Telangana High Court
Smt Mini Ipe vs A Srinivas Rao on 21 May, 2025
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
CONTEMPT APPEAL Nos.17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 of 2023
COMMON JUDGMENT:(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy) Since the issue arising in the instant appeals is one and the same, they are taken up for analogous hearing and are decided by way of this common judgment.
2. Heard Mr. Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi and Bathula Raj Kiran, learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Aka Venkataramana, learned counsel for the respondents.
3. The instant appeals are filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The challenge is to the common order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Singh Bench of this High Court in a batch of contempt cases decided analogously; lead case being C.C.No.1530 of 2019.
4. Vide the impugned common order, the Hon'ble Singh Bench while hearing the batch of contempt petitions has held that the Page 2 of 38 appellants herein have been found guilty of contempt and are liable to be convicted for wilful violation of the order dated 18.07.2019 passed in W.P.No.10572 of 2012.
5. The relevant material necessary for adjudicating the instant appeals are certain orders which need to be borne in mind before we proceed to decide the matter itself. The order against which the contempt petitions were filed before the Hon'ble Singh Bench was one decided on 18.07.2019 in W.P.No.10572 of 2012. The necessary operative part of the said writ petition is being reproduced hereunder:
"The petitioners further contended that only after disposal of the case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the respondents have finally filled up 193 posts in 2012 and among 193 posts, 33 posts remained unfilled, and subsequently, the respondent Corporation has filled up another 200 posts, and in the second recruitment also 17 posts remained unfilled, thus, in all, 50 posts are lying vacant. The petitioners contended that they are the next meritorious candidates and the respondents must consider their cases against the 50 non-joined vacant posts. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that appropriate orders be passed in the writ petition directing the respondent Corporation to consider the case of the petitioners for appointment to the post of Sub-Staff (Peon) in 50 non-joined vacancies in pursuance to the notification, dated 17.07.1996.Page 3 of 38
On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents had contended that the petitioners are not coming within the zone of consideration and 400 candidates were employed and that is the reason why the respondent Corporation has not considered the case of the petitioners. He further contended that if the petitioners are the next meritorious candidates and submits a representation, the respondent Corporation will consider the case of the petitioners and appropriate orders will be passed on the representation in accordance with law. Learned Standing Counsel has informed that there are only 50 posts consequent upon non-joining of selected candidates.
Having regard to the rival submissions made by the parties, this Court is of the considered view that this Writ Petition can be disposed of directing the petitioners to submit a fresh representation to the respondents within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and upon such representation being received, the respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the petitioners for appointment in the non-joined posts, if they are the next meritorious candidates in the merit list, and pass appropriate orders in eight weeks thereafter. It is needless to say that the respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the petitioners only against the 50 vacancies of non-joined posts.
With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs."
6. Pursuant to the disposal of the aforesaid writ petition by the Hon'ble Singh Bench, the authority concerned passed an order on Page 4 of 38 23.09.2019, the relevant portion of which is also reproduced hereunder:
"As per the directions of the Honorable High Court dated 18.07.2019 in WP No. 10572/2012, the undersigned has perused the records and observe as follows:
1. That the recruitment process for appointment of staff in Class III & IV is government by LIC of India Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff) Instructions, 1993, as amended from time to time. As per the said LIC of India Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff) Instructions, 1993 the recruitment shall be only against the vacancies in the sanctioned posts and number of persons to be empanelled shall be twice the number of posts.
2. That LIC of India, Hyderabad Division, vide employment notice dated 17.07.1996, has invited applications from Indian Citizens for empanelment for appointment to the post of Sub-staff (Peon), in the offices under the jurisdiction of Hyderabad and Secunderabad Divisions and Zonal Office, Hyderabad.
As per the employment notice, the number of anticipated vacancies to be empanelled were 400 and those who are empanelled will be offered permanent appointment and when regular vacancies arise.
3. That as per the Honourable Supreme Court Order dated 18.01.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 953-968/2005, in case of open market candidates vide notification dated 17.07.1996, a ranking list of 393 (7 short in OBC category due to non availability of candidates) Page 5 of 38 candidates was drawn by a cut off mark based on the written test/ interview.
4. That as per LIC of India Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff) Instructions, 1993, after offering appointment to the first 200 candidates in the ranking list, the remaining candidates in the empanelled list were to be offered appointment as and when vacancies arise and within a period of maximum two years from the date of publication of the ranking list or till the next recruitment notification whichever is earlier.
