Jharkhand High Court
Dead (Expunged) vs Dwarika Singh on 17 August, 2022
Author: Anil Kumar Choudhary
Bench: Anil Kumar Choudhary
Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
S.A. No.149 of 2008
(Against the Judgment and decree dated 07.05.2008 passed by the learned 1st
Additional District Judge, Garhwa in Title Appeal No.38 of 1998)
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1. Dead (expunged)
2. Krishna Kumar Keshri @ Krishna Keshri
3. Vijay Kumar Keshri
4. Kanhaiya Kumar Keshri @ Kanhaiya Keshri Appellant Nos.2 to 4 are sons of late Ram Lal Prasad 5 (a). Nanda Devi w/o, Late Binod Prasad Keshri 5 (b). Saurabh Keshri, s/o Late Binod Prasad Keshri 5 (c). Shilpa Keshri d/o Late Binod Prasad Keshri and w/o Abhishekh Keshri 5 (a) to 5 (c) all R/o, Building No.61, 2nd Floor, Tagore Town, P.O. & P.S. Ardali Bazar, Dist. Varanasi
6. Dilip Kumar Keshri @ Dilip Keshri s/o late Brij Bihari Lal Keshri
7. Anita Kumari @ Anita Keshri d/o Brij Bihari Lal Keshri All residents of village Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, Dist. Garhwa .... .... .... Appellant Versus
1. Dwarika Singh 2 (a). Parwati Devi w/o late Amerika Singh 2 (b). Bihari Singh 2 (c). Sohrai Singh 2 (d). Satendra Singh 2 (e). Kaltu Singh All sons of late Amerika Singh 2 (f). Joga Devi 2 (g). Antuna Devi Both daughters of late Amerika Singh All are residents of village Garhwa, P.O. Annaraj Nawadih, P.S. & Dist. Garhwa.
3 Tetari Devi w/o Ganesh Singh 4 Metri Devi w/o Kailash Singh both residents of village Bohita, P.O. & P.S. Lesliganj, Dist. Palamau. 5 Mundrika Singh s/o late Janan Singh Resident of village Obra, P.O Annaraj Nawadih, P.S. & Dist. Garhwa 6 Smt. Usha Devi 7 Smt. Manju Devi Both daughters of late Ram Lal Prasad 8 Rani Keshri w/o late Lal Bihari Keshri 9 Punam Keshri d/o late Lal Bihari Keshri 10 Mamta Keshri, d/o late Lal Bihari Keshri 11 Swaty Keshri (minor), d/o late Lal Bihari Keshri 12 Suprit Keshri (minor), s/o late Lal Bihari Keshri 13 Amit Keshri (minor) s/o late Lal Bihari Keshri Appellant nos.11 to 13 being minors are represented through mother 1 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 and natural guardian namely, Rani Keshri (appellant no.2 herein) All residents of village Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, Dist. Garhwa 14 Ashok Prasad Keshri 15 (a). Nirmala Keshri, w/o Late Anil Prasad Keshri 15 (b) Vishal Keshri Parwai s/o Late Anil Prasad Keshri 15 (c) Sapna Keshri 15 (d) Dibya Keshri 15 (e) Vandana Keshri 15 (f) Kumari Rajshri Keshri 15 (c) to 15 (f), all daughters of Late Anil Prasad Keshri All residents of Village Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, Dist. Garhwa 16 Arun Prasad Keshri 17 Satish Prasad Keshri 18 Ajay Prasad Keshri 19 Raju Prasad Keshri All sons of Late Biswa Nath Prasad Keshri All residents of village Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, Dist. Garhwa 20 Most. Sumitra Kuar, w/o late Brij Bihari Lal Keshri 21 Sunita Kumari 22 Sangita Kumari 23 Chandra Kumari (minor) 24 Jyoti Kumari (minor) All daughters of Late Brij Bihari Lal Keshri Respondent nos.23 and 24 minors are represented through mother and natural guardian namely, Most. Sumitra Kuar All residents of village Garhwa, P.O. & P.S. Garhwa, Dist. Garhwa 25 Smt. Asha Devi w/o Chedi Lal Resident of village Bharatganj, At & P.O. Bharatganj, P.S. Bharatganj, Dist. Allahabad, State Uttar Pradesh 26 Neelam Devi w/o Dilip Kumar Resident of Village Sikandra, At & P.O. Sikandra, P.S. Sikandra, Dist. Mungher, State Bihar ... .... .... Respondents
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For the Appellants : Mr. Pratyush Kumar, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Anurag Kumar, Advocate
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PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
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By the Court:- Heard the parties.
