Gujarat High Court
For Approval And Signature vs Gujarat State Energy Corp. Ltd on 3 February, 2017
Author: K.M.Thaker
Bench: K.M.Thaker
C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8564 of 2003
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER Sd/-
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed Yes
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of No
the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of No
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?
GAUTAMKUMAR UGAMSHIBHAI CHAUHAN....Petitioner(s)
Versus
GUJARAT STATE ENERGY CORP. LTD....Respondent(s)
Appearance:
MR TR MISHRA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR DIPAK R DAVE, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER
Date : 03/02/2017
ORAL JUDGMENT
Heard Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner, and Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent.
2. In present petition, the petitioner has placed under challenge award dated 21.3.2003 Page 1 HC-NIC Page 1 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT passed by learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No.884 of 1997 whereby the learned Labour Court dismissed the reference and rejected the relief prayed for by present petitioner.
3. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and from rival submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties that present petitioner had raised industrial dispute with the allegation that the opponent board terminated his service illegally and arbitrarily. Appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication by learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad. The dispute came to be registered as Reference (LCA) No.884 of 1997. The terms of reference required learned Labour Court to decide as to whether the claimant should be reinstated in service on his original post with backwages. So as to justify his demand, the claimant averred and alleged in his statement of claim that he was appointed by the board on 3.8.1994 as Supervisor (Cleaning), however, his position / post was described as Mukadam-cum- Sanitary Inspector. His salary was fixed in pay- scale of Rs.890-1700 and that he performed his duties regularly, continuously and diligently until 12.9.1995 and thereafter on 13.9.1995, the Dy. Engineer (Civil) of the opponent board Page 2 HC-NIC Page 2 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT terminated his salary by oral instructions without assigning any reasons and without any fault on his part. He also alleged that the opponent board terminated his service without following procedure prescribed by law and in violation of principles of natural justice. The claimant also alleged breach of statutory provisions. With such allegations, the claimant demanded that he should be reinstated in service with all benefits.
3.1 The opponent board opposed the reference. In his written statement, the board contended that the claimant was engaged for a specific work and for specified / limited tenure on temporary and ad-hoc basis on account of exigency of work. The board claimed that in the appointment order, the period for which the claimant was engaged was specifically mentioned and that it was also expressly clarified in the appointment order that the appointment would automatically came to end upon expiry of period of employment mentioned in the appointment order. The board claimed that in view of specific condition in the appointment order, the claimant's appointment was covered under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that therefore, cessation of claimant's service with the board upon expiry of period mentioned in the Page 3 HC-NIC Page 3 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT appointment order cannot be termed retrenchment and consequently, provision under Section 25F would not be applicable. The board also claimed that after the employment of the claimant came to end in light of specific condition in the appointment order, any other person was not engaged by the board on same post in same department for same work and that therefore, provision under Section 25-H also would not be applicable and the automatic cessation of claimant's service upon expiry of period of appointment cannot be termed as an action in violation of Section 25G or Section 25H. With such contentions, the opponent board opposed the reference and submitted that the reference should be rejected.
3.2 After the parties completed their pleadings, learned Labour Court received and recorded evidence from both sides. Upon conclusion of evidence by both sides, learned Labour Court heard rival submissions and passed impugned award after considering material available on record as well as rival contentions. The learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the claimant was engaged for specific work and for specified / limited period expressly mentioned in the appointment order and that therefore, Section 25F and/or Section 25G and/or Section 25H were not Page 4 HC-NIC Page 4 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT applicable in case of the claimant. Having reached such conclusion, the learned Labour Court rejected the reference.
