Himachal Pradesh High Court
Rfa No. 68/2 vs General Manager on 6 April, 2016
Author: Rajiv Sharma
Bench: Rajiv Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
RFA No. 68 of 2010 alongwith .
RFA Nos. 127, 128, 129, 130 and 131/2010 (a/w Cross-objections No.23 of 2016) Reserved on: 5.4.2016 Decided on: 6.4.2016 ______________________________________________________ of
1. RFA No. 68/2010 Hari Singh. ...Appellant.
Versus General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam) and others.
rt ...Respondents
2. RFA No. 127/2010
General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project).
...Appellant.
Versus Ranjeet Singh and others. ...Respondents.
3. RFA No. 128/2010General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project). Appellant Versus Kalo Devi and others. ...Respondents 4. RFA No. 129/2010 General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project). Appellant Versus Hari Singh and others. ...Respondents 5. RFA No. 130/2010 General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project). Appellant Versus Makhan Deen and others. ...Respondents 6. RFA No. 131/2010 ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 2 General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project). Appellant Versus Karnail Singh others. ...Respondents
7. Cross Objections No.23 /2016 .
General Manager, Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam Project. Non-Objector Versus Kalo Devi and others. ...Objector.
______________________________________________________________ of Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes rt For the Appellants : Mr. Anuj Nag, Advocate in RFAs No. 127/2010 to 131/2010 and for respondent in RFA No. 68/2010 and for Non-objector in Cross-
Objection No.23/2016.
For the Respondents: Mr. Adarsh Sharma, vice counsel in RFAs. No. 127/2010 to 131/2010 and for appellant in RFA No. 68/2010 and for objector in Cross-
Objection No.23/2016.
Mr. Parmod Thakur, Addl. A.G. for the respondent-State in the respective appeals/cross-objections.
___________________________________________________________ Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge.
Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all these appeals, the same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment.
2. "Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of these appeals and cross-objections are that the land of the respondents-claimants situated in Mohal Bhotan, Pargana 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 3 Chuhan, Tehsil Dalhousie, District Chamba was acquired for public purpose, namely, for construction of reservoir of Ranjit Sagar (Thein Dam) Project. Notification under section 4 of .
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was published on 7.4.1997. It was published in the Rajpatra on 10.5.1997. It was also published in two daily newspapers Jansatta and Indian Express on 29.4.1997. The of Notification was also displayed at the conspicuous place of the locality. Thereafter, notification under Sections 6 and 7 of rt the Act was issued on 3.9.1997. It was also got published in State Rajpatra on 20.9.1997. The notification was also published in two daily newspapers i.e. Jansatta and Indian Express on 4.10.1997 and 5.10.1997. Wide publicity was also given by displaying the notification at the conspicuous place in village Bhotan through Pradhan, Gram Panchayat.
The notices as required under Section 9 (3) and (4) of the Act were served upon the concerned land owners to file their respective claims and objections and the Collector after conducting enquiry assessed the market value of the acquired land situate in village Bhotan as given in the Award for different classifications of land alongwith statutory benefits. The claimants aggrieved by the Award made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 27.1.1999 filed reference ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 4 petitions under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. The learned District Judge enhanced the rate of compensation irrespective of the classification of the land.
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Hence, these appeals. The claimant in reference petition in 24/2000 also filed cross-objections for enhancement of the Award.
3. Mr. Anuj Nag, Advocate has vehemently argued of that the reference petitions were barred by limitation. He has supported the Award made by the Land Acquisition Collector dated 27.1.1999.
rt
4. Mr. Adarsh Sharma, Advocate, has vehemently argued that the deductions made by the learned District Judge, are contrary to the law. He has prayed for enhancement of the compensation.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully.
6. The Land Acquisition Collector has made the Award on 27.1.1999. The acquired land falls in Mohal Bhotan. The land was acquired for construction of reservoir.