2. This second appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure against the concurrent judgment and decree 2 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 dated 07.05.2008 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Garhwa in Title Appeal No.38 of 1998 whereby and where under, the learned first appellate court has dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-Judge-I, Garhwa in Title Suit No.12 of 1988 on 18.07.1998 whereby and where under, the learned trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs filed with a prayer for declaration that the suit lands are the raiyati lands of the plaintiffs coming in their continuous possession since the time of their ancestors and the defendants or their ancestors had neither any right nor title nor possession in respect thereof and if it is found that the plaintiffs have been dispossessed from the suit land by the orders passed in Misc. Case No.459/77 and Criminal Revision Case No.143/85 on any date they be ordered to be put in possession of the same.
3. The case of the plaintiffs in brief is that Sheo Sahai Singh, a tribal, chero by caste owned and possessed lands in village Obra and during last cadastral survey and settlement operations before filing of the suit, the suit land was recorded in the name of Sheo Sahai Singh as a kaiyami raiyati. The plaintiffs are the great grandson of Sheo Sahai Singh. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that Sheo Sahai Singh continued in possession of the suit lands and after his death, his son Sanpa Singh continued in possession of the suit land. Sanpa Singh was succeeded by his two sons, Patan Singh and Budhan Singh. Budhan Singh is the father of the plaintiffs. Patan Singh died in the year 1930 without any male issue so, Budhan Singh is the only surviving coparcener continued to own and possess the entire properties inherited by their father. Budhan Singh in 3 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 the year 1932 sold the entire lands appertaining to khata no.170 to Mahabir Singh, S/o Dhupa Singh of the village and put him in possession thereof while retained the suit land in his possession and cultivation. Budhan Singh died living behind his widow Most. Biphani Devi and his two sons Dewa Singh being the plaintiff no.1 and Janan Singh being the plaintiff no.2 who succeeded the suit properties upon the death of Budhan Singh. The plaintiffs converted the tand land to paddy growing lands at considerable cost and amalgamated the land of khata no.98 with one another. Upon the death of Budhan Singh, the plaintiffs paid rent of the suit land to Jagdeo Sao and Sahdeo Sao Kasarwani till the vesting of their intermediary interest into the State of Bihar under Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950. The defendant and their brother late Bishwanath Keshri in the year 1971 for the first time in collusion with the police got a proceeding initiated under Section 144 Cr.P.C. in respect of part of suit land against the plaintiffs and during the course of the said proceeding, the plaintiffs could know that defendants fraudulently created evidence in order to lay a false claim over the suit land and fabricated resettlement of only 0.28 acres of land, half of the suit land and got them included in the allotment of civil court partition suit in which the plaintiffs or their ancestors were not impleaded as parties and the same being collusive and fraudulent suit. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs denied that none of their ancestors surrendered any part of the suit land. The defendants fraudulently procured assessment of rent order followed by 'M' form without any enquiry on the spot, without any 'istahar' having been published in the village. In the year 1976 as the defendants and their 4 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 brothers went to take forceful possession of the suit land, a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. in respect of the suit land was drawn up and the rule was made absolute against the defendant nos.1 and 2 and the rule was vacated in favour of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Executive Magistrate, Garhwa dated 20.01.1977, the defendants and their brothers preferred Criminal Revision No.13 of 1977 before the District Judge, Palamau and the revision was dismissed on 20.08.1977. Thereafter, the defendants got initiated a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C in respect of the suit land by Misc. Case No. 459 of 1977 wherein, the defendants nos.1 and 2 and some of the descendants of their two deceased brothers were found to be in possession and the plaintiffs were restrained from going to land which was the subject matter of the said 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding. The plaintiffs filed Criminal Revision No.145/85 but the same was dismissed and a cloud was cast on the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit lands. So the plaintiffs filed the suit.