3.3 Feeling aggrieved by the award, original claimant has taken out present petition.
4. While assessing the impugned award, Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner - original claimant, submitted that the claimant had worked for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months and that therefore, his service could not have been terminated without complying the provisions under Section 25F, more particularly when the claimant's service was not terminated for any misconduct. He submitted that the petitioner was not granted opportunity of hearing and the respondent did not pay retrenchment compensation, notice pay, etc. at the time when his service was discontinued by oral order w.e.f. 13.9.1995. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner - claimant, submitted that the learned Labour Court committed error in rejecting the reference even after recording specific finding of fact that the petitioner had worked continuously for more than 12 months and during the said period, he had worked for more than 240 days. Learned advocate for the petitioner - claimant also submitted that the respondent had engaged other person after Page 5 HC-NIC Page 5 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT terminating the service of the claimant and that therefore, the respondent also committed breach of Section 25-H. He further claimed that at the time when the petitioner's service was terminated, the respondent had not prepared and had not displayed seniority list which resulted into breach of Section 25-G because the respondent did not observe the principle of seniority i.e. principle of Last Come First Go. According to the learned advocate for the petitioner, for such reasons, the petitioner's termination from service was illegal and therefore, the learned Labour Court ought to have directed the respondent to reinstate the claimant with consequential benefits. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner - claimant, in support of his submissions relied on the decisions in case of Deepak Industries Limited & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [[1975 LLJ 293], Management of Messers Hotel Samrat and Government of N.C.T. & Ors. [2007 (113) FLR 395], Madhya Pradesh Text Book Corporation and Krishna Kant Pancholi & Anr. [1998 (80) FLR 54], Surat Mahila Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd., Surat and Mamtaben Mahendrabhai Joshi [2001 (3) LLN 444], Kutch District Panchayat v. Kishor D. Varu [1998 LLR 886], Tata Consulting Engineers v. Valsala K. Nair (Ms.) & Ors. [1997 II CLR 1099], Ram Chandra v. Union of India & Ors. [2001 LLR 1043] and the Page 6 HC-NIC Page 6 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT decision in Letters Patent Appeal No.850 of 2001 decided on 8.7.2010 by the Division Bench of this Court.
5. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent, opposed the petition and submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner - claimant. He submitted that the petitioner - claimant was appointed for specific period and for specific work and the appointment order specifically mentioned the period of employment and that therefore, the service of the claimant automatically come to an end on expiry of the period mentioned in the appointment letter. He submitted that in view of the nature of appointment of the claimant, Section 25-F would not be applicable and the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in holding that the respondent did not commit breach of Section 25-F. He submitted that in view of the evidence on record, the learned Labour Court is justified in rejecting the reference and the award does not warrant any interference. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent, relied on the decision in case of Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. v. Bamaniya Lakhabhai Bhagvanjibhai decided on 10.3.2015 and in case of GEB-Substituted as Gujarat State Electricity Corporation v. Harishkumar N. Bosamiya decided on 10.1.2014.
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6. At the outset, it is relevant to mention that there is no dispute so far as relevant facts are concerned. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed in August 1984 and continued in service until September 1995 by virtue of different appointment orders of similar nature whereby appointment for 58 days were given.
6.1 It is also not in dispute that such appointments were given continuously and consecutively i.e. immediately after expiry of the period of 58 days and the petitioner was continued in service during the said period continuously and without any break.
6.2 Likewise, it is also not in dispute that the petitioner - claimant had worked for more than 12 months during the said period and that he had worked for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months.
6.3 In this factual background, rival contentions have to be examined.
7. According to the petitioner - claimant, the termination of his service is illegal on the ground of, (a) breach of Section 25-F; and (b) Page 8 HC-NIC Page 8 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT breach of Section 25-G and 25-H. 7.1 So as to justify the said contentions, it is claimed that the claimants comply both the conditions for attracting Section 25-F inasmuch as he worked for more than 12 months prior to termination of his service and during the period of previous 12 months, he worked for 240 days. It is also claimed that after his termination, other persons were engaged and that at the time when his service was terminated, the seniority list as contemplated under Rule-81 was not prepared and display and principle of seniority was not followed.
