Allahabad High Court
Kafeel vs State Of U.P And 3 Others on 20 March, 2023
Author: Karunesh Singh Pawar
Bench: Karunesh Singh Pawar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved in court No.86 on 21.09.2022 Delivered on 20.3.2023 through Video Conferencing from Lucknow IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 25 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 3982 of 2021 Applicant :- Kafeel Opposite Party :- State Of U.P And 3 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Rahul Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Karunesh Singh Pawar,J.
1. By this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the entire proceedings of CNR No. UPJB010048152019 (State Vs Shahnawaj alias Shanu & others) pending before the Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court-11, Amroha including Charge Sheet No. 01/2019 dated 11.09.2019 submitted by the Investigating Officer before the Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court-11, Amroha in Case Crime No.0193/2019 under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 Police Station Amroha City, District Jyotiba Phule Nagar, order of cognizance dated 27.09.2019 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 4, Amroha in CNR No. UPJB010048152019 (State Vs Shahnawaj alias Shanu & others) as well as Non- Bailable Warrants dated 28.08.2020, 21.10.2020 and 10.12.2020 issued by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 4, Amroha against the applicant. Further prayer has also been made for quashing the approval order dated 19.03.2019 passed by the District Magistrate, Amroha upon the gang chart which has been recommended by the Superintendent of Police, Amroha on 19.03.2019 so far as it relates to the applicant.
2. Brief facts of the case are that an F.I.R. dated 13.08.2018 was lodged under Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 at Police Station Amroha City, District Jyotiba Phule Nagar which was registered as Case Crime No. 0492/2018. The prosecution version as contained in the First Information Report dated 13.08.2018 is being translated into English and quoted as under:-
"The police party in its regular check and patrolling reached Kakar Saral Mod where a tip was received that in Mohalla Moti Shah one Shahnawa) allas Shanu son of Shafeek and others are selling cow meat after slaughtering it, if they immediately reach, the accused can be nabbed. No one agreed to be a prosecution witness and therefore, the police party reached the house of Shahnawaj alias Shanu. It was a two-storied house. The tip informed that Shahnawaj alias Shanu was slaughtering the cow and selling its meat, thereafter the tip went away. Three persons were arrested; one of them disclosed his Identity as Shahnawaj alias Shanu from whom a knife was recovered. Another person named Naeem was also arrested from whom another knife recovered. Third person named Kafeel (applicant) was arrested from whom two Kilogram of cow meat was recovered from his right hand in a polythene bag. 60 kilogram cow meat was lying on floor. Shahnawaj and Naeem told that they have procured the cow meat with the help of another accused person Rafi Ahmad. Veterinary Doctor was contacted on phone, who arrived at the crime scene. The Veterinary Doctor prima facie expressed his opinion of cow meat on Inspection of the meat lying on floor. Two knives, two gandasa, and iron hook, one large needle and a wooden plank were recovered".
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the co-accused Shahnawaj @ Shanu has a slaughter license under Food Safety and Standard Authority of India which is on record as Annexure No. 7 to the petition.
4. It is further submitted on behalf of the applicant that from perusal of the license, it is apparent that Shahnawaj @ Shanu is a valid license holder and is a licensed butcher having a shop in the name and style of Shahnawaj Buffalo Meat Shop. As per the prosecution case, knifes were recovered from the possession of Shahnawaj @ Shanu. It is also submitted that since he is licensee butcher, therefore, the recovery of knife shown from him is nothing but a police heroic. The investigating officer has investigated the case and the statements of the witnesses were recorded which are on record as annexure No. 8. He further submits that from perusal of the statements, it is evident that there is no independent witnesses to the incident. Charge sheet in the aforesaid crime No. 0492/2018 came to be filed on 11.10.2018 before the CJM, Amroha against the four named accused persons including the applicant, upon which the cognizance was taken on 12.10.2018 and the accused persons were summoned before the trial court.
