Madras High Court
Mr.G.Balasubramanian vs The State Government Of Tamil Nadu on 6 June, 2014
Author: S.Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATE: 06.06.2014 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR W.P.No.1476 of 2011 and M.P.Nos.2 to 5 of 2011 Mr.G.Balasubramanian .. Petitioner versus 1.The State Government of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Secretariat, Chennai 9. 2.The Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Unit III, Tamilnadu Housing Board, Nandanam Chennai 35. 3.The Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, KK Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai - 83 .. Respondents PRAYER: This writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for a writ of certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records of the respondents, relating to the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011, published in the Daily Thanthi issued by the 3rd respondent inviting applications for the purchase of the proposed HIG Flats to be constructed by the respondents in Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division, Chennai District, (behind Raghavendra Kalyana Mandapam) and to quash the same and to consequently forbear the respondents herein from interfere with the ownership and possession of the writ petitioner in and over the land, comprised in T.S.No.16/3, Block No.38, Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai District. For Petitioner : Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Sr. Counsel for Mr.V.Mani. For Respondents : Mr.K.Balasubramanian Special Government Pleader. O R D E R
One of the land owners of the immovable property vacant land measuring an extent of 43 grounds and 2215 sq.ft. comprised in old Paimash Nos.967 to 972, Town Survey Nos.16/1, 16/2, 16/3, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai District, within the sub-registration District of Kodambakkam, has filed the present writ petition, for a Certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records of the respondents relating to the public notice dated 20.01.2011, published in Daily Thanthi issued by the Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, calling for applications for the purchase of the proposed HIG flats to be constructed in Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division, Chennai District and quash the same consequently, the petitioner has sought for a direction to the respondents, not to interfere with the ownership and possession of the petitioner.
2. According to the petitioner, the abovesaid lands were originally owned and possessed by his grandfather late Kalyanasundara Pathar. He died intestate on 08.11.1973. Thereafter his legal heirs viz., Mrs.Anjammal and Mrs.Duraikannammal (two wives) succeeded to his estate. Mrs.Anjammal died intestate leaving behind her daughter Mrs.Jothilakshmi and grandchildren through her daughter viz., Mr.G.Balasubramanian, the writ petitioner and Mahadevi and Manjula. The other wife Mrs.Duraikannammal, also died intestate leaving behind her adopted son Mr.Jayachandren. According to the petitioner, suits are pending between the parties in C.S.No.166 of 1989 on the file of High Court, Madras. He has also stated that W.A.No.366/99 and W.P.No.7295/2010, are pending
3. The details of the lands and the land acquisition proceedings are extracted hereunder:
Sl.No. T.S.No. Village Extent 1 16/1 part, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 21 grounds and 2274 sq.ft 2 16/2, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 11 grounds and 511 sq.ft.3
16/3, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 10 grounds and 282 sq.ft.
Total (1+2+3) 43 grounds and 2215 sq.ft Sl.No. T.S.No. Village Extent Status of Acquisition Proceedings initiated by the respondents 1 16/1 part, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 21 grounds and 2274 sq.ft 4(1) Notification issued. However, the possession has not been taken over. The Government has decided to reconvey the land to the owners 2 16/2, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 11 grounds and 511 sq.ft.
No award passed possession continues to vest with the owners 3 16/3, Block No.38 Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division 10 grounds and 282 sq.ft.
Award was passed on 04.03.1986. Since both notice and award was passed against dead person, the same is pending in RA No.10390 of 2010 in W.A.No.366 of 1999
4. According to the petitioner, the public notice dated 20.01.2011 issued by Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, is defective. The lands consists of 43 grounds and 2215 sq.ft. Though the respondents claim that they have taken over the land, measuring an extent of 10 grounds and 282 sq.ft comprised in T.S.No.16/3, Puliyur Village, the same has not been sub divided from and out of the larger extent of land. Demarcation has not been done. Physical possession has not been taken.
5. The petitioner has further contended that the owner of the land Kalyana Sundara Pathar, expired, intestate in 1973 and that the notification issued under Section 4(1) did not contain the names of the legal heirs. Award dated 19.03.1986, passed against a dead person is unsustainable and non est in law. The petitioner and others continue to be in possession of 33 grounds and 385 sq.ft. Lands comprised in T.S.No.16/1, 16/2, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7. There is a suppression of information in the public notice dated 20.01.2011 about the correct particulars of the lands, subject matter for proposed development. Award has been passed after a lapse of more than 13 years against a dead person.
6. The petitioners have submitted that
(a) The impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 is prima facie sham, perverse and defective and hence liable to be quashed in toto.
(b). In as much as the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 is devoid of the specific particulars such as T.S.No., Block No. etc. and the exact location of the proposed construction of apartments, the same suffers from willful suppression and wanton non-disclosure, necessitating the quashing of the same in its entirety.
(c) The impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011, has been caused to be published by the 3rd respondent without any material particulars in a defective and mechanical manner with total non-application of mind. Hence the same is liable to be quashed in toto.
(d) In as much as the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 is issued based on the strength of the award dated 19.03.1986 passed against the dead person, the same is beyond the powers and authority of the respondents herein as the respondent cannot claim any right whatsoever under the award, which is non-est in the eye of law.
