Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sultan Mohammad Mansoori vs Union Of India on 28 April, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662
1 WP-21020-2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 28th OF APRIL, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 21020 of 2011
SULTAN MOHAMMAD MANSOORI
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Praveen Dubey - Advocates for the petitioner.
Shri Ashish Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents.
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed assailing the order dated 20.05.2010 (Annexure P/3) passed by respondent No.4 i.e. the disciplinary authority whereby major penalty of 'removal from service' has been imposed against the petitioner. The petitioner is further aggrieved by the order dated 25.02.2011 (Annexure P/2) passed by respondent No.3 i.e. the appellate authority whereby his appeal has been rejected. Challenge is also made to the order dated 09.09.2011 (Annexure P/1) whereby the revision petition preferred by the petitioner has been rejected.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was initially appointed on the post of Constable under the respondent-department on 21.01.1976. Considering his exemplary service record, vide order dated 07.03.2001, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Head Constable and thereafter, vide order dated Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 2 WP-21020-2011 23.03.2001, he was posted at Bhopal Division. He has rendered 33 years of unblemished service career in the respondent-department but thereafter he faced his removal order. He has never been punished or visited with any other departmental enquiry or any complaint against him. He was rewarded three times for his exemplary performance and was known for his strict discipline and devotion towards his duty. It is submitted that a complaint was made against the petitioner by one Smt. Uma Jatav for committing assault and abuse on her with respect to an incident that took place on 08.08.2009 when the petitioner was posted as escorting officer in Damoh-Sagar Railway route. While he was escorting in Train No. 8235-DN, an illegal vendor who was selling groundnuts was found by the petitioner. The petitioner seized his groundnut basket for further action. Complainant Raju Jatav ran away.
Returning from the next train, Raju Jatav along with his wife Smt. Uma Jatav (another illegal vendor) came to the petitioner started abusing him and the incident took place. On the report made by Smt. Uma Jatav, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the office of Inspector, Railway Police Force, Sagar. After recording of statements in the preliminary enquiry of Raju Jatav & Smt. Uma Jatav and other witnesses, the preliminary report was submitted on 19.08.2009 to the respondent No.4, holding petitioner to be guilty of violation of Rules 146.2(i), 146.4 and 146.8(b) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (for short 'Rules of 1987') and the recommendations were made for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him.
3. Accordingly, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 26.08.2009 in terms of Rule 153 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 levelling Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 3 WP-21020-2011 five charges against him. A reply to the same was submitted by the petitioner. Inquiry Officer proceeded against the petitioner and recorded statements of as many as 10 witnesses on behalf of prosecution including that of Raju Jatav and his wife Smt. Uma Jatav (injured/victim). They categorically stated before the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner has not misbehaved with them nor she has received any injury. They further stated that no demand was made by him at any point of time. After conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the inquiry report was submitted on 09.03.2010 holding that Charge No.1 not found proved against the petitioner and Charges No.2 to 5 were found proved against him. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 20.05.2010 was passed, whereby the petitioner has been given penalty of 'removal from service'. On appeal and subsequent revision, the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 20.05.2010 was affirmed. The said order has been put to challenge on the ground that the disciplinary authority has shown its disagreement with the inquiry report with respect to Charge No.1; however, the procedure as contemplated under the Rules of 1987 had not been followed by the authority. No show cause notice was issued to the petitioner informing him regarding proposed action to be taken against him with respect to Charge No.1.
4. It is submitted that recording of findings with respect to Charges No.2 to 5 is based upon no evidence as the entire action has been taken based upon the complaint made by Smt. Uma Jatav with respect to the incident said to have taken place on 08.08.2009. Smt. Uma Jatav and her husband Raju Jatav have categorically deposed before the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner has Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 4 WP-21020-2011 not misbehaved with them. The petitioner has not caused any injury to them nor there was any demand of bribery by him. It is argued that statement of Smt. Uma Jatav being the injured reflects that she was specifically asked that why she is taking a somersault from the statement made during the preliminary enquiry and now denying the allegations. She has categorically stated that it was on account of anger and anguish against the petitioner as the petitioner while on duty has seized the groundnuts basket from her husband Raju Jatav, therefore, under anger, the said statement was given. Both the witnesses have further stated that they are not giving the statements under any coercion or pressure or threatening from anyone. The said aspect was never considered by the Inquiry Officer and has directly hold Charges No.2 to 5 proved against the petitioner.
