Bombay High Court
Gangaram Kalu Gavit And Anr vs The State Of Maharashtra on 22 April, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:17999
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO. 722 OF 1999
1. Mr. Gangaram Kalu Gavit, ]
Adult ]
2. Mr. Laxman Kalu Gavit, ]
Adult ]
(No. 1 for self and head of joint family for ]
Applicant No. 2) ]
Both are residents of : Amdar, Taluka : ]
Kalwan, District : Nashik ] ...Appellants
Versus
The State of Maharashtra ]
through The Special Land Acquisition Officer, ]
National Highway Project, Nashik ] ...Respondent
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Mr. Anil J. Ahuja, Ms. Bhavana Khemani for the Appellant.
Mr. A. R. Patil, AGP for Respondent-State.
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Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Reserved on : 28th March, 2025.
Pronounced on : 22nd April, 2025.
Judgment :
1. The First Appeal impugns the Judgment and Award dated 30 th April, 1998 passed by Joint District Judge, Nashik in Land Acquisition Reference No. 253 and 254 of 1990 dismissing both the land references. The challenge in the present First Appeal is confined to Land Acquisition Reference No. 253 of 1990.
2. The acquisition of the Appellant's land i.e. Gat No 1 was from Village - Amdar, Taluka - Kalwan, District - Nashik for construction of Sairaj 1 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc percolation tank. The subject land came to be acquired pursuant to publication of Section 4 Notification Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short, "L. A. Act"] which was lastly published on 7th February, 1986.
Section 6 declaration was published on 10th July, 1986 and the Award under Section 11 was passed on 8th July, 1988.
3. Being aggrieved by the compensation, the Claimant sought Reference under Section 18 of the L. A. Act seeking enhanced compensation of Rs 20,000/- per hectare and Rs 2,000/- per hectare for Pot-Kharab Land.
4. In support of the claim, C.W.-1 deposed that the acquired land was paddy field and possession was taken prior to 20 years. He further deposed that there were no sale instances in Village Amdar and that Villages Wadala, Lingama, Deoli Karad are adjoining villages having the same quality of lands. In the cross-examination, C.W.-1 deposed that there are no sale instances in the adjoining villages. He has admitted that his village is surrounded by mountains.
5. C.W.-2 corroborated the deposition of C.W.-1 that there were no sale instances in Village - Amdar at the time of acquisition or in the adjoining villages i.e. Villages Wadala, Yelli Karad, Kosurde, Desgaon, Daregaon, Lingama. He had further deposed that Kanashi is adjacent to village Kosurde and Desgaon. He has deposed that percolation tanks were constructed at Village Chankapur and Karmale and he knows Sairaj 2 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc Chopade and Bhoi from village Karmale whose lands are located at distance of 1 to 2 k.m. distance from the acquired land. He has further deposed that some lands from village Abhona were acquired and Kanashi and Karmale are nearer to their village than Abhona.
6. In the cross-examination, C.W.-2 was unable to tell the names of Bhoi and Chopade or their Gat Numbers nor the crops raised in their respective fields. C.W.-2 was unable to state how many villages were situated between their village and village Karmale. He was unable to give details of the acquired lands and date of acquisition. C.W.-2 was unable to state the nature of produce in the lands of Village Karmale.
7. The Opponents did not file written statement and no evidence was led.
8. The Reference Court framed the following issues :-
- Issues -
(1) Are the Claimants entitled to enhanced compensation? If so, to what amount?
(2) What order?
9. During arguments, the Learned AGP raised the issue of limitation which was opposed by the Advocate for the Claimants in the absence of any specific issue framed and without granting opportunity to lead evidence. The Reference Court opined that Issue No. (1) was wide enough to consider issue of limitation and as documents were filed by Claimants on date of evidence, they had adequate opportunity to Sairaj 3 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc answer the issue of limitation.
10. The Reference Court noted the provisions of Section 18(2)(b) of L.A. Act and held that Reference should have been filed within six months form date of award and rejected the contention that limitation would begin from date of payment. The Reference Court noted that Section 12(2) notices under L.A. Act were served twice to receive payment, i.e. on 18th October, 1988 and on 16th December, 1988 and the case of the Claimant was that they had applied for certified copy of the award on 16th October, 1988 but till 27th July, 1989, the same was not received and the files were inspected and Reference came to be filed on 28th July, 1989 is not supported by certified copy of Application. It further held that no office bearer was examined on the point to show that the said office did not provide copies on or before 27th July, 1989.
11. Despite holding that the References were time-barred, the Reference Court examined the claim on merits. The Reference Court held that there is no evidence produced to show absence of sale instances in the adjoining villages. The Reference Court did not accept the judgment in Reference proceedings in respect of lands at Village Karmale in absence of any map produced to show proximity of location.
