Gauhati High Court
Geetali Doley vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 18 March, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 GAU 75
Author: Manojit Bhuyan
Bench: Manojit Bhuyan
Page No.# 1/96
GAHC010139172019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C) 4198/2019
1:GEETALI DOLEY
R/O VILL. TARIANI BHEKELI,P.O. DHINPORA BALIJAN, P.S. BOGIMADI,
DIST.-LAKHIMPUR, PIN-786003
VERSUS
1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, DISPUR,
GUWAHATI-781006
2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A
3RD FLOOR
JANATA BHAWAN
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A
3RD FLOOR
JANATA BHAWAN
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
4:THE SECRETARY
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. BLOCK-A
3RD FLOOR
JANATA BHAWAN
DISPUR
Page No.# 2/96
GUWAHATI-78100
Advocate for the Petitioner : MS K GOGOI
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM
Linked Case : WP(C) 2684/2019 1:NIPAN KUMAR PATHAK S/O- SRI SUSENDRA KUMAR PATHAK PERMANENT R/O- VILL- MAIRAMARA P.O. AND P.S. HOWLY DIST- BARPETA ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6 Page No.# 3/96 4:THE COMM. AND SECY.
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GHY-6 5:THE COMM. OF TAXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S.ROAD DISPUR GHY-6 6:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES KOKRAJHAR Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A K BHUYAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1618/2018 1:JYOTIRMOY ADHIKARY AND ANR.
S/O- SRI MRINAL ADHIKARY R/O- WARD NO. 1 KANAKLATA ROAD P.O AND P.S- BONGAIGAON DIST- BONGAIGAON ASSAM 2: RAJU SAHA S/O- LATE RAMKRISHNA SAHA R/O- VILL- KALAHBHANGA (MISSION ROAD) P.O AND P.S- BARPETA ROAD DIST- BARPETA ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 Page No.# 4/96 2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT DISPUR GHY-06 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT DISPUR GHY- 06 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 3066/2019 1:KAMAL DEBNATH S/O KHITISH DEBNATH R/O WARD NO. 3 KALAHBHANGA BARPETA ROAD DIST.-BARPETA PIN-781315 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 2:THE JOINT SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 5817/2017 1:BHASKAR CHANDRA DEVA SARMA Page No.# 5/96 S/O- HARISH CHANDRA DEVA SARMA R/O- H NO.5 CHANDRA CHOUDHURY PATH BHETAPARA GUWAHATI- 28 KAMRUPM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM and 5 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY- 6 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL A DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-6 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DISPUR GHY- 6 4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNELA DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 6 5:THE ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN JAWAHAR NAGAR KHANAPARA GHY- 22 6:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM RAJBHAWAN GHY-1 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M DAS Advocate for the Respondent : SC PERSONNEL DEPT.
Page No.# 6/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 4905/2019 1:VIKASH KUMAR PINCHA S/O- SHIKHAR CHAND PINCHA R/O- SHREE ARIHANT GARMENTS B.G. MARKET 2ND FLOOR SRCB ROAD FANCY BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP (M) GHY-1 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.
REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY.
FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE JOINT SECRETARY FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : SC FINANCE AND TAXATION Linked Case : WP(C) 954/2019 1:KAVITA DAS R/O- SRIMANTAPUR BHANGAGARH GHY ASSAM PIN- 781032 VERSUS Page No.# 7/96 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 4:THE JOINT DIRECTOR TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2783/2019 1:RAJU SAHA S/O- LT RAMKRISHNA SAHA R/O- KALAHBHANGA (MISSION ROAD) P.O. AND P.S. BARPETA ROAD DIST- BARPETA ASSAM PIN- 781315 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-06 Page No.# 8/96 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-06 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 7891/2018 1:SABBIRA IMRAN D/O. NURUL IMRAN R/O. MANIRAM DEWAN ROAD NEAR NAGAON SADAR THANA KHAN BAHADUR COMPLEX P.S. AND DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY.-06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Page No.# 9/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 2374/2019 1:BHARGAV PHUKAN S/O. SRI D. K. PHUKAN R/O. H/NO.9 KRISHNAPUR BELTOLA D.TAROO PATH 2ND LEFT BYLANE P.O. LAKHIMANDIR GUWAHATI-781028 DIST. KAM.RUP ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 7122/2019 1:HARSHAJYOTI BORA AND 7 ORS.
S/O- SRI ANIL CHANDRA BORA R/O- BISHNURAVA ROAD P.S. TEZPUR DIST- SONITPUR Page No.# 10/96 ASSAM 2: JAYANTA KUMAR NATH S/O- NAGEN CHANDRA NATH R/O- VILL- KABAICHUBA BORDOLGURI P.S. SIPAJHAR DIST- DARRANG ASSAM 3: HEMANTA SAIKIA S/O- BHOGESWAR SAIKIA VILL- LAKHTAKIA P.S. DHEMAJI DIST- DHEMAJI ASSAM 4: MS. SABBIRA IMRAN D/O- SRI NURUL IMRAN R/O- MANIRAM DEWAN ROAD NEAR NAGAON SADAR THANA P.O. NAGAON PIN- 782001 5: DILIP KR. KALITA S/O- LT BHABA KANTA KALITA R/O- SENCHOWA TINIALI P.O. SENCHOWA DIST- NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782002 6: JATINDRA PRASAD BARUA S/O- DR. HOMESWAR BARUAH R/O- AMOLAPATTY B.M.ROAD NAGAON ASSAM 7: KAUSHIK KALITA S/O- SRI SANATAN CH. KALITA R/O- H.NO. 28 LAKHIMI NAGAR HATIGAON GHY- 38 8: KAVITA DAS R/O- SRIMANTAPUR BHANGAGARH GHY Page No.# 11/96 ASSAM PIN- 781032 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-06 2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME AND POLITICAL DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-06 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1727/2019 1:BARNALI DAS D/O MR. JAGADISH DAS RESIDENT OF VILLAGE PIJUPARA PO NAGARBERA PS NAGARBERA DIST KAMRUP 781127 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM Page No.# 12/96 PERSONNEL(A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1762/2019 1:MUSTAFA AHMED BARBHUIYA S/O ISHAQUE BARBHUIYA R/O HOUSE NO. 5 LNB ROAD HATIGAON P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON DIST.-KAMRUP(M) PIN-781038 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA Page No.# 13/96 ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1766/2019 1:LEENA KRISHNA KAKATI D/O MR. TIKENDRA NATH KAKATI R/O HOUSE NO. 20 BAGHARBARI SATGAON ROAD PANJABARI GUWAHATI-37 P.O-PANJABARI P.S- DISPUR DIST.-KAMRUP(M) ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1759/2019 1:MOON MAZOOMDER W/O PRANJAL CHAKRABORTY D/O MRS. MEERA MAZOOMDER R/O NETAJI ROAD Page No.# 14/96 MADHAYA SRIPURIA P.O.- SRIPURIA P.S.- TINSUKIA DIST.- TINSUKIA PIN- 786125 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1371/2019 1:JOYDEV MAHANTA S/O. LT. NILOMONI MAHANTA R/O. BAPUJI NAGAR P.O. BALADMARI P.S. GOALPARA DIST.- GOALPARA ASSAM PIN- 783121.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR Page No.# 15/96 GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARTY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 131/2019 1:RUMI SAIKIA R/O VILL- NAGAON ROAD- PAINGAON JYOTINAGAR HOUSE NO. 69A P.. ITACHALI DIST. NAGAON ASSAM PIN - 782003.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
Page No.# 16/96 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1346/2019 1:ANIRUDHYA ROY S/O. MANOMOHAN ROY R/O. OXIGURI P.O. SRINAGAR P.S. TAMRAHAT DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM-783332.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:COMMISSIONER AND SECY.
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
Page No.# 17/96 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2621/2018 1:BHASKAR DUTTA DAS S/O SRI BHADRESWAR DUTTA DAS R/O HOUSE NO. 9 A.G. OFFICE ROAD KRISHNAPUR BELTOLA GUWAHATI 781028 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2228/2019 1:SRABANTI SENGUPTA R/O- BHOLANATH ROAD VILL- KADAMONI Page No.# 18/96 P.O- DIBRUGARH P.S- DIBRUGARH DIST- DIBRUGARH WARD NO.3 PIN- 786001 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 3123/2019 Page No.# 19/96 1:NISHA MONI DEKA WIFE OF VIKASH KUMAR PINCHA RESIDENT OF SRCB ROAD FANCY BAZAR DIST.- KAMRUP (M) GUWAHATI- 781001 ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
2:THE JOINT SECRETARY HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2454/2019 1:PALLABI SARMA CHAUDHURY W/O. SURAJIT CHAUDHURY R/O. HOUSE NO. 26 KRISHNANAGAR CHATRIBARI P.S. PALTAN BAZAR GUWAHATI KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY CHIEF SECRETARY ASSAM DISPUR Page No.# 20/96 GUWAHATI-06 ASSAM.
2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-06 ASSAM.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL-A DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR B KAUSHIK Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 206/2019 1:SURANJITA HAZARIKA W/O- SAURAV KUMAR DEKA H NO. 34 KALYANI NAGAR KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI- 781019 P.O- KAHILIPARA P.S- DISPUR WARD NO. 26 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 3:THE SECRETARY Page No.# 21/96 DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 4:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY DEPTT OF TRANSPORT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2131/2019 1:SMTI. BARNALI DEVI W/O- DIPJYOTI UZIR R/O- HOUSE NO. 6 HATIGAON P.S. HATIGAON DIST.- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM PIN- 781038.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPARTMENT 1ST FLOOR F-BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
3:THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN Page No.# 22/96 G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
4:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NALBARI UNIT ZONE-B NALBARI ASSAM PIN- 781335.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A CHAMUAH Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 8539/2018 1:PRASENJIT KR. GHOSH S/O- LATE SURESH KUMAR GHOSH R/O- H NO. 40 APRO COLONY LANE ULUBARI GUWAHATI P.S PALTAN BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP(M) ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM 2:THE SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM 3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY Page No.# 23/96 TRANSPORT DEPTT GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR S S DEY Advocate for the Respondent : SC TRANSPORT Linked Case : WP(C) 2376/2019 1:GULSHAN DAOLAGUPU S/O LT. GOVIND DAOLAGUPU R/O F/NO. 408 MANIK NAGAR R.G.BARUAH ROAD GUWAHATI-781005 DIST.-KAMRUP (M) ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME(A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 5809/2018 Page No.# 24/96 1:SRI HIMANGSHU CHOWDHURY AND 3 ORS.
S/O- SRI BIBHU BHUSAN CHOUDHURY R/O- VILL- BELTOLA PO BALADMARI DIST- GOALPARA ASSAM 2: SRI DEBOJIT BORA S/O- LT JITENDRA MOHAN BORA R/O- VILL- GANDHINAGAR L.K.ROAD PS NAGAON DIST- NAGAON ASSAM 3: SRI BADRUL ISLAM CHOUDHURY S/O- LT ABDUS SHAKUR CHOUDHURY VILL AND PO MOHAKAL PS BADARPUR DIST- KARIMGANJ ASSAM 4: SRI RAJARSHI SEN DEKA S/O- NILAMANI SEN DEKA R/O- LACHITNAGAR KANAKLATA PATH GHY-7 ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECY.
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Page No.# 25/96 Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 998/2019 1:DILIP KUMAR KALITA S/O SHRI BHABA KANTA KALITA R/O VILL- SENCHOWA P.O. SENCHOWA TINIALI P.S. NAGAON DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI -06 IDS.T KAMRUP (METRO) ASSAM.
2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-6 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.
3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -6 DIST.KAMRUP (M) ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR F KHAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Page No.# 26/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 608/2019 1:PRASENJIT KR. GHOSH S/O. LATE SURESH KUMAR GHOSH R/O. HOUSE NO. 40 APRO COLONY LANE ULUBARI GUWAHATI P.S. PALTANBAZAR DIST. KAMRUP(M) ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT.
GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.
2:THE SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT.
GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.
3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TRANSPORT DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. P N GOSWAMI Advocate for the Respondent : SC TRANSPORT Linked Case : WP(C) 3121/2019 1:HRITURAJ GOGOI Page No.# 27/96 S/O- SHRI TANKESWAR GOGOI R/O- H.NO. 19 CHANDAN NAGAR PATH LANE 3 BASISTHA GHY DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM PIN- 781028 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONAL (A) DEPTT.
ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE SECRETARY IN THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6 4:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6 5:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE DEPTT.
ASSAM SECRETARIAT (CIVIL) DISPUR GHY-6 6:THE DY. COMMISSIONER LAKHIMPUR DISTRICT NORTH LAKHIMPUR ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R SARMA Advocate for the Respondent : GA Page No.# 28/96 ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 7768/2018 1:HARSHAJYOTI BORA AND 2 ORS.
S/O SRI ANIL CHANDRA BORAH R/O BISHNURAVA ROAD P.S. TEZPUR DIST. SONITPUR ASSAM- 784001 2: SRI JAYANTA KUMAR NATH S/O NAGEN CHANDRA NATH R/O VILL- KABAICHUBA BORDOLGURI P.S. SIPAJHAR DIST. DARRANG ASSAM PIN - 784145.
3: SRI HEMANTA SAIKIA S/O BHOGESWAR SAIKIA VILL- LAKHTAKIA P.S. DHEMAJI DIST. DHEMAJI ASSAM- 787057.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Page No.# 29/96 Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2513/2019 1:UTPAL BHUYAN SON OF SRI JOGEN BHUYAN R/O. VILL. MODHUPUR P.O. KURUKANI P.S. KAKOTIBARI PIN- 785691 DIST. CHARAIDEO ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY.- 781006.
2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY.- 781006.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY.- 781006.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A D CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1008/2019 1:GANESH CHANDRA DAS AND 2 ORS.
