Uttarakhand High Court
Unknown vs Chancellor Uttarakhand Technical ... on 28 September, 2018
Author: Lok Pal Singh
Bench: Rajiv Sharma, Lok Pal Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition (S/B) No.429 of 2017
Arun Kumar
....Petitioner
Versus
Chancellor Uttarakhand Technical University & others
....Respondents
Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Atul Bahuguna and Mr.
Bhupesh Kandpal, Advocate, for the respondent-University.
Dated- 28th September, 2018
Coram: Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J.
Hon'ble Lok Pal Singh, J.
Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J. (Oral) Today, the Contempt Petition No.432 of 2018 was listed. Since the respondents, arrayed in the contempt petition, did not comply with the interim directions issued by this Court vide order dated 19.6.2018, we ordered the petition itself to be listed for final hearing. It is in these circumstances that we have heard the petition finally.
2. Petitioner was appointed as the Assistant Controller of Examination in the respondent-University vide order dated 23.10.2015, till furthers orders, or till regular appointment, whichever was earlier. Petitioner's academic qualification and administrative experience was also taken into consideration while appointing him as the Assistant Controller of Examination. There was no complaint against his functioning. However, vide the impugned order dated 06.09.2017 passed by the respondent no.4, the petitioner has been restrained from discharging the duties of the Assistant Controller of Examination.
23. Petitioner has not been issued any show cause notice before the issuance of office order dated 6.9.2017. Any order, which has civil and evil consequences, must be passed in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The respondent-University, in its own wisdom, taking into consideration the petitioner's academic qualification and experience, has appointed the petitioner to discharge the duties of the Assistant Controller of Examination. There is violation of principle of natural justice. There is also arbitrariness in the action of the respondents.
4. In 2001 (1) SCC 182, in the case of "Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant & others", their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that it is the fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be complied with and the same has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence. The doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"1. Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak case (A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India) one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances -- who then is a reasonable man -- the man on the Clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds good even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above-stated as below: (SCC p. 387, para 8) "8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yardstick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the 3 administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in H.K. (an infant), In re. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case as 'insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances'. However, even the application of the concept of fair play requires real flexibility. Everything will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, L.J. observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk:
'The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth.' "
20. It is a fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be complied with and the same has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence of this country. The judicial process itself embraces a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend though, however, we may hasten to add that the same is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The facts in the matter under consideration is singularly singular. The entire chain of events smacks of some personal clash and adaptation of a method unknown to law in hottest of haste; this is however, apart from the issue of bias which would be presently dealt with hereinafter. It is on this context, the observations of this Court in the case of Sayeedur Rehman v. State of Bihar seem to be rather apposite. This Court observed: (SCC p. 338, para 11) "The omission of express requirement of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering the order, dated 22-4-1960, is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasi-judicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting rights of parties."
5. In 2003 (4) SCC 557, in the case of "Canara Bank & others vs. Debasis & others", their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have explained the scope of natural justice as under:-
"14. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence.
19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil consequences" encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non- pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.4
21. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is "nemo judex in causa sua" or "nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua" as stated in Earl of Derby's case16 that is, "no man shall be a judge in his own cause".
Coke used the form "aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars" (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, "no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party". The form "nemo potest esse simul actor et judex", that is, "no one can be at once suitor and judge" is also at times used. The second rule is "audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side". At times and particularly in continental countries, the form "audietur et altera pars" is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely "qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera acquum licet dixerit, haud acquum fecerit" that is, "he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right" [see Boswel's case17 (Co Rep at p. 52-a)] or in other words, as it is now expressed, "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done". Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon (sic open). All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated."
6. In 2003 (9) SCC 731, in the case of "State of Maharashtra & others vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council & others", their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that it is a fundamental principle of fair hearing incorporated in the doctrine of natural justice and as a rule of universal obligation that all administrative acts or decisions affecting rights of individuals must comply with the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"30. It is a fundamental principle of fair hearing incorporated in the doctrine of natural justice and as a rule of universal obligation that all administrative acts or decisions affecting rights of individuals must comply with the principles of natural justice and the person or persons sought to be affected adversely must be afforded not only an opportunity of hearing but a fair opportunity of hearing. The State must act fairly just the same as anyone else legitimately expected to do and where the State action fails to satisfy the test it is liable to be struck down by the courts in exercise of their judicial review jurisdiction. However, warns Prof. H.W.R. Wade that the principle is flexible:
"The Judges, anxious as always to preserve some freedom of manoeuvre, emphasise that 'it is not possible to lay down rigid 5 rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter'. Their application, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. 'In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility.' There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant: there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice." (Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 2000, pp. 491-92.)"
