Chattisgarh High Court
Neeraj Prasad vs Smt. Gauri Prasad (Died And Deleted) on 6 April, 2026
1
AFR
Digitally
VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR VISHAKHA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BEOHAR
FA No. 79 of 2022
Order Reserved on : 19.03.2026
Order Delivered on : 06.04.2026
1 - Neeraj Prasad S/o Late Ramanand Prassad (R.N.Prasad) Aged
About 48 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Twhsil And District
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Chandan Prasad (Death) Nill
2.1 - Smt. Manishi Prasad, W/o Late Chandan Prasad Aged About
42 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
2.2 - Rishika Prasad, D/o Late Chandan Prasad, Aged About 13
Years Thorugh Its Guardian Smt. Manishi Prasad, R/o Gulab
Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
2.3 - Arya Prasad, S/o Late Chandan Prasad, Aged About 8 Years
Through Its Guardian Smt. Manishi Prasad, R/o Gulab Nagar,
Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Ranjan Prasad, S/o Ramanand Prasad (R.N. Prasad) Aged
About 43 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
... Appellants/Plaintiffs
versus
1 - Smt. Gauri Prasad (Died And Deleted) As Per Honble Court
Order Dated 29-01-2026.
2
2 - Smt. Jayshree Sawarkar, W/o Narendra Kumar Sawarkar, Aged
About 50 Years R/o Rajkishor Nagar Holly Nursery School, Tehsil
And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Bank Of Baroda, Branch Office Birkona, Near Pt. Sundar Lal
Open Univeristy Birkona, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
4 - Bank Of Baroda, Through Regional Manager, Regional Office
Rosarb Branch, First Floor Mhavir Goshala Complex, Mohdapara,
K.K. Road, Raipur 492004 C.G.
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Bilaspur, District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents/Defendants
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioner :- Mr. Goutam Khetarpal, Advocate
For State :- Mr. Kanwaljit Singh Saini, Dy.G.A.
For Respondent No.2 :- Mr. Sajal Kumar Gupta, Advocate
For Respondents No. 3 & 4:- Mr. Ankit Singhal, Advocate
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Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal
& Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
1. This First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as 'CPC') has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs calling in question the legality, validity, and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 13.04.2022 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 in Civil Suit No. A/30/2020, whereby the plaint has been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC holding that the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter to be referred as 'SARFAESI Act').
2. Following prayer has been made by the appellants/plaintiffs by way of this appeal:-
"It is therefore prayer that the impugned judgment passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. parties Neeraj Prasad & others Vs. Smt. Gauri Prasad & others may kindly be set aside and allowed the Appellants/plaintiffs appeal and restore the main suit in the ends of justice."
3. Briefly stated, the suit property was purchased by late Ramanand Prasad, father of the appellants, by a registered sale deed dated 11.12.2002. After his death on 08.05.2009, the property devolved upon the appellants and Respondent No.1 as legal heirs. It is the case of the appellants that Respondent No.1, without consent of other co-heirs and without partition, got her name mutated exclusively and executed a registered sale deed dated 03.07.2017 in favour of Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 thereafter mortgaged the suit property with Bank of Baroda, and upon default in repayment of loan, proceedings under Section 4 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act were initiated and possession notice dated 21.05.2019 was issued. The appellants filed a civil suit seeking declaration of title to the extent of 75% share, cancellation of the sale deed dated 03.07.2017, and permanent injunction restraining the Bank from auctioning the suit property. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent Bank filed applications under Sections 13, 34, and 35 of the SARFAESI Act and under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. The learned trial Court accepted the said objections, relying upon Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the judgment passed in Jagdish Singh vs. Heeralal (2014) 1 SCC 479, and rejected the plaint.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error of law in rejecting the plaint by holding the suit to be barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. It is contended that the provisions of Sections 13 and 17 of the said Act are not attracted in the present case inasmuch as the appellants are neither borrowers nor guarantors, but are claiming independent title over the suit property as co-heirs. The suit, in essence, is one for declaration of title, cancellation of the sale deed dated 03.07.2017 as null and void, and for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction, which falls within the exclusive domain of the civil court and not within the jurisdiction of the Debts 5 Recovery Tribunal. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has failed to consider this material aspect and has erroneously ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of title, particularly between third parties who are not parties to the loan transaction. Learned counsel also contends that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to confine itself strictly to the averments made in the plaint alone, and the defence taken by the defendants, whether in the written statement or in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, cannot be looked into. This being a settled proposition of law, the impugned order suffers from serious legal infirmity. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2025) 4 SCC 38 [Central Bank of India and another vs. Prabha Jain and others] and also upon the decision of the High Court reported in 2012 SCC OnLine MP 9514 [Smt. Prabha Jain vs. Central Bank of India and others].