S/O- SRI RAGHAB CHANDRA DAS R/O- BELTOLA COLLEGE ROAD BELTOLA GHY- 28 Page No.# 30/96 P.O- BELTOLA P.S- BASISTHA DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM 2: DEEPSIKHA PHUKAN D/O- MR. DIPAK KUMAR PHUKAN R/O- H NO. 9 AG OFFICE ROAD D TAROO PATH KRISHNAPUR GUWAHATI- 781028 P.O- BELTOLA P.S- BASISTHA DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM 3: MONIKA TERONGPI W/O- SRI HABE TIMUNG R/O- RONGHINGCHONG (NEAR PANCHAYAT OFFICE) KARBI ANGLONG- 782460 P.O- DIPHU P.S- DIPHU DIST- KARBI ANGLONG ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY- 06 ASSAM 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 ASSAM 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 ASSAM 4:THE PRINCIPAL / JOINT SECRETARY Page No.# 31/96 TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DM DEPTT DISPUR GHY-06 ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR N DUTTA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1749/2019 1:SAIBUR RAHMAN BARBHUIYA S/O. MR. TAYEEBUR RAHMAN BARBHUIYA R/O. TML ROAD KADAMTAL P.O.- RONGPUR P.S. SILCHAR SADAR SILCHAR DIST.- CACHAR PIN- 788009 ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECREARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Page No.# 32/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 1442/2019 1:MANZOOR ELAHI LASKAR S/O- MAHI UDDIN LASKAR R/O- MEHERPUR P.O- SILCHAR DIST- CACHAR ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL(A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 8523/2018 1:JATINDRA PRASAD BARUAH S/O- DR. HOMESWAR BARUAH R/O- AMOLAPATTY B.M.ROAD P.O. NAGAON P.S. SADAR DIST- NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782001 Page No.# 33/96 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE ADDL. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R P KAKOTI SR. ADV. Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 8117/2018 1:JYOTIRMOY ADHIKARY S/O SRI MRINAL ADHIKARY R/O WARD NO. 1 KANAKLATA ROAD P.O. AND P.S. BONGAIGAON DIST. BONGAIGAON ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPARTMENT Page No.# 34/96 DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.OF ASSAM LABOUR WELFARE DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI - 06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S K TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 863/2019 1:DHRUBOJYOTI CHAKRABORTY S/O- LATE SUDHANGSHU SEKHAR CHAKRABORTY SETTLEMENT ROAD KARIMGANJ TOWN P.O- KARIMGANJ- 788710 DIST- KARIMGANJ ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR DISPUR GHY- 06 3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR DISPUR GHY- 06 Page No.# 35/96 4:THE APSC REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN APSC KHANAPARA GUWAHATI- 22 ASSAM 5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HAILAKANDI DISTRICT P.O- HAILAKANDI- 788151 DIST- HAILAKANDI ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DHAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2458/2019 1:RHITURAJ NEOG S/O. SH. RAJENDRA PRASAD NEOG R/O. HOUSE NO.1 BYE LANE NO.2 CHANDAN NAGAR SURVEY BELTOLA GUWAHATI-781006 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY.
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
3:THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM Page No.# 36/96 FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
4:THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR B CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2244/2019 1:DIPAK KHANIKAR R/O- VILL- NATUN BAZAR P.O- RATANPUR P.S- JENGRAIMUKH DIST- MAJULI WARD NO. 10 PIN- 785105 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK-A 3RD FLOOR Page No.# 37/96 JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT BLOCK- A 3RD FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 7098/2018 1:DWITHUN BORGAYARY S/O ASWINI KR. BORGAYARI RESIDENT OF HATIMATHA PO- KOKRAJHAR DISTRICT- KOKRAJHAR ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GHY-6.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY Page No.# 38/96 Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1730/2019 1:MANAS PRATIM HALOI AEC ROAD ANGAD NAGAR PATH HOUSE NO. 41 P.O. GAUHATI UNIVERSITY P.S. JALUKBARI DIST. KAMRUP(M) WARD NO. 02 PIN- 781014.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/ JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
4:THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
Page No.# 39/96 5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NAGAON ZONE GOVT. OF ASSAM COURT CAMPUS NAGAON- 782001.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 779/2019 1:SUSOVAN DAS S/O. SRI SALIL KUMAR DAS LONGAI ROAD SREEPALLI KARIMGANJ TOWN P.O. SETTLEMENT ROAD- 788712 DIST. KARIMGANJ ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
3:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR DISPUR GUWAHATI- 781006.
4:THE ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY THE CHAIRMAN ASSAM PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION KHANAPARA Page No.# 40/96 GUWAHATI- 781022 ASSAM.
5:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER KARIMGANJ DISTRICT P.O.- KARIMGANJ- 788710 DIST.- KARIMGANJ ASSAM.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N DHAR Advocate for the Respondent : SC PERSONNEL DEPT.
Linked Case : WP(C) 2163/2019 1:PALLAVI SHARMA D/O- SHRI RAM PRASAD SARMAH R/O- H.NO. 6 DR. B.K.KAKOTI ROAD KACHARI BASTI ULUBARI GHY-7 DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GHY-6 2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GHY-6 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR D K MISHRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Page No.# 41/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 8554/2018 1:KUNAL DAS S.O- TAPAN DAS PERMANENT R/O- VILL- ULUBARI P.O- ULUBARI P.S- PALTAN BAZAR DIST- KAMRUP(M) ASSAM PIN- 781007 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 2:THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 4:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT DISPUR GUWAHATI- 06 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A K BHUYAN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 1721/2019 Page No.# 42/96 1:SUNAYANA AIDEW RESIDING AT B N MAHANTA ROAD HOUSE NO. 54 AMULAPATTY NAGAON P.O. NAGAON P.S. NAGAON SADAR DIST. NAGAON WARD NO. 10 PIN-782001.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
2:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
1ST FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM FINANCE (TAXATION) DEPTT.
2ND FLOOR F BLOCK JANATA BHAWAN DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
4:THE COMMISSIONER OF TEXES GOVT. OF ASSAM KAR BHAWAN G.S. ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006.
5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES NAGAON ZONE GOVT. OF ASSAM COURT CAMPUS Page No.# 43/96 NAGAON-782001.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR A JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 156/2018 1:HIMANGSHU CHOWDHURY S/O. SRI BIBHU BHUSAN CHOUDHURY RESIDENT OF VILLAGE BELTOLA P.O. BALADMARI DIST. GOALPARA ASSAM.
2: SRI RAJARSHI SEN DEKA S/O. NILAMANI SEN DEKA RESIDENT OF LACHIT NAGAR KANAKLATA PATH GUWAHATI-7 DISTRICT KAMRUP (M).
3: SRI BADRUL ISLAM CHOUDHURY S/O. LATE ABDUS SHAKUR CHOUDHURY VILL. AND P.O. MOHAKAL P.S. BADARPUR DIST. KARIMGANJ ASSAM.
VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
2:ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
Page No.# 44/96 4:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
5:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. U K NAIR Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Linked Case : WP(C) 2625/2018 1:AMRIT JYOTI SHARMA S/O LATE PRAFULLA CHANDRA SHARMA R/O NEW AMOLAPATTY P.O./P.S. GOLAGHAT DIST. GOLAGHAT ASSAM PIN 785621 VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM PERSONNEL (A) DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI 781006 3:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM REVENUE AND DISASTER DEPTT.
DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. D K MISRA Advocate for the Respondent : GA ASSAM Page No.# 45/96 Linked Case : WP(C) 820/2019 1:KAUSHIK KALITA S/O SANATAN CHANDRA KALITA R/O HATIGAON LAKHMINAGAR P.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM VERSUS 1:THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.
REP. BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI - 06.
2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
3:THE ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI -06.
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R SINGHA Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM Dates of Hearing : 02.12.2019, 03.12.2019, 04.12.2019, 05.12.2019, 06.12.2019, 09.12.2019, 11.12.2019, 12.12.2019, 13.12.2019, 16.12.2019, 17.12.2019, 18.12.2019, 02.01.2020, 03.01.2020, 06.01.2020, 07.01.2020, Page No.# 46/96 08.01.2020 and 22.01.2020.
Date of Judgment : 18.03.2020.
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT BHUYAN
JUDGMENT & ORDER
The 52 (fifty-two) writ petitioners in the present 49 (forty-nine) writ petitions cries foul with their discharge from service during the period of probation and pleads in one voice that the Court should lift the veil to reach and ascertain the intention and reason behind the issuance of the impugned orders. The petitioners submit that their discharge from service is based on alleged misconduct and it is the report of the investigation carried out by the Dibrugarh Police Station that propelled and became the foundation of the impugned action.
2. The imputations against each of the writ petitioners finds recorded in the respective supplementary charge-sheets, which came about following investigations in Dibrugarh P.S. Case No. 936/2016, on the basis of an FIR dated 27.10.2016 lodged by one Dr. Angshumita Gogoi of Namrup, district Dibrugarh, alleging to the effect that one Naba Kanta Patir contacted and told her to pay Rs.10 lakhs in consideration of her recruitment to a post of Dental Surgeon in the exercise carried out by the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC). Said Sri Patir demanded that the amount of Rs.10 lakhs be brought to his residence at Dibrugarh on 27.10.2016. She had informed the matter to the Dibrugarh Police and on the said date i.e. 27.10.2016 Sri Patir was apprehended from his residential premise located at the Circuit House Road while in the process of receiving the amount from the complainant. Following further investigations, each of the petitioners were arrested and implicated as accused with imputations being more or less the same. Investigations revealed that one accused Sri Rakesh Kumar Paul (A-3), who was the Chairman of APSC, along with his brother Page No.# 47/96 Sri Rajib Paul (A-9), who is a businessman and the owner of the printing house 'Subhadeep Printers' and one Sri Sudip Das (A-10), another businessman, colluded with each other and used to print duplicate and fake APSC answer scripts, which were given to the writ petitioners for re-writing the answers again after the examination. The re-written answer scripts were thereafter replaced with the original answer scripts in connivance with one Sri Pabitra Kaibarta (A-5), the then Assistant Controller of Examinations, APSC, for the purpose of getting the writ petitioners selected in the Combined Competitive Examination of 2013 and 2014 respectively, conducted by the APSC. The duplicate and fake answer scripts of the writ petitioners were recovered and seized from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC. The forensic examination of the seized answer scripts revealed that the same were not printed in the Government Press and the handwriting of marks is of Rakesh Kumar Paul (A-3). In the said answer scripts, either there was no signature of the Invigilator or in case of any signature appearing, the same were found to be fake and mis-matched with the signature of the concerned Invigilator.
3. The entry of the writ petitioners into service may now be noticed. One set of petitioners are from the 2015 batch of candidates, who had cleared the Combined Competitive Examination-2013 under the aegis of the Assam Public Service Commission, pursuant to Advertisement dated 11.08.2013. As many as 42,553 candidates had appeared in the Combined Competitive (Preliminary) Examination, out of which 2287 nos. of candidates appeared in the Main Examination on being so qualified. Candidates qualifying and called for interview stood at 497 nos. and finally 241 candidates were selected and recommended for appointment to various services under the Government of Assam, having regard to options expressed by the candidates. Another set of petitioners are from the 2016 batch of candidates who had qualified in the Combined Competitive Examination-2014 pursuant to Advertisement dated 03.04.2014. As many as 24,722 candidates appeared in the Combined Competitive (Preliminary) Examination and from amongst those qualifying, a total of 1550 nos. of candidates appeared in the Main Examination. For the purpose of interview 371 candidates were called, out of which 180 candidates were selected and recommended for appointment to various services under the Government of Assam, considering their Page No.# 48/96 preferences/options expressed by them. Thus, a total 421 nos. of candidates from both batches were offered appointments on probation, including the 52 nos. of writ petitioners in the present bunch of cases. These 52 nos. of writ petitioners are from the total 60 persons whose services were discharged during the period of probation, which discharge orders are primarily the subject-matter of challenge herein. The particulars of the writ petitioners, implicated as accused in respective charge-sheets, and the service to which they belonged, are shown hereunder:
Assam Civil Service (Jr. Grade) Sl. W.P.(C) No. NAME OF PETITIONER ACCUSED SUPPLE-
No. No. MENTARY
CHARGE/SHEET
1. 5817 of 2017 Bhaskar Chandra Dev A-12 I
Sharma
2. 2621 of 2018 Bhaskar Dutta Das A-11 I
3. 2625 of 2018 Amrit Jyoti Sharma A-13 I
4. 5809 of 2018 Himangshu Chowdhury A-25 II
5. 5809 of 2018 Debojit Bora A-20 II
6. 5809 of 2018 Badrul Islam Choudhury A-32 II
7. 5809 of 2018 Rajarshi Sen Deka A-35 II
8. 7098 of 2018 Dwithun Borgayary A-17 II
9. 8554 of 2018 Kunal Das A-27 II
10. 131 of 2019 Rumi Saikia A-36 II
11. 779 of 2019 Susovan Das A-59 VI
12. 863 of 2019 Dhrubojyoti Chakraborty A-55 VI
13. 1008 of 2019 Ganesh Chandra Das A-58 VI
14. 1008 of 2019 Deepsikha Phukan A-52 VI
15 1008 of 2019 Monika Teronpi A-48 VI
16. 1346 of 2019 Anirudhya Roy A-24 II
17. 1371 of 2019 Joydev Mahanta A-45 IV
18. 1442 of 2019 Manzoor Elahi Laskar A-56 VI
19. 1727 of 2019 Barnali Das A-51 VI
20. 1749 of 2019 Saibur Rahman A-57 VI
Barbhuiya
21. 1759 of 2019 Moon Mazoomder A-47 VI
22. 1762 of 2019 Mustafa Ahmed A-65 VI
Barbhuiya
23. 1766 of 2019 Leena Krishna Kakati A-50 VI
24. 2228 of 2019 Srabanti Sengupta A-49 VI
25. 2244 of 2019 Dipak Khanikar A-14 II
26. 2454 of 2019 Pallabi Sarma Choudhury A-22 II
Page No.# 49/96
27. 2513 of 2019 Utpal Bhuyan A-60 VI
28. 3121 of 2019 Hrituraj Gogoi A-43 IV
29. 3123 of 2019 Nisha Moni Deka A-37 II
30. 3066 of 2019 Kamal Debnath A-30 II
31 4198 of 2019 Geetali Doley A-34 II
Assam Police Service (JR. GRADE)
Sl. W.P.(C) No. NAME OF THE ACCUSED SUPPLE-
No. PETITIONER No. MENTARY
CHARGE/SHEET
32 7768 of 2018 Harshajyoti Bora A-21 II
33 7768 of 2018 Jayanta Kr. Nath A-16 II
34 7768 of 2018 Hemanta Saikia A-15 II
35 7891 of 2018 Sabbira Imran A-18 II
36 8523 of 2018 Jatindra Pd. Baruah A-26 II
37 820 of 2019 Kaushik Kalita A-42 IV
38 954 of 2019 Kavita Das A-66 VI
39 998 of 2019 Dilip Kumar Kalita A-29 II
40 2163 of 2019 Pallavi Sharma A-53 VI
41 2374 of 2019 Bhargav Phukan A-62 VI
42 2376 of 2019 Gulshan Daolagapu A-61 VI
ASSAM TAXATION SERVICE
Sl. W.P.(C) No. NAME OF THE ACCUSED SUPPLE-
No. PETITIONER No. MENTARY
CHARGE/SHEET
43 1721 of 2019 Sunayana Aidew A-33 II
44 1730 of 2019 Manas Protim Haloi A-39 III
45 2131 of 2019 Barnali Devi A-44 III
46 2458 of 2019 Rhituraj Neog A-63 VI
47 2684 of 2019 Nipan Kr. Pathak A-64 VI
48 4905 of 2019 Vikas Kr. Pincha A-38 III
ASSAM TRANSPORT SERVICE
Sl. W.P.(C) No. NAME OF THE ACCUSED SUPPLE-
No. PETITIONER No. MENTARY
CHARGE/SHEET
49 8539 of 2018 Prasenjit Kr. Ghosh A-46 V
50 206 of 2019 Suranjita Hazarika A-54 VI
Page No.# 50/96
ASSAM LABOUR SERVICE
Sl. W.P.(C) No. NAME OF THE ACCUSED SUPPLE-
No. PETITIONER No. MENTARY
CHARGE/SHEET
51 8117 of 2018 Jyotirmoy Adhikari A-31 II
52 2783 of 2019 Raju Saha A-19 II
4. From the above it is seen that the writ petitioners herein belonged to different service under the Government of Assam.
