Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Veeraboina Gangadhar vs G Mangamma on 29 September, 2023
Author: U.Durga Prasad Rao
Bench: U.Durga Prasad Rao
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO
C.C.No.533 of 2019
ORDER:
W.P.No.9101/2019 was filed by the petitioner seeking writ of mandamus declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in issuing the notice which was received on 08.07.2019 and not receiving the reply submitted by the petitioner and proposing to demolish the aqua culture ponds of the petitioner situated in S.No.1505 in an extent of Ac.20.00 cents in Koduru-II Village, Thotapalli Gudur Mandal, SPSR Nellore District is illegal, arbitrary without jurisdiction and in contravention of provisions of AP Forest Act, 1967 and consequently to set aside the impugned notice 04.07.2019.
2. PETITIONER'S CASE:
(a) The land in S.No.1505 to an extent Ac.16.05 cents situated in Koduru-2 Village, is a Gramakantam land. The said land being looked after by the village elders called "peddakapu and grama kapus" and income derived by leasing out the said land is 2 used for development of temple of Grama Devata and for celebrating Jaatara every year.
(b) While so, the said peddakapu and gramakapus entered into a lease agreement with the petitioner and his partner Namburu Muniratanam Naidu for the period from 13.02.2017 to 12.02.2021 i.e., for four years. The lessees are permitted to dig prawn ponds, establish bores and motors and obtain electricity connection with their expenditure to undertake prawn culture. Accordingly, they dug prawn ponds and bore-wells and obtained electric connections and fitted motors by incurring huge expenditure about Rs.50 lakhs.
They developed seeds in the ponds.
(c)Further case of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent issued a notice as per Section 20 of AP Forest Act, 1967 alleging that the petitioner encroached into the Koduru Tope Reserved Forest Land under the control of Forest Department, Government of A.P and directed the petitioner to show cause within five days as to why he should not be evicted from the said land. The notice allegations are not true as the land in S.No.1505 which is actually in an extent of Ac.20.00 cents is a Gramakantam land. Apart from 3 it, as per Section 20(4) of the AP Forest Act, 1967, notice shall be issued by the Divisional Forest Officer/2nd respondent and take confiscation proceedings after giving an opportunity to the person effected. Hence the 3rd respondent has no jurisdiction or authority to issue notice. On 11.07.2019 at 6:00 PM the 3rd respondent came with machinery to demolish the aqua ponds which was resisted by the villagers and the petitioner by showing the relevant documents. The 3rd respondent went away, threatening that he would come again with police force and demolish the ponds. Hence, the writ petition.
3. This Court having heard both parties passed the following order dated 12.07.2019:
"6. Thus, the law is clear that, in case of omissions and commissions mentioned in Section 20 of the Act, the Divisional Forest Officer is the competent authority to act upon. In the present case, admittedly, the eviction notice, dated
04.07.2019, was passed by the Forest Range Officer, who is not competent in that regard.
7. Having regard to this procedural irregularity, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned notice, dated 04.07.2019, issued by the Forest Range Officer, Nellore, is set-aside. However, the respondent authorities are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner by following due process of law, and giving an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his case by way of reply notice. No order as to costs."
4
4. While so, the present CC is filed by the petitioner submitting that after passing of the order on 12.07.2019 this Court directed the Registry to furnish copy of the order by next date, and when the petitioner expressed apprehension that the Forest Department might take up demolishing proceedings, learned GP for Forest informed the Court that the Department would not initiate demolition activity since the impugned notice was set aside and they would proceed only by complying this Court's order. Further case of the petitioner is that the petitioner sent a reply through registered post to the 1st respondent on 11.07.2019 which was received by them on 12.07.2019 at 15:44 hours as per the postal consignment tracking system. As the things stood thus, on 15.07.2019 some people in police uniform came to the pond of the petitioner for its demolition. The petitioner approached the respondents at 05:30 PM and informed them about the orders passed by this Court setting aside the notice issued by the 3rd respondent and requested not to proceed further. However the respondents, without considering the same forcibly sent out the 5 petitioner from the room and threatened that if he once again come to their office he will be implicated in criminal case.