5. It is pointed out that one of the charges levelled against the petitioner is with respect to not taking any action against the illegal vendors. The fact remains that as soon as the petitioner caught hold of Raju Jatav who was selling groundnuts illegally, he immediately reported the matter to the Headquarters at Sagar and when the train reached Sagar, the matter was registered at GRP Post Sagar, therefore, the aforesaid allegation/charge levelled against the petitioner was incorrect.
6. It is argued that even if for the sake of arguments, it is seen that the petitioner while on duty has found some illegal vendors in the running train and has caught hold of one of them and has seized the basket being a routine part of the duty and owing to the fact that the groundnuts vendors had a scuffle with the petitioner and the matter was reported to the authorities then, Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 5 WP-21020-2011 by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioner has misbehaved with them, as there was no material evidence available on record pertaining to the same. In the light of the statements made by the complainant that under anger, she has given such a statement coupled with the fact that there is no medical report regarding the injuries sustained by her, the punishment of 'removal from service' being on higher side and disproportionate to the act committed by the petitioner if any. To buttress the contentions, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of M.V. Bijlani vs Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88, S.P. Malhotra vs Punjab National Bank, (2013) 7 SCC 251, Union of India vs Ram Lakhan Sharma, (2018) 7 SCC 670, Nirmala J. Jhala vs State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301 as well as by this Court in the cases of Dev Vrat Mishra vs State of M.P. 2016 SCC OnLine MP 10774 and Surender Singh vs State of M.P. : Writ Petition No. 5652 of 2010 decided on 27.03.2025.
7. Counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that the charges levelled against the petitioner are inter-connected as they are virtually arising out of the same incident which took place on 08.08.2009, therefore, it cannot be said that different charges were levelled against the petitioner. On these grounds, it is prayed for that impugned orders be quashed.
8. Per contra, counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions and denied the petition's averments by filing a detailed reply. It is submitted that it is a matter of imposition of punishment against a delinquent employee after conclusion of departmental enquiry. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity to participate in the inquiry Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 6 WP-21020-2011 proceedings which he has done. Interference in cases of departmental enquiry is limited to the extent of procedural flaw. There cannot be any reappreciation of evidence at this stage. In terms of the argument with respect to disagreement of the disciplinary authority with a finding of the Inquiry Officer with respect to Charge No.1 is concerned, it is argued that in terms of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987, with reference to Rule 153 thereof which provides for procedure for imposing major punishments, and Rules 154.5, 146, 146.2, 146.4 & 146.8 thereof, the disciplinary authority is competent to record its own findings and arrive at a conclusion after going through the records. He has read over the relevant provisions to substantiate his arguments. It is submitted that the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of 'removal from service' which was subsequently challenged in appeal and the same was affirmed vide order dated 25.02.2011 and