Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S Vidhya Enterprises Through Its ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 December, 2025
Author: Pranay Verma
Bench: Pranay Verma
1 WP-20914-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
WRIT PETITION No. 13456 of 2023
INDORE STEELS AND IRON MILLS LIMITED THROUGH ITS
DIRECTOR MR. GURUCHARAN SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Malhotra - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Ambar Pare - Advocate for the respondent No.2.
Shri Amol Shrivastava - Advocate for respondents No.4 and 5.
WITH
WRIT PETITION No. 5490 of 2023
VIRENDRA KUMAR JAIN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vaibhav Bhagwat - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Mini Ravindran - Advocate for respondents No.4 and 5.
Shri Amol Shrivastava - Advocate for respondent No.3.
WRIT PETITION No. 13457 of 2023
GGS PROPERTIES PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
PRADEEP KUMAR JAIN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Malhotra - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Amol Shrivastava - Advocate for respondents No.4 and 5.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SHILPA
NAAGDEVE
Signing time: 16-Dec-25
1:40:28 PM
2 WP-20914-2024
WRIT PETITION No. 13458 of 2023
GNS DEVELOPMERS PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
PRADEEP KUMAR JAIN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Malhotra - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Mini Ravindran - Advocate for respondent No.2.
Shri Amol Shrivastava - Advocate for respondents No.4 and 5.
WRIT PETITION No. 20914 of 2024
M/S VIDHYA ENTERPRISES THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR SHRI
DHIREN PATEL AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vibhor Khandelwal, Advocate with Ms. Kriti Dubey - Advocate for the
petitioners.
Shri Amol Shrivastava - Advocate for respondents No.4 and 5.
(Reserved on :- 22.09.2025)
(Pronounced on :- 16.12.2025)
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Since these petitions raise common questions of facts and law, they have been heard together and are being decided by a common order.
02. These petitions have been preferred by the petitioners for directing the respondents not to initiate or undertake any proceeding or action for the intended construction of road and for further directing them to restrain themselves from commencing and carrying out any work of construction of road on their land. Prayer has also been made for directing the respondents to Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 3 WP-20914-2024 confine the demolition up to the boundary wall only as submitted in previous round of litigation i.e. in W.P. No.6227/2015 and in the alternate for directing the respondents first to compensate the petitioners as per the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Prayer has also been made for quashing the notices issued to the petitioners as regards the proposed construction of the road directing them to remove their construction.
03. As per the petitioners, they are the owners and in possession of various parcels of land situated in Gram Bhagirathpura, Indore which are freehold land. They have made constructions thereupon after obtaining due permissions. They are regularly paying property tax for their land and building. Earlier, two writ petitions bearing W.P. No.6688/2015 and W.P. No.6226/2015 were preferred by the petitioners before this Court challenging similar action by the respondents in issuing notices to them for widening of the road. In W.P. No.6688/2015, it was observed that a declaration has been given by the IDA as well as Municipal Corporation that not even an inch of petitioner's land will be acquired for widening of the road in light of which the petition was disposed off by order dated 13.10.2015. In W.P. No.6226/2015, a detailed paragraph wise reply was filed by the respondents wherein they had agreed that they shall not demolish anything except the boundary wall and the temporary shed for the purpose of construction of the road. The road which was sought to be constructed/widened in the earlier round of litigation is the same road for which removal/demolition activities are sought to be carried out by way of the impugned notices. Since the entire Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 4 WP-20914-2024 dispute was set at rest by such declaration in express terms by the respondents, the petitioners made certain important and vital changes in their property on the basis of their undertaking. Having altered their position, the respondents are now estopped from demolishing any other structure except what was undertaken by them in the earlier petition. The petitioners have however been served with notices to the effect that pieces of their lands shall be acquired for the purpose of widening of the road already existing in the area. The respondents have also earmarked and drawn lines by using chalk and paints for the purpose of road widening. In the impugned notices, in accordance with Rule 61 (1) of M.P. Bhoomi Vikas Rules, 2012, petitioners have been granted permission for carrying out additional construction on the remaining land admeasuring double the area proposed to be acquired which is totally purposeless and futile.
04. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the action of the respondents in widening the road is illegal and against settled provisions of law. The land acquisition proceedings have to be undertaken within the purview of the Act, 2013 which has not been followed by the respondents. Petitioners are owners of their land and have constructed building / godown after taking all the necessary permission from the concerned authorities hence they cannot be deprived of their right to enjoy the property. Hundreds of workers are employed in the properties of the petitioners who are earning their livelihood from the same. No additional construction has been made by the petitioners. The entire action of the respondents in proposing to widen the road by demolishing the property of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 5 WP-20914-2024 the petitioners is hence illegal. In earlier rounds of litigation, respondents had taken a stand that they will not be taking / acquiring even an inch of petitioner's land and that the removal will be to the extent of boundary wall and temporary cycle stands. Now, in violation to the statement, respondents are seeking to raise construction of road on petitioner's land which is illegal and also against principles of equity and fairness. Such declaration was made by the respondents twice in two writ petitions and they had assured the petitioners that no part of their land would be acquired. On the said assurance, petitioners undertook further construction, investing huge amount. If respondents are allowed to proceed with their construction, it will cause great prejudice to the petitioners. The principle of promissory estoppel is squarely attracted in the facts of the case. Alternate government land i.e. vacant land belonging to Indian Railways is available which can be used / acquired by the respondents for the purpose of widening of the road. The impugned proceedings against the petitioners are against the principles enshrined under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India. It is hence submitted that the petitions deserve to be allowed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Krishna Rai (Dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Banaras Hindu University through Registrar and Others (Civil Appeal Nos.4578-4580/2022 decided on 16.06.2022), State of Himachal Pradesh and Others Vs. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta and Another, 2024 SCC online SC 36 and Amrit Banaspati Company Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another 1992 (2) SCC 411.
05. Reply has been filed by respondents No.4 and 5 and learned Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 6 WP-20914-2024 counsel for respondents No.4 and 5 has submitted that the impugned notices have been issued for widening of the road connecting Vallabh Nagar to Ujjain bypass (MR-4) road. In accordance to the Indore Master Plan, 2021, the said MR-4 road is prescribed as 45 meter however currently the same is being widened to 30 meter only. In the earlier writ petitions, this Court did not find any ground to interfere with the process of road widening. The said orders do not operate as estoppel against respondents No. 4 and 5 and the same were passed in the available facts and circumstances of the case as they then existed. The road widening is being done in accordance to the Indore Master Plan, 2021 and in larger public interest. The traffic on the road has risen significantly and is expected to increase even more hence road widening is necessary for smooth flow of traffic. The Apex Court in the case of Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare Vs. Indore Municipal Corporation and Others, 2017 (1) SCC 667 has already held that there is no requirement to resort to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Act, 2013 in view of specific power under Sections 305, 307 and 387 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. By virtue of powers vested in the Corporation under Sections 305, 306 of the Act, 1956, where a street line has been determined by the competent authority under Sections 18 and 19 of M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973, width of the road as proposed in the Master Plan is binding upon everyone and the Municipal Corporation is duty bound to implement the same. Once a street line has been determined, no further process of acquisition is required to be taken by the Corporation. Service of notice under Section 305 of the Act, 1956 itself Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 7 WP-20914-2024 is deemed vesting of said land coming outside the street line and petitioners are bound to remove the same for the purpose of road construction. Earlier, the Corporation was only working to expand the road to 12 meter but is now under the current scenario wanting to expand the same to 30 meter hence the orders passed in the previous writ petitions cannot be said to be binding upon respondents No.4 and 5. It is further submitted that various arguments which have been raised during hearing of these petitions are not required to be considered in view of absence of any pleading in that regard in the petitions. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in Kasinka Trading and Another Vs. Union of India and Another 1995 (1) SCC 274, Union of India and Another Vs. VVF Ltd. and Another 2020 (20) SCC 57, Commissioner Corporation of Chennai Vs. R. Sivasankara Mehta and Another 2011 (13) SCC 285 and Rani Laxmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor and Others 1998 (7) SCC 469. It is hence submitted that the petitions deserve to be dismissed.
06. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
07. During course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners have raised certain contentions and have advanced arguments regarding which there is no pleading either in the writ petitions or in the rejoinders filed by them hence those arguments are not being considered since it is well settled that in absence of any plea, no oral arguments can be considered. Certain documents have been filed by the petitioners on record in respect of which also there is no pleading. However, these documents are being taken into Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 8 WP-20914-2024 consideration to the limited extent of clarifying the facts of the case.
