Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal
Km Wedding Events Management Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner Of Gst & Central ... on 19 September, 2025
CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
CHENNAI
REGIONAL BENCH - COURT No. III
Service Tax Appeal No. 41182 of 2017
(Arising out of Order-in-Original No. CHN-SVT AX-002-COM- 28 & 29/2016-17 dated 06.03.2017
passed by Commissioner of Service Tax II, Newry Towers, No. 2054-1, II Avenue, Anna Nagar,
Chennai - 600 040)
M/s. KM Wedding Events Management Private Limited ...Appellant
Formerly M/s. KM Matrimony Pvt. Ltd.,
No. 6/7, Ramasamy Street,
T. Nagar,
Chennai - 600 017.
Versus
Commissioner of GST and Central Excise ...Respondent
Chennai Outer Commissionerate,
Newry Towers, No. 2054-I,
2nd Avenue, Anna Nagar,
Chennai - 600 040.
And
Service Tax Appeal No. 40220 of 2022
(Arising out of Order-in-Original No. 46/2021(C) dated 30.11.2021 passed by Commissioner of
GST & Central Excise, No. 692, MHU Complex, 5th Floor, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai - 600
035)
M/s. KM Wedding Events Management Pvt. Ltd. ...Appellant
Formerly M/s. KM Matrimony Pvt. Ltd.,
No. 6/7, Ramasamy Street,
T. Nagar,
Chennai - 600 017.
Versus
Commissioner of GST and Central Excise ...Respondent
Chennai South Commissionerate,
MHU Complex, 692, Anna Salai,
Nandanam,
Chennai - 600 035.
APPEARANCE:
For the Appellant : Mr. S. Jaikumar, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. M. Selvakumar, Authorised Representative
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. P. DINESHA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
HON'BLE MR. VASA SESHAGIRI RAO, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)
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FINAL ORDER Nos. 41026-41027 / 2025
DATE OF HEARING : 22.08.2025
DATE OF DECISION : 19.09.2025
Per Mr. P. DINESHA
The Appellant M/s. KM Matrimony Pvt. Ltd.,
presently known as M/s. KM Wedding Events
Management Pvt. Ltd., has filed this appeal before us
against the two Orders-in-Original passed against
three Show Cause Notices, viz., SCN No. 166/2013
dated 13.06.2014 (Covering the period from 2009 -
10 to 2012-13), SCN No. 20 / 2014 (Covering the
period from July 2012 to March 2013) dated
12.09.2014 and SCN No. 5 / 2020 dated 18.09.2020
(Covering the period from April 2013 to June 2017).
On adjudication, the SCN No.20/2014 dated
12.09.2014 was dropped as the period involved
apparently was covered under SCN No. 166/2013
dated 13.06.2014. Hence the scope of these Appeals
pertain to the demands confirmed in the impugned
Orders-In-Original in respect of 2 SCNs.
1.1 For ease of reference, various services, period
involved and the demand thereof, are tabulated as
below: -
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O-in-O Nos. 28 & 29/2017 dated 06.03.2017
Sl.
Description of service provided Period Demand (Rs)
No.
1. Web based access to profiles and retrieval April 2009 to
50,74,158
(OIDAR services) June 2012
2. July 2012 to
Matrimonial services 45,69,201
March 2013
3. 2011-12 to
Outdoor Catering Service 19,30,766
2012-13
4. Sale of space or time for advertisement 2011-12 to
2,63,479
(other than print media) service 2012-13
5. Production programme of tv or radio
2011-12 17,44,567
service
Total 1,45,82,171
O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021
Sl.No. Description of service Period Demand
2013-14 to
1 Matrimonial Services 2,79,08,259
June 2017
2013-14 to
2 Catering Services 79,97,411
2015-16
2015-16 to
3 Mandap Keeper Services 2,95,983
2016-17
2013-14 to
4 Export of Television Rights 10,15,219
2014-15
Total 3,72,16,872
2.0 Heard Shri. S. Jaikumar, and Shri. M.
Karthikeyan, Ld. Advocates assisted by Ms. Varshini,
Advocate for the appellants.
2.1 Explaining the facts of the case and various
services provided by the appellant, the learned counsel
would submit that the primary service rendered by the
appellants is in the nature of match making service per
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se. The above service would be rendered primarily in
the form of printing the entire details, information,
matrimonial bio-data of the prospective brides and
grooms, for a subscription. While such advertisement
is the backbone of the match making service, during
the disputed period there was also three low-priced
entry-level packages offered, where such database
would be made available on the web. Out of variety of
packages offered by them, the advertisement through
print media was most popular as well as the fountain
head, due to ease as well as convention. The Ld.
Counsel would contend that during the disputed period
namely 2009-13, the parental community had not
progressed to match making based on web search but
would solely rely on the horoscope/bio-data of the
prospective bride/bride groom only through print
media. In fine, it was argued that during the period of
dispute, the entire match making services rendered by
the appellants are "advertisement in print media",
which were exempted services till the introduction of
"negative list" in July 2012.
2.2 With respect to the demand of Service Tax on
other services namely outdoor catering, sale of space
and T.V. program production services, they would not
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contest on merits but vehemently argued on limitation
and the penalty.
2.3 With respect to the invocation of larger period
of limitation under proviso to Section 73 (1) of the
Finance Act 1994 (herein after the Act), the Ld.
Counsel would contend that the officers visited their
unit on 23-01-2013, which is claimed to be the trigger
for investigation and the justification of invoking of the
larger period of limitation. In this connection, the Ld.
Counsel would submit that on 11-01-2013, the
appellants had voluntarily submitted a letter to the
Department wherein, they had intimated about the
services rendered by them including the tax remitted
as well as the balance of Service Tax to be paid by
them; owing to their financial difficulty they also
undertook to make the payment along with the
interest in due course. Subsequently, they also
submitted a letter dated 22.01.2013 whereby, they
appear to have informed about the details of payment
and the balance thereof. Both these letters have been
duly acknowledged on the respective dates and are
also forming part of the RUDs in SCN No.166/2013.
Referring to the above, the Ld. Counsel would submit
that the trigger for investigation is itself the letter
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given by the appellants to the department disclosing
the entire facts and hence, the Department cannot
invoke the larger period alleging any suppression of
facts against the appellants.
