Himachal Pradesh High Court
____________________________________________________________ vs Amar Singh on 21 April, 2025
( 2025:HHC:11450 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA LPA No.183 of 2025 Decided on: 21.04.2025 ____________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh and others ...Appellants Versus Amar Singh ...Respondent Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellants: Mr. Rakesh Dhaulta, Additional Advocate General.
For Respondent : Notice not issued Per Ranjan Sharma, Judge State of Himachal Pradesh, has come up before this Court in Letters Patent Appeal, assailing the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge in Amar Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh & others, CWP No.9090 of 2022, decided on 14.05.2024, {herein, the Impugned judgement} whereby, the writ petition filed by the Respondent herein-Writ petitioner Amar Singh was allowed with directions to appellants herein to initiate the acquisition proceedings of land used for the construction of road, within a period of 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
-2- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
six weeks.
FACTUAL MATRIX IN WRIT PETITION IN
CWP No. 9090 OF 2022:
2 Respondent-writ petitioner, Amar Singh, filed
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for a direction to the State Authorities-
Appellants herein to initiate acquisition proceedings qua the land as described in writ petition under the Land Acquisition Act and with second prayer to allow exchange of 4 Marlas of government owned in Khasra No 111 in lieu of 6 Marlas of his land in Khasra No. 124, which was utilized for construction of road during the year 1984-1985 from Hamirpur to Sarkaghat via Bhukkar Bajoura, Tanamorh, Kalahu [Amroh to Chandruhi as per reply].
In this background, the writ petition was filed by respondent-Amar Singh herein.
STAND OF STATE IN WRIT PROCEEDINGS:
3. Appellants-State Authorities had filed a reply to the writ petition stating that the petitioner has neither any legal nor fundamental right. So far as the construction of link road from Amroh to Chandruhi, it was stated in Reply-Affidavit that road
-3- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) was constructed in the years 1984-1985, over Khasra No. 124, situated in Mohal Tan-Amroh from Kilometers 0/000 to Kilometers 4/225 by the State Authorities-
Appellants herein. It was averred in the reply that the land owners including writ petitioner-respondent herein did not raise any objection at the time of construction of road. It was pleaded that petitioner had never raised any demand for compensation for utilized land. It was averred that the road was constructed as per their own demand and the villagers have utilized aforesaid land. So far as the claim of petitioner for exchanging his 6 Marlas of utilized land in Khasra No 124 with 4 Marlas of government land in exchange in Khasra No.111, the reply stated that the petitioner was an encroacher on Government land in Khasra No. 111 and Government land cannot be exchanged in lieu of private land.
With aforesaid averments, the prayer was made for dismissing the writ petition.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT DATED 14.5.2024:
4. The writ petition, CWP No. 9090 of 2022, titled as Amar Singh versus State of Himachal
-4- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) Pradesh and others was decided by Learned Single Judge on 14.05.2024. So far as the claim of the petitioner for compensation is concerned, Learned Single Judge directed the appellants/respondents to initiate acquisition proceedings for the land utilized for the construction of road, within six weeks, after negativating the contention of the State Authorities-
Appellants herein regarding delay and laches. So far as second claim of the petitioner, for awarding or giving him alternative piece of Government land in Khara No.111, measuring 4 Marlas in lieu of his 6 Marlas of land in Khasra No.124 utilized by the State Authorities for construction of road, the plea was not accepted by Learned Single Judge with specific finding recorded in Para-4 of the judgment that there was no policy which permits the exchange of Government land in lieu of private land utilized for construction of road by the State Authorities. In this background, the writ petition was allowed only to the limited extent of directing the State Authorities
-Appellants herein to initiate acquisition proceedings for having utilized the land of the Respondent herein
-5- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) for construction of road in question.
PROCEEDINGS IN INSTANT LPA:
5. The judgment passed by the Learned Single Judge on 14.05.2024 has been assailed in Letters Patent Appeal by the State Authorities along with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 225 days in filing the accompanying appeal. Vide even date, the delay was condoned and CMP (M) No.268 of 2025 was allowed by this Court.
However, in view of the nature of the controversy involved, the instant appeal, LPA No 183 of 2025 was finally heard by this Court, at this stage itself.
CONTENTIONS BY STATE AUTHORITIES IN INSTANT APPEAL:
6. First contention of Learned State Counsel for the appellants is that the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024, passed by Learned Single Judge is contrary to the facts of law and is erroneous judgment.
The above contention of the appellants is misconceived for the reason that impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024 has been passed by the Learned
-6- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) Single Judge after discussing the factual matrix and the contentions raised and the legal mandate as applicable in the instant case. Thus, the contention of Learned State Counsel is misconceived and devoid of any merit.
7. Second contention of Learned State Counsel is that the road was constructed during the years 1984-1985 and the writ petitioner-respondent had offered the land for construction of road and had neither raised by objection for construction of road nor demanded any compensation at the relevant time. It is contended that respondent-writ petitioner had consented for construction of road and therefore, the impugned judgment directing initiation of acquisition proceedings for having utilized the land of the Respondent writ petitioner for construction of road is erroneous.
The above plea set up by Learned State Counsel is without any merit, for the reason, that the plea of consent cannot be presumed unless some evidence of consent either in the form of letter, writing or signatures or representation is placed
-7- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) on record. Plea of oral consent or no objection at the time of construction cannot be used as a tool to deprive the writ petitioner-respondent of his legitimate entitlements i.e. compensation and when, no such consent based on documentary evidence was placed on record by the State Authorities, before the writ court and even in LPA and thus the plea of consent stands negativated.