12. Mr. Ahuja, Learned Counsel for Appellants submits that there was no Written Statement filed and no issue of limitation was framed. He submits that it is undisputed that Section 12(2) notice issued on 4 th Sairaj 4 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc October, 1988 was served on 15 th October, 1988 and second notice issued on 9th December, 1988 was served on 16th December, 1988 and the copy of the Award was not annexed to the notices. He submits that though the notices called upon the Claimants to accept compensation, the date of actual payment is admittedly on 21 st June, 1989 and reference filed within four weeks is within limitation. He relies upon the decision of Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade vs. State of Maharashtra through Collector1 to contend that certified copy of Award was essential for effective exercise of right to seek Reference under Section 18 of L.A. Act. He would further point out the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer2 and would submit that what is required is actual or constructive knowledge of passing of the Award.
13. On the merits, he would submit that the relevant date for the purpose of determination of market value is date of publication of Section 4 Notification on 7th February, 1986. He draws attention of map produced with compilation of documents to demonstrate that village Amdar is near to Villages Kanashi and Karmale. He submits that it is a specific deposition of C.W.-2 that village Karmale is at the distance of one to two kilometre. He would submit that there was evidence on record to enable application of the same rates of compensation to the 1 (2018) 8 SCC 266.
2 1961 SCC OnLine SC 140.
Sairaj 5 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc acquired lands as that of Village Karmale. He submits that the Award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer shows that proximity of the acquired lands to the Taluka headquarter. He submits that L. A. Act being social welfare legislation, even in absence of cogent evidence, it needs to be considered that in respect of village Karmale, the rate awarded was Rs. 31,000/- per hectare whereas the Claimants have got about Rs. 4,312/- per hectare.
14. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned AGP submits that the second part of the proviso (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the L. A. Act is applied in the present case which requires reference to be filed within a period of six months from the date of Award. He submits that stand of Claimants was that they were called upon to take the payment on 16 th December, 1988 and they were paid only on 21 st June, 1989. He submits therefore, on 16th December, 1988, the Claimants had constructive knowledge of the Award. He draws attention of this Court to the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (supra), Bhagwan Das vs. State of Uttar Pradesh3, and State of Punjab vs. Qaisar Jehan Begum 4,to contend that even constructive knowledge is sufficient to commence period of limitation.
15. On merits, Learned AGP submits that this is case of 'no evidence'. 3 (2010) 3 SCC 545.
4 AIR 1963 SC 1604.
Sairaj 6 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc Pointing out to the deposition of C.W.-1, he submits that the deposition that there were no sale instances in the adjoining village has not been substantiated by producing any certificate, which was in fact produced in respect of village Amdar. He submits that Exhibit-3e which judgment is in the case of acquisition from village Karmale and Kanashi cannot be considered for the purpose of determining the market value of village Amdar as it is not shown that the lands were identically situated.
16. In rejoinder, Mr. Ahuja would rely on Premji Nathu vs. State of Gujarat5, to contend that mere knowledge of passing of Award will not imply knowledge of relevant particulars of Award. He would further submit that in the case of Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat6, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that limitation prescribed under the latter part of Section 18 (2) (b) is to be computed having regard to the date when the knowledge has been acquired. He would submit that there was no valid notice and the same was not accompanied by the Award. He would further submit that in the case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Harnand Singh (deceased) through LRs7, the Hon'ble Apex Court has applied the principle of guesstimation and therefore, the same principle should 5 (2012) 5 SCC 250.
6 (2005) 7 SCC 431.
7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1691.
Sairaj 7 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc apply in the present case and the meagre compensation should be enhanced.
17. The facts of the case would give rise to the following points for determination:
(i) Whether the Reference Court was justified in holding that the Reference was barred by limitation without framing a specific issue of limitation and without granting an opportunity to lead evidence on the said issue?
(ii) Whether the Reference in question was barred by limitation?
(iii) Whether the Claimants have proved that compensation awarded by Special Land Acquisition Officer is inadequate and is required to be enhanced?
18. Dealing first with the aspect of limitation, the admitted position is that no written statement was filed and it was during final arguments that the Learned AGP raised the issue of limitation. Section 18 of L.A. Act provides for Reference to the Court and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 prescribe different period of limitation depending on whether the person seeking Reference was present or represented at the time of the making of Award, in which case it is six weeks. In the other case within six weeks of receipt of notice from Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from date of Collector's Award, whichever period shall first expire.
