Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
R K Agrawal vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 20 January, 2026
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Item No. 20/C-II
OA No. 32/2022
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 32/2022
Reserved on: 05.12.2025.
Pronounced on: 20.01.2026.
Hon'ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Shri R. K. Agrawal, s/o Late Phool Chand Agrawal
Additional Superintendent of Police
(Retired), CBI, STF, New Delhi
Presently residing
At- Orange 405
Gulmohar Residency
Ahinsa Khand-11
Indrapuram
Distt. Ghaziabad, U.P.
Pincode-201014 ... Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. S. K. Gupta)
Versus
1. Union of India
Through its Secretary
Department of Personnel & Training
Ministry of Public Grievances & Pensions
At- North Block, New Delhi-110001
2. The Director
Central Bureau of Investigation
5-B, 11th Floor, A-Wing
CGO Complex, Lodhi Road
New Delhi-110003 ... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar)
NEETU Digitally signed by
NEETU SHARMA
Date: 2026.01.29
SHARMA 17:47:52+05'30'
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Item No. 20/C-II
OA No. 32/2022
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A): -
By way of the present O.A. filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant, in Para 8 of the O.A., has prayed for the following reliefs: -
"8.1. To quash and set aside, first stage advice of the Central Vigilance Commission dated 11.10.2013.
8.2. To quash and set aside, the memorandum of charge bearing No. F No. 221/06/2011 AVD-II(B) dated 04.08.2015.
8.3. To quash and set aside orders No. F No. 221/06/2011 AVD-II(B) dated 10.01.2017.
8.4. To quash and set aside the report of Inquiring Authority dated 01.06.2018.
8.5. To quash and set aside, Union Public Service Commission‟s advice dated 17.11.2020.
8.6. To quash and set aside punishment order bearing No. F No. 221/06/2011 AVD-II(B) dated 06.04.2021.
8.7. To quash and set aside order bearing No. DP/RDA Cell- 2021/1588/53/01/2011 dated 24.11.2021.
8.8. To award cost.
8.9. Any other relief(s) which the Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. As stated by the applicant, he was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police, CBI on 01.07.1983. Thereafter, he was promoted as Inspector of Police, CBI on 16.08.1988 as also to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI on 28.04.2003. 2.1 The applicant was further promoted to the post of Additional Superintendent (Grade ‗A'/Gazetted) in the Pay Band-3 (Rs. 15600-39100/-) + Grade Pay of Rs. 6600/- along with other 3 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 colleagues in pursuance to letter of DoP&T dated 11.01.2010 vide Office Order dated 20.01.2010 (Annexure-A/9), i.e., with the approval of the Hon'ble Prime Minister as Minister-in-Charge of DoP&T. 2.2 On 11.10.2013 (Annexure-A/2), Central Vigilance Commission (in short 'CVC') had advised for initiation of RDA for major penalty against the applicant. The Hon'ble Prime Minister as Minister-in-Charge of DoP&T had delegated his power of making appointment and promotion to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police including some other post to the Hon'ble Minister of State in Prime Minister's office vide order dated 06.01.2015 (Annexure-A/10).
2.2 Memorandum of charge dated 04.08.2015 (Annexure- A/3) under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for initiating Major Penalty) was served on the applicant on 12.08.2015. The applicant was directed to submit a written statement of defence within ten days of receipt of memorandum and also to state whether the applicant deserves to be heard in person. On 18.09.2015, the applicant had submitted his written statement of defense. On 10.01.2017 (Annexure-A/5), Sh. Anurag, Superintendent of Police, CBI, SC-I, New Delhi was appointed as Inquiring Authority to inquire into the charges framed against the applicant. On the same date, vide another order, Sh. A. K. Pandey, Additional Superintendent of Police, CBI, SC-II, New 4 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Delhi was appointed as Presenting Officer to present the case in support of the charges against the applicant before Inquiring Authority.
2.3 Inquiring Authority submitted its report dated 01.06.2018 whereby the IA had held Article of Charge No. 1- as partly proved; Article of Charge No. II-as Not proved; Article of Charge No. III- as Proved; Article of Charge no. IV- as Partly proved; Article of Charge No. V- as Proved and Article of Charge No. VI- as Not proved.
2.4 After considering the Inquiry Report dated 01.06.2018 of the IA, the DoP&T tentatively decided to agree with the findings of the IA in respect of Articles of Charge I, II, III, IV & V but disagreed with the findings of the IA in respect of Article of Charge VI to the extent that during the period from 16.08.2004 to 20.01.2010 as DSP and from 20.01.2010 to 03.01.2011 as ASP, the applicant showed the accused Jeetpal Singh as a private person in the charge sheet of RC 21(A)/2006-SCU-V/SIC- II/CBI/New Delhi knowing fully well that he was a public servant.
2.5 On 01.10.2018 (Annexure-A/6), the DoP&T has supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report along with the disagreement note to the applicant. On 17.10.2018, the applicant has submitted his representation to the respondents. On 28.02.2019, the applicant has been retired after attaining the age of superannuation. 5 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 2.6 Union Public Service Commission in its advice dated 17.11.2020 (Annexure-A/7) held that Article of Charge No. I & VI as partially proved, Article of Charge No. II as not proved, Article of Charge No. III, V & VI as proved. Accordingly, the Commission has advised imposition of penalty of withholding of 100% of monthly pension on permanent basis and withholding 100% of Gratuity permanently.
2.7 On 15.01.2021, the applicant had submitted his representation against the advice of UPSC. DoP&T vide punishment order dated 06.04.2021 (Annexure-A/8) has imposed penalty of withholding of 100% of monthly pension on permanent basis and withholding 100% of Gratuity permanently. The applicant addressed a representation dated 01.08.2021 (Annexure-A/11) to the respondents requesting him to recall/cancel memorandum of charge dated 04.08.2015 and punishment order dated 06.04.2021. The aforesaid representation dated 01.08.2021 has been disposed of by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Head Office, New Delhi on 24.11.2021 (Annexure-A/1) stating that no appeal lies against any order made by the President. Hence, the present O.A. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
3. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the act of the respondents is both factually perverse and legally unsustainable on the following grounds:--
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Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022
(a) The Hon'ble Prime Minister as Minister-in-Charge of DoP&T had not empowered the Hon'ble Minister of State in PMO to exercise disciplinary powers and/or quasi-judicial powers in respect of the applicant. Therefore, it is submitted that the Hon'ble MoS (PMO) is not competent authority to initiate disciplinary action by framing of charges and directing holding of inquiry into them and imposing disciplinary punishment against the applicant as he has been appointed Deputy Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police prior to 06.01.2015 (Annexure-A/10).
(b) The decision to appoint the Inquiring Authority and the Presenting Officer has not been taken by the competent authority, but the same has been taken by MoS in PMO who is incompetent to take decision in the instant matter.
(c) The written statement of defense has not been examined by the Disciplinary Authority and that the Inquiring Authority and the Presenting Officer have been appointed by MoS in PMO itself vitiated the whole of the proceeding initiated against the applicant by issuing the memorandum of charge dated 04.08.2015.
(d) The Regular Hearing on 28.07.2017 onwards were illegal as no formal order was issued by the Disciplinary Authority/DoP&T in favour of the Inquiring Authority after his promotion as Deputy Inspector General of Police, AC-I, CBI, New Delhi as the Inquiring Authority was appointed by designation as Superintendent of 7 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Police, CBI. Therefore, a fresh order was required for the Inquiring Authority to continue in the case of his promotion to the higher rank with effect from 30.06.2017.