7.2 The said contentions are opposed by the respondent on two grounds namely, (a) the appointment was for fixed period by virtue of appointment orders which mentioned specific condition / clause about the period of appointment and therefore, the appointment was covered under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and that therefore, Section 25-F and/or Section 25G would not be applicable; and (b) any person was not appointed after the service of the petitioner was terminated, and that therefore, the board did not commit breach of Section 25H.
8. The question which arises for consideration Page 9 HC-NIC Page 9 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT is whether the petitioner's appointment gets protection of Section 2(oo)(bb) or not.
8.1 The legal position with reference to clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is explained by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of S.M.Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 27] wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:-
"12. 'Retrenchment' in its ordinary connotation is discharge of labour as surplus though the business or work itself is continued. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions that labour laws being beneficial pieces of legislation are to be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries in case of doubt or where it is possible to take two views of a provision. It is also well-settled that the Parliament has employed the expression "the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever" while defining the term "retrenchment", which is suggestive of the legislative intent to assign the term 'retrenchment' a meaning wider than what it is understood to have in common parlance. There are four exceptions carved out of the artificially extended meaning of the term 'retrenchment', and therefore, termination of service of a workman so long as it is attributable to the act of the employer would fall within the meaning of 'retrenchment' de hors the reason for termination. To be excepted from within the meaning of 'retrenchment' the termination of service must fall within one of the four excepted categories. A termination of service which does not fall within the categories (a), (b), (bb) and (c) would fall within the meaning of 'retrenchment'.
13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:-
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simplicitor, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project; and
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract.
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made Page 10 HC-NIC Page 10 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment.
14. The engagement of a workman as a daily-wager does not by itself amount to putting the workman on notice that he was being engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a particular length of time or upto to occurrence of some event, and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment was short- lived. The contract of employment consciously entered into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to the workman on the date of the commencement of the employment itself that his employment was short- lived and as per the terms of the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the contract and the scheme or project coming to an end. The workman may not therefore complaint that by the act of employer his employment was coming to an abrupt termination. To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of Sub-clause (bb) abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent-employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of Sub-clause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily-wagers in a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of Sub-clause (bb), it has to be held that the termination of the services of the appellants amounted to retrenchment."
8.2 The case of the petitioner is required to be considered in light of the said decision of Hon'ble Apex Court.
8.3 Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner - claimant, would contend that continuing a person in service by separate orders and by different appointment letters issued consecutively demonstrates that the work for which the workman is engaged is of permanent nature and merely because period of appointment is mentioned in the appointment orders his case should not be excluded from retrenchment.
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8.4 So far as the said submission is concerned, it is relevant to note that in in the case of Kishorchandra Samal [(2006) 1 SCC 253], the concerned person was engaged as Junior Typist on NMR basis. He was engaged w.e.f. 12.7.1982 and was continued for more than 1 month. Subsequently, another order was issued appointing him for 44 days w.e.f. 1.10.1983 and on expiry of the said period (on 15.11.1983) another appointment letter was issued on 5.12.1983 for fixed period giving effect from 16.11.1983. Thereafter the person was allowed to continue for about 8 months. Subsequently, he was engaged on ad hoc basis w.e.f. 23.7.1985. Thereafter he was again engaged on NMR basis and payment of Rs.10/- for period of 90 days from 1.12.1985 to 28.2.1986 and thereafter he was allowed to continue from 29.6.1986 to 25.9.1986 and thereafter from 27.9.1986 to 24.12.1986 and thereafter he was allowed to continue without any break till 11.18.1989.