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submit that the learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding the same to be barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is contended that the subsequent purchaser of the suit property had validly mortgaged the same with 6 Bank of Baroda and obtained a loan, and upon default in repayment, the secured asset was liable to be proceeded against by the Bank in accordance with law. Consequently, proceedings were initiated under the SARFAESI Act for enforcement of the security interest. It is further submitted that once measures under the SARFAESI Act have been invoked, the statutory remedy available to the aggrieved party lies under Section 17 of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly barred under Section 34 of the said Act. Learned counsel contends that the trial Court, after duly considering the factual matrix and the legal position emerging from Sections 13, 17, and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, has rightly rejected the plaint as being barred by law, and the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
7. From a perusal of the order of the trial Court, it is evident that reliance has been placed upon the decision in Jagdish Singh (Supra). However, such reliance appears to be misconceived. The said judgment pertains to cases involving borrowers and guarantors in the context of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, and does not deal with disputes where third parties assert independent title over the property. Therefore, the ratio of the said 7 judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, where the plaintiffs claim rights as independent co-heirs.
8. From a bare perusal of the plaint, it is quite vivid that the plaintiffs have sought reliefs in respect of declaration of title, declaration of their share in the suit property, declaration of sale deed dated 03.07.2017 as null and void, declaration of their share to the extent of 25% each in the entire suit land, further declaration that the mortgage of the property is not in accordance with law, and grant of permanent injunction restraining auction proceedings. From the plaint, it further appears that there is a specific pleading that the suit property originally belonged to their father late Ramanand Prasad, who had acquired the same by way of a registered sale deed dated 11.12.2002. The property, bearing Plot No. 350, Khasra No. 804/5, admeasuring 2400 sq. ft., situated at Mouza Mopka, Tehsil and District Bilaspur, Revenue Circle No. 19, was thus the self-acquired property of the deceased. It is further pleaded that in the year 2002 the land was duly diverted and assigned Khasra No. 804/5 with Plot No. 350. After the death of their father on 08.05.2019, Defendant No.1 (mother) got her name mutated in the revenue records without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, she illegally sold the property vide sale deed dated 03.07.2017 in favour of Defendant No.2, who, despite having knowledge that the property was joint family property of the 8 plaintiffs and Defendant No.1, purchased the same and subsequently mortgaged it with Bank of Baroda, Birgaon Branch. It is only upon publication of auction notice in the daily newspaper that the plaintiffs came to know about such transactions, leading to filing of the present suit.
9. From the nature of reliefs claimed in the plaint, it is apparent that the core reliefs pertain to declaration of title, declaration of share, and cancellation of the sale deed as null and void. These reliefs fall within the exclusive domain of the civil court and cannot be adjudicated by any other forum, including the Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the SARFAESI Act.
10. This aspect has already been considered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Smt. Prabha Jain vs. Central Bank of India and others reported in 2012 SCC OnLine MP 9514, wherein it has been held that where the relief sought by the plaintiff is essentially for declaration of title and related civil rights, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, and such matters cannot be adjudicated by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
11. The aforesaid judgment of the High Court was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which came to be decided in (2025) 4 SCC 38 [Central Bank of India and another vs. Prabha Jain and others] and it was held as under :
9
"15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs: (a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand / Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati. (b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Pramod Jain in favour of the Bank. (c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property.
16. So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
23. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and arewithin the civil court's jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
24. 1f the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the 10 view that relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order 7 Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B."