7. In 2008 (14) SCC 151, in the case of "Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I & another", their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that even a pure administrative act entailing civil consequences, has to conform with rules of natural justice. Their Lordships have also explained the term "civil consequences". Their Lordships have held as under:-
"15. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd.)
17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated and it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistent with the rules of natural justice. Since then the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is invariably read into administrative actions involving civil consequences, unless the statute, conferring power, excludes its application by express language.
19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial.
26. In the light of the aforenoted legal position, we are in respectful agreement with the decision of this Court in Rajesh Kumar2 that an order under Section 142(2-A) does entail civil consequences. At this juncture, it would be relevant to take note of the insertion of proviso to Section 142(2-D) with effect from 1-6-2007. The proviso provides that the expenses of the auditor appointed in terms of the said provision shall, henceforth, be paid by the Central Government. In view of the said amendment, it can be argued that the main plank of the judgment in Rajesh Kumar2 to the effect that direction under Section 142(2-A) entails civil consequences because the assessee has to pay substantial fee to the special auditor is knocked off.
30. As already noted above, the expression "civil consequences"
encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil 6 liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. Anything which affects a citizen in his civil life comes under its wide umbrella. Accordingly, we reject the argument and hold that since an order under Section 142(2-A) does entail civil consequences, the rule audi alteram partem is required to be observed."
8. In 2014 (9) SCC 105, in the case of "Gorkha Security Services vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) & others", their Lordships have held that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, any exercise of power prejudicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"21. The central issue, however, pertains to the requirement of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind the serving of show-cause notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement, according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated so that the notice is able to point out that proposed action is not warranted in the given case, even if the defaults/breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to blacklisting, this requirement becomes all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it is harshest possible action."
9. No reasons, whatsoever, have been assigned why the petitioner was prevented from discharging the duties of Assistant Controller of Examination. It is settled law that in the administrative orders also, the reasons must be assigned. The reasons are required to be given in the administrative orders since these are open to judicial review.
10. In 2010 (9) SCC 496, in the case of "Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan", their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court have summarized the principle of recording of reasons as follows: -
"(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.7
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision- making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process"."
11. In 2017 (2) SCC 609 in the case of 'J. Ashoka v. University of Agricultural Sciences & others', their Lordships of Ho'nble Supreme have also explained that the reasons are links between materials on which conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They 8 disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision. Their Lordships have held as under: -
"24. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that the relevant provisions of the Statute were fully complied with."
12. The impugned order has been passed by the Vice Chancellor of the University on 6.9.2017.
13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the appointment of the Vice Chancellor, itself, is bad in law since he has not been appointed in conformity with sub-section (5) of Section 9 of the Uttarakhand Technical University Act, 2005 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act').
14. The respondent no.4 has been appointed as the officiating Vice Chancellor.
15. It is evident from the plain language of sub- section (5) of Section 9 that where the Vice-Chancellor is unable to discharge the functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, the Pro-Vice Chancellor or in his absence, senior Professor/Reader nominated by the 'Vice Chancellor or in their absence, senior Professor/Principal nominated by the Chancellor shall discharge the functions of the Vice-Chancellor until the Vice-Chancellor resumes his duties or if the post of Vice Chancellor is vacant, until the permanent Vice Chancellor is appointed.
16. Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondent-University, has placed on record copy of the 9 order dated 19th April, 2018 (which is taken on record), whereby the respondent no.4 has been appointed as the Vice Chancellor of the University. The persons serving the University, may be the Pro-Vice-Chancellor or in his absence, senior Professor/Reader or in their absence, senior Professor/Principal nominated by the Chancellor can only be appointed as the Officiating Vice Chancellor until the Vice Chancellor resumes his duties or if the post of the Vice Chancellor is vacant until the permanent Vice Chancellor is appointed.