5. It is further submitted on behalf of the applicant that from the prosecution case in the police report, it is evident that the only allegation against the applicant is that he was caught with 2 kg of meat in his right hand in the polythene. It is also submitted that there is no independent witness to testify the alleged crime as the F.I.R. explicitly states that none was ready to be witness of the said raid. All the prosecution witnesses are members of the police party who raided the house of Shahnawaj @ Shanu who is a licensed butcher. It is next submitted that the alleged recovery of 2 kg meat from the applicant is planted.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that there is no material collected by the Investigating Officer to invoke the Gangsters Act. The gang chart has been prepared in cyclostyle manner which shows total non-application of mind. In the gang chart, only one case of cow slaughter has been shown. The applicant has no criminal history except the sole case i.e. case crime No. 492/2018, under Sections 3/5/8 of the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955. There is no input in the police report and no material at all to bring this offence under the definition of gang. No subjective satisfaction has been recorded by the District Magistrate, Amroha. Gang chart has been prepared and recommended by the various authorities in a very short time in a mechanical manner without there being any subjective satisfaction.
7. It is further submitted on behalf of the applicant that there is no report of any veterinary doctor and no sampling of the alleged recovered meat has been sent for the forensic science laboratory. The ingredients to invoke of Section 2(d) of the Act are absent. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the applicant has relied on the judgments of this High Court passed in the case of Tej Singh and others Vs. State of U.P., in Application U/S 482 No. 3239/2005, Arjun Vs. State of U.P. in Writ Petition No. 642 of 2021 and Pankaj Singh Vs. State of U.P. in criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5707/2021.
8. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has opposed the petition submitting that on the basis of a solitary case, gangster can be invoked. In support of his contention, he has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court passed in the case of "Shraddha Gupta v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 514".
9. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
10. It is admitted case of the prosecution that the accused-applicant has been apprehended while he was standing and holding 2 kg meat in his right hand. The main accused Shahnawaj @ Shanu is admittedly a licensed butcher and was having a shop in the area. There is no allegation in the entire prosecution case that the alleged offence has been committed to make undue economic gain, to perpetrate some terror or to continue any such criminal activities which by and large are detrimental to the safety and security of the society. The definition of the gang has been provided under Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act which is reproduced as under:-
..........2. Definitions. - In this Act,-
(a) "Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974);
(b) "Gang" means a group of persons, who acting either singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person, indulge in anti-social activities, namely-
(i) offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or
(ii) distilling or manufacturing or .storing or transporting or importing or exporting or selling or distributing any liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous drugs, or other intoxicants or narcotics or cultivating any plant, in contravention of any of the provisions of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 1910), or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985), or any other law for the time being in force, or
(iii) occupying or taking possession of immovable property otherwise than in accordance with law, or setting-up false claims for title or possession of immovable property whether in himself or any other person, or
(iv) preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant or any witness from discharging his lawful duties, or
(v) offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act No. 104 of 1956), or
(vi) offences punishable under Section 3 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 (Act No. 3 of 1867), or
(vii) preventing any person from offering bids in auction lawfully conducted, or tender, lawfully invited, by or on behalf of any Government department, local body or public or private undertaking, for any lease or rights or supply of goods or work to be done, or
(viii) preventing or disturbing the smooth running by any person of his lawful business, profession, trade or employment or any other lawful activity connected therewith, or
(ix) offences punishable under Section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or in preventing or obstructing any public election being lawfully held, by physically preventing the voter from exercising his electoral rights, or
(x) inciting others to resort to violence to disturb communal harmony, or
(xi) creating panic, alarm or terror in public, or
(xii) terrorising or assaulting employees or owners or occupiers of public or private undertakings or factories and causing mischief in respect of their properties, or
(xiii) inducing or attempting to induce any person to go to foreign countries on false representation that any employment, trade or profession shall be provided to him in such foreign country, or
(xiv) kidnapping or abducting any person with intent to extort ransom, or
(xv) diverting or otherwise preventing any aircraft or public transport vehicle from following its scheduled course;
[(xvi) offences punishable under the Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976;
(xvii) illegally transporting and/or smuggling of cattle and indulging in acts in contravention of the provisions in the Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960;
(xviii) human trafficking for purposes of commercial exploitation, bonded labour, child labour, sexual exploitation, organ removing and trafficking, beggary and the like activities.
