Orissa High Court
Orissa Engineering College Employees' ... vs State Of Orissa And Ors. on 3 May, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(II)OLR78
Author: L. Mohapatra
Bench: L. Mohapatra
JUDGMENT L. Mohapatra, J.
1. All the writ applications arise out of dispute between the Management of Orissa Engineering College, Bhubaneswar, some of its employees and the State Government. Since in all of them common questions of law are involved based on same set of facts, on the request of the parties they were all taken up together for hearing and are disposed of in this judgment.
2. O.J.C. No. 3520 of 1996 has been filed by the management of the Orissa Engineering College thereinafter referred to as 'College') challenging the action of the State Government on the ground that the State Government has no control over the College in exercise of power under the Orissa Education Act, 1969 as the college is governed under the provisions of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 thereinafter referred to as the 'AICTE Act'). Another ground taken in the writ application is that the College being a privately managed one, the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Orissa Act') has no application to it.
O.J.C. No. 4502 of 2001 has been filed by some members of staff of the college challenging reconstitution of the Governing Body of the college as well as appointment of an Officer-on-special duty.
O.J.C. No. 6049 of 2001 has been filed by members of the institution for an independent and impartial enquiry with regard to alleged mal-administration and gross financial irregularities committed by the management.
While the aforesaid writ applications relate to the dispute between the management of the College and its staff, another writ application has been filed by some of the students of the College for smooth conduct of examination and for appointment of an Administrator for smooth functioning of the College. From out of the aforesaid writ applications, three important cases argued before the Court are taken up individually so far as they relate to the facts and reliefs claimed.
3. O.J.C No. 4502 of 2001 has been filed by the members of the staff. Their case is that they submitted a Charter of demands to the Governing Body of the College mainly for implementation of AICTE scale of pay and career advancement etc. with a request to fulfil the same by 19.2.2001. This demand was made on 12.2.2001 with a warning that in the event the demands are not fulfilled, the members of the staff will resort to hunger strike. On the allegation that the demands are not fulfilled all the teaching and non-teaching staff started "cease work movement" as well as hunger strike in the college premises with effect from 19.2.2001. On 26.2.2001 a meeting was conducted by the Minister, industries and in the said meeting, the members of the staff agreed to resume duties with a note of protest and in terms of such decision on 27.2.2001 the members of the staff submitted their consent to resume duties with a note of protest. It is further alleged that though the petitioners were willing to resume their duties they were not allowed to do so by the management of the College. On 17.3.2001 a high level committee consisting of the Industry Secretary, Secretary, Higher Education, Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University and others directed the College authority to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the college by/taking the help of the staff. The examinations were to start from 22.3.2001. and all the members of the staff were present in the college campus to conduct the examination. Since the Centre Superintendent did not turn up in time, the University Authority cancelled the examination at spot. It is also alleged that in spite of repeated efforts made by the members of the staff to resume duties, they were not allowed to do so by the College authorities and the examination had to be conducted by order of this Court in O.J.C. No. 4165 of 2001, in presence of Advocate-Commissioners appointed by the Court. The petitioners allege that they were not allowed to enter into the College premises during such period. Only on 25.4.2001 the Governing Body of the College issued letters to the petitioners to submit the joining report along with a prescribed undertaking in a stamp paper duly notarised by 5.5.2001. Again similar directions were issued on 4.5.2001 by the president of the Governing Body. On 5.5.2001 more than 180 members of the staff requested the authority to reconsider the decision and submitted a representation tendering unconditional apology. Since the same was also not accepted, the petitioners approached this Court in this writ application. Prayer in this writ application is for a direction to the opposite parties 1 and 2, i.e. the State Government to reconstitute the Governing Body of the College, to initiate appropriate action against the erring Governing Body for mal-administration and corruption as well as for a direction to quash the order of abandonment of service passed by the management.