2.4 Notwithstanding the above argument on
limitation, it was further argued that there is an
inherent contradiction with respect to the classification
of match making services in O-in-O No. 28&29/2017
dated 06.03.2017. It remains undisputed that all the
various packages of match making services provided
by the appellants would remain the same during the
entire period of the dispute, i.e., 2009 till March 2013
which is the period covered in O-in-O No. 28&29/2017
dated 06.03.2017. The SCN as well as O-in-O No.
28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 have proceeded to
classify the entire match making services for the
period from March 2009 to June 2012 under OIDAR
services whereas, from July 2012 till March 2013, they
have classified the same services under 'matrimonial'
services. Referring to this as an inherent contradiction,
the Ld. Counsel would argue that there cannot be two
classifications for the same services, pre and post
negative regime. Agreeing that post-negative list
regime (July 2012 onwards) all services which are
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neither figuring in the negative list nor specifically
exempted, would fall under the Tax net, it was argued
that in the pre-negative list regime (till 30-06-2012)
the services should be having a positive classification
to attract the levy. They would also submit that even
if the classification of the department as "matrimonial
services" (being a composite service containing
OIDAR, print media, match making consultancy) post-
negative list regime, the same should hold water even
in the pre-negative list regime. If so, then on the
application of Section 65A (2)(b) of the Act (pre-
negative list regime), the matrimonial services which
is a composite of OIDAR, print media and match
making consultancy, should be classified as "print
media services", which renders the essential character
to such composite service and accordingly stand
exempted.
2.5 The Ld. Counsel has also filed a written
submission to the effect that since the period of
dispute in the impugned SCN is between April 2009 to
March 2013 which is well before the introduction of
Section 73 (2A) of the Act, the Show Cause Notice and
the consequent O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated
06.03.2017 should fail in entirety and cannot be
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limited to even the normal period of limitation. In this
connection, they have placed reliance on the ratio of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CCE Jaipur
Vs. Alcobex Metals [2003 (3) TMI 98 (SC)].
2.6 In respect of O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated
30.11.2021, the Ld. Counsel would submit that the
same is a periodical Notice covering the period from
April 2013 to June 2017 whereas, the notice was given
on 18-09-2020. This vehemently assailing the
invocation of larger period for a periodical notice, the
Ld. Counsel would argue that invocation of larger
period of limitation is an extraordinary provision which
would be normally exercised with utmost caution
whereas in the instant case, all such legal prescriptions
have been thrown to wind, by invoking such a
draconian provision for a periodical notice, that too, for
the same set of facts and services. They would also
fairly concede that the only new service rendered by
them which was not part of the O-in-O No.
28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 period would be
"mandap keeper services" wherein, the tax involved is
Rs.2,95,983/- for the entire period. The Ld. Counsel
would also submit that in respect of O-in-O No.
46/2021 dated 30.11.2021, the adjudicating authority
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has gone beyond even the extended period of
limitation namely 5 years, by erroneously computing
the 'relevant date' as the date of return which was filed
belatedly. In this connection, reliance is placed on the
decisions of CESTAT in the following cases: -
i. M/s. Right Resource Management - 2023 (11)
TМІ 100 - СESTAT New Delhi
ii. M/S. Clean Care Services - 2025 (8) TMI 75 -
CESTAT Chennai.
Ld. counsel would thus pray for setting aside both the
OIOs and allow the Appeals.
3.0 Per contra, Shri M. Selva Kumar, Ld. Asst.
Commissioner defended the impugned orders and
reiterated the finding of the adjudicating authority in
both the impugned Orders-in-Original.
3.1 Further, he would also file written submissions
and emphasized that non-filing of ST-3 returns on time
is a justifiable ground for invocation of extended period
and would rely on the following decisions: -
i. UNITED ENTERPRISES VS. CCE & ST, PATNA
[2013(29)STR.605(Tri-Kolkata)]:
Demand Limitation - Liability to pay Service Tax for
extended period - Suppression of taxable value and
intentionally evading the Service Tax stating the service
rendered as Cargo Handling service - Extended period
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invocable - Even for subsequent show cause notice non-
filing of returns and not responding to the queries of the
Range Officer extended period is invocable - Section 73
of Finance Act, 1994.
ii. UNIWORTH TEXTILES LTD. VS. CCE, NAGPUR
[2009(244)ELT.401(Tri-Del.)]:
Demand - Limitation - Second SCN on same facts but
for different period - Assessee not furnishing
information regarding their sales for later period - SCN
issued reportedly for later period only because of delay
on part of assessee - No dispute that assessee
committed fraud for evasion of duty - SCN for the
entire period would have been issued at time of first
SCN had the assessee furnished figures - Extended
period - applicable - Apex Court decision of Nizam
Sugar Factory distinguished - Proviso to Section 11A(1)
of Central Excise Act, 1944."
He would thus pray for dismissal of both the Appeals
as devoid of any merits.
4.0 Heard both sides. Though there is a concession
in respect of various other services rendered by the
appellants except matrimonial services, the main hub
of their argument would be against the invocation of
larger period of limitation in both Orders-in-Original. It
is the case of the appellant that the composite service
rendered by them which comprises of OIDAR, print
media as well as match making consultancy services
during the pre-negative list regime i.e., till June 2012
has been sought to be taxed under OIDAR services by
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the department. It is a fact on record that post-
negative list regime, i.e., 01-07-2012 onwards, for the
same services rendered by the appellants the notice
has proceeded to classify the services as 'matrimonial'
services by treating them as a composite service of
OIDAR, print media and match making services and by
applying the principles laid under Section 66F of the
Act. To amplify, the appellants are engaged in
providing a host of services, for a subscription to the
prospective clients who seek match making for their
respective bride/bride grooms. The appellants provide
different packages which comprise of an
advertisement in their proprietary printed books which
are circulated with a specified periodicity, during the
period of subscription. Such printed books will carry
the particulars like the photograph of the prospective
bride/bride grooms. Along with this, there are also few
exclusive services where the founder/chairman of the
appellant firm would provide private one-to-one
consultation/marriage counselling to their elite
customers. Apart from the above, there are also few
low-priced services where the database is made
available on the web, which are allowed to be retrieved
for a subscription. It is the case of the Appellant that
they were classifying such services where the
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subscriptions are for web-based database as OIDAR
services and paying appropriate service tax during the
relevant period. Now the moot question that bothers
is, whether the composite services namely
matrimonial services (classified by the department
post 2012) which comprises of all the three ingredient
services namely OIDAR, print media/match making
services could be vivisected and taxed with respect to
OIDAR services for the period prior to July 2012, in the
absence of any specific taxing entry with respect to
'Matrimony' services prior to negative list regime? The
law is now well settled that in terms of composite
services, the department cannot vivisect and cull out
a specific and an individual component thereof, for the
purpose of levy of service tax. There is no dispute
whatsoever, that the composite services find a place
as "matrimonial services" post July 2012 whereby, all
and any services are taxable except when they are
either listed under the negative list or exempted by
any notification. Hence, the question is, whether the
said 'matrimonial' services which are undisputedly
composite services, could be identified as OIDAR
services prior to July 2012? or the OIDAR component
alone could be vivisected and taxed prior to July 2012?