7(i). Plea as set-up in the instant appeal by the State Authorities denying claim for compensation by asserting that the land was utilized on the basis of oral consent of land owner-petitioner stands negated by the Full Bench of this Court, in Shankar Dass alias Shankru versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others in CWP No. 1966 of 2010-C decided on 2.3.2013 [2013 SCC OnLine HP 681], mandating that that the oral consent cannot be presumed until some evidence of consent either in form of letter, writing or signatures on a representation for construction of road was placed on record by the State Authorities therefore, in these circumstances, plea of oral consent is not tenable, in the following terms:
-8- ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
51. On the question of consent, I am of the considered view that after the judgement in Nokhia's case, quoted hereinabove, the State should not have constructed roads without taking consent in writing from the land owners. If the State did so, it did at its own peril. his Court had issued clear cut directions which have held the field since 1984 that the State should ensure that roads are constructed only after the land owners give informed consent.
52. Oral consent cannot be presumed in the case of poor persons or those living in rural or remote areas. In cases where parties are rich and educated and they do not approach this Court within a reasonable period, then the Writ Court may direct them to approach the Civil Court. But in cases where people are poor and uneducated, it would invariably be better to take a more liberal view.
53. The State also cannot plead consent or implied consent only on the basis that the road had been constructed. There must be some better evidence in this regard. If some evidence of consent, either in the form of letter, writing or signatures on a representation for construction of road, is placed before this Court, then this Court may not exercise its writ jurisdiction and direct the party to approach the Civil Court. But if the only sort of consent pleaded is the implied consent due to construction of road, then this Court may entertain the writ petition.
7(ii). Similar plea of divesting a land private owner of his lands and in utilizing it for the construction of road without paying compensation by taking the "plea of consent of land owner(s)" was repelled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar versus State of Himachal Pradesh
-9- ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) and others, SLP (C) No. 2373 of 2014 [arising from LPA No 285 of 2012], decided on 29.10.2015, in the following terms:
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Anil Nag, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court was in error in declining to intervene and grant relief prayed for by the appellant. It was submitted that the case of the appellant was no different from that of Kanwar Singh in whose case the High Court had not only issued a Mandamus for acquisition of the land utilised for the very same purpose but order so passed had been complied with by the State by not only initiating the proceedings but even determining and paying compensation lawfully due and payable to them. In the case of the appellant also the State had on its own initiated proceedings for acquisition of land but the said proceedings were allowed to lapse ostensibly because the road in question had subsequently been taken over under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna which did not provide for payment of compensation to the land owners whose lands were utilised for such projects. It was urged that the utilisation of the land for construction of the road was not in dispute before the High Court as was evident from the counter affidavit filed to the writ petition. There was therefore no question of directing the appellant to approach the Civil Court for adjudication of any disputed question of fact. It was also submitted that the transfer of the road to the Pradhan Mantri Sadak Yojna for maintenance etc. was no reason why the owners whose land had been utilised should have been denied the payment of compensation otherwise due to them. It was urged that the State had never claimed that the erstwhile owner of the land and the predecessor in interest of the appellant herein had made any formal or informal donation of the land in favour of the State to facilitate the construction of the road. In the absence of even an assertion that the road was constructed on the invitation of the erstwhile
- 10 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) owner, the High Court was in error in declining to grant relief to the appellant who had lost his valuable land and thereby the source of livelihood. The remedy in a civil court was neither speedy nor efficacious. It was urged that the appellant would be satisfied in case the actual extent of land utilised by the State out of his ownership is verified by the Collector and compensation determined in Kanwar Singh's case under Award No. 10 of 2008 directed to be paid to the appellant depending upon the classification of the land that has been utilised by the State Government. It is urged that the appellant would keeping in view the intervening delay give up his right to claim compensation for the user of the land without acquisition and payment of statutory interest recoverable on the said amount. This would according to the learned counsel not only serve the ends of justice but also prevent any further litigation in the matter. It was submitted that this Court could in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and with a view to giving a quietus to the entire controversy make a suitable order that would meet the ends of justice.
There is in our opinion considerable merit in the submission made by Mr. Nag. It is true that the appellant had approached the High Court rather belatedly inasmuch the land had been utilised sometime in the year 1985-86 while the writ petition was filed by the appellant in the year 2009. At the same time it is clear from the pleadings in the case at hand that the user of the land owned by the appellant is not denied by the State in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court or that filed before us. It is also evident from the averments made in the counter affidavit that the State has not sought any donation in its favour either by the appellant or his predecessor in interest during whose life time the road in question was constructed. All that is stated in the counter affidavit is that the erstwhile owner of the land "might have donated" the land to the State Government. In the absence
- 11 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) of any specific assertion regarding any such donation or documentary evidence to support the same, we are not inclined to accept the ipsit dixit suggesting any such donation. If that be so as it indeed is, we fail to appreciate why the State should have given up the land acquisition proceedings initiated by it in relation to the land of the appellant herein. The fact that the State Government had initiated such proceedings is not in dispute nor is it disputed that the same were allowed to lapse just because the road had in the meantime been taken under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna. It is also not in dispute that for the very same road the land owned by Kanwar Singh another owner had not only been notified for acquisition but duly paid for in terms of Award No. 10 of 2008.
7(iii). Plea of the State Authorities that the land was utilized on the basis of the oral consent given by land-owner(s) was negated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, which reads as under:
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction and without following due process of law and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had "orally"
consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State.
- 12 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
7(iv). In Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022)
7 SCC 508, {i.e. CA No 2773 of 2022}, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any material on record, the plea of verbal consent or the fact that the land owner did not raise any objection cannot be used to deny compensation, in the following terms:
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants' alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea.
Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner known to law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State's position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings.
22. This court is also not moved by the State's contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason-construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court's intervention under Article 226
- 13 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment. 7(v). The judgment in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) was again taken in Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 7253 of 2023 titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Sukh Dutt Ratra, resulting in dismissal of review petition on 03.08.2023 in the following terms:
Review Petition (Civil) Diary No 7253 /2023 "Delay condoned.
Instant petition has been filed by the petitioners for review of order dated 6.4.2022 passed by this Court in CA No 2773 of 2022.
Having carefully perused the petition for review and the papers connected therewith, we do not find any reason for reconsideration of the above mentioned order.
The Review petition is accordingly dismissed."
Thus, taking into account the material on record in the writ proceedings and even in instant Letters Patent Appeal, this Court is of the considered view, that the State Authorities have not placed any material on record to substantiate
- 14 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) the plea of verbal consent by writ petitioner(s)-
private land owner and in absence of any proof of "consent on the basis of cogent and concrete evidence-material" the action of the State Authorities in depriving the landowner-writ petitioner of his land(s) and in divesting a land owner of the right to get compensation for his lands but in utilizing such land for the construction of road, being without sanction of law does not stands the test of judicial scrutiny.
In absence of any material, contention of Learned State Counsel is misconceived on facts and also in view of the mandate of law in the case of Shankar Dass, Raj Kumar, Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra).
Thus, once the Appellants-State Authorities have not placed on record any material to substantiate the plea of consent or willingness by writ petitioner
-respondent at the time for construction of said road then, the aforesaid plea without being supported by any material on record cannot be used to deprive the petitioner of legal entitlement for compensation, admissible to him.
- 15 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
8. Third contention of Learned State Counsel is that claim for compensation was hit by principle of delay and laches.
The above contention of Learned State Counsel is devoid of any merit, for the reason, that after construction of road in question and awaiting initiation of land acquisition proceedings, which was an act to performed by the State Authorities under the Land Acquisition Statutes so as to enable the release of compensation, the writ petitioner-respondent had moved an application to revenue authorities on 15.01.2004, Annexure P-5, on the plea that once the State Authorities have utilized 6 Marlas of his land situated in Khasra No.124 for construction of road in question then, the writ petitioner-respondent may be given Government land in exchange in Khasra No.111. The application dated 15.01.2004, Annexure P-5, was forwarded by Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Bhoranj to District Collector Hamirpur on 07.01.2005, which is borne out from report of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Bhoranj dated 18.2.2005 Annexure P-3 with the writ file. Material on record with the writ
- 16 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) file reveals that even the Sub-Divisional Officer [Civil], Bhoranj has sent a communication to the Collector Hamirpur, Annexure P-6, for considering his case for exchange of land as per report of the revenue staff. Ultimately, on 30.05.2022, Annexure P-9, District Revenue Officer on behalf of the Collector Hamirpur rejected the case of petitioner for exchange of private land utilized for construction of road with other Government land. Thus, once the case of petitioner was rejected on 30.05.2022, Annexure P-9, denying benefit of exchange of land, awaiting the initiation of acquisition proceedings by State and therefore, the writ petition filed after passing of rejection orders on 02.12.2022, on facts, does not suffer any delay and laches.
The plea of delay and laches as put-forth by Learned State Counsel needs to be examined from another angle also. Once it is an admitted case of the State Authorities-Appellants that they had utilized 6 Marlas of land situated in Khasra No 124 in Mohal Tan-Amroh, Tehsil Bhoranj, District Hamirpur and further admitted in the communication
- 17 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) dated 24.08.2021, Annexure P-4, that the road, Amroh-Chandruhi was constructed by State and after construction of road, this road has been marked as Gair Mumkin Sadak as per Jamabandi for the years 2017-2018, therefore, in these circumstances once the land of the writ petitioner stood utilized then, deprivation of compensation cannot be defeated by invoking the defense of delay and laches or limitation when, the deprivation of compensation relates to a continuing cause of action and denial of compensation, certainly shocks the conscious of this Court as the writ petitioner-respondent has been deprived of his legal entitlement by the State Authorities
-Appellants.
8(i). Repelling the contention of delay and laches or limitation the Hon'ble Supreme Court mandated that the defence of delay and laches or limitation will not apply, if the case relates to a continuing cause of action or if circumstances shocks the conscious of the Court while exercising constitutional jurisdiction so as to do substantial justice in Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and
- 18 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, in the following terms:
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, of if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights and the remedy claimed and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
8(ii). Negativating the contention of delay and laches in case a person was forcibly dispossessed of private property without following due process of law and by mandating that there cannot be a limitation for doing justice the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508 after following the mandate in the case of Vidya Devi (supra), in the following terms:
"16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while
- 19 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) acquiring land, the question remains- can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness."
[Emphasis supplied]
22. This court is also not moved by the State's contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason-construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court's intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment.
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case.
8(iii). A coordinate Division Bench of this Court based on the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi, Vidya
- 20 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) had outlined in LPA No. 54 of 2017, In re: State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar and other connected matters decided on 27.3.2024 that the objection regarding limitation or delay and laches cannot be permitted to come in the way so as render do substantial justice when, the action of forcible deprivation of private land owner from his property was without sanction of law resulting in expropriation of property by the State, resulting in a continuing cause of action and/or such act shocks the judicial conscience in the following terms:
10. It is now trite law that in dealing with constitutional rights in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, one can no longer apply mutatis mutandis, the time frame stipulated in limitation law as if they were attracted. The issue has been dealt with time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, particularly in the context of land acquisition.
11. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power-of-Attorney Holder versus Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others (2013) 1 SCC 353 ("Tukaram"), the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to property could not be defeated on technical grounds citing delay. Though, in the case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 ("Digambar") the Hon'ble Supreme Court had denied relief to farmers on the ground of delay, but delay was not simply declared to be an absolute bar on filing of a writ petition.
- 21 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
12. It cannot be disputed that while deciding Tukaram's case (supra), Digambar's case (supra) had not been noticed, but the same was later noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a fairly recent case of Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 ("Sukh Dutt Ratra") wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with a number of its judgments to emphasis that there can be no "limitation" to do justice if it is clear that the right to property has been intruded into without due process of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repelled the citation of delay and laches in enforcement of the constitutional right to property in land.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, as observed above, has considered the case of Digambar.
13. Thus, the law as stands today is that the State cannot, on the ground of delay and laches, evade its responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated. In any case, what principles a Court must apply while assessing whether a writ petition is so hopelessly barred by delays and laches that a remedy is not worthy of consideration, is well articulated in Maharashtra SRTC versus Balwant Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329 and these principles stand extracted and endorsed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra's case (supra) wherein it was held as under:
"16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains-can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.
- 22 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State's actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court's directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC Online HP 220) and 20.12.2013 (in Onkar Singhvs. State, CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way-as contended by both sides in the present dispute-however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a 'limitation' to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case-Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (1969) 1 SCR 808, held:
"11......Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
- 23 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."
14. By now, it is well settled that right to property though no longer a fundamental right and is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save and except by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions. 8(iv). The judgment in Upender Kumar's case (supra) was taken by State Authorities in SLP (C) No. 49057 of 2024, titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar wherein, after cautioning the State Authorities with exemplary
- 24 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) costs, the SLP was dismissed on 22.11.2024, in the following terms:
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s).49057/2024
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 27-03-2024 in LPA No. 54/2017 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla] THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UPENDER KUMAR Respondent(s)
1. Delay condoned.
2. We have come across several matters wherein the State of Himachal Pradesh has challenged the orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, thereby directing the compensation to be paid to the respondent(s).
3. The writ petitioner(s) has approached the High Court with a grievance that though the possession of their lands were taken for road construction, they did not receive compensation.
4. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has held that the State cannot take possession of citizen land without paying the compensation.
5. Although the right to property is no longer considered a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right. The State cannot be permitted to acquire citizen land without paying appropriate compensation.
6. In these circumstances, it would have been justified in dismissing the special leave petition(s) with exemplary cost. However, we refrain from doing so now and simply dismiss these special leave petitions.
8(v). While dealing with a claim by landlord
- 25 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) for compensation, who was non suited on the ground of delay and laches, the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the compensation by negating the plea of delay and laches, so as to rectify injustice and moreso when, the right of an individual to vindicate and protect private property could not be brushed aside by invoking delay and laches in Urban Improvement Trust versus Vidhya Devi and others, Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024 decided on 13.12.2024 in the following terms:
45. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration:
(i) Whether the High Court committed any error in taking the view that the respondents herein should be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches?
46. As regards the appellant's challenge to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned.
47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as
- 26 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) follows:
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]"
[Emphasis supplied]
48. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated by this Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 7 SCC 508 wherein the court opined that there cannot be a 'limitation' to doing justice....".
50. This Court in its decision in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 held that:
"10. ... There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] "is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit.... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose". ...[ SCC para 11] ..."
(Emphasis supplied)
- 27 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases of acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in approaching the court, while a significant factor, cannot override the necessity to address illegalities and protect right to property enshrined in Article 300A. The court must balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the need to rectify injustice. The right of an individual to vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of delay and laches.
{Emphasis Ours}
Based on the factual matrix and the
legal mandate as discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that once the State Authorities have curtailed the constitutional right of the writ petitioner i.e. by forcibly depriving him of his property without sanction of law and in depriving such land owner of the compensation by utilizing the land of writ petitioner, even though for a public purpose i.e. construction of road. This action of State Authorities has certainly resulted in civil consequences, by depriving the land owner-writ petitioner of his right to reap the benefits accruing from his land resulting in recurring loss and this action has shocked the conscience of this Court. In these circumstances,
- 28 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) the plea of delay and laches cannot be permitted to be raised by the State so as to safeguard the rights of writ petitioner so as to rectify injustice and to enable the writ petitioner to get compensation for his land, from which he was forcibly and illegally dispossessed in the teeth of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, in facts of this case, the plea of delay and laches needs to be brushed aside so as to rectify injustice and to render substantial justice to the writ petitioner. Accordingly, the contention of Learned State Counsel based on delay and laches does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and the same is rejected.
9. Fourth contention of Learned State Counsel is that the judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 has not been considered by the Learned Single Judge is misconceived when, the Learned Single Judge had referred to the judgment in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra), wherein, the judgment in Digambar's case (supra) as discussed in the case of Vidya Devi (supra) was relied upon and based on the aforesaid
- 29 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) judgment(s), the plea of delay and laches was negated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the contention of Learned State Counsel does not stand test of judicial scrutiny and is accordingly turned down.
10. Fifth contention of Learned State Counsel is that the judgment in case of Rajiv versus State of Himachal Pradesh has not been considered by the Learned Single Judge.
The above contention is contrary to the records, when no such judgment was made part of reply affidavit before the writ Court and even, in instant appeal, no such judgment has been referred and relied upon during the hearing today. Even on a query by this Court, Learned State Counsel was unable to point out the aforesaid judgment, as quoted in grounds of appeal today.