5. Further case of the petitioner is that on 16.07.2019 at about 5:30 AM the respondents along with Nellore Rural DSP, Krishnapatnam Port CI of Police, SI of Muttukur Police Station, SI of Thotapalli Gudur PS and also about 500 police constables came along with proclainers to the ponds of the petitioner and threatened the villagers of Venkateswarapalem Village not to come out of the houses until permission was given and started demolition of ponds by cutting down the bunds. At that time also the petitioner requested the respondents not to proceed with the demolition but he was sent out by using police force. The demolition activity continued upto 04:00 PM. Even though the Advocate of the petitioner communicated the order copy at 03:00 PM which was shown to the respondents herein they continued the demolition. Even though the respondents stated that they have issued notices in respect of 60 acres of land to be the Forest Land they demolished only 16.50 acres of prawn culture ponds of the petitioner causing damage approximately worth Rs.2 Crores. The action of the 6 respondents amounts to willful and deliberate violation of the orders of this Court.
6. Further the respondents gave interview with electronic media on 16.07.2019 at 09:00 AM stating as if the High Court has dismissed the writ petition and therefore they were proceeding with the demolition process. It indicates the knowledge of the respondents about petitioner's filing writ petition. Thus their Acts constitute willful disobedience and contempt of the Court order. Hence, the Contempt Case.
7. COUNTER AVERMENTS OF RESPONDENTS:
On notice, both the contemnors attended the Court and filed counters. The Forest Range Officer, Nellore (T) Range / 2nd respondent - Contemnor filed counter dated 22.08.2019 with the following averments:
(a) As a Forest Range Officer, Nellore (T) Range, the 2nd respondent is authorized under Section 20(3) of the AP Forest Act, 1967 to evict the persons from forest lands by giving reasonable opportunity to the person affected and accordingly he issued notice 7 to the petitioner on 04.07.2019 and received reply notice dated
08.07.2019 from the petitioner stating that he took land on lease from the villagers and the said land is a Gramakantam which is contrary to the provisions of the A.P. Panchayatraj Act, 1994. The lands where the petitioner cultivates prawns were notified under Section 16 of the Madras Forest Act (V of 1882) as Koduru Tope Reserved Forest vide proceedings in Forest No.262 dated 18.09.1902. The petitioners sent similar reply again on 12.07.2019 by registered post without enclosing any legal documents of the ownership over the subject land. Hence, in good faith the 2 nd respondent discharged his official duties in terms of procedure laid down under the A.P. Forest Act, 1967 and the rules made thereunder and evicted the petitioner on 16.07.2019 by following due process of law. There was no violation of law and procedure in evicting the petitioner from illegal encroachment.
(b) It is further contended that the respondents have not deviated from the operative portion of this Court's order dated 12.07.2019, wherein it was observed that the respondent authorities are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner by following due 8 process of law. Even though the respondents were not aware of the actual orders passed by this Court as on the date of eviction of encroachments i.e., 16.07.2019, the respondents have followed due process of law while evicting the encroachments made by the petitioner in Koduru Tope Reserved Forest lands. There is no willful and deliberate disobedience of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court on the part of respondents.
(c) It is further submitted that the lands where the petitioner cultivates the prawns are within the 500 meters distance to Bay of Bengal and those lands will come under the purview of "Costal Regulatory Zone" and they are to be maintained for raising of shelterbelt / mangrove plantations to protect the inlands from the cyclonic effect. As per Article 51A(g) of Indian Constitution, it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including the forest, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures. The petitioner tried to get self-benefit by doing prawn culture at the cost of costal environment by polluting the same and by distracting the shelterbelt / mangrove plantations. The respondents have highest 9 regard for this Hon'ble Court and they have not violated the orders of this Court. In case, this Court considers that there is any delay or lapse on the part of the respondents in implementing the orders of this Court, the respondents tender their unconditional apology and the same may be accepted and contempt may be closed.
8. It should be noted that the 2nd respondent filed another counter dated 20.12.2022 with more or less the similar facts as above and few additional facts. Hence, those counter averments are also mentioned as below:
(a) The writ petition was filed by the petitioner through Lunch Motion on 12.07.2019 and on the same day it was allowed by this Court holding that the Forest Range Officer is not competent to issue the impugned orders (notice). The 2 nd respondent received copy of the order of this Hon'ble Court on 18.07.2019. It is submitted that in fact the agricultural ponds are in the lands notified as Reserved Forest under Section 16 of the Madras Forest Act, 1882 and they are not the patta lands of his lessors as pleaded.10
(b) It is submitted that as per Section 20(3) of the A.P. Forest Act, the Ranger, S.I. of police or Deputy Tahsildar of the Revenue Department is authorized to evict any person for the violations contemplated under Section 20(1) of the said Act. Under clause
(vii) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the A.P. Forest Act, activities such as clearing, shooting, fishing, ploughing any land for cultivation or for any other purpose is a violation attracting eviction and penalty.
