Delhi District Court
Kamla Gupta vs Nirmala Nath @ Gupta on 22 January, 2024
IN THE COURT OF CCJ CUM ARC, CENTRAL, TIS
HAZARI COURTS
RC ARC No. 584/2017
Smt. Kamla Gupta Vs. Smt. Nirmala Nath @ Gupta
CNR No. DLCT03-004548-2017
In the matter of :
Smt. Kamla Gupta,
W/o Late Sh. Durga Prasad Gupta,
R/o B-15, Sector-33,
Noida, UP. ...Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Nirmala Nath @ Gupta (Deceased),
Through Legal Heir,
Ms. Illashree Nath Gupta,
W/o Sh. Ved Gupta,
R/o 75, Creekside Road,
Hopewell Junction,
New York, USA. ...Respondent
Eviction Petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958
Date of Institution : 05.07.2017
Date on which judgment was reserved : 15.07.2023
Date of Decision : 22.01.2024
Decision : Petition Allowed
JUDGMENT
1. This is an eviction petition for recovery of back portion consisting of two rooms, situated on the first floor, extended chajja and converted into kitchen, side balcony with common bathroom and latrine, and temporary shed/barsati, situated on the second floor, forming part of the property bearing municipal No. 4911, plot No. 98, block R, ward No. XI, RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.1/60 Daryaganj, Delhi as shown in red colour in the site plan (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) against the respondent u/s 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act).
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the the petitioner is the owner and landlady of the ground floor portion consisting of one drawing cum dinning, kitchen, bathroom and a store as well as back side portion at first floor i.e. tenanted premises, forming part of property bearing municipal No. 4911, Plot No.98, block R, ward No.XI, Daryaganj, Delhi by virtue of Will dated 21.9.1984 executed by mother of the petitioner i.e. Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. That the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent and her husband in the year 1973-74 but unfortunately, the husband of the respondent expired and after his demise, the respondent became sole tenant in respect of tenanted premises. That Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, predecessor in interest of the petitioner, had filed an eviction petition under section 14 (1)
(a) of DRC Act, 1958 against the respondent and the respondent was granted benefit under section 14 (2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 vide order dated 07.08.1998 passed by Ms. Ravinder Kaur, the then ARC, Delhi, in eviction petition bearing No. E- 372/88. That inspite of the said court order, the respondent was not complying with the said order and had been committing default in making the payment of rent.
3. It is further stated that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for her own personal use and requirement as well as for needs of her family members, who are dependent upon the petitioner. That the family of the petitioner is consisting RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.2/60 of petitioner herself and her three sons namely Deepak Gupta, Pradeep Gupta, Manoj Gupta. That all sons of the petitioner are married and having their respective families. That Sh. Deepak Gupta is having his wife and two children. That Sh. Pradeep Gupta is having his wife and two children. That Sh. Manoj Gupta is having his wife and two children. That the petitioner along- with her two sons Deepak Gupta and Pradeep Gupta are residing in Noida (UP) as she has no accommodation to live in Delhi. That Sh. Manoj Gupta and his family is settled in abroad. That the petitioner and her family members wish to shift to Delhi for the betterment of her grand children. That grand daughters of the petitioner namely Apoorva Gupta (aged about 21 years) and Smiti Gupta (aged about 18 years) are studying in JNU, IIT, New Delhi and Hansraj College, University of Delhi, respectively. That Sh. Deepak Gupta is working as General Manager in a private company in Saket, New Delhi. That the son and grand children of the petitioner are finding it very difficult to up and down Delhi on daily basis. Thus, the petitioner and her family members wish to shift to Delhi but due to paucity of accommodation, they are unable to fulfill their desire.
4. It is further stated that the petitioner and her family members do not own any property in Delhi. That the son of the petitioner namely Sh. Pradeep Gupta is owner of property No. B- 15, Sector 33, Noida consisting of two stories. That apart from this property, the petitioner and her family members do not have any other property. That the petitioner and her family consisting of nine members, who are living together, wish to shift to Delhi. The accommodation available with the petitioner in the said premises is only one drawing cum dinning, kitchen, store, which RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.3/60 is not sufficient to accommodate nine family members, therefore, the petitioner bona fide requires the tenanted premises in possession of the respondent. That except the aforementioned property, the petitioner is neither owner nor in possession of, any other reasonably suitable accommodation and the tenanted premises is required by the petitioner for her bona fide need. Hence, the present petition.
5. Upon receipt of the petition, the respondent appeared and filed leave to defend application along with affidavit. Vide order dated 19.03.2018, the leave to defend application filed by the respondent was allowed and the respondent was granted leave to contest the present petition. As a consequence of granting leave to defend, the respondent filed written statement stating the following:
(a) That the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition as the petitioner is neither the owner nor the landlord of the respondent qua the tenanted premises. That the petitioner has relied upon alleged Will dated 21.09.184 but the said Will has not been filed on record. That the petitioner has also relied upon alleged Will dated 14.12.1987 which is a forged and fabricated. That Sh. Jagdish Rai Seengal was very much alive in the year 1985.
(b) That there has never existed an tenant- landlord relationship between the respondent and the petitioner as the respondent had already purchased the premises in question including the front portion of the ground floor of the property from its erstwhile owner Sh. Jagdish Rai Seengal vide agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 for a valuable consideration of Rs.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.4/60 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs) and the said amount was paid by three bank cheques to the said Sh. Jagdish Rai Seengal. Thus, it is clear that the respondent is the owner of the property including premises in question since the year 1982 and, admittedly, her ownership of the premises in question has never been under challenge from anyone.
(c) That the present petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e. Smt. Prabha Aggarwal and Smt. Pragya Aggarwal, who both are allegedly claiming their ownership rights over the property by virtue of registered gift deed dated 12.06.2017.
(d) That the petitioner, in the garb of the present petition, is seeking the relief of declaration of title of the suit property and accordingly, the present petition is not maintainable as only the civil court has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the title of the immovable property.
(e) That the present petition is not maintainable as the present case is a case of partial eviction and the petitioner has filed a wrong site plan of the suit property and even has not shown the complete tenanted premises in suit. That the tenanted premises of the respondent consist of a portion on the ground floor, rear side first floor and rear side second floor which had been under exclusive use and occupation of the respondent. That the tenanted premises cannot be bifurcated and the petition be filed only in respect of a portion of the tenanted premises.
(f) That the petitioner has filed the present petition on the basis of concocted story and on the basis of the forged, fabricated and manipulated documents. That the RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.5/60 petitioner has concealed the true and material facts and has malafidely projected a false bonafide requirement.
(f) That there had been no litigation between Smt. Bhagwanti Devi and the respondent qua the suit premises and no eviction petition under section 14(1)(a) of DRC Act was ever filed or adjudicated.
(g) That the present petition has been filed by the petitioner on false and concocted grounds and is liable to be dismissed. That the petitioner has nowhere stated in the entire eviction petition that she requires the premises in question for her bonafide requirement and that she is the owner of the premises in question.
(h) That the petitioner in eviction petition, has only expressed her wish to shift to Delhi and that does not satisfy the requirement under section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act.
(i) That the petitioner is already in possession of rear side two rooms on the ground floor besides one room, one hall, kitchen and two bathrooms on the first floor. The said accommodation is lying vacant. That the front three rooms with open space on the ground floor shown as mark A, B, C and D is part of the tenanted premises which have been broken into by the petitioner and the petitioner is in illegal possession of the same.
(j) That the petitioner has taken a false plea on oath before this court that she does not have any other accommodation in Delhi besides the premises in question. That 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi is also in the ownership of the petitioner. That the petitioner claimed herself to be a resident of Noida, UP but she has been residing at property RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.6/60 No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi, which is the ancestral property of husband of the petitioner. That this property consists of ground and first floor and each floor consists of six big rooms besides drawing cum dining room, stores, kitchen, toilet on each floor and the said entire ground floor and half first floor are in possession of the petitioner and her son Deepak Gupta and his family members.
6. The petitioner filed her replication to the written statement of the respondent, wherein petitioner re-affirmed and re-iterated the facts mentioned in the petition and denied the defences taken by the respondent.
7. In support of their case, petitioner examined Sh. Pradeep Gupta as PW1 who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A relied upon following documents :
(i) Original Power Attorney in favour of PW-1 Ex. PW- 1/1 (objected to mode of proof),
(ii) Will of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi Seengal Ex. PW-1/2 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof),
(iii) Death certificate of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi Ex. PW-
1/3 (OSR),
(iv) Copy of letter of administration in respect of Will of
Shri Jagdish Rai Seengal Ex. PW-1/4,
(v) Site plan of the suit property Ex. PW-1/5,
(vi) Certified copy of statement of Shri Rajesh Goel and
Smt. Rajni Atal alongwith order dated 13.04.2011 Ex. PW-1/6,
(vii) complaint made by the petitioner against the respondent and others vide DD No. 33B dated 16.07.2017 RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.7/60 Ex. PW-1/7 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof),
(viii) certified copy of FIR no. 499/1999 PS Darya Ganj Ex. PW-1/8 (objected to mode of proof),
(ix) Passbook of Shri Jagdish Rai Seengal with Punjab National Bank, Jawahar Ganj, Jabalpur Ex. PW-1/9 (OSR),
(x) Dairy of Mr. J.R. Seengal Ex. PW-1/10 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
(xi) Certified copy of Will dated 21.09.1984 Ex PW1/11 (objected to mode of proof),
(xii) Copy of agreement dated 12.08.1988 Mark C,
(xiii) Form 34A Ex. PW-1/13 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof),
(xiv) Certified copy of the judgment dated 21.08.1999 Ex. PW-1/14,
(xv) Certified copy of the order dated 21.04.2005 Ex. PW-1/15, (xvi) House tax receipt dated 25.06.2015 Ex. PW-1/16 (OSR), (xvii) Possession memo dated 12.05.2005 Ex. PW-1/17 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof), (xviii) Certified copy of the judgment dated 07.08.1998. Ex. PW-1/18, (xix) Letters dated 19.08.1986, 06.02.1987. 21.04.1989 and 23.09.1996 Ex. PW-1/19 (Colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
(xx) Letters from Bhikki Lal Goyal (running into 14 pages) Ex. PW-1/20 (colly) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.8/60 (xxi) House Tax Bill for the year 1985-86 Ex. PW-1/21 (OSR), (xxii) House Tax payment receipts (running into 17 pages) Ex. PW-1/22 (colly.) (OSR).