11. Last contention of Learned State Counsel is that the writ petitioner-respondent did not raise the claim for compensation and, therefore, plea for compensation could not have been acceded to by the Learned Single Judge while passing the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024.
- 30 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) The above plea of Learned State Counsel is misconceived and devoid of any merit for the reason that writ petitioner-respondent could not have been deprived of his property, saved by authority of law, in view of the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Merely by an executive fiat and without there being any specific legal authority or sanctity of law, made by competent legislature, the action of State Authorities in depriving the writ petitioner-respondent of his property and that too in an unlawful and unfair manner and without any sanctity of law cannot be a ground for denying compensation to the writ petitioner, for having utilized his 6 Marlas of land for construction of road, situated in Khasra No 124, is admitted by the State Authorities, by reflecting this constructed road, on the land of writ petitioner as Gair Mumkin Sadak, in the revenue records i.e. Jamabandi for years 2017-2018, which is borne out from the writ records, Annexure P-1.
12. Based on the principle of eminent domain at relevant time, Article 30(1-A) and provisos to
- 31 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) Article 31-A (1) of the Constitution of India recognized the right to property and the right of a person to acquire, hold and dispose of property was conferred the status of a fundamental right. However, keeping in view the directive principles of state policy, the right of property which was a fundamental right, after the enactment of the 44th amendment in 1978, introducing Article 300-A in the Constitution of India mandating that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law" was recognized as a "constitutional right".
12(i). Consequent upon being recognized as a constitutional right, a question arose as to whether a person can be deprived of his property, save by authority of law under Article 300-A, merely by an executive fiat but without any specific legal authority or without sanctity of law made by a competent legislature was answered by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. T. Plantation Private Limited and another vs State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 01 mandating that the deprivation of property under Article 300-A
- 32 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) must be for a public purpose and the same cannot be by an executive fiat but such deprivation can take place only by operation of law, which has to be lawful, fair and which does not undermine the rule of law, failing which any such law shall be subject to judicial review, in the following terms:
168. Article 300-A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of law made by a competent legislature. The expression 'Property' in Art. 300-A confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognised by law.
169. This Court in State of W. B. & Others v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd & Another (2002) 4 SCC 134, while examining the provisions of the West Bengal Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980, held in the context of Article 300-A that the State or executive offices cannot interfere with the right of others unless they can point out the specific provisions of law which authorizes their rights.
170. Article 300-A, therefore, protects private property against executive action. But the question that looms large is as to what extent their rights will be protected when they are sought to be illegally deprived of their properties on the strength of a legislation. Further, it was also argued that the twin requirements of 'public purpose' and 'compensation' in case of deprivation of property are inherent and essential elements or ingredients, or "inseparable concomitants" of the power of eminent domain and, therefore, of
- 33 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) entry 42, List III, as well and, hence, would apply when the validity of a statute is in question.
171. On the other hand, it was the contention of the State that since the Constitution consciously omitted Article 19 (1) (f), Articles 31(1) and 31(2), the intention of the Parliament was to do away the doctrine of eminent domain which highlights the principles of public purpose and compensation.
172. Seervai in his celebrated book 'Constitutional Law of India' (Edn. IV), spent a whole Chapter XIV on the 44th Amendment, while dealing with Article 300A. In paragraph 15.2 (pages 1157-1158) the author opined that confiscation of property of innocent people for the benefit of private persons is a kind of confiscation unknown to our law and whatever meaning the word "acquisition" may have does not cover "confiscation" for, to confiscate means "to appropriate to the public treasury (by way of penalty)". Consequently, the law taking private property for a public purpose without compensation would fall outside Entry 42 List III and cannot be supported by another Entry in List III.
173. Requirements of a public purpose and the payment of compensation according to the learned author be read into Entry 42 List III. Further the learned author has also opined that the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) could have repercussions on other fundamental rights or other provisions which are to be regarded as part of the basic structure and also stated that notwithstanding the repeal of Article 31(2), the word "compensation" or the concept thereof is still retained in Article 30 (1A) and in the second proviso to Article 31A (1) meaning thereby, that payment of compensation is a condition of legislative power in Entry 42 List III.
174. Learned senior counsel Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, also referred to the opinion expressed by another learned author Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in his article "Right to Property after 44th Amendment -
Better Protected than Ever Before" (reported in AIR 1980 J pg. 49-52). Learned author expressed the opinion and the right of the individual to receive compensation when his property is acquired or requisitioned by the State, continues
- 34 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) to be available in the form of an implied condition of the power of the State to legislate on "acquisition or requisition of property" while all the exceptions and limitations set up against and around it in Article 31, 31A and 31B have disappeared. Learned author opined that Article 300-A will require obviously, that the law must be a valid law and no law of acquisition or requisitioning can be valid unless the acquisition or requisition is for a public purpose, unless there is provision in law for paying compensation, will continue to have a meaning given to it, by Bela Banerjee's case (supra).
175. Learned author, Shri S.B. Sathe, in his article "Right to Property after the 44th Amendment" (AIR 1980 Journal 97), to some extent, endorsed the view of Prof. Tripathi and opined that the 44th amendment has increased the scope of judicial review in respect of right to property. Learned author has stated although Article 300A says that no one shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, there is no reason to expect that this provision would protect private property only against executive action. Learned author also expresses the wish that Article 21 may provide viable check upon Article 300A.