(c) The 2nd respondent issued notice dated 04.07.2019 under Section 20 of the Act for removal of the encroachment made by the petitioner and the petitioner submitted his reply on 12.07.2019 by registered post stating that the fishermen of two villages viz., Venkateswarapalem and Kothapattapupalem leased the land for four years vide Lease Agreement dated 13.02.2017. Exfacie, the land is notified as forest land and the so-called lessors have no title to lease the same. The land where the ponds were dug by the petitioner is not situated in Sy.No.1505 of Koduru II village and he has not mentioned the survey number in his reply dated 12.07.2019. Therefore, in exercise of the power conferred under 11 Section 20(3) the respondents demolished the ponds with the support of the Revenue and police on 16.07.2019, which was completed by 11.30 A.M. At about 04.30 P.M. the petitioner gave a representation about his filing the W.P.No.9101/2019 and orders of this Court. It is submitted that the 2nd respondent was not informed by the learned Government Pleader regarding the filing of writ petition on 12.07.2019 as stated by the petitioner. The 2nd respondent came to know about the writ petition only on 16.07.2019 at about 04.30 P.M. Had the 2nd respondent been informed about the writ petition, he would have instructed the learned Government Pleader that the land is not situated in Sy.No.1505 of Koduru Bit-II and the land is in the reserved forest area and that the Forest Range Officer is competent under section 20(3) to take up eviction proceedings. The petitioner furnished a wrong survey number for the purpose of writ petition. Hence, the In-charge Officer was requested to file a review petition before the Hon'ble High Court. Finally it is stated that the 2nd respondent has no motive to evict the petitioner from his leased premises and obviously the petitioner contracted lease of the land in Sy.No.1505 12 of Koduru village and cultivated the forest reserve without any authority. The 2nd respondent would not have taken up any further action if he received the orders of the Court or initiation of the proceedings before the action taken under Section 20(3) of the Act.
9. 1st respondent also filed a separate counter with the above same averments.
10. REPLY OF PETITIONER:
The petitioner filed reply affidavit denying the counter averments. He submits that though the notice is styled as 'eviction notice', however, in the body of the notice it was stated as to why the property thereon should not be confiscated to the Government under the provisions of A.P. Forest Act, 1967. Considering the same, the Court felt that such power is conferred only on the Divisional Forest Officer but not on the Forest Range Officer and the latter cannot issue the impugned notice and set aside the same.
Against the said order dated 12.07.2019 the respondents have neither filed appeal nor revision petition and hence the same attained finality. In spite of the same without implementing the orders of this Court, the respondents have intentionally demolished 13 the aqua culture ponds on 16.07.2019 without passing any orders on the representation submitted by the petitioner. Their contention that they did not know about the order dated 12.07.2019 is palpably false because they stated in the press meets after demolition that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed which implies their knowledge about filing of the writ petition and setting aside of the notice. It is contended that the respondents have deliberately violated this Court's order.
11. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Subodh and Sri Kasa Jaganmohan Reddy, learned counsel for respondents.
12. ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:
Both the learned counsel reiterated their pleadings in their respective arguments. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the land in S.No.1505 in an extent of Ac.20.00 cents in Koduru-II Village, Thotapalli Gudur Mandal, SPSR Nellore District is a Gramakantam land and not a reserve forest and the said land was under the control of villagers which was leased out to the petitioner and his partner Namburu Muniratnam Naidu for four years i.e., from 13.02.2017 to 14 12.02.2021 and the petitioner by investing about 50 lakhs developed aqua ponds and set up bore-wells and electric motors for rearing prawns, the respondents on a false plea that the said land is part of Koduru Tope Reserve Forest, issued a notice dated 04.07.2019 for eviction of petitioner and for confiscation of the structures and other assets set up on the subject land and the petitioner issued reply notice on 11.07.2019 clearly stating that the subject land is Gramakantam land but not a part of reserve forest but in spite of the same when the respondents were causing threat to him he filed Writ Petition No.9101/2019 on 12.07.2019 and this court passed the order on the same day setting aside the impugned notice on the ground that the Forest Range Officer is not competent to issue the notice and observed that the respondents are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner by following due process of law.