8.5 The said details give out that in the said case also several orders were issued whereby the person was engaged over a period of 7 years, i.e. from July 1982 to August 1989. In that background, Hon'ble Apex Court considered the defence of the Corporation in light of Section Page 12 HC-NIC Page 12 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT 2(oo)(bb). Hon'ble Apex Court also referred to the decision in the case of S.M. Nilajkar (supra). Having considered above mentioned details and the decision in the case of Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. as well as the decision in the case of Anil Bapulal Kalsary and the decision in the case of Batala Cooperative Sugar Mills, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the decision in the case of S.M. Nilajkar would not be applicable because in the case of S.M. Nilajkar any period of appointment was not indicated. In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:-
"6. The Division Bench held that the workmen (respondents before it) were employed under a project of the Telecom Department and were, therefore, covered by Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. It was a clear case of termination of services of the workmen as a result of non-renewal of contract of employment on the expiry of the contract. The question of compliance of Section 25F of the Act did not arise. The respondent-workmen could not be said to have been retrenched. The engagement of the workmen was on daily wages and only for the purpose of completion of the project undertaken by the Telecom Department for laying coaxial cables in the Belgaum District. That the project had been completed in 1986-87 itself, is not in dispute. Because of completion of the project their services stood terminated ipso facto. The Department's Circular date 30.03.1985 was relied upon. The Division Bench placed reliance of decisions of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority and Ors. v. Vikram Chaudhary and Ors. , (1995) 5 SCC 210 and Executive Engineer, State of Karnataka v. K. Somasetty and Ors. , for forming the opinion that the workmen could not be said to have been illegally retrenched. The Division Bench also formed the opinion that unexplained and undue delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the disputes before the Tribunal vitiated the reference because of laches. For taking this view, reliance was placed on Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, , Ratan Chandra Sammanta v. Union of India, 1993 Supp.(4) SCC 467 and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors. , . The Division Bench allowed the appeals preferred by the employer and directed the Page 13 HC-NIC Page 13 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT award of the Tribunal as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge to the set aside.
11. 11. It is common knowledge that the Government as a welfare State floats several schemes and projects generating employment opportunities, though they are short-lived. The objective is to meet the need of the moment. The benefit of such schemes and projects is that for the duration they exist, they provide employment and livelihood to such persons as would not have been able to secure the same but for such schemes or projects. If the workmen employed for fulfilling the need of such passing-phase-projects or schemes were to become a liability on the employer-State by too liberally interpreting the labour laws in favour of the workmen, then the same may well act as a disincentive to the State for floating such schemes and the State may opt to keep away from initiating such schemes and projects even in times of dire need, because it may feel that by opening the gates of welfare it would be letting-in onerous obligations entailed upon it by extended application of the labour laws. Sub-clause (bb) in the definition of retrenchment was introduced to take care of such like-situations by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 with effect from 18.8.1984"
8.6 In the case of Kishorchandra, the learned Labour Court had directed the Corporation to reinstate Mr.Samal. However, the High Court accepted the stand of the Corporation that since there was no renewal of contract after August 1989, the person had no right to demand that he should be continued in service. The High Court set aside the award of the learned Labour Court. Before Hon'ble Apex Court, the facts were considered in light of the above mentioned decisions and after considering the case of S.M. Nilajkar, Hon'ble Apex Court confirmed the decision of the High Court whereby the award passed by the learned Labour Court was set aside.
Therefore, the distinction which Mr.Mishra,
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learned advocate has urged, is not permissible.
8.7 Even in the case of Karnaktaka Handloom Development Corporation Limited, the employee was appointed for various spells of fixed period. This aspect is taken note of by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No.2 of the decision, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has recorded that:
"2. The respondent was appointed for various spells of fixed periods on a fixed honorarium as an expert weaver to train the weavers in the unorganised sector. The respondent was appointed on contract basis for a period of 200 days only, on a fixed pay of Rs.400 per month with a stipulation that the contract of appointment automatically expires on the 201st day."
Having noticed said facts, Apex Court observed that:-
"14. It is thus clear from the above that the respondent claimant is aware that his appointment was purely contractual and for a specified period. He is also aware that he is not eligible to any other benefits as a regular employee of the Corporation and could be liable for termination without any notice and without payment of compensation. The claimant is also aware that his appointment stood automatically terminated on the completion of the stipulated period. The case of the claimant, therefore, in our view, does not become an industrial dispute.
