Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Sonia Singh & Anr on 21 November, 2024
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
1 2024:HHC:12132-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 232 of 2013 a/w Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2013 Reserved on: 11.11.2024 Date of Decision: 21.11.2024
1. Cr. Appeal No. 232 of 2013 State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant.
Versus
Sonia Singh & Anr. ...Respondents.
2. Cr. Appeal No. 159 of 2013
Karam Chand ...Appellant.
versus
Sonia Singh & Ors ...Respondents.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge. Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Pawan Nadda, Additional
Advocate General, for the
appellant/State in Cr. Appeal No. 232
of 2013 and for respondent No.3/State
in Cr. Appeal No. 159 of 2023 and Mr.
Harish Kumar, Advocate vice Mr.
Jagat Pal, Advocate in Cr. Appeal No.
159 of 2013.
For the Respondent No.1 : Mr. Atul Jhingan, Advocate, in both
the appeal(s).
For the Respondent No.2 : Mr. Virender Singh Rathore,
Advocate, in both the appeal(s).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2
2024:HHC:12132-DB Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeals are directed against the judgment dated 31.12.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC'). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that deceased Vikas was running a shop of computer repair at Navbahar. He married accused Sonia, the daughter of accused Swaroop Singh, in Sankat Mochan Temple in the year 2005. Vikas and Sonia resided happily after their marriage. Sonia left her matrimonial home on 07.06.2010 without informing anyone. Vikas and his parents tried to bring her back but accused Swaroop Singh, father of Sonia, threatened Vikas and his parents. Vikas became depressed. Sonia never returned to her matrimonial home. Informant Karam Chand (PW1), father of Vikas, was going on a morning walk on 29.09.2010 at about 5:45 AM when he noticed that the lights of the room of Vikas and T.V. set in the room 3 2024:HHC:12132-DB were switched on. He called Vikas but nobody responded. He pushed the door and found that Vikas was lying dead. A half-filled bottle of Nuvan pesticide was found on the table. A suicide note written by Vikas was also found on the side of the double bed. Vikas committed suicide because Sonia had left him and her father had threatened him. An intimation was given to the police and entry (Ex.PW13/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Sudhir Kumar (PW13), ASI Gauri Dutt and Constable Sandeep Kumar went to the spot to verify the correctness of the information. ASI Sudhir Kumar (PW13) recorded the statement of the informant (Ex.PW1/H) which was handed over to Constable Sandeep Kumar with the direction to carry it to Police Station, Chotta Shimla. Constable Sandeep Kumar took the statement to the Police Station where FIR (Ex.PW7/A) was registered. ASI Sudhir Kumar (PW13) conducted the investigation. He took the photographs (Ex.PW13/B1 to Ext.PW13/B4) and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW13/C). He seized the bottle of pesticide, wrapped it in a parcel and sealed the parcel with three seal impressions of seal 'R'. He also seized four pages of suicide note (Ex.P3) vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He seized tower bolt steel (Ex.P5) vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). He seized a double bed sheet (Ex.P7), pillow covers (Ex.P8 & Ex.P9), quilt cover (Ex.P10) and 4 2024:HHC:12132-DB plastic table sheet (Ex.P11) vide memo (Ex.PW-1/D). He obtained sample seals (Ex.P12 & Ext. P13) on separate pieces of clothes. He found a Nokia mobile (Ex.P14) and seized it vide memo (Ex.PW1/E). He conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the reports (Ex.PW13/D and Ex.PW13/E). Post-mortem examination of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Sangeet Dhillon (PW12) who found no antemortem external injury on any part of the body. He issued the post-mortem report (Ex.PW12/B). He handed over the viscera to the police official accompanying the dead body. The case property was deposited with LHC Kamlesh (PW5) who deposited them in Malkhana and made the entries in the register (Ex.PW5/A and Ext.PW5/A-1). Dinesh (PW4) handed over one exercise book (Ex.P15) to the police which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/F). He also handed over the executive diary (Ex.P16) which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/G). The case property was sent to SFSL, Junga for analysis. The results of the analysis (Ex. PA and Ex. PB) were issued stating that viscera contained traces of Organophosphorus Insecticide (Dichlorvos), the admitted handwriting on the notebook and the executive diary matched with the disputed handwriting on the suicide note. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the 5 2024:HHC:12132-DB investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Shimla who committed it for trial to learned Sessions Judge. Learned Sessions Judge assigned the case to the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court (learned Trial Court).