176. Durga Das Basu in his book "Shorter Constitution of India", 13th Edition, dealt with Article 300A in Chapter IV wherein the learned author expressed some reservation about the views expressed by Seervai, as well as Prof. Tripathi Learned author expressed the view, that after the 44th amendment Act there is no express provision in the Constitution outside the two cases specified under Article 30(1A) and the second proviso to 31(1A) requiring the State to pay compensation to an expropriated owner. Learned author also expressed the opinion that no reliance could be placed on the legislative Entry 42 of List III so as to claim compensation on the touchstone of fundamental rights since the entry in a legislative list does not confer any legislative power but only enumerates fields of legislation.
177. Learned counsel on the either side,
- 35 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) apart from other contentions, highlighted the above views expressed by the learned authors to urge their respective contentions.
178. Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not seen incorporated in Article 300-A, as we see, in Article 30(1A), as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) though we can infer those principles in Article 300A. Provision for payment of compensation has been specifically incorporated in Article 30(1A) as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) for achieving specific objectives. Constitution's 44th Amendment Act, 1978 while omitting Article 31 brought in a substantive provision Clause (1A) to Article 30. Resultantly, though no individual or even educational institution belonging to majority community shall have any fundamental right to compensation in case of compulsory acquisition of his property by the State, an educational institution belonging to a minority community shall have such fundamental right to claim compensation in case State enacts a law providing for compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority community. Further, the second proviso to Article 31 A (1) prohibits the Legislature from making a law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate not less than the market value which follows that a law which does not contain such provision shall be invalid and the acquisition proceedings would be rendered void.
179. Looking at the history of the various constitutional amendments, judicial pronouncements and the statement of objects and reasons contained in the 44th Amendment Bill which led to the 44th Amendment Act we have no doubt that the intention of the Parliament was to do away with the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property. But the question is whether the principles of eminent domain are completely obliterated when a person is deprived of his property by the authority of law under Article 300 A of the Constitution.
- 36 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
Public purpose
180. Deprivation of property within the
meaning of Art. 300-A, generally speaking, must take place for public purpose or public interest. The concept of eminent domain which applies when a person is deprived of his property postulates that the purpose must be primarily public and not primarily of private interest and merely incidentally beneficial to the public. Any law, which deprives a person of his private property for private interest, will be unlawful and unfair and undermines the rule of law and can be subjected to judicial review. But the question as to whether the purpose is primarily public or private, has to be decided by the legislature, which of course should be made known.
12(ii). Another question arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Plantation (supra) as to whether a person who is deprived of property for public purpose is entitled to get compensation has to be justified by the State on judicially justifiable standards depending upon the law formulated by a State, which has to be just, fair and reasonable. In case, State enactment provides for acquiring a private property for public purpose for no compensation or nil compensation then, the Court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law, as mandated in the following terms:
183. Payment of compensation amount is a constitutional requirement under Article 30(1A) and under the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1),
- 37 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) unlike Article 300A. After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300-A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property, but the question is whether a person is entitled to get compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of his property.
189. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the state on judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors.
190. Article 300A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorizing deprivation of property have not been complied with. While enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) [the "Rule of law" doctrine] and not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable.
It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive.
191. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300A must be "just,
- 38 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) fair and reasonable" as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
192. At this stage, we may clarify that there is a difference between "no" compensation and "nil" compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that "no compensation shall be paid". However, there could be a law awarding "nil" compensation in cases where the State undertakes to discharge the liabilities charged on the property under acquisition and onus is on the government to establish validity of such law. In the latter case, the court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind the above parameters.
198. Article 300 A, unlike Articles 31A(1) and 31C, has not made the legislation depriving a person of his property immune from challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but let us first examine whether Article 21 as such is available to challenge a statute providing for no or illusory compensation and, hence, expropriatory.
12(iii). Reference in the case of K. T. Plantation (supra) was answered by the Supreme Court mandating that public purpose is a pre-condition for depriving a person from his property under Article 300-A and right to claim compensation is also inbuilt under that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify such deprivation on
- 39 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) the basis of the statute or legislative policy and its object and purpose and other related factors. 12(iv). The judgment in K. T. Plantation's case was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Association of Vasanth Apartments' Owners versus V. Gopinath and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 137, Civil Appeal No. 1890-91 of 2010, decided on 13.02.2023 that illegal deprivation is attracted where a person is deprived of his property, in case of "no compensation" in the following terms:
118. The Court also reiterated the distinction between 'no compensation' and 'Nil compensation', as laid down in K.T. Plantations (supra). The Court proceeded to find that it was a case of 'no compensation' at all, and therefore, it attracted the vice of illegal deprivation of property and gave relief on the said basis.
This is after finding that the property in question was a productive asset.
144. An acquisition is a compulsory vesting of the property of a person with the state. It is traceable undoubtedly to the power of eminent domain assured to every sovereign. It can undoubtedly be exercised only for securing public interest as contrasted with promotion of private interest (See K.T. Plantation (supra).
145. K.T. Plantations (supra) was a case which involved the validity of a law which provided for compulsory acquisition under the State enactment. The understanding of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra) was that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by executive fiat without any specific legal authority or without support of law made
- 40 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) by a competent Legislature. We must notice here that law for the scope of Article 300A has been explained by this Court in Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others as follows:
"41. There still remains the question whether the seizure of wheat amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. It is, therefore, necessarily subject to Article 300-A. The word "law"
in the context of Article 300-A must mean an Act of Parliament or of a State legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or State made law. The decisions in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [AIR 1954 SC 415: (1955) 1 SCR 408 : 1954 SCJ 600 : 1954 Cri LJ 1029] and Bishan Das v. State of Punjab [AIR 1961 SC 1570 : (1962) 2 SCR 69 : (1963) 1 SCJ 405] are an authority for the proposition that an illegal seizure amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law.....".