(xxiii) Self assessment form (running into 4 pages) Ex. PW-1/23 (colly.) (OSR), (xxiv) Application filed by the petitioner for releasing of arrears of rent Mark D. (xxv) Rent receipts (running into 3 pages) Ex. PW-1/25 (colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof). (xxvi) Rent receipt dated 15.05.1996 Ex. PW-1/26 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
(xxvii) Letter sent by respondent to the petitioner (running into 8 pages) Ex. PW-1/27 (colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
(xxviii) Letters received by the petitioner from Shri Amitabh Narain, Advocate (running into 3 pages) Ex. PW- 1/28 (colly) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof), (xxix) Rent receipt issued by petitioner (running to 3 pages) Ex. PW-1/29 (colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof).
(xxx) Letter received by petitioner (running into 9 pages) Ex. PW-1/30 (colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof). (xxxi) Letter dated 31.10.2002 written to MCD Ex. PW- 1/31 (OSR), (xxxii) Letter dated 02.04.1986 written to respondent Ex. PW-1/32 (objected to mode of proof), (xxxiii) Letter dated 10.05.1997 written to the respondent and her husband Ex. PW-1/33 (OSR) (objected to mode of RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.9/60 proof), (xxxiv) Original rent receipt dated 14.10.2010 Ex. PW- 1/35 (objected to mode of proof), (xxxv) Original letters dated 07.02.2013 and 24.08.2013 alongwith there envelopes Ex. PW-1/36 (colly.) (objected to mode of proof), (xxxvi) GPA in favour of Shri Rajesh Goyal Mark E, (xxxvii) Election I-card of petitioner Ex. PW-1/39 (OSR), (xxxviii) Passbook of Shri J.R. Goel and Deepak Gupta with Punjab National Bank Ex. PW-1/40 (OSR), (xxxix) Passbook of Smt. Kamla Gupta with Punjab National Bank Ex. PW-1/41 (OSR), (XL) Passbook of Smt. Kamla Gupta with Central Bank of India Ex. PW-1/42 (OSR), (XLI) Deposit slip with Central Bank of India (running into 5 pages) Ex. PW-1/43 (colly.) (OSR) (objected to mode of proof), (XLII) Complaint vide DD no. 21B dated 24.04.2017 Ex. PW-1/44 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof), (XLIII) Complaint dated 14.05.2006 DD no. 11A Mark F, (XLIV) Passbook of Shri Jagdish Rai Seengal with Punjab and Sind Bank, Jabalpur Ex. PW-1/47 (OSR) (objected to mode of proof), (XLV) Memorandum of partition Ex. PW1/12 (OSR).
PW1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the respondent.
8. The petitioner examined SI Pritam Singh as PW2 who was a summoned witness. PW2 produced original complaint dated 08.07.2017 received in Police Station Daryaganj vide DD RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.10/60 entry no. 33B dated 16.07.2017. The copy of the complaint Ex. PW-1/7 was compared with the original an the same was stated to be the correct copy of the original. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
9. The petitioner examined Shri Dinesh Kumar, J.J.A. Record Room Civil, Room No. 319, Tis Hazari Courts as PW3. PW3 could not produce the original record pertaining to E- 372/1988 titled as Kamla Gupta V. Mohinder Nath, date of decision 07.08.1998 as the same had been weeded out on 26.06.2009. PW3 produced the Goeshwara register and the entry relating to the eviction petition bearing E-372/1988 was stated to be mentioned at serial No. 537/RC. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
10. The petitioner examined Dr. Hitesh Kumar Agarwal, as PW4 who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW4/A and relied upon documents already Ex. PW1/2, Ex. PW1/4, Ex. PW1/11 and Ex. PW1/12. He deposed that he was the son of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi Seengal and Shri Jagdish Rai Seengal. He further deposed that his mother Bhagwanti Devi had executed her last and final Will on 14.12.1987 Ex. PW1/2 in his presence. That the said Will was signed by her in Hindi at both the pages. He recognized her signature on the said Will and he deposed that she had signed the will in his presence. He further deposed that the said Will was attested by Shri D.P. Gupta, who was the husband of his real sister, Smt. Kamla Gupta. He also recognized the signatures of Sh. D.P. Gupta on the said Will. He deposed that he attested the Will in his presence. He further deposed that he had also attested the said Will in the presence of RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.11/60 Smt. Bhagwanti Devi and Sh. D.P. Gupta. He deposed that they had also got the said Will registered from the concerned Sub- Registrar at Jabalpur on 14.12.1987. He further deposed that his parents Sh. Jagdish Rai Seengal and Smt. Bhagwanti Devi and his brothers and sisters, who are members of an Hindu Undivided Family, had signed a memorandum of oral family settlement. He deposed that the said document was signed by different parties on different dates. He deposed that he had signed the same on 16.10.1983 at Jabalpur. He has brought the original of the said memorandum and the copy of the same was already on record as PW1/12.
11. PW4 further deposed that his father had also executed a Will dated 21.09.1984 Ex. PW-1/11, which was also got registered. He deposed that Will Ex.PW1/11 bears the signatures of his father at the last page. He further deposed that a letter of administration of the said Will was also applied from the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which was granted to the Petitioner Smt. Kamla Gupta vide judgment Ex.PW1/4. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
12. The petitioner examined Sh. Rajesh Goel as PW5. PW5 deposed that he was the grand son of late Sh. Jaishi Ram Goel, advocate who was residing at 1610, Madrasa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. He deposed that his father was a tenant over there in respect of first floor portion. He further deposed that the landlord had filed an eviction petition in respect of the said tenanted premises. He further deposed that in the said litigation he had appeared on behalf of his grand father Shri RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.12/60 Jaishi Ram Goel being his Power of Attorney holder and had given a statement in the Court to vacate the said premises. He deposed that the statement forming part of Ex. PW-1/6 bears his signature at point A and B. He deposed that the signature at point C are of Shri Satya Prakash Gupta, Advocate who was their Counsel in the said proceedings. He deposed that Sh. Jaishi Ram Goel, Advocate had expired on 03.10.2012. He further deposed that the said premises were vacated in October 2013 and the possession was handed over to the landlord. He deposed that they had not vacated the said premises as per the statement recorded on 13.04.2011 forming part of Ex. PW-1/6 as they had compromised the matter with Ms. Rajni Atal to the effect that they would be vacating the premises after performing the Barsi of his grand father Shri Jaishi Ram Goel in the tenanted premises, who was residing there since 1950's and that the landlord Rajni Atal had requested that since late J.R. Goel (Babuji) was residing there for quite long period and more than 100 years old person, she would retain his name plate on the ground floor near the stair case as good omen for them and that they should not remove the said name plate at the time of vacating the premises. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
13. The petitioner examined Dr. Dinesh Singhal as PW6. PW6 has brought the original complaint bearing DD no. 21B dated 24.04.2017 Ex. PW-1/44 and the same bears his signatures at point A. He deposed that complaint also bears the signature of his wife at point B. He deposed that the said document was written in the handwriting of his wife Mrs. Seema Singhal. He had also brought the original complaint dated RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.13/60 14.05.2006 given by him to SHO, Police Station Darya Ganj vide DD Entry No. 11A dated 14.05.2006. The Office copy of the same was exhibited as Ex. PW-6/1. He deposed that the complaint bears his signature at point X. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
14. The petitioner examined Sh. Rajesh Popli, Ahlmad in the court of Sh. Shirish Aggarwal, Ld. ARC, Tis Hazari Courts as PW7. He has brought the institution register relating to case No. E-372/1988 registered on 06.12.1988. He deposed that the case was filed by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi W/o late Shri Jagdish Rai Singhal against 1. Shri Mahender Nath Gupta 2. Smt. Nirmala Gupta 3. Hitwant Rai Aggarwal 4. Yashwant Rai Aggarwal 5. Uttam Rai Aggarwal 6. Ghanshyam Rai Aggarwal 7. Kuldeep Rai Aggarwal 8. Jitender Kumar Aggarwal 9. Hitesh Kumar Aggarwal 10. Sarla Gupa 11. Vimal Aggarwal 12. Kamla Gupta and 13. Sneh Lata Roy. He deposed that the said case continued upto 14.05.1998. He deposed that there was no reference of the Court name, in respect of which he has brought the record. He deposed that he has seen the certified copy of the institution register relating to E- 378/88. He deposed that he had compared the same with the original register brought by him. The certified copy was exhibited as Ex.PW7/A (OSR). The certified copy of order dated 07.08.1998 pasted with the said register was exhibited as Ex.PW7/B. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
15. The petitioner examined Sh. Brijesh Kumar, Chief Manager, Vijaya Bank, Branch Ansari Road, Darya Ganj as PW8. PW8 has brought the summoned record i.e. the register RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.14/60 showing issuance of cheque book. He deposed that as per the record cheque book containing cheques from 078576 to 078600 was issued on 02.12.2014 to the account No. 601701011000109. The copy of the said page was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/1 (OSR). He also deposed that the same register also contained the entry relating to issuance of cheque book containing numbers 101051 to 101075 against the same account number on 07.09.2015. The copy of the relevant page was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/2 (OSR). He has also brought another register showing issuance of cheque book containing cheque no. 656401 to 656425 on 16.12.2013 in respect of the aforementioned account number. The copy of the relevant page was exhibited as Ex. PW-8/3 (OSR). He has also brought the copy of requisition slip which is Mark XI. He deposed that the aforementioned account number was in the name of Nirmala Devi Nath. He deposed that the Mark XI bears the signatures of the customer at point A. He further deposed that Mark X2 was the copy of the requisition slip bearing attested signatures of the person to whom the cheque book issued on behalf of the customer. He deposed that the signatures of the said person are at point B and signature of the customer are at point C. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
16. The petitioner examined Smt. Rajni Atal as PW8. There appears to be an inadvertent mistake as this witness was given the serial number PW8 and the same should have been PW9 since, serial PW8 was given to Sh. Brijesh Kumar. Be that as it may since it does not affect the deposition given by the witness and the documents proved by her.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.15/60
17. PW Smt. Rajni Atal deposed that she was the owner of property No. 1610. Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. She further deposed that she purchased the said property in the year 1993. The copy of the sale deed dated 07.06.1993 in her favour was exhibited as Ex. PW8/A (OSR). She further deposed that Sh. Jaishi Ram Goel was earlier a tenant in respect of first floor of the said property. He deposed that he and his family had vacated the said premises in the year 2013 and handed over the vacant possession to her. She deposed that she was in possession of the said property since then. The witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for the respondent.