3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Karam Chand (PW1) is the informant and father of the deceased. Ravinder Kumar (PW2) is the neighbour of the deceased and the witness to various recoveries. Ms. Gitanjali (PW3) is the sister and Dinesh Sharma (PW4) is the brother of the deceased. LHC Kamlesh (PW5) was working as the MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HHC Amar Singh (PW6) carried the case property to SFSL, Junga. ASI Narotam Chand (PW7) registered the FIR. Rajinder Kaushal (PW8) proved the marriage between the deceased and accused Sonia. HC Yog Raj (PW9) sent the documents to SFSL, Junga. SI Ram Singh (PW10) arrested the accused and received the report from SFSL. SI Kamal Chand (PW11) conducted 6 2024:HHC:12132-DB the investigation partly. Dr. Sangeet Dhillon (PW12) conducted the post-mortem examination of the dead body. Sudheer Kumar (PW13) conducted the investigation. HC Padam Kumar (PW14) proved the FIR lodged by Prem Chand.
5. The accused Sonia in her statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC admitted that she was married to the deceased. She denied the rest of the prosecution case. She stated that her relations with the family of the deceased were not cordial. She informed the deceased that she was going to Jammu. The deceased used to talk to her on the telephone but he never visited Jammu. He used to tell her that his parents restrained him from going to Jammu. She never threatened Vikas. She was not responsible for his death. He wanted to reside with her in Jammu but his parents did not allow him to go to Jammu. He had a tendency to commit suicide and he had threatened to do so, even during her stay at her matrimonial home. Accused Swaroop Singh admitted the relationship between Sonia and Vikas but denied the rest of the prosecution case. He stated that he was innocent. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of the informant and his children were general. They were insufficient to 7 2024:HHC:12132-DB amount to abetment. Merely because the wife had left her matrimonial home will not cause the husband to commit suicide. Hence, the accused were acquitted.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, two separate appeals have been preferred -- one by the informant and another by the State. It has been asserted in the appeal filed by the State that learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution evidence was not appreciated in its proper perspective and the case was decided mechanically based on hypotheses, conjectures and surmises. The inferences drawn by the learned Trial Court are patently erroneous. The evidence was wrongly divided into pieces and was not read as a whole to reach the right conclusion. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion and the contradictions can occur due to the lapse of time between the incident and the date of deposition. The accused had continuously harassed the deceased. The suicide note clearly shows that the accused had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. Both the accused conspired. The deceased spent money on the education of Sonia Singh. She thereafter left him. When he tried to bring her back, both the accused threatened him. 8
2024:HHC:12132-DB Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate these aspects. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. In an appeal filed by the informant, it was asserted that the learned Trial Court had not given proper weightage to the informant's evidence. The suicide note established that the relationship between the deceased and his wife was not cordial. Both the accused threatened the deceased from time to time which compelled Vikas to commit suicide. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, Mr Harish Kumar, Advocate Vice Mr Jagat Pal, learned counsel for the informant, Mr Atul Jhingan, learned counsel for respondent No.1- accused Sonia and Mr Virender Singh Rathore, learned counsel for respondent No.2-accused Swaroop Singh.
10. Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State submitted that the suicide note proved that the relationship between the deceased and his wife was 9 2024:HHC:12132-DB not cordial. Both the accused threatened him after Sonia had left her matrimonial home. He tried to bring her back but she resisted. The deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. He prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
11. Mr. Harish Kumar, learned counsel for the informant adopted these submissions.
12. Mr. Atul Jhingan, learned counsel for respondent No.1/accused submitted that the relationship between the accused and deceased was cordial. She left the matrimonial home after informing the deceased. The deceased wanted to reside with the accused but his family members did not allow him to do so. The evidence of the prosecution did not show the continuous conduct which would compel a person to commit suicide. Merely because the wife has left her matrimonial home or the relationship has not worked is no ground to conclude the abetment of the suicide. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhu v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 137 in support of his submission.