(I) As regards those belonging to the Assam Civil Service, their discharge from service was in terms of the provisions under Rule 20, clause (c) of the Assam Civil Service Rules, 1998 (in short the 1998 Rules), the relevant part of which reads as under :
"20. Discharge of Probationer- A member shall be liable to be discharged from service-
(c) if any information received relating to his integrity, age, health, character and antecedents the Governor is satisfied that the probationer is ineligible or otherwise unfit for being a member of the service; or "
(II) Those belonging to the Assam Police Service, they were discharged from service in exercise of powers under Rule 16, clause (b) of the Assam Police Service Rules, 1966 (in short the 1966 Rules) the relevant part of which reads as under :
"16. Discharge of a probationer- A probationer shall be liable to be discharged from the service or in the case of persons appointed to the service under clause (b) of rule 5(1) be reverted to the post of Inspector of Police if he -
(b) is considered otherwise unsuitable, for reasons to be recorded, for continuing in the service by the Governor."
Page No.# 51/96 (III) In so far as the petitioners belonging to the Assam Taxation Service are concerned, their discharge from service came about in terms of Rule 19, clause (ii) of the Assam Taxation Service Rules, 1995 (in short the 1995 Rules), the relevant portion of which reads as under :
"19. A temporary or officiating member under these Rules shall be liable to be discharged or reverted to the lower cadre of the service or to his original service as the case may be, if :-
(ii) it is found on a subsequent verification that he was initially not qualified for the appointment or that he had furnished any incorrect information with regard to his appointment."
(IV) In so far as the petitioners belonging to the Assam Transport Service are concerned, they were discharged from service in exercise of powers under Rule 19, sub-rule (2) of the Assam Transport Service Rules, 2003 (in short the 2003 Rules), the relevant part of which reads as under:
"19. A temporary or officiating member shall be liable to be discharged or reverted to the lower cadre of the service or to his original service, if :-
(2) it is found on a subsequent verification that he was not initially qualified for appointment or that he had furnished any incorrect information with regard to his appointment."
(V) Lastly, as regards the petitioners belonging to the Assam Labour Service, they were discharged from service in exercise of powers under Rule 13, clause (c) of the Assam Labour Service Rules, 2007 (in short the 2007 Rules), as amended, the relevant part of which reads as under :
Page No.# 52/96 "13. Discharge of a Probationer - A probationer shall be liable to be discharged from the service -
(c) if on information received relating to his nationality, age, health, character and antecedents the Government is satisfied that the probationer is ineligible or otherwise unfit for being a member of the service; or "
5. Before proceeding to record the primary grounds of challenge, the three different model forms of discharge orders that had been issued, may be noticed. The same are reproduced hereunder and taken at random from (i) WP(C)/2621/2018, (ii) WP(C)/2163/2019 and (iii) WP(C)/206/2019 :
(i) " AAP.148/2017/28
Government of Assam
Department of personnel (personnel :: A) Assam Secretariat (Civil) Dispur Guwahati-781006 Dated Dispur the 8th September, 2017 Orders by the Governor notification Whereas, Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS was appointed on probation to ACS (Jr. Grade) vide Notification No. AAP. 319/2011/248 dated 12-08-2015 and subsequently his service was placed at disposal of Revenue & D.M. Department vide Notification No. AAA.20/2015/46 Dated 28-02-2017 for posting him as Circle Officer/Assistant Settlement Officer; and Whereas, Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS, Circle Officer, Borbhag Revenue Circle was arrested by the Dibrugarh Police on 03-05-2017 in connection with the Dibrugarh Police Station Case No. 936/2016 U/S 7/13(1)(A)(B)(D)/(2) P.C. Act R/W Sec. 120(B)/420 IPC and added Sec. 463/468/471/477(A)/201 IPC and placed under suspension vide Notification No. RLR.97/2016/13 Dtd. 18-05-2017; and Whereas, the service of Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS (Under Suspension) was withdrawn from Revenue & DM Department vide Notification No. AAA 15/2015/78 Dtd. 01-07-2017; and Whereas, sufficient information relating to the integrity of Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS (under Suspension) has been received which warrants drawal of conclusion that the officer is unfit for being a member of the Service; and Whereas, the Governor of Assam is satisfied that the officer is, thus, ineligible or otherwise unfit for being a member of the Service and it is necessary & expedient to discharge him from service; and Whereas, the Governor of Assam is also satisfied that any further departmental enquiry may hamper the Police investigation in the above mentioned criminal cases having larger interest of the State;
Now, therefore, the Governor of Assam in exercise of the powers conferred by rule 20(c) of the Assam Civil Service Rules, 1998 r/w rule 10(ii) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 is pleased to discharge Shri Bhaskar Dutta Das, ACS (Under Suspension) from service with immediate effect.
By order and in the name of the Page No.# 53/96 Governor of Assam Sd/- Dr. K. K. Dwivedi Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam Personnel (A) Department. "
(ii) "
Government of Assam home (a) Department :: dispur Guwahati ::6 E-mail : [email protected] Orders by the Governor notification Dated Dispur the 30th November, 2018 No. HMA.924/2017/59 : The Governor of Assam, in exercise of power conferred by Rule 16(b) of the Assam Police Service Rules, 1966, is pleased to discharge Smti Pallabi Sharma, APS (Probationer), Deputy Superintendent of Police, 25 th AP (ONGC) Bn., Ligiripukhuri, Sivasagar (Under Suspension) from service with immediate effect.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Assam Sd/- Dr. Deepak Majumdar Secretary to the Govt. of Assam Home (A) Department. "
(iii) " Government of Assam TRANSPORT Department :: Dispur OFFICE ORDER Dated Dispur the 21st January, 2019 No. TMV.298/2016/144 : Whereas, Smti Suranjita Hazarika W/o Shri Saurav Kr. Deka resident of Kahilipara, Guwahati had appeared for the Combined Competitive Examination 2014 - 2015 conducted by APSC and, Whereas, on recommendation by APSC vide letter No.51PSC/CON/Exam-141/CC(M)/2014- 2015 dated 30-06-2016, Smti Suranjita Hazarika was appointed temporarily as DTO, as per Notification No. TMV.295/2015/287 dated 15-10-2016, who had undergone two-week Joint Page No.# 54/96 Induction Training Course alongwith the Probationers of ACS & Allied Services conducted by AASC, Khanapara w.e.f. 18th to 28th October, 2016 and; Whereas, after completion and release from the Joint Induction Training Course vide No. AASC(T/C)118/2016 dated 28th October, 2016, Smti. Hazarika, DTO (Probationer) had joined in the Commissionerate of Transport on 31 st October, 2016 and subsequently was posted in the regular place of posting and;
Whereas, a report has been received from Commissioner of Transport, Assam vide letter No.CT-E/377/2016/3218 dated 20-07-2018 that Smti Suranjita Hazarika, DTO, Transport Officer (Pool) and DTO (Licensing) Kamrup (M) was arrested on 18-07-2018 (during her Probation period) in connection with Dibrugarh PS Case No.936/16 U/S 7/13 (1) (A) (B) (D)/(2), the prevention of corruption of Act, and SEC 120 B/420/463/468/471/477(A)/201 IPC and detained under custody beyond 48 hours and;
Whereas, during investigation the examination conducted by the APSC, the answer booklets were seized U/S 27 of Indian Evidence Act from the confidential room of APSC building which was of the CCE (M) 2014-2015 for the ACS and allied services and was sent to the FSL, Guwahati for forensic examination by observing all the formalities and; Whereas, during the course of investigation, Smti Hazarika, District Transport Officer, Sonitpur was arrested on 18-07-2018 for evidence opined by SP, Dibrugarh for seizure of fake/duplicate answer scripts and;
Whereas, as per report of Shri Surajeet Panesar, APS, Additional Superintendent of Police (H.Q) Dibrugarh, Smti Suranjita Hazarika was placed under suspension vide Notification No. TMV.298/2016/67, dated 24-07-2018 w.e.f. the date of arrest i.e. 18-07-2018 and; Whereas, another report along with the certified copies of relevant documents have been received from the Superintendent of Police, Dibrugarh, Assam vide letter No.RB/2018/4067, dated 24-07-2018, with a request for sanction order to prosecute the arrested public servant Smti Suranjita Hazarika and;
Whereas, as per request of S.P Dibrugarh prosecution sanction order has been accorded against Smti Hazarika vide Notification No. TMV.298/2016/138-A, dated 30-10-2018 and; In view of the above, it is found from the copies of records that the case of Smti Suranjita Hazarika (Probationer) is similar to the cases of ACS/APS (Probationers), since she appeared in the same CCE (M) 2014-2015 conducted by APSC and was selected. Now, the Governor of Assam in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 19(1 & 2) of the Assam Transport Service Rules, 2003, is pleased to discharge Smti Suranjita Hazarika, DTO (Probationer), Transport Officer (Pool) and DTO (Licensing) Kamrup (M) (Under Suspension) from service with immediate effect.
Sd/- N.G. Sonowal, IAS Secretary to the Govt. of Assam Transport Department. "
6. Arguments and submissions were advanced on behalf of all the respondents. To be precise, Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel, represented the petitioners in WP(C) Page No.# 55/96 5809/2019, WP(C) 7098/2018, WP(C) 7768/2018, WP(C) 131/2019, WP(C) 954/2019 and WP(C) 2458/2019; Mr. A.K. Bhuyan, learned counsel in WP(C) 5817/2017, WP(C) 8554/2018 and WP(C) 2684/2019; Mr. A. Chamuah, learned counsel in WP(C) 2131/2019; Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 2621/2018, WP(C) 2625/2018, WP(C) 1749/2019, WP(C) 1762/2019, WP(C) 2163/2019, WP(C) 2374/2019 and WP(C) 2376/2019; Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 1008/2019; Mr. N. Dhar, learned counsel in WP(C) 779/2019 and WP(C) 863/2019; Mr. U.K. Nair, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 156/2018, WP(C) 820/2019, WP(C) 2458/2019, WP(C) 3066/2019, WP(C) 3123/2019 and WP(C) 4905/2019; Mr. S.K. Talukdar, learned counsel in WP(C) 1618/2018, WP(C) 7891/2018, WP(C) 8117/2018, WP(C) 1346/2019, WP(C) 1371/2019, WP(C) 1442/2019 and WP(C) 2783/2019; Mr. S.S. Dey, learned senior counsel in WP(C) 8539/2018 and WP(C) 608/2019; Mr. R. Sarma, learned counsel in WP(C) 3121/2019; Mr. S. Das, learned counsel in WP(C) 4198/2019, WP(C) 206/2019, WP(C) 1721/2019, WP(C) 1730/2019, WP(C) 2228/2019 and WP(C) 2244/2019; Mr. P. Dutta, learned counsel in WP(C) 2513/2019, Mr. B. Kaushik, learned counsel in WP(C) 2454/2019; Mr. A.B. Dey, learned counsel in WP(C) 8523/2018 and Mr. F. Khan, learned counsel in WP(C) 998/2019, WP(C) 1727/2019, WP(C) 1759/2019 and WP(C) 1766/2019.
7. The thrust of Mr. K.N. Choudhury's submission is that if on the attending facts and circumstances the impugned order of discharge is seen to be based on alleged misconduct or if a live connection or nexus is seen to exist between the allegations of misconduct and discharge, then the same, even if couched in a language which may not appear to be stigmatic, would amount to punishment for which a departmental enquiry would be imperative. Referring to the paragraphs 7 to 17 of the affidavit-in-opposition dated 09.05.2019 filed by the State respondents in WP(C) 5809/2018, submission made is that it is clear therefrom as to what propelled the respondents to discharge the petitioners, which came in the guise of the order under Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules. Similarly, reference is also made to the stand of the State respondents that also in respect of discharge of petitioner employed in the Assam Police Service, the same was based on allegations of misconduct although shrouded in an innocuous-looking order under Rule 16(b) of the 1966 Rules. Thus, the pin-pointed argument is that the very foundation for taking recourse to either Rule 20(c) or Rule 16(b) is clearly the investigation carried out by the Dibrugarh Police. It is contended Page No.# 56/96 that condemning the petitioners on the basis of the police investigation is a travesty of justice. Further, it is only on presumption that the petitioners are sought to be victimized, inasmuch as, the allegations are yet to find established before the competent authority in accordance with law. Referring to the relevant rules envisaging discharge of a probationer from service, it is stated that the conditions precedent for invoking the same is the satisfaction of the Governor, which must be on an objective criteria based on relevant materials and concrete evidence. It is submitted that recourse to such rule cannot be in an ipsi-dixit manner, that is, on the mere saying of the respondents. By referring to paragraph 7 of the affidavit-in-opposition dated 09.05.2019 of the State respondents, it is stated that it is apparent therefrom that the conscious decision taken to discharge the petitioners was only on the basis of the report of the Dibrugarh Police in June, 2018.
