Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Ragiboyina Bhulakshmi vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Anr. on 2 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(3)ALD462, 2002(3)ALT549, 2002 A I H C 3344, (2002) 3 ICC 930, (2002) 3 ANDH LT 549, (2002) 3 ANDHLD 462
ORDER P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The writ petition is filed questioning the validity of G.O. Ms. No. l11, PR, RD, & RD (Election-Ill) Department, dated 3-3-1995 as illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts in nutshell are as follows :
3. The writ petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Tatarlapalli Gram Panchayat, Nuzendla Mandal, Guntur District defeating 2nd respondent in Gram Panchayat elections held on 20-8-2001 and she had assumed charge and has been discharging her functions as Sarpanch from the said time onwards. The 2nd respondent filed an Election Petition, OP No. 7 of 2001 before Election Tribunal headed by District Munsif exercising the jurisdiction as persona designates and not as a Judge under Sub-clause (3) of Clause (2) of G.O. Ms. No. l11, PR, RD & R (Election-Ill) Department, dated 3-3-1995, read with Section 233 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, hereinafter referred to in short as "Act". The said election petition was filed on the ground that the petitioner had become disqualified prior to getting elected as Sarpanch inasmuch as she begot three children which is a disqualification under Section 19(3) of the Act and the said Election Petition was posted to 5-12-2001 for the purpose of filing counter. The present writ petition is filed questioning the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 111, PR, RD & R (Election-III) Department, dated 3-3-1995, aforesaid read with Section 233 of the Act, on the ground of discrimination and also on the ground of the remedy being more harsh than provided under Section 22 of the Act. It was also stated that the decision of an election petition is final in view of Rule 15(iii) of G.O. Ms. No. 1ll and no appeal or revision is provided for as against the said order. Under Section 22 of the Act, any voter can give an intimation that a particular member of the Gram Panchayat was disqualified and such member or the executive authority on the direction of the Gram Panchayat alone will be entitled to file a petition to declare such member as disqualified under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Act. It was also stated that absolutely no guidelines are provided for when to invoke Section 22 of the Act and G.O. Ms. No. 111 aforesaid.
4. A counter-affidavit was filed by the 2nd respondent stating that the 2nd respondent had filed election petition OP No. 7 of 2001 on the file of the Election Tribunal-cum-District Munsif, Vinukonda challenging the election of the writ petitioner as Sarpanch of Talarlapalli Gram Panchayat as void, illegal and liable to be set aside as she is disqualified to contest the election as per Section 19(3) of the Act as she is having three children. It is also stated that even at the time of scrutiny of nominations this objection was raised, but however the Election Officer without taking into consideration of the said objection had accepted her nomination. It is also stated that all the particulars of the children of the writ petitioner had been given in detail in the election petition and the writ petition is filed without filing a counter in the election petition and the present writ petition is filed on untenable grounds only with a view to delay the proceedings before the Election Tribunal. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit it was specifically stated that the proper remedy available to her is only to file an election petition and not to invoke the procedure as contemplated under Section 22 of the Act.
5. No counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent.
6. Sri Movva Chandra Sekhar Rao, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner had made the following submissions. The learned Counsel had maintained that the remedies provided for relating to disqualifications under Section 19(3) of the Act, both under Section 22 of the Act and also G.O. Ms. No. 111, in fact operate in the same field and absolutely there are no guidelines at all under what circumstances the remedy under Section 22 has to be invoked and the remedy under G.O. Ms. No. 111 has to be invoked. The learned Counsel also had contended that no distinction can be drawn between the preelection disqualifications and the post-election disqualifications and Section 22 of the Act is applicable to both the cases covered by Article 243-O and also Article 243-F of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel also had pointed out the period of limitation specified under G.O. Ms. No. 111 for filing election petition and how the different provisions under G.O. Ms. No. 111 are definitely harsher when compared to the provisions of Section 22 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that G.O. Ms. No. 111 is bad in law inasmuch as there are no guidelines and it suffers from the vice of unguided discretion, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel further would maintain that such exercise of power is definitely arbitrary. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to several rules and also Sections 233 and 268 of the Act and had contended that definitely the remedies provided for under Section 22 and G.O. Ms. No. 111 operate virtually in the same field and are overlapping without any guidelines whatsoever. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Northern India Caterers (Private) Limited and another v. State of Punjab and another, , Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, and also J. Srinivasa Rao v. In re., 1972 (2) APU 49.
7. Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, the learned Additional Advocate-General had drawn my attention to Article 243-F(l)(b) of the Constitution of India and had pointed out the distinction between post-election disqualifications and pre-election disqualifications. The learned Counsel would maintain that the remedies provided for under G.O. Ms. No. 111 and Section 22 of the Act operate in different fields and absolutely there is no overlapping. Even if there is some overlapping it cannot be a ground to contend that G.O. Ms. No. 1ll is in any way unconstitutional, especially in the light of the constitutional provisions Article 243-F and also Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel had drawn my attention to different rules under G.O. Ms. No. l11 and also Section 233 of the Act and Section 22, Section 17, Section 18, Section 19 and Section 20 of the Act. It was also further contended that the mere absence of the provision relating to appeal or revision by itself will not render a provision invalid and hence absolutely there are no grounds to hold that the said G.O. Ms. No. 111 is either arbitrary or illegal.
8. Sri Sudershan Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the 2nd respondent had contended that Section 19(3) of the Act contains, two parts relating to disqualifications and continuance as members. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Act. The learned Counsel further submitted that the relief prayed for by the 2nd respondent is a declaration that the election of the writ petitioner is not valid and also for a declaration that she should be declared as duly elected and this relief cannot be granted under Section 22 of the Act and at any rate such reliefs are not covered by Section 22 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had maintained that G.O. Ms. No. 111 and the rules framed thereunder in fact, operate in different fields when compared to Section 22 of the Act. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Rule 12 of the rules under G.O. Ms. No. 111 and also Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to N.P. Ponnuswamy v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, , Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. the Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, , G. Kanaka Durga v. State Election Commissioner, and also Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (MM) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharashtra, .
9. Heard both the Counsel on record and also perused the material available on record.
10. In paragraph 6 of the election OP aforesaid, the reliefs prayed for are as follows :
"The petitioner herein therefore prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to :
(a) Declare that the election of the 1st respondent herein as Sarpanch of Talarlapalli Gram Panchayat is null and void as she is disqualified to contest the election as per the provision of Section 19(3) of the A.P. P.R. Act, 1994.
(b) to declare that the petitioner is duly elected as Sarpanch of Talarlapalli Gram Panchayat, Nuzendla Mandal, Guntur District.
(c) to award costs to the petitioner; and
(d) such other reliefs as the Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
Apart from the relief prayed for, the 2nd respondent herein who is the petitioner in the election OP had stated as follows in the said election petition.
"The petitioner submits that the 1st respondent herein is disqualified to contest for the election, as she is having 3 children and the third child was born on 10-7-1996. As per Section 19(3) of A.P. P.R, Act, 1994, a person having more than 2 children shall be disqualified for election, as continuing as Member and Sarpanch also. According to the proviso to the said section if a third child is born within one year from the date of commencement of A.P. P.R. Act, 1994 i.e., 30-5-1994, the said additional children shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of Section 19(3). As stated supra the 1st respondent is having 3 children namely 1. Lingamma (10 years), 2. Padma (8 years) and 3. Venkat Rao and the third child was born on 10-7-1996 i.e., more than two years after the commencement of the A.P. R.R. Act, 1994. The Birth Certificate pertaining to the third child of the 1st respondent furnished by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Nuzendla Mandal is filed herewith to substantiate the contention of the petitioner that the 3rd child of the 1st respondent was bom on 10-7-1996. It is crystal clear from the birth certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Nuzendla Mandal, dated 10-8-2001 that the 1st respondent gave birth to her 3rd child on 10-7-1996 and as such she is disqualified to contest for the election for the post of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat and a person who is disqualified to contest cannot continue in the said post. Due to inaction on the part of the 2nd respondent in not making any enquiry with regard to the objection raised by the petitioner with regard to the disqualification of the 1st respondent and improperly accepting the nomination of the 1st respondent the result of the election has been materially effected. As stated supra there was a straight contest between the petitioner and the 1st respondent and once the 1st respondent is found to be disqualified to contest the election and the acceptance of her nomination itself is improper and the petitioner alone will remain in the field and she is entitled for a declaration, to declare her as duly elected Sarpanch of Talarlapalli Gram Panchayat."