18. Vide order dated 15.03.2019, the petitioner's evidence was closed in affirmative.
19. Respondent examined Sh. Atul Aggarwal, attorney of the respondent, as RW1 who tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A and relied upon the following documents:
(i) Gift Deed dated 12.06.2017 Ex. RW1/1,
(ii) Copies of criminal complaints Ex. RW1/2 to Ex.
RW1/5,
(iii) Copy of agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 Mark R/X,
(iv) Copy of electoral roll pertaining to property No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi Ex. RW1/7.
RW1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner.
20. Respondent examined Sh. Surjan Singh as RW2 who brought summoned record pertaining to registered gift deed Ex. RW1/1.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.16/60
21. Respondent examined Mr. Jagdeep Dahiya as RW3 who brought the summoned record pertaining to electoral roll pertaining to property No. 1610, Madrasa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi for the period 2010-2017. The certified copy of the record was exhibited as Ex. RW3/1.
Vide order dated 13.02.2020, respondent's evidence was closed in affirmative.
22. I have heard arguments heard from both the sides. It is contended by Ld Counsel for the petitioner. It is contended by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that perusal of both the site plans Ex. PW1/5 and Ex. PW1/R1 would show that they are similar as far as the portions of first and second floor are concerned. He contended that as far as the claim of the respondent about the ground floor is concerned, the same is false as the same was never in possession of the respondent and earlier Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal was tenant on the ground floor. He contended that Ex. PW1/14 is the judgment passed in favour of the petitioner in respect of the ground floor portion on a petition under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act filed against tenant Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal. He further argued that order Ex. PW1/15 passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on an application of the petitioner for de-sealing of the ground floor since the said portion under tenancy of Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal was sealed by official liquidator. The possession was obtained by the petitioner through her attorney on 12.05.2005 vide Ex. PW1/17. The revision petition filed by Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal against the eviction order was dismissed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide order Ex. RW1/PX.
23. He further contended that vide Ex. PW1/18, the RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.17/60 petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent under order 14(1)(a) of DRC Act was decided in favour of the petitioner and benefit of section 14(2) of DRC Act was given to the petitioner. He argued that the said judgment shows that the respondent was never a tenant in respect of the ground floor. He further contended that RW1 also admitted in his testimony that there is no written proof that front portion of the ground floor was under
tenancy of the respondent. He further contended that the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 is a forged document as the respondent, in the earlier eviction proceeding instituted by the petitioner in the year 1987, never took the stand that she has purchased the premises in the year 1982. He further contended that the original agreement to sell was not produced before this Tribunal. He also relied upon Ex. RW1/P10 which is a petition filed by the respondent under article 227 of the Constitution of India in the year 1996 where no such plea was taken by the respondent. Ld counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the rent receipts, the letter issued by the respondent tendering rent along-with copy of cheques have been proved which show that the respondent was a tenant in the premises. He further contended that the respondent, in her written statement, has admitted that he has made payment to the petitioner by the cheques Ex. PW1/15 to Ex. PW1/30 and Ex. PW1/35 to Ex. PW1/36 but took a plea that those were financial help given by the respondent to the petitioner and these cheques were duly proved by PW8 to be pertaining to the account of the respondent. He further contended that the plea of the respondent that she gave financial help to the petitioner is false because of the reason that the petitioner is getting family pension from Central Government RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.18/60 apart from old age pension from Delhi Government.
24. It is further contended by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent has not been able to prove the payment of Rs. 3,00,000/- allegedly made by her in consideration to the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982. He contended that the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 is an unregistered document and thus, is inadmissible in evidence. Further, he contended that an agreement to sell does not create any right or interest in a property but only creates a right in persona. He further contended that the respondent was granted leave to contest the present petition only on the ground of availability of alternative accommodation i.e. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. He contended that the property does not belong to the petitioner but belongs to Smt. Rajni Atal who had given the property on rent to father-in-law of the petitioner i.e. Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal and the petitioner along-with her family was residing on this property before its vacation. He submitted that PW5 and PW Rajni Atal proved this fact during evidence. PW Rajni Atal proved sale deed in respect of the said property as Ex. PW8/A. He also contended that the respondent did not cross-examine PW1 on the bona fide requirement and not even a suggestion was put to him. He further contended that the pleas of the respondent regarding the jurisdictional errors were decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide orders dated 31.10.2017 and 28.11.2022 and the pleas of the respondent were dismissed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following authorities:
(i) Sh. Natha Singh Vs. Sh. H. V. Nayar, 1983 1 AIR CJ 158, RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.19/60
(ii) Y. V. Patil Vs. Y. L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392,
(iii) S. Ramachandra Rao Vs. S. Nagabhushana Rao & Ors., Civil Appeal No.7691-7694/22, dated 19.10.2022,
(iv) D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundarajan, 2019 9 SCC 282,
(v) Nand Kishore Garg Vs. Jitender Singh Tomar & Ors., MANU/DE/0119/2020,
(vi) Jiwan Dass Rawal Vs. Narain Dass & Ors., AIR 1981 Del. 291,
(vii) Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Teckchandani, 2008 106 DRJ 24,
(viii) Gaffar Ahmed Vs. Shiv Kumar Ohri, 2020 IV AD (Del) 313.
25. On the other hand it was contended by AR of the respondent, who himself is an advocate, that in the present petition, even if an eviction order is passed, the same would not be executable as the legal representative of the deceased respondent is not in possession of the tenanted premises rather the legal representative of Smt. Prabha Aggarwal and Smt. Pragya Aggarwal are in possession of the tenanted premises being the joint owners of the same by virtue of the gift deed dated 12.06.2017. It is the further contention of the AR of the respondent that the present petition suffers from inherent jurisdictional error since the present petition was allegedly filed under section 14(1)(D) of DRC Act which is non-existent whereas the petition was tried under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. It was contended by AR of the respondent that the deceased respondent had become owner of the premises vide agreement to RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.20/60 sell dated 30.12.1982 and that Smt. Prabha Aggarwal (deceased) and Smt. Pragya had become owners of the premises vide registered gift deed dated 12.06.2017. He further argued that the wills dated 21.09.1984 and 14.12.1987, executed by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and Smt. Bhagwanti Devi respectively have not been probated by the competent Court of law. He further contended that the memorandum of partition Ex PW1/12 is not capable of creating any right, title or interest in the property and that the same is no registered as per the provisions of law. He further argued that till dated the registered gift deed dated 12.06.2017 has not been challenged by the petitioner side.
26. AR of the respondent further contended that the respondent had got the memorandum of partition as well as the Will dated 14.12.1987 examined by a forensic expert (Truth Lab Forensic Services) and the expert concluded that the signatures of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi on both these documents are different which shows that the will is forged and fabricated. He further argued that the falsity of memorandum of partition is clear from the fact that as per the will dated 21.09.1984, there was a dispute between Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and his brother Sh. Inder Sain Singhal which was decided vide order dated 28.08.1981. He further argued that the signatures of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal on the memorandum of partition and on the will dated 21.09.1984 are different. He further argued that the Will dated 21.09.1984 was a conditional and the petitioner was required to make a payment of Rs. 25,000/- to Sh. Ghamshyam Rai Aggarwal. He contended that the Will dated 14.12.1987 incapable of conferring any rights on Smt. Bhagwanti Devi as the same is an outcome of memorandum of partition. He further argued that the said Will RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.21/60 was also conditional as the petitioner was required to make payment of Rs. 15,000/- to Sh. Ghanshyam Rai Aggarwal.
27. It is further contended by AR of the respondent that after the death of the respondent, the petitioner has filed an application under order 22 Rule 4 CPC for impleadment of Mrs. Ilashree Nath Gupta which was allowed. He argued that Mrs. Ilashree Nath Gupta is a resident of USA and thus, this Tribunal has committed an error which goes to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. He further argued that no eviction petition bearing No. 372/88 was filed against the respondent and the record produced by PW7 in respect of the same is forged and fabricated as the record has been weeded out on 26.06.2009 and the same has no been signed by Ld. Presiding Officer. He argued that at the time, when the petition was filed, the petitioner was about 82 years old and thus, the averments that her family members were dependent on her was false. He further argued that as per the pleadings in the petition, there was no bona fide need of the petitioner to possess the tenanted premises and it was only a mere wish or desire because the petitioner herself has stated in the petition that she wished to shift to Delhi. He further contended that as per the petitioner all nine members of the family of the petitioner were residing together but they have only one drawing room cum dining, kitchen, which would not be possible because the property is built up to two storeys.
28. It is further contended by AR of the respondent that the reliance of the petitioner on the cheques issued by the petitioner is misconceived as the cheques were taken by the petitioner along-with some blank signed papers on the pretext of RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.22/60 getting the property mutated in the name of respondent and the same was proved by RW1 through Mark X-1. He argued that the rent receipts relied upon by the petitioner are also not reliable as the same were not signed by the respondent. AR of the respondent has relied upon the following authorities:
(i) Nathi Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta, 2005 2 SCC 271,
(ii) Rattan Singh & Ors. Vs. Nirmal Gill & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 936,
(iii) Surjit Singh Kalra & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 1991 2 SCC 87,
(iv) Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (D) Thru LRs, 2010 2 SCC 15,
(v) Jagdish Prasad Vs. Hardayial Singh, 1982 RLR 283,
(vi) Parmendra Shrivastava Vs. Farukh Miya & Ors., W. P. No.14244/2017 dated 22.10.2021,
(vii) Suresh Kumar Kohli Vs. Rakesh Jain & Anr., 2018 6 SCC 708,
(viii) Kiran Singh & Ors. Vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors, AIR 1954 SC 340,
(ix) Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (D) Through LRs, 1990 1 SCC 193
(x) Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh & Ors., 1993 2 SCC 507,
(xi) Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd.
& Anr., 2005 SCC 791,
(xii) Sarup Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 2011 RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.23/60 11 SCC 198,
(xiii) Charan Das Duggal Vs. Bramha Nand, 1983 1 SCC 301,
(xiv) Poonam Chawla Vs. Niranjan Kumar, CM (M) No.374/2008 dated 17.03.2009,
(xv) Muzaffar Hussain Vs. State of UP & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 567, (xvi) Jagdish Prasad Patel (D) through LRs & Anr. Vs. Shivnath & Ors., 2019 6 SCC 82.