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4.1 We have to note that it is the settled position
of law that vivisection of composite services and taxing
individual component thereof is impermissible under
service tax. In fact, this bench had an occasion to deal
with a similar situation in the case of M/s. Core
minerals Vs. Commissioner of GST, Central
Excise, Chennai [2024 (12) TMI 1196 - CESTAT,
Chennai]. For ready reference, the relevant paras are
extracted here under: -
"15.0 We have heard both sides and considered their
submissions and the following questions arise for
decision in this matter: -
i. Whether demand of service tax made under 'Site
Formation service' for the period from June 2005 to May
2007 by culling out the site formation charges from a
composite mining contract is sustainable?
ii. Whether the demand of service tax made under
'Mining service' on account of short payment for the
period June 2007 to September 2008 is sustainable?
iii. Whether the demand of service tax made under
'Mining Service' for the very same period June 2007 to
Sept 2008 on account of charge of under valuation is
sustainable?
We proceed to take up the above issues for decision in
seriatim.
(i) Demand of Service Tax under "Site Formation
Service": -
15.1 We have perused the agreement dated 15.05.2002
entered for Mining in Nugaon Mines and also the
agreement dated 01.09.2002 entered for mining in
Thakurani Mines by the appellant and both are composite
agreements for mining of iron ore and the consideration
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for mining is fixed at 'per metric ton' of iron ore mined.
There is no separate mention about provision of 'site
formation service' or the connected scope or activity in
the above contracts. Para 3.1 of the SCN observes that
the extraction of ore involves the following processes
namely (i) overburden removal, (ii) raising and stacking,
(iii) hiring of pay loaders, (iv) mining, (v) screening,(vi)
sampling and analytical study of iron ore, etc and hence,
it appeared that the appellant was engaged in providing
'site formation service', but there is no such details
mentioned anywhere in the agreements. From the
expenses incurred by the appellant during the relevant
period, the audit appears to have culled out the figures
for such site formation activity and proposed to demand
service tax.
15.2 The Ld. Adjudicating Authority has considered the
activity of site formation independently. From the
documents available on record and the agreements
between the parties which is the 'cause' for any action
between the parties, it is definitely not the intention of
either of the signing parties to undertake SFS and hence,
at the most, it could be incidental to the mining service.
This is in fact of the spirit of the TRU Letter dated
28.02.2007 wherein the Board has considered the
incidental activities insofar as the Mining Service is
concerned. Hence, we are of the view that the Circular
F.No. B1/6/2005-TRU dated 27.07.2005 would apply
only when the scope of work is SFS per se. The scope of
work would naturally flow from the intention between the
parties, as reduced into writing, which alone is
instrumental in working out the tax liability. Hence,
demanding tax on a service that was not agreed upon,
for which no separate consideration is payable or paid, is
clearly unsustainable.
15.3 In this context, we deem it appropriate to refer to
the 'Raising agreement' entered into between the
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contracting parties, relevant clauses of which are
extracted below: -
"1. The validity of the Agreement shall be initially for a
period of 20 (Twenty) years with-effect-from 01.09.2002
and upon expiry there of the agreement shall be renewed
for such further periods upon Terms & Conditions that
may be mutually agreed upon. However Party of the First
Part would ensure renewal of the Lease within the
required time of expiry of the Lease (30 Years from
01.01.1982). However, the increase in the extraction
charges would be increased @ 10% per MT every year
for Lump Ore/Natural Fines on account of cost revision.
The maximum extraction cost that can be attained only
over a period of time will be Rs. 96.63 (Rupees ninety
six Paisa sixty three only) per MT for Lump Ore and Rs.
64.42 (Rupees four Paisa-forty two only) per MT for
Natural Fines. For example, in the Second Year Lump Ore
price will be Rs. 66.00 (Rupees sixty six only) per MT and
for Natural Fines will be Rs. 44.00 (Rupees Forty Four
only) per MT.
2. The Party of First Part hereby grant full right and
liberty to that contractor to enter upon the said mine for
carrying out surveying, prospecting and extraction of
Iron Ore and related mining work from the said mine.
The contractor has agreed to depute/loan the services of
such of its personnel, as it may deem fit and proper to
the leaseholder. The Party of the First Part has agreed to
keep the contractor's qualified mining personnel on its
pay rolls on terms and conditions including emolument
and other allowances as may be decided by the
contractor. Such contractor's personnel shall be deemed
to be the party of first party employees for all legal
effects and purposes. The party of first party shall
appoint one of the contractor's person as the "Mines
Manager" and/or "Agent for the said Mine, Thakurani
Iron Ore Mines. The party of first part shall accordingly
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notify the Indian Bureau of Mines, the Labour
Enforcement Officer, the District Magistrate, the
Department of Mines Safety and such other authorities
as required under the law. The contractor reserves its
right to recall and/or replace all or any of its
deputed/loaned personnel at any time and from time to
time as it may deem fit and proper, without assigning
any reason. However all payment of salaries and other
expenditure of deputed personnel mentioned
hereinabove shall be borne by the contractor."
At this juncture, we find it most appropriate to refer to a
recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of
Commissioner of Service Tax Delhi Vs. Quick Heal
Technologies Limited [with Civil Appeal Nos. 5168-5169
of 2022 dated 05.08.2022] wherein, the Hon'ble court,
while considering the importance of 'contract' between
the parties, has ruled as under: -
"Construction of agreement between the parties: -
53. ......
54. In Delta International Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar
Ganeriwalla, (1999) 4 SCC 545 : AIR 1999 SC 2607 and
Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai
Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726, this Court quoted with approval
the following principles of construction of contracts from
the 'Interpretation of Contracts' by Kim Lewison, Q.C. as
follows :
"1.03 For the purpose of the construction of contracts,
the intention of the parties is the meaning of the words
they have used. There is no intention independent of that
meaning.