5. That the entire process of offering appointment to 393 candidates was completed by 30/11/2013 and the notification dated 17.07.1996 was implemented in totality.
6. That the petitioner's name was not appearing in the empaneled list and hence was not offered appointment.
7. Thus considering the facts as noted from the records and the submissions of the petitioner in his representation dated 01.08.2019, it is not found possible to accede to his request to appoint him for the post of Sub-staff(Peon) since there is no provision in the rules to offer appointment beyond the published/ empaneled list."
7. Pursuant to the rejection of the representation; the employees preferred batch of contempt cases, the lead case being C.C.No.1530 of 2019. The Hon'ble Singh Bench after hearing the parties, vide its common order dated 13.10.2023, found the Page 6 of 38 appellants herein guilty of contempt, the operative portion of which is again reproduced hereunder:
"15. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the respondents are guilty of Contempt and they are liable to be convicted for wilful violation of the order, dated 18.07.2019 passed in W.P.No.10572 of 2012. Hence, the respondents are directed to be present in the Court on the next date of hearing, so as to enable this Court to sentence the respondents, after hearing them."
8. It is this common order which is under challenge in the instant appeals.
9. Broadly speaking, the instant appeals have been filed by the appellants on the following substantial grounds:
a) The impugned common order of conviction is bad in law on the technicalities of the contempt proceedings having been initiated without framing of charge. Thus, the entire proceedings initiated under the Act gets vitiated, as it is in clear violation of the rules and guidelines framed under the Act itself which mandates framing of charge.
b) The fact that the authority concerned has considered and passed an order as directed by the High Court and reached to the conclusion that benefit cannot be extended to the Page 7 of 38 appellants hereinby itself amounts to compliance of the Court's order, therefore, it is not a case of non-compliance of the directives of the High Court.
c) Even otherwise since there was no specific mandamus or any sort of writ issued, no contempt of Court proceedings could be attracted, as the only direction was to consider the representation / claim of the workers strictly in accordance with law and pass appropriate decision on the said representation. Hence, no contempt would be made out and the impugned common order is therefore un-sustainable / not maintainable, and the Hon'ble Singh Bench ought to have rejected the contempt proceedings at the threshold itself.
d) Since the representation as directed by the High Court was duly considered and decided, the decision so taken by the Insurance Company becomes a fresh cause of action and it ought to had been challenged by way of a fresh proceedings rather than pursuing the contempt remedy.
10. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, the direction given by the Hon'ble Single Bench while disposing of the writ petition was not on merits, but was only to "consider and thereafter pass appropriate orders" and the Page 8 of 38 appellants did consider the same and have taken an appropriate decision. Thus, the order stood complied with and the contempt petitions ought not to have been entertained by the Hon'ble Single Bench.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions:
a) A.P. SRTC and Others vs. G. Srinivas Reddy and Others 1
b) Prof. Pannalal, Registrar, Osmania University, Hyd vs. Holy Bharathi P.G. College, Hyd. And Others 2
c) C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining and Another 3
d) R.N. Dev vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik 4
e) Modi Telefibres Ltd. vs. Sujit Kumar Choudhary 5
f) Anil Kumar Dubey vs. Pradeep Kumar Shukla 6
g) Shriramsetty Saidulu vs. Dantala 7
h) J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar 8
i) Indian Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee and Another 9 1 (2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases 674 2 2000(6) ALD 674 (DB) 3 (2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 115 4 AIR ONLINE 2000 SC 144 5 AIR ONLINE 2005 SC 54 6 AIR ONLINE 2017CHH 156 (FB) 7 2014 (4) ALD 200 (DB) 8 AIR 1197 SUPREME COURT 113 Page 9 of 38
j) Chhoturam vs. Urvashi Gulati and Another 10
k) Dr. Ramesh Kumat Gupta vs. Shri Subrat Sahu 11
l) Kamalakant Shrivasta vs vs. Smt. Ranu Sahu 12
m) Sahdeo Alias Sahdeo Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others 13
n) Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang 14
12. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the action on the part of the appellants is nothing but a blatant defiance of the order passed by the High Court. Learned Senior Counsel contended that a plain reading of the order passed by the appellants while rejecting the claim of the respondents is a clear indication of willful and deliberate act on the part of the appellants not to decide the claim of the respondents in terms of the directions given by the High Court dated 18.07.2019, in W.P.No.10572 of 2019.