(e) The entire disciplinary proceeding ought to be completed and the Inquiring Authority had to submit his report within a period of six months from the date of receipt of order of his appointment as Inquiring Authority. It is to be noted that one Committee of Experts on Disciplinary & Vigilance Inquiries (Hota Committee) had suggested to conclude the disciplinary proceedings in case of Major Penalty proceedings in a period of18 months, which was duly approved and accepted by the Government of India vide OM No. 372/3/2007-AVD-III (Vol. 10) dated 14.10.2003. However, the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were also amended vide Gazette notification dated 02.06.2017 whereby it was mandated that the Inquiring Authority has to conclude the Inquiry and submit his report within a period of six months from the date of receipt of order of appointment as Inquiring Authority. The Inquiring Authority has submitted Inquiry Report on 01.06.2018 i.e. after 1 year 4 months 21 days. Neither the IA has sought extension of time to submit his report nor the DoP&T has granted additional time to the IA. In view of point No. (x) of the DoP&T OM No. 425/04/2012-AVD-IV (A) dated 29.11.2012 which states that the I.O. was required to complete the proceedings in six months' time from the date of receipt of order of his appointment as I.O. Where it is not possible to adhere to this time limit, the I.O. should 8 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 submit reasons for delay to the Disciplinary Authority in writing.
No reasons for delay were submitted by the Inquiring Authority to the Disciplinary Authority in the present matter.
(f) The entire disciplinary proceeding ought to be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of order of his appointment as Inquiring Authority as mandated vide CVC Circular No. 02/01/2016, Circular No. 000-DGL-18dated 18.01.2016 regarding timely completion of disciplinary proceedings/departmental inquiry proceedings improving vigilance administration and as per this CVC circular, the departmental proceedings were to be completed within 6 months as per Model Time Limit For Departmental Enquiries as laid down in Circular No. 8 (1) (g) 99 (3) dated 03.03.1999.
(g) The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India also passed an order for completing the enquiry in a time bound manner as held on 16.12.2015 in Civil Appeal No. 958 of 2010 Pram Nath Bali Vs Registrar, High Court of Delhi & Anr. Para No. 33, "Keeping these factors in mind, we are of the considered opinion that every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavour to conclude the departmental inquiry proceedings once initiated against the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six months as on outer limit Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the timeframe then efforts should be made to conclude within reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year".
(h) The DoP&T had issued OM No. 221/07/2014-AVD.II (B) dated 25.02.2014 vide which Single Window System was 9 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 introduced by the DoP&T for receiving proposals for initiation of Departmental Proceedings (DP) against Group A Officers of the CBI and also in order to avoid delay in processing of the proposals due to procedural infirmities etc. in the proposals referred to DoP&T for initiation of departmental proceedings against such officers of CBI. Apart from other things, it was also clarified in the said OM that the proposals received would initially be scrutinized in DoP&T in terms of information sought and In consonance with the prescribed Checklist & that, incomplete cases would be returned after pointing out deficiencies. Cases, which are complete in all respects as per the Checklist, would only be accepted for further detailed scrutiny and examination. The said OM dated 25.02.2014 was received in CBI HO on 07.05.2014 itself whereas the Memorandum No. 221/06/2011-AVD. II (B) dated 04.08.2015 was served on 12.08.2015. As per this Memorandum, a Show Cause Notice was required to be issued to the applicant and to obtain his explanation as per the enclosed Check List but no explanation was called for from the applicant thus the procedure was not followed.
(i) The DoP&T had issued OM No. 425/04/2012-AVD-IV(A) dated 29,11.2012 regarding guidelines for monitoring & expeditious disposal of Disciplinary Proceeding cases but no guidelines were ever followed by the DOP&T and CBI, during and after the Enquiry.
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(j) There is no discussion as to how the alleged misconduct can be regarded as grave misconduct within the meaning of explanation
(b) after Rule 8 (5) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
(k) The order of punishment is otherwise nullified, since no pecuniary loss had been caused to department/government, therefore, the imposition of punishment arising out of departmental proceedings under Rule 9 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 may not be legally enforceable after the retirement of the applicant.
(l) The order of punishment is too severe, shocking, disproportionate as it shocks human conscience, since applicant was pension holder (pensioner) withholding of 100% of monthly pension on permanent basis and withholding 100% of Gratuity on permanent basis is undoubtedly too harsh.
REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS
4. Learned counsel for the respondents, by referring to the counter affidavit filed on 20.09.2022, submitted that the Charge Memo dated 04.08.2015 was issued by the Competent Authority to the applicant with six Articles of Charge including alleged demand of bribe amounting to Rs. 50-60 lakhs and on the non- payment thereof there were allegations to falsely implicate some persons. It was further alleged that despite directions/advice of the higher authorities, the applicant inserted certain points to 11 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 falsely implicate those persons. Thus, a RDA for major penalty was initiated against the applicant. The applicant submitted his written statement of defence and denied the charges. The Competent Authority was not satisfied with the same and decided to inquire into the matter and thereafter, Inquiring Authority (IA) and Presenting Officer (PO) were appointed vide order dated 10.01.2017.
4.1 The IA submitted his Reports on 01.06.2018 and concluded that some charges proved, some charges partly proved and some charges not proved against the CO/applicant and the same was forwarded to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority agreed on the findings of the IA on 5 charges, but on the 6th charge, issued a disagreement note dated 11.09.2018. The Report of IA along with the Disagreement Note were forwarded on 24.09.2018 to the applicant for submitting his representation. On 15.10.2018, the applicant submitted his representation. The said representation was examined by the Disciplinary Authority and it tentatively decided that the misconduct as committed by the applicant was grave enough and referred the matter to the UPSC for their Statutory Advice on 30.08.2019. The UPSC vide its advice on 17.11.2020 observed that the act of the applicant was serious enough and advised that the ends of justice would be met if penalty of withholding of 100% of the monthly pension as admissible to the applicant be imposed upon him on permanent basis and further 100% of gratuity as admissible to him should 12 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 also be withheld permanently. The UPSC's advice was forwarded to the applicant on 01.01.2021. On 15.01.2021, the applicant submitted his representation on the advice of the UPSC which was duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 06.04.2021 after considering the representation of the applicant as submitted on the advice given by the UPSC, decided to withhold the 100% of the monthly pension otherwise admissible and further withholding of 100% Gratuity permanently as admissible to the applicant. 4.2 It is submitted that the applicant being a Group-A Officer, his Appointing Authority is the President of India. However, what the applicant is challenging is that the Charge Memo was issued under the authority of Minister of State (MoS) in the office of the Hon'ble Prime Minister and according to the applicant, the Hon'ble MoS was not the Competent Authority to issue the Charge Memo. The said contention of the applicant is wrong and hence denied. It is submitted that in accordance with Article 77 of the Constitution of India and the Government of India (Transaction of Business Rules), the Ministries/Departments under the charge of the Hon'ble Prime Minister, it is the prerogative of the Hon'ble Prime Minister to delegate/allot the work to the MoS in the PMO. The said power/authority is the original authority of the Hon'ble Prime Minister and he is entitled to delegate or allocate work to the MoS. As per the same, the Hon'ble Prime Minister has approved that powers regarding appointment in respect of posts 13 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 upto the level of J.S. may be delegated to the MoS in PMO and thus, the MoS becomes the Disciplinary Authority of such employees. It may be submitted herein, that on similar issue, this Tribunal had the occasion to decide various O.As including O.A. Nos. 3301/2008, 3695/2019 and 2956/2019 and this Tribunal was pleased to reject the said O.As.