8. Mr. K.N. Choudhury have also touched upon another aspect, in that, in so far as the petitioners who were members of the Assam Civil Service are concerned, they had completed the initial 2 (two) year period well before order was passed extending their period of probation. It is submitted that they were appointed on 12.08.2015 on probation and the subsequent order of extension was issued on 27.11.2017. By referring to Rule 22 of the 1998 Rules, particularly to sub-rule (2) thereof, it is submitted that the conditions required for being confirmed in service were complied with by completing necessary training etc. It is thus the contention that having regard to the same, their service stood confirmed and on such confirmation if any discharge order was to be issued, the same could only have been done after affording opportunity of hearing and granting protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, by following the procedure as engrafted under Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1964 (hereinafter the 1964 Rules). As regards the petitioners who were members of the Assam Police Service, it is submitted that they had already been confirmed in service and to this end reference is made to page 50 of WP(C) 7768/2018 to show that mention therein is made of their completion of the probationary period of 2 (two) years. Thus, similar argument is also made in respect of their deemed confirmation of service. Reference is made to the Notification dated 08.03.2018, which is a Final Gradation List available in the records of WP(C) 7122/2019, to say that the very fact that the names of the Page No.# 57/96 petitioners appeared in the said Final Gradation List, reinforces the stand of having been confirmed in service as, by normal practice, names of probationers do not generally figure in Gradation Lists unless confirmed. Reference is also made to several other documents enclosed to the writ petitions where the word 'probation' is not mentioned against their names, meaning thereby that it must be inferred that the period of probation stood completed. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the petitioners were never served with the orders extending their service and the same came to light only from the affidavit filed by the respondents in the present proceedings.
9. While denying the allegations of payment of bribe money, Mr. Choudhury submits that statements made by the petitioners, if any, before the police authorities with regard to payment of money for securing jobs, cannot or could not have been acted upon to their detriment in view of the clear bar under section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In this respect, reliance is placed in the case of Khatri vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 493 to say that although statements made before the police officer can be used as evidence in proceedings under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution, however, the same is hedged with a rider, so much so, that such statements can only be used provided it is otherwise relevant under the Evidence Act. Submission made is that in view of the law laid down in Khatri (supra), the statements alleged to have been made by the petitioners before the police cannot or could not have formed the basis for the impugned action.
10. In support of the arguments and submissions above, Mr. Choudhury have placed reliance in as many as 10 (ten) decisions of the Supreme Court, including the case in Khatri (supra). The reported cases relied upon are mentioned hereinbelow. However, only those reported cases which, in the opinion of this Court, are relevant to the cases at hand, would be referred to in the later part of this judgment.
(i) 1958 SC 828 (Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India)
(ii) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)
(iii) (1980) 2 SCC 593 (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Ors. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors.) Page No.# 58/96
(iv) (1984) 2 SCC 369 (Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India and anr.)
(v) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors.)
(vi) (2014) 6 SCC 644 (Joginder Pal and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.)
(vii) (2006) 11 SCC 356 (Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.)
(viii) (2010) 8 SCC 220 (Union of India and Ors. vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi)
(ix) (2013) 3 SCC 607 (State Bank of India and Ors. vs. Palak Modi and anr.)
11. Mr. A.K. Bhuyan adopts the arguments of Mr. K.N. Choudhury and on facts adds that the petitioners must be deemed to have been confirmed in service as even in the orders of suspension there is no whisper of their service being on probation. It is submitted that the discharge orders being ex facie punitive, therefore, opportunity of hearing was mandatory.
Relying upon the case reported in (2015) 15 SCC 151 (Ratnesh Kumar Choudhury vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar and Ors.), submission made is that it will amount to stigma if the order is in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. According to Mr. Bhuyan, stigma is writ large in the impugned orders. Reliance is also placed in (1994) 3 SCC 569 (Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab) to say that a confession made to a police officer while the accused is in the custody or made before he became an accused, is not provable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged to the commission of the said offence.
12. Mr. A. Chamuah, too, adopts the arguments of Mr. K.N. Choudhury and goes on to say that the petitioner is a meritorious student with First Class distinctions in her academic career throughout. Mr. Chamuah submits that the order of discharge dated 12.02.2019 under Rule 19(ii) of the 1995 Rules have already received consideration of this Court and the prima facie findings finds recorded in the order dated 11.04.2019 to the effect that a process by which the impugned action although may appear to be based on a tentative premise but if the same have devastating and irreversible effect, the same would attract the principles of natural justice and Rule 19(ii) involves the said process. Mr. Chamuah further submits that there can be no dispute that if it is a case of deciding the suitability of a probationer and for that limited purpose an inquiry is conducted, the same cannot be faulted as such. However, if during the Page No.# 59/96 course of such an inquiry any allegations are made against the person concerned which result into a stigma, he must be afforded the minimum protection contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India even though he may be a probationer. It is further submitted that in case this Court holds the petitioner to be a tainted person, the same will vitiate the trial. Also, the Office Order dated 05.01.2018 extending the period of probation, was never made known to the petitioner. In support of his arguments, reliance is placed in -
(i) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)
(ii) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors.)
(iii) (2013) 16 SCC 59 (Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat and anr. Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti)
13. Mr. D.K. Mishra relies on categorical statements made in the writ petitions to say that the discharge orders are stigmatic, casts aspersions on integrity, it is by way of punishment and founded on the police report. To illustrate that the impugned action is founded on police report, reference is made to the Additional Affidavit dated 24.04.2019 of the State respondents in WP(C) 2621/2018 to say that the basis is implicit at paragraphs 5, 7 and 18 thereof. Moreover, at paragraph 28, the respondents themselves have admitted that the order was passed as per the report of the Dibrugarh Police. Thus, it is submitted that allegations of misconduct were the springboard from where the impugned orders were catapulted, which is not permitted in law sans an enquiry. It is also submitted that the very fact of dispensing with the enquiry for reasons that criminal trial will be affected, itself demonstrates existence of allegations of misconduct. By making reference to the 1964 Rules it is stated that nature of penalties are specified in Rule 7; the procedure for imposing a penalty is provided in Rule 9 and Rule 10(ii) provides for dispensing with the enquiry, for reasons to be recorded, which is same as the Proviso(b) of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Submission made is that resort to Rule 10(ii) could not have been made by by-passing the provisions of Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules. In support of the above reliance is placed in -
(i) (1985) 3 SCC 398 (Union of India and anr. vs. Tulsiram Patel)
(ii) (2006) 13 SCC 581 (Tarsem Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors.) Page No.# 60/96
(iii) (2016) 9 SCC 491 (State Bank of India vs. Neelam Nag and anr.)
14. Whether the discharge orders are stigmatic or not, submission made is that the stand of the respondents are contrary, in that, whereas at paragraph 62 of their Additional Affidavit dated 25.07.2019 it is stated that the order is not punitive, however, at paragraph 6 it speaks of 'colossal fraud' and that the petitioners are the 'beneficiaries'. Mr. Mishra contends that the statement at paragraph 6 itself demonstrates that the view of the respondents that the discharge orders are not punitive and Article 311(2) is not attracted, does not hold water. Anticipating that the State respondents would take the stand that rules of natural justice are not required to be followed in cases of cancellation of selection which is vitiated due to fraud, manipulation, corruption and illegalities involving the petitioners and those responsible for conducting the selection and that the selection and appointment of the petitioners are null and void and, further, that the said stand would have the support of decided cases of the Supreme Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 356 and in Joginder Pal and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported (2014) 6 SCC 644, Mr. Mishra submits that the facts in the said cases, as may be obtained from the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Amarbir Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, reported in 2004 (1) SCT 88 (P&H), are altogether different. It is stated that the irregularities noticed in Amarbir Singh involved leaking of questions papers to the candidates; instructions given to the examiners to award higher marks; manipulation and upgrading of marks awarded to candidates, with very high marks to those who paid money; award of poor marks in the interview to those who were not to be selected and had not paid money despite securing high marks in the written examination; control exercised by the Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission in appointing examiners with instructions for awarding specific marks to the chosen candidates, and the irregularities found in the answer books of some of the candidates. As against the decision of the High Court in Amarbir Singh cancelling the entire selection process, the matter had travelled to the Supreme Court in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon. Mr. Mishra reiterates that the present case is entirely distinct and, to this end, makes reference to paragraph 40 of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon to say that it was in the context of submissions made by the senior counsel representing the State of Punjab and senior counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court that the services of the Page No.# 61/96 appellants before the Supreme Court were terminated not in terms of the rules but in view of the commission of illegality in the selection process involved, the Supreme Court did not feel necessary to consider the applicability of the relevant provisions of the statute and the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It was on this premise that the Supreme Court returned a finding that an appointment made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void and a nullity. This, according to Mr. Mishra, is not the case at hand. Drawing attention to paragraph 46 of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon it is submitted that there always exists a distinction between a proven case of mass cheating for a Board examination and an unproven imputed charge of corruption where an appointment of civil servant is involved. Further, at paragraph 93 thereof the Supreme Court observed that a different standard should be adopted for terminating the services of the officers who had completed about 3 (three) years of service, inasmuch as, they may have passed departmental tests, given higher responsibilities, were nearing completion of period of probation and had been working to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. Referring to the decision in Joginder Pal, which is the case decided by the Supreme Court against the decision in the second Amarbir Singh's case after remand from the Supreme Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon, Mr. Mishra submits that the Supreme Court have recorded the fact that in respect of the appellants the High Court found that FIRs were registered against them and they definitely carry a trace, stain or blemish that they were tainted. Submission made is that lodging of FIRs with imputations against the petitioners are altogether missing in the cases at hand.
15. Referring to the provisions of discharge of probationers in Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules, permitting discharge from service in case of doubtful integrity, Mr. Mishra submits that having regard to the meaning of 'integrity', as propounded in paragraph 18 of Vijay Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 242, any allegations against the petitioners of lacking integrity and unfit to be retained in service, are clearly stigmatic in nature and this view can be had from paragraph 16 of Swaran Singh Chand vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and Ors., reported in (2009) 13 SCC 758.
Page No.# 62/96
16. Drawing notice to the important principles on the concept of "motive" and "foundation" concerning a probationer, as enunciated in various landmark decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr. Mishra submits that it is well settled that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated during or at the end of the period of probation and the same will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and the termination of service is sought to be founded on such misconduct or negligence or inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Mishra further submits that "misconduct" is not just a phenomenon relatable to post recruitment period but can also relate to the period when evaluation test is held for entry into service. In support of the contentions above, reliance is placed in :
(i) (1974) 2 SCC 831 (Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab and anr.)
(ii) (2000) 5 SCC 152 (Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Ors)
(iii) 2016 (3) GLR. 381 (Prasanta Kalita vs. Gauhati High Court and anr.)
(iv) (2013) 3 SCC 607 (State Bank of India vs. Palak Modi and anr.)
(v) (2001) 3 GLT 528 (Biplab Mazumdar vs. Union of India)
(vi) (1970) 2 SCC 871 (The State of Bihar vs. Shiva Bhishuk Mishra)
17. Objection is raised as regards the manner of the verification of the statements in the Additional Affidavit of the respondent no.2 filed on 25.07.2019 bringing a different stand, which affidavit was filed after 11 (eleven) months from the date when the affidavit-in- opposition was filed. It is submitted that in view of the slip-shod verification, which is apparently contrary to Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Rule 27 of the Gauhati High Court Rules, together with the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Purushottam Jog Naik, reported in AIR 1952 SC 317 and in the case of Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury vs. State of Assam and Ors, reported in 1995 (3) GLT 467, no credence can be given to the said Additional affidavit dated 25.07.2019.
18. Lastly, Mr. Mishra submits that the FIR dated 27.10.2016, which set in motion the investigation by the Dibrugarh police implicates one Naba Kanta Patir and this FIR does not, in any manner, implicate the petitioners. No separate FIRs have been lodged against any of Page No.# 63/96 the petitioners. Further, the allegations of payment of bribe are as vague as can be, in that, neither in the Accused Forwarding Report nor in the Production Report and Bail Objection there is any mention of any confession having been made by the petitioners with regard to payment of bribe, unlike the cases in respect of one Samedur Rahman (A-4) and Pabitra Kaibarta (A-5) where, in their Production Report and Bail Objection, it records the fact of their making confession. Submission made is that the allegation that the petitioners had confessed as regards payment of bribe is absolutely false. From the Supplementary Charge-sheet implicating the petitioners it is stated that there is a fundamental flaw, in that, it cannot be a case that answer scripts are never given for printing by outsourcing from empanelled printing houses. Reference is made to the statements at paragraph 20 of the Affidavit-in-Reply dated 23.10.2019 in WP(C) 2621/2018, read with Annexure-2/page 43 thereof, which gives the list of Firms registered under the Directorate of Printing and Stationary, Assam from the year 2013 to 2016. In the course of hearing Mr. Mishra submitted that the name of 'Subhadeep Printers' also finds place at Sl. 73 in the list produced over to the Court.
19. Mr. N. Dutta's core submission is that under whatever circumstances, the protection under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India enuring to the petitioners cannot be taken away. This is in the context that there cannot be a general proposition that in respect of a probationer the protection under Article 311 can never be applicable. It would depend on individual facts. Referring to Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules it is submitted that the expression "any information" would take within its fold reasonable and probable information which must verily be believed to be true and such information relating to integrity, character or antecedents of the probationer must appear from the file records. Apprehension expressed is that no exercise was carried out to find out or satisfy itself as to the existence of reasonable and probable information, which is one of the condition precedent for invoking Rule 20(c). In short, that there is utter lack of due application of mind in the impugned action. On the principles of natural justice it is contended that opportunity of hearing is imperative if an impugned administrative action is attended to by civil consequences. Further, that natural justice being the quintessence of the process of justice, fairness in action demands that an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person affected. In this, as contended, there Page No.# 64/96 can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function, inasmuch as, an unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may result in far more serious consequences than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry and, therefore, the rules of natural justice must apply equally in an administrative inquiry which involves civil consequences. In support of the above, heavy reliance is placed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248. Further, that audi alteram partem rule of natural justice, being a highly effective tool devised by the Courts to act as a healthy check on abuse or misuse of power by a statutory authority, its applicability should not be narrowed or circumscribed. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the cases at hand even the well-recognised exceptions and exclusions to audi alteram partem rule are not attracted, so much so, grant of opportunity of hearing would not have the effect of paralysing the administrative process and/or that the need for promptitude or urgency of the situation demanded exclusion of the requirement of fair-play in the administrative action. Submission is also made that in a given case audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit a brief and minimal hearing, either prior to a decision or as a post-decisional remedial hearing. As in Maneka Gandhi, where the Supreme Court observed that a fair opportunity of being heard following the order impounding the Passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and that the requirement of giving opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by implication in the Passports Act, 1967, Mr. Dutta contends that a similar exercise would be in sync with the concept of circumstantial flexibility of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice.