13. It was also contended that after the order in W.P.No.10572 of 2012 was passed on 18.07.2019, the Insurance Company had also got the order tested in a Writ Appeal before the Hon'ble Division Bench, and the said Writ Appeal also was dismissed with 9 AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 880 10 AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3648 11 AIR ONLINE 2018 CHH 5 12 AIR ONLINE 2018 CHH 13 13 AIR 2011 SC (CRIMINAL) 1200 14 AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 721 Page 10 of 38 heavy costs of Rs.50,000/-. Still the appellants did not think it proper to comply with the order of the Hon'ble Single Bench in its proper perspective.
14. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, plain reading of the impugned common order would go to show that in fact there has been no consideration whatsoever made by the appellants and they have in a mechanical manner without even going through the contents of the directions given by the High Court has passed the order.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents referring to certain judicial precedents, strongly contended that the instant appeals itself under Section 19 of the Act at this stage are not maintainable, as the stage for preferring an appeal under Section 19 has not arisen. According to the learned Senior Counsel, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, there has to be an order of punishment in the Contempt of Court proceedings which in the instant case has not occurred and, therefore, the appeals at the threshold itself are liable to be rejected as not maintainable. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the impugned common order is not an order of punishment, and since Page 11 of 38 it is not an order of punishment, the instant appeals under Section 19 of the Act would not be sustainable.
16. So far as the maintainability part raised by the appellants by not framing of charge before passing of the final order is concerned, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that since it is a civil contempt, the matter has to be proceeded as a summary proceedings and in the summary proceedings if the charge is not framed it would not be fatal so far as the contempt proceedings are concerned, as the petition for initiating the contempt itself for non-compliance of the order passed by the High Court is the charge. Further, the Form I notice has been sent to the alleged contemnors itself requiring to reply to the charge. Therefore, only because the charge has not been framed by itself would not vitiate the proceedings under challenge before this Court. According to the learned Senior Counsel, framing of charge would be required in the event if the proceedings would have been for a criminal contempt and not in a case of civil contempt.
17. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions: Page 12 of 38
a) Dolly Kapoor and Anothervs. Sher Singh Yadav and Others 15
b) ECL Finance Limited vs. Harikiran Shankarji Gudipati and Others 16
c) Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy vs. State of West Bengal and Others 17
d) Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others vs. Chunilal Nanda and Others 18
e) State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another 19
f) Union of India and Others vs. M. Bhaskar and Others 20
g) D.N. Taneja vs.Bhajan Lal 21
h) Bharat Petroleum (Erstwhile Burmah Shell) Management Staff Pensioners vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Others 22
i) Purshotam Dass Goel vs. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon and Others 23
j) Bai Malimabuand Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others 24
k) Harish Kumar Kathuria and Another vs. Sanjay Gupta and Others 25 15 ILR (2012) III DELHI 151 16 (2018) 13 Supreme Court Cases 142 17 (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 514 18 (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 399 19 (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 411 20 (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 416 21 (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 26 22 (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 32 23 (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 370 24 (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 373 25 2024 SCC OnLine Del 817 Page 13 of 38
l) Ajay Kumar Bhalla and Others vs. Prakash Kumar Dixit 26
18. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel representing either side and on perusal of records, what is be to decided in the instant appeals are, in fact, the following three issues:
i. Whether the impugned common order is one which could be challenged by way of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act?
ii. Whether the impugned common order is sustainable on the ground that the order of conviction has been passed without framing of charge, and as such, the impugned common order would get vitiated?
iii. Whether passing of the order dated 23.09.2019 would amount to compliance of the directives given by the Hon'ble Singh Bench in W.P.No.10572 of 2012 or not?
19. So far as, whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable, we need to consider the wordings of the provisions of law, and first of all we need to appreciate the contents of 26 2024 SCC OnLineSC 1874 Page 14 of 38 Section 19 of the Act. For ready reference, Section 19 is reproduced hereunder, viz., "19. Appeals.--
(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt--
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that--
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt."
20. Upon a plain reading of the provisions of first part of Section 19, what was intended is that, an appeal can be filed against 'any order or a decision'. In common parlance, when we refer the terminology' any order or decision' it simply gives only one Page 15 of 38 conclusion that the provision refers to more than one stages when an appeal can be filed i.e. it could be either an order or it could be an decision. Secondly, what is also evident is that, Sub-Section (2) of Section 19 indicates that any order or decision those which is exercised by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punishfor contempt. This further indicates that Section 19 from its very wordings itself gives a clear indication that an appeal under Section 19 is not one which is filed challenging an order of punishment, but it could be an order other than the order of punishment also.