4.3 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that with regard to the contention of the CO that regular hearings (RH) held on 28.07.2017 onwards are illegal as no formal order was issued in favour of the I.O. by the DA after his promotion as DIG, AC-I, CBI, New Delhi, it is stated that DoP&T vide ID No. 221/16/2016- AVD.II (B) dated 10.01.2018 had clarified that I.O. is appointed by name and not by designation he holds. Therefore, no fresh order is required for the I.O. to continue when the I.O. is promoted to a higher rank. It is further submitted that with regard to the contention of the C.O. that a show cause notice (SCN) was required to be issued to the C.O. as per OM dated 221/07/2014- AVD.II (B) dated 25.02.2014 of the DoP&T before issuing charge sheet, it is stated that the checklist in the said OM does not mandate a SCN to be necessarily issued to the C.O. REJOINDER TO THE REPLY OF RESPONDENTS
5. In rebuttal to the reply filed by the respondents, the applicants have filed rejoinder on 08.12.2022 reiterating the contentions as stated in the O.A. The applicant's counsel denied that no appeal 14 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 lies under Rule 22 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against the order in question. The Rule 23 (V) (c) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is quite clear on the rights of the Govt. servant to prefer an appeal against an order reducing or withholding the pension. The explanation clause of the Rule 23 clearly states that the expression ‗pension' includes additional pension, gratuity and any other retirement benefits. Hence, the applicant is well within his rights to challenge the order for major penalty passed against him. 5.1 It is wrong to suggest the applicant has not challenged the findings of the inquiry report dated 01.06.2018 on the merits or procedural, improprietory. The applicant has all along challenged the various orders and prayed for the quashing of the same i.e. the CVC advice issued vide OM No. 013/DPT/009/228934 dated 11.10.2013, the Memorandum of Charge, the Union Public Service Commission's Advice dated 17.11.2020 as well as the punishment order dated 06.04.2021. The advice rendered by the Central Vigilance Commission vide its letter dated 11.10.2013 is totally based on surmises and conjectures. The said advice is contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case. The CVC in its observation has stated that Sh. Jeetpal Singh was not charge sheeted despite being member of several cooperative societies and a disproportionate asset charge was not being looked into against him. The said observations are totally contrary to the facts that the applicant had filed a charge sheet on 23.06.2006 against Sh. Jeetpal Singh in CBI Case No. RC. 21 (A) 2006/SCU-V/SCR- 15 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 II/CBI/New Delhi exactly on the abovementioned charge in a case assigned to CBI by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi passed on 13.02.2006 in connection with WP (C) No. 10066/2004 and CMS No. 15487/2005.The applicant tried to investigate Sh. Jeetpal Singh on the charges of acquisition of disproportionate assets also by enquiring into the assets of his family members as he had information that they have acquired membership in various co- operative societies through the RTI. However, his source information report was not approved by the competent authority and no case was registered on the ground that an offence under Delhi Co-operative Societies Act was not notified under DSPE Act for investigation by CBI.
5.2 It is over vehemently denied on behalf of applicant that he tried to implicate anybody with pre-meditated intentions. The applicant acted well within his official mandate on the basis of information received and verified and after seeking proper approvals from the competent authority. The role of the applicant ends, on the submission of the Source Information and then it is for the I.O. of the concerned case to investigate the role of the suspects. The inquiry report has nowhere specified as to how the acts of the applicant constituted ‗grave misconduct' to attract the major penalty of withholding of 100% of monthly pension otherwise admissible to the CO on permanent basis and further withholding of 100% of gratuity permanently admissible to him. In fact, the order of punishment is otherwise nullified, since no 16 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 pecuniary loss had been caused to the Govt. Exchequer. There is no denial of the facts that the aforementioned penalties are quite severe and harsh considering the alleged offences against the applicant. It is wrong to suggest that the applicant has nowhere challenged the decision making process or the infirmities in the decision making process. On the contrary, the applicant at every stage has written letters/submitted written representation to the authorities seeking clarifications/challenging the various decisions but failed to receive any positive response from the concerned authorities. The applicant has denied the charges levied against him vide detailed reply dated 18.09.2015 and has challenged the oral testimonies of the various witnesses without any documentary evidences to prove the same. The allegations regarding demand of bribe, entry of Sh. Jeepal Singh as a private person in the list of accused etc., are not accepted even by the Inquiry Officer and i.e. why charge No. II and charge No. VI were not proved, whereas, charge No. I and charge No. IV are partly proved. The applicant has time and again pointed out various irregularities in conducting the aforesaid inquiry i.e. non- compliance of Rule 14 (9) CCS (CCA) Rules 1965, non-issuance of show cause notice to the CO as per OM DoP&T dated 25.02.2014 and also the non- completion of the inquiry proceedings in 6 months' time as per DoP&T OM No. 425/04/2012-AVD-IV (A) dated 29.11.2012. The department has failed to adhere to the various timelines as issued by the DoP&T, CVC and reaffirmed by 17 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 the various judicial pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court, resulting the entire report being vitiated and void ab-initio. 5.3 It is correct to suggest that the advice of the UPSC is issued without application of the mind and is contrary to the facts of the case. The advice has nowhere specified that on what grounds the competent authority has come to the conclusion that the alleged charges constitute grave misconduct warranting such severe and harsh penalties. It is further wrong to suggest that advice of the UPSC has no binding effect on the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has accepted the advice of UPSC in toto without any application of mind. The Memorandum was served to the applicant in Delhi and the departmental proceedings were started, continued and completed in Delhi during the posting of the applicant in Delhi. The applicant got his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation from Delhi and he was residing in a Govt. accommodation in Delhi. Further, cause of action lies in Delhi and therefore, this Tribunal is not lacking the Territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present O.A. It is wrong to suggest that the present petition is without territorial jurisdiction as the Offices/Headquarters of the respondents, are situated within the territorial limits of this Tribunal. Hence, the Tribunal is competent to entertain and decide the present petition. 5.4 The applicant has filed an Additional Rejoinder to supplement his earlier rejoinder dated 08.12.2022.The rejoinder 18 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 addresses six Articles of Charge contained in the Memorandum dated 04.08.2015, arising out of his tenure as DSP/ASP in CBI. The applicant contends that the charges are false, baseless, malicious, and unsupported by record, and that he acted strictly in accordance with the CBI Crime Manual and established procedure.
Article-wise Defence Article I Allegation: Submission of verified source information falsely implicating Jeetpal Singh and Bhupender Singh. Defence: The applicant asserts that the Verified Source Information (VSI) dated 12.10.2009 was only against Manohar Lal, Tarsem Bansal, and unknown persons. Jeetpal Singh and Bhupender Singh were never named as accused, and no evidence was alleged against them. The VSI and subsequent verification were duly processed and approved by competent CBI authorities, leading to registration of RC No. 8(S)/2009.Hence, the charge is factually incorrect.
Article II Allegation: Retaining names of Jeetpal Singh and Bhupender Singh despite directions of SP.
19Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Defence: The source information was purely oral, and the applicant clearly recorded that there was no concrete evidence against them. No written or official direction from the SP exists. The applicant used the expression ―unknown others‖ and did not recommend action against them. The charge is termed frivolous and concocted.
Article III Allegation: Improper involvement in search operations of Jeetpal Singh and Bhupender Singh.