20. On the aspect that rules of natural justice must be complied with when an administrative action may result in civil consequences, Mr. Dutta places reliance in Mohinder Singh Gill and ors. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 for the proposition that 'civil consequence' cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but also of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. Emphasis is laid on deprivation of salary etc., which is visited upon the petitioners due to the impugned administrative action, adversely affecting their civil rights. Submission made is that even taking an extreme view that protection under Article 311 is not available, Page No.# 65/96 this cannot be the end of the road, inasmuch as, following Maneka Gandhi and Mohinder Singh Gill, a reasonable opportunity of hearing is always present. On another score, by terming the state action as arbitrary which strikes at the equality clause, so guaranteed to a person by Article 14 of the Constitution, Mr. Dutta submits that since the state action also touches upon the matter with relation to public employment, it is violative of Article 16 too.
21. On the concepts of "motive" and "foundation" to discover the true effect of an order of termination, although reference is made to the cases in Gujarat Steel Tubes (supra); Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra) and in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and anr., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520, Mr. Dutta submits that the 7 Judges' case in Samsher Singh (supra) holds the field to distinguish between the motive and the foundation of an order. Referring to paragraph 62 of Samsher Singh, where reference is made to the two important observations in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, it is submitted that law is clear that where a right exists under a Service Rules to terminate the service, the motive operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant. Reason being, motive inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible. On the other, if termination of service is founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article 311 of the Constitution. Thus, the imperativeness and duty of the Court to find out from the relevant file-notings as well as from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of discharge what the true ground for the discharge is. It is contended that if on scrutiny the Court finds that the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, even if non-injurious terminology is used in the impugned order. Reliance is also placed in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 369 for the proposition that where the form of the impugned order is merely a cloak for an order of dismissal for misconduct, it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. In other words, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the aggrieved person.
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22. Lastly, Mr. Dutta submits that unproved allegations cannot be the basis for discharge from service even if there is proved violation of Article 14 and 16 in the conduct of the selection process in so far as the petitioners are concerned without an inquiry. The mere fact that the petitioners are charge-sheeted in the Dibrugarh Police case, the same cannot constitute cogent ground for discharge from service. In this, reliance is placed in the Constitution Bench judgment in Manoj Narula v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 1, particularly to paragraph 122 thereof, to say that mere allegation, be it in the form of an off- the-cuff allegation or an allegation in the form of a first information report or a complaint or an accusation in a final report under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code or even on charges being framed by a competent court, the law does not hold a person guilty or deem or brand a person as a criminal. That person may stand condemned in the public eye, but even that would not entitle anyone to brand the said person as a criminal. The fundamental reason being, a person is innocent until proven guilty. On a final note, Mr. Dutta reiterates and emphasises that adjudication of the present cases would necessarily require ascertainment from the office records if the order is founded on misconduct or otherwise. If the answer is in the affirmative, applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution will come into play proprio vigore and even in an extreme situation where the protection of Article 311 is not found to be attracted, the petitioners are entitled to a reasonable opportunity of hearing, be it as a post-decisional remedial hearing, in terms of the law laid down in Maneka Gandhi.
23. Mr. N. Dhar begins by saying that Rule 20(c) of 1998 Rules is itself stigmatic and, therefore, the petitioners could not have been discharged without opportunity of hearing. Relying on Chandra Prakash Shahi, it is submitted that the Court must lift the veil and on doing so would find that the impugned orders are not discharge simpliciter. For the fact that the petitioners were not probationers on the date of discharge, compliance of natural justice became more imperative. It is also submitted that there are no allegations against the petitioners in the FIR filed by Dr. Angshumita Gogoi. Mr. U.K. Nair adopts the arguments of the preceding counsels and also submits that misconduct being the foundation of the impugned orders of discharge, as would be apparent from paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in- opposition dated 09.05.2019 of the respondents, the legal necessity for affording opportunity Page No.# 67/96 of hearing to the petitioners could not have been dispensed with. Mr. S.S. Dey submits on behalf of his client, who was appointed to the Assam Transport Service, that the Discharge Order dated 21.01.2019 itself demonstrates that the action is based on the report of the Dibrugarh Police. Referring to Rule 19 of the 2003 Rules, which provides for discharge of a probationer, it is submitted that none of the conditions in Rule 19 are attracted to cause discharge of the petitioner from service. Also, having regard to the date of appointment and the provisions of Rule 21 of the 2003 Rules, the petitioner must be deemed to have been confirmed in service, more so, when no extension order had been issued in respect of the petitioner. Mr. R. Sarma have referred to the various date(s) on which the petitioner was appointed, passed departmental examination and completed training, extension of the period of probation, suspension from service and the final discharge on 07.09.2018. Primary contention made is that the impugned order of discharge could not have come about in violation of the principles of natural justice. By referring to the case in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant and Others, reported in (2001)1 SCC 182, Mr. Sarma submits that it is a fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be complied with and such compliance is an integral part of administrative jurisprudence, although it would be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Mr. P. Dutta as well as Mr. B. Kaushik adopts the arguments of the senior counsels and also submits that the expression "satisfaction" appearing in Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules itself connotes the requirement of an enquiry. Further, that the discharge orders having touched upon and having questioned the integrity of the petitioners is itself stigmatic, thus, requiring compliance of natural justice. Mr. A.B. Dey submits that there is no proved violation on the part of the petitioner and the discharge order is not on established facts. It is submitted that the petitioner, as a member of the Assam Police Service, have rendered distinguished service and have also received commendation certificate from the Director General of Police, Assam. Referring to Rule 16(b) of the 1966 Rules, it is submitted that the expression "is considered otherwise unsuitable", by necessary intendment and implication, takes within its fold the requirement of opportunity of hearing. Placing reliance in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, reported in (1985)3 SCC 545, it is submitted that even if the rules are silent, the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice must be read into. Mr. F. Khan submits that the petitioners having completed the probationary period in service, therefore, in terms of the Page No.# 68/96 decision in Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana vs. Dwarka Das, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 789, the power to discharge could not have been exercised. Further, since the impugned order of discharge is actually in the realm of dismissal from service, the protection granted by Article 311(2) of the Constitution would apply, be it a temporary servant or a probationer. On the said proposition, reliance is placed in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1964 SC 449; Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 593 and V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Ors, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239.
24. Mr. S.K. Talukdar echoes the arguments already placed and adds that the order of discharge is stigmatic in nature and essentially an order of dismissal/removal from service, although it prima facie appears to be innocuous. It is clearly relatable and connected to alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner arising out of Dibrugarh Police Case No.939/2016. It is, therefore, submitted that the alleged misconduct having formed the foundation, as such, the impugned action could not have been resorted to without an inquiry as contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Further, the guilt of the petitioners not having been established by the prosecution in any criminal court of law, the presumption of innocence is attached to them. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent no.3 on 02.04.2019 and the subsequent additional affidavit filed by the same respondent on 25.07.2019, it is contended that both affidavits demonstrates different stand of the respondent. Although much has been stated by the respondents that the order of discharge is in conformity with law and the same is in the domain of 'discharge simpliciter' without any stigma attached to it and that the materials appearing from the preliminary inquiry, including the investigation carried out by the Dibrugarh Police, forms the motive of discharge and not the foundation thereof, it is submitted that the discretion so exercised in invoking the relevant provisions under the rules is, however, subject to the rule of law. Submission made is that the duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of power to decide and determine, if the act of the State operates to the prejudice of a person. Entitlement to a hearing need not be shown or super-added if adjudication of a matter involves civil consequences. Further, that the concept of rule of law would lose its meaning if the State instrumentalities are not made accountable with the duty of discharging their functions in a Page No.# 69/96 fair and just manner. After all, the requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. For the above propositions, reliance is placed in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 and in A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 150. On Rule 13(c) of the 2007 Rules and, particularly, to the words employed therein i.e. "character" and "antecedents", reference is made to the meanings thereof in Black's Law Dictionary (Tenth Edition). Meanings of ancillary words "antecedent character" and "bad character" are also referred to and submission made is that the expressions itself are insinuations of dishonesty, unreliability and unlawful or immoral behaviour. This being the position, it is submitted that the provision in the rules is itself stigmatic, thus, calling for the requirement of an enquiry. In other words, compliance with natural justice is implicit in Rule 13(c) and nothing more has to be super-added. Further, the satisfaction of the Government is a condition precedent in invoking Rule 13(c) and although it may be a subjective satisfaction, the same must be grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value. The discretion so exercised cannot be an unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. On the above, reliance is placed in the Constitution Bench judgment in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. Company Law Board and Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 295 and in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81.
25. On the aspect of natural justice, Mr. Talukdar further submits that the requirement of opportunity of hearing cannot be dispensed with merely in the absence of any provision in the statute providing for such hearing. In a situation where the statute is silent, the requirement of natural justice has to be read into it, particularly when the order assailed involves adverse civil consequences to the party concerned. In this, reference is made to the case in Olga Tellis as well as in Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and Anr., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 and in Kesar Enterprises Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2011) 13 SCC 733.
26. It is contended by Mr. Talukdar that the stand of the respondents with regard to allegation of colossal fraud and of the petitioners being beneficiaries of a corrupt selection Page No.# 70/96 process, the same are without any foundational facts and are mere conjectures. Allegation of illegal gratification is vehemently denied unless adverse finding is rendered in a trial before the competent court of law. For the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances preceding or attendant thereto resulting in the impugned action, it is submitted that the same would require ascertainment by the court and, if need be, to lift the veil and examine the office records relating to the decision-making process. The case in Chandra Prakash Shahi is placed for consideration for the above proposition. Lastly, Mr. Talukdar submits that the decision to dispense with departmental proceedings cannot rest solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. Further, no final opinion can be formed with regard to any direct involvement of the petitioners merely on the basis of the report of handwriting expert. On both the propositions above, reliance is placed in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 185 and in Dayal Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 263.
27. Mr. Somnath Das opens his arguments stating that a mere perusal of the discharge order would go to show that it is stigmatic and the element of stigma is so apparent that it would not even be necessary to look at the contemporaneous records/file notings. Without doubt, it is submitted, that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, the same would operate as a hindrance/hurdle for future employment. In respect of Rule 19 of the 2003 Rules, it is contended that neither of the two sub-Rules apply in the instant case and, therefore, the same could not have been resorted to for discharging the petitioners from service. It is stated that the petitioners had successfully undergone necessary training and there has been no occasion where they failed to render satisfactory service during their tenure. As such, sub- Rule (1) of Rule 19 has no application. As regards sub-Rule (2) of Rule 19, it is contended that the expression "subsequent verification" would mean verification made after appointment and the other expression "initially qualified" would only mean qualifications necessary for direct recruitment, as prescribed under Rule 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said 2003 Rules, which are criterions on age, academic qualifications, health and character respectively. Further, in the absence of any allegations against the petitioners of having furnished incorrect information with regard to their appointment, the sub-Rule (2) also has no application. Submission made is that in the absence of the essential ingredients and/or conditions Page No.# 71/96 precedent for invoking the power under Rule 19, the impugned orders had been passed illegally and without due application of mind.
28. Mr. Das submits that as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, one of the tests for ascertaining the punitive element in an order of termination is as to whether the person concerned has been visited with evil consequences. It is contended that "evil consequences"
has to be assessed in relation to the blemish on the employee's reputation so as to render him unfit for service elsewhere. It is submitted that the order of discharge clearly connotes blemish, disrepute, aspersions on character and integrity and moral reproach on the part of the petitioners. The order is clearly in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Thus, stigma and punitive element in the impugned order being all-pervasive, a full-fledged enquiry into the allegations, in strict compliance of natural justice, could not have been dispensed with and, in this situation, even a post-decisional opportunity of hearing would not subserve the rules of natural justice. On the above propositions, reliance is placed in Chandra Prakash Shahi as well as in Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Management of M/s Pan American World Airways Inc. and Ors., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 146 ; Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) and H.L. Trehan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1989) 1 SCC 764. Further, relying in the case of D.K. Yadav v.
J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259, Mr. Das submits that an order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with rules of natural justice and 'civil consequences' would also cover material deprivations. Therefore, a person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and a fair opportunity must be given to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. It is contended that principles of natural justice and duty to act in just, fair and reasonable manner must be read into the relevant rules governing the service of the person concerned.
29. Mr. Das submits that in respect of the petitioners whom he represents and are from the Assam Civil Service, they are to be deemed as to have been confirmed in service. Reason assigned is that Rule 25 of the 1998 Rules prescribes that after the first increment being made admissible to a member of the service in the Junior Grade time scale on expiry of one Page No.# 72/96 year from date of joining, the further increments due would be allowed only on confirmation in the service. The said petitioners having received the first and second increments and going by the prescription in Rule 25 of the 1998 Rules, contention made is that they must be deemed to have been confirmed in service. Touching upon another aspect it is submitted that having regard to the sequence of events, commencing with the date(s) of arrest, suspension from service, payment of subsistence allowance and finally the discharge from service, it cannot be a case that the respondents have taken a prompt decision and that the same was a reflex action following the investigation and report of the Dibrugarh Police.