The reference petitions were ordered to be tagged with LAC petition No. 15/2000 titled as Rajkumar vs. GM Thein Dam and others on 21.9.2000. Learned District Judge, Chamba has framed issues on 19.9.2000, 20.9.2000 and 21.9.2000.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 57. The claimants have placed strong reliance on sale deed dated 27.3.1997. The sale deed is mark 'A'. PW-7 Chaman Lal is the vendor. According to him, he has sold 1 .
biswa 5 biswansis of land at village Lehri to PW-6 Kulwant Singh for a consideration of Rs.25,000/-. PW-6 Kulwant Singh is the vendee. He has testified that he has purchased land measuring 1 biswa 5 biswansis from Chaman Lal for a of consideration of Rs.25,000/-. Mark 'A' is the certified copy of sale deed. The learned reference court has taken into rt consideration mark 'A', sale deed dated 27.3.1997 of Mohal Lehri. Mohal Lehri is adjacent to Mohal Bhotan. The Notification under Section 4 of the Act was made on 7.4.1997. Thus, the sale deed has rightly been taken into consideration for determination of market value of the acquired land in Mohal Bhotan. Hari Singh and Kalo Devi and Amro have testified that their land was acquired for the construction of Ranjit Dam and they should be paid compensation of Rs. 25,000/- per biswas as their land was more fertile as compared to Mohal Lehri. The distance from Mohal Lehri to their village was 2 kms. There was motorable road in Mohal Lehri. Whereas there was no motorable road in Mohal Bhotan. The land of Mohal Lehri was plain and Dalhousie and Banikhet were at a distance of 25 kms from ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 6 Mohal Bhotan. The sale took place on 27.3.1997, i.e. prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act on 7.4.1997. It is settled law that there is no parameter with .
reference to the transfer of land of particular village. The instances of sale of adjacent land can be taken into consideration.
8. The claimants have also placed reliance upon Ex.
of PL, Award given by the Land Acquisition Collector in Mohal Lehri. The land in the Award in Ex. PL was also acquired for rt the similar purpose i.e. for reservoir of Ranjit Sagar Dam Project, Shahpur, Kandi. The Collector has assessed the value of the land to Rs.5.00 Lakh per bigha. There is no tangible evidence placed on record to suggest that award dated 20.3.1999 Ext. PL was assailed. The learned District Judge has taken into consideration the sale deed mark 'A' but has made deduction to the extent of 60%. In other words, instead of Rs.25,000/- per biswa he has awarded Rs.15,000/- per biswa or say Rs. 3.00 Lakh per bigha to the claimants taking into consideration the geographical and topographical conditions.
9. It is no more res integra that when sale deeds are of small areas and the land acquired is a big chunk, in those ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 7 cases, the deductions are permissible while assessing the market value of the land.
10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme in .
Trishala Jain and another versus State of Uttaranchal and another, (2011) 6 SCC 47 have held that the sale instances even of smaller plots could be considered for determining the market value of a larger chunk of land with of some deduction unless, there was comparability in potential, utilization, amenities and infrastructure with hardly any rt distinction. Their Lordships have held as under:
44. It is thus evident from the above enunciated principle that the acquired land has to be more or less developed land as its developed surrounding areas, with all amenities and facilities and is fit to be used for the purpose for which it is acquired without any further expenditure, before such land could be considered for no deduction.
Similarly the sale instances even of smaller plots could be considered for determining the market value of a larger chunk of land with some deduction unless, there was comparability in potential, utilisation, amenities and infrastructure with hardly any distinction. On such principles each case would have to be considered on its own merits."
11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Major General Kapil Mehra and others vs. Union of India and another, (2015) 2 SCC 262 have held that the factors which merit consideration as comparable sales are : (i) exemplar sale should be within reasonable time of date of issuance of notification under section 4 (i); (ii) it should be ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 8 bone fide transaction; (iii) it should be of land acquired or of land adjacent to land acquired; and (iv) it should possess similar advantages. Their Lordships have further held that if .
sale exhibits pertained to small plots of land while large tract of land was acquired, appropriate deductions towards smallness of area were permissible. Their Lordships have held as under:
of [11] The standard method of determination of the market value of any acquired land is by the valuer evaluating the land on the date of valuation publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, rt acting as a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase the land in open market at the prevailing price on that day, from a seller willing to sell such land at a reasonable price. Thus, the market value is determined with reference to the open market sale of comparable land in the neighbourhood, by a willing seller to a willing buyer, on or before the date of preliminary notification, as that would give a fair indication of the market value.