Learned counsel would submit that in spite of the said order the respondents threatened to proceed against the petitioner and the petitioner informed about the order dated 12.07.2019 of this Court on 15.07.2019 but the respondents have highhandedly demolished 15 the aqua ponds and the structures situated on the subject land and thus caused willful disobedience of the Court order.
13. ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS:
Per contra, learned counsel for respondents Sri Kasa Jaganmohan Reddy would argue that the subject land is not situated in S.No.1505 and is not a Gramakantam but it is a part of Koduru Tope Reserve Forest Land, which the petitioner has illegally occupied and therefore eviction notice dated 04.07.2019 was issued by the 2nd respondent for which the petitioner issued reply notice dated 08.07.2019 with the false averments as if the subject land is a Gramakantam which was taken on lease by the petitioner from the villagers of Koduru-II village and doing prawn cultivation. Learned counsel would submit that since the act of the petitioner amounts to encroachment of reserve forest land, the respondents after following due process of law have demolished the prawn ponds and constructions raised on the subject land. He would submit that the respondents were absolutely not aware of the Writ Petition being filed by the petitioner and orders passed thereon by the Hon'ble Court since the learned Government 16 Pleader had not informed them of the said fact. Even otherwise, he would emphasize, the demolition was undertaken only after issuance of notice and following due process of law. He would submit that the respondents have every respect for the orders of the Court and they have not committed any willful disobedience to the Court order. Hence their bona fide acts may be condoned.
14. The points for consideration are:
(i) Whether the respondents/contemnors have knowledge of this Court's order?
(ii) If point No.1 is held in affirmation, whether the respondents/contemnors have willfully disobeyed the order of this Court?
(iii) Whether the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents/contemnors is acceptable?
15. Point Nos.1 & 2: The order dated 12.07.2019 passed by this Court has already been extracted in Para 3 of this order. One of the main contentions of the respondents is that on 12.07.2019, the petitioner moved a lunch motion and this Court while granting permission for lunch motion, admitted the writ petition and passed the above orders on the same day. Their further submission is that neither certified copy of the order was furnished to them by the Court or the petitioner nor the learned GP for Forests intimated 17 about the said order and in those circumstances, the respondents had no knowledge about the order of this Court. Their further contention is that in that backdrop, since the contention of the petitioner in his reply notice that the subject land is the Gramakantam land is false and as he encroached upon the Reserved Forest Tope land, the respondent authorities demolished the prawn ponds on 16.07.2019 with the help of the local police and the demolition activity completed by 11.30 A.M. Thereafter, at about 04.30 P.M. the petitioner gave a representation about his filing the present W.P.No.9101/2019. Thus, the 2nd respondent came to know about the writ petition only on 16.07.2019 at about 04.30 P.M. Had the respondents came to know about this fact earlier, they would have informed the GP that the land claimed by the petitioner is not located in Sy.No.1505, but in the Reserved Forest Tope land. This is precisely the contention of the respondents regarding the lack of their knowledge.
16. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines the phrase 'contempt of court' which means civil contempt or criminal contempt.
18
(a) While so, Section 2(b) of the said Act defines the term 'civil contempt' means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
(b) As can be seen from the above definitions, a civil contempt with which we are now dealing, has two facets. The first one is an act of willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the court and the second facet is a willful breach of an undertaking given to a court. In the present instance, by facts, the contemnors allegedly committed the contempt by their willful disobedience to the orders of this Court. Contemnors are admittedly the public servants.