O.J.C. No. 3520 of 1996 has been filed by the Management of the college challenging the action of the State Government in exercise of power under the Orissa Act on the ground that the college being a private Engineering college, the provision of Orissa Act have no application and the State Government had no control over the college in view of the provisions contained in AICTE Act. The facts giving rise to the are that after the college came into existence a Managing Committee was constituted and the panel of names constituting the Governing Body was sent to the Director, Higher Education, Orissa for approval on 26.5.1992. The three years tenure of the Governing Body which had been approved completed its full term on 26.5.1995. After completion of the term of the Governing Body the Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University on 21.10.1995 nominated one Sri A. K. Patnaik as nominee in accordance with the provisions laid down in Orissa Education (Amendment) Act, 1991 and rules made thereunder. On 8.2.1996, the Industries Department of the State Government, Orissa also advised the then president of the Governing Body to reconstitute the Governing Body under the amended Act. On 24.2.1996 the outgoing president submitted a panel of names including the name of Mr. A. K. Patnaik nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University to the Director, Technical Education and Training, Orissa for approval and reconstitution of the Governing Body of the college for the next term. On 21.5.1996 the State Government notified the Director, Technical Education and Training, Orissa as prescribed authority in respect of Technical Institution under the administrative control of Industries Department in the State superseding all earlier instructions. While the matter was pending approval before the State Government, this writ application was filed and an order of status quo was obtained and pursuant to said order of status quo the old Governing Body is still continuing.
O.J.C. No. 6049 of 2001 has been filed by members of staff praying for an independent and impartial inquiry regarding maladministration and gross financial irregularities committed by the management and for appropriate direction.
4. On the basis of pleadings the following questions, both factual and legal, arise for consideration :
(1) Whether the provisions of the Orissa Act and the Rules made thereunder are applicable to the institution which is admittedly a privately managed Engineering College ?
(2) Whether the management of the college is controlled by the provisions of the AICTE Act alone ?
(3) Whether the members of the staff who are before this Court abandoned their services resulting in termination or they were prevented from resuming their duties by the management of the College ?
(4) Even if it is found that the members of the staff before this Court had been illegally terminated from service, whether any direction can be issued for their re-instatement in service specially when a stand is taken by the management that all the posts occupied by them have been filled up in the meantime ?
5. Question Nos. 1 and 2 being inter-related they are taken up together for adjudication. Section 3 (d) of the Orissa Act defines 'college' as an educational institution imparting instructions in higher general education leading to any degree conferred by any of the Universities established under the Orissa Universities Act, 1989. Section 3 (f) defines educational institution to be any college or junior college, etc. or any institution imparting technical and professional education, special education as the case may be. The words "any institution imparting technical and professional education, special education" were incorporated into the definition by way of amendment vide Orissa Act 13 of 1994 which came into force with effect from 2.4.1994. Prior to that there was amendment to the said definition which included any institution imparting technical education in the State and same was incorporated vide Orissa Act 16 of 1991 which came into force with effect from 6.7.1991. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the staff that initially Orissa Act excluded technical education from the purview of educational institution. But for smooth and efficient management the technical education was brought under the definition of educational institution and accordingly amendments were made to the definition of "educational institution" in Section 3 (f) of the Act. Technical and professional education appearing in Section 3 (f) has further been defined in Section 3(s) and it includes courses of study in engineering, technology, architecture, mining, fine arts, law, management, etc. Referring to the aforesaid three definitions appearing in Section 3 of the Act, it is submitted that institutions imparting technical and professional education includes the course of study in engineering and are brought within the definition of educational institution. Therefore, Orissa Engineering College which is imparting technical education having courses of study in engineering squarely comes within the definition of "educational institution " as defined in Section 3(f) of the Act.
Prescribed authority has also been defined in Section 3 (m-l). As per the definition 'prescribed authority' means the authority to be notified by the State Government from time to time in the official Gazette. It is submitted that the Director, Technical Education and Training has been designated as the prescribed authority vide Government Notification dated 21.5.96 (Annexure-1 in OJC No. 4502 2001).
Section 27 of the Orissa Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out or any of the purposes of the Act and in exercise of the said power the State Government has enacted "The Orissa Education (Establishment, Recognition and Management of Private Colleges) Rules , 1991 which came into force with effect from 18.12.1991 . Rule 21 read with Rule 22 of the 1991 Rules deal with constitution of Governing Body and its approval by the prescribed authority. Rules 23 and 24 of the said Rules deal with reconstitution of the Governing Body and approval of unaided recognised private educational institution by prescribed authority. Referring to the said rules as aforesaid, it was submitted before the Court that since Orissa Engineering College comes within the definition of educational institution, it is also covered by Rules 21 and 24 of the 1991 Rules so far as it relates to constitution of the Governing Body, approval of the same by prescribed authority as well as reconstitution and approval of Governing Body of unaided recognised private educational institutions by the prescribed authority.