30. The State respondents are represented by Mr. Maninder Singh, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N. Kohli, Advocate. Mr. Singh opens his arguments by saying that notwithstanding any provision in the relevant Service Rules, the General Clauses Act, 1897 abundantly provides that if there is power to appoint, such power shall also include the power to suspend or dismiss. Having struck this opening note, it is also argued that where a selection process is actuated by fraud, appointments made would be void ab-initio on satisfaction that may be derived by the authority based on cogent materials. In the case in hand, as submitted, the appointments of the petitioners were not validly made. Their appointments are tainted with element of fraud and, in fact, as against each of the petitioners, criminal prosecution is on. The vital determination to be made by the Court in the backdrop of the foundational facts involving the petitioners, according to Mr. Singh, is whether the State action was bona fide on having discharged the petitioners from service. Question raised is, was it not obligatory on the part of the State to take the impugned action for maintaining sanctity and for reposing faith in the system and public offices in relation to affairs of the State Government and whether in the attending foundational facts was there any other option available to the State. Further, if the relief prayed for in the writ petitions affects public interest, whether prayers so made can be entertained. On the arguments advanced by the petitioners on the Police Report being the foundation and not the motive, it is submitted that the same are without relevance and do not come into play in the present cases as fraud in the process of selection of the petitioners finds demonstrated at the Page No.# 73/96 threshold itself. It is argued that the decision taken by the State respondents is entirely in conformity with law and the action so impugned is in the realm of discharge simpliciter where no adverse civil consequences are involved. It is not a case of discharge on alleged misconduct after appointment and during the probationary period but on discovery of predominant fraud at the point of entry into service. Therefore, according to Mr. Singh, no determination of the question as to whether the impugned action involves motive or foundation vis-à-vis the Police Report is warranted. On the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that a mere perusal of the discharge orders would show that stigma is all- pervasive, thus bringing in the punitive element, Mr. Singh contends that such argument would be available only in case where there has been valid appointments, which is not so in the cases at hand. Further contention is that discharge on the basis of Police report is valid and the same have found approval in decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. Also, because of the foundational facts, the petitioners are clearly an identifiable and segregated class of persons whose appointments are tainted. It is not a case of individual enmity nor any element of bias exists that may be attributable to the action of the State respondents.
31. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition of respondent nos. 2 to 4 dated 25.07.2019, much reliance is placed in the statements and averments made therein. Mr. Singh has taken this Court to the categorical statements made to the effect that the cases in hand do not pertain to allegations of misconduct against the petitioners during discharge of their duties after having been appointed to public offices. It pertains to their indulging in colossal fraud for securing appointments to public offices by payment of illegal gratifications. Such appointments having been secured through a tainted/fraudulent process, the same are to be tested by application of different parameters and yardstick. It is not a case where initial appointments are not clouded with allegations of fraud and/or that it is only on misconduct attributable to a period subsequent to a valid initial appointment. It is further stated that it being a case where at the very induction to public offices it is tainted with fraud and illegality, it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend violation of any right, much less violation of any fundamental rights. Further, that it is too well settled in law that if fraudulent and illegal means are predominant in any selection process and it is impossible to identify the Page No.# 74/96 participants and/or the beneficiaries to a spoils system, then in every such case the entire selection process would require interference. However, if identification of participants/beneficiaries is possible, then it would be a case where no laxity is to be shown and the matter to be suitably dealt with as being undeserving to remain in the public offices. Mr. Singh makes a brief reiteration of the facts to say that investigation revealed that a large number of candidates who had participated in the competitive examination held in the year 2013 and 2014 had secured appointments by payment of illegal gratification to the then Chairman and officials of APSC, in addition to various touts and middlemen. It is only those candidates in whose cases duplicate answer sheets, substituting the original answer sheets, had been recovered from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the house of the then Chairman, they alone have been discharged from service and added as accused in the charge-sheet(s) filed before the competent court of law.
32. As to the role and responsibility attached to the discharge of functions by a member of the civil service, Mr. Singh places reliance in the observations made by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398. It is submitted that the task of efficiently and effectively implementing the State policies and enactments rests with the civil services. Thus, the public is vitally interested to be ensured of the efficiency and integrity of such services. The discharge of duties with a sense of responsibility does not depend only upon the top echelons of the civil services but also percolates to such other members of the civil services, including those in the most subordinate posts. The call of the hour is that it is much in public interest and public good that government servants who are inefficient, dishonest, corrupt or have become a security risk should not continue in service. In this, the concerned government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. Neither public interest nor public good would require that salary or subsistence allowance be continued to be paid out of the public exchequer to the concerned government servant.
33. Referring to the case in Krishan Yadav & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 165 and in Union of India vs. O. Chakradhar, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 146, Page No.# 75/96 where report of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had formed the basis for cancellation of selection and such report having commended itself to acceptance by the Supreme Court, it is the contention of Mr. Singh that the orders of discharge in the present cases, based on the foundational facts as revealed from the Police Report, would not suffer from any legal infirmity and, likewise, would commend itself to acceptance by this Court.
34. Much reliance is placed in the case of Joginder Pal, where observations and conclusions made in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon's case also received due consideration. It is submitted that the said cases had gone into the aspect of two categories of candidates who had been selected to executive posts by the Punjab Public Service Commission - one category labelled as tainted candidates and the other as non-tainted candidates. In so far as tainted candidates are concerned and who are facing criminal trial, Mr. Singh takes the cue from Joginder Pal to say that the fate of such candidates hardly pose any challenge, inasmuch as, as it has been specifically found that the petitioners herein have indulged in unfair means and have been selected by paying bribe and definitely not on their merit, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Relying on Joginder Pal and Inderpreet Singh Kahlon it is further submitted that if an appointment is made in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the same would be void and a nullity and in view of the foundational facts substantiating commission of illegality in the selection process, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution would not warrant consideration. On the argument that the impugned orders of discharge had been made in terms of the rules, unlike in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon, and that it was on this account that the Supreme Court did not consider the applicability of the relevant provisions of rules as also the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, Mr. Singh places reliance in Tulsiram Patel, particularly to paragraph 126 thereof, where it has been laid down that if a source of power exists by reading together two provisions, whether statutory or constitutional, and the order refers to only one of them, the validity of the order should be upheld by construing it as an order passed under both those provisions. Thus, omission to mention provision will not invalidate an order where the source of power exists. It is the contention of Mr. Singh that the power to discharge the petitioners is also referable to Page No.# 76/96 the source of power emanating from Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mr. Singh also submits that law would not permit tainted candidates to plead reinstatement in service on ground that they are facing criminal proceedings and may also be acquitted after investigation or trial. This aspect of the matter, according to Mr. Singh, has been duly answered at paragraphs 20 and 21 in Joginder Pal. Reliance is also placed in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sekhar Roy v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1984) 1 GLR 500 to say that it is open to the appointing authority to terminate the service of a temporary employee during the pendency of criminal proceedings if the appointing authority is satisfied that such temporary employee is not suitable to hold the post. Further, there is no rule that on initiation of a departmental or criminal proceeding the services of a temporary employee cannot be terminated by an order of termination simpliciter.
35. Referring to Parshotam Lal Dhingra Mr. Singh contends that appointment of a Government servant to a permanent post may be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. It is submitted that only in the cases where a person has been appointed substantively to a permanent post in Government service or to a temporary post for a fixed term or appointed temporarily to a post which has ripened into a quasi-permanent service, their termination without appropriate proceedings as per the relevant service rules read with Article 311(2) of the Constitution or termination before the expiry of the fixed term of service or deprivation of the right to the post after it has so ripened, would prima facie be a punishment and be regarded as a dismissal or removal from service so as to attract the application of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is thus submitted that except in the three cases above, a Government servant has no right to his post and termination of his service would not amount to dismissal or removal by way of punishment. Illustratively, where a person is appointed to a permanent post in a Government service on probation, if his service is terminated either during or at the end of the period of probation, it will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment. Reason being, the Government servant so appointed on probation is without any right to continue to hold such a post anymore than a person who has been employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. Further, such termination would not operate as a forfeiture of any right of the Government servant so appointed on probation Page No.# 77/96 to hold the post and it obviously cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Mr. Singh submits that even if an extreme view is taken that the petitioners herein fall into any of the three categories above, the protection under Article 311 will still not be available as their discharge from service is not on grounds of misconduct or inefficiency during post- recruitment period but predominantly due to their illegal and fraudulent induction to Government service at the entry point. In this connection reference is also made to Samsher Singh where the two important observations made in Parshotam Lal Dhingra with regard to termination of service of a person appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation was noticed. It is submitted that whereas the motive operating on the mind of the authority to terminate the service is wholly irrelevant as motive only inheres in the state of mind which is not discernible but if the termination is sought to be founded on manifest misconduct, then it would be a punishment and will go to violate Article 311 of the Constitution. Mr. Singh reiterates that discharge of the petitioners from service is far from being founded on misconduct and, therefore, arguments on 'motive' and 'foundation' are wholly misplaced.
36. Touching upon the power of the State authority to discharge a probationer, Mr. Singh submits that Samsher Singh has laid down that before a probationer is confirmed in service, obligation is cast upon the authority to make consideration whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post and even in the absence of any rules thereof, the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any other object the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. In this connection reference is made to the relevant provisions in the applicable Rules relating to discharge of probationer and it is contended that power is vested on the authority concerned to make consideration as to whether the probationer is "otherwise unfit" for being a member of the service and, wherever the Rules is silent, the ratio laid down in Samsher Singh, as above, would operate proprio vigore. Thus, whether the Rules provide or not, it is obligatory on the part of the authority concerned to undertake an exercise to satisfy itself on the suitability of the probationer to continue to hold the post.
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37. It is submitted by Mr. Singh that until the date of discharge all the petitioners were on probation. It is stated that confirmation in the service has to be preceded by expression of satisfaction of the appointing authority and such stipulation finds expressed in the service rules relevant to the cases at hand. Relying on various Supreme Court decisions, it is contended that one cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of time, unless the service rules which govern the servant specifically lays down that the probationer will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over, which is not so in the present cases. Further, the service rules do not contemplate automatic confirmation and there is a condition of the probationer having completed the period of probation to the satisfaction of the appointing authority. It is, thus, contended that satisfaction being a pre- condition for confirmation, even if the probationer is allowed to continue beyond the initial period of two years as mentioned in the rules, there is no question of deemed confirmation. Further, this contention of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before making confirmation and the authority so competent to confirm must pass an order to that effect. For the proposition above, reliance is placed in G.S. Ramaswamy v. the Inspector General of Police, Mysore State , Bangalore, reported in AIR 1966 SC 175; Pratap Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh , reported in (1979) 4 SCC 263; K.A. Barot v. State of Gujarat , reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 287; Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P., reported in (1996) 1 SCC 560; Wasim Beg v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (1998) 3 SCC 321; Registrar, High Court of Gujarat v. C.G. Sharma, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 132 and Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School and Anr. v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena and Anr., reported in 2019 SCC Online SC 1075.
38. In conclusion, Mr. Singh submits that reliance placed by Mr. D.K. Mishra in paragraph 37 of Palak Modi that the use of unfair means in the evaluation test/confirmation test constitutes a misconduct and such observation would support a contention that misconduct can also be a pre-recruitment phenomena at the stage of evaluation test, the same has been placed out of context, inasmuch as, the said observation in Palak Modi was rendered in a very different factual context. Reliance is also placed in Debendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 to say that it is a settled proposition of law that Page No.# 79/96 where appointment to an office is secured by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Fraud unravels everything and if by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a Court of law as the appointment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer. Lastly, that exercise of power by the Court should be for the sake of justice. It should refuse to interfere in exercise of its equity jurisdiction if the quashing of the order results in greater harm to the society. It is the responsibility of the Court, as custodian of the Constitution, to maintain the social balance by interfering wherever necessary for sake of justice and also refusing to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. In this, reliance is placed in State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Prabhu, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481.
39. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, replying to the primary submissions of Mr. Singh, submits that it is premature on the part of the State Respondents to conclude that since initial appointment is tainted, thus, it is void ab initio and nothing further is required. Bona fide action of the State respondents, as emphasized by Mr. Singh, is misplaced as the same has to be tested, having regard to the civil consequences that may visit the petitioners. Further, the stand of the State Respondents that the impugned action was also taken for restoring public faith in high public office, the same are merely high words. Also, the role of public servants as observed in Tulsiram Patel cannot be applied proprio vigore in the cases at hand detrimental to the interest of the petitioners as facts are altogether different. Mr. Choudhury also contends that although there cannot be any dispute to the proposition that fraud vitiates everything, however, the said proposition is wholly inapplicable as no element of fraud on the part of the petitioners have been established. On the two cases relied upon by Mr. Singh, Mr. Choudhury contends that both Krishna Yadav and O. Chakradhar were only based on preliminary Police report which was of administrative nature. On Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it is submitted that indeed the power to appoint also includes power to suspend or dismiss but the power to dismiss cannot, ipso facto, be exercised without following procedure as established by law. Placing reliance in the case of Manoj Narula, it is submitted that mere Police report cannot operate as a disqualification warranting invoking of Rule 20(c) of the Page No.# 80/96 1998 Rules and/or the provisions relating to discharge of probationer under the service rules. Mr. N. Dutta, in his reply, submits that reliance placed on Krishna Yadav and O. Chakradhar by the State Respondents, are distinguishable as the facts in both the cases are entirely different from the cases at hand. In the said cited cases the Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and irregularity was found vitiating the whole selection, unlike the present cases where individuals have been targeted. It is submitted that although law is clear that individual show-cause notices to selectees are not required to be served when irregularity committed in the process of selection is all-pervasive vitiating the whole selection, however, the said principle would not be applicable as the petitioners have been individually targeted, thus, making it incumbent upon the State Respondents to serve individual notices on them. Mr. Dutta reiterates his submissions on the exceptional circumstances, as observed in Maneka Gandhi and Tulsiram Patel, where principles of natural justice can be excluded. It is contended that the impugned action was not under any circumstance where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before the discharge order had been passed would have obstructed taking of prompt action and/or the nature of the action to be taken, together with its object, purpose and scheme of the relevant statutory provisions, warranted its exclusion and/or invoking the principles of natural justice would have had the effect of paralysing the administrative process or circumstance demanded the need for promptitude and for taking of urgent action. Mr. D.K. Mishra, in his reply, submits that by dispensing with enquiry with reference to Article 311(2), Proviso (b) or Rule 10(2) of the 1964 Rules, it cannot be said that the discharge is termination simpliciter. It is submitted that the State action to discharge the petitioners are more guided by unnecessary media publicity than by reason. Placing reliance in State of Maharastra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 386, it is submitted that a trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of law and it can well lead to miscarriage of justice. On Krishna Yadav and O. Chakradhar, Mr. Mishra echoes the arguments of Mr. Dutta and submits that both the cases are distinguishable and cannot be applied to the cases at hand. So is the case in Registrar, High Court of Gujarat, cited by the State Respondents, which is factually different altogether. It is submitted that in the said case the Supreme Court itself expressed satisfaction after perusing the confidential reports and other relevant vigilance files etc. to conclude that the High Court and the Full Court in the administrative side was right in taking the decision to Page No.# 81/96 terminate the services and that the respondent therein was not entitled to continue as a Judicial Officer. In such circumstance, the Supreme Court observed that the order of termination was termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature and, therefore, no opportunity was required to be given to the respondent therein. In contrast, it is submitted that discharge of the petitioners from service in the present cases are only based on doubts on their integrity and no further. No conclusion had been reached after an exercise as done in the cited case. It is further submitted that there is neither any admission on the part of the petitioners nor any indisputable factual position with regard to their involvement in "colossal fraud" for securing appointment, which two factors may abundantly suggest that only one conclusion would be possible and the Court would not be required to issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that in the absence of the two primary factors, the decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 237, referred in Part-III Compilation of Judgments placed by the State, is misplaced. On the necessity for compliance of the principles of natural justice, reliance is placed in the case of Mahipal Singh Tomar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in (2013) 16 SCC 771, wherein the law laid down in Maneka Gandhi, Mohinder Singh Gill, Tulsiram Patel and Inderpreet Singh Kahlon had been reproduced. Referring to the stand of the State Respondents, where reliance was placed in Parshotam Lal Dhingra to the extent that except in the three cases illustrated in paragraph 11 thereof that a government servant on probation is without any right to continue to hold a post anymore than a person who has been employed on probation by a private employer, Mr. Mishra submits that the same has been placed out of context, inasmuch as, paragraph 11 has to be read with paragraph 14 which lays down that persons who officiate in a permanent post or in a temporary post, the constitutional protections would as much be applicable to them and any contrary view cannot find support. It is further submitted that none of the petitioners were discharged on grounds of unsuitability. Integrity having been questioned by invoking Rule 20(c) of the 1998 Rules, the said action itself is stigmatic. Also, the impugned action is ill-conceived, inasmuch as, foundational facts can never stand established ex parte. By passing, mention is made that there are at least three candidates who are continuing in service despite being similarly placed but treated differently for having turned approvers. Mr. Somnath Das, in his reply, reiterates his submissions and rebuts the stand of the respondents that the entry of the Page No.# 82/96 petitioners was illegal and therefore natural justice is not applicable. It is submitted that, at first, it must be established that the entry was illegal, which fact can only be ascertained after any enquiry. It is submitted that expressions like integrity, antecedents etc. itself makes Rule 20(c) stigmatic. Further, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable as the relevant service rules itself provides the power to discharge probationers. Mr. Das also contends that discharge of the petitioners is visited with evil consequences, in that, there is not only loss of pay and allowances but also affects future career. This being apparent on the face of it, it must be held that the petitioners have been punished and the termination of their service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service and such termination without opportunity of hearing must be regarded as wrongful and in violation of their constitutional rights. For the above proposition, Mr. Das makes reference to paragraph 28 of Parshotam Lal Dhingra.