29. I have also perused the record.
30. In order to bring a case within the purview of section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act, the followings are the essential ingredients :
i. Petitioner is the owner/landlords in respect of the tenanted premises;
ii. The tenanted premises are required bona fidely by the petitioner for himself or for family members dependent upon him;
iii. The petitioner does not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation.
31. Before returning findings on the merits, it is necessary to deal with the preliminary submissions of the AR of the respondent. It is the contention raised on behalf of the the respondent that the present petition suffers from jurisdictional error since as per the title of the present petition, the present petition was filed under section 14(1)(D) of DRC Act which is a non-existent provision but the summons were issued under RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.24/60 section 25B of DRC Act for a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. He submitted that the entire trial conducted is vitiated by this defect. It is pertinent to mention that perusal of the present petition shows that the petition is filed for eviction of the respondent on the ground of bona fide requirement. Except the title of the petition, there is nothing in the petition which would show that it is not a petition filed u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. It is settled law that mere quoting a wrong statutory provision does not create a bar in the way of considering the petition and granting the relief so long as the power to grant the same exists. Reliance is placed on Nitish Arora vs. State of Delhi 2007 (141) DLT 21 and Vijay Kumar Nagpal Vs. Parveen Kumar Nagpal, Neutral Citation 2022:DHC:5. In P.K. Palanisamy Vs. N. Arumugham & Anr., SLP (Civil) No. 2308/2009, dated 23.07.2009, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is a well settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of a provision does not invalidate an order if the court and/or statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction therefor. Moreover, the contention of the respondent has been dealt with by this Tribunal vide its order dated 25.09.2017 and it was held that mentioning of section 14(1)(D) was a typographical error and the petition was held to be one under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. It is also relevant to mention that the said order dated 25.09.2017 was challenged by the respondent before Hon'ble Delhi High Court in RC Rev. No. 494/2017 but the respondent did not succeed and the same was disposed of with the following observations:
"3. The senior counsel for the petitioner/tenant, after full arguments, under instructions, does not press this petition with liberty to take grounds as urged herein, in the remedy if any RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.25/60 preferred, if remains aggrieved from the order to be passed on the application filed by petitioner for leave to defend the petition for eviction.
4. Needless to state that during the course of hearing of the application for leave to defend, all legal pleas available to the petitioner shall remain open to the petitioner. 5. Dismissed as not pressed with liberty aforesaid."
The order dated 25.09.2017 has thus, attained finality and the respondent, after the passing of the order dated 19.03.2018 by which he was granted leave to contest the present petition, cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same. The contention of the respondent is therefore, rejected.
32. The next contention of AR of the respondent is that after the death of the respondent, her daughter was impleaded as respondent being her legal representative but she is not a resident of India and the premises are under in possession of Smt. Prabha Aggarwal (since deceased) and Smt. Pragya Aggarwal being the owners of the premises vide registered gift deed dated 12.06.2017. It is contended that the present petition has become infructuous since any eviction order, if passed, would not be executable. It is pertinent to mention that vide order dated 27.07.2022, the application filed under order 22 Rule 4 CPC filed by the petitioner was allowed and the same has not been challenged by the respondent in appropriate appellate or revisional proceedings till date. The order dated 27.07.2022 has attained finality. Whether or not the eviction order, if passed, would be executable, is a question to be decided in execution proceedings. It is relevant to note that an executing Court has the power to decide title of the parties. Moreover, as per section 25 of the DRC Act, eviction order is binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises except the person who has an RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.26/60 independent title to the premises. Thus, the contention of the respondent is rejected being without any merit.
Ownership of petitioner and Landlord-tenant Relationship between the parties
33. In the present case, the respondent has disputed the ownership as well as landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. The case of the petitioner is that respondent and her husband Sh. Mahendra Nath Gupta were inducted as tenant in respect of the tenanted premises in the year 1973-74. As per the petitioner, after the death of the husband of the respondent, the respondent became the sole tenant in the tenanted premises. The petitioner has relied upon Will dated 14.12.1987 Ex. PW1/2 executed by mother of the petitioner Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, Will dated 26.09.1984 Ex. PW1/11 executed by father of the petitioner Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal, Memorandum of Partition Ex. PW- 1/12, Lease Deed dated 13.06.1963 in respect of Plot no.98, R- Block, Daryaganj, Delhi Ex. RW-1/P13 and letters of Administration granted by Hon'ble MP High Court Ex. PW-1/4. As per the Memorandum of Partition Ex. PW-1/12, a partition of property no. 4911, plot No. 98, Daryaganj, Delhi had taken place between Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal, his wife Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, Sh. Hitwant Rai Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal), Sh. Yashwant Rai Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal), Dr. Uttam Rai Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal), Sh. Ghanshyam Rai Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal), Sh. Kuldeep Rai Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal), Sh. Jitender Kumar Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal) and Dr. Hitesh Kumar Aggarwal (son of Sh. Jagdish RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.27/60 Rai Seenghal) in the year 1974. As per the said document, front courtyard, store, drawing-cum-dining room, kitchen and portion of inner courtyard, situated on the ground floor had fallen to the share of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal. It is also mentioned in the said document that the portion of bathroom, WC, part of inner courtyard and back passage on the ground floor was held jointly by Sh, Jagdish Rai Seenghal and Sh. Inder Sain Singhal. Whereas, the back portion of the first floor consisting of store, bed room, chajja and tin shed, kolki, roof and construction on the back portion of the second floor came to the share of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. The portion of bathroom, latrine and portion of passage on the first floor, portion of passage on second floor and front and back stair cases was held jointly by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi and Sh. Inder Sain Singhal. As per the Will Ex. PW-1/11, executed by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal on 21.09.1984, it is mentioned that in a suit between Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and Sh. Inder Sain Singhal, bearing civil suit no.566/1979, decided on 28.08.1981, front portion of the ground floor consisting of front courtyard, store room, drawing-cum-dining room, kitchen and part of inner courtyard, back portion of the first floor consisting of store, bedroom, chajja, tin shed, and kolki, roof and construction on the back portion of the second floor (before the partition in 1974) came to the exclusive ownership of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal, whereas the portion consisting of bathroom, WC, portion of inner courtyard, back passage on the ground floor, and bathroom, latrine, portion of passage on the first floor, portion of passage on the second floor, and back and front staircase were held by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal in joint ownership with his brother Sh. Inder Sain Singhal. It is further mentioned in the said RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.28/60 Will that on a family partition, the front portion on the ground floor consisting of front courtyard, store, drawing-cum-dining room, kitchen, portion of inner courtyard, and the portion held in joint ownership with Sh. Inder Sain Singhal consisting of bathroom, WC, portion of inner courtyard and back passage on the ground floor, came to the share of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal. Vide the Will dated 21.09.1984 Ex. PW-1/11, Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal had bequeathed his share along-with his share held in joint ownership with his brother, as aforesaid, to the petitioner. Further, as per the Will dated 21.09.1984, executed by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, the back portion of the first floor consisting of store, bedroom, chajja, tin shed, and kolki, roof and the construction on the second floor, which came to the share of Smt. Bhagwanti Devi on the family partition and the portion consisting of bathroom, latrine, portion of passage on first floor, portion of passage on second floor, back and front stair case held by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi with Sh. Inder Sain Singhal, was bequeathed to the petitioner by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. Thus, as per the above two Wills i.e. Ex. PW-1/11 & Ex. PW-1/2, the following portion of the property no.4911, Plot No.19, R-Block, Daryaganj, Delhi came to the share of the petitioner-
(i) front portion of the ground floor consisting of front courtyard, store room, drawing-cum-dining room, kitchen and part of inner courtyard,
(ii) back portion of the first floor consisting of store, bedroom, chajja, tin shed,
(iii) kolki, roof and the construction on the second floor,
(iv) the portions held by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and Smt. Bhagwanti Devi in joint ownership with Sh. Inder Sain Singhal RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.29/60 i.e. portion consisting of bathroom, WC, portion of inner courtyard, back passage on the ground floor, and bathroom, latrine, portion of passage on the first floor, portion of passage on the second floor, and back and front staircase.
34. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent was inducted tenant in respect of back portion of the first floor consisting of two rooms, extended chajja converted into kitchen, side balcony with common bathroom and latrine, and temporary shed/barsati on the second floor, along-with her husband in the year 1973-74. The respondent has disputed the Wills Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/11, and the Memorandum of Partition Ex. PW- 1/12. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the documents Ex. PW-1/2, Ex. PW-1/11 and Ex. PW-1/12 are forged and fabricated documents. However, the respondent has not disputed the title of Jagdish Rai Seenghal. The case of the respondent is that she, not her husband, was inducted as tenant by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal in respect of front portion of the ground floor, the back portion of the first and second floor. The respondent has claimed that Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal had sold the said front portion of the ground floor, rear portion of first and second floor to the respondent vide agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 Mark R/X for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- and thus, she had become exclusive owner of the front portion of the ground floor, rear portion of first and second floor on 30.12.1982. As per the respondent, the petitioner and her associates have tresspassed into the ground floor portion, which was earlier in her possession of which she had become the owner after execution of the said agreement to sell Mark R/X. It is pertinent to mention that the original agreement dated 30.12.1982 has not been produced RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.30/60 during the trial and the agreement to sell dated Mark R/X remained unproven. It is a settled law that agreement to sell is incapable of conferring title in an immovable property. A combined reading of Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of Registration Act, would show that immovable property having value more than Rs.100/- can only be conveyed through a registered sale deed. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 provides that a document which requires compulsory registration under the Act, if unregistered, is incapable of conferring any right in immovable property. The reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakeel Ahmed Vs. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, Civil Appeal No. 1598/2023, dated 01.11.2023, wherein it was held :
"...10. Having considered the submissions at the outset, it is to be emphasized that irrespective of what was decided in the case of Suraj Lamps and Industries(supra) the fact remains that no title could be transferred with respect to immovable properties on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell or on the basis of an unregistered General Power of Attorney. The Registration Act, 1908 clearly provides that a document which requires compulsory registration under the Act, would not confer any right, much less a legally enforceable right to approach a Court of Law on its basis. Even if these documents i.e. the Agreement to Sell and the Power of Attorney were registered, still it could not be said that the respondent would have acquired title over the property in question. At best, on the basis of the registered agreement to sell, he could have claimed relief of specific performance in appropriate proceedings. In this regard, reference may be made to sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 11. Law is well settled that no right, title or interest in immovable property can be conferred without a registered document. Even the judgment of this Court in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries (supra) lays down the same proposition. Reference may also be made to the following judgments of this Court:
(i). Ameer Minhaj Vs. Deirdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Others
(ii). Balram Singh Vs. Kelo Devi
(iii). M/S Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited Vs. Amit Chand Mitra & Anr.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.31/60
12. The embargo put on registration of documents would not override the statutory provision so as to confer title on the basis of unregistered documents with respect to immovable property. Once this is the settled position, the respondent could not have maintained the suit for possession and mesne profits against the appellant, who was admittedly in possession of the property in question whether as an owner or a licensee."