21. This view of the Bench gets fortified on further reading of Sub-Section2 of Section 19. Particularly clause (a) of Sub-Section 2 refers to the powers on the Appellate Court in granting an order of suspension of firstly; an execution of the punishment or an order appealed against. This also clearly gives an indication that an appeal would be maintainable even if it is not an order of punishment alone. Another reason to reach to this conclusion is that the law makers were not required using the term 'any order of decision' in Sub-Section (1). It could have been easily worded as an appeal to be maintainable only against an order of punishment in contempt. Same would be the condition even if we read clause Page 16 of 38
(a) of Sub-Section (2) i.e. to say, if an appeal were to be filed under Section 19 only against an order of punishment, then under clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) there would not been a necessity to empower the Appellate Court to even suspend an order appealed against, in addition to the wordings already put i.e. the execution of punishment.
22. Thus, from plain reading of Section 19 and also clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 19, it will clearly force us to reach to the conclusion that since in the aforesaid two provisions of law under Section 19, the lawmakers have used the words 'any order or decision' they both have to be given a distinctive meaning.
23. The full Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) held at paragraph No.5 as under:
"5. Section 19 give a right to a party to appeal against "any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt." Section 19(1) of the Act, 1971 clearly shows that the legislature in its wisdom conferred the right of appeal not only against a decision but also against an order. When two words are used in a statute, they both have to be given separate meaning. They may be read ejusdem generis but normally they cannot be treated to have the same meaning."Page 17 of 38
24. The full Bench further in paragraph Nos.39, 40, 41, 44 and 45 has held as under, viz., "39. A close analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the High Courts as well as the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, 1971, we are clearly of the view that any order which is not an interlocutory order but by which the High Court proceeds to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, would be appellable.
40. The language of Section 19 of the Act, 1971 is clear and unambiguous. As held by the Apex Court that when the language of an Act is unambiguous, the Court must follow the same. The issue in question is what interpretation has to be given to the phrases "any order or decision" and "in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt". As far as the words, "order" and "decision" are concerned, though they may have to be read ejusdem generis, we cannot presume that the language used by the legislature is superfluous. When the legislature has used the word 'order and decision', it must be presumed that the legislature was aware that these are two different words having two different meaning. It may be true, asheld by the Apex Court that the word 'order' will have to be interpreted and take its colour from the word 'decision' but can we assume or presume that the order must only be a final order imposing punishment. We do not think so because then there would be no difference between "order" and "decision".
41. Another recognized principle of statutory interpretation is that an effort should be made to give a meaning to each and every word used by thelegislature. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose {AIR 1952 SC 369}, Chief Justice, Patanjali Shastry, speaking for the Apex Court held "it is not a sound Page 18 of 38 principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute".
44. In view of the above principles of statutory interpretation, normally an attempt has to be made to give all the words used in the statute a meaning in the context of the Act. In our view, the words "any order or decision" are wide enough to include and take within their ambit all orders passed in the direction and in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
45. Similarly, the phrase "in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt" not only includes an order actually imposing any punishment but also any order or direction which may be prejudicial to the contemnor and which, if not passed, may terminate the proceedings. As held by the Bombay High Court, these may not be actually orders punishing the contemnor for contempt but may be a direction prejudicial to the contemnor and passed in exercise of contempt jurisdiction."
25. Keeping the aforesaid legal precedents and statutory provisions in mind, we need to appreciate as to what is the order under challenge in the instant appeals. Admittedly, all these batch of contempt appeals have been filed against an order of conviction whereby the Hon'ble Singh Bench has already reached to the conclusion that on the basis of submissions and explanations so provided by the appellants herein, the order passed by the Page 19 of 38 authority concerned on 23.09.2019 is an act of wilful disobedience of the order passed by the High Court in W.P.No.10572 of 2012. Upon holding the appellants guilty of having committed contempt and having been convicted them for the said act of contempt, what is now left is only, what is the appropriate sentence that could be awarded on the appellants? This in other words means that the contempt proceedings, as such, have reached to its conclusion and the appellants have already been found guilty and they have also been found to have wilfully committed act of contempt and as a consequence been convicted for the said act. Thus, the impugned common order passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, in the opinion of this Bench, would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 19(1) of the Act wherein the statute permits an appeal to be filed against an order or decision whereby the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction and reached to the conclusion to punish the appellants for contempt.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, this Bench is of the considered opinion that the appeals in the instant case under Section 19 of the Act are maintainable even though the appellants have till date not been punished. Though they are not punished, admittedly the appellants have been held guilty and also stand convicted. The Page 20 of 38 objection so raised by the respondents so far as the aspect of maintainability under Section 19 is concerned, stands decided in favour of the appellants and the objection raised by the respondents stands overruled.