Defence: Investigation and search proposals were exclusively within the domain of the Investigating Officer (DSP Binay Kumar) and approved by higher authorities. The applicant had no role in proposing or conducting searches. Documentary evidence (Annexure-13) supports this position.
Article IV Allegation: Abuse, threats, and demand of ₹50-60 lakhs from Jeetpal Singh.
Defence: The applicant categorically denies the allegations. The Inquiry Officer has already held Article IV as ―Not Proved‖ in the inquiry report dated 01.06.2018.No contemporaneous complaint, corroboration, or documentary evidence exists. Bhupender Singh himself stated that no demand of money was 20 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 made. The complaint is stated to be delayed, motivated, and malicious.
Article V Allegation: Seeking personal information through RTI via a proxy source and misuse of position.
Defence: Collection of intelligence and deployment of sources is a legitimate duty under the CBI Crime Manual. Use of RTI through a source is not prohibited. The SIR dated 10.08.2010 disclosed serious IPC offences, not merely DCS Act violations. The SIR was allegedly suppressed by senior officers to shield Jeetpal Singh. The applicant acted bonafide and within authority.
Article VI Allegation: Showing Jeetpal Singh as a private person in charge- sheet despite being a public servant.
Defence: The charge-sheet was legally vetted by Public Prosecutors and approved by CBI Headquarters. The alleged acts (forgery, false records) were committed in a private capacity, not in discharge of official duties. The trial court has already framed charges, validating the investigation. Hence, no misconduct is attributable to the applicant.
21Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Additional Legal Submissions
1. CVC Advice (OM dated 11.10.2013):
o The applicant disputes the CVC's observations as factually and legally unsustainable.
o No favour was shown to Jeetpal Singh; rather, incriminating material was placed on record.
2. Violation of Natural Justice:
o The applicant was not issued a show-cause notice at the pre-disciplinary stage under the DoP&T Single Window System, causing serious prejudice.
3. Inordinate Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings:
o Proceedings took over 5 years and 8 months, contrary to DoP&T guidelines, CVC circulars, and the Supreme Court judgment in Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar, HC of Delhi.
o Such delay is asserted to be fatal to the disciplinary action.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court namely; (i) Judgment dated 06.11.2024 in W.P. (C) 6000/2018 in the matter of Union of India Vs. R. K. Nim, reported in 2024, SCC Online Del, 7712; (ii) Judgment dated 05.09.2013 in Civil Appeals No. 7761/2013 with 7762-67 of 2013 in the matter of Union of India Vs. B. V. Gopinath, reported in 2014, Vol. 1, SCC 351; and (iii) Judgment dated 17.12.2021 in Civil Appeal No. 22 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 7764/2021 in the matter of Sunny Abraham Vs. Union of India, reported in 2021, Vol. 20, SCC 12.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the ground pleaded by the applicant in the O.A. that the approval granted by the Hon'ble MoS (PP) may not be construed to be approval even by the competent disciplinary authority, such issue has already been decided by this Tribunal in its order/judgment dated 15.10.2018 in O.A. No. 3909/2018 in the case of Madan Mohan Vs. Union of India and further, in the case of Anil Srivastava Vs. Department of Expenditure in O.A. No. 1458/2022 vide order/judgment dated 14.09.2022 and such judgments have attained finality after the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
8. Mr. Hanu Bhaskar, learned counsel for the respondents, has further argued that while seeking approval of the Hon'ble MoS (PP), he has accorded his approval qua the article of charges inasmuch as in the relevant note, the article of charges as issued vide the impugned memorandum has also been placed before him. He further added that while granting the approval for initiation of the impugned disciplinary proceedings, the competent authority has also perused the draft article of charges from him for issuance of the same charges which have been approved by him on 22.07.2015.
9. Mr. S. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant, in response thereto, submits that the article of charges might have 23 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 been placed before the Hon'be MoS while granting his approval on 22.07.2015, however, draft memorandum includes a charge which also contains the list of documents and list of witnesses impugned in the present O.A. have not been there before the Hon'ble MoS while granting approval on 22.07.2015 and the draft of the impugned memorandums has only been approved by the Additional Secretary, as is evident from the page 228 of the paper book.
10. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and carefully perused the pleadings available on record.
11. We have also perused the original file wherein approval has been granted by the Hon'ble Minister of State (PP) on 22.07.2015, a copy of which has been placed at page no. 227 of the paper-book.
12. We have further perused the noting dated 28.07.2015, placed at page no. 228 of the paper-book, vide which draft memorandum issued to the applicant has been sought and granted by the Additional Secretary (S & V) on 04.08.2015.
13. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings, rival submissions, original records produced before us, and the settled legal position, the following issues arise for adjudication in the instant case:-
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(i) Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of impugned charge memorandum dated 04.08.2015 were approved by the Competent Authority or Hon'ble MoS? Is Hon'ble MoS competent to do the same?
(ii) Whether in the instant case, inquiry has to be completed within 6 months, if not completed, the IA had taken up the matter for permission from the Disciplinary Authority in writing as is the requirement of Rule 14 (22) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
(iii) Whether the penalty imposed under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is legally sustainable and proportionate;
and
14. The applicant's principal contention is that the Hon'ble Minister of State (PMO) was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings or approve the charge memorandum, as the applicant had been appointed/promoted prior to delegation dated 06.01.2015.
15. The law on this aspect is no longer res integra. In Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that approval of the charge-sheet as a whole by the Competent Authority is mandatory, and mere approval to initiate proceedings is insufficient. The same principle has been reiterated in Sunny Abraham Vs. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 12 and 25 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 order/judgment dated 17.07.2025 of this Tribunal in OA No. 503/2023 in the matter of Sh. Anil Kumar Kashyap Vs. Union of India & Ors. It would be profitable to extract the relevant portion of order/said judgment in Sh. Anil Kumar Kashyap (supra) as under:-
"7. Having regard to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we observe that there is no dispute that the applicant, being a Scientist-D, is a Group „A‟ officer and his Disciplinary Authority is the President of India i.e. Minister of Electronics and Information Technology and vide Order dated 6.4.2022 (Annexure R-1) issued with the approval of the Minister of Electronics and Information Technology in connection with the allocation of work to Minister of State for Electronics and Information Technology, it has been decided that all disciplinary/vigilance matters relating to officers up to the level of Director/Scientist F (Where President is the Appointing/Disciplinary Authority) will be disposed of at the level of Minister of State for Electronics and Information Technology and the impugned charged Memorandum dated 13.09.2022 (Annexure A/1) admittedly has been issued with the approval of the MoS, and further contention of the applicant that the impugned charge Memorandum is hopelessly time barred, we are of the considered view that the following issues are required to be adjudicated by this Tribunal in the instant case:-
(i) Whether the Minister of State for Electronics and Information Technology can act as a delegate of the Minister of Electronics and Information Technology in respect of works allocated to such Minister of State?
(ii) Whether the impugned chargesheet is barred by limitation?
8. For appreciating the issue (i) as noted under para 7 above, which mainly relates to conduct of business of the Government of India, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the provisions of Article 77 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under:-
"77. Conduct of business of the Government of India. - (1) All executive actions of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules (notification No. S.O. 2297, dated the 3rd November, 1958, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 1958, Pt. II, Sec.
3 (ii), p. 1315, as amended from time to time) to be made by the President, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. (3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.