(xix) offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1966:
(xx) printing, transporting and circulating of fake Indian currency notes;
(xxi) involving in production, sale and distribution of spurious drugs;
(xxii) involving in manufacture, sale and transportation of arms and ammunition in contravention of Sections 5, 7 and 12 of the Arms Act, 1959;
(xxiii) felling or killing for economic gains, smuggling of products in contravention of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and Wildlife Protection Act, 1972;
(xxiv) offences punishable under the Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979;
(xvv) indulging in crimes that impact security of State, public order and even tempo of life.]
(c) "gangster" means a member or leader or organiser of a gang and includes any person who abets or assists in the activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b), whether before or after the commission of such activities or harbours any person who has indulged in such activities;
(d) "public servant" means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or any other law for the time being in force, and includes any person who lawfully assists the police or other authorities of the State, in investigation or prosecution or punishment of an offence punishable under this Act, whether by giving information or evidence relating to such offence or offender or in any other manner;
(e) "member of the family of a public servant" means his parents or spouse and brother, sister, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter or the spouses of any of them, and includes a person dependent on or residing with the public servant and a pen on in whose welfare the public servant is interested;
(f) words and phrases used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the Indian Penal Code shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in such Codes.
11. A perusal of the definition of the gang shows that it is, a group of persons, who acting either singly or collectively by causing violence or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion, or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person.
12. A perusal of the entire prosecution case depicts that it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused has committed any violence, or extended any threat or has intimidated or has done coercion with the object of disturbing public order or the offence has been done for gaining any undue temporal pecuniary material or other advantage either for himself or any other person indulged in antisocial activities which are defined in Section 2(b)(1) of the Gangsters Act. The word or otherwise used in Section 2(b) of the Act has to be interpreted in context of the preceding words such as violence, threat, show of violence, intimidation or coercion, it cannot be assigned general meaning in order to invoke the Gangsters Act. In order to invoke the gangster in the case in hand, it has to be seen what was the object of the offence or the motive behind it. If the motive was of gaining undue temporal pecuniary or material advantage then the case is different. From the material gathered by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the accused had the aforesaid motive to interpret the general word used in section 2(d) of the Act i.e. 'other advantage'. The rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' has to be invoked. The Coordinate Bench of this Court while relying on the judgment of the Apex Court passed in the case of "Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Ramdev Tobacco Co., (1991) 2 SCC 119" and while invoking the rule of Ejusdem Generis has interpreted the word 'other advantage' which finds place in Section 2 of the Act and has held that the phrase 'other advantage' must take its hue from the accompanying words which immediately precede the same and which have a qualifying effect. The relevant part of the judgment of Tej Singh (supra), is extracted below:-
After having perused the record, this Court finds itself in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants that though the accused are facing the allegations of having committed murder but they cannot be said to have committed the crime because they were gangsters. There was no motive of making any wrongful economic gains. This Court also does not see any material on the basis of which it may be held that the prime object behind committing the crime in question was so as to disturb the public order. Whenever some grave crime is committed it always leads to a consequential result of some kind of disturbance in society. Such normal disturbance in society and disturbing the public order or creating panic or terror are different species. Ordinary law and order problems can not be clubbed with phenomenon of break of public order. The crime in question does not appear to have been committed with the object of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other similar kind of advantage for itself or for any other person indulged in anti-social activities.