Therefore, the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 Mark R/X has not created any right in the property No. 4911, Plot No.98, R-Block, Daryaganj, Delhi in favour of the respondent. As already observed above, even the respondent has not been able to prove the said agreement to sell as the original has not been produced. Consequently, the registered gift deed dated 12.06.2017 Ex. RW-1/1 executed by the respondent in favour of Smt. Prabha Aggarwal (since deceased) and Ms. Pragya Aggarwal was also incapable of creating any right in the property No. 4911, Plot No. 98, R-Block, Daryaganj, Delhi as the respondent herself was not having any right in the said property. It is a settled principle of law that no one can transfer a better title than what he himself possesses (nemo dat quod non habet). Therefore, the gift executed by the respondent in favour of Smt. Prabha Aggarwal and Smt. Pragya Aggarwal was a void transaction. It is the contention of AR of the respondent that apart from it being a registered document, the gift deed dated 12.06.2017 has not been challenged by the petitioner till date. It is to be remembered that a void document is not required to be cancelled. A void document can be ignored by the Court being of no legal effect or consequence. Of course, there is a presumption of due registration of a document and correctness of facts mentioned in the same, but the said presumption is not conclusive. Reliance is placed on the decision of full bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Ram Padaradh & Ors. Vs. RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.32/60 Second Additional D.J., Sultanpur & Ors., 1989 15 ALR 90. The said view of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram & Anr. Vs. Ist Additional Distt. Judge & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1250. Therefore, the fact that no challenge was presented to the registered gift deed Ex. RW-1/1 by the petitioner is of no consequence since Ex. RW1/1 did not create any right in the property and the contention of the AR of the respondent is rejected.
35. Moreover, there is no evidence led from the respondent's side as to whether the respondent has claimed her title to the property No. 4911, Plot No. 98, R-Block, Daryaganj, Delhi before any statutory or government authority. The property was also not mutated in favour of the respondent. On the other hand, the petitioner has produced house tax receipt Ex. PW-1/16, Ex. PW-1/21, Ex. PW-1/22, self assessment form for house tax Ex. PW-1/23 and request for mutation made by the petitioner to MCD Ex. PW-1/31. These documents show that the property was mutated in the name of the petitioner. Therefore, the claim of the respondent that she had become the owner in the year 1982 does not appear to be correct.
36. Further, once it is held that no title to the property was created in favour of the respondent by the agreement to sell Mark R/X, the status of the respondent had remained to be of a tenant only. It is the defence of the respondent that no such partition as referred to in Ex. PW-1/12 had taken place and that the Wills Ex. PW-1/11 and Ex. PW-1/2 are forged, fabricated and sham documents. It is pertinent to mention that it is not the claim of the respondent that petitioner is not a legal heir of late Sh.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.33/60 Jagdish Rai Seenghal and late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. The petitioner being the class-I heir of late Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, was atleast a co-owner of the property and being a co-owner, she was entitled to file the present eviction petition. Reliance is placed upon, Sheikh Mohd Zakir v. Shahnaz Parveen, 2012 (2) RCR (Rent) 235 (DHC), wherein it has been held that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners and this principle is based on the doctrine of agency. It was further held that one co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. It is settled legal position that the production of a 'will' would discharge the burden of the landlord for proving ownership under Section 14(1)(e). Reliance in this regard is placed on Plasticchemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha & Anr., (2004) 114 DLT 408 and Bharat Bhushan Vij v. Arti Teckchandani, 2008 (153) DLT 247. Moreover, a tenant has no locus to challenge a partition or family settlement arrived at between the members of the family of the petitioner. It is also a settled principle of law that the document of partition or family settlement cannot be challenged by a tenant on the ground of the same being not registered. A family settlement, even if unregistered, affects the property settled thereby. Reliance is placed on Gopal Kishan Vs. Ram Saroop, Neutral Citation 2017:DHC:5792, Surender Kumar Gupta & Ors. Vs. Mahesh & Ors., Neutral Citation 2020:DHC:3607, Harbhajan Singh @ Bhajji Vs. Mahavir Singh, RC Rev No. 172/2018 dated 15.02.2019. It was observed in Gopal Kishan (supra) as under:
"16. A Family Settlement, it was held as far back as in RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.34/60 Kale Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1976) 3 SCC 119, is to be viewed without the technicalities of law and to be honoured.
17. Thus, there is no merit in the plea of the same being not registered. It has been held expressly in (i) Satya Pal Gupta Vs. Sudhir Kumar Gupta (2016) 230 DLT 73 (DB), Vikram Singh Vs. Ajit Inder Singh (2014) 3 High Court Cases (Del) 627 (DB) and B.S. Goel Vs. The Registrar, High Court of Delhi AIR 2007 Del 72 (DB) that a family settlement, even if unregistered, affects the property settled thereby.
18. The counsel for the petitioner / tenant has next contended that the respondent / landlord on the one hand has taken the plea of an oral family settlement and on the other hand produced the copy of a Memorandum of Family Settlement.
19. If the document recording division of properties is not a record or memorandum of an earlier oral Family Settlement, it would take the colours of a Partition Deed and require stamping and registration, putting a substantial financial burden on the family members. There is thus a widespread practise to record oral Family Settlement in a Memorandum. There is thus no inconsistency in the stand of the respondent / landlord, as argued.
20. It is not the case of the petitioner / tenant that the persons who have executed the Memorandum of Family Settlement are not members of the family of the respondent / landlord or do not exist. Once that is so, it is not the locus of the petitioner / tenant to challenge the Family Settlement arrived at between the members of the family of the respondent / landlord. Reliance in this regard may be placed on A.K. Nayar Vs. Mahesh Prasad (2008) 153 DLT 423 and Ashok Kumar Vs. Harish Chander Sahni 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6647."
Similarly, it is not for the respondent being a tenant to challenge the Wills Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/11. In Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Tchchandani, 2008 VIII AD (Delhi) 285, it was held that if premises was let out by a person and after his death, premises has come in hands of beneficiary under a Will, tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. In any event, the petitioner has examined Dr. Hitesh Kumar Aggarwal, PW-4, in her evidence who was the attesting witness to the Will dated 21.09.1984 Ex. PW1/2 executed by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. It is pertinent to mention that the other attesting RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.35/60 witness of the Will i.e. Sh. D. P. Gupta, has already expired. PW- 4, in his cross examination, has denied the suggestion that Ex. PW-1/2 was a forged and fabricated document and that he did not witness the execution of the said Will. The respondent has failed to illicit anything during the cross examination of PW-4, which would have cast doubt on the execution of the said Will. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve that the Will 21.09.1984 was executed by Smt. Bhagwanti Devi Ex. PW-1/2 in favour of the petitioner.
37. The word 'owner' has not been defined either in DRC Act, 1958 or in Transfer of Property Act, 1872. The word 'owner' has to be construed in the context of the purpose and object of the provision u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. It was held in T.C. Rekhi Vs. Smt. Usha Gujral, 1970 RCR 292, that the word 'owner' in this clause seems to be inspired by the definition of the word 'landlord' as contained in section 2(e) of the DRC Act and is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control legislations has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit before a Civil Court. In Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs. Smt. Ved Prabha & Ors. 1987 AIR SC 2028, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the word 'owner' connotes that the petitioner/landlord has to have a better title than the respondent/tenant and he is not required to show that he has the best of all possible titles for the purposes of section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. The petitioner to an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) need not show that he is the absolute owner in the strict sense and has to show only a RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.36/60 better and superior title to the tenant. Reliance, in this regard, is placed on Parvati Devi v. Mahinder Singh 1996 (1) AD (Del) 819, B. Banerjee v. Romesh Mahajan 1996 (63) DLT 930, Milk Food Ltd. v. Kiran Khanna 1993 (51) DLT 141, Sushil Kanta Chakravarty v. Rajeshwari Kumar AIR 2000 Del 413, Ujjagar Singh v. Iqbal Kaur 2002 (97) DLT 646. In Boorugu Mahadev & Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao 2016 3 SCC 343, it has been held as under:
"19. It is also now a settled principle of law that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. (Vide Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash)."