(e) The acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents originally related to the larger extent of land covered under T.S.No.16/1 to 16/7, Block 38, Puliyur Village, Kodambakkam Division is 43 grounds and 2215 sq.ft. However the proceedings relating to 11 grounds and 511 sq.ft. Comprised in TS No.16/2 has been dropped by the respondent. Further the respondent also agreed to drop the proposed proceedings in respect of the land measuring 21 grounds and 2274 sq.ft., comprised TS Nos.16/1, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7. In so far as the land measuring 10 grounds and 282 sq.ft., comprised in T.S.No.16/3, though award has been passed by the respondent on 19.03.1986, no right whatsoever has flown to the respondent under the said award, since the award itself is a nullity being the one passed against the dead person, without even impleading the legal heirs of the deceased. While so, the public notice dated 20.01.2011 is ultra vires of the authority and powers of the respondents herein. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside in toto.
(f) Since the respondents are well aware of the fact that the awards dated 19.03.1986, passed in respect of the land comprised in T.S.No.16/3, has been passed in a mechanical manner, abusing the process of law and statutory powers without bringing on record the owners of the property as on date of acquisition, the respondents have not taken measures to bifurcate TS No.16/3, from and out of the total extent of 43 grounds 2215 sq.ft. Hence the respondents herein are estopped by their own conduct in issuing the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 and hence the same is liable to be quashed.
(g) The issue as to the validity and the sustainability of the award dated 19.03.1986, passed by the respondent relating to the immovable property comprised in TS No.16/3, is already seized up on the file of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble High Court under RA No.10390 of 2010 in WA No.366 of 1999. While so, the respondents herein does not have any right whatsoever toissue the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011, without the final and conclusive determination of rights under the aforesaid pending legal proceedings. Hence, the impugned notice deserves to be quashed.
(h) At the outset the award passed by the respondent is a nullity prima facie. Since no award can be passed against the dead person, the respondents do not acquire any right whatsover under the award relating to TS No.16/3. Hence, the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 issued by the respondents is akin to the saying building castles on airand hence the same is laible to be quashed.
(i) The public notice dated 20.01.2011 issued by the respondent is mischievous and misleading. The respondent being a welfare state ought to have disclosed the correct particulars of the land, which is the subject matter of proposed development in their public notice dated 20.01.2011. The respondents herein willfully suppressed the material information in public notice date 20.01.2011 for the reasons best known to them only. The respondents cannot be permitted to proceed further based on defective public notice dated 20.01.2011 based on anticipated presumption and assumptions. Hence the impugned public notice dated 20.01.2011 is liable to be set aside, in its entirety.
7. The Executive Engineer and Administrative Officer, Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Division, Tamilnadu Housing Board, Chennai, in his counter affidavit has stated that land in T.S.No.16/1 etc., measuring an extent of 43 grounds and 2215 sq.ft., of Block No.38, Puliyur Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai District (behind Ragavendra Kalyana Mandapam at Kodambakkam), was proposed for acquisition for housing Scheme of the Tamilnadu Housing Board vide letter No.92792/80/L.AI(3) dated 20.04.1983, as hereunder.
Town Survey No. Extent 16/1 21 Grounds 2274 sq.ft. 16/2 11 Grounds 2268 sq.ft. 16/3 10 Grounds 0073 sq.ft. Total 43 Grounds - 2215 sq.ft
8. After verification of the town survey land register and inspection, the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was approved by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.570, Housing & Urban Development Department dated 24.07.1984 and that the same was published in Tamilnadu Government Gazette in part II Section 2 (supplement) No.33A page 6 dated 24.07.1984. Draft declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, has been approved in G.O.Ms.No.351, Housing & Urban Development Department, dated 04.03.1986. Local publication has been made on 19.03.1986. The same has been published in Hindu and Makkal Kural on 09.04.1986. Draft declaration under Section 7 of the Act, has been approved by the Government in its letter No.28746/G1/86-3 dated 08.09.1986. Thereafter award has been passed for the entire lands. Compensation amount has been deposited in the Civil Court under Section 30 & 31 (2) of the Act, since the land owners or any other interested persons have not produced any documents or any evidence to prove the ownership to the Land Acquisition Act. The Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, has further stated that the entire lands in T.S.No.16/1 to 16/3 admeasuring 43 Grounds 2215 sq.ft., have been acquired by Tamilnadu Housing Board. Composite land in T.S.No.16/1 was further subdivided into five denoted as T.S.Nos.16/1, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6, 16/6 & 16/7 and the extent & ownership of the lands detailed hereunder.
T.S.No. Extent Name of the owner 1. 16/1 15 grounds 1901 sq.ft. K.M.Amanullah Basha 2. 16/4 1 ground 1306 sq.ft. K.M.Kannan 3. 16/5 1 ground 1306 sq.ft. P.Gopalakrishnan & P.Narayanasamy 4. 16/6 1 ground 1306 sq.ft. P.V.Subramanian & P.V.Kamala 5. 16/7 1 ground 1255 sq.ft Jagan Mohan Total Extent 21 grounds 2274 sq.ft.