08. These petitions challenge notices issued by respondents No.4 and 5 to the petitioners as regards widening of the road connecting Vallabh Nagar to Ujjain bypass (MR-4). As per the Indore Master Plan, 2021, the road is prescribed as 45 meter but respondents No.4 and 5 have submitted that they are widening it to 30 meter only for the present. By filing a Google map of the road, it has been tried to be contended that it is not necessary for the road to be widened by using the land of the petitioners and that an alternate way can also be worked out including acquisition of land of the railways but in this regard it has to be noticed that the road is prescribed under the Master Plan itself and its width and alignment is fixed therein. The road has to be constructed at the very same place where the same has been earmarked in the Master Plan and no deviation therefrom is permissible. The Master Plan is binding on all the parties including the respondent authorities as well as the Municipal Corporation also and alteration therefrom is permissible. Thus, the contention that respondents No.4 and 5 should try to acquire other land which is available instead of taking over the property of the petitioners cannot be accepted. For the very same reason, the contention of the petitioners that the land lying adjacent to the railway line which belongs to the railways should be acquired by respondents No.4 and 5 also cannot be accepted since the same would result in alteration of the alignment of the Master Plan road, which is impermissible. When the road has been earmarked in the Master Plan and its width and exact extent and location has been fixed, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that respondents No.4 Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 9 WP-20914-2024 and 5 should deviate from the Master Plan and alter the alignment and location of the road.
09. It has further been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondents No. 4 and 5 ought to resort to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Act, 2013 and should acquire the lands of the petitioners and pay compensation to them thereunder but this issue has already been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare (Supra) in which it has been held that there is no requirement of resorting to the process of land acquisition and the public street can be widened in exercise of power under Section 305 of the Act, 1956 as per the development plan prepared under Section 19(5) and Section 25 of M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973. As soon as the proceedings are initiated and notice is served, the land vests absolutely in the Corporation and thereafter only the process of payment of compensation as per the provisions of the Act remains to be resorted to. Thus, the contention of the petitioners in this regard is not acceptable. For ready reference the relevant part of the judgment in the case of Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare (Supra) is reproduced below:
"52. In order to understand the procedure of compensation prescribed under Section 305, we have to take note of the provisions contained in Sections 306 and 387 of the 1956 Act also. The provisions are extracted hereunder:
"306. Compensation.--(1) No compensation shall be claimable by an owner for any damage which he may sustain in consequence of the prohibition of the erection of any building.
(2) The Corporation shall make reasonable compensation to the owner for damage or loss which he may sustain in consequence of the prohibition of the re-erection of any building or part of a building except insofar as the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 10 WP-20914-2024 prohibition is necessary under any rule or bye-law:
Provided that the Corporation shall make full compensation to the owner for any damage he may sustain in consequence of his building or any part thereof being set back unless for a period of three years or more immediately preceding such notice the building has by reason of its being in a ruinous or dangerous condition become unfit for human habitation or unless an order of prohibition issued under Section 286 has been and still is in force in respect of such building.
(3) The Corporation shall make reasonable compensation to the owner for any damage or loss which he may sustain in consequence of the inclusion of his land in a public street but in assessing such compensation, regard shall be had to the benefits accruing to that owner from the development of the land belonging to him and affected by such street.
***
387. Arbitration in cases of compensation, etc .--(1) If an agreement is not arrived at with respect to any compensation or damages which are by this Act directed to be paid, the amount and if necessary the apportionment of the same shall be ascertained and determined by a panchayat of three persons of whom one shall be appointed by the Corporation, one by the party, to or from whom such compensation or damages may be payable or recoverable, and one, who shall be Sarpanch, shall be selected by the members already appointed as above.
(2) If either party or both parties fail to appoint members within one month from the date of either party receiving written notice from the other of claim to such compensation or damages, or if the members fail to select a Sarpanch, such members as may be necessary to constitute the panchayat shall be appointed, at the instance of either party, by the District Court.
(3) In the event of the panchayat not giving a decision within one month or such other longer period as may be agreed to by both the parties from the date of the selection of the Sarpanch or of the appointment by the District Court of such members as may be necessary to constitute the panchayat, the matter shall, on application by either party be determined by the District Court which shall, in cases, in which the compensation is claimed in respect of land, follow as far as may be the procedure provided by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for proceedings in matters referred for the determination of the court:
Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM11 WP-20914-2024 Provided that--
(a) no application to the Collector for a reference shall be necessary, and
(b) the court shall have full power to give and apportion the costs of all proceedings in manner it thinks fit.