The said election petition was filed before the Election Tribunal-cum-Junior Civil Judge, Vinukonda under Section 233 of the Act and Rules 2, 3, 12, 13 and 15 of A.P. Panchayat Raj (Election Tribunals in respect of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zilla Parishads) Rules, 1995, hereinafter in short referred to as "Rules" for the purpose of convenience. Inasmuch as the 2nd respondent had invoked the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal-cum-Junior Civil Judge, Vinukonda under the aforesaid Rules under G.O. Ms. No. 111, the successful candidate in the election, the 1st respondent in the said election OP had filed the present writ petition questioning the validity of the said GO.
11. Before adverting to several contentions which had been advanced by the Counsel on record, it may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions of the Act and also the rules. Section 19(3) of the Act reads as follows :
"A person having more than two children shall be disqualified for election or for continuing as member :
Provided that the birth within one year from the date of commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 hereinafter in this section referred to as the date of such commencement, of an additional child shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of this section;
Provided further that a person having more than two children (excluding the child if any born within one year from the date of such commencement) shall not be disqualified under this section for so long as the number of the children he had on the date of such commencement does not increase;
Provided also that the Government, may direct that the disqualification in this section shall not apply in respect of a person for reasons to be recorded in writing."
On the basis of this provision, the 2nd respondent in the writ petitioner is raising a ground that the writ petitioner in fact was a disqualified candidate even as on the date of election and in fact an objection was raised, but the same was not considered. Section 22 of the Act deals with authority to decide questions of disqualifications of members and the provision reads as follows :
"(1) Where an allegation is made that any person who is elected as a member of a Gram Panchayat is not qualified or has become disqualified under Section 17, Section 18, Section 19 or Section 20 by any voter or authority to the executive authority in writing and the executive authority has given intimation of such allegation to the member through the District Panchayat Officer and such member disputes the correctness of the allegation so made, or where any member himself entertains any doubt whether, or not he has become disqualified under any of those sections, such member or any other member may, and the executive authority, at the direction of the Gram Panchayat or the Commissioner shall, within a period of two months as the case may be, apply to the District Munsif having jurisdiction over the area in which office of the Gram Panchayat is situated for decision.
(2) Pending such decision, the member shall be entitled to act as if he is qualified or were not disqualified.
(3) Where a person ceases to be the Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat as a consequence of his ceasing to be a member of the Gram Panchayat under Clause (b) of Section 20 and is restored later to his membership of the Gram Panchayat under Sub-section (2) of Section 21, he shall, with effect from the date of such restoration, be deemed to have been restored also to the office of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch, as the case may be."
Rule 3(1) of the Rules under G.O. Ms. No. lll specifies that the election petition shall be presented within 30 days from the date of declaration of the result of the election. Rule 12 of the Rules reads as follows :
"If in the opinion of the Election Tribunal.
(a) that on the date of his election, a Returned Candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chose to fill the seat under the Act, or
(b) that any corrupt practice as laid down under Section 211 of the Act has been committed by a Returned Candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the Returned Candidate or his election agent, or
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected, or
(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a Returned Candidate has been materially affected,
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice, committed in the interest of the Returned Candidate by an Agent other than his election agent, with the connivance of the Returned Candidate, or
(iii) by any improper reception, refusal, or rejection of any vote, or the reception of any vote which is void,
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or any Rules or Orders made under the Act.
(A) The Election Tribunal shall declare the election of the Returned Candidate to be void.
(B) If the Election Tribunal holds the Returned Candidate guilty under Clause (b) and Clause (d(ii) of this rule, the Election Tribunal shall in addition to declare the election of the Returned Candidate as void, shall also declare that to the Returned Candidate shall be disqualified to contest in any elections under this Act, for a period of six years from the date of order."
Rule 15 of the Rules specifies that the order of the Election Tribunal under Sub-rules (i) and (ii) shall be final. Section 233 of the Act dealing with election petitions reads :
"No election held under this Act shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf."
Section 268 of the Act deals with Power of the Government to make rules for purpose of this Act. Article 243-F(2) of the Constitution of India reads as follows :
"If any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide."
Article 243-O(b) reads as follows :
"no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State."