6.09 Where the words of a contract are capable of two
meanings, one of which is lawful and the other unlawful,
the former construction should be preferred.
Sir Edward Coke [Co. Litt. 42a] expressed the
proposition thus :
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'It is a general rule, that whensoever the words of a
deed, or of one of the parties without deed, may have a
double intendment and the one standeth with law and
right, and the other is wrongful and against law, the
intendment that standeth with law shall be taken.'
In more modern times that statement was approved by
the Privy Council in Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escomple de
Paris, (1869) LR 2 PC 393 : 16 ER 618, in which Sir
Joseph Napier, delivering the advice of the Board said :
'The rule that words shall be construed most strongly
against him who uses them gives place to a higher rule;
higher because it has a moral element, that the
construction shall not be such as to work a wrong.'
Similarly, in Fausset v. Carpenter, (1831) 2 Dow & Cl
232 : 6 ER 715, the House of Lords accepted the
submission of counsel that the court :
'... in judging of the design and object of a deed, will not
presume that a party executing the deed meant to do
and did what he was wrong in doing, when a construction
may be put on the instrument perfectly consistent with
his doing only what he had a right to do.
However, the question of construction should not be
approached with a leaning in one direction or another.
Thus although the law frowns upon covenants in restraint
of trade, nevertheless such a covenant should not be
approached on the basis that it is prima facie illegal. 'You
are to construe the contract, and then see whether it is
legal.' "
55. The sum and substance of the ratio of the case
of BSNL (supra) as discernible is that the contract
cannot be vivisected or split into two. Once a lump
sum has been charged for the sale of CD (as in the case
on hand) and sale tax has been paid thereon, the
revenue thereafter cannot levy service tax on the entire
sale consideration once again on the ground that the
updates are being provided. We are of the view that
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the artificial segregation of the transaction, as in
the case on hand, into two parts is not tenable in
law. It is, in substance, one transaction of sale of
software and once it is accepted that the software
put in the CD is "goods", then there cannot be any
separate service element in the transaction. ....."
[emphasis added by us]
Now, it is equally relevant to refer to the determination
of classification as prescribed under Sec. 65A of the
Finance Act, 1994. The same is reproduced for
convenience:
"65A. Classification of taxable services -
(1) For the purposes of this chapter, classification of
taxable services shall be determined according to the
terms of the sub-clauses (105) of section 65;
(2) When for any reason, a taxable service is prima facie,
classifiable under two or more sub-clauses of clause
(105) of section 65, classification shall be effected as
follows: -
(a) the sub-clause which provides the most specific
description shall be preferred to sub-clauses providing a
more general description: -
(b) composite services consisting of a combination of
different services which cannot be classified in the
manner specified in clause (a), shall be classified as if
they consisted of a service which gives them their
essential character, in so far as this criterion is
applicable;
(c) when a service cannot be classified in the manner
specified in clause (a) or clause (b), it shall be classified
under the sub-clause which occurs first among the sub-
clauses which equally merits consideration;"
When we consider the understanding between the
parties as reduced in the form of 'Agreement', the scope
and objective of which are reproduced herein above, the
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same clearly mandate that the appellant shall extract
Iron Ore. The rate is one payment, as agreed to between
the parties, which is for the extraction of Iron Ore and
nothing else. Thus, the above ruling of Apex court would
squarely apply. Secondly, even going by the Order-in-
Original and assuming the vivisection of the above terms
of the agreement which may lead to the provision of
multiple services, then the same has to be examined in
the context of Sec. 65A ibid, for classification. So, if we
assume more than one service, then we have to go by
the essential character, in terms of Sec. 65A(2)(b) ibid.
This is because, the agreement is for 'Mining Service'
which is being treated as the one for 'SFS'. Thus, when
the agreement, the ratio of the above decision of
the Apex court and Sec. 65A(2)(b) are read
together, the only service that is being perceived
between the parties, for which the consideration
flows is the 'Mining Service'.
15.4 In view of the above, we hold that the Order-in-
Original passed by the Ld. Commissioner is clearly on
surmises and wrong interpretation of the understanding
between the parties, and thus the impugned order lacks
any credit and cannot be supported.
15.5 The TRU Letter dated 28.02.2007, explaining the
budget proposals made, inter alia explained the scope of
Mining service which was proposed to be brought under
tax net wherein, it was clearly mentioned that the
services provided in relation to mining are
comprehensively covered under the proposed service of
mining. Further, the case law relied upon by the
appellant have decided the issue in question as to
whether the site formation activity undertaken
incidentally by a service provider in a mining contract is
leviable to tax under 'site formation service' for the
period prior to 01.06.2007 and the issue is no more res
integra. The Co-ordinate Bench at Bangalore held as
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follows in the case of M. Ramakrishna Reddy [2008 (10)
TMI 115 CESTAT Bangalore]: -
"10.1 From the above, it is very clear that the salient
feature of the services rendered by the appellant is
mining. In other words, the appellant is expected not
only to remove the overburden but also to excavate the
Barytes Ore. We cannot say that the appellant is not
undertaking site formation work, but site formation work
undertaken by the appellant is incidental to the mining
activity. To put it in different words, the essential
character of the work undertaken by the appellant is
mining or winning of minerals. The mining services
became taxable only with effect from 1-6-2007. The
period in the present case is prior to 1-6-2007. It cannot
be said that the entire service rendered by the appellant
comes under the category of site formation. If that were
so, one cannot say that it also falls under "Mining
Services." In any case, Section 65A (2) of Chapter V of
the Finance Act, 1994 reads as follows:
"When for any reason, a taxable service is, prima facie,
classifiable under two or more sub-clauses of clause
(105) of Section 65, classification shall be effected as
follows:
(a) the sub-clause which provides the most specific
description shall be preferred to sub-clauses providing a
more general description;
(b) composite services consisting of a combination of
different services which cannot be classified in the
manner specified in clause (a), shall be classified as if
they consisted of a service which gives them their
essential character, in so far as this criterion is
applicable;
(c) when a service cannot be classified in the manner
specified in clause (a) or clause (b), it shall be classified
under the sub-clause which occurs first among the sub-
clauses which equally merit consideration"
21
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ST/40220/2022
10.2 If the above provision is applied, the services
rendered would amount to only mining services. As the
contract is a comprehensive one for mining, it cannot be
vivisected for levying service tax on that portion of the
activity relating to "Site Formation" in the light of the
decision of the Tribunal in the case of Daelim Industrial
Company v. CCE, Vadodara [2006 (3) S.T.R. 124 (Tri.-
Del.)] = [2003 (155) E.L.T. 457 (Tri.- Del.)] upheld by
the Apex Court [2007 (5) S.T.R. J99 (S.C.)] = [2004
(170) E.L.T. A181 (S.C.)]. Consequently, we hold that
the services rendered by the appellant are classifiable
only under the category of "Mining Services" and
therefore they would not be liable to service tax prior to
1-6-2007. In the light of the above finding, there is no
justification for imposition of any penalty. Hence, we
allow the appeal with consequential relief."