(c) Professor Dicey, propounded and propagated the renowned doctrine i.e., 'Rule of law', which envisages that every person, literate or illiterate, rich or poor, public servant or a private individual, shall obey, respect and follow the law laid down by the statutes. The orders of the Courts equally require obeisance by the concerned, lest the orders should serve the purpose no more than a waste paper and the citizens who tread the portals of the Courts to 19 vindicate their rights in a lawful manner would lose faith in the judicial system and resort to unethical, illegal and extra- constitutional measures which lead to anarchy in the society. Therefore, to obviate such pandemonium on one hand and to protect and preserve the respect, dignity, majesty and authority of the courts, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been legislated. This avowed object of contempt jurisdiction has been exposulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following decisions:
(i) Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of AP 1 the Apex Court observed thus:
"It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges, personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened" (Emphasis Supplied) 1 AIR 1954 SC 10 = MANU/SC/0020/1953 20
(ii) In Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union2, apex Court observed "The contempt proceedings against a person who has failed to comply with court's order serves a dual purpose (i) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (ii) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires of him" (Emphasis Supplied)
(iii) In Advocate General, Bijar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries 3 Supreme Court held:
"It may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The Court has the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression "contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced obstructed or interfered with. (Emphasis Supplied) "It is a obstruction and outrage."
(iv) In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj4, as follows:
"9. Contempt jurisdiction conferred onto the law Courts power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the Courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizens that his rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is 2 MANU/SC/0075/1970 = AIR 1970 SC 1767 3 MANU/SC/0504/1980 = 1980(3) SCC 311 4 MANU/SC/0040/2014 = (2014) 16 SCC 204 21 undermined.(Emphasis Supplied). Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither fair nor reasonable for the law Courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. (Vide:
V.G. Nigam and Ors. v. Kedar Nath Gupta and Anr. MANU/SC/0419/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 2153; Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and Anr. MANU/SC/0492/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 3468; Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh and Ors. MANU/SC/0175/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 1405; Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and Anr.
MANU/SC/1031/2003 : AIR 2004 SC 942; Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors.
MANU/SC/0132/2010 : (2010) 3 SCC 705; andN ational Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus and Anr. MANU/SC/0295/2013 : AIR 2013 SC 1299).
17. The above jurisprudence would, in pellucid and clear tone, exhort that everyone how so ever high he may be, is bound to carry out the Court's order. An order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction is binding on all concerned and those who disregard the Court's order, do so at their own peril. No one can think himself above the law and the Court is under a duty to see that the confidence of the public in the institution of Courts is not shaken by the executive authorities by their disregard to the orders of the Court.
22
18. Be that as it may, what is willful disobedience was also explained by Apex Court in Courts on its Own Motion v. N.S. Kanwar 5. It was observed:
"23. xxxx. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fifty Edition, the word 'wilful' implies nothing blameable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this, that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent, what is intentional is 'wilful'. The ordinary meaning of 'wilful' as defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary is that, action or state for which compulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded as excuse, intentional, deliberate, due to perversity or self-will.
24. According to Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edition)? 'wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly, "wantonness" implies action without regard to the rights of others, a conscious failure to observe care, a conscious invasion of the rights of others, wilful, unrestrained action and "recklessness" a disregard of consequences, an indifference whether a wrong or injury is done or not, and an indifference to natural and probable consequences.
25.xxxx
26.xxxx
27.xxxx
28. From the above quoted dictionary meaning of the term 'wilful' and the decision of the Courts, it is reasonable to derive that term 'wilful disobedience' used in section 2(b) of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be construed to mean that an act must in all cases be designed and deliberate to be held as Civil Contempt. If a party who is fully in know of the order of the Court or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation of the Court's order, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. In our view ordinarily it is never practicable to prove the actual intention behind the act or 5 1995 CriLJ 1261 = MANU/PH/0346/1994 23 omission. A court can approach the question only objectively and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act. (Emphasis Supplied)
19. In Ram Kishan's case (supra 4) the Apex Court explained the term 'wilful' as follows:
"10. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is 'wilful'. The word 'wilful' introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. 'Wilful' means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a "bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct" .
20. In Niaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana6 the Apex Court explained the difference between the civil contempt 6 AIR1995SC 308 = MANU/SC/0063/1995 24 under Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and the contempt of a decree under execution. It was observed thus:
"9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defines "Civil Contempt" to mean "willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non compliance of the direction of a court the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was willful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was willful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequences thereof. But wile examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was willful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish the alleged contemner.25
21. Thus from the above citations, the term 'wilful' can be understood to mean that it is a mental element and hence to know whether a particular person has willfully disobeyed the order of the Court, one must look into nature of his acts, the circumstances under which he did. If the acts are done without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely and with bad purpose they shall be regarded as 'wilful disobedience'. On the other hand, a mere disobedience due to lack of knowledge of the Court order or under compelling circumstances in which it was not possible to comply with the order, such acts cannot be termed as 'wilful disobedience'.