27. We now proceed to decide the second issue involved in the instant batch of appeals, that of, whether the impugned common order of conviction is sustainable in the absence of entire proceedings having been drawn without framing of charge.
28. For deciding this question, we need to consider: 1) as to whether the appellants have ever been apprised of the charge leveled against them? 2) without framing of charge, could the Court hearing the contempt proceedings have proceeded to conclude the trial of contempt? 3) whether the Form I notice issued to the appellants by itself be not construed as if it were the charge framed against the appellants? and 4) as to what would be the consequence in the event if the aforesaid three situations are decided in favour of the appellants / contemnors or otherwise.
29. For answering the aforesaid issues, as is reflected in the preceding paragraph, it is appropriate at this juncture to refer to the Andhra Pradesh High Court Rules wherein the Rules to regulate proceedings for contempt of Subordinate Courts and of the High Page 21 of 38 Court under the Act has been enacted. Rule 7 and Rule 18 are the relevant provisions for deciding the second issue. For ready reference, Rule 7 and Rule 18 are reproduced hereunder:
"7. (1) Every petition under Rule 5 (b) and (c) shall contain :
(a) the name, description and place of residence of the petitioner of petitioners and of the person charged;
(b) the nature and details of the contempt alleged, and such material facts, including the date or dates of commission of the alleged contempt, as may be necessary for the proper determination of the case;
(c) the details of the petition previously made by the petitioner on the same facts, if any, and the result thereof.
(2) Where the petitioner relies upon a document or documents in his possession or power and refers to them in the petition in support thereof, he shall file such document or documents or true copies thereof duly authenticated along with the petition.
(3) No Court-fee shall be payable on the petition or any documents filed in the contempt proceedings.
18. Notice of every contempt case, if ordered by Court for service on the Contemnor, shall be in Form I and shall be accompanied by one set of all papers filed in the case and the said notice with all-enclosures shall be served personally on the alleged Contemnor, unless the Court otherwise directs for reasons to be recorded, requiring him to appear in person, unless otherwise ordered, on a day fixed, which shall be not Page 22 of 38 less than four weeks from the date of the order or as fixed by the Court, for hearing of the proceeding and to show cause why hemay not be suitably punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and he shall continue to remain present during the hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed of by order of the Court, unless otherwise directed:
Provided that the Court, on an application made by the Contemnor, before the date fixed for his appearance in the notice, to dispense with the personal appearance in Court, may, for sufficient cause, dispense with his personal appearance and permit him to appear by his pleader."
30. Rule 7 prescribes the requirements of a petition or complaint that is filed under the Act by the aggrieved person. In other words, Rule 7 prescribes the mode in which a contempt petition is to be prepared; and Rule 18 deals with the manner in which the contempt proceedings have to be drawn. After the contempt petition if being filed, as per Rule 18, the first thing that is required is for issuance of Form I.
31. At this juncture, it would also be relevant to take note of the contents of Form I, which again for ready reference is reproduced hereunder:Page 23 of 38
FORM I NOTICE TO A PERSON CHARGED WITH CONTEMPT OF COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD [Original Jurisdiction] Contempt Case No. ...... of ......
............... ......... Petitioner
Versus
............... ......... Respondent
To
Whereas your attendance is necessary to answer a charge of Contempt of Court, viz :
(here briefly state the nature of the Contempt) You, Sri ........................................................................................................................... are hereby required to appear in person (or byAdvocate if the Court has soordered) before this Court at Hyderabad on the ........................ day of ............ 19 ......... at ......... a.m. and show cause why you shall not be punished or other appropriate order be not passed against you for contempt of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh/Subordinate Court (Name of Court).
You shall attend this Court at Hyderabad in person on the .............................. day of ..................... 19 ...... at a.m. and shall continue to attend the Court on all days thereafter to which the case against you stands adjourned and until final orders are passed on the charge against you.
Herein fail not.
Dated this .............................. day of ............... 19 .........