15.6 The Department has preferred an appeal to Hon'ble
Supreme Court against the above order which came to
dismissed vide order dated 27.11.2019 since the tax
effect is very low. The above decision of the Tribunal has
been followed in many decisions of the co-ordinate
benches cited supra and though the dept has preferred
appeals in some cases, no stay has been granted in any
of the cases. The above decision has been followed by
the co-ordinate bench at Hyderabad in the case of M.
Ramakrishna Reddy himself, as reported in 2018 (1) TMI
1498-Cestat Hyderabad, Department appears to have
preferred an appeal against the said decision also and
the same was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
along with the earlier appeal, on 27.11.2019.
15.7 Under the circumstances, we are of the view that
the above issue is settled in favour of the appellant
and hence, we find no reason not to follow the
above ratio laid down therein and accordingly, we
hold that the contract entered into in 2002 by the
appellant with the mine owners for raising of ore
22
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ST/40220/2022
is a composite mining contract and the alleged
activity of 'site formation' is only incidental to the
of mining service and hence, the scope of mining
contract cannot be vivisected to demand service
tax on the incidental activity of site formation.
Therefore, the demand confirmed under 'site formation
service' for the period from June 2005 to May 2007 is not
sustainable and is ordered set aside."
[Emphasis added by us]
We also note that the above decision has also been
affirmed by the Supreme Court, as reported in 2025
(8) TMI 1146 - SC.
4.2 It is not in dispute that the matrimonial
services provided by the appellant is a composite
service comprising of three services namely OIDAR,
print media and match making advisory services.
Applying the above ratio to the issue on hand, the legal
position is that an individual component of a
composite/indivisible service cannot be vivisected and
taxed, which leaves the only question as to whether
which of the three services in the above composite
service namely OIDAR, print media and match making
services, would render the essential character to the
composite service on hand? While the department
argued that it is OIDAR services, the appellant argued
that they are print media services. To our mind, what
23
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ST/40220/2022
has been lost sight of is an important fact that both
OIDAR as well as print media are only the carrier
medium whereas, the primary service is that of match
making/matrimonial services. The department is right
in classifying the above composite service as
'matrimonial' service considering the same as a
'bundled service' as per Section 66F of the Act post-
negative list regime. In fact, even the appellant does
not have any grouse about the same. It is the
grievance of the appellant that the same
composite/bundled service are sought to be classified
as 'OIDAR services' prior to July 2012. We find force in
the argument advanced by the Ld. Counsel that even
under pre-negative list regime, the said services
rendered by the appellants would be in the nature of
composite services/bundled services only and hence,
the same has to be classified as per the prescription
under Section 65 A(2)(b) of the Act. For ready
reference the relevant provisions of Section 65A and
66F are reproduced here under: -
"65A. Classification of taxable services (Pre-negative list
regime)
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, classification of
taxable services shall be determined according to the
terms of the sub-clauses of clause (105) of section 65.
(2) When for any reason, a taxable service is, prima
facie, classifiable under two or more sub-clauses of
24
ST/41182/2017
ST/40220/2022
clause (105) of section 65, classification shall be effected
as follows:-
(a) the sub-clause which provides the most specific
description shall be preferred to sub-clauses providing a
more general description;
(b) composite services consisting of a combination of
different services which cannot be classified in the
manner specified in clause (a), shall be classified as if
they consisted of a service which gives them their
essential character, insofar as this criterion is applicable;
(c) when a service cannot be classified in the manner
specified in clause (a) or clause (b), it shall be classified
under the sub-clause which occurs first among the sub-
clauses which equally merit consideration.
Section 66F (Post-negative list regime)
Principles of interpretation of specified descriptions of
services or bundled services.
66F. (1) Unless otherwise specified, reference to a
service (herein referred to as main service) shall not
include reference to a service which is used for providing
main service. 8 3.6
(2) Where a service is capable of differential treatment
for any purpose based on its description, the most
specific description shall be preferred over a more
general description.
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the
taxability of a bundled service shall be determined in the
following manner, namely:--
(a) if various elements of such service are naturally
bundled in the ordinary course of business, it shall be
treated as provision of the single service which gives
such bundle its essential character;
(b) if various elements of such service are not naturally
bundled in the ordinary course of business, it shall be
25
ST/41182/2017
ST/40220/2022
treated as provision of the single service which results in
highest liability of service tax.
Explanation - For the purposes of sub-section (3), the
expression "bundled service" means a bundle of
provision of various services wherein an element of
provision of one service is combined with an element or
elements of provision of any other service or services,"
4.3 At this juncture, we shall refer to both the
Orders-in-Original wherein, apparently, the demands
have been confirmed, we deem it appropriate to
reproduce facts as recorded in both the impugned
orders.
4.4 In respect of the OIO Nos. 28&29/2016-17
dated 06.03.2017, the following facts emerge: -
"4.5. I find that the assessee offers the following 10
packages to the bride/bridegroom seekers: 1. GOLD, 2.
DIAMOND, 3. PLATINUM, 4. BASIC MAGAZINE SPECIAL-
3, 5. BASIC MAGAZINE-SPECIAL-6, 6. BASIC WITH
VALUE ADDITION SMART PLUS-3, 7. BASIC WITH VALUE
ADDITION SMART PLUS-6, 8. EXCLUSIVE - SUPER
EXCLUSIVE, 9. EXCLUSIVE-CHAIRMAN'S EXCLUSIVE
and 10. CHAIRMAN'S PLUS. Each of these packages
comes with its own set of features and services as listed
at Paragraph 2.1.