12. No doubt contentions had been advanced relating to the post-election disqualifications and pre-election disqualifications on the strength of the language employed in different provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 111 and also Section 22 of the Act. As already referred to supra, the principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner is that the remedy provided under G.O. Ms, No. 111 is a harsher remedy when compared to the remedy provided under Section 22 of the Act and both operate in the same field and that absolutely there are no guidelines when to invoke Section 22 of the Act and also the provisions of G.O. Ms. No. 111 and the said GO also is attacked on the ground that under Section 22 of the Act, the District Munsif acts as a civil Court and hence the remedy of appeal or revision will be available, whereas in view of Rule 15(iii) of the Rules, the Election Tribunal being a persona designata and the order being final, such opportunity is not available and even in this view of the matter, the said GO is liable to be held as bad in law. In the decision referred (supra), Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 was held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the said Act does not repeal the remedy of eviction under ordinary law. In the decision referred (supra), at page 2022 the Apex Court held as follows :
"Where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case and Suraj Mall Mohta's case , without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Article 14. Even there, as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohta 's case, a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases it from the preamble and surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of the statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case and Jyoti Pershad's case the statute will not be hit by Article 14. Then again where the statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldar's case and Bajorai's case , the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason of authority."
Placing strong reliance on these decisions a contention was advanced that where there are two procedures for determination and enforcement of the liability operating in the same field without any guiding policy or principle, the law providing for more drastic and prejudicial procedure should be condemned as discriminatory and void. In otherwords, what is contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner is that since the remedy provided under G.O. Ms. No. lll is a harsher remedy, the said GO has to be declared as illegal. In the decision referred (supra), while dealing with the jurisdiction of the District Munsif to decide questions of disqualifications under Section 9 of the A.P. Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959, it was held :
"A reading of Section 11 discloses that the District Munsif has jurisdiction to decide whether or not a member in respect of whom the question arose is disqualified under Section 10 of the Act. There is no reference in Section 11 to the disqualifications specified in Section 9 of the Act. However, under Section 10(1)(a) a member of a Panchayat Samithi shall cease to be a member if he is or becomes disqualified on account of any of the disqualifications specified in Section 9. Section 10(1)(a) instead of enumerating or reiterating the disqualifications once again, has referred to the disqualifications specified in Section 9. It is pertinent to note that the disqualifications specified in Section 9 are subject to the provisions of Section 11."
In Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P. and others, , a direction issued by High Court in writ petition not to declare the result of the Panchayat elections and to conduct fresh poll, was held to be illegal. In the decision referred (supra), it was held that when election process has been set in motion, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the same giving directions to the Election Officer to stall the proceedings or to conduct election process afresh. Reliance also was placed on the decisions referred (supra). In Garla Sheshamma and another v. The Presiding Officer, Mandal Parishad, Gudluru, Prakasam District and others, 1997 (4) ALD 588 = 1997 (2) An.WR 285 (DB), it was held that it may be important to note that Section 233 of the Act provides that no election held under the Act shall be called in question except by election petition presented to such authority and in accordance with such rules as may be made in that behalf. In Shaik Khasim Bee v. PH. Magistrate (Election Tribunal), (DB), it was held that there is no substance in the argument that Rule 15(ii)(b) of the Rules is either illegal, arbitrary or unconstitutional and there is no basis to say that the said rule offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance also was placed on Gadi Koppula Rajamauli v. Election Tribunal (Senior Civil Judge, Adilabad and others), .