thereafter, by the revisional authority vide order dated 09.09.2011, therefore, there are concurrent findings recorded by three authorities with respect to guilt of the petitioner. This Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and reappreciate the entire evidence. It is only the procedural error which can be looked into by this Court while dealing with the cases of imposition of punishment after a detailed departmental enquiry in the matter. Placing reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 and Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force vs Rajendra Kumar Dubey, (2021) 14 SCC 735 wherein, while dismissing the claim of the delinquent employee, it has been observed that "a police officer in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 7 WP-21020-2011 Railway Protection Force is required to maintain high standard of integrity in the discharge of his official functions and it shall be the duty of every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. The primary object of constituting the Railway Protection Force is to secure better protection and security of the railway property", as also of this Court in Mahendra Singh Chauhan vs Northern Central Railway : WP No. 9653 of 2021 decided on 20.02.2025, he has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. There is no dispute with respect to the incident which took place on 08.08.2009 when the petitioner was posted in the escorting staff in Damoh- Sagar Railway route. The complaint was made by Smt. Uma Jatav with respect of committing assault and hurling of abuses and snatching of groundnuts basket from her husband Raju Jatav and demanding bribe of Rs. 60/-. After conduction of the preliminary enquiry, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner, levelling five charges which are reproduced below:
... ी सुलतान मोह मद मसूर , धान आर क, यूआईएन नं. 7500292 (वे ट नं. 116) (वतमान मे िनलं बत) तैनाती सागर पो ट वतमान म अटै च व र मंडल सुर ा आयु रजव कंपनी जबलपुर ने रे ल सुर ा बल पो ट सागर म एसीपी क रोकथान डयूट पर काय करते हुये:-
1. एक अवैध म हला वे डर से उसे अनुिचत लाभ पहुचाने के एवज मे धनरािश क मांग क अत: उ बल सद य (िनलं बत) ने अपने िनजी अिभलाभ के िलए बल सद य म अपने थित का अनुिचत प से योग कया।
2. उ अवैध म हला वे डर जो कत य के िन पादन के दौरान बल सद य उ (िनलं बत) के स पक मे आई, के व धमक गालीगलौच एवं अनाव यक हं सा का योग कर बल सद य के प मे अपने ािधकार का द ु पयोग कया।
3. उसके अपनी डयूट के दौरान रे ल प रसर मे अवैध वे डग कर रहे अवैध वे डरो के व कोई कानूनी कायवाह नह क , जो कत य क Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 8 WP-21020-2011 उपे ा है ।
4. दनांक 8.8.2009 को बल सद य उ (िनलं बत) क डयूट दौरान घ टत स पूण घटना म से शासन को अवगत नह कराकर शासन को अंधेरे म रखा।
5. े न मे एक म हला से अभ ता गाली-गलौज एवं मारपीट क एवं अवैध प से धनरािश क मांग क जससे जन साधारण के सम रे वे सुर ा बल क छ व धुिमल हुई। यह एक अ व ासजनक आचरण है ।
11. The petitioner replied to the charge sheet and denied the same, therefore, decision was taken to proceed against the petitioner in a departmental enquiry. During the course of disciplinary enquiry, the prosecution has recorded statements of 10 witnesses including that of Smt. Uma Jatav and her husband Raju Jatav. The Inquiry Officer found Charge No.1 not proved against the petitioner which deals with demand of bribe by him. The Inquiry Officer after going through the records as well as statements of witnesses has categorically observed that Charge No.1 is not found proved against the petitioner as is reflected from the inquiry report which is in the following terms :
जांच िन कष के मुख कारक : आरोप मांक 01 :- एक अवैध म हला वे डर से अनुिचत लाभ पहुँचने के एवज म धनरािश क मांग क । अत: उ बल सद य (िनलं वत) ने अपने िनजी अिभलाभ के िलए बल सद य के प म अपनी थित का अनुिचत प से योग कया।
...