9. According to Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, Tamilnadu Housing Board, is the absolute owner of the land in T.S.No.16/3 measuring an extent of 10 Grounds 0073 sq.ft., which was acquired as per the Award No.1/98 dated 09.03.1998. Out of 10 grounds 0073 sq.ft., an extent of 9 grounds 1473 sq.ft., has already been handed over to the Tamilnadu Housing Board, by the Land Acquisition Officer on 05.06.1998, after leaving 1000 sq.ft., which is encroached in the form of thatched house and bathroom and that the same has to be evicted by invoking Section 47 of the Land Acquisition Act. Further, an award has been passed for the remaining land in T.S.No.16/1 & 16/7 measuring an extent of 17 grounds 756 sq.ft., of Puliyur Village vide Award No.2/98 dated 10.09.1998. The land in T.S.No.16/4, 16/5 & 16/6, measuring an extent of 4 grounds 1518 sq.ft., was acquired vide award No.1/99 dated 18.05.1999 and that the land in T.S.No.16/2 measuring an extent of 11 grounds 0511 sq.ft., was acquired vide Award No.1/2010 dated 8.6.2010. The abovesaid lands have been handed over to the Tamilnadu Housing Board, by the Land Acquisition Officer, after evicting the inmates.
10. After taking over the land in T.S.No.16/3, admeasuring 9 grounds 1473 sq.ft., the Tamilnadu Housing Board proposed to construct 48 HIG Flats and obtained administrative approval from Board to a value of Rs.309.13 lakhs vide Board resolution No.4.10 dated 25.11.1998. Tenders were floated on 12.01.1999 and that the work has been awarded to M/s.Rathinam Chetty & Co., vide KKNC Agreement No.A/6/99-2000 dated 27.01.1999. The construction was not taken up due to the interim order granted by this Court in W.A.No.366 of 1999 filed by Tmt.Duraikannammal claiming to be the legally wedded wife of Late Kalyanasundara Pather, owner of the property. At the time of 4(1) notification, Tmt.Duraikannammal's husband was the registered owner of the property. Subsequent to the death, the ownership in the revenue records had not been changed. Hence, the Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, has contended that it is not open to Tmt.Duraikannammal to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground of non service of notice. Writ appeal has been dismissed on 27.07.2009. Based on the orders of the Court, an eviction was carried on 16.11.2009 and that the unauthorised encroachment was removed. Thereafter, the Housing Board, has proposed to take up the scheme for the construction of 48 HIG Flats in the abovesaid lands and that the same was approved by the Board vide Board Resolution No.4.04 dated 12.1.2011 to a value of Rs.883.50 lakhs. Applications have been invited from the general public.
11. The Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, has further submitted that another Writ Petition No.6794 of 1999 was filed by Tmt.Jothilakshmi rep. by the Power agent R.Veerappan, challenging the patta issued by the Settlement Officer, Tanjavore, which was remitted back to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai against Thiru.K.M.Ahamadullah Basha, K.M.Asadullah Basha, K.M.Assamadullah Basha and Imitiaz Fathima was also dismissed on 27.07.2009. In the meantime one Mrs. Jothilakshmi alias Jothi and G.Balasubramaniam, the petitioner herein has filed W.P.No.6008 of 2010 and that the same was withdrawn, and dismissed on 29.03.2010.
12. The Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, K.K.Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai, the 3rd respondent herein, submitted that, one after another, writ petitions are being filed against the respondents challenging the same proceedings, even after the acquisition had reached finality. Possession has been taken and in some places there is encroachment, for which action has to be taken by the respondents under Section 47 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
13. Contentions raised in the present writ petition, include that the proceedings initiated against a dead person and the consequential award are, non est in law. Material on record discloses that the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was approved by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.570, Housing & Urban Development Department dated 24.07.1984 and that the same was published in Tamilnadu Government Gazette in part II Section 2 (supplement) No.33A page 6 dated 24.07.1984. Draft declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, has been approved in G.O.Ms.No.351, Housing & Urban Development Department, dated 04.03.1986. Local publication has been made on 19.03.1986. The same has been published in Hindu and Makkal Kural on 09.04.1986. Draft declaration under Section 7 of the Act, has been approved by the Government in its letter No.28746/G1/86-3 dated 08.09.1986. Thereafter award has been passed for the entire lands. Compensation amount ha been deposited in Civil Court under Section 30 & 31 (2) of the Act, since the land owners or any other interested persons have not produced any documents or any evidence to prove the ownership to the Land Acquisition Act.
14. Transfer of charge certificate dated 05.06.1998 is extracted hereunder TRANSFER OF CHARGE CERTIFICATE I, P.Umakanthan, Assistant Grade Revenue Inspector, O/o. District Revenue Officer (L.A.), Tamilnadu Housing Board Scheme, Nandanam, Chennai.35 have this day of 5th June 1998, handed over to Thiru.N.S.Swaminathan, Head Surveyor, Office of the Executive Engineer and Administrative Officer, K.K.Nagar Division, Chennai on behalf of the Tamilnadu Housing Board have taken over the properties mentioned above.