4. The case of the defendants on the other hand is that the suit is not maintainable as of various technical reasons. The defendants pleaded that the ancestors of the defendants and thereafter, the defendants themselves are openly and adversely possessing the suit land against the plaintiffs and their ancestors on uninterrupted continuous possession for more than three statutory period of 12 years. Hence, the suit is barred by the principle of adverse possession. The defendants further pleaded that Dwarika Singh fell heavily into the arrears of rent of the suit land which he could not pay and he voluntarily surrendered of 5 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 the suit land in the year 1937 to his landlord Sahdeo Sao- the ancestor of the defendants. The defendants got the land from the landlord in respect of part of the suit land bearing plot no.1148 on rent and plot nos. 1151 and 1152 were given as rent free land. Budhan Singh paid rent for plot no.1148 while alive and after him, this rent was paid by the plaintiffs till the vesting of intermediary interest in the year 1955 when their tenancy of plot no.1148 was recognized by the State of Bihar by opening demand in their names and they are still paying rent for plot no.1148 under khata no.97 to the State of Bihar. In Partition Suit No.17 of 1934 between Sahdeo Sao and Ors. vs. Kashi Singh; khata no.97 was exclusively allotted in their four anna share and in the said suit, the lands of khata no. 98 along with other lands were allotted as Bakast land in their share.
5. On the basis of rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court altogether framed eight issues :-
(1.) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (2.) Whether the plaintiffs have cause of action for the suit? (3.) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation and adverse possession?
(4.) Whether the suit is barred by law of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence?
(5.) Whether the plaintiffs are in continuous possession of the suit land since the time of their ancestors? or whether the defendants or their heirs acquired possession over the suit land?
(6.) Whether the plaintiff have got right, title and interest as 6 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 raiyati tenant over the suit land? Or whether the defendants acquired right, title and possession over the suit land? (7.) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as claimed for by them in the suit?
(8.) To what relief or reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to?
6. The learned trial court took up issue no.3 and 8 together and decided the issues in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned trial court came to the conclusion that the story of surrender of the lands of khata no.98 is not correct and due to fluctuating stands of the defendants, it was not believable that all the lands of khata no.97 except plot no.1148 were surrendered by the ancestor of the plaintiffs to the ancestor of the defendants in the year 1940. The learned trial court also came to the conclusion that the defendants prepared false documents with regard to their possession and also came to the conclusion that the lands of khata no.97 and 98 were never the subject matter of partition suit no.17 of 1933 as no part of the suit land was in controversy. The learned trial court also came to the conclusion that plaintiffs and their ancestors were all along in possession of the suit land and that the defendants did not acquire any right, title and interest over the suit land by virtue of adverse possession and accordingly all the issues were decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs and the suit was decreed on contest but without costs.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court in Title Suit No.12/88 dated 18.07.1998, the 7 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 defendants-appellants filed Title Appeal No.38 of 1998 in the court of District Judge, Garhwa, which was ultimately heard and disposed of by the learned first appellate court being the 1st Additional District Judge, Garhwa, by the impugned judgment and decree.
8. After considering the submissions made before him, the learned first appellate court framed the following three points for determination:-
(1) Whether ancestors of the respondents/plaintiffs surrendered the lands of Khata No.97 and 98 to the then landlord as told by defendants/appellants?
(2.) Whether the then landlords converted the lands belonging to ancestors of the plaintiff as their Bakast land? (3.) Whether defendants have acquired right and title over the suit land by virtue of adverse possession?
9. The learned first appellate court made a threadbare discussions of the evidence in the record that is oral testimonies of the seven witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs and the documents were marked Ext. 1 to 5 and 16 witnesses examined from the side of the defendants and the documents were marked as Ext. A to Ext. P/1.