146. What this Court in K. T. Plantations (supra) meant was to distinguish 'law' as a legislative measure as distinct from mere Executive fiat.
12(v). Right for compensation in case the property of a private owner is utilized by the State has been answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
- 41 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) Ultra-tech Cement Limited versus Mast Ram and others, (2025) 1 SCC 798, Civil Appeal No. 10662 of 2024 decided on 20.09.2024 in the following terms:
52. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired.
When such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation /awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. 12(vi). Recently Hon'ble Supreme Court in JT 2025 (1) SC 41 titled as Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others, decided on 02.01.2025, has outlined that where a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. While reinforcing that the right of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated that deprivation of property without any authority amounts to violation of human rights in a welfare State. It has further been stated that it is the bounden duty / obligation of the State Authority
- 42 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) to ensure that individuals whose lands have been utilized are paid compensation along with admissible benefits. Deprivation of compensation and benefits amounts to denying the legitimate dues to the land owners as in this case. The relevant portion of this judgment reads as under:
"33. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case observed that it is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. It can further be seen that this Court held that the acquisition notification therein failed to meet the statutory mandate and that it was vague. It was further held that the least that was required was that the acquisition notification therein should have let the person whose land was sought to be acquired know what he was going to lose. It was, therefore, held that the acquisition notification was not in accordance with law.
42. Right to Property ceased to be a Fundamental Right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continues to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution.
43. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law.
46. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. (supra), this Court further observed that acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired It was therefore, observed that when such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquire are paid
- 43 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest.
48. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago. It can also not be controverted that money is what money buys. The value of money is based on the idea that money can be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of money decreases over time due to inflation. What the appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with promptitude.
49. We find that in the present case, the appellants were required to knock at the doors of the courts on number of occasions during the period of last twenty-two years. The appellants have been deprived of their property without paying any compensation for the same in the said period of last twenty-two years. As already discussed hereinabove, the appellants had purchased the plots in question for construction of residential houses. Not only have they not been able to construct, but they have also not been even paid any compensation for the same. As discussed hereinabove though Right to Property is no more a fundamental right, in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, it is a constitutional right. A person cannot be deprived of his property without him being paid adequate compensation in accordance with law for the same."
The intent and object of Article 300-A having been outlined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.T. Plantation, V. Gopinath, Ultra-tech Cement Limited and in Bernard Francis (supra), this Court on the basis of existing material on record is of the considered view, that the appellant-State Authorities
- 44 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) have not pointed out any law enacted by State Legislature empowers the State to divest a person of his land without paying compensation. In absence of any statute having been enacted by State [which has not placed before this Court], the action of the State Authorities in divesting the Writ petitioner- Amar Singh of his private property and by utilizing his land(s) for construction of Amroh to Panchruhi road is an act unbecoming of a model state and the same is deprecated.
In these circumstances, the State Authorities cannot by way of an executive fiat divest the writ petitioner-Amar Singh of his private land(s), without his consent and without paying compensation and by utilizing such land for construction of road in question, and such expropriation of property, by the State, without sanction of law visits a landowner with civil consequences, depriving him of the right to use his own property and action confers a continuing cause to a landowner to claim compensation. Even the whimsical and anarchical manner of depriving the landowner-writ petitioner
- 45 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) of property and right of compensation shocks the conscience of this Court. Accordingly, the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge after noticing the material on record and the factual and the legal aspects-herein, does not require any interference in instant appeal.
13. While dealing with a similar claim for compensation for having utilized the land of a land owner, a Coordinate Division Bench of this Court has negativated the claim of State Authorities- Appellants and has mandated that compensation for land utilized deserves to be given to the land owners in terms of the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge in respective cases in LPA No 154 of 2024 titled as State of HP & ors. Versus Sohan Lal and LPA No 303 of 2024, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & ors. Versus Vishal Kumar & ors, reads as under:-
LPA No.154 of 2024
"3 We have heard learned Additional Advocate General and have also gone through the judgment passed on 3rd August, 2023 in CWP No. 3679 of 2022.
4 These grounds have been considered and dealt with by learned Single Judge in the
- 46 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Umed Ram Sharma (1986)2 SCC 468; State of Maharashtra vs.Digambar (1995)4 SCC 683; Vidya Devi vs. State of HP and others (2020) 2 SCC 569; Hari Krishana Mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra & others (2020) 9 SCC 356; Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508; Civil Appeal No. 1278 of 2023 titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Rajiv and another, decided on 24.2.2023 as well as judgments passed by this High Court on 18.7.2023 in CWP No. 8647 of 2022 titled as Ramanand and others vs. State of HP and others; dated 27.7.2023 passed in CWP No 5928 of 2022 titled Vir Sain vs. State of HP and others and in Shankar Dass vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, CWP No. 1966 of 2010 decided on 2.3.2013, has allowed the petition.
5 In similar matters, identical appeals have been dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court passed in LPA No. 40 of 2024 titled State of HP vs. Ramesh Kumar decided on 27th February, 2024; LPA No. 24 of 2019 titled as State of HP vs. Baldev Singh and others decided on 27th March, 2024; LPA No. 144 of 2024 titled State of HP vs. Karam Singh decided on 27th May, 2024; and LPA No. 151 of 2024 titled State of HP vs. Prem Nath decided on 12th June, 2024, by referring the judgment of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 10492 of 2023, titled Dharnidhar Mishre (D) and another vs. State of Bihar and others, and Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024, titled Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Anr. vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others.