40. All parties were heard extensively covering 18 (eighteen) dates. Hearing stood concluded on 22.01.2020 and on the same date judgement was reserved. With leave of the Court and on 04.02.2020 Mr. K.N. Choudhury placed for consideration a recent judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 28.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No. 777 of 2020 ( Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala & Ors.), which is a case pertaining to termination of service of an Associate Professor in the Department of Hindi on grounds of committing sexual misconduct with the girl students during the period of probation. The said Associate Professor was terminated from service by orders of the Vice Chancellor of the Central University of Kerala, based on the report of the Internal Complaints Committee and the decision of the Executive Council of the University. Placing reliance in the said case Mr. Choudhury submits that where an order of termination is ex-facie stigmatic or even if material amounting to stigma is not contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order and such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent, in that case the impugned order must be construed as ex-facie stigmatic and which cannot be issued without subjecting the incumbent to a regular enquiry as per the service rules.
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41. In a nutshell, the contentions on behalf of the petitioners are basically that the orders of discharge are founded on alleged misconduct which can be traced to the investigation and report of the Dibrugarh Police. In other words, a live connection exists between the allegations of misconduct and discharge. Besides, stigma is writ large in the orders, so much so, that it casts aspersions on integrity and clearly demonstrates that the same had been issued by way of punishment. The very fact that there are allegations of lacking integrity and unfit to be retained in service in the impugned orders, this itself makes the orders stigmatic in nature. Taking it one step further, it is also contended that the element of stigma is so manifest in the discharge orders that it would not even be necessary to look at any contemporaneous records or file-notings. That the orders of discharge clearly connote blemish, disrepute, aspersions on character and integrity on the petitioners. The orders are clearly in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Thus, stigma and punitive element being all-pervasive, the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice could not have been dispensed with. Illegality abounds that whereas discharge is founded on the allegations in the police report, such allegations are yet to find established in accordance with law. Contention is that the discharge orders are not on established facts. There are neither any separate FIRs lodged against the petitioners nor there are irrefutable proof with regard to payment of bribe, not to speak of the fact that even if any admission of involvement had been made by the petitioners before the police, the same could not have been acted upon, being hit by section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Further, no exercise had been carried out by the respondents to satisfy itself as to the existence of reasonable and probable information, which is a condition precedent to invoke the rule relating to discharge of probationer. Contention is also made that as in a quasi-judicial enquiry, the rules of natural justice equally apply in an administrative enquiry which involves civil consequences and civil consequences would also cover material deprivations. As regards natural justice, it is contended that even if an extreme view is taken, in the facts of the case, that protection under Article 311 is not available, a reasonable opportunity of hearing would always subsist following Maneka Gandhi and Mohinder Singh Gill. Even if rules are silent, the requirement of audi alteram partem rule of natural justice must be read into it. The entitlement of hearing need not be shown or supper-added if the adjudication of the matter involves civil consequences. The thrust of the attack being that the impugned action is Page No.# 84/96 founded on misconduct, which the respondents deny, it would therefore be imperative for the Court to lift the veil and look into the relevant file-notings and other proceedings or documents connected with the formal orders of discharge to discover the true ground leading to the discharge orders and whether there is punitive flavour in cause or consequence. Further contention is that law does not hold a person guilty or brand him as a criminal on mere allegations or even on charges framed by a competent Court of law. Guilt has to be established and until then the presumption of innocence is attached to the person. The position would not change even if the person stands condemned in the public eye. This is in the context that unproved allegations cannot form the basis for discharge without holding an inquiry even if there is proved violation of Article 14 and 16 in the conduct of the selection process. Further, the discretion to draw satisfaction in the act of discharging a probationer, the same cannot be an unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability. There is utter lack of application of mind, in that, provisions of the service rules pressed into action are wholly inapplicable and could never have been resorted to for the mere fact that there has been no occasion where the petitioners failed to render satisfactory service during their tenure of service. Lastly, the decision to discharge the petitioners from service was not a prompt decision or a reflex action immediately following the investigation and report of the Dibrugarh Police.
42. Indeed, a rain of rulings merely adds to the volume, not to the weight of the proposition and so this Court would desist from citing all of them except a few. The expression "misconduct" echoes predominantly throughout in the submissions on behalf of the petitioners. Therefore, it is most necessary to understand the concept and the legal requirement when applied to an act involving discharge of a temporary servant or a probationer from service. The answer is not far to seek, having regard to the law laid down in a series of judgments, starting with the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, followed by the seven-Judge Bench in Samsher Singh to Gujarat Steel Tubes, Anoop Jaiswal, Dipti Prakash Banerjee, Chandra Prakash Shahi, to cite the least, which are amply discussed in Palak Modi. Clearly, if the termination of service results from or is founded on the right of the employer flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the Page No.# 85/96 termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. However, if such termination from service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination/discharge are to be examined, the motive behind it being immaterial and irrelevant for the reason that motive inheres in the mind which is not discernible. Simplicity of the form of the order of discharge or of the order itself, even if innocuously worded, will not give any sanctity if the circumstances of the case establishes that the order is founded on misconduct involving stigma and that it had been effected in infraction of the principles of natural justice or that of the provision of Article 311. Thus, where the form of the order is just a facade for an order of dismissal for misconduct, justice would require the Court, before which the order is put to challenge, to go behind the form to ascertain the true character of the order.
43. Applying the above principles to the present cases to ascertain the circumstances and the foundational facts leading to the discharge of the petitioners from service during the probation period, the original office files containing the notes on arrest and suspension of the petitioners as well as the notes on the decision-making process involving consultations with and approval accorded by high governmental authorities, are perused. The office files called for by this Court covers each of the 52 (fifty-two) writ petitioners and, to be precise, the following Office File No. (i) AAP 148/2017 pertains to Bhaskar Dutta Das(A-11), Bhaskar Deva Sarma(A-12) and Amrit Jyoti Sharma(A-13); (ii) AAP 380/2017 in respect of Dipak Khanikar(A-14), Dwithun Borgayary(A-17), Debojit Bora(A-20), Pallabi Sarma Choudhury(A-
22), Anirudhya Roy(A-24), Himangshu Choudhury(A-25), Kunal Das(A-27), Kamal Debnath(A-
30), Badrul Islam Choudhury(A-32), Geetali Doley(A-34), Rajarshi Sen Deka(A-35), Rumi Saikia(A-36) and Nisha Moni Deka(A-37); (iii) AAP 150/2018 in respect of Moon Mazoomder(A-47), Monika Teronpi(A-48), Srabanti Sengupta(A-49), Leena Krishna Kakati(A-
50), Barnali Das(A-51), Deepshikha Phukan(A-52), Dhrubajyoti Chakraborty(A-55), Manzuoor Elahi Laskar(A-56), Saibur Rahman Barbhuiyan(A-57), Ganesh Chandra Das(A-58), Susovan Das(A-59), Utpal Bhuyan(A-60) and Mustafa Ahmed Barbhuiyan(A-65); (iv) AAP 91/2018 in Page No.# 86/96 respect of Hrituraj Gogoi(A-43) and Joydev Mahanta(A-45); (v) HMA 924/2017 in respect of Hemanta Saikia(A-15), Jayanta Kr. Nath(A-16), Sabbira Imran(A-18), Harshajyoti Bora(A-21), Jotindra Pd. Baruah(A-26), Dilip Kumar Kalita(A-29), Kaushik Kalita(A-42), Gulshan Daolagupu(A-61), Pallavi Sharma(A-53), Bhargav Phukan(A-62) and Kavita Das(A-66); (vi) FTX 115/2017 in respect of Sunayana Aidew(A-33), Vikas Kr. Pincha(A-38), Manas Protim Haloi(A-39), Barnali Devi(A-44), Rhituraj Neog(A-63) and Nipan Kr. Pathak(A-64); (vii) TMV 299/2016 in respect of Prasanjit Kr. Ghosh(A-46); (viii) TMV 298/2016 in respect of Suranjita Hazarika(A-54), and (ix)/(x) GLR 169/2017 and GLR 169/2017/Pt-I in respect of Raju Saha(A-19) and Jyotirmoy Adhikary(A-31). The grounds of arrest and the materials collected against the petitioners are contained in the aforesaid office files. Broadly, investigations revealed that the petitioners were involved in securing job by adopting unlawful means in collusion with the arrested accused person, Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul, the then Chairman of APSC, and other arrested members of the Assam Public Service Commission and officials and agents connected therewith. During the course of investigations, written answer-scripts of the APSC Combined Competitive Examination were seized from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the house of Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul. The handwriting samples of the arrested accused persons as well as that of the petitioners were obtained and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. It revealed that the answer-scripts were not printed in the Government Press. Also, the signatures of Invigilators in the answer-scripts were found to be fake and mismatched with the Invigilators who were on duty on the respective day of examination in the particular Examination Hall. These fake answer-scripts were written again by the petitioners after completion of the examination and the same were replaced with the original answer-sheets in connivance with Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul and his other arrested associates.
44. Without entering into any legal argument as to its admissibility, which is for the appropriate fora to decide, the office files also contains statements made by a section of the petitioners before the police admitting to their complicity in the illegal activity to which they were beneficiaries. The statements of such petitioners found in the office files are that of Hrituraj Gogoi(A-43), Joydev Mahanta(A-45), Barnali Devi(A-44), Moon Mazoomder(A-47), Page No.# 87/96 Monika Teronpi(A-48), Srabanti Sengupta(A-49), Leena Krishna Kakati(A-50), Barnali Das(A-
51), Deepshikha Phukan(A-52), Dhrubajyoti Chakraborty(A-55), Manzuoor Elahi Laskar(A-56), Saibur Rahman Barbhuiyan(A-57), Ganesh Chandra Das(A-58), Susovan Das(A-59), Utpal Bhuyan(A-60), Mustafa Ahmed Barbhuiyan(A-65), Vikas Kr. Pincha(A-38), Manas Protim Haloi(A-39), Rhituraj Neog(A-63), Nipan Kr. Pathak(A-64), Suranjita Hazarika(A-54), Raju Saha(A-19) and Jyotirmoy Adhikary(A-31). The statements are basically with regard to their appearance in the APSC Mains Examination and making payment of money ranging between 25 to 40 lakhs to Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul, through his agents, for getting selection by the APSC and for securing job.
45. The office files, as indicated above, chronologically records the events taking place, following information received from the Dibrugarh Police as regards arrest of the petitioners in connection with Dibrugarh P.S. Case No.936/2016. From the decision calling for detailed reports from the Dibrugarh Police for taking further action, to receiving such reports in connection with the arrest of the petitioners, to the decisions to withdraw the services of the petitioners pending action to be taken by the Personnel (A) Department, Government of Assam, to obtaining the views of the Judicial Department before taking final decision and to obtaining the approval accorded by the Chief Minister of Assam, together with the views of the Advocate General, Assam, before the petitioners were discharged from service by orders of the Governor of Assam, the same finds recorded in the respective office files.