6. Shri Nanda, learned counsel appearing for the institution, on the other hand, submitted that functioning of the Engineering College is governed under the provisions of AICTE Act. It was submitted by Sri Nanda that AICTE Act provides for establishment of an All India Council for Technical Education with a view to planning and co-ordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country. The said Act also provides for promotion of qualitative improvements of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth and the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system. Referring to Section 2(h) of the said Act Sri Nanda submitted that technical institution as defined under the Act means an institution, not being a University which offers courses or programmes of technical education. Referring to Section 10 of the Act Sri Nanda submitted that council constituted under the Act has the right to inspect or cause to inspect any technical institution and is also empowered to withhold or discontinue grants in respect of courses, programmes of such technical institutions which fail to comply with the directions given by the Council. The Council is also empowered to set up a National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct evaluation of technical institutions or programmes on the basis of the guidelines, norms and standards specified by it and to make recommendation to it, or to the Council, etc. regarding recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme. Referring to the aforesaid provisions of the AICTE Act Sri Nanda submitted that since functioning of the technical institution is governed by the AICTE Act, in the event Orissa Education Act is made application to such institution there may be overlapping and such overlapping may create confusion. In support of such submission Sri Nanda relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Adiyamanab Education & Research Institute, 1995 (4) SCC 104. He further submitted that the Apex Court in the said decision has made it clear that the Council established under the Act for coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system at all levels throughout the country is enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth. Since the standards by the Council have to be laid down on a national level they have necessarily to be uniform throughout the country without which the coordinated and integrated development of the technical education all over the country will not be possible resulting in failure of the main objectives of the statute. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has held as follows :
"What is further, the primary object of the Central Act, as discussed earlier, is to provide for the establishment of an AN India Council for Technical Education with a view, among others, to plan and coordinate the development of technical education system throughout the country and to promote the qualitative improvement of such education system and to regulate and properly maintain the norms and standards in the technical education which is a subject within the exclusive field of the Central Govt. as it clear from Entry 66 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. All the other provisions of the Act have been made in . furtherance of the said objectives. They can also be deemed to have been enacted under Entry 25 of List 111. This being so, the provisions of the State Act which impinge upon the provisions of the Central Act are void and, therefore, unenforceable. It is for these reasons that the appointment of the High Power Committee by the State Government to inspect the Respondent Trust was void as has been rightly held by the High Court."
Reliance was also placed by Sri Nanda on a decision of the Apex Court in Jaya Gokul Educational Trust v. The Commissioner & Secretary Govt. Higher Education Depatt., 2000 (3) Supreme 467. The Apex Court in the said case held as follows :
"It was held that the University could not impose any conditions inconsistent with the AICTE Act or its regulation or the conditions imposed by the AICTE. Therefore, the procedure for obtaining the affiliation and any conditions which could be imposed by the University, could not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Act. The University could not, therefore, in any event have sought for 'approval' of the State Government."
Sri Nanda also referred to a decision of this Court rendered in O.J.C. No. 6520/1995 (Kishore Chandra Nath and Ors. v. State of Orissa and others) disposed of on 1.3.1996. On examination of the aforesaid case it is seen that in the order impugned in the writ application, the Secretary was of the view that the State Government have no statutory authority to constitute governing body of a private technical institution which is the creature of a Trust and the role of the Government was essentially advisory and in the academic interest of the institution. Referring to the said order Sri Nanda submitted that since the Government was of the view that it had no statutory authority to constitute the Governing Body of a private technical institution, there cannot be departure from the said stand in the present case.