12. It has come in the statement of PW-6 Kulwant Singh and PW-7 Chaman Lal that the road facility was available at a distance of about 6 kms from village Bhotan.
Most of the land at village Bhotan was in the shape of hills. It has also come in the evidence that most of the land in village Lehri was plain or level. Thus, it is in these circumstance deductions have been made by learned District Judge from the assessed value of the land acquired in village Bhotan.
13. Mr. Adarsh Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that inadequate compensation has been paid for the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 9 structures in the acquired land by the Land Acquisition Collector.
14. The claimants have not led any evidence to prove .
their plea. The structures/buildings have been assessed on the basis of the estimates prepared by the Junior Engineer at the site and duly signed by the Assistant Engineer, PWD.
15. Now, as far as the trees are concerned, of compensation of the trees was worked by the DFO Dalhousie and no evidence has been led by the claimants/ cross-
rt objector to substantiate the plea that the Award made for the trees was inadequate.
16. Mr. Anuj Nag, Advocate has vehemently argued that the reference petitions have not been filed within the period of limitation. However, the fact of the matter is that the Award was made on 27.1.1999. The reference petitions were received in the Reference Court on 4.12.1999 though filed on 20.2.1999. It has come in the statement of PW-8 Chaman Lal Patwari, Thein Dam, Land Acquisition Office Dalhousie that before sending the land reference petitions to the Court, the same were lying with the Senior Assistant of Land Acquisition Collector. He has sought voluntary retirement. It was the responsibility of the Land Acquisition Collector to send the references within the period prescribed.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 10Moreover, in the present case, no notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act was issued to the claimants. Award was made in the absence of the claimants. The delay, in fact, was on the .
part of the Land Acquisition Collector and the claimants can not be held responsible for the same. Thus, the reference court has rightly concluded that the reference petitions were within limitation.
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17. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and rt another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 have held that where the award was never communicated to the party the question is when did the party know the award either actually or constructively. Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made.
The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. Their Lordships have held as under:
[5] As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra). It was there observed that a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of Collector's award" occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Admittedly the award was ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 11 never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on .
December 24,1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run of from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These rt contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it. or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had knowledge of the award one of the respondents gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge and she said :
"The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given by me but the amount of compensation was not known to me, nor did I know about acquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my Karinda had told me on the day I filed the said application that the land had been acquired by the Government."
This evidence was not seriously contradicted on behalf of the appellant and the learned Subordinate Judge did not reject it. It is worthy of the note that before the Collector also the appellant did not seriously challenge the statement of the respondents that they came to know of the award on July 22, 1955 the date on which the compensation was paid. On the reply which the appellant filed before the learned Subordinate Judge there was no contradiction of ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 12 the averment that the respondents had come to know of the award on July 22, 1955. That being the position we have come to the conclusion that the date of knowledge in this case was July 22, 1955. The application for a reference was clearly made within six months from that date and was not therefore barred by time within .
the meaning of the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso to S.18 of the Act.
18. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pratap Narain vs. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others, 1969 (3) SCC 631, have held that in a case where the of appellant had not received any notice of the making of the award and consequently his application under section 18 was within time, rt this plea was not controverted by the respondents, the Land Acquisition Officer was not justified in refusing to exercise his statutory duty. Their Lordships have held as under:
[3] The appellant's case is that he had not received any notice of the making of the award and consequently his application under section 18 was within time. This plea had not been controverted by the respondents in this court. The records produced by the appellant lend support to that plea. Hence prima facie the appellant's application under Section 18 was within time, see Raja Harish Chandcra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another and State of Punjab v. Mst. Osisar Jehan Begum and Another. If the allegations made by the appellant are accepted as correct as we have to do on the basis of the pleadings and material before us then there is no doubt that the land Acquisition Officer was not justified in refusing to exercise his statutory duty.
19. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in S. Gulab Singh vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1973 Delhi 231 while relying State of Punjab vs. Mst. Qaisar ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 13 Jehan Begum and another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 has held that where a person has no notice under section 12 (2), an application filed by him within six months from the date of .
knowledge of essential contents of the award is competent.