22. Now the case on hand has to be tested on the anvil of above principles. When the chronology of events that transpired as is evident from the respective pleadings is perused, the hornets' nest was stirred when the contemnor/2nd respondent issued eviction notice dated 04.07.2019 to the petitioner. A copy of the said notice is filed along with the material papers enclosed to Contempt Case. The said notice shows that it was issued under Rule 20 (sic Section
20) of A.P. Forest Act. It reads as if the petitioner has encroached 26 upon the land namely Koduru Tope Reserved Forest at the disposal of the Forest Department GOAP. Hence he was directed to show cause within five days of receipt of the notice as to why he should not be evicted from the said land and that the property thereon should not be confiscated to the Government. It should be noted, in the said notice, the crucial facts such as extent, boundaries and survey number of the Koduru Tope Reserved Forest into which the petitioner allegedly encroached are not mentioned. Thus the notice is as vague as it could be qua the descriptive particulars of the alleged reserved forest tope land.
23. Be that as it may, as admitted by the 2nd respondent in Para-6 of his counter, the petitioner sent his reply / objections which was received by the respondents on 12.07.2019. Also the petitioner filed copy of the reply dated ___NIL.07.2019 and copy of postal receipt dated 11.07.2019 and postal tracking receipt dated 12.07.2019 which would show the reply sent under registered post was delivered to the 2nd respondent on 12.07.2019 at 15:41 hours. In the reply he submitted that the subject land was obtained on lease for four years by him and his partner Muniratnam Naidu 27 from the villagers of Koduru Panchayat, Venkateswarapalem and Kottaputtapu Palem under lease agreement dated 13.02.2017 and the said land as per Revenue Records is a Gramakantam (village site) and it is not a Forest Land as claimed by the respondents. He stated that he obtained necessary permits and set up prawn ponds in the subject land by spending about Rs.50 lakhs. He requested respondents not to cause any inconvenience to him. Having received the notice, since there is a dispute about the title regarding the subject land, the respondents ought to have conducted due enquiry by following due process of law. However, admittedly no enquiry-notice was issued to the petitioner and no finding was arrived that the land claimed by the petitioner in S.No.1505 forms part of reserved forest tope land.
24. Without conducting enquiry, when the respondents set out for demolition in a post-haste manner, the petitioner moved lunch motion on 12.07.2019 and this Court allowed the same and W.P.No.9101/2019 came up for admission before learned counsel for petitioner and learned GP for Forests and after hearing them this Court having been convinced with the argument of the 28 petitioner that since the impugned notice contemplated confiscation of the property situated on the subject land apart from eviction and as such, the Divisional Forest Officer was competent to issue notice and pass orders U/s 20(4) of A.P. Forest Act but not the Forest Range Officer, allowed the writ petition and passed the order as extracted in Para-3 of this order.
25. Now the contention of respondents is that they had no knowledge of the said order and Government Pleader did not inform them and they came to know about the said order only on the evening of 16.07.2019 at about 04:30 PM through the representation of the petitioner. Refuting the same, the submission of the petitioner is that the respondents were very much aware of the Court's order on 15.07.2019 itself because on that day when some people in police uniform came to the ponds for demolition, the petitioner approached the respondents at about 05:30 PM and informed about the court order and tried to give representation but they refused to receive the same. It is his further submission that on the early morning of 16.07.2019 at about 05:30 AM when the respondents along with police force came to demolish the prawn 29 ponds, the petitioner again intimated them about the Court order and requested not to demolish the ponds and sheds. However, they paid a deaf ear and proceeded with the demolition. It is further argued that after demolition, the respondents / contemnor gave a press statement at the demolition site as if the writ petition was dismissed by this Court. The petitioner produced a CD containing the press statement of the respondents and also produced copies of photos and newspaper reports.