7. At this stage it is profitable to refer to a decision of this Court in Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology v. State of Orissa, 1993 (II) OLR 435. In the said case Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology, which is a private Engineering College assailed the validity of the Section 2(i) of the Orissa Education (Amendment) Act, 1991 by which Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Orissa Act was amended by substituting the words "or any institution imparting technical education in the State" in place of "other than an institution for technical education not under the control of the Education Department of the State Government". While considering the said question this Court also took into consideration of the provisions laid down contained in AICTE Act and Orissa Act as amended in 1991 as well as the Entry No. 25 of List - III of the 7th Schedule came to the following conclusion :
"Let us see what is the subject-matter of the Central Act. A reference to the preamble of that Act shows that it was enacted with a view to proper planning and co-ordinated development of the technical education system throughout the country, promotion of qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth and the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system and for matters connected therewith. To achieve these objectives, various powers and functions have been assigned to various bodies established by the Act. One of which has been assigned to All India Council for Technical Education Act of which mention has been made in Section 10(k), to which our attention is invited by Sri Pal, is grant of approval for starting new technical institutions. The subject-matter of the amendment being, as stated earlier, "to prevent mismanagement of technical institution", we are of the view that both the Acts can co-exist and there is no repugnancy and so, there was no necessity of obtaining any assent of the President as required by Article 254 of the Constitution of India."
This question was neither raised nor decided in the earlier decision of this Court referred to by Sri Nanda in O.J.C. No. 6520 of 1995. Even a plain reading of the two Apex Court decisions relied on by Sri Nanda would show that the Apex Court only observed that there should not be overlapping between the AICTE Act and the State Act. In the case of Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology (supra) this Court on examination of the State Act as well as the AICTE Act, came to conclusion that both the Acts can co-exist and there is no repugnancy.
We, therefore, find no reason to take a different view than what has been decided in the case of Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions contained in the Orissa Act shall be applicable to the Orissa Engineering College since AICTE Act as well as the Orissa Act (as amended) can co-exist and there is no repugnancy.
8. The question Nos. 3 and 4 being inter-related they are taken up together for discussion. Sri Routray, learned counsel appearing for the staff contended that termination of services of its members is not in accordance with law for the following legal lacunae ;
(a) No individual notice to show-cause was given to the individual employees;
(b) No opportunity was given to any of them to defend himself against any allegation;
(c) No disciplinary proceeding was initiated against any of the terminated staff nor has any staff been given any opportunity to defend himself;
(d) The order of termination on the ground of abandonment was not communicated to the staff individually except in a newspaper publication in the daily The Samay' dated 22.5.2001.
(e) There was no application of mind individually in all the cases.
Referring to the averments made in the writ application Sri Routray submitted that some of the staff members were issued with show-cause notices to file their replies by 8.3.2001 with regard to their unauthorised absence for more than continuously 10 days. Before expiry of the period, i.e., before 8.3.2001 notices were published in three daily Oriya Newspapers on 5.3.2001, 6.3.2001 and 9.3.2001 directing the staff members to join by 8.3.2001 and 11.3.2001 respectively. According to him by such conduct in directing the staff to join duty the Management in its own wisdom waived the notice requiring the staff members who had remained absent from submitting his show-cause by 8.3.2001. It is further submitted that members of staff were all along willing to resume their duties keeping in mind the future of the students, but with protest against the Governing Body regarding non-implementation of AICTE Scale of pay. Even though staff members expressed their willingness to resume duties, an undertaking was insisted upon by the Management resulting in such termination orders on ground of abandonment of services. Shri Routray, further submitted that since all members of the staff whose services have been terminated are permanent employees of the institution having rendered 10 to 12 years of service, they could not have been removed from service in the manner it has been done. According to him, even though there in such provision for termination on ground of abandonment of service the same cannot be override the mandates and fundamental rights of a permanent employee in an organisation guaranteed under the Constitution.
9. On the question of abandonment Sri Routray relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Scooter India Limited v. M. Mahammed Yaqub. 2000 (7) Supreme 613, submitted that there could not be any automatic termination of service of employees without following the principles of natural justice. He also referred to another decision of this Court in Jaminikanta Das v. Governing Body, 84 (1997) CLT 483 and stated that before terminating the services of any employee the management must apply its mind to the facts of each case individually and the same having not been done in the present case, all the termination orders are liable to be quashed. In this connection also he referred to another decision of the Apex Court in The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840.