6 Learned Additional Advocate General is not able to point out any ground indicating that present case is not squarely covered by aforesaid verdicts of the Court. 7 In aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or any other perversity in the impugned judgment. Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits.
- 47 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) 8 We consider it fit to record that State is
preferring the appeals despite dismissal of their similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy adopted by the State of HP which is causing wasting the time and energy of the State as well as the Court. It may invite imposing cost but taking lenient view, no cost is being imposed.
9 Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with direction that consequential action, in terms of judgment dated 03.08.2023 passed in CWP No. 3679 of 2022 be taken within four weeks.
Appeal stands disposed of along with all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any."LPA No.154 of 2024
"3. It is undisputed that land of the petitioner was utilized by the State for construction of road namely "Pangan to Shangcher" through the Public Works Department in the years 1992-93 and petitioner had approached the Court seeking direction to the respondents to pay compensation for the land utilized for construction of aforesaid road.
5. It is also pertinent to record here that vide judgment dated 27.05.2024, passed in LPA No .144 of 2024 and judgment dated 27.02.2024 passed in LPA No.40 of 2024, similar appeals preferred by the respondents-State were dismissed by the Division Benches of this Court by referring judgment of this High Court in LPA No. 24 of 2019, titled as State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Baldev Singh & Ors. as well as judgment of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.10492 of 2023, Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and others and in Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024, Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others.
6. Learned Additional Advocate General is not able to point out any ground indicating that present case is not squarely covered by aforesaid verdicts of the Court.
- 48 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
7. In aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or any other perversity in the impugned judgment. Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits.
8. We considered it fit to record here that State is preferring appeals despite dismissal of their similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy adopted by the State of Himachal Pradesh, which is causing wastage of time and energy of the State as well as the Court. It may invite imposing cost, but taking lenient view no cost is being imposed.
9. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with direction that consequential action, in terms of judgment dated 08.08.2023, passed in CWP No.2929 of 2021 along with connected matter, be taken within four weeks from today. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."
14. Challenge to the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024 must fail, in view of the fact that writ petitioner-respondent had filed LPA No.228 of 2024, assailing the impugned judgment and this LPA was decided on 29.08.2024 laying challenge to the impugned judgment, disallowing the claim for exchange the land owned by the writ petitioner- respondent which was utilized for construction of land in Khasra No.124 with Government land in Khasra No.111 as the plea for exchange without there being any policy for exchange was not tenable.
- 49 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) However, the findings recorded by Learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024, entitled writ petitioner-respondent for compensation for that land which was utilized by the State Authorities-Appellants for the construction of road in terms of Para-3 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under:-
"3. The learned Single Judge had considered the said notification and expressed a view that the said notification is not applicable. He also held that as per the said notification, the land, if any, allotted under the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968, can be exchanged, but certainly by applying the aforesaid notification, no order can be issued to the respondents to accede to the request made by the appellant for exchange of his private land with that of Government land. The learned Single Judge held that since there is no dispute that the land comprised in Khasra no.124, measuring 06 Marlas was utilized by the respondents for construction of a road, the appellant is only entitled to compensation under the law relating to Land Acquisition for that land, but he cannot claim Government land in exchange in lieu of the land used for construction of road in question."
Thus, once the findings of Learned Single Judge recorded in the impugned judgment dated 14.05.2024 have been affirmed in LPA No. 228 of 2024, titled as Amar Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, qua the entitlement for
- 50 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 ) compensation, for having utilized his land and these findings have attained finality then, instant appeal, challenging the judgment in instant proceedings is not permissible.
15. A similar issue raising the identical contentions stands decided by this Court in LPA No.68 of 2025, tilted as State of Himachal Pradesh and others vs Charan Dass, decided on 01.03.2005, in the following terms:-
"14. Based on the factual matrix and the mandate of law as discussed hereinabove, this Court does not find any merit in the contentions advanced by the Learned State Counsel, in the instant appeal which are just a reiteration of the pleas taken by the appellate-State Authorities before the Writ Court. Accordingly, the contentions of Learned State Counsel for appellants, are without merit and the same are accordingly turned down.
16. Before parting with this case, this Court observe that State Authorities have been filing appeals notwithstanding the fact that benefit of acquisition and/or compensation for utilization of lands of landowner(s) by the State Authorities in identical cases stands implemented. Yet, filing of instant appeal reveals a sorry state of affairs, for which this Court would have imposed exemplary costs. However, without observing further and by refraining ourselves, this Court hopes and trust that State Authorities shall follow its litigation policy in letter and spirit hereinafter, failing which we shall be constrained to levy exemplary costs which shall be liable to be paid by the officer concerned.
In aforesaid terms, the letters patent
appeal is dismissed in limine and pending
- 51 - ( 2025:HHC:11450 )
miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of accordingly."
16. No other points are pressed.
17. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant Letters Patent Appeal, is devoid of any merit and is dismissed in the following terms:-
(i) The impugned judgment passed by Learned Single Judge in CWP No. 9090 of 2024, titled as Amar Singh vs State of Himachal Pradesh & others, decided on 14.05.2024 is upheld;
(ii) State Authorities-Appellants are directed to initiate the acquisition proceedings for awarding compensation for having utilized the land(s) of the writ petitioner-respondent herein [Amar Singh]; with directions to complete the entire process expeditiously ;
(iii) No order as to costs.
In aforesaid terms, the instant appeal is dismissed in limine and all pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(G.S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma)
Chief Justice Judge
April 21, 2025
[Bhardwaj]