13. Mr. Virender Singh Rathore, learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused adopted these submissions and prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
10
2024:HHC:12132-DB
14. We have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
15. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed:
"25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal.
26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the 11 2024:HHC:12132-DB High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity.
27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The "two-views theory" has been judicially recognised by the courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law.
28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19]: (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) "13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. 12 2024:HHC:12132-DB Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus : (SCC p. 643, para 9) '9. ... We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so.
Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.'"
29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522], the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) "7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of 13 2024:HHC:12132-DB H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ).
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807]). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320])."
16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
17. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the suicide note stated to have been written by the deceased. The police collected the notebook and executive diary stated to have been written by the deceased. These were sent to the SFSL Junga for comparison with the disputed writing on the suicide note and the report of the analysis (Ext. PB) was issued. Jagjit Singh and Dr. Meenakshi Mahajan who signed the report were not examined by the prosecution. The report mentions that it is admissible under Section 293 of Cr.P.C. However, it is not correct. It was laid down by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh versus Anoop Kumar 2008 (1) ShimLC 71 that the opinion of a handwriting expert is required to be proved in accordance with the law. It was observed:- 14
2024:HHC:12132-DB "The allegations against Anoop Kumar are that he forged G.R. Ext.PW-18/A. In support of forgery allegedly committed by Anoop Kumar, the prosecution has relied on handwriting expert report Ext. PW-19/A. This report was produced by P.W.-19 Garib Dass, a Retired Inspector. The prosecution did not examine handwriting experts to prove Ext.PW-19/A. Section 293, Cr.P.C. permits the use of some reports in evidence but the report of a handwriting expert is not included in Section 293, Cr.P.C. In other words, handwriting expert opinion is required to be proved in accordance with the law. In the present case, the handwriting expert report has not been proved as per law, therefore, handwriting expert report Ext.P.W.-19/A cannot be read in evidence. In the absence of a handwriting expert report, there is nothing on record to show that Anoop Kumar has forged Ext.P.W.- 18/A. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly acquitted Anoop Kumar under Section 468, I.P.C."
18. Thus, no reliance can be placed upon the report of analysis to prove that the suicide notice was written by the deceased and no advantage can be derived by the prosecution from the suicide note (Ex. P3).
19. It was submitted that the informant and his children had identified the handwriting of the suicide note. They were the best persons to know about the handwriting of the deceased being their relative and the suicide note was proved. This submission is not acceptable. Karam Chand (PW1) stated that he found one suicide note of four pages on the back side of the bed and a pen. He called his wife. All persons came into the room and they started crying. He further stated that four pages of suicide note (Ext.P3) 15 2024:HHC:12132-DB were taken in possession in his presence and the presence of Ravinder Kumar (PW2). He identified his signatures on the memo. He nowhere stated that the suicide note was in the handwriting of the deceased. Hence, his testimony does not prove the identity of the author of the suicide note and no advantage can be derived from his testimony.
20. Gitanjali (PW3), sister of the deceased did not state anything regarding the suicide note or the note being in the handwriting of the deceased. Dinesh (PW4) stated that he handed over the exercise book and the executive diary. He told the police that pages No. 1, 2, 12, 15, 19 and 22 of the exercise book were in the handwriting of the deceased. He told the police that pages No. 1, 19, 10, 11 and 12 of the Executive Diary were in the handwriting of his brother. He has also not deposed anything about the suicide note. Hence, their testimonies do not establish that the suicide note was in the hands of the deceased.
21. The present challan was filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. This Section was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 216 as under:
16
2024:HHC:12132-DB "64. Suicide is distinguishable from homicide inasmuch as it amounts to the killing of self. This Court in M. Mohan v. State (2011) 3 SCC 626 went into the meaning of the word suicide and held as under:
37. The word "suicide" in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however, its meaning and import are well known and require no explanation. "Sui" means "self" and "cide" means "killing", thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his objective of killing himself.
65. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court delved into the meaning of the word 'instigate' or 'instigation' and held as under:
20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.
66. Thus, this Court held that to 'instigate' means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of 'instigation', it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or that the words or act should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. But, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of 17 2024:HHC:12132-DB conduct creates a situation in which the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.
67. Again, in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (2009) 16 SCC 605, this Court elaborated further and observed that to constitute 'instigation', a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by 'goading' or 'urging forward'. This Court held as follows:
17. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction" (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts"
(see Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.).
18. Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such a person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter.
68. Thus, this Court has held that in order to prove that the accused had abetted the commission of suicide by a person, the following has to be established:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and 18 2024:HHC:12132-DB
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, the presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.
69. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court after referring to some of the previous decisions held that it has been the consistent view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. Thereafter, this Court held as under:
13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
70. Similar is the view expressed by this court in Ude Singh (supra).
71. In Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2020) 15 SCC 359, this Court after referring to Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC held as follows:19
2024:HHC:12132-DB
9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide.
Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
72. Reverting back to the decision in M. Mohan (supra), this Court observed that abetment would involve a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Delineating the intention of the legislature and having regard to the ratio of the cases decided by this Court, it was concluded that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.
73. Sounding a note of caution, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 observed that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged 20 2024:HHC:12132-DB and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty."
22. This position was reiterated in Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1701 wherein it was observed:
"8. Reading these sections together would indicate that there must be either an instigation or an engagement or intentional aid to the 'doing of a thing'. When we apply these three criteria to Section 306, it means that the accused must have encouraged the person to commit suicide or engaged in a conspiracy with others to encourage the person to commit suicide or acted (or failed to act) intentionally to aid the person to commit suicide.
9. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190, this court explained the concept of abetment along with the necessary ingredient for an offence under Section 306 of IPC as under:
"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."
10. In Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. (2010) 1 SCC 707, this court explained the parameters of Section 306 in the following words:
21
2024:HHC:12132-DB "12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.
13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC."
11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, while explaining the meaning of 'Instigation', this court stated that:
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased 22 2024:HHC:12132-DB was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation."
12. These principles and necessary ingredients of Section 306 and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 were reiterated and summarized by this court in the recent case of Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) 10 SCC 200."
23. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the prosecution has to show that the accused had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to take away his life. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1486 that the mere abuses or altercations do not constitute abetment. It was observed at page 611:
"20. In the background of this legal position, we may advert to the case at hand. The question as to what is the cause of suicide has no easy answers because suicidal ideation and behaviours in human beings are complex and multifaceted. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. Each individual's suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-respect. Each of these factors are crucial and exacerbating contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his own life, which may either be an attempt for self- protection or an escapism from intolerable self.
21. In the present case, the charge against the appellant is that he along with the other two accused "in furtherance of 23 2024:HHC:12132-DB common intention", mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the deceased) and abetted him to commit suicide by the said act of mental torture. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life."
24. A similar view was taken in Velladurai v. State, (2022) 17 SCC 523: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 715 wherein it was observed at page 526:
"12. Now so far as the offence under Section 306 IPC is concerned, in a case where any person instigates another person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 306IPC for abetting the commission of suicide. Therefore, in order to bring a case within the provision of Section 306IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigating or by doing a certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. As observed and held by this Court in Amalendu Pal [Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B., (2010) 1 SCC 707 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 896], mere harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused proximate to the time of occurrence which led to the suicide would not amount to an offence under Section 306IPC.
13. Abetment by a person is when a person instigates another to do something. Instigation can be inferred where the accused had, by his acts or omission created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. In the instant case, the allegation against the appellant is that there was a quarrel on the day of the occurrence. There is no other material on record which indicates abetment. There is no material on 24 2024:HHC:12132-DB record that the appellant-accused played an active role by an act of instigating the deceased to facilitate the commission of suicide. On the contrary, in the present case, even the appellant-accused also tried to commit suicide and consumed pesticide. Under the circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of the case and there is no other material on record which indicates abetment, both the High Court as well as the learned trial court have committed an error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 306IPC."