(Seal) Registrar _____ Page 24 of 38 A plain reading of the contents of Form I by itself gives an indication that the contents of Form I and the enclosures attached thereto are the allegations which have been made for initiation of contempt and that has to be accepted as the charge leveled against the contemnor(s). Further, a reading of the contents of the annexures enclosed along with Form I and annexures of contempt petition and thereafter reading contents of Form I, will clearly reflect that Form I is in fact the charge leveled against the contemnor(s) and Form I is nothing other than an explanation called from the alleged contemnor(s) to answer the charge of contempt and also to show cause why the contemnor(s) should not be punished for contempt of Court.
32. In the said circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that in the instant case, when admittedly Form I was issued and the entire contents of the contempt petition also were enclosed along with Form I, the appellants were disclosed of the nature of allegations leveled against them and were also well aware of the charge of contempt. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that once when the appellants were well appraised of the nature of charge leveled on the very issuance of Form I at the behest of the Court itself, there was no necessity for framing of further charge. Page 25 of 38 That Form I itself has to be construed as the charge leveled against the appellants. Lastly, only because there have been no separate proceedings like framing of charge, the manner in which the Hon'ble Single Bench has proceeded cannot be found fault with. Neither would the impugned common order get vitiated only because the charge, as such, was not framed independently other than that which was narrated in Form I. As such, the second issue of non-framing of charge stands decided against the appellants.
33. Now we proceed to decide the third issue involved, that is, whether the order dated 23.09.2019, passed by the Insurance Company be construed as substantial compliance of the order of the Hon'ble Singh Bench or not.
34. For this purpose, what is necessary to be appreciated at the first instance is, as to what exactly were the directions given by the Hon'ble Singh Bench. For convenience, the operative portion of the order passed by the Hon'ble Singh Bench on 18.07.2019 is again reproduced hereunder:
Having regard to the rival submissions made by the parties, this Court is of the considered view that this Writ Petition can be disposed of directing the petitioners to submit a fresh representation to the respondents within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and Page 26 of 38 upon such representation being received, the respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the petitioners for appointment in the non-joined posts, if they are the next meritorious candidates in the merit list, and pass appropriate orders in eight weeks thereafter. It is needless to say that the respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the petitioners only against the 50 vacancies of non-joined posts.
35. Thus, from the aforesaid operative paragraph of the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, we need to scrutinize as to what is the nature of direction as such given by the Hon'ble Single Bench. Upon reading the same, we find that the Single Bench had only disposed of the writ petition on a consensus that was arrived at between the parties. The consensus that was arrived at is that which is reflected in bold in the operative part reproduced above, which in other words means, it was agreed between the parties that the respondents shall make an appropriate representation to the employer and the employer in turn shall consider the case of the claimants for appointment against 50 vacancies that have arisen on account of the selected candidates having not joined. The Single Bench directed the Insurance Company to take an appropriate suitable decision strictly in accordance with law. It could also be said that the Single Bench while disposing of the writ petition had ordered the respondents to make an appropriate Page 27 of 38 representation with a direction to the appellants / Insurance Company to pass appropriate orders.
36. Two things that need to be considered are: 1) there had to be consideration of the representation first and 2) passing of appropriate orders. Both the words used i.e as regards the consideration of representation, firstly the respondents were required to make a fresh representation and upon filing of the fresh representation, the appellants in turn were to pass an appropriate order. Thus, initially, there has to be consideration and subsequently there has to be an appropriate order passed. Nowhere does the operative part of the order of the Singh Bench depicts issuance of mandamus, and there was no specific direction given as to how the case of each of the respondents was to be decided inasmuch as the order was silent so far as whether the writ petition needs to be allowed or whether the writ petition was intending anything else. The only thing that is revealing from the order was firstly the respondents herein had to make a representation; secondly the appellants had to duly consider the same, and lastly, the appellants had to pass an appropriate order.
37. What is meant by considering the representation is to evaluate the contents of the representation, find out merits of the Page 28 of 38 case and also find out the legal position as regards their claim. Likewise, when we also consider the term 'appropriate order' it means that an order which could either allow or reject the claim. Once when the term 'appropriate order' was used in the course of disposal of the writ petition, under no circumstances can it be construed to be one which has been issued indicating allowing the representation. So reading of the operative part and comparing the facts of the instant case, what we can safely derive of is, three aspects referred earlier that of a) respondents making representation afresh b) the appellants considering the representation and c) appellants passing an appropriate order on considering the representation.