(4) 2[***]" (emphasis supplied) 8.1 Having regard to the above provisions of the Constitution of India, it is observed that Clause (1) enacts that whenever executive action is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President in whom the 26 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 executive power of the Union is vested. A similar provisions is made for the conduct of Government business in the States. The provisions of clause (1) are merely directory. Where an order is not issued in strict compliance with the provisions of Article 77 (1), it can be established by evidence aliunde from elsewhere or from another source that the order was made by the appropriate authority. Clause (2) provides that the validity of an order or instrument made or executed in the name of the President, and authenticated in the manner specified in the rules made by the President, shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. If an order is issued in the name of the President and is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed in clause (2), there is an irrebuttable presumption that the order or instrument is made or executed by the President. Any non-compliance with the said rule does not invalidate the order, but it precludes the drawing of any such irrebuttable presumption.
8.2 It does not prevent courts from inquiring into the correctness of recitals contained in an order or instrument. Nor does it prevent a person from challenging orders of the government as being bad or invalid or ultra vires. In Emperor v. Shib Nath Banerji, reported in AIR 1945 PC 156, a case under the Government of India Act, 1935, which contained a similar provision, the Privy Council observed as follows:
"It is quite a different thing to question the accuracy of recital contained in a duly authenticated order, particularly where that recital purports to state as a fact the carrying out of what I regard as a condition necessary to the valid making of that order. In the normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. The presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that the recital is not accurate."
8.3 Under clause (3) the President is to make rules for the more convenient transaction of government business and for the allocation of the same amongst ministers. A similar provision occurs in Article 166 (3) empowering the Governor to make rules for the conduct of government business in the States. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his function conferred on him by or under this Constitution with the aid and advice of his minister, he does so by making rules for more convenient transaction of business and for allocation among ministers of the said business in accordance with Articles 77 (3) and 166 (3), respectively. Further the rules of business and allocation among ministers of the said business is relatable to Articles 53 (1) and 154 (1) that the executive power shall be exercised by the President or the Governor directly or through the subordinate officers. Articles 74 (1) and 163 (1) providing for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President and the Governor respectively are the sources of the rules of business. In this context, in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831, the then the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of India observed that the decision of any minister or officer under rules of business made under any of the two Articles 77 (3) and 166 (3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These articles do not provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of the minister or officer under 27 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 the rules of business is the decision of the President or the Governor. Referring to the holding in State of U.P v. Babu Ram Upadhya, reported in AIR 1961 SC 751, that the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provisions of Article 311, is not an executive power under Article 154 but a constitutional power and is not capable of being delegated to officers subordinate to him, the then the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of India observed that it is no longer good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E.F Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600. The theory that only the President or the Governor is personally to exercise pleasure of dismissing or removing a public servant is repelled by express words in Article 311 that no person who is a member of the civil service in the Union or the State shall be dismissed or removed by authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Thus the pleasure of the President or the Governor is exercised by such officers on whom the President or the Governor confers or delegates power. In Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of W.B., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1145, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the decision of any minister or officer under the rules of business is a decision of the President or the Governor, as the case may be. The President or the Governor means the President or the Governor aided and advised by the minister. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation Power. Although the executive power vests in the President and the Governor respectively, it is carried on by ministers under Articles 77(3) and 166(3). The allocation of business is the decision of the President or the Governor on the aid and advice of ministers. In A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 443, it was reiterated that the essence of the cabinet system of government responsible to legislature is that an individual minister is responsible for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his ministry. In every administration decisions are taken by civil servants, the ministers lay down the policy and the Council of Ministers settle major issues. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does so on behalf of the government and not as its delegate.
8.4 Clause (4) introduced by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976 denying any court or other authority power to require the production of any rules made under clause (3) for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, was omitted by the Constitution (Forty fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
8.5 Further, as per the provisions of Article 53 (1) of the Constitution of India, the executive power of the Union vests in the President and the same is exercised by him directly or through officers subordinate to him. Further, for smooth and convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, the President in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (3) of article 77 of the Constitution has made the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 and the Government of India Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961. These rules lay down the functions and the manner of their discharge for the Ministries, Departments, Secretariats and Offices of Govt. of India. The decisions of the Government of India are not always taken personally by the President and the same may be taken by the Minister concerned or by the officials authorized under the above- mentioned Rules. Further, Rule 4 (3) of The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 provides as under:- 28
Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) or sub- rule (2), the President may, on the advice of the Prime Minister-
(a) associate in relation to the business allotted to a Minister under either of the said sub-rules, another Minister or Deputy Minister to perform such functions as may be assigned to him;
(b) entrust the responsibility for specified items of business affecting any one or more than one Department to a Minister who is in charge of any other Department or to a Minister without Portfolio who is not in charge of any Department."
8.6 Further Rule 8 of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 (in short „TBRs‟) deals with Submissions of Cases to the Prime Minister and the President. Rule 8 of the TBRs reads as under:-
"All cases of the nature specified in the Third Schedule to these Rules shall, before the issue of orders thereon, be submitted to the Prime Minister or to the President or to the Prime Minister and the President, as indicated in that Schedule."
8.7 It is apt to mention that in Sanjeevi Naidu and others vs. State of Madras and others, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1102, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that the Minister is not expected to burden himself with the day to day administration.
His primary function is to lay down the policies and programmes of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the major policies and programmes of the government. Hence, arises the need for making provision for the more convenient transaction of business within each ministry. This is done by the Rules of Business by designating particular civil servants or officials within the ministry who shall be competent to take decisions or dispose of business of the Government, subject of course, to the control of the minister-in- charge, or directions issued by him, which are known as „standing orders‟. Any action taken by the specified official is an action of the Government, because the Officials designated by the Rules of Business are limbs of the Government, nor its delegates. Further, in Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that the Council of Ministers exercise power not as delegate of President, but as official subordinate to him by the constitutional mechanism envisaged by Article 77 (3).
8.8 In the light of the above legal discussion assigning of the subject related to cases of disciplinary action, against officers of the All India Services and all Group „A‟ Central Civil Services including those under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, in which the applicant is working, by the President to the Minister in-charge is not ipso facto a delegation of power. Further, as per Rule 4 (3) of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, President is empowered to associate, on the advice of Prime Minister, any Minister or Deputy Minister to perform such function as may be assigned to him. Thus when the Minister-in-charge (Prime Minister) further entrusts the function to the subordinate (including Minister of State), and accordingly such function is performed by the subordinate so empowered, there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the subordinate is that of the Minister. Therefore, MoS for Electronics and Information Technology can be said to be the competent authority for approving the chargesheet issued to the applicant.
8.9 At this stage, we deem it fit to refer to the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Madan Mohan vs. Union of India in 29 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 OA No. 3909/2018 decided on 15.10.2018 in which this Tribunal in paras 9 and 10 held as under:-
"9. From this, it is evident that the allocation of powers between the Minister of Finance on the one hand and Minister of State for Finance, on the other hand, were made. It is a matter of arrangement and allocation within the Ministry and by no stretch of imagination, it can be treated as sub delegation. The power exercised by the Minister of State would be as good as it having been exercised by the Minister of Finance.
10. The applicant placed reliance upon certain paragraphs in the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India v B.V. Gopinath. That was the case in which the powers of Minister of Finance were exercised by the Chairman of Central Board of Direct Taxes. That is not the case here."