25. A similar view was taken in Prabhu (supra) wherein it was observed:
15. In a recent judgment of this Court in Kamalakar v. State of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 1485 of 2011 [decided on 12.10.2023], one of us (Vikram Nath J.) explained the ingredients of Section 306 IPC. The Court has held as follows:
"8.2. Section 306 IPC penalizes abetment of the commission of suicide. To charge someone under this Section, the prosecution must prove that the accused played a role in the suicide. Specifically, the accused's actions must align with one of the three criteria detailed in Section 107 IPC. This means the accused either encouraged the individual to take their life, conspired with others to ensure the person committed suicide, or acted in a way (or failed to act) which directly resulted in the person's suicide.
8.3. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court has analysed different meanings of "instigation". The relevant para of the said judgment is reproduced herein:
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a 25 2024:HHC:12132-DB reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."
8.4. The essentials of Section 306 IPC were elucidated by this Court in M. Mohan v. State (2011) 3 SCC 626, as under:
"43. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words "instigation" and "goading".
The Court opined that there should be an intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self- esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.
44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."
26
2024:HHC:12132-DB 8.5. The essential ingredients which are to be meted out in order to bring a case under Section 306 IPC were also discussed in Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 in the following paragraphs:
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.
13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC."
8.6. On a careful reading of the factual matrix of the instant case and the law regarding Section 306 IPC, there seems to be no proximate link between the marital discord between the deceased and the appellant and her subsequent death by burning herself. The appellant has not committed any positive or direct act to instigate or aid in the commission of suicide by the deceased." 27
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16. On a perusal of the above, and relying upon this Court's previous judgments discussing the elements of Section 306 IPC, the following principles emerge:
17. Where the words uttered are casual in nature and which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people, and nothing serious is expected to follow from the same, the same would not amount to abetment of suicide. [Swami Prahaladdas v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438, Paragraph 3; Sanju v. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371, Paragraph 12]
18. In order to constitute 'instigation', it must be shown that the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. The words uttered by the accused must be suggestive of the consequence [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, Paragraph 20]
19. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605, Paragraph 20]
20. There must be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The accused must be shown to have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide [Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707, Paragraph 12-14]
21. The accused must have intended or known that the deceased would commit suicide because of his actions or omissions [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628]
26. It was laid down by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Alka Grewal v. State of M.P., 1999 SCC OnLine MP 193 : (2001) 4 MP LJ 480:
2000 Cri LJ 672: 2000 Cri LR (MP) 26 : (2000) 1 MPHT 435 that the 28 2024:HHC:12132-DB immoral character of a wife does not amount to the abetment of suicide by the wife. It was observed at page 481:
"4. The provisions of presumption under section 113-A of the Evidence Act do not arise against the wife due to whose cruelty the husband commits suicide. It is certainly a case of mental cruelty by the wife due to her alleged characterless manner but unfortunately, the legislature has not taken into account these factors.
5. In the absence of any such presumption, inference of abetment because of the cruel conduct of the wife against her, cannot be raised. It is not a common course of events nor a natural result. The husbands generally inflict cruelty upon the wives. It is not that the wives are not cruel. But such cruelty by the wife cannot be said to be an instigation to the husband to commit suicide.
6. Abetment has been defined under section 107, Penal Code, 1860. There has to be either of the 3 acts by the abettor. Engaging with one or more other persons or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of a particular act is one of them. There should have been a conspiracy that the husband led to commit suicide and along with the conspiracy there should be an act of illegal omission or there should be instigation of the person who commits suicide to do that act. There should be intentionally aiding an act or illegal omission. Even facilitation for the commission of crime amounts to abetment.