4.6. The first three packages, viz., GOLD, DIAMOND and
PLATINUM are offered for an amount of Rs. 2,000/- Rs
3,000/-and Rs.5,600/-, respectively for a maximum
duration of 3 months, 6 months and 9 months,
respectively. In these packages the bride/bridegroom
26
ST/41182/2017
ST/40220/2022
seeker can view contact details of 25 profiles, 50 profiles
and 80 profiles, respectively and can send emails to
preferred profiles. I find that the assessee paid service
tax on these packages considering it a taxable service
under the category of "Online information and database
access or retrieval service prior to 01.07.2012, defined
under Section 65(75) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with
Section 65(105)(zh) of the Act.
4.7. I find that the remaining seven packages are
composite ones.....
....
4.8. There is no doubt that these seven packages are composite in nature involving not only web based access/retrieval services but also other services, such as, advertisement in the fortnightly magazine "Kalyanamalai", supply of copies of magazines to its clients and other personalised services, viz., assistance by an executive, horoscope matching, etc. Though the packages involve various services, show cause notice was issued to demand service tax only in respect of the consideration relatable to 'Online information and database access or retrieval service' for the period prior to 01.07.2012 leaving out the consideration relatable to advertisement in magazine and other matrimonial services on the ground that advertisement in print media was exempted from service tax prior to 01.07.2012 as such matrimonial services were not covered in any of the definitions of 'taxable service' prior to 01.07.2012. 4.9. The assessee's main contention in this regard is that these seven packages are composite packages and artificial vivisection of composite package and proposal to tax part of the consideration relatable to 'Online information and database access or retrieval service' is impermissible as per Tribunal's order in the case of Daelim Industrial Company Ltd. Vs CCE - 2006 (3) STR 27 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 124 Tri-Delhi which is also upheld by Supreme Court - 2004 (170) ELT A181 (SC). I find that this case law relates to works contract service where both sale and service are involved and this is also relevant only for the period prior to 01.06.2007, i.e., prior to introduction of works contract service. Whereas, the issue involved in this case is a bouquet of services and taxability of part of it and period involved is 2009- 10. Hence, I am of the opinion that the ratio of this case law cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case." 4.5 It appears that the appellant placed on record some evidence in the form of Affidavits from its purported clients but the same has been held as follows: -
"4.16 .... all similarly worded, of some of its purported clients which state that the services in the form of published advertisements in the magazine "Kalyanamaalai" are of very much use to them and his/her marriage was finalised only through the advertisement in the magazine. The simple glance at these affidavits proves that these are nothing but tutored affidavits filed to help the cause of the assessee. I have no hesitation in stating that these affidavits are filed as an afterthought and in any case have no evidential value. Further, authenticity of these affidavits is suspect. On perusal of some of the affidavits, I find that the customers have signed in the second page of the affidavit on 08.06.2015 and the date as indicated in the Rs.20/- stamp paper (first page) is 20.06.2015 and hence the reliability of such sample affidavits is under serious doubt. Also, out of thousands of clients whose marriages purportedly settled through the assessee, it has on its own selected a few customers and obtained 28 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 affidavits in the same cut and paste format to substantiate the claim of the assessee that the advertisement in the magazine is of very much use to them....."
4.6 Thus, it is the case of the appellant that the Adjudicating Authority could have examined all or any of those who executed and that a common format is used just to convey what they had a greed for; what is relevant is the context and not the format.
"4.17. I find that though the assessee disputed the taxability of such composite packages, it has not disputed the quantum of service tax liability worked out in the notice on the value relatable to 'Online information and database access or retrieval service' by leaving out the consideration relatable to advertisement in print media and other matrimonial services for the period prior to 01.07.2012. ...."
"4.18. I now turn my attention to taxability of composite package after 01.07.2012. ... ....
....
4.21. In terms of Section 66F(2) above, where a service is capable of differential treatment for any purpose based on its description the most specific description is to be preferred over a more general description. As already held in the preceding paragraph, the set of services provided by the assessee can be specifically termed as "matrimonial services". As per Section 66F(3)(a) above, if various elements of service are naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business, it is to be treated as provision of the single service which gives such bundle 29 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 its essential character. In this case, the matrimonial service is the main service and to render this service various other services are provided and hence such services are incidental or ancillary or integral part of such matrimonial service. ..."
4.7 Facts as captured in the OIΟ Νο.46/2021(C) dated 30.11.2021 are as under: -
"4.0. The assessee is in the business of assisting bride/ bridegroom seekers in selection of suitable partners. The assessee renders various services, such as, providing information through online information and database access/ retrieval, publishing advertisement in its fortnightly magazine and various other matrimonial services, as mentioned supra. Through such ground events, the assessee conducts its business where registrants receive a set of matching profiles, which includes a photo, horoscope, profile and contact particulars to choose from. The assessee also provides other personalized services like assistance from a dedicated personal relationship executive, providing star compatible profiles/ horoscope matching profiles, receiving and forwarding all proper responses, SUN TV photo profile advertisement, customised promotion based on the profile, exclusive service offered to some privileged clients, 100% confidential and highly protected service offered selectively under the guidance of Shri V. Mohan, Chairman.
4.1. The main services provided by the assessee are matrimonial services and to perform the same, various other incidental or ancillary services are provided. The entire activity of offering online information access and retrieval service, other additional services and sale of space in print media in connection with the main service 30 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 of 'Matrimonial service' are in the form of bundled services."
....
...
4.3. ...
...
(ii) The following other factors are supporting that the services provided by the assessee is a bundled services, viz.,-
• ....
• The service is normally advertised as a package -in the instant case the whole service consists of various other related services such as Online data access/retrieval, elements, publishing advertisement in its fortnightly magazine and various other matrimonial services, viz., horoscope matching, organising matrimonial events, etc; • The other related services mentioned supra are not available separately, except of certain web only services such as gold, diamond or platinum, and offered by assessee only in the form of various schemes.
4.4. The gross amount charged for providing the above service as a package to the customer is a bundled service, i.e. the matrimonial service provided is the main service/ essential service and publication of name in magazine and supply of magazine to the customers are part of the package, therefore, it appears that as per provisions of Section 65F (3) (a) & (b), the gross amount charged by the assessee for such services appears be liable for service tax. ...
..."
Considering the earlier O-in-O at para 4.9, the Department appears to have entertained inconsistency 31 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 while interpreting the composite package or bundled services.