46. Clearly, the allegations of irregularities on the part of the petitioners are not allegations of any irregularities, negligence, inefficiency and misconduct taking place during discharge of their duties post-recruitment or after having been appointed to public offices. The allegations against the petitioners in indulging in gross irregularities and fraud, involving payment of illegal gratifications, for securing appointments to public offices are apparently of pre- recruitment period, that is, before they were appointed to public offices. In the understanding of this Court the element of misconduct, which reverberates in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, is attributable only in respect of a period subsequent to a valid initial appointment. Not a single citation could be placed on behalf of the petitioners for the Page No.# 88/96 proposition that irregularities committed during the recruitment process and/or before appointments had been made and/or before a person is born into a cadre/service, would constitute misconduct. A vain attempt was made when reliance was placed in paragraph 37 of Palak Modi to say that the use of unfair means in the evaluation test/confirmation test would certainly constitute misconduct. Reliance so placed vis-à-vis the facts and circumstances in the present cases, is altogether out of context. In Palak Modi the private respondents therein had already been appointed as Probationary Officers way back on 05.05.2006. In due course, the State Bank of India informed that they were due for confirmation in service and, therefore, they are to appear in the test proposed to be conducted on 27.02.2011.The private respondents appeared in the test held on 27.02.2011 but their names did not figure in the result declared on 10.05.2011, primarily on the ground that the Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, which body was entrusted with the task of preparing the examination papers and evaluating the answer-sheets, submitted a Report to the Bank that some candidates including the private respondents were suspected to have used unfair means. Thus, paragraph 37 of Palak Modi, which makes mention that use of unfair means during "evaluation test/confirmation test" would constitute misconduct, was only in respect of test conducted for the purpose of confirmation in service. No law was laid down in Palak Modi that misconduct can also be stretched back to a period prior to entering into service and for illegalities and irregularities committed during the selection process. As misconduct cannot be a pre-recruitment phenomena, the very bedrock of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned action being founded on misconduct, therefore, the principles of natural justice and/or the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution could not have been dispensed with, in the considered opinion of this Court, does not hold any water.
47. Indeed, there can be no hiding from the fact that the arrest and the materials collected against the petitioners following the FIR dated 27.10.2016, registered as Dibrugarh P.S. Case No.936/2016, had set the ball rolling. The investigation reports of Dibrugarh Police were the foundational facts, the gravity of which was considered by the Government of Assam in the Personnel (A) Department, which eventually resulted in the impugned orders being passed, preceded by consultations with the concerned Departments, obtaining the views of the Page No.# 89/96 Judicial Department and with approval of the highest governmental authority. The impugned actions are only in respect of an identifiable group/section of the candidates who had appeared in the Mains Examination. The identifiable group are only those candidates where their duplicate answer-sheets, after substituting with their original answer-sheets, were recovered from the Confidential Examination Branch of APSC as well as from the house of the then Chairman Sri Rakesh Kr. Paul. This identifiable group alone were discharged from service and against whom charge-sheets have been filed. They are the 52 (fifty two) writ petitioners herein and another 8 (eight) candidates who are not before this Court. Allegations are with regard to criminal conspiracies resulting in tampering with the examination process for the benefit of the petitioners herein. Investigations have revealed that the petitioners had indulged in unfair means for getting selected by paying bribe or on extraneous considerations, but certainly not on account of merit. There are cogent materials on which the respondent authority derived satisfaction that the selection process through which the petitioners came to be selected and eventually appointed was tainted by fraud. Irregularities in the selection and appointment of the petitioners being found at the threshold itself, can it be said that the State action was not bona fide in discharging the petitioners from service and was it not the solemn duty of the State to take the impugned action for maintaining sanctity and in reposing faith in the system and public offices in relation to the affairs of the State Government. Can it be said that it was not open to the State Government to act on the disturbing revelations emanating from the police investigations with regard to grave illegalities being discovered involving the petitioners during the selection process, which illegalities occurred well before they had entered into service. To reiterate, the discharge of the petitioners from service was not on account of any alleged misconduct after appointment but on discovery of fraud at the point of their very entry into service. There is a clear dividing line between a challenge made to an order of discharge on grounds of misconduct during post-recruitment period and a challenge made to an order of discharge on grounds of irregularities and illegalities finding place relatable to a pre-recruitment period. Whereas the former would invariably invite compliance of audi alteram partem rule of natural justice and/or compliance of the protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution, the latter can fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem, particularly, if there are reliable materials to reach a satisfaction that, in so far as the Page No.# 90/96 petitioners are concerned, the examination process and their selection was vitiated. Going back to Parshotam Lal Dhingra and Samsher Singh, it is only when termination is seen to be founded on manifest misconduct, it would be a punishment and will go to violate Article 311 of the Constitution in the absence of any enquiry. However, as observed above, the arguments on misconduct being the foundation, are wholly misplaced and misconceived, inasmuch as, discharge of the petitioners from service are not founded on the phenomena of misconduct, as is understood in service jurisprudence.
48. The Dibrugarh Police Reports, following investigations, are part of the records and a compilation of the same has also been furnished before this Court by Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, during the course of hearing. It is seen that the illegalities and irregularities discovered in the selection had been scrutinised and investigated upon in respect of each of the writ petitioners. The detailed police investigations enabled to pick out the candidates who had unlawfully benefited. A mere perusal of the police reports leaves no room for doubt as to the thoroughness with which the investigation was carried out. Irregularities attributed against each of the petitioners are minuted, reinforced by statements made before the Investigating Officer by such petitioners, as available in the records, admitting to their complicity. Having gone through the police reports, the prima facie view of this Court is that the same commends itself to acceptance. The question is, could such selection in respect of the petitioners be acted upon in the matter of public employment. Also, whether the State respondent could have acted upon the police reports to eventually discharge the petitioners from service. No law is cited on behalf of the petitioners to support a view that there is legal embargo in acting upon police reports, as seen to be done in the present cases. On the contrary, the decisions in Krishan Yadav and O. Chakradhar goes to support a contention that police reports can be acted upon. This Court, therefore, would hold that the orders of discharge, which are the subject-matter of challenge in the present cases, do not suffer from any legal infirmity only on a contention that the impugned orders are based on foundational facts emanating from the reports of the Dibrugarh Police. Orders of discharge from service founded on police reports are one thing and orders founded on misconduct are altogether a different aspect or proposition. What is relevant in the present cases is to ascertain whether Page No.# 91/96 the orders of discharge were founded on misconduct, as understood in service jurisprudence. This has already been answered in the negative in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment.
49. In Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Joginder Pal, the Supreme Court had dealt with two categories of candidates who had been selected to executive posts through examinations conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission. They were categorised as tainted and non-tainted candidates. Taking a cue from Inderpreet Singh Kahlon, this Court would hold that if services of appointees are to be terminated after having put in few years of service, what would be imperative are that sufficient materials have been collected on the basis of a thorough investigation in fair and transparent manner; that the illegalities committed have gone to the root of the matter, vitiating the selection of the appointees, and that the appointees must be found to be part of the fraudulent purpose and/or the system itself must be found to be corrupt. Applying the above principles, there is no denying the fact that against each of the writ petitioner sufficient materials had been collected through a process of thorough investigation and the materials so collected disclosed grave illegalities with involvement of the petitioners. The gravity of the illegalities found to have been committed was such that it had gone to the root of the matter, thereby, vitiating their selection. In Joginder Pal, in respect of the petitioners therein who were found to be tainted candidates and were facing criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that the fate of such candidates do not pose much of a challenge as it was found that they had indulged in unfair means and were selected either by paying bribe or because of other extraneous reasons, certainly not on their merit. This is precisely the case of the writ petitioners herein, as revealed from the police reports. Although the petitioners were discharged from service by taking recourse to the provisions of the governing service rules relating to discharge of petitioners, what stands out predominantly is that such discharge from service was in view of the commission of illegalities in the selection process involving an identifiable group, which included the petitioners as well. Therefore, the arguments made on behalf of the petitioners questioning the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Service Rules as also the effect of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, is not required to be gone into, more so, when the foundational facts as Page No.# 92/96 revealed from the police reports were duly taken into consideration. The appointments of the petitioners having been made in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the same would be void and rendered a nullity.
50. On the foundational facts the consequences of law impacting on the petitioners would brook no exception. Manifestly, the petitioners cannot be regarded as innocent or too immature to understand the consequences of their action. The materials collected through the process of a thorough investigation revealed that the petitioners were clearly amongst the identified, segregated beneficiaries of an illegal process. The petitioners who have been identified as having indulged in illegal and unfair means for selection, either for making illegal gratifications or because of extraneous reasons and not on account of merit, this Court would take a position that the decision to discharge them from service is perfectly justified. This Court would also not accept any contention that as there may be a possibility of acquittal in the criminal case, therefore, the decision to discharge them from service at this stage was not warranted. Relying on the observation made in Joginder Pal, the petitioners cannot be heard to say that they should be reinstated in service and allowed to continue until decision is rendered by the competent criminal court.
51. The increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law was noticed in Maneka Gandhi. Fair play in action was held to be the soul of natural justice. Truly, if there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. It is also held in Maneka Gandhi that the duty to act judicially need not be super-added. It may be spelt out from the nature of power conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the person affected. Where it is found to exist, the rules of natural justice would be attracted. Opportunity of hearing also becomes imperative if an administrative action is seen to be attended to by civil consequences. In Mohinder Singh Gill a civil consequence has been defined to cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. While relating to the exceptions to audi alteram partem rule, as noticed in Maneka Gandhi, it was held that every legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis, be tested on Page No.# 93/96 the touchstone of pragmatic realism. Audi alteram partem rule would stand excluded if (i) importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process, or (ii) there is need for promptitude, or (iii) the urgency of the situation demands. The exclusions, as held in Maneka Gandhi, must be applied only in exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. In a given case, the audi alteram partem rule may also suffer situational modifications. Essentially, the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and such reasonable opportunity may be a full-fledged hearing or it may be a hearing which is very brief and minimal, either prior to the decision or even as a post-decisional remedial hearing. Importantly, the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.
52. On the above, first and foremost, the circumstances resulting in the discharge of the petitioners from service are undoubtedly exceptional. Sham examinations involving the petitioners in the Mains examination and their selection and appointment through an illegal process is the basis of their removal. The foundational facts, as observed in the preceding paragraphs, in the opinion of this Court, were sufficiently compulsive to take the petitioners out of their jobs. There was need for promptitude in taking stringent action. Urgency of the situation also demanded weeding out those identifiable persons who had entered into service through an irregular and illegal process. The audi alteram partem rule, tested on the exceptional facts and circumstances of the present cases, is not applicable and the petitioners cannot be heard to demand an opportunity of hearing or to claim a right for a post-decisional hearing. The disturbing disclosures in the investigation reports with regard to prevalence of unfair procedure and tampering of the examination process for the benefit of the petitioners, brings the present cases within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem. To reiterate, there are sufficient reliable material and foundational facts to reach a finding that the examination process involving the petitioners in the Mains examination was vitiated. The petitioners also cannot be heard to say that merely because they would be deprived of salary and allowances, the impugned action have visited them with civil consequences. A discharge from service founded on misconduct and without opportunity of hearing may inflict a person with civil consequences. However, when it involves discharge from service, not Page No.# 94/96 founded on misconduct but on grounds of grave illegalities and irregularities, as indulged by the petitioners at the point of their selection and prior to entry into service, there cannot be a contention of infliction of civil consequences.
53. On the argument that even if protection under Article 311 is not applicable the audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit a brief and minimal hearing following Maneka Gandhi, this Court would observe that even if an extreme view is taken that the petitioners could make out a case that they have suffered prejudice on being denied opportunity of hearing, the same would have no bearing. This Court would record and the petitioners would admit that opportunity of hearing was granted in ample measure by this Court. During the course of hearing on day-to-day basis, covering 18 days, both sides were heard on their contentions and arguments extensively and elaborately, both on facts as well as on law. Having considered their contentions, this Court is of the opinion that the concerned State respondent was justified in ordering discharge of the petitioners from service. In so far as the case in Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala & Ors. is concerned, which was placed for consideration by Mr. K.N. Choudhury after judgment in the present cases was reserved, it is seen that the facts therein vis-à-vis the facts in the instant cases are altogether different. Further, this Court has neither found any element of stigma in the impugned orders nor has found that the impugned orders are founded on misconduct. The said case in Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. is not applicable and/or relevant in the adjudication of the present cases.
54. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that power to appoint also includes the power to suspend or dismiss. The relevant provision under the respective Service Rules also provides power to discharge a temporary or officiating member or a probationer from service. In the impugned orders reference had been made only to that provision in the Service Rules relating to such discharge. In this context, notice is had to paragraph 126 in Tulsiram Patel which clearly lays down that if a source of power exists by reading together two provisions, whether statutory or constitutional, and the order refers to only one of them, the validity of the order should be upheld by construing it as an order passed under both Page No.# 95/96 those provisions.
55. The arguments placed on deemed confirmation in service, either on account of having completed the initial probationary period of 2 years in some cases or due to names of some of the petitioners appearing in the Final Gradation List or the word 'probation' not being mentioned against their names in some official documents or the second increment having been paid to some petitioners, which increment is allowed only on confirmation in service in terms of Rule 25 of the 1998 Rules , the fact remains that there are no orders passed by the competent authority in respect of any of the petitioners towards confirmation of their service. It is seen that in the Service Rules relevant to the cases at hand the expression of satisfaction of the appointing authority has to precede confirmation in service, which is singularly absent in case of the petitioners. Law does not permit automatic confirmation in service due to efflux of time unless the Service Rules governing the servant specifically lays down that condition. There cannot be any question of deemed confirmation merely on the ground of continuance of service beyond the initial 2 (two) year probationary period. The case laws cited by Mr. Singh on behalf of the State respondents on the legal principles above commends for acceptance by this Court. Reference is made to paragraph 11 in Chandra Prakash Shahi wherein a legal proposition was reiterated that permanent status can be acquired only by a specific order confirming the employee on the post held by him on probation. This Court also finds great force in the submissions of Mr. Singh justifying the bona fide action of the State in discharging/removing the petitioners from service.
56. For all the reasons and the findings above, the writ petitioners have failed to make out any case warranting interference to their impugned orders of discharge from service. The petitioners are not entitled to any equity and the foundational facts alone speaks volumes of the irregular and unfair procedure that had been set in motion and processed to reach its illegal goal, which process have found the petitioners to be the direct beneficiaries. Before parting with the case, this Court would also record that judicial conscience must only support the righteous cause. Grant of any relief to the petitioners, in the opinion of this Court, would only act as an anathema to a righteous cause. All the 49 (forty-nine) writ petitions Page No.# 96/96 accordingly stands dismissed. Interim orders passed in the writ petitions stands recalled. Parties are left to bear their own cost.
JUDGE Comparing Assistant