26. On careful scrutiny, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the respondents. In a case of this nature where tension was prevailing at the subject land, it is hard to believe that the learned GP for Forest who participated in the court proceedings, would remain silent without informing about the Court's order to the respondents. It should be noted that except pleading that the learned GP did not inform them, the respondents did not file the affidavit of concerned Government Pleader to lend credence to their argument. Therefore, their plea of ignorance is false and untenable. Apart from it, the petitioner made a specific plea that on the evening of 15.07.2019, he went to the office of 2nd 30 respondent and informed about this Court's order and tried to give a representation but the respondents refused to receive. This plea was not specifically denied by the respondents in their counters. It implies that on 15.07.2019 itself the respondents had the knowledge about this Court's order. However, they did not make any effort to consult learned Government Pleader for Forest to ascertain the truth. Above all, on the morning of 16.07.2019, when the respondents proceeded to the site for demolition, the petitioner again apprised them about the Court's order and requested not to demolish the ponds. At that juncture also the respondents did not act diligently by trying to consult the Government Pleader to know the truth of the statement of the petitioner. It is natural that when the respondents along with police force went for demolition, in all probability, the petitioner would resist their acts by informing them about this Court's order. Therefore, the respondents cannot naïvely plead that they came to know about this Court's order only at 04:30 PM on 16.07.2019. Above all, the paper copies of the photos would show the gathering of the police force at the site and demolition of the prawn ponds and sheds erected on the site with 31 the help of proclainer. Those copies also reveal about the press statement given by the respondents. Further, the CD filed by the petitioner contains the statement given by the respondents to the media wherein they claimed as if the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by this Court. All the aforesaid facts would clinchingly establish that the respondents had knowledge about this Court's order. They might not have received certified copy of the order but they had knowledge about the order. In Aligarh Municipal Board's case (supra 2) the Apex Court observed thus:
"It may also be pointed out that in order to justify action for contempt of Court for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been officially-served on the party against whom it is granted if it is proved that he has notice of the order aliunde and he knew that it was intended to be enforced. Official communication is not a condition precedent, provided there is no valid reason to doubt the authenticity of the order conveyed to him."
27. From the above facts the contention of the respondents that they had no prior knowledge of this Court's order is far from truth and hence unbelievable. Then their act of proceedings with demolition in spite of their knwoeldge about this Court's order cannot be taken as a mere carelessness but deliberate, intentional 32 and with utter disdain and impunity. I am constrained to hold, since the inception the respondents showed scant respect to rule of law and due procedure. As stated supra, the impugned notice was woefully short of vital particulars such as extent, boundaries, survey numbers etc., of the alleged reserved forest tope land. In that view when the petitioner replied that the subject land is a village site (Gramakantam) which was under the control of villagers who have leased it to him for four years and that the land is not a reserve forest land, meaning thereby questioning the very right and title of the respondents over the subject land, law and common sense compel the respondent authorities to embark upon a due enquiry by giving an enquiry notice to the petitioner calling upon him to attend on a given date with his documents. That exercise was not undertaken. This observation of mine is on the presumption as if the impugned notice was a valid one. However, the notice was not legally valid, inasmuch as this Court in its order had held that it was the Divisional Forest Officer but not the Forest Range Officer who is competent to issue Notice U/s 20(4) of AP Forest Act since the notice spells out the intention of confiscation but not mere 33 demolition. Accordingly, writ petition was allowed with a liberty to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner by following due process of law which means by issuing a fresh notice through the Divisional Forest Officer. However, having known this fact, such exercise was also not undertaken by the respondents. They proceeded with demolition and proclaimed as if the writ petition was dismissed by this Court. After being informed by the petitioner about this Court's order, had the respondents exercised diligence, they would have obtained copy of the order and known the real import of the order. However, in a post haste manner and without there being any immediate urgency, they proceeded with the demolition activity. All these acts of the respondents, in my considered view, constitute willful and deliberate flouting of this Court's order. Hence they are liable for contempt.
