Karnataka High Court
Chaduranga Kantharaj Urs vs Revamma on 16 February, 2026
NC: 2026:KHC:9225
WP No. 15041 of 2017
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
WRIT PETITION NO. 15041 OF 2017 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. CHADURANGA KANTHARAJ URS
S/O. LATE. K B RAMACHANDRARAJ URS,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
GAYATRI VIHAR,
BANGALORE PALACE GROUND,
RAMANA MAHARSHI ROAD,
BANGALORE 560080
2. KIRTIMALINIDEVI AVARU
D/O. LATE. SIRDAR K B RAMACHANDRARAJ URS,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
GAYATRI VIHAR,
BANGALORE PALACE GROUND,
RAMANA MAHARSHI ROAD,
BANGALORE 560080
...PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. GEETHADEVI M PAPANNA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. REVAMMA
W/O. LATE. S. NARASAIMHARAJU,
AGE ABOUT 84 YEARS,
R/AT 7/1,
PALACE GUTTAHALLI MAIN ROAD,
BANGALORE 560003.
SINCE DECEASED AND
REPRESENTED BY HER
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
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WP No. 15041 of 2017
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2. N.G. RAJU
S/O LATE. LATE. S. NARASIMHARAJU,
AGE ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 133, 4TH CROSS,
R.M.V-II-STAGE,
BANGALORE 560094
3. M/S DYNASTY DEVELOPERS PVT LTD
NO. 150, 1ST FLOOR,
EMBASSY POINT.
INFANTRY ROAD,
BANGALORE 560001,
REP BY ITS DIRECTOR,
NARPAT SINGH CHORARIA
4. DEEPAMALINI DEVI AVARU
W/O. JAIDEEP BHALE RAO,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 304,
BRIGADE PARKWAY,
NO. 2636, II MAIN ROAD,
VV MOHALLA, MYSORE 570002
5. TRIPURASUNDARI DEVI AVARU
W/O. SWAROOP ANAND,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
GAYATRI VIHAR,
BANGALORE PALACE GROUND,
RAMANA MAHARSHI ROAD,
BANGALORE 560 080
6. THE SUB REGISTRAR
GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE 560009
IMPLEADING APPLICANT
7. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SANKEY RD,
NEAR 5TH MAIN RD,
KUMARAPARK WEST,
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WP No. 15041 of 2017
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GUTTAHALLI,
BANGALORE 560 020.
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MAHESHA KONGAVI, ADVOCATE FOR R3
R1, DECEASED, VIDE ORDER DATED 07.01.2025 NOTICE
TO R2 IS DISPENSED WITH
SRI. K.S. RAHUL CARIAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R4,
SRI. SANJAY, ADVOCATE FOR R5,
SRI. BOJEGOWDA, AGA FOR R6)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO-SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DTD 28.01.2017 BY THE CITY CIVIL COURT,
BANGALORE IN O.S.NO.25580/2013 VIDE ANNX-M AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
ORAL ORDER
1. The present petition seeks to challenge an order dated 28.01.2017 passed in O.S.NO.25580/2013 by learned City Civil Court, Bangalore (hereinafter referred as 'Impugned Order'). By the Impugned Order an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, 1908 filed by the applicant BDA seeking impleadment has been allowed.
2. The challenge in the present petition is by the petitioner/plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the -3- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR petitioner/plaintiffs submit that the petitioner/plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property being the first cousin of the erstwhile Maharaja of Mysore and that the petitioner/plaintiff is the legal heir of one Rajkumari Leelavathi Devi who was granted the suit schedule property. Reliance in this behalf is placed on documents annexed along with the suit filed.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant Respondent No.7/BDA on the other hand submits that the suit schedule property was given free of cost to the predecessor in interest the City Improvement Trust Board (CITB) by the then Maharaja of Mysore in the year 1958 in order to form a park around Brindavana in the name of late Maharajakumari Jaylakshmmannaiavaru. In this behalf, he seeks to rely upon the impleadment in this regard.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit that was filed for disputes inter se between the -4- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR petitioners and Defendants Nos.1 and 2 and that the respondent/applicant has not taken any steps to evidence his title. She further submits that no documents as has been referred to in the application has been placed on record.