(4) In any case where the compensation is claimed in respect of land and the panchayat has given a decision, either party, if dissatisfied with the decision, may within a month of the date thereof apply to the District Court and the matter shall be determined by the District Court in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3).
(5) In any case where the compensation is claimed in respect of any land or building, the Corporation may after the award has been made by the panchayat or the District Court, as the case may be, take possession of the land or building after paying the amount of the compensation determined by the Panchayat or the District Court to the party to whom such compensation, may be payable. If such party refuses to accept such compensation, or if there is no person competent to alienate the land or building, or if there is any dispute as to the title to the compensation or as to the appointment of it, the Corporation shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the District Court, and take possession of such property."
53. We have extracted the definitions of "private street", "public street" and "street" as defined in Sections 5(45), 5(49) and 5(55) of the 1956 Act. Private street means a street which is not a public street. Public street means any street over which the public have a right of way or which have been levelled, paved, metalled, asphalted, channelled, sewered or repaired out of municipal or other public funds or which under the provisions of the Act, becomes a public street as provided in Section 330 and which includes the roadway over any public bridge or causeway, footway attached to any such street, public bridge or causeway; and the drains attached thereto. Street means any road, footway, square, court, alley or passage, accessible whether permanently or temporarily to the public. Public street and private street are separately defined -- though the public street may also include any street provided in Section 5(49) but every street is not a public street and private street is a street which is not a public street. Any street may be declared to be public street under the provisions of Section 330. In the exigencies as provided in sub-section (1) thereof and the Commissioner may also after inviting objections, declare a street or part of the same to be public street, and an appeal is provided against the decision. Under Section 305 the power is conferred on the Municipal Corporation to remove building or any part of the building beyond the regular line of a "public street"; whereas the provisions Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 12 WP-20914-2024 contained in Section 79(3) is with respect to a new street or for widening or improving an existing street. There is difference when there is a public street line, the special provision contained in Section 305 is attracted. The recourse to the provisions of acquisition under Sections 78 and 79 is clearly ousted by the special provision contained in Section 305 of the 1956 Act. Being a special provision with respect to maintaining a regular line of a public street which has been carved out by the legislature under Section 305 of the 1956 Act, would prevail upon the general provisions with respect to acquisition of land as provided in Sections 78 and 79 thereof.
54. In The Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 13th Edn. 2012, Chapter 2 in which it has been laid down that inconsistency and repugnancy to be avoided and provisions should be harmoniously construed, the author has observed thus:
"It has already been seen that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the courts to avoid "a head on clash" between two sections of the same Act and, "whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise". It should not be lightly assumed that "Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other". The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another "unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them". The same rule applies in regard to sub-sections of a section. In the words of Gajendragadkar, J.:"The sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy." As stated by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.:"The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction." That, effect should be given to both, is the very essence of the rule. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber" or "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions is more general and which is more specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude the more specific. [South India Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Board of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 13 WP-20914-2024 Revenue [South India Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1964 SC 207 : (1964) 4 SCR 280] , AIR p. 215; Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. [Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 90 : (1963) 3 SCR 209] , AIR p. 95; J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of U.P. [J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170 : (1962) 1 SCJ 417 : (1961) 3 SCR 185] , AIR p. 1194; Paradip Port Trust v. Workmen [Paradip Port Trust v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 339 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 253 : AIR 1977 SC 36] ; U.P. SEB v. Hari Shankar Jain [U.P. SEB v. Hari Shankar Jain, (1978) 4 SCC 16 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 481 :
AIR 1979 SC 65] ; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur [LIC v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : AIR 1980 SC 2181] ; State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. [State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 SC 1737] ; and State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen [State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 522 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 295 : AIR 1992 SC 1754] . See further LIC v. S.V. Oak [LIC v. S.V. Oak, AIR 1965 SC 975 : (1965) 1 SCR 403] , AIR p. 980 (compulsive provision will control a discretionary provision).] The question as to the relative nature of the provisions general or special has to be determined with reference to the area and extent of their application either generally or specially in particular situations.