Here in this context it may also be seen that in the definition of 'gang' as provided under Section -2(b) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as Act) reference to the words 'gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage' for himself or any other person has been given. One might argue that the words 'other advantage' is an all inclusive term and all kinds and categories of advantages will come under its title, and therefore, there is hardly any need to see the facts of the case with a fine class in order to find whether the object of the gang is or was of gaining undue temporal, pecuniary and material advantage or not. If the violence or offence committed was inspired to get any kind of advantage for himself or for any other person, the letter of definition as provided by the Act shall stand satisfied. But in the considered opinion of this Court such kind of approach will lead to complete misinterpretation of the Statute. If the Legislature in its wisdom has used a number of qualifying words with regard to Anti Social Activity as has been referred to and contemplated in the Act, then its whole purpose shall stand defeated by providing such an all sweeping meaning to the words 'other advantage' as has been used in the definition. If the term 'other advantage' was meant to include all advantages or was meant to include any kind of advantage whatsoever where was the need to use different other defining words like 'temporal, pecuniary and material' which immediately precede the words 'or other advantage' ! It is self evident that the use of the preceding words have a qualifying effect and must be seen lending its complexion to the subsequently used words 'other advantage'. The words 'other advantage' has got to be seen in the context and perspective and with reference to the preceding aforesaid words and must be understood in the same light. Just as a man is often known by the company he keeps, the import of words in Statute also are often to be seen and understood by the company of the words in which they appear. In this regard this Court deems it appropriate to keep in perspective the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' in order to correctly appreciate the scope and the actual ambit of the general words which follow the aforesaid specific words used in the Statute. The Court is of the view that the aforesaid preceding words 'temporal, pecuniary and material' are constituting a genus and the words 'other advantage' has to be read as an species of the same. Though ordinarily the general words must be provided to bear their natural and larger meaning but they have to be confined Ejusdem generis to the class of things previously enumerated by certain specific words because it is not difficult to see clearly the intention of the Statute which it spells out by using a specific class and category of qualifying words. This Court sees reasons and therefore feels persuaded to limit the scope of the meaning of the general words 'other advantage' because if we provide to it a larger all embracing meaning it is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. The general expression has to be read contemplating to imply the things of the same kind which have been referred to by the preceding specific class of things constituting a genus. If we do not adhere to this rule and do not impute specific complexion to the general words in the light of the preceding words the blatant misuse and plain absurdity to which it shall lead is that the administrative executives and the police would feel free to impose the provisions of this Act upon anybody and everybody who is facing the charge of committing any sort of offence or any breach of law howsoever trivial it be because hardly any violence or threat or show of violence or intimidation or coercion is done without having the object of gaining some kind of advantage himself or for any other person. The word 'advantage' has an all sweeping natural meaning and may include material and psychological both kinds of advantages. In that view of the matter the use of the words 'other advantage' will bring in its mischief everything under the sun. It is therefore very expediently needed to read these words in right perspective and read them Ejusdem generis with the things or words previously enumerated by the Statute. In order to substantiate its view this Court finds strength from the pronouncement given by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company, 1991 AIR (SC) 506. In this case the principle of Ejusdem generis was expatiated upon at some length and was also brought into application while giving interpretation to the issues involved in the case with which it was dealing. It would be profitable to extract the relevant portion of the pronouncement which reads as under:-
"5. But the question is whether the issuance of a show cause notice and the initiation of the consequential adjudication proceedings can be described as `other legal proceedings' within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act? If the said departmental action falls within the expression `other legal proceeding' there can be no doubt that the action would be barred as the same indisputably was initiated six months after the accrual of the cause action. So the crucial question is whether the issuance of the show cause notice dated August 30, 1972 and the passing of the impugned order in adjudication proceedings emanating therefrom constitutes `other legal proceeding' within the meaning of section 40 (2) of the Act to fall within the mischief of that sub-section which bars such proceedings if commenced after a period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the expression `other legal proceeding' must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding expressions `suit' and `prosecution' and if so read it becomes crystal clear that the department's action cannot come within the purview of `other legal proceeding'. How valid is this contention is the question which we are called upon to answer in the present appeal.
6. The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words (which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus) is required to be determined. By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words constituting a genus is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them, unless the context otherwise requires. General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect. Courts have also limited the scope of the general words in cases where a larger meaning is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To put it differently, the general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specific things constituting a genus, unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statute gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But unless there is genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words.
7. There can be little doubt that the words `other legal proceeding' are wide enough to include adjudication and penalty proceedings under the Act. Even the learned Additional Solicitor General did not contend to the contrary but what he said was that since this wide expression is preceded by particular words of a certain genus, namely, words indicating reference to proceedings taken in courts only, the wide words must be limited to things ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding words and should, therefore, receive a limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type in question. There can be no doubt that `suit' or `prosecution' are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one. The use of the expression `instituted' in section 40 (2) strengthens this belief. Since this sub-section has been construed by this Court in Raju's case (supra) not to be confined in its application to only Government servants but to extend to others including the assessees and since the words `for anything done or ordered to be done under this Act' are found to be comprehensive enough to include acts of non-compliance or omissions to do what the Act and the Rule enjoin, the limitation prescribed by section 40(2) would undoubtedly hit the adjudication and penalty proceedings unless the expression `other legal proceeding' is read ejusdem generis to limit its ambit to legal proceedings initiated in a court of law.