5. A perusal of the record shows that the plaint has been filed seeking inter alia the following reliefs:
"a) Declare that the entries made in the revenue records in respect of the suit schedule property pursuant to the Gift Deed dated 23.02.2012 as fraudulent and null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs.
b) Declare that the Gift Deed dated 23.02.2012 and the Agreement of Sale dated 22.02.2013 are void and not binding on the plaintiffs.
c) Direction to the BBMP/Revenue Authorities to cancel/delete the entries made in the records of the property pursuant to the Gift Deed dated 23.02.2012.
d) Permanent injunction restraining defendant No.1 & 2 from interfering with the plaintiffs possession or otherwise alienation/ encumbering the suit schedule property in any manner.
e) Direction to the BBMP/Revenue authorities to delete the entries made in the encumbrance pursuant the records to Agreement of Sale dated 22.02.2013.
f) Such other Judgment decree, direction or Order deemed just and appropriate in the facts and the circumstances of the case including an order for costs".-5-
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6. The record reflects that the suit was filed by the petitioner/plaintiff seeking a declaration in respect of Gift Deed dated 23.02.2012 and an Agreement to Sell dated 22.02.2013 being null and void and not binding on the petitioner/plaintiff. This suit was filed by the petitioner/plaintiff claiming rights on the suit schedule property against Defendants Nos.1 and 2 stating that Defendants Nos.1 and 2 do not have any rights in the suit schedule property and the khata certificate, extract and tax receipts are fabricated. The suit schedule property is described in the plaint as follows:
"SCHEDULE All that piece and parcel of the land No.895 along with temple and other buildings in property known as "BRINDAVANA", situated at Sadashivnagar, BANGALORE, measuring 43264 sft. and bounded on the:-
East By : Corporation Park, West By : Sadashivnagar Club South By : Vth cross, Sadashivnagar, North By : VI Main Road".
7. The respondent/applicant contends that he is a necessary party to the present suit as he owns the suit schedule property in terms of a grant made by Maharaja of -6- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR Mysore to the Chairman of City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore in terms of communications dated 04.07.1958 and 07.06.1958. It is further stated in the application that when the BDA prepared a master plan for the city of Bangalore in the year 2005 they called for objections, the plaintiffs filed their objections to the master plan in respect the property claiming it was their private property.
8. The relevant extract of the affidavit in support of the impleadment application is set out below:
"3. I state that the suit schedule property is the land bearing property No. 895 along with the temple and other buildings in the property known as "BRINDAVANA", measuring 43264 sq. ft. situated at Sadshivanagar, Bengaluru. The Plaintiffs are claiming ownership Jayachamaraja Wadiyar, the Maharaja of Mysore had granted the over the suit schedule property contending that His Highness same in favour of his first cousin, Rajakumari Leelavathideviavaru on 28-05-1958 and that they being the legal heirs of her only son, K.B. Ramachandrarai Urs, have succeeded to the property. They further claim that some time in the year 1997 the plaintiffs late father entered into an oral partition with the plaintiffs and that a registered confirmation deed was also executed among them in that regard on 16-01-2000. But, the Plaintiffs have no legal documents to show that the suit schedule land was granted in favour of the said Rajakumari Leelavathideviavaru on 28-05-1958.
4. 1 state that the suit schedule property being the palace land measuring one Acre situated in upper palace orchards was given free of cost to the then C.I.T.B -7- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR by the then Maharaja of Mysore in the year 1958 in order to form a park around the Brindavana of late Maharajakumari Jayalakshmmanniavaru. The Communications dated 04-07-1958 and 17-06-1958 issued by the Secretary of the then Maharaja of Mysore to the Chairman of C.I.T.B, Bangalore establish the fact that the suit schedule land has been granted in favour of the then C.I.T.B. Hence, the suit schedule property is now vested with the Bangalore Development Authority. The above said grant of the suit schedule land was made in favour of the C.I.T.B when it had purchased the lands in upper and lower orchards in Rajmahal Vilas from the then Maharaja of Mysore for formation of Rajmahal Vilas Extension Layout during the year 1958. The C.I.T.B had purchased 69 Acres 38 Guntas of land in Sy. No.2 of Rajmahal Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk in upper palace orchards and 17 Acres 38 Guntas of land in Sy. No.2 of Rajmahal Village in lower palace orchards in the year 1958. In addition to that the CITB had also acquired 108 Acres of land in the said Sy. No.2 of Rajmahal and formed the Rajmahal Vilas Extension layout in the year 1959.