District: Chennai Taluk: Egmore-Nungambakkam Village: Puliyur. Survey No. Extent Structures Trees Walls Gr. Sq.ft T.S.No.16/3 10.0073 nil nil Block 38 Total Extent 0.10.0073 Excluding Brick with thatched encroachment 0.00.1000 house with bathroom 0.09.1473 Handed over with sketches Taken over with sketches sd/- sd/- Assistant Grade Revenue Inspector, Head Surveyor O/o. District Revenue Officer (L.A.), K.K.Nagar Division Tamilnadu Housing Board Scheme, Tamilnadu Housing Board Nandanam, Chennai.35 Madras - 83
15. Material on record further discloses that K.Duraikannu Ammal represented by her power of Attorney has filed W.P.No.1733 of 1999 for a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records on the file of the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Fort St. George, Chennai, the 1st respondent therein, pursuant to Sec.4(1) Notification in G.O.Ms.No.570, Housing and Urban Development Department published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Part.II Sec.2 on 22.8.1984, in so far as it relates to the acquisition of her land in T.S.No.16/1 to 16/7, Block No.38 in 109, Puliyur Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai and 6 Declaration in G.O.Ms.No.351, dated 4.3.86 published in T.N.Government Gazette Part-II Sec.2 on 19.3.1996 and to quash the same and direct the respondents therein, to conduct fresh enquiry after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner therein, to putforth her claim before the respondents.
16. The said writ petition has been dismissed on 22.02.1999. Being aggrieved, K.Duraikannu Ammal, has filed W.A.No.366 of 1999. Having found that a similar writ petition in W.P.No.6794 of 1999, was also pending, the Hon'ble Division Bench vide order dated 27.07.2009, has passed a common order, as follows:
2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the Writ Appeal and the Writ Petition are:- The petitioner in W.P.No.1733 of 1999, viz., the appellant herein claiming to be the legally wedded wife of Late Kalyanasundara Pathar who is the owner of the land acquired by the second Respondent. At the time of notification the appellant/petitioner's husband was the registered owner of the property. Subsequent to his death, the ownership in the revenue records had not been changed. Still the revenue records stand in the name of the husband of the appellant/petitioner. However, during the award enquiry the second wife of the appellant/petitioner's husband made a claim and the award had been passed and the amount has been deposited. The contention of the Respondents is that the appellant/petitioner was not the registered owner as per the revenue records, it is not open to her to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground of non-service of notice. The learned single Judge after considering the facts and circumstances of the case has found that since the appellant/petitioner is not a registered owner of the property under acquisition, she cannot expect any notice from the acquisition officer. The non service of notice on the petitioner by the respondents with regard to acquisition of the land cannot vitiate the acquisition proceedings. The learned single Judge further observed that as represented by the learned Government Pleader, the compensation had been deposited and the second wife of the petitioner's husband had put forth the claim, it is open to the petitioner to file a petition before the Land acquisition Officer claiming either the entire compensation amount as the legally wedded wife or otherwise and establish her claim. If any such petition is filed within a reasonable time, the second respondent is directed to refer the matter to a civil Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for the apportionment of the compensation amount between the claimants.
3. We see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge in dismissing the writ petition. The learned single Judge has considered the issue raised in the writ petition and answered the issue in negative on the ground that the writ petitioner is not a registered owner. Therefore, she is not entitled to receive any notice from the acquisition officer. We agree with the findings of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P.3697 of 1999 is closed.
4. In W.P.No.6794 of 1999 the petitioner claiming to be the owner of the property acquired by the second Respondent and she has filed this writ petition challenging the very same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that she was not served with any notice. Admittedly, in the year 1970 the land was surveyed and issued Patta by the Settlement Tahsildar, Villupuram in the name of the legal heirs of Late K.M.Akbar Badsha viz., K.M.Ahamadullah Badsha, K.M.Asadullah Badsha, K.M.Asamathullah Badsha and Imitiaz Fathima and in the revision filed by the petitioner before the Settlement Officer, Thanjavur, which was remitted back to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai, results in issuance of Patta in the name of the above said four persons. The petitioner is still fighting for her title to the property in question. Since the petitioner is not a registered owner of the property acquired by the second respondent at the time of acquisition she cannot expect any notice from the acquisition officer. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Respondents. The writ petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Consequently, W.P.M.P.No.9801 of 1999 is closed.
17. As per the supporting affidavit filed to vacate the interim order of status quo granted on 22.01.2001 in M.P.No.3 of 2011, in the present writ petition, the Executive Engineer and Administrative Officer, Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Division, Tamilnadu Housing Board, Chennai, has referred to the Writ Petition No.6008 of 2010, filed by the petitioner, as well as Smt.Jothilakshmi @ Jothi that the same has been withdrawn.
18. When records were called for, from the Registry, it is noticed that Jothilakshmi has filed two writ petitions viz., W.P.Nos.16582 and 16583 of 1999 and by a common order dated 09.10.2001, the same have been dismissed. Being aggrieved by the same, she has preferred two Writ Appeals viz., W.A.Nos.2864 and 2865 of 2011.