8. The scope of section 40(2) as it stood before its amendment pursuant to Raju's case came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Universal Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, [1977 Tax LR 1825]: 1977 ELT (J92) wherein the question raised for determination was whether penalty proceedings taken under Rule 173Q for the infraction of Rule 173C with a view to evading payment of duty fell within the expression `other legal proceeding' used in the said sub- section. The High Court conceded that the expression when read in isolation is wide enough to include any proceeding taken in accordance with law, whether so taken in a court of law or before any authority or tribunal but when read with the preceding words `suit' or `prosecution' it must be given a restricted meaning. This is how the High Court expressed itself at page J 106 (at page 1838 of Tax. L.R.):
"Now the language of section 40(2) is: `no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted'. `Suit' and `prosecution' which precede the expression `other legal proceeding' can be taken only in a Court of Law".
After stating the expanse of the ejusdem generis rule, as explained in Amar Chandra v. Excise Collector, Tripura, AIR. 1972 SC 1863 at 1868 (Sutherland, Volume 2 pages 399-400) the High Court observed that there was no indication in the said sub-section or elsewhere in the Act that the said general words were intended to receive their wide meaning and were not to be construed in a limited sense with the aid of the ejusdem generis rule. A departmental proceeding like penalty proceedings were, therefore, placed outside the scope of the said sub-section. This view was quoted with approval by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in C.C. Industries & Others v. H.N. Ray, 1980 ELT 442 at 453. These two cases, therefore, clearly support the view canvassed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General.
9. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. In considering the scope of the expression `other legal proceeding' we have confined ourselves to the language of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision. On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression `other legal proceeding' must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words `suit' and `prosecution' as they constitute a genus. In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication proceedings in question did not fall within the expression `other legal proceeding' employed in section 40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and therefore, the said proceedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the said sub-section."
Illumined by the aforesaid view adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court sees good reason to hold that the use of phrase 'other advantage' as it finds place in the Act must take its hue from the accompanying words which immediately precede the same and which have a qualifying effect.
13. Thus, in absence of allegation of violence, threat or show of violence or intimidation or coercion or otherwise, I am of the view that first information report registered against the applicant under Section 3(1) of the Act cannot be sustained. Further the words "or otherwise" used in the first part of section 2(b) of the Act, shall derive its meaning from the preceding words and it shall not include all general acts/offences which are trivial in nature, for the purpose of the Section 2(b) of the Act. So far as the contention of learned A.G.A. that on a solitary case, the gangsters can be invoked is concerned, there is no quarrel on this point. The law is settled. The Apex Court has already settled the controversy in the case of Shraddha Gupta (supra) wherein in para 10 it has been held that there can be prosecution against a person even in a case of a single offence/F.I.R./charge sheet for any of the antisocial activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act provided such antisocial activity is by violence or threat or by show of violence or intimidation or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal pecuniary material or advantage for himself or any other person. In the present case, it is alleged that the petitioner herein was apprehended with 2 kg meat in his right hand. There is no allegation of any of the antisocial activities mentioned in Section 2 of the Act such as violence, threat, show of violence, intimidation, coercion etc., therefore, it cannot be said that the said offence was committed by the applicant for object of disturbing public order or of gaining undue temporal pecuniary material or other advantage for himself or any other person.
14. It is settled that for a solitary case, the gangster can be imposed against the accused persons, if the offence is found to have been committed for any of the antisocial activity mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act. It is not the case here. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the charge sheet has been filed for any of the antisocial activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act as discussed above. The accused may commit such kind of offence just once or he may commit several offences and could face more than one F.I.R.s in that connection, the numbers of the F.I.R.s are irrelevant. The motive behind the offence and the object has to be seen in order to arrive at a conclusion whether the provision of the gangsters act can be invoked in a given case or not. The motive and the object are clearly missing, thus, the case could not have been brought under the provision of the Act.
15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the entire criminal proceedings as well as charge sheet under the Act as well as consequential proceedings are quashed. The application is allowed.
Let copy of this order sent to the learned trial court forthwith (Karunesh Singh Pawar,J.) Order Date :- 20.03.2023 RC