38. The petitioner has also relied upon the rent receipts Ex. PW-1/25, signed by Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal, the then Advocate of the petitioner on the letter head of Sh. Amitabh Narayan, who as per the petitioner was the Advocate of the respondent. The rent receipt Ex. PW-1/28 was issued by Sh. Amitabh Narayan, Advocate on behalf of the respondent to the petitioner. The petitioner has also relied upon rent receipts Ex. PW-1/27, Ex. PW-1/29 and Ex. PW-1/30. It is pertinent to mention that some of the rent receipts in Ex. PW-1/27 also mention cheque numbers through which the payment of rent was made by the respondent. The rent receipts Ex. PW-1/30 are accompanied by the copies of cheques through which the payment towards the rent was made by the respondent. The AR of the respondent has contended that RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.37/60 no advocate in the name of Sh. Amitabh Narayan was engaged by the petitioner. He further contended that the signature on the other rent receipts are not of the respondent. He also contended that the cheques along-with some blank papers were obtained by the petitioner from the respondent on the pretext of getting the property mutated in favour of the respondent. The AR of the respondent has relied upon copy of letter issued by the respondent on 27.08.2013 Mark X-1 to the petitioner in this regard. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner has confronted RW-1 with certified copy of CM (Main) Petition bearing no.324/1996, allegedly filed by the respondent against the petitioner and the others, and the certified copy of the order passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court dated 10.09.1996 Ex. RW-1/P12. The said petition was allegdly filed by Sh. Amitabh Narayan, Advocate on behalf of the respondent. When confronted with the said petition Ex. RW-1/P10, RW-1 stated that the said petition was not filed by the respondent and the name of the respondent in the said petition was interpolated. Perusal of Ex. RW-1/P12 shows that there are no interpolation in the name of the respondent in the order passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The said order also shows that Sh. Amitabh Narayan had appeared on behalf of the respondent. Except bare denial by RW- 1 to Ex. RW-1/P10 and Ex. RW-1/P12, nothing substantial has been brought on record by the respondent to refute the authenticity of Ex. PW-1/10 and Ex. PW-1/12. It is relevant to note that Ex. RW1/P10, Ex. RW1/P11 and Ex. RW1/P12 are certified copies. Perusal of Ex. RW-1/P10, Ex. RW-1/P11 and Ex. RW-1/P12 shows that in the petition and in the affidavit, at several places the pleadings are supplemented by additional RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.38/60 writing which were handwritten and attested by the counsel. Moreover, these handwritten overwriting do not appear to be new. As already observed, no overwriting were found in the order Ex. RW-1/P12. As per Section 74 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the documents forming part of judicial record are public documents and as per Section 77 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the certified copies of public documents are admissible in evidence in proof of the contents of such public documents. Section 79 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the certified copies of public document shall be presumed to be genuine. The respondent has not brought any evidence on record to dislodge the presumption in favour of Ex. RW-1/P10, Ex. RW- 1/P11 and Ex. RW-1/P12. Therefore, the contention of the AR of the respondent that Sh. Amitabh Narayan was not the advocate for the respondent that the rent receipts Ex. PW-1/25 and Ex. PW-1/28 could not have been executed by him on behalf of the respondent, is rejected.
39. Further, it is not disputed by the respondent that the cheques copies of which are part of Ex. PW-1/30 were issued by the respondent. It is also not disputed by the respondent that these cheques were pertaining to the bank account of the respondent. It has been the contention of AR of the respondent that the respondent used to sign as 'N Devi' (Nirmala Devi) only. However, the signatures on the cheques are different than what is claimed by the AR of the respondent. PW-8, Brijesh Kumar, has proved that these cheques were pertaining to the respondent. PW- 8 has also brought the record pertaining to the cheque books containing cheques bearing serial numbers 078576 to 078600 and 656401 to 656425. PW-8 has also brought the requisition slips in RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.39/60 regard to the issuance of the above mentioned cheque books on which the signatures of the respondent are mentioned at point A on Mark X-1 and at point C on Mark X-2. Even though, objections were raised by Ld. counsel for the respondent at the time of exhibition of these documents, since these documents were part of the official record of the bank and the fact that there cannot be any motive on the part of PW-8 or the concerned bank to falsify these documents, no doubt can be raised on the authenticity of these documents. There is no evidence on record that these cheques were dishonoured for mismatch of signatures of the respondent. There is no explanation put forward in this regard by the respondent. Further, no document is produced by the respondent to show that the respondent has applied for mutation of the property. As per the defence of the respondent, she had become owner of the property in the year 1982, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent to be dependent upon the petitioner and issue cheques to her for mutation of the property in her favour. It is also not the stand of the respondent that she was uneducated and in fact, from the testimony of RW-1, it appears that the respondent was well educated and thus, it was highly unlikely that she would issued blank signed cheques to the petitioner and would have signed blank papers at the instance of the petitioner. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the claim of the respondent that the cheques, which are part of Ex. PW-1/30, were issued to the petitioner for mutation of the property in favour of the respondent and the petitioner has been successful in proving the rent receipts Ex. PW-1/25, Ex. PW-1/27, Ex. PW-1/28 and Ex. PW-1/30.
40. The petitioner has also relied upon the certified copy RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.40/60 of the judgment dated 07.08.1998 passed in the eviction petition bearing No. 372/1988 titled as 'Smt. Bhagwanti Devi Vs. Sh. Mahendra Nath Gupta & Ors.' Ex. PW-1/18. As per the petitioner, late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi had filed an eviction petition against the respondent and her husband under section 14 (1) (a) of DRC Act for non-payment of rent, which was allowed vide judgment dated 07.08.1988 Ex. PW-1/18 and the benefit of section 14 (2) of DRC Act was granted to them. It is the contention of the AR of the respondent that no such petition was filed against the respondent and the Ex. PW-1/18 is forged and fabricated. He further contended that when PW-3 was summoned for production of the record pertaining to the eviction petition bearing No. 372/88, he deposed that the record pertaining to the said petition had been weeded out on 26.06.2009 but when PW-7 was summoned to produce the institution register pertaining to the eviction petition No. 372/88, he produced one handwritten order Ex. PW-7/B whereas, no such handwritten order was produced by PW-3. It is pertinent to mention that in the WS, it is pleaded by the respondent that the said eviction petition bearing No. 372/88 actually pertains to eviction petition titled as 'Nand Kishore Vs. Rita Devi'. However, no such evidence was led by the respondent to prove that the eviction petition bearing No. 372/88 pertains to the eviction petition 'Nand Kishore Vs. Rita Devi'. It is also pertinent to mention that when the statement of PW-3 was recorded, it is categorically deposed by PW-3 that the eviction petition bearing No. 372/88 pertains to the case 'Kamla Gupta Vs. Mohinder Nath', which was decided on 07.08.1998 by Ms. Ravinder Kaur, Ld. Presiding Officer. It is also pertinent to mention that when the documents Ex. PW-7/A and Ex. PW-7/B RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.41/60 were being admitted in evidence, no objection was raised by the counsel for the respondent. It is the contention of AR of the respondent that when the entire order Ex. PW-1/18 is a typed one, the order Ex.PW-7/B could not have been handwritten. It is pertinent to mention that the certified copy of the judgment Ex. PW-1/14, on which no such objection was raised, is also accompanied by separate order which is handwritten. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the order Ex. PW-7/B is forged and fabricated, is liable to be rejected. As already observed, certified copies of judicial record, being public documents, are admissible in evidence by virtue of Section 77 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the certified copies of public documents carry themselves, a presumption of genuineness as declared by Section 79 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The respondent has not been able to dislodge the presumption by bringing on record any evidence to the effect that no eviction proceedings, in respect to which Ex. PW-1/18 was passed, had taken place between late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi and the respondent. As already observed above, the petitioner has been able to prove that the respondent has filed a CM (Main) petition Ex. RW-1/P10 emanating from the eviction petition bearing No. 372/88 and order Ex. RW-1/P12 was passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on the said petition. Therefore, the contention of the AR of the respondent that no eviction proceedings, in which Ex. PW-1/18 was passed, were instituted by late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi, is rejected.
41. In the present case, the petitioner has been successful in proving that she has a better title to the tenanted premises than the respondent. The petitioner is claiming from her RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.42/60 parents i.e. late Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal and late Smt. Bhagwanti Devi. As already observed, the title of Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal is not disputed and the respondent has not been able to prove that the property was sold by Sh. Jagdish Rai Seenghal to her. The petitioner has also been able to prove that respondent had paid rent to her vide rent receipt Ex. PW-1/25, Ex. PW-1/27, Ex. PW-1/28 and Ex. PW-1/30. The petitioner, by virtue of her superior title, is entitled to receive the rent from the respondent and is thus, covered within the definition of 'landlord' under section 2(e) of DRC Act. Moreover, the findings with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship in the order dated 19.03.2018 have not been challenged by the respondent and the same has attained finality. Therefore, the landlord-tenant relationship for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act is established between the parties.
Bona fide requirement of the petitioner.
42. In regard to the bona fide requirement, it is pleaded by the petitioner that the tenanted premises are required by the petitioner for her own personal use as well as for the needs of her family members who are dependent on the petitioner. That the family of the petitioner is consisting of petitioner herself and her three sons namely Deepak Gupta, Pradeep Gupta, Manoj Gupta. That all sons of the petitioner are married and having their respective families. That Sh. Deepak Gupta is having his wife and two children whereas the family of Sh. Pradeep Gupta consists of his wife and two children. That Sh. Manoj Gupta and his family are settled in abroad. That the petitioner along-with her two sons Deepak Gupta and Pradeep Gupta are residing in RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.43/60 Noida (UP) as she has no other accommodation to live in Delhi. That the petitioner and her family members wish to shift to Delhi for the betterment of her grand children. That grand daughters of the petitioner namely Apoorva Gupta (aged about 21 years) and Smiti Gupta (aged about 18 years) are studying in JNU, New Delhi and Hansraj College, University of Delhi, respectively. That Sh. Deepak Gupta is working as General Manager in a private company in Saket, New Delhi. That the son and grand children of the petitioner are finding it very difficult to commute to Delhi on daily basis.
43. Per contra, it is pleaded by the respondent that the petitioner has no where stated in the entire petition that she requires the premises for her bona fide requirement and she has expressed only her desire to shift to Delhi. It is stated that the petitioner is already in possession of rear side two rooms on the ground floor besides one room, one hall, kitchen and two bathrooms on the first floor. The said accommodation is lying vacant. It is contended by AR of the respondent that the averments made in the petition that the family members of the petitioner are dependent upon the petitioner is not correct as the petitioner is more than 88 years of age and suffering from various health issues and she herself is required assistance for her daily chores. It is further contended that the ground taken by the petitioner that her son Deepak Gupta, who is employed at Saket, is finding it difficult to commute daily from Noida to Saket is not convincing as the distance between Saket and Daryaganj is similar to the distance from Noida to Saket. It is further contended that the petition was filed in the year 2017 and now the granddaughters, who were pursuing their education in the RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.44/60 year 2017, must be around 26-27 years and 23-24 years respectively and hence, the bona fide requirement does not survive as on date.
44. It was held in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100, that :
".....The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself....".
45. It is the contention of the AR of the respondent that the averment of the petitioner that her family members are dependent upon her is not correct as the petitioner being more than 88 years of age is herself dependent upon others for her daily chores. The contention of AR of the respondent is misconceived. It is now well established that a family member residing with the landlord may not be financially dependent upon him but he is dependent for the purposes of accommodation. In the case titled as M. M. Mehta Vs. Chaman Lal, 1981 J. RLR (Note) 30, it was observed that : -
"A member of the family though not financially dependent but living together with him is covered in the word 'dependent' used in Section 14 (l)(e) of the Act."