19. One of the contentions raised in the appeals, is that the award has not been made within the period provided for under the Act. After considering the number of litigations challenging the acquisition proceedings, on the abovesaid ground and others, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, to which I am a party, vide order dated 25.08.2006, has dismissed both the appeals. The order of the Hon'ble Division Bench is extracted.
COMMON JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.SATHASIVAM, J.) As against the common order passed by the learned single Judge, dated 09.10.2001, in W.P. Nos.16583 and 16582 of 1999, the writ petitioner/land owner preferred the above Writ Appeals.
2. Before the learned Judge as well as before us, the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner is that the Awards passed by the Land Acquisition officer (Award Nos.1/98 and 2/98) are beyond the prescribed period, hence, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.
3. The learned Judge, after considering the date of last notification under Section-6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the date of passing of the Award; and verifying the date of filing of the Writ Petitions, stay orders and disposal of the same; rejected the said contention, dismissing all the writ petitions.
4. Mr.Sridhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, by furnishing a list of dates in respect of the Notifications and orders passed by this Court both in the Stay Petitions as well as main Writ Petitions, contended that Award Nos.1/98 and 2/98 passed on 09.3.1998 and 10.09.1998 respectively cannot stand since they are beyond the prescribed period of two years from the date of declaration.
5. As against the said contention, learned Government Advocate, by furnishing list of dates and events and placing the records as well as earlier orders passed by this Court, contended that the time limit for passing the award was available upto 09.11.1999, hence, the awards passed on 09.03.1998 and 10.09.1998 were well within time, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of both the Writ Appeals.
6. In the light of the submissions made, we verified the details regarding the last mode of publication, notification under Section 6 of the Act and the award proceedings in Award Nos.1 of 1998 and 2 of 1998. Inasmuch as the learned Government Advocate has culled out the relevant dates and details from the Files as well as orders of this Court, we intend to refer to those details hereunder:-
" W.A. Nos.2864(S.No.16/1) and 2865 (S.No.16/3) of 2001 filed by G.Jothilakshmi by power Agent R.Veerappan.
Award No.1/98 Award No.2/98 Award No.1/99 S.No.16/3 S.No.16/1, 16/7 S.No.16/4,5,6 dt.9.3.98 dt.10.9.98 dt.18.5.99 Notification issued u/s.4(1) in G.O.Ms.No.570 - 24.7.84 TNGG - 22.8.84 Declaration made u/s.6 in G.O.Ms.No.351 - 4.3.86 TNGG - 19.3.86 Local publication - 15.4.86 From the last date of the publication of the declaration ie., from 15.4.86, the Award ought to have been passed on or before 14.4.88.
Particulars with regard to the writ petitions challenging the said acquisition proceedings:
1. W.P.No.13985/86 filed by Samuga Nalapani Kahagam S.No.16/2. Interim stay granted on 22.12.86 date of disposal of writ petition 20.2.97
2. W.P.No.2879/88 filed by Ahamedulla Basha S.No.16/1 Interim stay granted on 21.3.88 date of disposal of writ petition 20.2.97.
3. W.P.No.4016/88 filed by Chellaiah (Member of the Sangam) S.No.16/213 Interim stay granted on 8.4.88 date of disposal of writ petition 14.6.97.
4. W.P. No.3902/88 S.No.16/5 and 16/6 interim stay granted on 7.4.88 date of disposal 16.7.98.
5. W.P. No.15158/98 filed by Margert S. No.16/1, 16/7 (6 Grounds) interim stay granted on 25.9.98 pending.
6. W.P.No.1733/99 filed by Duraikannuammal S. No.16/1, 16/7 date of disposal 1999.
7. W.A. No.366/99 filed against the order in W.P.No.1733/1999 Disposed on 9.7.2001
8. W.P. No.231/2000 filed by legal heirs of Jegan Mohan S.No.16/1 Part) pending.
9. W.P. No.12347/99 filed by 11 members date of disposal 16.8.99.
10. W.P. No.9795/99 filed by K.M.Kannan S.No.16/4 interim stay granted on 10.6.99 pending.
11. W.P. No.16369/93 filed by Ahmadulla Basha S. No.16/2 interim stay granted on 17.11.93 disposed on 9.10.2001.
Date of disposal of last writ petition i.e. W.P.No.3902/88 dt.16.7.98 In respect of the above said acquisition proceedings, the interim stay was granted on 22.12.86, hence from 15.4.86 to 21.2.86 there was no stay (period not covered by stay 8 months 7 days) Out of two years for passing award, the remaining period available to pass the award is one year three months 23-days. Adding the said one year three months 23-days from 16.7.98, the time limit for passing award was available up to 9.11.99 Hence the award No.1/98, 2/98 as well as 1/99 are made within two years.
7. On going through the details furnished relating to the acquisition proceedings and the orders passed by this Court both in the Stay Petitions and the main Writ Petitions, we are of the view that there is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the particulars furnished by the learned Government Advocate. In view of the fact that the respondents had time to pass awards till 09.11.1999 after excluding the period of stay and disposal of the Writ Petitions; and of the fact that award No.1/98 was passed on 09.03.1998 and Award No.2/98 on 10.09.1998; the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be rejected.
