, the investigation was not done under the POTA provisions and dehors the provisions of POTA, hence there was no legal bar against obtaining the handwriting samples. The learned counsel relied upon the eleven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [(1962) 3 SCR 10 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856] in support of his contention that Article 20(3) of the Constitution was not infringed by taking the specimen handwriting or signature or thumb impressions of a person in custody. Reference has also been drawn to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Boota Singh [(1979) 1 SCC 31: 1979 SCC (Cri) 115]. We find considerable force in this contention advanced by Mr Gopal Subramanium. In fact, this aspect was not seriously debated before us.

23. Therefore, the submission that signatures during the course of investigation were admissible and learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the same cannot be accepted.

24. The statement of Simanchal Saho (PW5) regarding the Voter Identity Card, Ration Card and Jamabandi having been ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:24709 annexed to the application is duly corroborated by the report of the handwriting expert.

.

25. Budh Ram (PW12) was posted as Patwari in Patwar Circle, Bajora. He stated that Jamabandi (Ex.PW12/A) was not written by him. It also did not bear his signatures. Similarly, he had not issued the scheduled declaration under Section 6(1) (Ex.PW5/B). As per Jamabandi brought by him. Khata/Khatauni No. 11/12 to 14 do not belong to Mehar Chand, Kehar Singh and others, but they belong to Bhagat Ram and others. Similarly, Rapat No. 1125 dated 22.4.2011 encircled in (Ex.PW5/B) does not figure against Khata/Khatauni No.11/12 to 14. He had also given his specimen signatures to the police. He was not cross-

examined on behalf of accused Tara Chand, which means that his testimony that Jamabandi was not issued by him was accepted to be correct.

26. Anjana Mahant (PW19) stated that she was posted as Panchayat Sahayak of Gram Panchayat, Neul. An entry of Dhale Ram, son of Hukam Ram, was made at Serial No. 173. Therefore, the entry of 173 cannot be in the name of Jagdish and is forged.

She stated in her cross-examination that the register brought by ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 30 2025:HHC:24709 her did not have any paging, and the ration card register brought by her was not in her name. It was nowhere suggested .

to her that accused Tara Chand or Jagdish were residing at Neul or that a ration card was issued in the name of Jagdish or his family members. Hence, her testimony shows that the ration card was fake.

27. Teja Singh (PW20) stated that he was working as a Clerk in Sub Divisional Election Office, Kullu. He used to prepare Voter Identity Cards and make an entry in the register. The Voter Identity Card (Ex.PW20/A) was not issued by the Election Office of District Kullu. The number of constituencies in the Voter Identity Card (Ex.PW20/A) was wrongly mentioned as 68 Banjar.

Village Nuen was under 57 of Banjar Vidhan Sabha area. The Initial HP/04/057 was wrongly mentioned and should have been HP/02/057. There was no entry as mentioned in (Ex.PW20/A) in the original register brought into the Court. He was not cross-

examined at all, and his testimony that the Voter Identity Card was fake has gone unrebutted. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly concluded that accused Tara Chand had produced forged fake Voter Identity Card and Ration Card.

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28. Therefore, it was proved on record that Tara Chand appeared before the Bank and represented himself to be Jagdish .

Kumar. He opened an account, filled the application form and other documents and submitted forged Voter Identity Card and Ration Card in support of the application. Thus, he had impersonated himself as Jagdish and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon the evidence.

29. It was submitted that putting the signatures in the name of a fictitious person does not constitute an offence. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Madras High Court in Rathnavel v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 212, that submitting an application for loan in the name of a fictitious person constitutes the offences of cheating and forgery. It was observed:-