5. 1 further state that when the B.D.A prepared a draft Master Plan for the City of Bangalore in the year 2005 and called for objections from the general public, the Plaintiffs have filed their objections to the draft Master Plan objecting for classifying the suit schedule property as public and semi public use in the draft Master Plan-2015, claiming to be its owners and requesting the B.D.A to re-classify the same as for residential use. The B.D.A by its Endorsement dated 27-01-2014 rejected the request made by the Plaintiffs for change of land use informing them that the suit schedule property has been vested with the B.D.A. The Plaintiffs have preferred a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in W.P No. 13599/2014 (BDA) challenging the above said Endorsement issued by the B.D.A. In the said writ petition, the 2nd Defendant has also filed an application seeking to implead him as Respondent No.5 making rival claims of title over the suit schedule property".
[Emphasis supplied] -8- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR
9. It is not disputed by the applicant/respondent No.7 that no documents in support of his application have been placed on record. It is also disputed by the parties that the applicant/respondent no.7 is not in possession of the suit schedule property and that the property is a vacant piece of land.
10. A perusal of the Impugned Order shows that although the learned Trial Court has given a finding that the objections were filed by the petitioner/plaintiffs in the year 2005 and it also filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the endorsement. The petitioner has also placed on record a copy of the writ petition No.13599/2014 captioned Chaduranga Kantharaj Urs & others vs State of Karnataka & others. By order dated 04.10.2017, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court after examining the documents between the parties directed that the planning authority cannot alienate the land belonging to private person meant for public use or garden/park. Further, it was held that the land has not -9- NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR been acquired in terms of Sec.69(2) of Karnataka Country and Town Planning Act allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. This order was challenged by respondent No.7 in W.A.No.6390/2017 c/w W.A.No.6446/2017. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 25.07.2025 modified the order passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.No.13599/2014. It was further held that the action of petitioner/respondent no.7 would depend on the outcome of O.S.No.25580/2013.
11. Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the order passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.6390/2017 is set out below:
"28. Admittedly, the land in question is neither utilized for the purpose for which it was designated nor has it been acquired. Therefore, the finding of the learned Single Judge insofar as lapsing of the land use as specified in the Master Plan in terms of the deeming provision is sustained. However, the further action on the application of the petitioners would depend on the outcome of O.S.No.25580/2013 pending on the file of the City Civil Judge at Bengaluru.
29. For the reasons recorded above, writ appeals stand disposed of modifying the order of the learned Single Judge to the above extent and the observations made during the course of the order".
[Emphasis supplied]
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12. The Division Bench has clearly directed that the action on the application of the petitioner ie., petitioner/plaintiff in the present suit would be subject to the outcome of the civil suit which is pending inter se between the parties. It is for this reason the learned Trial Court has thus deemed it appropriate that the issue of ownership be decided in the presence of BDA which also claims title to the property. This would also avoid multiplicity of pleadings. The learned Trial Court has thus held that the BDA is a proper party to the suit.
13. It is no longer res integra that an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be allowed where the applicant is either a necessary or a proper party. It is equally well settled that even a proper party can be impleaded if his presence enables the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate the dispute and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd.1 has held that a "proper party" is one whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute, even though no relief is claimed against such party. Similarly, in J.N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan2, the Supreme Court has reiterated that where rival claims of title arise, the presence of the applicant may be necessary for proper and effective adjudication and the genuineness of the claim is a matter for trial and not for rejection at the stage of impleadment.