पर तु घटना म मु य अिभयोजन गवाह पी डता PW-02, व PW-03, वभागीय जांच के दौरान दये अपने बयानो से साफ तौर पर मुकर गये है । दौराने वभागीय जांच पी डता उमा जाटव (PW-02) व राजू जाटव ने बताया क घटना ितिथ को धान आर क एस.एम. मंसरू ने उनसे पैसो क कोई मांग नह क थी। पर तु .आ. मंसरू ारा े न म मूॅगफली बेचने से मना करने व मूॅगफली क टोकर क िछना झपट म आई चोटो क वजह से ोध वस, दनांक 11.08.09 को अपने-अपने बयान म .आ. ी मंसरू ारा पैसे क मांग करना बता दया था। जो क गलत है । दौराने वभागीय जांच दोनो (PW-02, व PW-03) ने बताया क आ मंसरू कभी पैसे नह मांगते और ना ह घटना ितिथ को उनके ारा पैसे क मांग क गयी थी। दोनो ने यह भी बताया क वे यह बयान बना कसी दवाव, भय या लालच के दे रहे Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662
9 WP-21020-2011 है ।
मु य अिभयोजन गवाह पी डता PW-03, व PW-03 के बयानो के आधार पर आरोप मांक 01 क पु नह होती है ।
अत: आरोप मांक 01 िस नह पाया जाता है ।
12. The said finding recorded clearly shows that PW2 and PW3 i.e. Raju Jatav and his wife Uma Jatav have not supported Charge No.1 above. They have categorically made a statement that there was no demand of money by Head Constable S.M. Mansoori; on the contrary, they said that while they were illegally selling groundnuts, the petitioner asked them not to sell and seized the groundnuts basket and owing to which the complainant being angry has lodged the complaint regarding demand by money by the petitioner. They have further clarified that they were not giving the statements under any threat, coercion or pressure; they are voluntary giving their statements. The said aspect was not considered by the disciplinary authority and in the impugned order it is observed that there is a possibility that the witnesses have been won over by the petitioner as they have made specific allegations while their statements were recorded in preliminary inquiry, therefore, the disciplinary authority has shown its dissatisfaction with the finding recorded by the inquiry officer with respect to Charge No.1. However, the fact remains that if the disciplinary authority is dissatisfied with the finding recorded by the inquiry officer, then the procedure as contemplated under the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 is required to be followed.
13. Rule 153 of the Rules of 1987 deals with the procedure for imposing major punishments. The procedure as contemplated therein is similar to that provided under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 10 WP-21020-2011 & Appeal) Rules, 1965.
14. Rule 153.20 of the Rules of 1987 being relevant is reproduced below :
"If in the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed, he may record his findings on such charges:
Provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the party charged has admitted the facts constituting them and has had an opportunity of defending himself against them."
15. Rule 154 of the Rules of 1987 deals with 'Action on the Inquiry Report'. Rule 154.5 is relevant and reads as under:
154.5 The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.
16. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the disciplinary authority is having powers to record its own findings with respect to disagreement on any article of charge on the basis of the evidence available on record. The aforesaid provision does not provide for granting of another opportunity of hearing to a delinquent employee. No show cause notice is required to be given to him. The disciplinary authority is required to go through the entire record and can record its own reasons for disagreement.
17. Rule 154.7 of the Rules of 1987 envisages that "If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of evidence on record, is of the opinion that any of the major punishments should be imposed on the party charged, it shall make an order imposing such punishment and it shall not be necessary to give to the party charged any opportunity of making representation on the punishment Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 11 WP-21020-2011 proposed to be imposed."
18. Hence, there is no requirement for issuance of any show cause notice or granting any opportunity of hearing or making any representation on the punishment proposed to be imposed. The aforesaid aspect was considered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in WP No. 9653 of 2021 (Mahendra Singh Chauhan vs Northern Central Railway and others) decided by Gwalior Bench of this Court vide order 20.02.2025. Therefore, the argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel with respect to disagreement of disciplinary authority qua Charge No.1 is no help to the petitioner. The case laws which are relied upon by the petitioner are virtually on different facts and their services are governed by different set of Rules. In the instant case, there is Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 governing the services of the petitioner. The entire action has to be taken in terms of the aforesaid Rules, therefore, to the aforesaid extent, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
19. As far as participation of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry is concerned, there is no dispute with the fact that he duly participated in the departmental enquiry. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity in the departmental enquiry and the procedure as required in terms of Rules 153 and 154 of the Rules of 1987 was followed by the authorities, therefore, no interference could be made in the present case. In the writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot sit over as a reviewing authority and cannot enter into correctness of the factual aspects. The scope of interference in such cases is limited.