8.10 The above Order/Judgment of this Tribunal was challenged before the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi by the said Madan Mohan by way of Writ Petition (C) No. 12130/2018, titled Madan Mohan vs. Union of India, and the Hon‟ble High Court had also an occasion to deal with the similar issue as noted in para 7 (i) above, which reads as under:-
"whether the Minister of State for Finance acts as a delegate of the Minister for Finance in respect of works are located to such Minister of State"
8.11 The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi vide Order/Judgment dated 04.03.2025 elaborately noted the rules position as well as the law on the said subject and held as under:-
"25. We, having heard learned Counsel and perused the record and the law in that regard, are of the view that there was, in fact, no such sub delegation, as the Tribunal has correctly held. All that the Office Order dated 3 April 2018 did was to allocate, certain some of the business which otherwise fell to the lot of the MOF, to the MOS. The MOS, while discharging the said functions, did not act as a delegatee of the MOF. The exercise of his functions was deemed to be exercise of the said functions by the MOF himself. In exercise of the said function, the MOS was, therefore, answerable, not to the MOF, but to the Government itself.
26. This position is not res integra. It stands lucidly captured in the following passages from A. Sanjeevi Naidu v State of Madras, (1970 1 SCC 443), rendered in the context of Article 16618 of the Constitution of India:
"9. We think that the above submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants are without force and are based on a misconception of the principles underlying our Constitution. Under our Constitution, the Governor is essentially a constitutional head, the administration of State is run by the Council of Ministers. But in the very nature of things, it is impossible for the Council of Ministers to deal with each and every matter that comes before the Government. In order to obviate that difficulty the Constitution has authorised the Governor under sub-article (3) of Article 166 to make rules for the more convenient transition of business of the Government of the State and for the allocation amongst its Ministers, the business of the Government. All matters excepting those in which Governor is required to act in his discretion have to be allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. Apart from allocating business among the Ministers, the Governor can also make rules on the advice of his Council of Ministers for more convenient transaction of business. He cannot only allocate the 30 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular function. But this again he can do only on the advice of the Council of Ministers.
10. The cabinet is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken in any of the Ministries. That is the essence of joint responsibility. That does not mean that each and every decision must be taken by the cabinet. The political responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the Council of Ministers to discharge all or any of the Governmental functions. Similarly an individual Minister is responsible to the Legislature for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his ministry. This again is a political responsibility and not personal responsibility. Even the most hard working Minister cannot attend to every business in his department. If he attempts to do it, he is bound to make a mess of his department. In every well planned administration, most of the decisions are taken by the civil servants who are likely to be experts and not subject to political pressure. The Minister is not expected to burden himself with the day-to-day administration. His primary function is to lay down the policies and programmes of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the major policies and programmes of the Government. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. It is always open to a Minister to call for any file in his ministry and pass orders. He may also issue directions to the officers in his ministry regarding the disposal of Government business either generally or as regards any specific case. Subject to that over all power, the officers designated by the "Rules" or the standing orders, can take decisions on behalf of the Government. These officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates."
27. The above exposition of the law in A. Sanjeevi Naidu was rendered in the context of Article 166 of the Constitution of India which is the provision parallel to Article 7719, in respect of State Government. In other words, just as Article 77 (3) empowers the President to make Rules for more convenient transaction of business of the Government of India, and for allocation amongst Ministers of the said business, Article 166 (3) empowers the Governor of a State to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the State Government and for allocation amongst Ministers of the said business. As the Supreme Court has held in paras 9 and 10 of A. Sanjeevi Naidu, the very intent of Article 166 (3) - and, therefore, of Article 77 (3) in the case of the Union Government - is to obviate the difficulty of the Council of Ministers having to attend to every aspect of government business. Thus, Article 166 (3) empowers the Governor of a State to allocate, to one or other of his Ministers, any matter except those in which the Governor is required to act in his discretion.
28. Equally, the President can allocate, to any one or more of the Ministers, the functions which vest in the President - which would include the power to act as disciplinary authority in respect of Group A officers, as vested by Rules 12 (1) and 13 (1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
29. Para 10 of A. Sanjeevi Naidu further clarifies that the responsibility of any individual Minister, for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his Ministry, is a political, and not a 31 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 personal responsibility. No Minister can attend to all the work in his Ministry.
30. Thus, it is open to a Minister to issue directions to officers in his Ministry regarding disposal of government business. Such officers are entitled to take decisions. In doing so, they do not act as delegates of the Minister, but as limbs of the government. In other words, merely by allocating work which otherwise falls to his lot to officials in his Ministry, the Minister does not delegate such work. He merely allocates the work so as to enable him to attend to work which would necessarily require his, and his own, intervention, such as laying down policies and programmes of the government. The official in the Ministry, to whom the work is allocated by the Minister does not, therefore, while performing the said work, act as the Minister‟s delegate. He is another limb of the government.
31. A. Sanjeevi Naidu was followed by the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831. Paras 31 to 35 read thus:
"31. Further the Rules of Business and allocation of business among the Ministers are relatable to the provisions contained in Article 53 in the case of the President and Article 154 in the case of the Governor, that the executive power shall be exercised by the President or the Governor directly or through the officers subordinate. The provisions contained in Article 74 in the case of the President and Article 163 in the case of the Governor that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President or the Governor, as the case may be, are sources of the Rules of Business. These provisions are for the discharge of the executive powers and functions of the Government in the name of the President or the Governor. Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by an official employed in the Minister's department there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister. The official is merely the machinery for the discharge of the functions entrusted to a Minister (see Halsbury's Laws of England 4 th Ed., Vol. I, paragraph 748 at p. 170 and Carltona Ltd. v Works Commissioners, (1943) 2 All ER 560).
32. It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional law that Ministers must accept responsibility for every executive act. In England the Sovereign never acts on his own responsibility. The power of the Sovereign is conditioned by the practical rule that the Crown must find advisers to bear responsibility for his action. Those advisers must have the confidence of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our Constitution. The Indian Constitution envisages a Parliamentary and responsible form of Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Presidential form of Government. The powers of the Governor as the constitutional head are not different.
33. This Court has consistently taken the view that the powers of the President and the powers of the Governor are similar to the powers of the Crown under the British Parliamentary system. (See Ram Jawaya Kapur v State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 63, A. Sanjeevi Naidu, U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC 63). In Ram Jawaya Kapur case Mukherjea, C.J. speaking for the Court stated the legal position as follows. The Executive has the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law. The condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is that the Executive retains the confidence of the 32 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 legislative branch of the State. The initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, the carrying on of the general administration of the State are all executive functions. The Executive is to act subject to the control of the Legislature. The executive power of the Union is vested in the President. The President is the formal or constitutional head of the Executive. The real executive powers are vested in the Ministers of the Cabinet. There is a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions.
34. The functions of the Governor under the rules of business of Madras Government in regard to a scheme for nationalisation of certain bus routes were considered by this Court in Sanjeevi Naidu. The validity of the scheme was challenged on the ground that it was not formed by the State Government but by the Secretary to the Government pursuant to powers conferred on him under Rule 23-A of the Madras Government Business Rules.
35. The scheme was upheld for these reasons. The Governor makes rules under Article 166(3) for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State. The Governor cannot only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular function. But that could be done on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The essence of Cabinet System of Government responsible to the Legislature is that an individual Minister is responsible for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his Ministry. In every administration, decisions are taken by the civil servants. The Minister lays down the policies. The Council of Ministers settle the major policies. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. The officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions are entrusted to a Minister and these are performed by an official employed in the Minister's department, there is in law no delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister." (Emphasis supplied)
32. Rule 3 of the Transaction Business Rules envisages that all business allotted to a Department under the Allocation of Business Rules shall be disposed of by or under the general or special directions of, the Minister-in-Charge. The Allocation of Business Rules have been enacted in exercise of the power conferred by Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India. Rule 2 of the Allocation of Business Rules stipulates that the business of the Government of India shall be transacted in the Ministries, Departments, Secretariats and Officers specified in the First Schedule to the Allocation of Business Rules.
33. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in P D Kanunjna, on which Mr Shanker Raju placed reliance, identifies the MOF as the Authority Competent to exercise the power of the President, vested by Rules 12 and 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules to institute disciplinary proceedings against Group A Officers of the Ministry of Finance and to pass orders of penalty. The petitioner also does not dispute the fact that the MOF was empowered to do so.
34. The petitioner‟s contention is that it was the MOF and the MOF alone who could exercise this function and could not have delegated it to the MOS by the office order dated 3rd April 2018. 33 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022
35. The submission is fundamentally flawed. Rule 3 of the Transaction of Business Rules specifically ordains that all business allotted to a Department under the Allocation of Business Rules would be disposed of by, or under the general or special directions of, the Minister-in-Charge. Thus, the Minister- in-Charge, i.e. the MOF in the case of the petitioner, is empowered to either discharge the business falling within his purview under the Allocation of Business Rules on his own or have the business discharged under the general or special directions.
36. Paras 2(ii) of Office Order dated 4 July 2019 - which is not under challenge in the present case - specifically states that all matters where the President of India is the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority would be submitted to the Finance Minister through the Minister of State. Thus, the involvement of the Minister of State in disciplinary matters concerning Group A officers, cannot be wished away. In exercising his powers in that regard, the MOS does not act as a delegate to the MOF. The acts of the MOS could be treated as the acts of the MOF, who is responsible for discharging of business in the Ministry of Finance which falls to his lot. The allocation of business of various officials in the Ministry of Finance including the MOS, is merely a matter of convenience as observed by the Supreme Court in A. Sanjeevi Naidu and is well within the provinces of the jurisdiction of the MOF. Smooth, efficient and expedient functioning of the Government has, in the ultimate eventuate, to be the predominant consideration. Inasmuch as the MOS while exercising the said power, does not act as a delegate of the MOF, he is not answerable in exercise to the MOF either but acts as an officer of the Government of India. Such allocation of business is within the province of the MOF, as upheld by the Supreme Court in A Sanjeevi Naidu and Shamsher Singh.
37. If the submission of Mr Raju were accepted, the MOF - and, for that matter, every Minister - who acts as the delegate of the President of India in respect of a wide variety of functions which, statutorily are to be discharged by the President, would have to discharge each and every function herself or himself. This would place, as is noted in A. Sanjeevi Naidu, an impossible burden on the Union Minister in each case, and would paralyze Governmental functioning. The power and discretion to allocate some of the business which the Minister, as the delegate of the President, is required to discharge, to officers in his Ministry is, therefore, indispensable and essential. It would be extremely hazardous, therefore, to hold that the Minister has no power or authority to do so. We, certainly, are unwilling to accept such a proposition.
38. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioner‟s submission that the Office Order dated 3rd April 2018 is illegal to the extent it allocates the work of disciplinary matters in the Ministry of Finance to the MOS, is misconceived. There is no sub-delegation of work involved in this exercise. The MOF has only allocated the work relating to all disciplinary matters - which would include disciplinary matters relating to Group A officers - to the MOS. Neither is this subdelegation, nor does the MOS act as a delegate of the MOF. He exercises the power which the MOF would have otherwise exercised and, in doing so, is directly answerable to the Union Government and the President, and not to the MOF.
34Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022
39. In that view of the matter, there is complete compliance in the present case with the mandate of B.V. Gopinath as the charge- sheet was specifically put up before and approved by, the MOS.
40. Mr. Raju cited the orders passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chander v Central Board of Direct Taxes (Judgment dated 22nd April 2022 passed in WP(C) 11260/2019) and P.D. Kanunjna. They are essentially the same order, passed on the same date, in two writ petitions, but were released as separate orders. We have noted that P.D. Kanunjna identifies the MOF as the authority competent to exercise the power of the President, vested by Rules 12 and 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules to institute disciplinary proceedings against Group- A Officers of the Ministry of Finance. Beyond this, however, the decision is of no particular relevance, as it does not deal with the aspect of allocation of work by the MOF to the MOS, with which, principally, we are concerned in the present case. Besides, we have decided this matter on the basis of authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, with which the decision in P.D. Kanunjna does not deal.
41. Before parting we may note that Mr. Raju also sought to contend - though no such ground was taken before the Tribunal in the OA - that the Office Order 3 April 2018 could not have been issued without prior consultation of the DOPT. For this purpose, he relies on Rule 4(4)(a) of the Transaction of Business Rules.
42. It is obvious that the invocation of Rule 4(4)(a) by Mr. Raju is completely misdirected. Rule 4(4)(a) only requires prior consultation with the DOPT before determining methods of recruitment and conditions of service generally applicable to Government servants in civil employment. The Office Order dated 3 April 2018 did not involve determination either of methods of recruitment or conditions of service of general application to Government servants in civil employment. It did not even involve any abdication by the MOF, of his power to act as Disciplinary Authority in respect of Group A officers in the Ministry of Finance. It merely allocated to the MOS in the Ministry of Finance, certain aspects of the work which was, prior thereto, being undertaken by the MOF himself. Rule 4(4) of the Transaction of Business Rules has no application in such a case. Conclusion
43. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal correctly held that the Office Order dated 3 April 2018 merely involved an exercise of internal allocation of work by the MOF in his Ministry and was, therefore, perfectly legal..." 8.12 The aforesaid Order/Judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi was challenged by the said Madan Mohan by way of Special Leave Petition (C) No.12784/2025 before the Hon‟ble Apex Court and the Hon‟ble Apex Court vide Order dated 13.5.2025 while issuing notice, declined to stay the disciplinary proceedings.
8.13 With regard to the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the applicant on the judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in P.D. Kanunjna (supra), it is pertinent to note that the said decision was also considered by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in a subsequent latest judgment dated 04.03.2025 rendered in the case of Madan Mohan (supra). It is relevant to mention that the decision in P.D. Kanunjna (supra) was challenged by the Central Board of Direct Taxes by way of SLP No. 699/2023 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Although the said SLP was 35 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 dismissed, the Hon‟ble Apex Court expressly left the question of law, i.e., whether the disciplinary proceedings were initiated under the authority of the competent authority, open to be decided in an appropriate case. In view of this, and considering that the Hon‟ble High Court in Madan Mohan (supra) has rendered a detailed and recent judgment on the issue, with due reliance on the decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, this Tribunal, being a subordinate judicial forum, is bound to follow the latest binding precedent, i.e., the judgment in Madan Mohan (supra). As such the issue (i) as noted in para 7 above is answered in favour of the respondents. Further the case law relied upon by the applicant with regard to the above issue is not helpful to the applicant in view of latest judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Madan Mohan (supra)."
16. We have perused the original file. It is evident that approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings was accorded by the Hon'ble MoS (PMO) on 22.07.2015. However, from the noting dated 28.07.2015 and subsequent approval dated 04.08.2015 by the Additional Secretary (S&V), it clearly emerges that the complete draft charge memorandum, including the statement of imputations, list of witnesses, and list of documents, was not placed before nor approved by the Hon'ble MoS.