18. We have perused all the appointment letters dated 14.01.1991, 24.02.1992, 10.02.1993, 03.03.1993 and 30.11.1993 produced by the respondent as annexures which consistently and categorically state that the respondent's appointment with the Corporation was purely contractual for a fixed period. The respondent was engaged only under the Vishwa programme scheme which is not in existence. Now the scheme came to an end during August, 1994 the respondent was also not governed by any service rules of the Corporation. The Corporation put an end to the contract w.e.f. 31.08.1993 which, in our opinion, cannot be termed as dismissal from service. Even assuming that the respondent had worked 240 days continuously he, in our opinion, cannot claim that his services should be continued because the number of 240 Page 15 HC-NIC Page 15 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT days does not apply to the respondent inasmuch as his services were purely contractual. The termination of his contract, in our view, does not amount to retrenchment and, therefore, it does not attract compliance of Section 25F of the I.D. Act at all.
19. The view taken by the High Court, in our opinion, is contrary to the judgment of this Court in Kishore Chandra Samal vs. Orissa State Cashew Development Corporation Limited Dhenkanal reported in 2006 (1) SCC 253 (Arijit Pasayat and R.V. Raveendran, JJ). The above is also a case of employment for specific period/fixed term and that the workman was engaged for various spells of fixed periods from July, 1982 to August, 1986. The workman was retrenched at the end of each period. The Labour Court held that the appellant served continuously for many years covering the requisite period of continuous service in a calendar year and that the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act had not been complied with, termination of his service is illegal and unjustified. On the basis of the said finding, the Labour Court directed the workman to be reinstated to his former post. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent Corporation that the appointment of the workman was on NMR basis for a fixed period of time on the basis of payment at different rates and since the engagement was for a fixed period, the High Court held that the award of the Labour Court was to be set aside. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the workman submitted that the High Court failed to notice that the period fixed was a camouflage to avoid regularization. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom District Manager Karnataka (supra) where it was held that mere mention about the engagement being temporary without indication of any period attracts Section 25-F of the Act if it is proved that the workman concerned had worked continuously for more than 240 days.
21. The Division Bench of the High Court in the instant case relied upon the decision in S.M.Nilajkar's case, which, in our opinion, has no application because in that case no period was indicated and the only indication was the temporary nature of engagement. We have already reproduced the terms and conditions of appointment in the case on hand, in all the orders of engagement specific periods and the amount of honorarium also been mentioned. Therefore, in our view, the High Court's order does suffer from infirmity."
8.8 It appears that in the said case, the concerned person was appointed in February 1993 for period of 3 months. Thereafter he was again Page 16 HC-NIC Page 16 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT appointed for period of 9 months and upon expiry of the appointment order in August 1994 he was not again engaged. Therefore, the workman raised dispute. The learned Labour Court allowed the reference and directed the Corporation to reinstate the workman.
8.9 Having taken note of the fact that the respondent was appointed for various spells of fixed period, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the claimant was aware that his appointment was purely on contractual basis and was for specified period and he was aware that he would not be eligible for any benefit as regular employee. In the backdrop of such facts, Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held that the concerned workman cannot be considered worker for the purpose of section 25F as he was employed as contract basis. Hon'ble Apex Court also observed that the High Court also committed error in appreciating the case in the judgment of S.M. Nilajkar. Hon'ble Apex Court also observed that even assuming that the concerned workman had worked for 240 days continuously, he cannot claim that his service should be continued and that termination of his contract does not amount to retrenchment.
8.10 In view of the above mentioned two decisions by Hon'ble Apex Court, the decisions on which Page 17 HC-NIC Page 17 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT learned advocate for the petitioner Mr.Mishra placed reliance would not be applicable.