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Dubey Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 12 WP-21020-2011 (supra) has held as follows :
Discussion and analysis
21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record, and written submissions filed on their behalf.
21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant.
21.2. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723], a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however, interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. 21.3. These principles were further reiterated in State of A.P. v.
Chitra Venkata Rao [State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349]. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 13 WP-21020-2011 court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
21.4. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , RPF v. Sai Babu [RPF v. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 464] , Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 :
(2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha [Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 334 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 316] , these principles have been consistently followed.
21.5. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh [State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569] this Court has summed up the law in following words : (SCC para 37) "37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 14 WP-21020-2011 The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy -- deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain."
21.6. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 15 WP-21020-2011 38] , this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (SCC pp. 616-17, para
12) "(a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence."
21.7. In para 13 of the judgment [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , the Court held that : (P. Gunasekaran case [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v.
Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 16 WP-21020-2011 Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 :
(2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , SCC p. 617) "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
21.8. In the present case, there is no allegation of mala fides against the disciplinary authority i.e. Chief Security Commissioner, or lack of competence of the disciplinary authority in passing the order of compulsory retirement, or of a breach of the principles of natural justice, or that the findings were based on no evidence.
21.9. We find from the record of this case that the charges under Charges 1(b) and 1(c) have been concurrently found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority the Chief Security Commissioner, RPF and the Director General of the RPF Railway Board. The issue under Charge 1(b) was the non-registration of an FIR pertaining to a theft case of CST-9 plates of the Railways. The finding was that even though the respondent had prepared the FIR after conducting investigation, he did not sign the FIR, and thereafter proceeded on leave without sanction. As a consequence, the FIR was not registered, and the investigation got thwarted right at the threshold. After some delay, a second panchnama was prepared by Nirmal Toppo, who was the in- charge of RPF Thana, who visited the spot, and then registered the FIR. It is relevant to note that the High Court has not disturbed the finding with respect to Charge 1(b). 21.10. With respect to Charge 1(c), this charge was a case of a Special Report, which are covered by Rule 229 of the Railway Protection Rules which reads as under:
"229. Special Reports.--In cases of thefts registered at the post involving loss of booked consignments or railway material exceeding the value fixed by the Director General from time to time, the Divisional Security Commissioner shall Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 17 WP-21020-2011 submit special report to the Director General with copy to the Chief Security Commissioner and to the concerned officer as may be specified through the Directives."
Charge 1(c) pertained to the theft of one coach trolley of the Railways which was to be sold as scrap and had been valued at Rs 28,000. The allegation was that the respondent had taken sick leave, so as to avoid being present at the time of handing over the trolley on 4-12-2006. This charge was found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority, and the Director General of Police-RPF Railway Board.
21.11. With respect to this charge, the High Court has given a contradictory finding. In para 24 of the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] , the Court held that the theft of the trolley was detected by another officer prior to the writ petitioner proceeding on leave. Hence, the question of delay in reporting the theft by the writ petitioner was held to have lost its significance. In para 25, the High Court, however, took a contrary view by holding that it concurred with the view taken by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner in the order dated 5-9-2007, wherein the charge was held to be proved. The High Court concluded by holding that the charge was not so serious so as to warrant the extreme punishment of removal from service, as there was no imputation of connivance or corrupt practices. 21.12. In our view, the aforesaid findings are erroneous, since the respondent has not been awarded the punishment of removal from service, but compulsory retirement from service vide order dated 5-12-2007.
21.13. It is further relevant to note that Charges 1(b) and 1(c) fall under Rule 146.2 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 which provides:
"146.2 Neglect of duty.--No member of the Force without good and sufficient cause shall--
(i) neglect or omit to attend to or fail to carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which is his duty as a member of the Force to attend to or carry out; or
(ii) fail to work his beat in accordance with orders or leave the place of duty to which he has been ordered or having left his place of duty for a bona fide purpose fail to return thereto without undue delay; or
(iii) be absent without leave or be late for any duty; or
(iv) fail properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of any money or property received by him in the course Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 18 WP-21020-2011 of his duty."