17. In view of foregone, it is decided that MoS is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings. In so far as this portion is concerned, it is decided against the applicant. However, in the present case, while approval for initiation of the proceedings may have been obtained from Hon'ble MoS, the final charge memorandum was approved only at the level of Additional Secretary, which is impermissible in law. This defect goes to the root of the matter and renders the entire disciplinary proceedings void ab initio. The requirement of seeking approval 36 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 of competent disciplinary authority has not been followed in this case. Therefore, this issue is decided against the respondents.
18. The memorandum of charge was issued on 04.08.2015. On 10.01.2017 (Annexure-A/4), Sh. Anurag, Superintendent of Police, CBI, SC-I, New Delhi was appointed as Inquiring Authority. The Inquiry Report was submitted on 01.06.2018, i.e., after more than one year and four months from the date of appointment of the Inquiring Authority, without any recorded extension or justification for delay.
19. At the outset, it would be appropriate to notice the legal framework governing the conduct and conclusion of departmental inquiries. Rule 14 (22) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 deals with the final order in disciplinary proceedings for major penalties, mandating the Disciplinary Authority (DA) to consider the inquiry report, defense, evidence, and penalties, and ensuring principles of natural justice are upheld before passing a final dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank order, with specific provisions for representation and appeal rights. For facility of reference, Rule 14 (22) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is reproduced herein below:
"(22) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises, such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself:37
Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interests of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and re-examine any such witnesses as hereinbefore provided."
20. The issue of delay in conclusion of departmental proceedings has also been examined by this Tribunal in its order dated 15.05.2025 passed in O.A. No. 644/2025, Vishal Garg Vs. National Investigation Agency & Anr. In the said decision, after considering the settled legal position laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the Hon'ble High Court, the Tribunal reiterated that departmental inquiries are required to be concluded within a reasonable time and that inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the proceedings. The relevant observations made by the Tribunal are extracted herein below for ready reference:-
"6. In Prem Nath Bali (supra), the Apex Court observed that it is the duty of the employer to ensure that the departmental inquiry proceedings, once initiated against the delinquent employee, should be concluded within a reasonable time, having six months as an outer limit. It was further observed that where it is not possible for the employer to conclude such proceedings due to certain unavoidable causes within the time frame, then efforts should be made to conclude it within a reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry, but not more than a year.
6.1 In Anish Gupta (supra), this Tribunal, vide order dated 29.07.2021, allowed MA No. 1880/2021 filed by the applicant therein for closure of the chargesheet and rejected the Union of India‟s MA No. 1879/2021 for extension of time on the ground that the inquiry was not completed within the stipulated time. Two separate petitions were filed by the applicant as well as the Union of India, which were disposed of vide common order dated 05.07.2022. The Division Bench of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court, relying upon the observation by the Apex Court made in para 21 of Prem Nath Bali (supra), dismissed the writ petition of the Union of India and the Departmental Enquiry initiated against Anish Gupta was closed.38
Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 6.2 In Dr. M. R. Diwan (supra), this Tribunal had quashed the penalty order on the ground of delay. This order was challenged by the Union of India before the Division Bench of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court. The Division Bench relied upon Prem Nath Bali (supra) and made the following observations in para 24:
"To be clear, we are not holding that the departmental enquiry proceedings have lapsed because they were not completed within the two month period stipulated by the Tribunal but because they are well beyond the maximum period of one year laid-down by the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali (supra)."
6.3 In O.P. Gupta (supra), the Apex Court made observations in para 15 that there is no doubt that an order of suspension, unless the departmental inquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a Government servant injuriously. The Apex Court further observed that it is a clear principle of natural justice that the delinquent officer, when placed under suspension, is entitled to represent that the departmental proceedings should be concluded with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable period of time. The Apex Court further observed that if such a principle were not to be recognised, it would imply that the Executive is being vested with a totally arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under disability and distress for an indefinite duration.
7. In the light of the decisions referred above, let us consider the facts of the present case. The applicant was placed under suspension and thereafter, a Departmental Enquiry was initiated vide charge memo dated 02.02.2024. Prior to that, though an FIR was registered against the applicant and Mohd. Rajib Khan, the CBI did not file any chargesheet against the applicant due to lack of evidence, and the chargesheet was filed only against Mr. Mohd. Rajib Khan, Inspector of Police. The Departmental Enquiry ought to have been completed within six months. As per the mandate of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali (supra), attempts ought to have been made to complete the departmental proceedings within six months and, if not possible, then the same should have been concluded within the outer limit of one year. Though four preliminary hearings of the Departmental Enquiry took place, not a single witness was examined, and there has been no progress in the inquiry. The facts stated hereinabove regarding the status of the departmental proceedings are not disputed by the respondents. The facts borne out by the record also show that the delay in concluding the enquiry is not at all attributable to the applicant. Rather, what we find from the record is that the applicant has been cooperative with the departmental inquiry, and despite that, the inquiry has been prolonged without any fault on the part of the applicant. Non-conclusion of the Departmental Enquiry, in our opinion, causes great prejudice to the applicant, since he is already under suspension. We are, therefore, of the view that the 39 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 Departmental Enquiry cannot be continued against the applicant and hence deserves to be quashed and set aside."
21. The DoP&T OMs, CVC Circulars, and the amendment to CCS (CCA) Rules mandating completion of inquiry within six months are not merely advisory but intended to uphold fairness and efficiency in disciplinary administration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, (2015) has clearly emphasized that prolonged disciplinary proceedings cause grave prejudice to the delinquent employee.
22. In the present case, the proceedings continued for over five years and eight months, and culminated after the applicant's superannuation. The respondents have failed to demonstrate any exceptional or unavoidable circumstances justifying such delay. The delay, therefore, is inordinate, unexplained, and fatal to the proceedings. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents.
23. The issue of proportionality of punishment has also been examined by this Tribunal. A perusal of the Inquiry Report shows that:
Two charges were not proved,
Two charges were partly proved, and
The gravest allegation of demand of bribe was not
established.
40
Item No. 20/C-II
OA No. 32/2022
24. Even thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with one charge and the UPSC advice was accepted mechanically, without an independent analysis as to how the alleged acts constituted ―grave misconduct‖ within the meaning of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
25. It is well settled that withholding of 100% pension and gratuity permanently is an extreme penalty, to be imposed only in cases of established grave misconduct causing serious pecuniary or moral damage to the State. Admittedly, no pecuniary loss to the Government has been established in the present case. The penalty of permanent withholding of 100% pension and gratuity is the harshest civil consequence short of dismissal. Such punishment, particularly when no pecuniary loss to the Government is established and the applicant has rendered more than three decades of service, is shockingly disproportionate and arbitrary. The Disciplinary Authority has failed to balance mitigating factors, length of service, and nature of proven misconduct.
26. Keeping in view the above position, the present O.A. deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed with following directions:-
(i) First stage advice of the CVC dated 11.10.2013;
Memorandum of charge dated 04.08.2015; Order dated 10.01.2017; Inquiry Report dated 01.06.2018; UPSC advice dated 17.11.2020; Punishment order 41 Item No. 20/C-II OA No. 32/2022 dated 06.04.2021; and Order dated 24.11.2021 rejecting the applicant's representation are hereby quashed and set aside;
(ii) The respondents are directed to restore full pension and gratuity to the applicant, along with all consequential benefits;
(iii) The applicant shall also be entitled to interest @ GPF rate on the withheld retiral dues from the date they became due till actual payment.
(iv) The above exercise shall be complied with by the respondents within a period of 04 (four) weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
27. No order as to costs.
28. Pending MA (s), if any, stand closed.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R. N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/neetu/