Learned Single Judge has held as under:
[2] It is not disputed that the name of the petitioner is not shown as owner in the revenue records. The Land Acquisition Collector had made the award in December, 1958 and the application of the of petitioner to make a reference under Section 18 was made on 8-2- 1962 (copy of which is Annexure-A to the Writ Petition). He has mentioned therein that no notice either under Section 9 or Section 12 (2) of the Act was served upon him and that only less than a rt month prior to the application he came to know that his land was acquired. The petition is sought to be resisted on the ground that no notice was served on the petitioner since he was not a person interested in the property in question and yet it is contended that his application was barred by time. Section 18 of the Act enables an application by a "person interested" not accepting the award to be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court for determining the amount of compensation. Such an application has to be made
(a) within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award if the person making it was present or was represented before the Collector at the time when he made the award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
This provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, 1961 AIR(SC) 1500. Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) explained the legal position in the following terms :
"The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 14 opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way".
[3] It was specifically observed by S. K. Das, J. in State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jeham Begum, 1963 AIR(SC) 1604 that knowledge of .
the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made and that the knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award which may be known actually or constructively. The impugned order dismissing the application for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act on the ground that it had not been filed within a period of six months from the date of the Collector's award is not correct and has to be quashed. It is of hereby quashed.
20. Division Bench of Bombay High Court in State of rt Maharashtra and another vs. Abdul Sattar and others, AIR 1995 Bombay 85 has held that no notice under section 12 (2) issued to the claimants, the application for reference made few days after claimants received payment is well within time prescribed. Division Bench has held as under:
[8] It is an admitted fact that the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not bear the date. That necessarily means that it was not known when the award was passed. The record also does not show that any notice was served on any of the claimants under section 12(2) of the Act. No office copy of such notice having been issued finds place in the record. The claimant No.1 has stated that no notice was served on any of the claimants intimating about the passing of the award. It may be stated that, as observed by the Court below, the payment was received by the claimants under protest on 20-6-1977 and the application for reference was made on or about 1-7-1977 but it was sent to the Court on 1-4-1980. It is clear from the record that none of the claimants had any knowledge about passing of the award untill they received the amount of compensation under protest. The Court below was, therefore, justified in recording a finding that the application for reference to the Court under section 18 of the Act was well within six months ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 15 from the date of passing of the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The learned Special Counsel for the appellants has not been able to dis-lodge this finding of fact recorded by the Court below. There is, therefore, no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that application for reference was .
not within the time prescribed under Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act. The application for reference was well within the time under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act.
21. Learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer vs. Tukkareddy, AIR of 1996 Karnataka 26 has held that if the authority does not act at all, the entire period that has elapsed as a result on the rt part of the default of the authority will on an analogy of the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act necessarily have to be excluded while computing limitation. In this case also, the application was filed in time but there was delay in making reference on the part of the authorities.
22. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 3 SCC 545 have held that if person interested or his representative was not present when the award was made, and if he does not receive notice under section 12 (2) from Collector, he can make application within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about contents of the award. Their Lordships have held as under:::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 16
[28] The following position therefore emerges from the interpretation of the proviso to section 18 of the Act :
(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award itself.
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(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application of within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under section 12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of rt such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the award.
23. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2011) 6 SCC 47 have held that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 17 either actual or constructive is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Their Lordships have held as under:
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[6] There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect person, it is essentially fair and just that the of said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making rt of the award cannot, consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector : it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement.
Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to S. 18 in a literal or mechanical way.
[11] A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Cloete, ILR 6 Mad 189, Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860 limited the time within which a suit may be brought to set aside the decision of the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 18 settlement officer to two months from the date of the award, and so the question arose as to when the time would begin to run. The High Court held that the time can begin to run only from the date on which the decision is communicated to the parties. "If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act", says the judgment, "it .
could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the having been passed". Adopting the same principle a similar construction has been placed by the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan Chettiar, ILR 53 Mad 491 : (AIR 1930 Mad 490) on the limitation provisions contained in Ss. 73 (1) and 77(1) of the Indian Registration Act XVI of of 1908. It was held that in a case where an order was not passed in the presence of the parties or after notice to them of the date when the order would be passed the expression "within thirty days after the making of the order" used in the said sections means within rt thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it. These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to S. 18 of the Act.