38. Now what we need to look into is the order that was passed by the appellants after the writ petition was disposed of. The contents of the order dated 23.09.2019 is already reproduced in the preceding paragraphs. A plain reading of the order dated 23.09.2019 would show that the appellants herein had in fact, in the course of considering the representation, taken note of the ground realities such as the employment notice being that of the year 1996. The recruitment process was challenged and travelled up till the stage of Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the Hon'ble Page 29 of 38 Supreme Court finally passed the order in the year 2011. The recruitment was thereafter completed in accordance with the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by which time, the entire recruitment process had been concluded, all the selected candidates totaling 393 were offered with appointment and the names of the respondents were not found in the empanelled list. The appellants also found that even if the respondents were found in the empanelled list, but by efflux of time, the validity of the selected list or the empanelled list got lapsed and, for the aforesaid reasons, found it not possible to give appointment to the respondents herein and the representation so filed pursuant to the disposal of the writ petition on 18.07.2019 stood disposed of.
39. As has been referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the fact which has already been discussed by this Bench holding that, of all the directions given by the Hon'ble Single Bench in the course of disposal of W.P.No.10572 of 2012, was firstly permitting the respondents to make a detailed representation to the appellants; secondly the appellants were commanded for duly considering the same and, lastly whether the order passed by the appellants claiming it to be compliance of the order be construed as if they have passed an appropriate order as indicated by the writ Court. Page 30 of 38 So far as the first part of the order is concerned, admittedly a representation was made on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, what is really to be tested is that of the remaining two aspects, as to whether there was due consideration by the appellants while passing the order dated 23.09.2019 and whether the said order can be considered to be an appropriate order.
40. As has been discussed above, we need to first appreciate the contents of the order passed by the appellants pursuant to the directions given by the writ Court. In the course of honoring the directives given by the Hon'ble Single Bench, we would find that the appellants have been able to process the claim of the respondents, and in the process of scrutiny so far as entitlement is concerned, they found that since for all the reasons mentioned in the impugned order dated 23.09.2019, the respondents were not entitled for any relief sought for.
41. Now the next thing to be considered is, whether the said order passed by the appellants herein can be brought within the purview of an act of disobedience or a wilful non-compliance, or for that matter, whether the act on the part of appellants can be held to be flagrant violation of the directions given by the writ Court while disposing of W.P.No.10572 of 2012. The Hon'ble Single Page 31 of 38 Bench, as such, did not give any command for deciding the representation which the respondents were to make in any particular format. Further, what is also revealing is the fact that it was for this reason that the Hon'ble Single Bench while disposing of the W.P. had ordered the authority concerned, after due consideration, to pass appropriate orders. One more aspect which needs to be borne in mind at this juncture is that the authority concerned have been consistently taking the view that as the notification which was issued in 1996 of the posts i.e. 393 out of 400 stood filled up and, as such, there would be no sanctioned vacant post. Further, what would also reveal is the fact that there does not seem to be an outright refusal by the appellants, but having explored the merits of the case, they found it to be not feasible in granting employment to the respondents.
42. Another aspect which needs to be considered is, once when they have applied their mind and upon due consideration does not find the respondents herein suitable for employment and expressed their regret in so far as all the respondents are concerned, there is a clear indication that the appellants herein were not in a position to take back their stand for the reason of non-availability of vacant post and also on the ground that the Page 32 of 38 recruitment had already got completed for a long time back, and also for the reason that the respondents were not the next most meritorious candidates, and also for the reason that the names of the respondents were not reflected in the empanelled list. Thus, these very facts would amount to due consideration of the contents of representation that the respondents herein have made and the order also would fit in the ambit of 'an appropriate order' as directed by the Hon'ble Single Bench.
43. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of a decision passed the Hon'ble Supreme Court so far as what is meant by 'an appropriate order'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chaduranga Kanthraj URS and Another vs. P. Ravi Kumar and Others 27, in paragraph Nos.1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 has held as under:
"1.10. In order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is 'wilful'. It means knowingly- intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It would exclude casual, accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability and would also not include involuntary or negligent actions. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. It is too well settled that if two interpretations are possible, and if 27 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3681 Page 33 of 38 the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be maintainable.
1.11. The weapon of contempt will not be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. The paramount consideration is given to maintain court's dignity and majesty of law. In Sudhir Vasudeva v. George Ravishekeran1 this Court has observed that a Court exercising jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must not travel beyond the four corners of the orders in relation to which contempt has been alleged. That the Court hearing a contempt petition ought to restrict the scope of its enquiry to such directions which are explicit in the judgment or orders of which contempt has been alleged.