[CCE v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. [CCE v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 299 : AIR 2000 SC 2027] ] The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus non derogant, [General things do not derogate from special things. Osborn's Law Dictionary] and Generalibus specialia derogant [Special things derogate from general things. Osborn's Law Dictionary]. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. [Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Venkateswara Gadde Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1966) 2 SCR 172] ; CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons [CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342 : (1966) 3 SCR 379] ;
AIR p. 1347, State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai [State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai, (1979) 3 SCC 347 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 219 : AIR 1979 SC 1098] ; State of Bihar v. Col. Yogendra Singh [State of Bihar v. Col. Yogendra Singh, (1982) 1 SCC 664 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 142 : AIR 1982 SC 882] ; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543] , SCC p. 47; and State of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 14 WP-20914-2024 Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen [State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 522 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 295 : AIR 1992 SC 1754] .] Apart from resolving conflict between two provisions in the Act, the principle can also be used for resolving a conflict between a provision in the Act and a rule made under the Act. Further, these principles have also been applied in resolving a conflict between two different Acts and two provisions in the Constitution added by two different Constitution Amendment Acts, and in the construction of statutory rules and statutory orders. But the principle, that a special provision on a matter excludes the application of a general provision on that matter, has not been applied when the two provisions deal with remedies, for validity of plural remedies cannot be doubted. Even if the two remedies happen to be inconsistent, they continue for the person concerned to choose from, until he elects one of them."
(emphasis supplied) It is apparent that the maxims generalia specialibus non derogant and generalibus specialia derogant have to be applied in particular situations. If a particular provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. The author has referred to the law as laid down by this Court, inter alia, in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Venkateswara Gadde Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1966) 2 SCR 172] , CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons [CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342 : (1966) 3 SCR 379] , State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai [State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai, (1979) 3 SCC 347 :
1979 SCC (Tax) 219 : AIR 1979 SC 1098] , State of Bihar v. Col. Yogendra Singh [State of Bihar v. Col. Yogendra Singh, (1982) 1 SCC 664 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 142 : AIR 1982 SC 882] and Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543]."
10. Much reliance has been placed by the petitioners upon order dated 13.10.2015 passed by this Court in W.P. No.6688/2015 to contend that the respondents therein had stated that they are not acquiring any inch of land of the petitioners hence they are now estopped from acquiring their land. In that Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 15 WP-20914-2024 petition, it had been stated by the IDA as well as the Municipal Corporation that no land is being acquired by them and that only existing road which is a public road is being constructed and widened by them. This Court had also observed that the petitioners should agree to construction and widening of the road, which is being done in larger public interest and had hence directed the respondents to complete the construction and widening of the road. It is hence evident that the undertaking which had been given by the IDA and Municipal Corporation in the said writ petition was to the effect that they would not acquire any property of the petitioners but would carry out the work of constructing and widening of the road. There was no undertaking to the effect that they would not carry out any widening of the road which was being done by them at that time and which is now being done by them at the present stage. The undertaking was only in respect of compulsory acquisition of the land which is still not being done. On the contrary, this Court had directed for widening of the road. As has been clarified by respondents No. 4 and 5, at that time, the road was being expanded only up to 12 meter but now the same is being expanded to 30 meter. The fact situation of the case has hence entirely changed since passing of the order in the previous writ petition which was 10 years ago. When the road was proposed to be widened up to 12 meter, the said order came to be passed. Much water has flown since then and under the changed circumstances, now the Municipal Corporation intends to widen the road up to 30 meter and in such changed circumstances, the impugned notices have been issued. It cannot be contended by the petitioners that since in the year 2015, the Municipal Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 16 WP-20914-2024 Corporation had stated that it is not acquiring their lands, they would never have any right to widen the road as per the Master Plan in perpetuity. Such a construction upon the order passed in the previous writ petition would be wholly preposterous.
11. In any case, in Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare (Supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that the development plan itself is binding and has to be implemented by the Corporation under the provisions of the Act, 1956 and the same is an obligation on its part. It has been held as under:
"66. On merits also, the submission based upon Sections 49 and 50 of the 1973 Act is found to be untenable. Development plan itself is binding and has to be implemented by the Corporation not only under the provisions of Section 292 but also under the provisions of Section 66(1)(y) of the 1956 Act which mandates a duty upon the Corporation for fulfilling any obligation imposed by the Act or under any other law for the time being in force. Provision of Section 66(1) is extracted hereunder:
"66. Matters to be provided for by Corporation.--(1) The Corporation shall make adequate provision, by any means or measures which it may lawfully use or take, for each of the following matters, namely--*** (y) fulfilling any obligation imposed by this Act or any other law for the time being in force;"
Thus Corporation while taking action, is simply carrying out the mandate of Sections 19(5), 25 and other provisions of the 1973 Act. Framing of the scheme under Section 291 as already held, is precluded by virtue of the provisions of Section 292, in view of the existence of development plan which is final as to width of road or town development scheme, as the case may be.