(emphasis supplied) The various allegations made against the respondent arise out of gross neglect of duty with respect to theft of railway property. The findings of gross neglect of duty under Charges 1(b) and (c) have been concurrently upheld. The findings of the EO and the disciplinary authority are based on materials on record. The High Court was not justified in reappraising the entire evidence threadbare as a court of first appeal, and substituting the order of punishment, by a lesser punishment, without justifiable reason.
21.14. Section 11 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 provides that it shall be the duty of every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. The primary object of constituting the Railway Protection Force is to secure better "protection and security of the railway property". The restricted power of arrest and search conferred on members of this Force is incidental to the efficient discharge of their primary duty to protect and safeguard railway property, and to uphold the law. A police officer in the Railway Protection Force is required to maintain a high standard of integrity in the discharge of his official functions. In this case, the charges proved against the respondent "were of neglect of duty" which resulted in pecuniary loss to the Railways. The respondent was a Sub- Inspector in the Railway Police discharging an office of trust and confidence which required absolute integrity. The High Court was therefore not justified in setting aside the order of compulsory retirement, and directing reinstatement with consequential benefits, and payment of back wages to the extent of 50%.
21.15. With respect to the registration of a criminal case by the CBI Nagpur, the High Court held that it was an irrelevant consideration taken note of by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner. On this issue, we were informed during the course of hearing that the respondent had been convicted by the Special Judge, Wardha vide judgment and order dated 2-8- 2017 for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo RI for one year with fine. The Counsel for the respondent informed the Court, that an appeal has been filed against the said judgment, which is pending consideration. We have therefore considered it appropriate not to advert to the findings in the CBI case, lest it prejudices the Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 19 WP-21020-2011 case of the respondent which is pending in appeal against the order of conviction. We have decided the issue of the validity of the order of compulsory retirement on the basis of the material in the enquiry proceedings, and the orders passed by the statutory authorities in this regard.
21.16. The respondent was compulsorily retired pursuant to the order dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner. The order of compulsory retirement took effect on 5-12-2007. The respondent is being paid pension after he has been compulsorily retired. The direction of the High Court for payment of back wages was consequent upon the reinstatement of the respondent employee. Since we are upholding the order of compulsory retirement dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner, there is no question of granting back wages. In any case, the respondent is being paid pension after his compulsory retirement.
22. We order and direct that:
22.1. The appeal is allowed, and the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] of the High Court is set aside for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, and the order of compulsory retirement passed on 5-12-2007 by the Chief Security Commissioner, as affirmed by the Director General, RPF vide order dated 19-5-2008/21- 5-2008 is restored.
22.2. The respondent has stated in his written submissions that the gratuity which was payable to him, has not been released by the Department so far. We direct the appellant-department to release gratuity, if due and payable to the respondent from 5-12-2007, within a period of six weeks from today, along with interest as provided by Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 read with the applicable Office Memorandum/Notification issued by the Government of India.
23. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above terms, with no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any are disposed of accordingly.
21. Further, there is no argument advanced before this Court regarding any mala fides against the authorities concerned. Therefore, the arguments so far as merits of the case are concerned are of no help to the petitioner.