8. No other contention has been raised before us.
9. Writ Appeals fail and the same are dismissed. No costs.
20. In the abovesaid circumstances, it is not open to the petitioner once again to contend that the award has not been passed within the statutory period. As stated supra, the scheme for construction of HIG flats has already been approved by the Government for a value of Rs.883.50 Lakhs and it is evident from the proceedings in Memo No.PW/32004/10 dated 14.01.2011. By Board's resolution No.4.04 dated 12.01.2011, a decision has also been taken to call for tenders, for construction of 48 HIG flats.
21. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, reported in 2000 (2) SCC 48, the Supreme Court, at paragraph Nos.8, 14, and 17, held as follows:
8. The observations, as above with due respect to the High Court are based on certainmisconception of facts. While it is true that the plea of limitation ought to be raised at the first available opportunity but that does not mean and imply that the party raising it even during the course of hearing would be barred therefrom. Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Time barred claim would not even be entertained by a civil court without there being any opportunity of filing a pleading by the respondents or the defendants in a civil suit. The fact remains that the respondents herein did in fact agitate the point of limitation during the course of hearing and also had taken the plea in their affidavit in reply and prior to the commencement of the hearing of the matter. The High Court was thus clearly in error in holding without any further factual detail that the cause of action for the challenge to the Notification under the Maharashtra Act of 1966 continues even on the date of filing of the writ petition. Mr. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents contended that since this is a continuing wrong, the question of the claim being time barred or the conduct being barred under the laws of limitation does not and cannot arise. Mr. Venugopal further contended that there are mala fides involved and mala fide ought not to be restricted to be challenged under the garb of limitation.
14. The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, delay defects equity has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefor, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above.
17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent cases (C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. & Ors.2. This court observed as below:-
"The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1891 (for short "the Act") in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17.10.1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs. No. 816 Industries dated 24.3.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GO Ms No. 439 Industries dated 10.5.1985. In GOMs 546 Industries dated 30.3.86, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No.1392 Industries dated 17.10.62 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed."
22. In Ramalingam and Others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2005 (3) CTC 1, after considering the decisions in Tej Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others, reported in 2003 (4) SCC 485, Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, reported in AIR 2000 SC 671; Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, Uttar Pradesh v. suresh Nand Jayal, reported in 1997 (9) SCC 224 and State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan and others, reported in 1996 (1) SCC 250, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has held that the writ petition filed challenging the acquisition proceedings after the award has been passed is not maintainable.
23. On the aspect of possession, in Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 387, on the facts and circumstances of the reported case and considering few earlier decisions, the Supreme Court, at paragraph Nos.13, 14 and 15, held as follows:
13. High Court held that actual physical possession of the land subject matter of the acquisition proceeding was not handed over to the appellant while it was the contention of the appellant as well as the State Government that possession of the land was handed over to L&T Ltd. on July 5, 1989. At the time the possession was taken over a Panchanama was prepared duly witnessed by two framers of the Village Magdalla and signed by the Circle Officer evidencing handing over of possession and also by M.H. Adhikari an officer of the L&T Ltd. for taking over possession. The possession receipt of the same date duly signed by the Circle Officer and the officer of the L&T Ltd. Was given. L&T Ltd. thus took possession of the land in presence of the panchas. Panchanama recites that both the witnesses (Panchas) had been intimated in advance by Mamlatdar, Choryasi and that possession of the concerned land that day taken over in their presence by the Circle Officer and that the land was an open spot and there was no construction or crops grown therein. Possession of the land was taken over along with the trees standing thereon. As noted above, possession was thereafter delivered to the representative of the L&T Ltd. at that time itself. In the High Court it was contended that no actual physical possession of the land had been taken. The petitioners filed affidavits of the Panchas who had signed the panchanama. In these affidavits they stated that they were called to the office of the Panchayat and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers and that they had not gone to the site and that neither the landlord was present not the actual possession was delivered to the acquiring body. Read with these affidavits High Court noticed from the recitation in the Panchanama that it was nowhere mentioned that the panchas had gone to the site from the office of the Panchayat. It was not disputed that in the revenue records it was L&T Ltd. who was shown in possession of the land. Affidavits of the Panchas filed in the High Court which contained statements contrary to what was recorded in the Panchanama and against the revenue entries are quite meaningless and in our opinion High Court unnecessarily put undue reliance on the same. High Court could not convert itself into a revenue court and hold that in spite of the Panchanama and the revenue records actual physical possession of the acquired land had not been handed over to the acquiring body. High Court, in our opinion, has not correctly analysed the two judgments of this Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab1 and Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors.2 to come to the conclusion that actual physical possession of the land was not taken over by the State.
14. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court was considering the question of taking possession of the acquired land under the Act. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) delivered judgment for himself and A.C. Gupta, J. He said he agreed with the conclusion reached by Untwalia, J. (who was the third Judge) as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion was based. He, however, said that a separate judgment was being written as he felt that it was not necessary to consider the question of delivery of symbolical and actual possession as provided in Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure as that was not necessary for the disposal of the appeal before the Court. Bhagwati, J. said as under:
There can be no question of taking `symbolical possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.
15. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) by LRs.3 the issue whether the land in question was taken possession of in proceedings under the Act. It is not necessary for us to refer to the facts of that case. We find the following statement of law relevant of the controversy in the present case:
It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum of Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses winged by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land.
24. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust Vs. State of Punjab and Others, reported in 1996 (4) SCC 212, referring to Larsen and Toubro's case (cited supra), at paragraph Nos.4 and 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court, held as follows:
4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchnama in the presence of Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession.
5. Under these circumstances, merely because the appellant retained possession of the acquired land, the acquisition cannot be said to be bad in law. It is then contended by Shri Parekh that the appellant-Institution is running an educational institution and intends to establish a public school and that since other land was available, the Government would have acquired some other land leaving the acquired land for the appellant. In the counter affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that apart from the acquired land, the appellant also owned 482 canals 19 marles of land. Thereby, it is seen that the appellant is not disabled to proceed with the continuation of the eductional institution which it seeks to establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may be given to the appellant to make a representation to the State Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give any such liberty since acquisition process has already been completed.
25. It is well known that after taking possession of the land, the property vests with the State, free from al encumbrances. In the State of Rajasthan Vs. D.R.Laxmi, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445, it is held as follows:
7. The question is : whether the absence of the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality renders the entire proceedings void? We need not dilate upon the question whether local publication of substance of Section 4(1) notification is mandatory or directory. Since this Court has consistently taken the view that compliance of the requirement of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette as well as publication of the substance of the notification in the locality now under the Amended Act in the newspaper, is mandatory requirement. As the facts are not in controversy, as mentioned in the judgment of the High Court, the substance of the notification was not published in the locality; we proceed on the premise that second step, namely, publication of the substance of the notification in the locality, was not taken. The question then is :
whether Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration are required to be quashed? In this regard, we have to consider the conduct of the parties and the effect thereof. Under the scheme of the Act, after the possession of the land was taken either under Section 17 (2) or Section 16, the land stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, there is no provision under the Act to divest the title which was validly vested in the State. Under Section 48(1) before possession is taken, the State Government is empowered to withdraw from the acquisition by its publication in the Gazette. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the question in Sanjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees Cooperative Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab & Ors.3 and held in paragraphs 12 thus :
"That apart, as facts disclose, the award was made on 24.11.1980 and the writ petition was filed on 9.8.1982. It is not in dispute that compensation was deposited in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. It is asserted by the appellant Society that possession of the land was delivered to it and the land had been divided and allotted to its members for construction of houses and that construction of some houses had been commenced by the date the writ petition was filed. It would be obvious that the question of division of the properties among its members and allotment of the respective plots to them would arise only after the Land Acquisition Officer had taken possession of the acquired land and handed it over to the appellant Society. By operation of Section 16, the land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369, the question arose: whether notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 gets lapsed if the award is not made within two years as envisaged under Section 11-A? A Bench of three Judges had held that once possession was taken and the land vested in the Government, title to the land so vested in the State is subject only to determination of compensation and to pay the same to the owner. Divesting the title to the land statutorily vested in the Government and reverting the same to the owner is not contemplated under the Act. Only Section 48(1) gives power to withdraw from acquisition that too before possession is taken. That question did not arise in this case. The property under acquisition having been vested in appellants, in the absence of any power under the Act to have the title of the appellants divested except by exercise of the power under Section 48(1), valid title cannot be defeated. The exercise of the power to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 would lead to incongruity. Therefore, the High Court under those circumstances should not have interfered with the acquisition and quashed the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively. Considered from either perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition."
26. Decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd., referred to in D.R.Laxmi's case, are extracted hereunder.
8. In Satinder Prasad Jain s case, another Bench of three Judges had held that though award under Section 11-A was not made within two years after the Amendment Act 68 of1984 came into force, the title having been vested in the State, the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 do not get lapsed and non-compliance of statutory provisions does not have the effect of divesting the title of the land vested in the Government free from all encumbrances.
9. Recently, another Bench of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (CA No.286 of 1989, decided on 6.9.1996 re-examined the entire case law and had held that once the land was vested in the State, the Court was not justified in interfering with the notification published under appropriate provisions of the Act. Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of latches. It is thus, well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition or the ground of latches. Reliance was placed by Shri Sachar on M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi & Ors.5 in particular paragraphs 8, wherein it was held that compliance of the requirements is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders all subsequent proceedings connected therewith unexceptionably illegal; but the question is what will be its effect. That was not the question in that case, since no award had come to be passed in Nutakki Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, L.A., Vijayawada6 a two-Judge Bench of this Court had held that if the requirements of Section 4 are not complied with, all proceedings had become invalid and possession was directed to be re-delivered to the appellant. We are of the view that the ratio therein is not correctly laid down. The question whether violation of the mandatory provisions renders the result of the action as void or voidable has been succinctly considered in "Administrative Law" by H.W.R. Wade (7th Edition) at page 342-43 thus :
"The truth of the matter is that the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff s lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he was waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the void order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an orders may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. A common case where an order, however void, becomes valid is where a statutory time limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned. The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid ; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result."
27. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Review Application was pending on the file of this Court, records called for from the Registry, shows that the said Review Application has been disposed of, vide order dated 30.06.2011, as hereunder.
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records.
2. It is brought to our notice by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the appellant, who executed the Power of Attorney, died on 04.6.2003. He submitted that though a petition was filed and numbered as C.M.P. No. 4608 of 2004 for substituted service, the same was not listed along with the Writ Appeal on the date of disposal of the Writ Appeal, ie., on 27.7.2009. He further submitted that since the substitution application was not considered before passing the impugned order, it has to be reviewed.
3. From the materials on record, it is seen that after the application got numbered even in 2004, the petitioner/proposed party, the son of the deceased Principal, who had executed the Power of Attorney, has not taken any steps to get it listed before the Division Bench and got substituted himself as a party appellant in the place of his mother, who filed the Writ Appeal in 1999.
4. It is well settled that the scope of the Review Application is very narrow and it can only be entertained in specified circumstances that too, when there is an error apparent on the face of the record.
5. The only grievance of the learned Senior Counsel is that the Division Bench without taking into consideration the substitution petition, had passed the impugned order. The submissions made by the petitioner now before this Court were very much available to be raised before the Division Bench before passing of the impugned order and the petitioner keeping quiet till the disposal of the writ appeal, now cannot come and seek for review of the said order on the ground that the substitution application was not considered. Since the petitioner has not taken earnest steps to get substituted as appellant, he cannot assail the order passed by the Division Bench in the writ appeal, though the application was filed soon after the date of death of the appellant. We do not find any error apparent on the face of the judgment and, therefore, we are not inclined to review the judgment, which was delivered on merits.
6. Even on facts, it is seen that the petitioner is not a registered owner of the land as the patta was issued in the name of the legal heirs of late K.M. Adbar Badsha as stated in paragraph 4 of the judgment.
7. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate to substitute the name of the petitioner as appellant in the copy of the judgment, which was delivered on merits. Accordingly, the Review Application is dismissed. Registry is directed to issue fresh order copy incorporating the name of the petitioner as appellant. No costs.
28. Thus, it could be seen from the series of proceedings that despite the petitioner and others having lost the proceedings instituted one after another, from 1999, somehow, they have prevented the Housing Board from taking possession of some portion of the lands acquired and vested with the Government and delayed the process of development of the same. As per the transfer of certificate and other particulars extracted supra, in respect of lands in T.S.No.16/1, 16/3, admeasuring 43 grounds 2215 sq.ft acquired by the Tamilnadu Housing Board, has been subdivided as T.S.Nos.16/1, 16/4, 16/5, 16/6 and 16/7.
29. Lands in T.S.No.16/3 measuring an extent of 10 Grounds 0073 sq.ft., has been acquired as per Award No.1/98 dated 09.03.1998. Out of 10 grounds 0073 sq.ft., an extent of 9 grounds 1473 sq.ft., has already been handed over to Tamilnadu Housing Board by the Land Acquisition Officer on 05.06.1998, after leaving 1000 sq.ft., which is stated to be encroached in the form of a thatched house and a bathroom, and that the same has to be evicted by invoking Section 47 of the Land Acquisition Act. Further, an award has been passed for the remaining land in T.S.No.16/1 & 16/7 measuring an extent of 17 grounds 756 sq.ft., of Puliyur Village vide Award No.2/98 dated 10.09.1998. The land in T.S.No.16/4, 16/5 & 16/6, measuring an extent of 4 grounds 1518 sq.ft., was acquired vide award No.1/99 dated 18.05.1999 and the land in T.S.No.16/2 measuring an extent of 11 grounds 0511 sq.ft., was acquired vide Award No.1/2010 dated 8.6.2010. The abovesaid lands have been handed over to the Tamilnadu Housing Board by the Land Acquisition Officer after evicting the inmates. After taking over the land in T.S.No.16/3, admeasuring 9 grounds 1473 sq.ft., the Tamilnadu Housing Board has proposed to construct 48 HIG Flats and obtained administrative approval from Board to a value of Rs.309.13 lakhs vide Board resolution No.4.10 dated 25.11.1998.
30. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 387, this Court is in agreement with the contention of the Housing Board, as regards taking over possession. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, once the lands are vested with the Government, and handed over to the Housing Board, they are entitled to dispose of the property, in accordance with the provisions of the Housing Board Act. The Board has resolved to construct 48 HIG flats. There are no merits in this writ petition to quash the public notice dated 20.01.2011. The interim order granted is vacated and the writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No Costs.
06.06.2014 Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No ars To
1. The Secretary to Government.
State Government of Tamil Nadu, Housing and Urban Development Department, Secretariat, Chennai 9.
2. The Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Unit III, Tamilnadu Housing Board, Nandanam Chennai 35.
3. The Executive Engineer cum Administrative Officer, Tamilnadu Housing Board, KK Nagar Division, Ashok Nagar, Chennai - 83 S.MANIKUMAR, J., ars W.P.No.1476 of 2011 06.06.2014