10. The learned first appellate court first took up point for determination no.1 and considered that there is no documentary evidence to prove the fact that the land of Khata no.98 and 97 were surrendered by the raiyat to the then landlord nor the defendants could examine any witness to prove the fact that the land of khata no.98 and 97 were surrendered by the ancestors of the plaintiffs. It was considered by 8 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 the learned first appellate court that the witnesses who appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs have supported the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs have been coming over the possession of the suit land since the time of their ancestors. Basing upon Ext.4 to 4/5, Ext. 4 being the record of right, it was considered by the learned first appellate court that the plaintiffs are still in possession of the suit land. The learned first appellate court relied upon the judgment of a Bench of this Court to the effect that in case of voluntarily abandonment, it was necessary for the landlord before entering into the land to take previous permission of the Deputy Commissioner and in this case, as no such permission was taken, hence the same is a factor which goes against the claim of the defendants that the ancestor of the plaintiffs abandoned the land. The learned first appellate court also considered that there is no provision of partial surrender by the tenant in the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and ultimately went on to hold that there is no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that the contention of the defendants that ancestor of the plaintiffs surrendered the suit land to the landlord is incorrect. The learned first appellate court then took up the second point for determination and considered that only fixation of rent does not create any title to the person in whose name rent has been assessed and that the entry in Register-D cannot be treated conclusive as to proprietary title. The learned first appellate court also considered principle of law that mutation of the name in Revenue Record is not an evidence of title and after considering the evidence in the record came to the conclusion that the suit land was never in exclusive possession of the then landlord or 9 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 their new purchasers at any time and hence, did not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the finding of the trial court in respect of the second point for determination. The learned first appellate court then considered the point for determination no.3 and after considering the fact that the defendants contested the case before the settlement officer in which ultimately the documents which has been marked Ext. 4 to 4/5 were passed and the record of right Ext. 4 was prepared and the said order of the settlement officer was never challenged. Hence, the same is binding on the defendants. Hence, the defendants have failed to acquire any title over the suit land by way of adverse possession and went on to dismiss the appeal.
11. Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that though there were several substantial questions of law proposed in the appeal memo but he confines his submission to the point that orders passed by the settlement officer being the order passed in terms of Section 6 of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the act of settlement officer is judicial in nature and as the said settlement order passed in the settlement proceeding was out and out barred by time, the same is void ab-initio and nullity and the same can be avoided and the court below ought to have relied upon the same. It is further submitted by Mr. Pratyush Kumar that Ext. P and P/1 being form No. M of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the learned first appellate court failed to appreciate the applicability of the said document in proper perspective. It is further submitted by Mr. Pratyush Kumar that the learned first appellate court gravely erred by not dismissing the suit as not maintainable as the 10 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 plaintiffs-respondents have not sought any relief against the final decree proceeding in Partition Suit No.17 of 1934 of the court of Sub-Judge, Daltonganj. In support of his contention, Mr. Pratyush Kumar relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sharif Mian & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (1999) 6 SCC 37 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court was right in setting aside the revisional order passed by the commissioner by observing thus in paragraph nos.2 and 3 which reads as under :-
"2. Relying upon Section 8 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and Rule 8 framed thereunder, the High Court held that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against the order of the Collector. For that purpose, the High Court relied upon an earlier decision of its own in Baldeo Prasad Sah v. Commr. of Bhagalpur Division [1960 BLJR 19] . This decision has since been followed by that High Court in another case, namely, Sk. Gajar v. State of Bihar [(1986) 34 BLJR 45] in which the decision was rendered by Mr Justice Lalit Mohan Sharma (as his Lordship then was) and it was held that:
"The proceedings under Section 6 of the Act are judicial in nature in which rival claims of the litigating parties are determined and unless the law vested in the Commissioner, authority to interfere with the orders passed in the proceedings, the power in this regard cannot be assumed merely for the reason that the Collector is an officer subordinate to the Commissioner. ... the Commissioner has no jurisdiction either revisionary or otherwise to interfere with the order passed in appeal under Section 8 of the Act (by the Collector)."
3. This being the settled law, we are of the view that the High Court was right in allowing the writ petition and setting aside the order passed by the Commissioner."
12. Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment of K.N. Nagarajappa & Ors. vs. H. Narasimha Reddy reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 694, paragraph no.16 and 18 of 11 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 which reads as under :-
"16. In the judgment reported as Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board2, this court held as follows:
"26. Thus, it is evident that Section 103 CPC is not an exception to Section 100 CPC nor is it meant to supplant it, rather it is to serve the same purpose. Even while pressing Section 103 CPC in service, the High Court has to record a finding that it had to exercise such power, because it found that finding (s) of fact recorded by the court (s) below stood vitiated because of perversity. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in the case has not been decided by the court(s) below.
27. There is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal even on a question of fact provided the court is satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter i.e. that the findings of fact are found to be perverse. But the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 647]; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [(1999) 6 SCC 343] and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [(2010) 12 SCC 740].)
28. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non- application of mind and thus, stands vitiated. (Vide Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan [(2010) 11 SCC 483]"
18. ..... ....... ....... ......... Moreover, the High Court, in second appeal proceeded to examine the documents in light of the evidence led and corrected the findings as it were 12 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 under Section 103. If the appellants' arguments were to prevail, the findings of fact based upon an entirely erroneous appreciation of facts and by overlooking material evidence would necessarily have to remain and bind the parties, thereby causing injustice. It is precisely for such reasons that the High Courts are empowered to exercise limited factual review under Section 103 CPC. However, that such power could be exercised cannot be doubted. The impugned judgment does not expressly refer to that provision. In the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the High Court exercised the power in the light of that provision. Furthermore, we are also of the opinion that having regard to the overall circumstances, the impugned judgment does not call for interference in exercise of special leave jurisdiction (which is available to this Court - even at the stage of final hearing)." (Emphasis supplied) And submits that even in a case of concurrent finding of facts, the second appellate court can interfere with the finding of fact of the courts below if they are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. Hence, the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents being Title Suit No.12/88 be dismissed.
13. Mr. Anurag Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and submits that both the courts below have made threadbare discussions of entire evidence in the record and considered that the evidence in the record is in their right perspective and certainly this is a case where the finding of the first appellate court is not based on no evidence or of such nature that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings nor the same suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity. Hence, it is submitted that since no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal hence, 13 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 this appeal being without any merit be dismissed.
14. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going the materials in the record, this Court finds that both the courts below have discussed the evidence in the record threadbare and this Court do not find any merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that the order passed by the settlement officer being barred by time ought not to have been relied upon by the courts below. This contention of the appellants is fallacious because of the following reasons :-
(i) There is no pleading of the defendants that the orders by the settlement officers were barred by time.
(ii) Except a bald assertions made by the learned counsel for the appellants that they are barred by time, no case is made out as to how the same are barred by time.
(iii) It is a settled principle of law that an order passed by the competent authority under the statute are binding upon both the parties unless and until the same is illegal and set aside by the appellate court.
Undisputedly, the defendants and the plaintiffs were parties to the proceedings before the settlement authority and consequent upon that Ext. 4 being record of right has been issued in favour of the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, this Court do not find any fault with the courts below for relying upon the Ext. 4.
15. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding no due weightage being not given to the form- M 14 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 which was marked Ext. P and P/1 by the first appellate court is concerned, Form-M of the Bihar Land Reforms, 1951 is issued in terms of the Rule 7I of the Bihar land Reforms Rules which reads as under :-
7I. Preparation of Rent-roll - Form M. - The fair rent or ground rent determined under these Rules in each proceeding together with the requisite particulars shall be entered in Form M Rent-roll under the signature of the Collector. Such Rent-roll shall form a part of the case record to which it relates.
16. After going through the aforesaid Rules, this Court has no hesitation in holding that essentially the purpose of issuance of preparation of rent in Form-M is for revenue collection. It is a settled principle of law that documents prepared for revenue collection can at best indicate the possession of a party over the land in question but certainly this cannot confer or extinguish any title of the parties, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commr., (2007) 6 SCC 186 which reads as under:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It is well settled that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only "fiscal purpose" i.e. payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh).Xxxxxxxxxxx.
17. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the plaintiffs having not sought any relief against the final decree passed in Partition Suit No.17 of 1934 of Sub-Judge, Daltonganj which was marked Ext. D to H is concerned, it is an undisputed fact that the plaintiffs are not parties to the said Partition Suit No.17 of 1934. Obviously, the decree passed in the said Partition Suit 15 Second Appeal No. 149 of 2008 No.17 of 1934 is not binding upon the plaintiffs and at best, the same was tried to be used as an evidence by the defendants in respect of their possession over part of the suit land but the plaintiffs in the plaint in no uncertain manner has mentioned that the said suit was a collusive suit filed solely for the purpose of creation of evidence of possession. Under such circumstances, this Court do not find any illegality in the plaintiffs not seeking any relief in respect of the decree passed in Partition Suit No.17 of 1934 as the same was not binding upon the respondents.
18. Because of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that there is no perversity in the concurrent finding of facts of both the courts below and there is also no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs. .
19. Let a copy of this Judgment along with Lower Court Records be sent to learned court concerned forthwith.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 17th August, 2022 AFR/ Sonu-Gunjan/-
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