12. From a perusal of the above judgment, it is evident that where the principal relief sought by the plaintiffs is for declaration of title, share, and cancellation of sale deed, the same lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil Court and not within the domain of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Consequently, Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act would not operate as a bar to such a civil suit. Merely because an ancillary relief of injunction against auction proceedings has been sought, the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be ousted.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karam Singh vs. Amarjit Singh and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2240, has held as under:-
"5. The defendants (i.e. the contesting respondents) filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 19083 for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is hopelessly barred by time. In the application it was, inter alia, stated that the will was set up in 11 the year 1983 after the death of Kartar Kaur; the mutation proceedings based on the will was contested and therefore, the plaintiffs including their predecessor in interest were fully aware of the existence of the will; hence, the relief for declaration qua the will, limitation of which is three years, was hopelessly barred by limitation. It was also contended that the plaintiffs' stand that cause of action had arisen on 20.07.2017 is incorrect and wrong. In addition to above, it was stated that plaintiffs have concealed a material fact regarding filing of civil suit no. 648/2012, which was filed by father of plaintiff no. 1, wherein the order of mutation dated 28.05.2012 was challenged without challenging the will and, therefore, the plaint of the said suit was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC vide order dated 17.05.2013. It was thus claimed that the suit was also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC.
18. In Indira v. Arumugam (1998) 1 SCC 614, this court held that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established based on relevant documents and other evidence, unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non- suited. Consequently, when a suit is instituted for possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on the ground of adverse possession, the burden is on the defendant to prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period. This, therefore, in our view, cannot be an issue on which the plaint could 12 be rejected at the threshold. Moreover, the plaintiffs herein, had clearly disclosed that they had been contesting the will in the mutation proceedings which culminated in the year 2017. The suit was instituted within three years thereafter to declare the mutation entry illegal. Thus, considering that mutation proceedings are summary in nature, the institution of the regular suit questioning the same is not ex facie barred by law.
19. That apart, where several reliefs are sought in suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC."
14. In the matter of P. Kumarakurubaran vs. P. Narayanan and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon careful perusal of the pleadings, the material on record, and the impugned judgment, we find it necessary to examine whether the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is to be pointed out at this juncture that though the respondents/defendants sought to reject the plaint on two grounds - valuation of the suit and 13 limitation - the High Court rejected the plaint solely on the ground that it was time-barred. Accordingly, we shall confine our consideration in this appeal to the issue of limitation.
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable."14
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Leelamma Mathew vs. Indian Overseas Bank and Others (2023) 20 SCC 459 has held as under:-
"14.4. It is submitted that in terms of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is absolutely barred except in case the plaintiff is able to show fraud or misrepresentation. It is submitted that in the present case from the communications on record and that the possession was handed over to the Bank pursuant to the order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act on 8-10-2007 and thereafter the plaintiff made the payments on various dates, leading to the issuance of the sale certificate on 21-11-2007, which was registered almost 3 years later on 1-2-2010, it is very much clear that the plaintiff was aware of the extent of the property and no case of fraud is made out.
20. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff and the finding recorded by the High Court that the suit was barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that the suit was for damages/compensation, with respect to the balance land, which could not have been decided by the DRT or Appellate Tribunal, Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act shall be applicable only in a case where the Debts 15 Recovery Tribunal and/or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to decide the matter under the SARFAESI Act. The plaintiff was not challenging the sale/sale certificate. The plaintiff claimed the damages/compensation with respect to the less area. Therefore, the High Court has seriously erred in holding that the suit was barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act."