9. At this stage, it would be appropriate to take into account the text of the order under which the claimant was engaged.
9.1 It is given out by the claimant that he was engaged / continued in service by virtue of orders dated 2.8.1994, 28.9.1994, 30.11.1994, 21.1.1995, 28.3.1995 and 5.6.1995. By way of illustrative reproduction, the text of the orders dated 2.8.1994, 30.11.1994 and 21.1.1995 are reproduced hereinbelow:
"Date: 2.8.94 OFFICE ORDER:
With reference to your application dated 27.6.94 you Shri G.U. Chauhan is hereby appointed as Mukadam-cum- Sanitary Inspector in the scale of Rs.890-1700 plus other allowances as admissible on purely temporary basis for a period of 58 days, whereof no further extension will be granted. Your services are liable to be terminated without any notice or compensation during the tenure of 58 days. You are not entitled for joining time, T.A., D.A. etc. for joining the duty. This appointment is purely on temporary basis due to exigencies of work and stand terminated at the end of 58 days.
If you are agreeable to the above you may report for duty to S.E. (Civil) TPS, Gandhinagar.
Date: 30.11.94 OFFICE ORDER:
The temporary service period for 58 days in respect of Shri G.U. Chauhan who is appointed as Mukadam.cum.S.I. vide O.O.No.GPS/Estt/Temp/10504 dt.2.8.94 & which is dt. 28.9.94 is hereby extended for a further period of 58 days w.e.f. 27.11.94.
Page 18 HC-NIC Page 18 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT Other terms & conditions of the original order will remain in force.
Date: 21.1.95 OFFICE ORDER:
The services on temporary basis for 58 days in respect of Shri G.U. Chauhan, who is appointed as Mukadam cum Sanitary Inspector which was extended vide O.O.No.GPS/Estt/Temp/15554 dt. 30.11.94 which is going to be expired on 23.1.95 is hereby further extended for a period of 58 days w.e.f. 24.1.95 & onwards.
Other terms and conditions of the original order will remain in force."
9.2 From the submissions by learned advocates, it has emerged that this Court had occasion to deal with a case where Court considered appointment and continuation/extension of service by virtue of orders engaging person on 58 days on temporary basis.
9.3 In the impugned award, the learned Labour Court considered documentary and oral evidence available on record and the Court also considered that the claimant was engaged for specified period and with specific stipulation that his appointment is for limited and specified period and after taking into account the said facts, the Court reached to the conclusion that disengagement of the claimant on completion of the specified period cannot be declared illegal.
Having reached such conclusion, the learned Labour Court rejected the reference. The facts of present case are similar to the facts in said -
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cited - decision.
9.4 When the award impugned in present petition is examined in light of above mentioned case of GEB-Substituted as Gujarat State Electricity Corporation (supra), it becomes clear that present case is covered by the conclusion in the said decision and any ground is not made out to take a view different from the decision in said case.
9.5 In light of the said decision by this Court, it cannot be said that the findings and conclusions recorded by the learned Labour Court are erroneous or contrary to statutory provisions or legal position or that the findings and conclusions are perverse.
9.6 The petitioner has failed to point out any infirmity in the award. Besides this, I am otherwise also bound by the decision by this Court in case of GEB-Substituted as Gujarat State Electricity Corporation (supra). Therefore, the impugned award cannot be faulted and does not deserve to be disturbed.
10. Having regard to the facts of the case and decision of this Court in case of GEB-Substituted as Gujarat State Electricity Corporation (supra), Page 20 HC-NIC Page 20 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017 C/SCA/8564/2003 JUDGMENT present petition is not accepted. This petition, therefore, fails and is consequently dismissed. The award dated 21.3.2003 passed by the learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No.884 of 1997 is confirmed. Rule is discharged.
Sd/-
(K.M.THAKER, J.) kdc Page 21 HC-NIC Page 21 of 21 Created On Sun Aug 13 08:38:48 IST 2017