22. The last argument advanced before this Court is regarding imposition of major punishment of 'removal from service' being disproportionate Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 20 WP-21020-2011 looking to the alleged allegations levelled against the petitioner. Five charges were levelled against him based upon the complaint made by Smt. Uma Jatav with respect of assault and hurling of abuses. However, while giving the statement during the departmental enquiry, she has resiled from her statement given in the preliminary enquiry. The disciplinary authority has relied upon the finding recorded in the preliminary enquiry and has substituted its own findings with respect to Charge No.1. The Inquiry Officer has found that Charge No.1 not to be proved against the petitioner. The said charge deals with demand of bribe/money. The disciplinary authority has observed that the petitioner is habitual of taking money from the illegal vendors; how such finding can be arrived at in absence of any material placed on record pertaining to the same. Even otherwise, in the alleged incident, the assault and hurling of abuse by the petitioner was subsequently denied by the complainant coupled with the fact that they have specifically given statements that as the petitioner has snatched their basket, they were got annoyed with the petitioner and therefore, made a statement with respect to assault and hurling of abuse by the petitioner but now they are giving the correct statements without any threat and undue pressure. On these grounds, it is submitted that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate and not commensurate with the nature of the charges proved against the petitioner.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that the punishment imposed must be proportionate. Whether it is a departmental misconduct or an offence in a criminal case, the doctrine of proportionality is Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 21 WP-21020-2011 the anvil on which quantum of punishment needs to be tested. However, this Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere into the punishment. For this, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman & Managing Director, VSP & others vs Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 569 wherein it was made clear that superior Courts in some cases may invoke doctrine of proportionality. If decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when misconduct stands proved. In the opinion of this Court, the basic principle running through catena of judgments that punishment order can be interfered with if it is shockingly disproportionate, is still good law.
24. In the case of U.P. SRTC vs Mahesh Kumar Mishra, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 450 has held as follows :
8. This will show that not only this Court but also the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee if, that penalty, shocks the conscience of the Court. The law, therefore, is not, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the High Court can, in no circumstance, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee after disciplinary proceedings.
9. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-
Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar [(1998) 3 SCC 192] has also laid down the same proposition and held that if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges held proved against the employee, it will be open to the court to interfere.
25. The question whether this Court should substitute the punishment while interfering with the punishment is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. vs K. Hanumantha Rao, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 528 has observed as under :
Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 22 WP-21020-2011 7.3. The impugned order is also faulted for the reason that it is not the function of the High Court to impose a particular punishment even in those cases where it was found that penalty awarded by the employer is shockingly disproportionate. In such a case, the matter could, at the best, be remanded to the disciplinary authority for imposition of lesser punishment leaving it to such authority to consider as to which lesser penalty needs to be inflicted upon the delinquent employee. No doubt, the administrative authority has to exercise its powers reasonably. However, the doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. The Court must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh [Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 159] , this principle is formulated in the following manner : (SCC pp. 380-81, paras 13-14) "13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405] this principle was explained in the following manner : (SCC p. 773, para 22) '22. ... The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering [Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1997 SCC OnLine Del 973 : (1997) 77 FLR 918] with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. ... The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 23 WP-21020-2011 warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone.'
14. Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak [State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, (2008) 7 SCC 580 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 431] , this Court reiterated the law by stating : (SCC pp. 584-
85, paras 14 and 17) '14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.
***
17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the appellate authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 24 WP-21020-2011 Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted."
26. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law and looking to the overall facts of the matter coupled with the unblemished service career of the petitioner, apart from this unfortunate incident in which the petitioner has faced the departmental enquiry, the imposition of punishment of 'removal from service' by the disciplinary authority appears to be too harsh and shockingly disproportionate. The said punishment has been affirmed by the appellate authority as well as by revisional authority. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, imposition of punishment of 'removal from service' being on higher side is too harsh. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 20.05.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority to the extent of imposition of punishment of 'removal from service' being unsustainable is hereby quashed. Consequently, the appellate order dated 25.02.2011 as well as the revisional order dated 09.09.2011 are also quashed. However, the procedure adopted by the authorities regarding imposition of punishment and submission of the inquiry report to the disciplinary authority is affirmed.
27. From the aforesaid facts and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court finds it appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed against the petitioner and for passing appropriate orders, as the punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh and disproportionate, hence, the matter is remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority to impose some lesser punishment after taking into consideration Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:20662 25 WP-21020-2011 the inquiry report, apart from removal from service, and thereafter pass a fresh order with respect of imposition of punishment. The above exercise be completed within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
28. Consequently, the petition is partly allowed and disposed of finally in above terms. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE VV Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 14-05-2025 17:50:11