68. We have applied the rule of strict construction and found that the action is permissible under the provisions of Section 305 as the Corporation has implemented the provisions of development plan, it is bound to implement the development plan prepared after following the exhaustive procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice, and is in the larger public interest."
12. In W.P. No.6226/2015 also which was disposed off by order dated 05.05.2017 an undertaking had been given by the Indore Development Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 17 WP-20914-2024 Authority (IDA) that open area is being utilized for construction of the road at the land in question, removal will take place only to the extent of boundary wall and temporary cycle stands. As stated above, the said statement was made in the year 2017 when the road was being proposed to be widened up to 12 meter whereas under the changed circumstances now the same is being widened up to 30 meter. The said undertaking cannot be said to be operative as an estoppel against the respondents. Moreover, the said undertaking was given by the IDA and in that petition, present respondents No.4 and 5 were not even parties hence the said undertaking cannot be enforced upon them since now work of widening of the road is being undertaken by them.
13. It has further been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondents No.4 and 5 are estopped in view of the undertaking given by them in the previous litigation since by acting upon the same, substantial improvements have been made by the petitioners over their land but as discussed above, no such estoppel is operative against respondents No.4 and
5. On the basis of the fact situation as then existing, statements were made but the situation has changed and now there is a pressing need for respondents No.4 and 5 to expand and widen the road and it is not open for the petitioners to contend that respondents No.4 and 5 would in perpetuity never have any right to widen the road as per the Master Plan which is an obligation on their part. Though along with list of documents, a certificate of the chartered accountant has been filed to show that investment has been made by the petitioners but from the same, it cannot be said with any great Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 18 WP-20914-2024 deal of certainty that the said amount has been spent only over the area which is now coming within the area which is required for the purpose of widening of the road. In any case, there is no other document to show the expense actually incurred except the certificate of the chartered accountant. It has not been shown that any fresh construction has been made over the land subsequent to passing of the orders in the previous writ petitions, which are now falling within the area where the road is proposed to be widened. The principle of estoppel hence does not come to the aid of the petitioners.
14. The Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No.5216 of 2022 [Asgar Ali A Taiyabali and Another versus Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur] and other connected petitions by judgment dated 28.06.2022 while considering the effect of offering FAR equal to double the area sought to be acquired in lieu of monetary compensation has held that Rule 61 of Bhumi Vikas Rules, 2012 clause (1) thereof deals with a situation where the owner in lieu of monetary compensation chooses to surrender a portion of his plot/land leading to vesting of ownership of the same in the government / authority for public purpose. As a reward for voluntary relinquishment, additional FAR is made available to such owner which is equivalent to twice the area of plot / land surrendered. The operation of the clause is founded upon voluntary act of the owner surrendering his plot/land. Thus, voluntary act of the owner forgoing his right to monetary compensation is the sine qua non for the municipal corporation to assume jurisdiction to grant FAR. Rule 61 of the Rules, 2012 cannot deprive the owner of adequate monetary compensation for the plot/land sought to be acquired for public purpose until and unless the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM 19 WP-20914-2024 owner voluntarily chooses to surrender the portion for public purpose.
15. Thus, respondents No.4 and 5 cannot compel the petitioners to take the FAR/TDR in lieu of compensation without the petitioners voluntarily surrendering their plot / land or part of it for public purpose. In case they do not do so, they would be entitled for monetary compensation as per the provisions contained in the Act, 1956 as per the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Asgar Ali A Taiyabali and Another (Supra) . However, respondents No.4 and 5 would be entitled to take possession of the property immediately without waiting for evaluation and payment of monetary compensation so that the progress in public work of widening of road is not hampered. They shall however ensure that adequate compensation in accordance with law is paid to the petitioners within a period of six months.
16. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any ground to interfere in the writ petitions. With the observations as regards payment of compensation as aforesaid, the petitions stand dismissed.
17. Let the signed copy of the order be placed in the record of W.P. No.13456/2023 and a copy thereof be placed in all the connected petitions.
(PRANAY VERMA) JUDGE Shilpa Signature Not Verified Signed by: SHILPA NAAGDEVE Signing time: 16-Dec-25 1:40:28 PM