28. Then the tendering of apology by the respondents is concerned, in the circumstances narrated above, such apology is neither bona fide nor with contrition but a mere lip serving ritual. At this juncture it is appropriate to observe that Government Departments are no exception while implementation of the Court 34 orders and facing contempt when flouted deliberately. Apex Court in Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India7 held thus:
"10. In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the courts are primarily concerned with enquiring whether the contemnor is guilty of intentional and willful violation of the orders of the court, even to constitute a civil contempt. Every party to lis before the court, and even otherwise, is expected to obey the orders of the court in its true spirit and substance. Every person is required to respect and obey the orders of the court with due dignity for the institution. The Government Departments are no exception to it. The departments or instrumentalities of the State must act expeditiously as per orders of the court and if such orders postulate any schedule, then it must be adhered to. Whenever there are obstructions or difficulties in compliance with the orders of the court, least that is expected of the Government Department or its functionaries is to approach the court for extension of time or clarifications, if called for. But, where the party neither obeys the orders of the court nor approaches the court making appropriate prayers for extension of time or variation of order, the only possible inference in law is that such party disobeys the orders of the court. In other words, it is intentionally not carrying out the orders of the court. Flagrant violation of the court's orders would reflect the attitude of the concerned party to undermine the authority of the courts, its dignity and the administration of justice."
In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P 8 Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus:
"..... We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the "slap-say sorry-and forget" school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying "sorry" does not make the person taking the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and 7 (2012) 1 SCC 273 = MANU/SC/1246/2011 8 (1984) 3 SCC 405 = MANU/SC/0077/1984 35 expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to "say" sorry - it is another to "feel" sorry..."
29. Thus considering the gravity of the contempt and heavy damage which is claimed to be sustained by the petitioner, both the contemnors are held guilty of contempt and their apology is rejected U/s 12 of Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
30. Both the contemnors are present today in court and this court has informed them with regard to quantum of sentence that can be imposed against contemnors under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
While the 1st contemnor has not specifically stated anything with regard to the sentence, the 2nd contemnor has stated that they did not know about the Court's order, which plea was considered and rejected by this Court in this order. Secondly, the 2nd contemnor would submit that his apology may be accepted. The said plea which has been taken in their counters was also considered and rejected by this Court. Therefore, the submission of the 2nd contemnor cannot be considered.
36
31. Having regard to the nature of the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.9101/2019 and the nature of the contempt committed by both the contemnors being the public officials and also the extent of the damage said to be caused to the petitioner, this Court is of the view that ends of justice will sufficiently be met if the contemnors are punished with fine and exemplary costs.
(a) In Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India9, the Hon'ble Apex Court apart from imposing fine also imposed exemplary costs to the contemnors as follows:
"17. xxxx. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Secretary, Transport and the Commissioner, State Transport Authority of the State of Haryana is guilty of willful disobedience/non-compliance of the orders of this Court, particularly the orders dated 30th November 2004, 7th April 2011 and 30th August 2011. Having found them guilty under the provisions of the 1971 Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India, we punish the Secretary, Transport and Commissioner, State Road Transport Authority of the State of Haryana as under:
i) They are punished to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default, they shall be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days;
ii) We impose exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- on the State of Haryana, which amount, at the first instance, shall be paid by the State but would be recovered from the salaries of the erring officers/officials of the State in accordance with law and such recovery proceedings be concluded within six months. The 9 MANU/SC/1246/2011 = (2012) 1 SCC 273 37 costs would be payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee."
Thus, it is evident that in suitable cases like the present one, in addition to fine, the Court can also impose exemplary costs to the contemnors.
32. Accordingly, both the contemnors are punished as under:
(i) Both the contemnors are directed to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) each and in default they shall be detained in civil prison for 15 (fifteen) days each.
(ii) exemplary costs of Rs,.2.00.000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) is imposed on the State of Andhra Pradesh, which amount at the first instance shall be paid by the State and recover at the rate of Rs.1.00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) each from the salaries of the erring officers / contemnors within six months. Failing to pay the fine by the State, the contemnors shall be detained in civil prison for 15 (fifteen) days each.
(iii) For payment of fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) each by the contemnors and for deposit of exemplary costs of Rs.2,00,000/- by the State of Andhra Pradesh, time is given till 03.10.2023. The aforesaid amounts shall be deposited with the Registrar Judicial. Upon such deposit of the exemplary costs by the State of Andhra Pradesh, the writ petitioner is entitled to withdraw the same.
(iv) This order will not preclude the petitioner to pursue his legal remedy before the competent Civil Court to recover the 38 possession of the subject land and claim damages in accordance with law if he is so advised.
Registry shall list the matter on 04.10.2023 for compliance. The contemnors are directed to appear before this Court on said date.
_________________________ U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J 29.09.2023 krk/mva 39 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO Contempt Case No.533 of 2019 29th September, 2023 krk