7. In this case the material on record may show a cause for the husband to feel so depressed as to take such a decision, but how much he was so depressed by the immoral character of the wife, is different from person to person. It is not a common feature that husbands are led to commit suicide. So it is not normal conduct. There is no other material on record against the petitioner except the suicide note of the husband and the letter written by him to his own sister earlier. They are totally insufficient material to infer that the wife abetted suicide. She may be the cause of the suicide, but not the abettor. So although this wife on the basis of dying 29 2024:HHC:12132-DB declaration deserves no sympathy of either the Court or society, but it cannot be said that she abetted suicide.
27. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Prabhu (supra) that broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life and merely because a person has a broken relationship with another does not mean that the latter abetted the commission of suicide by the former. It was observed:
"23. Broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life. It could not be said that the appellant by breaking up the relationship with Kousalya and by advising her to marry in accordance with the advice of her parents, as he himself was doing, had intended to abet the suicide of Kousalya. Hence the offence under Section 306 is not made out."
28. Thus, the mere fact that Sonia had left her matrimonial home cannot lead to an inference that she had abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased.
29. The prosecution further asserted that the accused threatened the deceased and the deceased was left with no option except to commit suicide. Karam Chand (PW1), Gitanjali (PW3) and Dinesh (PW4) made general statements that the accused used to threaten the deceased and they have not given any particulars of the date, time or details of the threats advanced by the accused. In the absence of any particulars, it is difficult to rely upon the general statements.
30
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30. Even otherwise the informant stated in his examination-in-chief that Sonia left the home on 07.06.2010, and when he enquired from the father of Sonia, he threatened him with dire consequences that he would do away with his life. He stated in his cross-examination that the father of Sonia had threatened him after 4-5 days from 07.06.2010 by saying that he was sending divorce papers and in case the divorce papers were not sent back duly signed then he would come to Navbahar and take away their lives. He told accused No.2 that he needed some time to think about the matter.
31. As per this statement, the threat was advanced somewhere in June and the suicide was committed in September after the lapse of three months. It is difficult to believe that a threat advanced in June would lead a person to commit suicide in September. Further, no evidence was led that accused no. 2 Swaroop Singh had sent any divorce papers to the deceased. Hence, this statement remains uncorroborated.
32. Informant further stated that the deceased had told him about the threats given to him by his in-laws 15 days after Sonia departed from Shimla to Jammu which again shows that the 31 2024:HHC:12132-DB incident took place somewhere in June and the same is not sufficient to constitute the abetment of the suicide.
33. He stated that the deceased told him about the threatening call from his in-laws 9 days before the incident. Significantly no such threats were mentioned in the complaint or the examination-in-chief; hence, reliance cannot be placed upon the general and vague statement.
34. Gitanjali (PW3) stated that the deceased used to receive threatening calls from the family members of Sonia, especially Sonia. He used to remain disturbed after receiving the calls. She stated in her cross-examination that the relationship between the deceased and Sonia remained cordial till she left Shimla. The deceased was sensitive right from his childhood. His behaviour had not changed even after Sonia had left his company. He used to receive threatening calls after Sonia left her matrimonial home. She could not say when he had received the calls from Sonia and her father.
35. The statement of this witness is also not satisfactory. She could not give the time or the date when such threatening calls were received by the deceased. She even stated that the relationship between the deceased and the accused Sonia remained 32 2024:HHC:12132-DB cordial when they were together. Nothing was brought on record as to why the relationship deteriorated after Sonia left her matrimonial home. In the absence of any particulars of the date and the nature of the threat, her statement is not sufficient to conclude that the accused had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide.
36. Dinesh (PW4) has not stated anything about the threat in his examination-in-chief. He stated in his cross-examination that the relationship between Sonia and the deceased was cordial. He did not know the reason why Sonia left the matrimonial home.
37. There is no other evidence to show that the accused had threatened the deceased in such a manner that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view based on evidence led before it and this Court will not interfere with the same while deciding an appeal against acquittal.
38. In view of the above, the present appeals fail and they are dismissed.
39. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail 33 2024:HHC:12132-DB bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
40. A copy of this judgment along with the records of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(Vivek Singh Thakur) Judge (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st November, 2024 (Nikita)