10. Shri Nanda, learned counsel appearing for the management, on the other hand, submitted that the service conditions of the Orissa Engineering College provide for termination of service in Rule 3 of the said service conditions. He also submitted that Chapter-VIII of the Conditions of Services prescribed Rules and Conduct for the employees and it is provided that if an employee absents himself from duty without leave or leave the college unauthorisedly and remains absent for more than ten days, it will be deemed that he has abandoned his service. According to Sri Nanda, in spite of repeated requests made to the terminated staff they did not join duty and continued to remain absent unauthorisedly without leave for more than ten days and, therefore, under the said provision it was deemed that they have abandoned their service and action as per the Rules had been taken by way of terminating their services on the ground of abandonment. It is further submitted by Sri Nanda that after the said employees' services were terminated the posts have already been filled up and in absence of those new appointed persons before this Court it may not be desirable on the part of the Court to pass any order adverse to the interest of the said new employees. He also submitted that there being no vacancy at present it will not be possible to accommodate the terminated staff again without disturbing newly appointed employees.
11. Keeping in mind the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we proceed to refer to the documents relied upon by both parties with regard to the aforesaid points. Sri Routray, learned counsel for the staff drawing attention of the Court to Annexure-0/5 series in O.J.C. No. 6049/2001 submitted that on 3.3.2001 for the first time the management gave notice stating that all the teaching and non-teaching staff of the College who resorted to cease work from 19.2.2001 in violation of their written undertaking not to resort to strike should join duty not latter than 8.3.2001, failing which their services would stand terminated and emergency recruitment shall be made to meet the AICTE norms and standards. Similar notice was published in the daily The Samay' dated 4.3.2001 and in daily 'Dharitri' on 6.3.2001 asking the terminated staff to join duty on or before 8.3.2001. On 9.3.2001 notices were sent asking the terminated staff to join duty by 14.3.2001 and similar publication was made in the daily "The Samay" on 9.3.2001. According to Sri Routray, the second notice practically waived the joining period as mentioned earlier. Sri Routray further submitted that the terminated staff expressed their willingness to join, but they were asked to sign an undertaking in a stamp paper which they were not willing to do, resulting in termination of the employees on the ground of abandonment of service. Relying on the said document Sri Nanda, learned counsel appearing for the Management submitted that several opportunities were given to the employees to join duty but they failed to do so and having remained unauthorisedly absent from 19.2.2001 continuously for a period of more than ten days, it was decided that their services should be terminated from abandonment of the same.
12. In the above factual background this Court is called upon to decide whether the order of termination on the ground of abandonment of service is justified or not. Much reliance is placed by Sri Nanda appearing for the Management on the following provisions incorporated in the Orissa Engineering College Service Conditions, 1989 :
"Section 15(b) : Any employee absent himself from duty without leave or leave the college unauthorisedly and remained absent continuously for more than ten days it will be deemed that he has abandoned his service and action as per C.C.R. Rules as incorporated in the Service conditions will be taken against such defaulted incumbent."
Referring to the said Regulation Sri Nanda submitted that admittedly terminated employees unauthorisedly remained absent from service from 19.2.2001. In spite of notice they did not join duty by 14.3.2001 and having remained absent unaulhorisedly by for more than ten days they are hit by the aforesaid Regulation and the Management was justified in terminating their services on ground of abandonment of service. Sri Routray, on the other hand, submitted that no regulation can take away rights of an employee guaranteed under the Constitution of India. According to him, whether the petitioners were willing to join duties and the Management did not allow them to join or not being in dispute it cannot be said that the terminated employees deliberately remained unauthorisedly absent for more than ten days. He further submitted that even under the service regulations no employee can be terminated from service without following due procedure prescribed in the said regulation and admittedly in the present case the Management has not started any disciplinary proceeding against any of the terminated employees and services of the employees were terminated only on the ground of abandonment of service. Sri Routray relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Scooters India Limited (supra). In the aforesaid case, the workman who was working against the post of semi-skilled worker was removed from service by taking recourse to Standing Order No. 9.3.12 of the Company which prescribed that any workman who remained absent from duty without leave in excess of the period of leave originally sanctioned or subsequently extended for more than ten consecutive days shall be deemed to have left service on its own accord. Considering the evidence available on record the Apex Court while deciding the question as to principles of natural justice were followed or not held that since the workman was not allowed to join duty, the standing order could not have been used for terminating his service.