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19. The above provision sets out (a) limitation of six weeks from date of award if the person was present/represented at time of making of award and (b) in other cases, limitation of six weeks from Section 12(2) notice or six months from date of Collectors' Award, whichever expires earlier.
20. In the present case, we are concerned with clause (b) to the proviso. The Reference Application pleads that Section 12(2) notice is received on 15th October, 1988, however notice did not contain particulars of contents of the Award. It was argued that date of payment of compensation is 21st June, 1989 which has not been shown to be disputed. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Vijay Kubade vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) that as the notice was not accompanied with the Award, there could not have been a valid notice of the Award under Section 12(2) until the Appellant received certified copy of the Award.
21. In State of Punjab vs Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 held that the knowledge of award must mean knowledge of essential contents of the Award in paragraph 5 as under:
"5. As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in Harish Chandra's Case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra). It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of the Sairaj 9 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively?
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had knowledge of the award one of the respondents gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said :
"The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given by me but the amount of compensation was not known to me, nor did I know about acquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my karinda had told me on the day I filed the said application that the land had been acquired by the Government."
This evidence was not seriously contradicted on behalf of the appellant and the learned Subordinate Judge did not reject it. It is worthy of the note that before the Collector also the appellant did not seriously challenge the statement of the respondents that they came to know of the award on July 22, 1955 the date on which the compensation was paid. On the reply which the appellant filed before the learned Subordinate Sairaj 10 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc judge there was no contradiction of the averment that the respondents had come to know of the award on July 22, 1955. That being the position we have come to the conclusion that the date of knowledge in this case was July 22, 1955. The application for a reference was clearly made within six months from that date and was not therefore barred by time within the meaning of the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 18 of the Act."
22. In Bhagwan Das vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 30 and 31 as under:
"30. When a person interested makes an application for reference seeking the benefit of six months' period from the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his representative) was not present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the award during a period of six months prior to the filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the person interested was present either in person or through his representative when the award was made, or that he had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so."
23. It was argued on behalf of Claimants that they had applied for Sairaj 11 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc certified copy of the Award which was not received and the file was inspected and reference filed. The Reference Court rejected the contention by holding that no officer was examined to corroborate the said contention. The Reference Court clearly fell in error by failing to appreciate that as no specific issue of limitation was framed, there was no occasion for the Claimants to lead evidence. The case of the Claimant was that of absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the Award. The issue therefore revolved upon the date of acquisition of knowledge of the essentials elements of Award sufficient to enable the Claimants to challenge the same. The issue of limitation was thus mixed question of fact and law mandating framing of specific issue and requiring evidence to be led. It is only if the question of limitation is pure question of law that the same could have been argued, say, for example where the notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was accompanied with a copy of Award and the Reference was not filed within the period of six weeks of receipt of notice under Section 12(2). In such case, it could be argued that the limitation did not require any evidence to be led and is pure question of law, which can be raised at the time of final argument. As what is sought to be emphasized is constructive knowledge on part of the Claimants, which in turn is dependent on the issue as to whether the Claimants had attended the office for the purpose of collecting the Sairaj 12 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc payment and could thus be said to amount to acquisition of constructive knowledge of the same, evidence was required to be led. There is specific pleading in the application that the notice under Section 12(2) did not contain particulars or essential elements of Award which could have been tested in evidence upon specific issue being framed.
24. As the issue of limitation was mixed question of law and fact without evidence being led, there cannot be inference of actual or constructive knowledge of Claimant for deciding the said issue. In usual course, the matter would have been remanded for consideration afresh for framing necessary issue of limitation and permitting evidence to be led. However, the Reference Court has not only rejected the Reference on ground of limitation but also on merits, which will have to be tested.
25. Coming to the merits of the claim, it is well-settled that the burden is upon the Claimants to prove that the compensation awarded is inadequate. The burden is sought to be discharged by the Claimants by examining two witnesses. Both the witnesses deposed about absence of any sale instance of Village Amdar or of adjoining villages which were described by C.W.-1 as Villages Wadala, Lingama, Divali Karad and supplemented by C.W.-2 with Villages Kosurde and Dasgaon. CW-2 has deposed that Village Kanashi is adjacent to Villages Kosurde Sairaj 13 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc and Desgaon. The Claimants seek to place reliance on the compensation awarded to the acquired lands from Village Karmale. There is no evidence to show that the Claimant's land the acquired lands from Village Karmale are identical lands. On the contrary, C.W.-2 has admitted in cross examination that he is unaware of the number of villages located between Village Amdar and Village Karmale. To establish parity in compensation, not only proximity of location but similarities of characteristics, potentiality, advantages, etc. is also required to be proved, which is not established in the present case.