"23. Insofar as the guarantor Mr. Sivaguru is concerned, he is a fictitious person; the signatures in Ex. P9 and ExP.14 are proved to be forged by A2[Palanivel]. The prosecution has also proved through witnesses that the guarantor, Mr. Sivaguru, S/o Munusamy, 4th Street, Ran- ganathapuram, Tambaram, is a fictitious person. The house tax receipt bearing No. 15279 is duplicated and used for several loans by A2[Palanivel]. The land document given to create an equitable mortgage is not that of A4[Ranthnavel]. The handwriting expert Pw-24, in his opinion, marked as Ex. P34 has opined that A2 has signed in Ex. P9 and Ex. P14 as Sivaguru.
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24. Thus, the prosecution has established that a housing loan in the name of Rathnavel [A4] has been sanctioned by A1[Prabhu] based on forged documents. A1 [J.S. Prabhu] before advancing the loan has not made a pre-
.
sanction inspection. A2 [Palanivel] had set up A4 [Rath- navel] to avail the loan of Rs. 3 lakhs in connivance with A1[J.S. Prabhu]. The accompanying documents presented by A4[Rathnavel] are proved to be forged, and they have been procured by A2[Palanivel] with the help of A3[Gu- nasekaran] and A6[N. Balasundaram]."

30. Therefore, the submission that no forgery was

31. to committed in the present case is not acceptable.

It was submitted that, as per the prosecution, accused Tara Chand had not forged Voter Identity Card, Ration Card and Jamabandi, and he was wrongly held guilty of the commission of offences under Sections 467 and 468 of IPC. This is not acceptable. Section 464 of IPC (Explanation-II) provides that making of a false document in the name of a fictitious person intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person may amount to forgery. The illustration provides that 'A' draws a bill of exchange upon a fictitious person and fraudulently accepts the bill in the name of such fictitious person with an intent to negotiate it; he commits forgery.

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32. In the present case, it has been proved by the statement of Budh Ram (PW12), Anjana (PW19) and Teja Singh .

(PW20) that no person by the name of Jagdish was residing at Neul. Therefore, the signatures were put in the name of a fictitious person (Jagdish) supported by the forged document, intending that the bank would act upon the representation that Jagdish exists and had made the application. Hence, the present case will fall within the purview of Section 464 (Explanation-II), and the accused Tara Chand was rightly held guilty of forging the application in the name of Jagdish and supporting it with the forged Jamabandi, Voter Identity Card and Ration Card.

33. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of IPC. Section 419 of IPC specifically provides for cheating by impersonation. In the present case, Tara Chand had impersonated Jagdish, a fictitious person. Therefore, he was rightly held guilty and the commission of an offence punishable under Section 419 of IPC. He induced the Bank to sanction a loan for him and disburse the loan amount by way of the representation so made by him. Therefore, he was rightly ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 34 2025:HHC:24709 convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC.

.

34. It was submitted that the accused was not a public servant and could not have been convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. This submission ignores the fact that the conviction was recorded with the aid of Section 120-B of IPC. It is apparent from the statement of Simanchal Sahu (PW5) that accused S.D. Bodh had told him (Simanchal Sahu) that he had verified the papers and the land of Jagdish, which shows that the accused Tara Chand could not have impersonated Jagdish without conspiring with S.D. Bodh. Otherwise S.D. Bodh had no reason to make such a statement. Hence, the conspiracy was writ large and Tara Chand was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) of PC Act read with Section 120-B of IPC. By way of clarification, it is necessary to state that this finding is confined to the role of Tara Chand and not to S.D. Bodh since S.D. Bodh is not before this Court.

35. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a ::: Downloaded on - 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS 35 2025:HHC:24709 fine of ₹10,000/- for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 467 of IPC. The offence under Section 467 of IPC .

can be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for either description for a term which may extend to 10 years. The accused, Tara Chand, had represented himself to be Jagdish to obtain a loan from the bank. He had annexed the forged documents with the loan application. Thus, the act was deliberately done with prior preparation. The act was not done on a spur of the moment. It was meant to benefit the accused and deprive the public of their money. It was an economic offence, and an economic offence is not to be viewed lightly, as the monetary gain is higher. Therefore, the sentence of seven years cannot be said to be excessive.

36. The rest of the sentences are less than seven years and are not excessive. Therefore, no interference is required with the sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court.

37. No other point was urged.

38. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

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39. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

.


                                               (Rakesh Kainthla)
                                                    Judge
     29th July, 2025





          (Chander)




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