As already observed, the petitioner has been able to prove her title to the property for the purpose of Section 14 (1)
(e) DRC Act. It is neither pleaded by the respondent nor has she RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.45/60 led any evidence to the effect that the family members of the petitioner for the benefit of whom the present petition is filed are having their separate properties in Delhi. Therefore, they are deemed to be dependent upon the petitioner for the purpose of accommodation in Delhi.
46. PW-1, Sh. Pradeep Gupta has deposed as Attorney of the petitioner to prove the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. The petitioner herself did not enter the witness-box. It is now well settled that a landlord can prove his bona fide requirement even without stepping into the witness-box and it cannot be held as inflexible preposition of law that bona fide requirement could be established by the evidence of landlord only and non else. Reliance is placed on Nathu Lal Gangabaks Khandelwal & Ors. Vs. Smt. Nandubai & Ors. (AIR 1984 Bom. 340 DB) and Smt. Ramkubai Vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak ( AIR 1999 SC 3089). It was held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Om Parkash Vs Inder Kaur ( 2009 156 DLT 292) that there is nothing in the DRC Act which suggests that the landlord must step into the witness box to prove his bona fide need for the premises in question and that it is open to the landlord to lead any evidence which he chooses in order to substantiate his case of bona fide requirement. Similar view was taken in Capt. Praveen Davar Vs. Harvansh Kumari (2010) 119 DRJ 560, wherein it was held that it is not essential for the landlord to enter into witness-box and depose in favour of his case and even an attorney holder can depose on behalf of the landlord who has personal knowledge of the facts of the case. In a recent judgment, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Anil Bhasin Vs Imarti Devi (RC Rev No. 266/2017 dated 06.11.2017), held that RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.46/60 it is not essential in a proceeding for eviction of a tenant for the landlord himself to step into the witness box and any other witness who has personal knowledge of the facts can depose as a witness. It was further held that the landlord can prove his case without stepping into the witness box and no adverse inference can be drawn against him on the ground that he did not appear his own witness in the case. It is relevant to reproduce the observation made by the Court :
"...21. As far as the second contention, of the respondent having herself not stepped into the witness box, is concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Ramkubai Vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak (1999) 6 SCC 540 that it is not essential in a proceeding for eviction of a tenant for the landlord to himself/herself step into the witness box. This Court in Om Parkash Vs. Inder Kaur 2009 (107) DRJ 263, in the context of a petition filed under Section 14D of the Act held that any person is a good witness if he deposes about the facts which are in his personal knowledge, whether he is a father or an attorney or a son or a neighbour; what law requires is that the deposition must be of the facts to which he is a privy; the evidence given by a witness cannot be rejected on the ground that he is a father or a relative, nor any adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff on the ground that he had not appeared his own witness in the case; the plaintiff is master of his case; he can prove his case without appearing in the witness box. Mention may also be made of Capt. Praveen Davar (Retd.) Vs. Harvansh Kumari (2010) 119 DRJ 560, (SLP (C) No.26449/2010 preferred whereagainst was dismissed on 27th September, 2010). In the present case, it is the son of the respondent who has appeared as a witness and who is admittedly residing in one of the two properties aforesaid which are stated to be situated in close proximity of each other, according to the petitioner also at a distance of 1 Km only. It cannot be said that the said son of the respondent was not conversant with the facts, so as to be not able to depose about the same. A perusal of the cross-examination by the counsel for the petitioner of the said son of the respondent also shows the same to be comprising of nothing except suggestions that each of the deposition of the said son in the affidavit by way of examination-in-chief was wrong."
Therefore, PW-1 was competent to depose about the facts pleaded in the petition and no adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner for not entering the witness-box.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.47/60
47. It is also contended by AR of the respondent that the bona fide requirement of the petitioner does not survive as on date because her granddaughters, for whom also the present petition was filed, must have completed their graduation and must be around 26-27 years and 23-24 years of age. It is relevant to note that the crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement of the landlord is the date of the filing of the eviction petition and not any other subsequent date. Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundararajan, (2019) 9 SCC 282. The relevant observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as under:
"12. Further, the High Court has also erroneously arrived at the conclusion that the bona fide occupation as sought should be not only on the date of the petition but it should continue to be there on the date of final adjudication of rights. Firstly, there is no material on record to indicate that the need as pleaded at the time of filing the petition does not subsist at this point. Even otherwise such conclusion cannot be reached, when it cannot be lost sight that the very judicial process consumes a long period and because of the delay in the process if the benefit is declined it would only encourage the tenants to protract the litigation so as to defeat the right. In the instant case, it is noticed that the petition filed by the landlord is of the year 2004 which was disposed of by the Rent Controller only in the year 2011. The appeal was thereafter disposed of by the appellate authority in the year 2013. The High Court had itself taken time to dispose of the revision petition, only on 6-3-2017. The entire delay cannot be attributed to the landlord and deny the relief. If as on the date of filing the petition the requirement subsists and it is proved, the same would be sufficient irrespective of the time lapse in the judicial process coming to an end. This Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC 604] has held that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement of landlord is the date of application for eviction, which we hereby reiterate."
Therefore, the respondent cannot be given the benefit of the time taken in completion of the trial of the present petition on the ground that some of the bona fide requirement RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.48/60 does not persist as on date due to the lapse of time.
48. It is pertinent to mention that PW-1, who deposed about the bona fide requirement of the petitioner, was not cross- examined on the facts deposed by PW-1 about the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. The cross-examination of PW-1 was centered around the title of the petitioner, the alternative accommodation allegedly available at 1610, Madrasa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi and the accommodation at B-15, Sector- 33, Noida, UP. PW-1 has denied the suggestion that the tenanted premises are not required by the petitioner for herself and for her family members and that her two sons are not dependent upon the petitioner for residence. The petitioner has sought the tenanted premises on the ground that her family consisting of her sons Sh. Deepak Gupta and Sh. Pradeep Gupta along-with their family members are residing at B-15, Sector-33, Noida, UP and since her granddaughters namely Apoorva Gupta and Smiti Gupta are studying in JNU and Hansraj College respectively and her son Deepak Gupta is working in Saket, they are finding it difficult to commute to Delhi on daily basis. Since, there was no cross-examination conducted from the respondent's side on these facts, the petitioner has been successful in proving these facts as they remained unrebutted. It is deposed by PW-1, during his cross-examination that the front side portion consisting of one room and one store is in possession of the petitioner. It is admitted by RW-1 in his cross-examination that one store, one room depicted as ABCD in site plan Ex. PW-1/5 and the portion of one drawing-cum-dining room, store, balcony depicted as X1 to X4 in Ex. PW-1/5 and the portion of the second floor depicted as X5 in Ex. PW-1/5 is in possession of Dr. Dinesh Singhal. RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.49/60 Therefore, it cannot be said that the portion in possession of the petitioner is sufficient to accommodate all the family members of the petitioner. It is settled law that when a landlord has a large family, the portions of the accommodation which the members of the family may occupying from time to time, may keep on changing and it is not open to the tenant to tell the landlord as to how the landlord should use the premises. In Anil Bhasin v. Imarti Devi (RC.REV. 266/2017 dated 06.11.2017), the law has been explained by by Hon'ble Delhi High Court:
"...Though the landlord may have pleaded use of the premises in a particular manner but when a landlord has a large family as has been found to be the case with the respondent herein, the portions of the accommodation which members of family may occupy from time to time may keep on changing as per their mutual understanding and it is not open to the petitioner as a tenant to tell the landlord, as to how the landlord should use the premises. The precedent, if any required on this aspect is to be found in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119, Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal (2005) 8 SCC 252 and Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610".
In the present case, the undisputed fact is that the family of the petitioner, who are residing with the petitioner excluding Sh. Manoj Gupta is consisting of the families of Sh. Deepak Gupta and Sh. Pradeep Gupta and at present they all are residing at B-15, Sector-33, Noida, UP, which is exclusively owned by Sh. Deepak Gupta. Therefore, if the petitioner on account of having a large number of family members is seeking the tenanted premises for their residence, apart from the fact that the tenanted premises are suitable and convenient for the family members of the petitioner, the bona fide need of the petitioner cannot be doubted. Moreover, the petitioner is seeking the tenanted premises for herself and her family members and the RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.50/60 need presented should be presumed to be bona fide, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
49. It is the contention of AR of the respondent that the petitioner herself has stated in the petition that she only wishes to shift to Delhi and hence, there is no bona fide requirement. On a meaningful reading of the petition, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner has only expressed a wish or desire in contra distinction to bona fide requirement. The petitioner has set out her bona fide requirement in detail. It is categorically stated by the petitioner that the tenanted premises are required for herself and her family members as the accommodation at B-15, Sector- 33, Noida, UP is not sufficient and convenient for the family members of the petitioner. It is not prudent to isolate one phrase from the rest of the pleadings and to argue that since the petitioner has used the words 'desire' and 'wish', there is no bona fide requirement of the petitioner to have the tenanted premises.
In view of the above, there is nothing on record which casts doubt on the bona fide need put forth by the petitioner.
Availability of suitable alternative accommodation.
50. In regard to the availability of alternative accommodation, it is pleaded by the petitioner that petitioner and her family members do not own any property in Delhi. It is contended by Ld. counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been successful in proving that the property no.1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi does not belong to the petitioner but actually belongs to Smt. Rajni Atal. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the testimony of PW-5, testimony of RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.51/60 PW-9, statement dated 13.04.2011 Ex. PW-1/6 and sale deed Ex. PW-8/A.
51. On the other hand, AR of the respondent contended that it has come on record in the testimony of PW-1 that the name plate of father-in-law of the petitioner i.e. Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal is still affixed on the property No.1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi and the same has been shown in the photograph Ex.PW-1/R2. He further contended that the name of the petitioner was appearing in the electoral roll of the concerned area where the property No. 1610, Madarsa road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi is situated and the same is reflected from Ex. RW3/1.