4.8 The commissioner refers to Section 66F(2) in the context of a decision of Hon'ble Gujarat HC in the case of M/s. Torrent Power Vs. Union of India [2020 (34) GSTL 385 (Guj.)] and holds that the main service provided by the assessee is matrimonial service and to perform the same, various other incidental or ancilliary services are provided and in terms of Section 66F(3)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 the said taxability of naturally bundled service in the ordinary course of business is treated as provision of single service namely "Matrimonial Service" which gives such bundle its essential character. Hence, the assessee is liable to pay service tax on the gross amount charged as per Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 for providing the matrimonial service.
4.9 A perusal of the above sections would reveal that both under pre-negative as well as post-negative regimes, the provisions relating to the classification of composite services are akin to each other. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding, in the present set of facts, that the provision of composite services namely 32 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 matrimonial services which comprises of OIDAR, print media & match making services could only be classified as 'matrimonial' services both under pre- negative as well as post-negative regimes by virtue of Section 65A(2)(b) read with Section 66F of the Act respectively, for the reason that such matrimonial services would render the most essential character of the composite/bundled services provided by the appellants. In view of the above, the classification under OIDAR service prior to July 2012 is held incorrect and accordingly, any demand based on the same merits to be set aside.
4.10 Coming to the arguments of the Ld. Counsel with the respect to the invocation of larger period, the appellants have placed on record two letters addressed to the department dated 11-01-2013 and 22-01-2013 duly acknowledged, which are part of the RUDs in the SCN wherein, the appellants appear to have communicated about the service tax payment and also the balances thereof. Moreover, as we could see from the records, the date of visit of the investigation agency is 23-01-2013, which is subsequent to the letter given by the appellant. Further, the entire proceedings have not brought out any material 33 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 suppression other than those communicated in the above letters submitted by the appellants. Rather, the entire quantification of the demand is solely based on the returns and the balance sheet of the appellants which could very well be seen from the RUDs to the SCN. This clearly demonstrates the case of the appellants that there is no suppression of facts in the instant case, which warrants invocation of extended period of limitation. Hence, we agree, as rightly pointed out by the Ld. Counsel that invocation of larger period which is a draconian provision, has to be exercised with utmost caution and reason, as held by various judicial fora. None of the ingredients namely suppression of facts, wilful mis-statement, fraud or collusion has been brought out in the instant case by the Revenue to justify the invocation of larger period. Even in the submission made before this bench, it was pressed that the appellants had filed their statutory returns namely ST-3 return belatedly, as a justification for invocation of larger extended period. 4.11 On the issue of extended period of limitation, the Adjudicating Authority has held as follows: -
"4.28. As regards extended period of time limit invoked in the notice, the assessee contends that it has filed ST- 3 returns for the half-yearly period ending September 34 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 2010 and March 2011 on 23.08.2011 and indicated the value of exempted services which represents the value realised from those packages on which no service tax is paid and hence there was no mis-declaration on its part. On perusal of both the ST-3 returns, I find that the assessee indicated total gross value of Rs. 6,35,98,005/- for the period from April 2010 to March 2011, whereas as per the group summary of direct income furnished by the assessee for the period 2010-11 which is one of the relied upon documents (A3), the gross income is Rs. 8,05,26,070/- thereby the assessee suppressed certain portion of gross, income. ...
4.29. Further, the assessee neither filed the ST-3 returns properly for the period from April 2010 to September 2010 and October 2010 to March 2011 nor did it file ST- 3 returns for the notice period, viz., April 2011 to September 2011, October 2011 to March 2012, April 2012 to September 2012 and October 2012 to March 2013, thereby violating the provisions of Rule 7 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 read with Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994. ..."
Further, what emerges from para 4.29 of the OIO dated 06.03.2017 is that there could be no denial of the fact that the appellant had filed its ST-3 returns, the same has however been termed as 'improper'; it is not that nothing is discernible from such returns. 4.12 In respect of O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021, the Appellant has submitted that: - 35
ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 "...
13.0...... The assessee vide their reply dated 5-10-2021 has stated that the demand is hit by time bar in as much as they have been issued with Show Cause Notice dated 12-9-2014 by DGGI for the same issue covering the period 2009-10 to 2011-12. When all the facts are within the knowledge of the department, it cannot be alleged that they have suppressed the facts from the department during the subsequent period. They further stated that merely because there has been a delay in filing ST3 returns for the period from 2013-14, the department cannot allege suppression of facts. ....."
Whereas the Adjudicating Authority has held that: -
"21.0 ......
....in the absence of non filing of ST3 returns on time and non furnishing of the details/documents as called for by the department, the contention of the assessee that the department is aware of the facts is not acceptable and I hold that extended period had been correctly invoked for the subsequent period also. In this regard, I rely on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat-I Vs Neminath Fabrics Pvt Ltd-2011-TIOL-10- HC-AHM-CX wherein the Court has held that merely because there is a knowledge of the Revenue, the suppression which stand established does not disappear."
Even here, the officers have taken variable stands, as could be seen from Para 4.28 of the other O-in-O, which is extracted supra.