13. In the present case by letter dated 27.2.2001 the General Secretary of O.E.C. Employees Union on behalf of the employees had expressed their willingness to conduct 7th Semester B.E. University Examination which were scheduled to be held on and from 5.3.2001, After this Court appointed two Advocate-Commissioners to conduct examination it appears from the record that by letter dated 16,4.2001 and letter dated 17.4.2001 the General Secretary of the Union had written letters to the Advocate Commissioners expressing willingness of the employees to work. In both the letters it has been specifically mentioned that the cease work movement had been withdrawn from 13.4.2001 with due information to the Principal-cum-Member Secretary and the Governing Body of the institution. From the face of the aforesaid three letters it appears that even though the employees wanted to resume duty the Management insisted upon furnishing an undertaking in a proforma. In response to the said conduct of the Management in insisting upon execution of an undertaking, the Union had written a letter to the Secretary of the Governing Body on 5.5.2001 and requested the Management to consider the matter afresh and allow them to discharge duties smoothly. The aforesaid materials clearly show that when the employees were willing to join duties the Management terminated their services on ground of abandonment of service without asking for any show-cause or without initiating a proceeding. Facts of the case in Scooters India Limited (supra) are more or less similar to that of the present case. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that the orders of termination passed by the Management on ground of abandonment of service cannot be sustained in law. Therefore, all orders of termination of service stand quashed and the petitioners terminated staff are entitled to be reinstated in service.
14. On the question of reinstatement an objection is raised by Sri Nanda, learned counsel for the Management that all the posts vacated by the terminated staff have been filled up and the newly recruited officers/staff having not been made parties to the proceeding, no order adverse to their interest can be passed. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Garuda Ababar v. State of Orissa and ors. 1997 (2) OLR 521. In the aforesaid reported case, the petitioner was appointed as a teacher in a High School in place of one Rabindranath Das whose services had been terminated by Managing Committee of the School. The aforesaid Rabindranath Das preferred an Appeal before the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa. The said appeal was allowed in his favour and the Director in his judgment directed the Management to reinstate him. The petitioner who had been appointed in his place challenged the order passed by the Director on the ground that he was not made a party in the appeal and reinstatement of Rabindranath Das would eventually result in termination of his service and, therefore, he was necessary party in the proceeding. This Court while examining the point, referring to some decisions of the Apex Court, held as follows :
"The principles of natural justice cannot be encompassed within any strait-jacket formula. They are easy to proclaim, but their precise extent is far less easy to define, as observed by Lord Evershed M. R. in Abort v. Sullivan, (1952) 1 KB 189. Essential characteristic of the principle is put by Romans in two maxims ; (1) Nemo judex in causa sua and (2) audi alteram partem, which respectively mean (1) no man can be a judge of his own cause and (2) hear both sides. Petitioner founds his case on the second. As indicated above, petitioner had no direct interest in or nexus with the subject-matter of adjudication. So his case is not covered by the second essential."
In view of the decision referred to above, the objection raised by Sri Nanda that newly recruited employees having not been made parties no orders adverse to their interest can be passed does not stand to any reason.
15. For the reasons afore-mentioned, O.J.C. No. 3520 of 1996 deserves dismissal being without any merit. We order accordingly.
O.J.C. No. 4502 of 2001 is allowed. The contesting opposite party management is directed to reinstate the petitioners in service within fifteen days of receipt of the writ with full back salary as the management has illegally kept them out of employment. The State Government is directed to take appropriate decision for reconstitution of the Governing Body of the College on the basis of the proposal submitted by the out-going President of the College on 24.2.1996 within two moths of receipt of writ. For the interregnum, the State Government will forthwith appoint an officer in the rank of Joint Secretary in the department of Industries as Officer-on-Special Duty for the day to day management of the College.
O.J.C. No. 6049 of 2001 is disposed of with the direction that immediately after the newly reconstituted Governing Body takes over charge of the institution, it will enquire into the alleged misappropriation of funds and mal-administration of the institution and take such action as permissible under law.
R.K. Patra, J.
1. I agree.