1.12. The civil contempt would mean a wilful disobedience of a decision of this Court. What would be relevant is the "wilful disobedience". Hence, knowledge of having acted in disregard to an order is sine qua non for being proceeded with if there is a deliberate, conscience and intentional act then the jurisdiction can be clutched."
44. Keeping the aforesaid aspect, if we take into consideration the very definition of contempt, it would really glaringly be visible that the appellants did consider the case of the respondents and thus have not committed any wilful disobedience or deliberate malafide or non-compliance; and for all these are met, the question would be 'whether it would amount to contempt of Court or not?' Page 34 of 38
45. The Hon'ble Supreme Court so far as what would amount to wilful disobedience, in the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. vs. A.J. Rana 28, held in paragraph Nos.14 and 15 as under:
"14. The words "considers it necessary" postulate that the authority concerned has thought over the matter deliberately and with care and it has been found necessary as a result of such thinking to pass the order. The dictionary meaning of the word "consider" is "to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate mentally, to think over, meditate on, give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect" (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases -- Permanent Edition Vol. 8-A "to consider" means to think with care. It is also mentioned that to "consider" is to fix the mind upon with a view to careful examination; to ponder; study; meditate upon, think or reflect with care. It is therefore, manifest that careful thinking or due application of the mind regarding the necessity to obtain and examine the documents in question is sine qua non for the making of the order. If the impugned order were to show that there has been no careful thinking or proper application of the mind as to the necessity of obtaining and examining the documents specified in the order, the essential requisite to the making of the order would be held to be non- existent.
15. A necessary corollary of what has been observed above is that mind has to be applied with regard to the necessity to obtain and examine all the documents mentioned in the order. An application of the mind with regard to the necessity to obtain and examine only a few of the many documents 28 (1972) 1 SCC 240 Page 35 of 38 mentioned in the order, while there has been no such application of mind in respect of the remaining documents, would not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of the statute. If, however, there has been consideration of the matter regarding the necessity to obtain and examine all the documents and an order is passed thereafter, the Court would stay its hand in the matter and would not substitute its own opinion for that of the authority concerned regarding the necessity to obtain the documents in question."
46. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (II) vs. Union of India 29, in paragraph Nos.34, 35 and 57 has held as under:
"34. The said principle has been reiterated in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. [(2002) 8 SCC 182] in the following terms: (SCC p. 197, para 14) "14. In view of the aforesaid requirements, before obtaining the assent of the President, the State Government has to point out that the law made by the State Legislature is in respect of one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List by mentioning entry/entries of the Concurrent List and that it contains provision or provisions repugnant to the law made by Parliament or existing law. Further, the words 'reserved for consideration' would definitely indicate that there should be active application of mind by the President to the repugnancy pointed out between the proposed State 29 (2007) 1 SCC 174 Page 36 of 38 law and the earlier law made by Parliament and the necessity of having such a law, in the facts and circumstances of the matter, which is repugnant to a law enacted by Parliament prevailing in a State. The word 'consideration' would manifest that after careful thinking over and due application of mind regarding the necessity of having State law which is repugnant to the law made by Parliament, the President may grant assent."
35. Yet again in State (Anti-Corruption Branch), Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Dr. R.C. Anand [(2004) 4 SCC 615 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1380] as regards necessity for application of mind for grant of sanction, this Court opined: (SCC p. 621, para 13) "13. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence including the transcript of the tape record have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority.
(See JaswantSingh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 Cri LJ 265] and State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] .)"
Page 37 of 38
57. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [(2001) 6 SCC 16 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 960] this Court categorically opined: (SCC pp. 24-25, paras 22-23) "22. ... Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact.
23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, 'after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists'. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'."
47. Once when the authority concerned has duly considered the contents of the representation and passed an appropriate order Page 38 of 38 either allowing the representation or rejecting the same, by itself, becomes a fresh cause of action which needs to be put to test in exercise of writ jurisdiction and under no circumstances can the contempt jurisdiction be invoked.
48. In the instant case, for the aforementioned reasons and more particularly, the appellants having applied their mind in considering the representation submitted by the respondents and passed an appropriate order as directed by the Hon'ble Single Bench, as such, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned common order of conviction passed by the Hon'ble Single Bench against the appellants herein is bad in law and unsustainable. Accordingly, the impugned common order is set aside / quashed and the instant batch of contempt appeals are allowed.
49. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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P.SAM KOSHY, J
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NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 21.05.2025
GSD