52. It was deposed by PW-1 that the property No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi was a tenanted property in which the father-in-law of the petitioner was a tenant and Smt. Rajni Atal was the owner and landlord of the said premises. It was further deposed by PW-1 that Smt. Rajni Atal had filed an eviction petition bearing No. 331/2008 against the father-in-law of the petitioner Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal and in the year 2013, a compromise had taken place between the parties and the tenanted premises was vacated. Petitioner has relied upon Ex. PW-1/6 which are the statements of Sh. Rajesh Goyal, grandson of Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal, statement of Smt. Rajni Atal and eviction order dated 13.04.2011 passed by Ld. ARC, North, Delhi in respect of first floor of property no.1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. Petitioner has also examined PW-5 i.e. Sh. Rajesh Goyal, grandson of Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal, who deposed that Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal was a tenant in respect of first floor of the property No.1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.52/60 Delhi and in the eviction petition filed by the landlord against Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal, he had appeared as an attorney holder of Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal. He further deposed that a compromise had taken place with the owner Smt. Rajni Atal and it was agreed that the property would be vacated after performing barsi of Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal in the said premises. He affirmed that he had made a statement Ex. PW-1/6 and that the premises was vacated in October 2013. He also deposed that since Jaishi Ram Goyal was residing in the said property for a long period of time, his name plate was retained on the ground floor near the staircase as a good omen. The petitioner has also examined Smt. Rajni Atal, who deposed that the property No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi was purchased by her in the year 1993 vide sale deed dated 07.06.1993 Ex. PW-8/A. He further deposed that Sh. Jaishi Ram Goyal was a tenant in respect of the first floor of the said premises and that his family had vacated the premises in the year 2013. Nothing has come in the cross- examinations of PW-5 and PW Rajni Atal, which would cast doubt on their testimony. The registered sale deed dated 07.06.1993 Ex. PW-8/A clearly proves that it was Smt. Rajni Atal who was the owner of the entire property bearing No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. The respondent has not been able to bring on record any evidence to the contrary which would disprove the fact that Smt. Rajni Atal was not the owner of the property No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi and that it was the petitioner or his family members, who were the owners of the same. The respondent has relied upon the electoral roll of the year 2017 pertaining to Chandni Chowk constituency to show that the address of the petitioner is property No.1610, RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.53/60 Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. The petitioner has also filed her Election I. D. Card Ex. PW-1/39 as per which the address of the petitioner was House No.B-15, Sector-33, Noida, UP. In view of the statement of PW-5, PW Rajni Atal, Ex. PW- 1/6 and Ex. PW-1/39, the petitioner has been successful in proving the premises No. 1610, Madarsa Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi were occupied by father-in-law of the petitioner as a tenant and the same was vacated in the year 2013.
53. The petitioner has sought the eviction of tenanted premises on the ground that the same is suitable for the family members of the petitioner as her son Deepak Gupta who is employed in a private Company at Saket, Delhi and her granddaughters who were studying in Delhi, are finding it difficult to commute to Delhi on daily basis. As per the petitioner, the property No.B-15, Sector-33, Noida, UP is owned by Sh. Pradeep Gupta. It is trite law that mere existence of alternative accommodation is not sufficient, it must be reasonably suitable. It was held in Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16 by Hon'ble Supreme Court that 'an alternative accommodation', to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be 'reasonably suitable', obviously in comparison with the accommodation whereform the landlord is seeking eviction. It was further held that the availability of another accommodation suitable and convenient in all respects as the accommodation from which the landlord is seeking eviction may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord, if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. It was yet further held that the bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises have to be RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.54/60 determined by the Court by applying objective standards and once the Court is satisfied of such bona fide, then in the matter of choosing out of more accommodation than one available to the landlord, his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. In Adarsh Electricals and others Vs Dinesh Dayal, RC Rev No. 195/2010, dated 25.10.2010, it was held as under:
"44. The concept of alternate accommodation means that accommodation which is "reasonable suitable" for the landlord, which in this case is not, as that particular accommodation is a support of income to the family of the respondent. As to alternative accommodation disentitling the landlord to the relief of possession, it has been held time and again that it must be reasonably equivalent as regards suitability in respect to the accommodation he was claiming. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. It is to be observed that it would be incorrect to suggest that the question of accommodation, actually in possession of the landlord, being 'reasonably suitable' is to be judged solely in the context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation and that the Court may hold that accommodation is insufficient having regard to various circumstances, such as, the social status of the family or traditions and customs observed by it as long as the landlord is able to establish that he in good faith and genuinely wishes to occupy the premises in possession of the tenant and that good faith or genuineness is of a reasonable man, it would not be open to the Controller to weigh the claim of the landlord in a fine scale and that the viability of the other accommodation will have also to be considered from the stand-point of a reasonable landlord. It is further to be observed that the law does not require the landlord to sacrifice his own comforts and requirements merely on the ground that the premises is with a tenant and for deciding whether or not the alternative accommodation available to the landlord is suitable or not, the social customs, conventions and habits, usage and practices of the society cannot be completely ruled out and termed as irrelevant. The problem had to be approached from the point of view of a reasonable man and not that of a whimsical landlord."
It is also settled law that it is for the landlord to RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.55/60 decide the suitability of premises, and neither the tenant nor the Rent Controller can have a say in that. It is settled law that the factum of suitability of the premises needs to be decided by the landlord and is not to be examined on the touchstone of the tenant. Reliance, in this regard can be placed on Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679. In Sait Nagjee Purshottam & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., 2005 8 SCC 252, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature and place of business, and tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord and advice him what he should do and what he should not do. Similarly, it was held in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary, AIR 2000 SC 534, that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Similarly, in Anil Bajaj and Anr. V. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:
"6. .... What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on different businesses and further that landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business."
As already observed above, no cross-examination of PW1 was conducted on the facts deposed by him for the bona fide requirement of the petitioner to have the tenanted premises.
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.56/60 Therefore, it is held that the petitioner does not have any other suitable alternative accommodation available for her and her family members.
54. It is the contention of the respondent that the tenanted premises, as originally let out to the respondent, comprises of the front portion of the ground floor, rear side of the first floor and second floor. It is pertinent to mention that as per the own case of the respondent, respondent is not in possession of any of the portion of the ground floor. There is no documentary proof placed on record by the respondent which would show that any portion of the ground floor was ever in possession of the respondent. RW-1, during his cross- examination, has admitted that all the documents Ex. RW-1/P1 to Ex. RW-1/P6 do not mention anything about ground floor portion. It is also pertinent to mention that the petitioner has filed certified copy of the judgment passed by the then Ld. ARC in eviction petition No .297/1994 Ex. PW-1/14, instituted by the petitioner against Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal for eviction of front portion of the ground floor, front courtyard, stairs, drawing-cum- dining room, kitchen and a portion of inner courtyard in property No.4911, Plot No.98, Daryaganj, Delhi. As per Ex. PW-1/14 Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal was the tenant in respect of the above mentioned front portion of the ground floor and the petitioner has instituted eviction petition bearing No.297/94 against the said tenant under section 14 (1) (e) and 14 D of DRC Act which was allowed in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has also relied upon certified copy of the order dated 21.04.2005 Ex. PW-1/15 in Company Petition No. 332/1999 for desealing of the above mentioned front portions of the ground floor, which was in RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.57/60 possession of tenant Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal since the said portion was sealed by official liquidator in liquidation proceedings against Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal. The petitioner has also relied upon the possession letter dated 12.05.2005 Ex. PW-1/17 and order dated 01.10.1999 passed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in revision petition No. 982/1999 Ex. RW-1/PX filed by Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal against the petitioner. Ex. PW-1/14, Ex. PW-1/15 and Ex. RW-1/PX are certified copies of judicial proceedings and are admissible in evidence as per Section 77 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The respondent has not been able to cast any doubt on the genuineness of these documents. The documents Ex. PW-1/14, Ex. PW-1/15, and Ex. RW-1/PX make it clear that the front portion of the property No.4911, Plot No.98, Daryaganj, Delhi was in possession of Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal as tenant since 1963 and its possession was taken by the petitioner in the year 2005. RW-1, when confronted with Ex. PW-1/14, Ex. PW-1/15, and Ex. RW-1/PX, stated that he did not have any knowledge about the proceedings between the petitioner and Sh. Bikki Lal Goyal. RW- 1 has also admitted that there is no proof in writing that the front portion of the ground floor was ever in tenancy of the respondent. Therefore, the claim of the respondent that the tenanted premises, as originally let out, were consisting of front portion of the ground floor apart from rear portion of first and second floor, and that the present petition is instituted only for a part of the tenanted premises, remained unsubstantiated.
55. The petitioner has relied upon the site plan Ex. PW- 1/5 to show that extent of the tenanted premises and the same are shown in red colour in Ex. PW-1/5. On the other hand, the respondent has relied upon the site plan Ex. PW-1/R1 to show the RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.58/60 extent of the premises pertaining to the respondent (the portion on which the respondent is asserting her claim as well as the portion she is occupying). The extent of the portion pertaining to the respondent is shown in red colour in Ex. PW-1/R1. As already observed, the respondent has not been able to prove that the front portion of the ground floor was part of the premises originally let out to her. From the site plans filed by the parties as well as the evidence recorded, it does not appear that the identification of the tenanted premises consisting of the rear portion of the first and second floor is in dispute. It is admitted by RW-1 in his cross-examination that the tenanted premises of the respondent on the first floor have been correctly shown in Ex. PW-1/5. It is also admitted by RW-1 in his cross-examination that the area shown on the second floor in red colour is under occupation of the respondent. Thus, the identification and extent of the tenanted premises has been proved to be the same as shown in Ex. PW1/5.
56. In regard to the authorities relied upon by AR of the respondent is concerned, it is suffice to say that they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Padma Sundara Rao & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 held:
"...9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board [(1972) 2 WLR 537 : 1972 AC 877 (HL) [Subnom British Railways Board v. Herrington, (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)]]. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases."
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.59/60
57. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has succeeded in establishing her case under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent directing the respondent to vacate the tenanted premises i.e. back portion consisting of two rooms, situated on the first floor, extended chajja and converted into kitchen, side balcony with common bathroom and latrine, and temporary shed/barsati, situated on the second floor, forming part of the property bearing municipal No. 4911, plot No. 98, block R, ward No. XI, Daryaganj, Delhi as shown in red colour in the site plan Ex.PW-1/5.
No order as to costs. Digitally
signed by
PRANAV
PRANAV JOSHI
JOSHI Date:
2024.01.22
Announced in open Court 17:33:40
+0530
on 22nd Day of January, 2024
(Pranav Joshi)
ASCJ-cum-JSCC-cum-GJ/Central,
THC/Delhi/22.01.2024
RC ARC No. 584/2017 Kamla Gupta Vs Nirmala Nath Page no.60/60