14. This Court, has while relying on these judgments in a matter captioned Smt. Kavalkunte Geetha Bhavani and Others Vs Sri. N.A.Krishnamurthy and Others3, has dealt with the similar issue as under:
"8. The question of whether a party is necessary or a proper party in terms of the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court has, in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency 1 (2010) 7 SCC 417 2 2025 SCC OnLine 1015 3 Vide order dt.16.02.2026
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others4 while discussing as to who a necessary party and who a proper party is, has held that a necessary party is a person in the absence of whom no effective decree could be passed, while a proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to effectively adjudicate proceedings, in the following manner:
"14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or
(b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance."
[Emphasis supplied] 4 (2010) 7 SCC 417
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9. The Supreme Court in the Sumti Bai case, has held that normally, in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale of property, a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as a defendant. However, where the third party has rights as a purchaser of the suit schedule property, his presence would become necessary. The relevant extract is set out below:
"9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others - (2005) 6 SCC 733. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 by which the property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour of not only Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus prima facie it appears that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not only Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence, it cannot be said that the sons of Kapoor Chand have no semblance of title and are mere busybodies or interlopers.
xxx xxx xxx
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.
[Emphasis Supplied]
10. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in J.N.Real Estate Vs. Shailendra Pradhan and others5 where after relying on the decisions in Mumbai International Airport case and the judgments of Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal6 and Sumtibai case, it was reiterated that the Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC does not pertain to the rights of a non-party to be impleaded but deals with judicial discretion to strike out or add parties at any stage of proceedings. It was further held that the Court will chose not to exercise the discretion if the Court is of the view that the impleadment will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action. The relevant extract is set out below:
"25. In Kasturi (supra), the respondent nos. 1 and 4 to
11 respectively therein, based their claim to be added as party defendants on an independent title and possession of the contracted property. In such a backdrop, while rejecting the applications for impleadment, this Court had expounded the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and laid down certain tests for determining whether a person is a 'necessary party' for the purpose of impleadment in a suit for specific performance as follows:
(i) First, that a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) clearly indicates that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale or an agreement to sell, are the parties to the contract or, if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also persons who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor...."
5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015 6 (2005) 6 SCC 733
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR [Emphasis supplied] 10.1. It was further held in the J.N.Real Estate case as under:
"27. While distinguishing Kasturi (supra), it was held in Sumtibai (supra) that if a third party can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can file an application for impleadment in the suit for specific performance. The relevant observations read thus:
"13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) '9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [[1951] A.C. 737 (HL)] (AC at p.
761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C- D) [...]'
---xxx---
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced."
[Emphasis Supplied]
28. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (supra) was also of the view that different situations require the application of different facets of Order I Rule 10(2) and consequently, held that there was no conflict between the decisions of this Court in Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai (supra). It was reiterated that that Order I Rule 10(2) CPC did not pertain to the 'right' of a non-party to be impleaded as a party but deals with the 'judicial discretion' of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of the proceeding. In exercising this judicial discretion, courts must act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.
29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in impleading a person who is a 'proper party' upon an application by a non-party to the suit for specific performance. If the court is of the view that the impleadment of such a proper party will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may either refuse to implead such person or order for his impleadment on certain conditions. However, even otherwise, the court would not be precluded from impleading a 'proper party' unconditionally in its discretion.
[Emphasis Supplied]
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the BDA has not filed its independent suit nor has filed any counter claim. Thus, the issue ownership cannot be
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NC: 2026:KHC:9225 WP No. 15041 of 2017 HC-KAR decided in this suit. The contention of the petitioner that the BDA has not filed its own suit and that in the present suit the title of BDA cannot be challenged, would have been taken into consideration if the proceedings before this Court in W.P.No.13599/2014 and W.A.No.6390/2017 were not there. Clearly the title of the petitioner is under a cloud. This is also admitted by the petitioner in its case filed before the Court.
16. In view of the aforegoing discussions and given the directions passed in W.A.No.6390/2017, this Court finds no infirmity with the Impugned Order. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
17. It is made clear that the order passed today will not preclude the petitioner from taking steps in accordance with law qua the challenge which has been made by the respondent BDA to the ownership of the suit property. The rights and contentions of both the parties are kept open to be agitated before the learned Trial Court.
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18. All pending applications stand closed. Digitally signed by TARA VITASTA GANJU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA
Sd/-
(TARA VITASTA GANJU)JUDGE SNB/BMV* List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4
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