17. There is no stipulation in sub-clause (5) of Section 9 of the Act for appointment of a person other than the Pro-Vice Chancellor or Professor/Reader as Vice Chancellor. It is settled law that no incumbent can hold the public office if he does not possess the eligibility as per the Act and the Statues, framed thereunder. Thus, the appointment of the respondent no.4 is in flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 9 of the Act. The respondent no.4 may be the Vice Chancellor of another University but could not be appointed as officiating Vice Chancellor of the respondent-University.
18. The principles of standing in quo warranto are liberal.
19. In AIR 1965 SC 491 in the case of 'University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao', their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court have explained the provisions of quo warranto. Their Lordships have held as under: -
"(7) As Halsbury has observed:
"An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolate writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined."10
Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons, not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not."
20. In the instant case also, the respondent no.4 is a usurper who has held the public office without any legal authority.
21. In AIR 1966 S.C. 828 in the case of 'Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra', their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the right that can be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, this rule has to be relaxed or modified. Their Lordships have held as under: -
"8. The first question is whether the appellant had locus standi to file a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal1 dealing with the question of locus standi of the appellant in that case to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, observed:
"Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the 11 exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right .... The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified."
22. In (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II) in the case of 'Retd. Armed Forces Medical Association & others v. U.O.I. and others', their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the rights under Article 226 can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus. However, the strict rules of locus standi are relaxed to an extent in quo warranto proceedings. Their Lordships have held as under: -
"43. Whether a writ of quo warranto lies to challenge an appointment made "until further orders" on the ground that it is not a regular appointment? Whether the High Court failed to follow the settled law that a writ of quo warranto cannot be issued unless there is a clear violation of law? The order appointing the appellant clearly stated that the appointment is until further orders. The terms and conditions of appointment made it clear that the appointment is temporary and is until further orders. In such a situation, the High Court, in our view, erred in law in issuing a writ of quo warranto the rights under Article 226 which can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus.
51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K. Jain v. Union of India was pleased to hold that the evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered. It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the legality or correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was declared that public law declaration would only be made at the behest of a public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner. Having regard to the fact that neither Respondents 1 and 2 were or could have been candidates for the post of Managing Director of the Board and the High Court could not have gone beyond the limits of quo warranto so very well delineated by a catena of decisions of this Court and applied the test which could not have been applied even in a certiorari proceedings brought before the Court by an aggrieved party who was a candidate for the post.
53. This Court in A.N. Shashtri v. State of Punjab held that the writ of quo warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of malice or ill will. The High Court failed to appreciate that on 18-1- 2003 the appellant filed a criminal complaint against the second respondent Halakatte, that cognizance was taken by the criminal court in CC No. 4152 of 2003 by the Jurisdictional Magistrate on 12 24-2-2003, process was issued to the second respondent who was enlarged on bail on 12-6-2003 and the trial is in progress. That apart, the second respondent has made successive complaints to the Lokayukta against the appellant which were all held to be baseless and false. This factual background which was not disputed coupled with the fact that the second respondent Halakatte initiated the writ petition as President of the 1st respondent Union, which had ceased to be a registered trade union as early as on 2-11-1992 suppressing the material fact of its registration having been cancelled, making allegations against the appellant which were no more than the contents of the complaints filed by him before the authorities which had been found to be false after thorough investigation by the Karnataka Lokayukta, would unmistakably establish that the writ petition initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 lacked in bona fides and it was the outcome of the malice and ill will the 2nd respondent nurses against the appellant. Having regard to this aspect of the matter, the High Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition on that ground alone and at any event should have refused to issue a quo warranto, which is purely discretionary. It is no doubt true that the strict rules of locus standi are relaxed to an extent in a quo warranto proceedings. Nonetheless an imposter coming before the Court invoking public law remedy at the hands of a constitutional court suppressing material facts has to be dealt with firmly."
23. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 6.9.2017 passed by the respondent no.4 is quashed and set aside. The appointment of respondent no.4- Vice Chancellor, Uttarakhand Technical University is also declared as illegal, unconstitutional and bad in law. The new Vice Chancellor of the respondent- University be appointed strictly in conformity with sub- Section 5 of Section 9 of the Act, within a period of four weeks from today and till then, we request Her Excellency, the Governor of Uttarakhand, to nominate the senior-most Professor/Reader of the respondent-University to discharge the duties of Vice Chancellor.
24. All pending applications stand disposed of accordingly.
(Lok Pal Singh, J.) (Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J.) NISHANT