13. G.O. Ms. No. lll, which is questioned in the present writ petition had been issued by the Panchayat Raj, Rural Development and Relief (Election-Ill) Department, dated 3-3-1995 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 233(1) and Section 268 of the Act. Rule 12(a) specifies "that on the date of his election a Returned Candidate is not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act." Under Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act, the words employed are "......... is not qualified or has become disqualified under Section 17. Section 18, Section 19 or Section 20 by any voter or authority to the executive authority in writing........" A careful reading of G.O. Ms. No. 111, the Rules framed under the rule making power under Section 22 of the Act, it is clear that even the procedure to be followed under both the provisions appear to be different. Apart from this aspect of the matter, merely because two remedies had been provided for, the other remedy cannot be held to be either illegal or invalid. What had been contended by the Counsel for the writ petitioner is that in the absence of any guidelines in the mode of exercise of the power under these provisions, it can be said that G.O. Ms. No. 111 is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As already referred to supra, Article 243-F of the Constitution of India deals with disqualification of membership and Clause (2) specifies that if any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. Article 243-O deals with Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters and Clause (b) specifies that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. In the light of these constitutional provisions, while exercising the rule making power under the Act, G.O. Ms. No. 111 had been issued and the mere fact that the orders specified under Rule 15 had been made final, by itself cannot render the G.O. itself illegal or invalid. Though contentions had been advanced about the pre-election disqualifications and post-election disqualifications, on an over-all reading of all the provisions - both the constitutional provisions and the statutory provisions as well governing this field, I am of the considered opinion that though the nature of disputes at certain times may overlap falling under Section 22 of the Act and G.O. Ms. No. 1ll, in substance these two provisions operate in different fields and all the reliefs which can be granted under G.O. Ms. No. 111 cannot be granted under Section 22 of the Act. Apart from it, as already referred to supra, the procedure also is different. However, the mere fact that limitation for a shorter period is specified under the GO by itself may not invalidate the GO. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the mere attachment of finality to an order under the rules by itself also may not render a provision either illegal or invalid. Further more, sufficient procedural safeguards have been provided for as can be seen under Rules 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Rules and hence on a careful reading of all the Rules under G.O. Ms. No. 11l and also the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that G.O. Ms. No. 111 cannot be said to be invalid or illegal or unconstitutional being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India on any of the grounds raised by the writ petitioner.
14. It is no doubt true that under Rule 15(iii) the Rules, it is specified that the order of Election Tribunal under Sub-rules (i) and (ii) shall be final. Rule 2(2) of the Rules specifies :
"The Election Tribunal shall be,
(i) Except in cases following under Clause (ii)
(a) the District Munsif, if there is more than one District Munsif, the Principal District Munsif, having territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the office of Gram Panchayat is located, in respect of the election of Members, Sarpanch as and Upa-Sarpanch as of Gram Panchayat.
(b) the Subordinate Judge of if there is more than one Subordinate Judge at the headquarters, having territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the office of Mandal Parishad or Zilla Parishad as the case may be, is located, in respect of the election disputes and matters pertaining to the election of President, Vice-President and Members of Mandal Parishad Territorial Constituencies and Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of Zilla Parishad Territorial Constituencies.
The explanation to Rule 2 says "For purposes of these rules, the expressions "Subordinate Judge" and "District Judge" and "District Munsif" shall in relation to the Scheduled areas mean the Agency Divisional Officer". Sub-rule (3) says :
"An Election Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under these rules shall be deemed to exercise such jurisdiction as a persona designata and not in his capacity as a Judge of other Officer of the Government, as the case may be."
The Subordinate Judge and District Munsif are now designated as Senior Civil Judge and Junior Civil Judge, respectively. It is needless to point out that though the Election Tribunal exercises jurisdiction as persona designata under the rules, in view of Rule 7 of the Rules, the Election Tribunal shall have the powers which are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying the suit in respect of matters specified in Rule 7(ii) of the Rules. Hence, in the light of the same, the Election Tribunal is expected to record evidence of the witnesses, mark the documents and decide the dispute in accordance with law. In such a case, attaching finality to the order of Election Tribunal under Sub-rules (i) and (ii), thus virtually affording the parties only an opportunity of questioning the said orders by invoking the constitutional remedies, may not be advisable or desirable. No doubt, the learned Additional Advocate-General had vehemently contended that though finality is attached to the order of an Election Tribunal, despite the same, always a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is available to an aggrieved party. As already observed by me, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary constitutional remedy and it is also well settled by a catena of decisions that the powers scope and ambit of judicial review in such cases are very limited. As far as appreciation of facts is concerned, it is always desirable to have an appellate Forum as a Court or an appellate Tribunal empowered to appreciate the evidence on record and decide the matter. However, while making the rules, for reasons best known, finality is attached to the orders of Election Tribunal made under Sub-rules (i) and (ii) of Rule 15 of the Rules. In my considered opinion, as already stated supra, even though the Tribunal is a persona designata it is always desirable to have an appellate Forum like one that of concerned District Judge of the District. I do hope that the State Government will consider this suggestion in right spirit and proper perspective, especially in the light of ditterent provisions of the Rules under G.O. Ms. No. 111. Except making these observations, I do not mink that any other relief can be granted in this writ petition.
15. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.