24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Premji Nathu vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2012) 5 SCC 250 have held that the landowner who is not present or is not represented before Collector at the time of making of award should be supplied with a copy of award so that he may effectively exercise his right of reference under section ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 19 18 (1) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships have held as under:
[10] An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that by .
virtue of Section 12(1), an award made by the Collector is treated final and conclusive evidence of the true area and value of the land and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. In terms of Section 12(2), the Collector is required to give notice of his award to the interested persons who are not present either personally or through their representatives at the time of making of award.
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13. Section 18(1) provides for making of reference by the Collector to the Court for the determination of the amount of compensation etc. Section 18(2) lays down that an application for reference shall be made within six weeks from the date of the rt Collector's award, if at the time of making of award the person seeking reference was present or was represented before the Collector. If the person is not present or is not represented before the Collector, then the application for reference has to be made within six weeks of the receipt of notice under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madan and another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 2 SCC 720, have held that the date of the Collector's award used in proviso (b) to section 18 (2) must be understood to mean the date when award is either communicated to party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Their Lordships have held as under:
[9] From the order dated 29.10.1993 passed in L.A.R. No. 75/1992, it is, inter alia, clear that there was a dispute amongst the land owners (the appellants are one set of such land owners) in respect of their respective shares in the acquired land on account of which no apportionment of compensation was made by the Collector who ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 20 made a Reference under Section 30 of the Act to the court. Further, in the order dated 29.10.1993 it is recorded that the appellants had no knowledge of the Award till the order dated 4.9.1991 came to be passed in the Reference under Section 30. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh this Court has held that the expression "the date of the .
award" used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must be understood to mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. It was further held by this Court that it will be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way. In the present case, it has already been noticed that a finding of has been recorded by the Reference Court in its order dated 29.10.1993 that "the petitioners had no knowledge about the passing of the award till the date of payment of compensation on 5.9.1991 because rt they were held entitled to receive the compensation after the decision of Reference under Section 30 dated 4.9.1991."
[10] What transpires from the above is that it is for the first time on 4.9.1991 (date of the order under Section 30 of the Act) that the appellants came to know that they were entitled to compensation and the quantum thereof. It is not in dispute that the Reference under Section 18 was made within 6 weeks from the said date i.e. 4.9.1991. In the above facts, it is difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the High Court to hold that the Reference under Section 18 was barred by limitation.
[13] For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the High Court had erred in allowing the appeal filed by the State and reversing the order dated 29.10.1993 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Beed. The award of compensation in the instant case having been made by the Collector as far back as in the year 1985 and the amount involved being exceedingly small we have considered the basis on which enhancement of compensation was made by the learned Reference Court in its order dated 29.10.1993. On such scrutiny, we do not find any error in the view taken by the learned Reference Court. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, while allowing this appeal and setting aside the order dated 09.09.2008 passed by the High Court we deem it proper to restore the order dated 29.10.1993 passed by the Second Additional District Judge in L.A.R. No.75 of 1995.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 2126. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan Housing Board versus New Pink City Nirman .
Sahkari Samiti Limited and another, (2015) 7 SCC 601 have held that the limitation period of six months from date of award for making reference to court commences from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of award. Their of Lordships have held as under:
[11] The provisions of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and rt section 12 of the Act of 1953 is extracted hereinbelow :
"12. Award of Collector when to be final.-(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's officer and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award or the amendment thereof to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award or the amendment thereof is made."
Section 12(2) requires immediate notice to be given of the award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representative/s when the award is made.
Section 18(2) of the Act of 1953 requires to file the objections within six weeks from the date of the award if the person or the representative was present when the award was made. In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the award whichever period shall first expire.
27. Accordingly, In view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove, all the appeals and cross-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 20:04:12 :::HCHP 22objections fail and the same are dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.
.
(Justice Rajiv Sharma), Judge.
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