16. Furthermore, in the matter of Rajiv Sareen vs. Divyanshu Enterprises and Others 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8354, the High Court of Delhi has held as under:-
"10. Respondent No. 3 thereafter filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, which was opposed by the Appellant. Upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions, the learned Single Judge allowed the said application and rejected the plaint, recording the following reasons:
i. No complaint was lodged by the Appellant against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 despite allegations of threat, coercion and undue influence.
ii. The particulars of fraud were not specifically pleaded by the Appellant and mere clever drafting cannot be permitted to circumvent the statutory bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.16
iii. Although the Appellant's father was shown as a party to the MoU, he did not sign the same, rendering the document suspect and apparently created subsequently.
iv. The Appellant's plea of non-payment of sale consideration is barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [hereinafter referred to as 'IEA'], since no oral evidence can be led contrary to the recitals of the Sale Deed. v. Non-payment of the entire sale consideration does not constitute a valid ground for cancellation of a registered sale deed. vi. Under the recitals of the Sale Deed, the title in the suit property stood transferred immediately to Respondent No. 1.
11. On behalf of the Appellant, learned counsel submits that the learned Single Judge erred in holding the suit to be barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Smt. Prabha Jain1, it is urged that the DRT-III has no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon a claim for cancellation of a registered Sale Deed. Accordingly, it is contended that since such a relief falls outside the scope of the SARFAESI Act, the civil suit instituted by the Appellant was maintainable before the Civil Court.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3 supports the Impugned Judgment and submits that the jurisdiction of 17 the Civil Court stands expressly barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. It is submitted that the reliefs sought by the Appellant are directly connected with the measures taken by the secured creditor in exercise of powers conferred under the said enactment.
Accordingly, it is contended that the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the plaint as being barred by law.
16. It is trite law that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court must confine itself to the averments made in the plaint, which are to be read as a whole, without reference to the defence of the opposite party. The veracity or correctness of the allegations is not to be adjudicated at this preliminary stage.
23. It is also settled law that even if the Court is of the opinion that the likelihood of success in the suit is remote or minimal, such a view cannot justify rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The plaint can be rejected only if it does not disclose a cause of action or is clearly barred by any law on its face, not merely because the claim may ultimately fail.
24. Insofar as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, the learned Single Judge's conclusion that the civil suit is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be 18 sustained. The relief sought in the suit is for cancellation of a registered sale deed. The jurisdiction to cancel or set aside a registered conveyance is not vested in the DRT, which is a statutory forum of limited jurisdiction."
17. Also, in the matter of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India AIRONLINE 2004 SC 948, the Supreme Court held that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction under Section 34 is not absolute and civil court jurisdiction survives where the dispute involves allegations requiring adjudication beyond the limited statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal, particularly where complicated questions of title arise.
18. Similarly, in the matter of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 676, the Supreme Court reiterated that where effective statutory remedy exists, ordinarily recourse must be taken under the SARFAESI mechanism; however, such principle applies where the dispute squarely falls within the Tribunal's competence.
19. Likewise, in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust and Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2012) 8SCC 706, the Supreme Court has categorically held that only plaint averments are required to be examined while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and unless the statutory 19 bar is apparent on the face of the plaint, rejection thereof is impermissible.
20. In the present case, the appellants claim independent title as legal heirs of the deceased and have specifically challenged the validity of the sale deed dated 03.07.2017. It is also their categorical case that they are in continuous possession of the suit property. The controversy involved in the present matter relates to determination of title, validity of transfer effected by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No.2, and adjudication of rights of co- heirs in the suit property. Such issues necessarily require a full- fledged trial, appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and adjudication by a competent civil Court. These questions cannot be decided in summary proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whose jurisdiction is limited in scope.
21. It is a settled proposition of law that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only the averments made in the plaint are required to be seen. The plaint, in the present case, clearly discloses a cause of action and raises triable issues requiring adjudication. Therefore, the rejection of the plaint at the threshold by the learned trial Court is legally unsustainable and contrary to settled principles of law.
22. In the present case, the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate this settled legal position and has committed an error of 20 law in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure by holding the suit to be barred by jurisdiction. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has committed a jurisdictional error in rejecting the plaint by misapplying Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, and the impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside.
23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 13.04.2022 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. A/30/2020 is hereby set aside. The plaint is restored to its original number. The matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court for adjudication on merits in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on a date to be fixed by the said Court.
24. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Vishakha
21
HEAD-NOTE
"Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only plaint
averments has to be considered, not the defence of the defendant. Rejection of plaint is impermissible where any relief claimed falls within civil court jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act is limited in nature."