36
ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 4.13 With regard to the contention that the demand has been raised for some years beyond the prescribed five years, the Commissioner records that: -
"20.1 Another contention of the assessee is that the demand for the period upto September 2014 has been raised beyond the extended period of five years. They further stated that as per sub-clause (a) of clause (i) of sub-section (6) of Section 73, if the return as envisaged in the rules is filed, the date of filing such return shall be the "relevant date". If no such return is filed as per the rule, as per sub-clause (b) of clause (i) of sub-section (6) of Section 73, the last date for filing such return shall be the "relevant date". The above contention of the assessee is not acceptable in as much as the time limit as prescribed under Sub-clause (a) of clause(i) of sub-
section(6) of Section 73 and sub-clause (b) of clause (i) of sub-section (6) of Section 73 is independent of each other and where the returns are filed by the assessee before the issue of show cause notice, the date of filing of return will be the relevant date and not the last date for filing such return as the said provision is applicable only in cases where return is not at all filed. In the present case, the show cause notice has been issued within five years from the date of filing ST3 returns as provided under sub- clause (a) of clause (i) of sub- section(6) of Section 73 of the Finance Act 1994 and hence I hold that the demand has not been issued beyond the period of limitation of five years." We are unable to appreciate the above finding as, clearly, the law itself prescribes '5 years' from the 'relevant date' which is also defined. 37
ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 4.14 Further, to our mind, however, belated filing of ST-3 return could at the most attract penalty, but the same can never be a ground for invocation of larger period and, that too, when the belated payment is compensated by appropriate interest. Hence, we find no justifiable ground being made out by the Revenue for invoking the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Act in the instant case and the consequential demand of duty for the larger period. It is also pertinent to note that in respect of O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021, the entire notice is for the subsequent period, which has to be considered as a periodical notice, when the entire set of facts and circumstances are similar to that of the period covered under O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 and hence, the allegation of suppression, etc. stands dis-proved; therefore, larger period cannot be invoked in O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021. With reference to the argument that in respect of O- in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021, certain portion of demand is beyond the larger period of limitation also by erroneous application of 'relevant date', we are in agreement with the same in view of the ratio upheld in the case of Right Resource Management [Supra]. This bench also had an occasion to consider and follow the above in the case of Clean Care Services 38 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 [supra]; the relevant paragraph of which decision reads as under: -
"10. We are unable to concur with the said finding which we find to be in the teeth of the decision of this Tribunal in Right Resource Management Service v. Commissioner of CGST, Central Excise and Customs, Dehradun, [(2024) 15 Centax 362 (Tri-Del)] wherein it has been held that even if return is filed after the due date, the relevant date for computation of limitation would be the last date on which such return ought to have been filed. In the instant case, the appellant was required to file half yearly ST-3 returns as per Rule 7(1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The appellant ought to have filed the ST-3 return for the half yearly period from September 2009 to March 2010, by the due date of 25th April 2010 as per Rule 7(2) of the Service Tax Rules ibid. As the Appellant did not do so, as per section 73(6)(i)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant date for calculating the period of limitation, being the last date on which the return is to be filed, would therefore be 25th April 2010. Thus, inasmuch as the second SCN has been issued only 17.02.2011, it would bring within its ambit only the period from September 2009 to September 2010 as within the normal period, and the demand for the period October 2008 to August 2009, which was sought to be covered under the said SCN, is clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the appellant is liable to pay the service tax along with the interest due thereon only for the period from September 2009 to September 2010 in so far as the SCN dated 17.02.2011 is concerned. We find that the case laws relied upon by the appellant are those in which the assessee has either adhered in full to the mandate of the statutory provisions governing payments made before issuance of the show cause notice or that where the returns were filed as statutorily 39 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 mandated, which fact circumstances are not akin to the case of the appellant herein. These case laws are of no avail to the appellant in this matter."
4.15 Further, another ground advanced by the appellant in respect of T.V. Production services is that the O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021 has proceeded to demand 6% under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for the 2 overseas transactions of the Appellant. It was argued that there cannot be a levy of service tax on a transaction which is admittedly done beyond the taxable territory. In other words, they are not the exempted services but would not fall within the parameter of Finance Act, 1994, in the first place. Notwithstanding the same, even assuming that the said overseas transactions are to be treated as exempt services, the corresponding CENVAT credit availed on provision of such services if any, alone would be required to be reversed, as held in Tiara Advertising - 2019 (10) TMI 27 - Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court. Though it is a well settled legal position in plethora of judicial pronouncements that corresponding Cenvat credit reversal would suffice the requirement of Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules, as we are holding that the entire demand in O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021 40 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 would not survive the tests laid down for invoking the larger period of limitation itself and that no demand would survive within the normal period of limitation, we find no purpose in addressing the above ground. 4.16 We have also considered the submissions made by the Learned DR that the composite service containing various element of services which are naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business is to be treated as provision of a single service which gives such bundle its essential character. We are also in agreement that the adjudicating authority has rightly held that the matrimonial service is the main service and to render the service various other services viz. OIDAR and Print Media are provided, which are incidental and ancillary to the Matrimonial services. It was further argued by the Learned DR that interest being a statutory liability, is applicable once a demand is upheld. With respect to the invocation of larger period, the learned DR has placed reliance on the decisions of United Enterprises Vs. CCE & ST, Patna [2013 (29) STR 605 (Tri.-Kolkata)] and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. Vs. CCE, Nagpur [2009 (244) ELT 401 (Tri.-Del.)]. Facts in the instant case are totally distinguishable to the above cases, as, in 41 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 those cases, the details were not given to the department despite attempts, whereas in the instant case, there is no such allegation. Further, as noted above the entire investigation itself is the offshoot of two letters given by the appellant itself. 5.0 The appellants have also taken a plea during the hearing that in respect of O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017, though there would be a demand under the normal period of limitation, the same would not survive because of the fact that Section 73 (2A) of the Act was not in vogue during the disputed period namely April 2009 to March 2013 whereas, the said Section was introduced only with effect from 10.05.2013.
5.1 Though we are in agreement that Section 73(2A) of the Act cannot be applied retrospectively, in the instant case the Show Cause Notices have been given on 13-06-2014, a date subsequent to the insertion of Section 73(2A) in the Finance Act. So, therefore, on the date of issue of the Show Cause Notice, the said Section was available in the statute and, hence, we are of the view that the same has been rightly pressed into service. We thus hold that in respect of O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 42 ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 though the larger period of limitation would fail to survive, the demand pertaining to the normal period is enforceable in view of Section 73(2A) of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that in respect of O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017, the demand of Rs.66,79,141/- pertaining to the period July 2012 to March 2013 would survive, being the demand for the normal period. Though the entire demand under O-in- O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021 would not survive on the limitation, we take cognizance of fair concession of Rs.2,95,983/- being the demand pertaining to "mandap keeper services" which was not part of O-in- O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 and accordingly, confirm the same. In fine, a total demand Rs.69,75,124/- is confirmed in respect of both O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 (Rs.66,79,141/-) and O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021 (Rs.2,95,983/-).
5.2 The impugned Orders-in-Original sought for adjusting an amount of Rs.84,71,684/- towards the tax (Rs.37,54,109/- in respect of O-in-O No. 28&29/2017 dated 06.03.2017 and Rs.47,17,575/- in respect of O-in-O No. 46/2021 dated 30.11.2021), as well as an amount of Rs.5,39,597/- towards interest. 43
ST/41182/2017 ST/40220/2022 The demand confirmed herein for the normal period as above, along with appropriate interest shall be adjusted against the above payments. Further, as we have held that there is no ground for invocation of larger period in the instant case, all the associated penalties stand vacated.
6.0 In the view of the foregoing, we hereby partially allow the appeal on above terms, with consequential relief if any, as per law.
(Order pronounced in open court on 19.09.2025) Sd/- Sd/-
(VASA SESHAGIRI RAO) (P. DINESHA) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) MEMBER (JUDICIAL) MK