26. Exhibits 32 and 33 which are the judgments in the Land References arising out of acquisition of lands of villages Kanashi and Karmale respectively were sought to be relied upon by the Claimants. CW-2's deposition that village Karmale was only at the distance of one to two kilometre has been demolished in the cross-examination. Though before this Court, a map has been produced to show the proximity of Village Amdar to Village Karmale, perusal of the original R& P does not indicate that the said map was produced before the Reference Court. Before the Reference Court, the map of Village Amdar was produced which was not sufficient to establish the proximity in location with the acquired lands under Exhibit 32 and Exhibit 33. Leaving that aside, even if the map produced before this Court is perused, it shows that Village Amdar is separated from the Sairaj 14 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc Village Karmale by various villages and it cannot be said that the villages are located at distance of one to two kilometre from the village Amdar. Thus, the Reference Court has rightly held that the judgment in the case of acquisition from villages Karmale and Kanashi cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of market value in instant case.
27. In the Award passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the situation and description of the acquired land is stated in clause 3 (c) as under:-
(c) ... Situation and description The village Amdar is situated at the western side of the Taluka Head Quarter Kalwan at a distance of 1 K.M.s. The nearest weekly bazar place is communication are S.T. bused playing up to Abhona. There is no S.T. Bus stop at the village. There is no S. T. Bus stop at the village. There are no industrial or Development or Non Agricultural activities the village. The nearest village are Abhona at a distance of 15 K.M. The lands under acquisition are located to the Eastern side distance of 1 K.ms. from the village gaothan. The lands have no N.A. potentiality. There is no Railway station. The main crops grown at the village are paddy, nagli, Dadar, groundnut etc. Kharif crops. The Rabi Crops viz. wheat, gram, Onions, chillis etc. bagait crops are grown on well water in the village. The total cultivable area of the village is 127-57. Hecters out of which 68-00 is Jirait and 10.90 is bagait. The village is in Survey group No. 4 and the maximum rate of assessment is Rs. 2.47 Per Hectare. There is no canal irrigation at the village. There are no buildings, cartracks, telegraph and transmission lines etc. in the land acquisition. The lands under acquisition. The lands under acquisition are mainly jirait lands.
In order to arrive at reasonable valuation of the lands under acquisition, it will be proper to from groups of lands on assessment basis. The maximum rate of assessment of the village is Rs. (2.47) Per Hectare. The lands can be divided in groups as under:-
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First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
Group Range of Asset
I Rs. 0.01 to Rs. 1.25
II Rs. 1.26 to Rs. 2.50
The lands under acquisition fall under the following groups.
Groups Gat No.
I 1p., 4Ap, 4 Cp, 2p.
II B p.
28. From the description in the Award, it is clear that there is no N.A. potentiality, the lands do not have the advantage of rail and bus connectivity, there is no industrial development or development of non-agricultural activities in the village and the nearest village is Abhona which is at the distance of 15 kilometres. The proximity to the Taluka headquarters when viewed with the above characteristics would not enhance the market value of the acquired lands.
29. The Reference Court had noted that Exhibit-32 which was in respect of acquired land from village Abhona had good N.A. potentiality, which is not so in case of Village Amdar. The evidence does not prove any similarities between the acquired lands and the lands from Villages Karmale or Kanashi and therefore, no reliance can be placed on Exhibit-33 judgment. The Claimants have not produced any evidence to substantiate their claim for enhanced compensation. As Mr. Patil, learned AGP rightly pointed out this is a case of "no evidence".
30. It is sought to be contended by Mr. Ahuja that the lands at Sairaj 16 of 17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 ::: First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc villages Karmale and Kanashi were granted compensation of Rs. 31,000/- per hectare whereas the acquired land from the village Amdar was granted only Rs. 4,312/- per hectare and by applying the principle of Guesstimation, the compensation is required to be enhanced. Firstly, it needs to be noted that in the case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Harnand Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that while the Court can use the principle of guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in absence of direct evidence, the exercise ought not to be purely hypothetical. In the present case, the enhancement of compensation would be purely hypothetical as there is absolutely no evidence which is brought on record on the basis of which there could be enhancement of compensation. There is no deposition as regards the potentiality or characteristics or advantages based on which the claim could be considered. All that is relied upon are the two judgments below Exhibits 32 and 33 which are not shown to be identical to the Claimant's land. This being a case of 'no evidence', there cannot be any applicability of principles of Guesstimation.
31. In light of above discussion, the First Appeal fails and stands dismissed.
32. In view of dismissal of First Appeal, nothing survives for consideration in pending Interim/Civil Applications, if any and the same stand disposed of.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
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