Karnataka High Court
Sri N V Ramesh vs The State Of Karnataka on 17 December, 2020
Author: S R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION No.34303 OF 2012 (LA - RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.13559 OF 2017 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34304 OF 2012 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34305 OF 2012 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34306 OF 2012 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34307 OF 2012 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.35741 OF 2012 (LA-RES)
IN W.P.NO.34303/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI.N.V.RAMESH,
S/O LATE N.G.VENKATACHALA SETTY,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT MARUTHI NILAYA,
MYLARPATNA ROAD,
T.B.EXTENSION,
NAGAMANGALA TOWN,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
2
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT,
MANDYA.
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3;
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED
R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.
3
IN W.P.NO.13559/2017 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. RAMU S/O KARIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
OCC:AGRICULTURE
R/O SY 398/P3, KASABA HOBLI
NAGAMANGALA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434.
2. NARASHIMIAH S/O KARIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
OCC:AGRICULTURE,
R/O SY 398/P2, KASABA HOBLI
NAGAMANGALA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434.
3. N.L.KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE LAKSHMIAH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
OCC:AGRICULTURE
R/O SY 399/2P4, KASABA HOBLI
NAGAMANGALA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434
4. K.H.NARASHIMAPPA S/O HANUMANTHA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
OCC:AGRICULTURE
R/O SY 398/P1, KASABA HOLBI
NAGAMANGALA TALUK
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
M.S. BUILDING,
VIDHANA SOUDHA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
4
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 571 434.
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434.
4. THE TOWN PANCHAYATH
NAGMANGALA
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 434
REP BY ITS CHIEF OFFICER.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.,
5
IN W.P.NO.34304/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI. N.S. NARAYANASWAMY,
S/O LATE N.N.SUBBARAYA SETTY,
AGED 52 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KANNIKAPARAMESHWARI
TEMPLE ROAD, NAGAMANGALA TOWN,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 577 142
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 577 142.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3;
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED
R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
6
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.,
IN W.P.NO.34305/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
Dr.I.VISHNUMURTHY BHAT,
S/O SRI. I. LAKSHMINARAYAN BHAT
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
RESIDING AT "VAGDEVI"
3RD BLOCK, T.B.EXTENSION
NAGAMANGALA TOWN
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA SOUDHA BEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 577 142.
7
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 577 142.
4. TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
NAGAMANGALA
MANDYA DISTRICT - 577 142.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.,
8
IN W.P.NO.34306/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI.N.V.GOVINDARAJU,
S/O LATE N.G.VENKATACHALA SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
SOCIETY GODOWN ROAD,
T.B.EXTENSION,
NAGAMANGALA TOWN,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 571 432
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 432
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3;
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
9
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.,
IN W.P.NO.34307/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
SMT.N.S.SUDHA,
W/O N.V.SHVIASHANAKR,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
RESIDING AT READING ROOM ROAD,
NAGAMANGALA TOWN,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 571 432
10
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 432
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3;
SRI. R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED
R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
A AND B RESPECTIVELY. AND ETC.,
IN W.P.NO.35741/2012 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI.N.S.VENKATACHALA SHETTY
S/O LATE SRI. R.SHAMAIAH SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
RESIDING AT T.B.EXTENSION
NAGAMANGALA TOWN
MANDYA DISTRICT.
11
DEAD BY LRs.
1) SMT.JAYASHEELAMMA
W/O LATE N.S.VENKATACHALA SETTY,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
2) N.V.SREENIVASAMURTHY
S/O LATE N.S.VENKATACHALA SETTY,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT
T.B.EXTENSION, B.M. ROAD,
EAST DIVISION, WARD NO.2,
NAGAMANGALA.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
VIDHANA SOUDHA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001
REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MANDYA DISTRICT
MANDYA - 577 142.
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND
ASST. COMMISSIONER,
PANDAVAPURA,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 577 142.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ROOPA K.R. HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3)
12
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER
ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING HE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT ON
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS IN NO.LAQ(2)
99/2011-2012 DATED 14-11-2011 UNDER SECTION 4
OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AND FINAL
NOTIFICATION ISSUED IN NO.G.O.NO.KUME51, LAQ
2012, DATED 28.07.2012. UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT, ACQUIRING BITS OF LANDS
SITUATED AT NAGAMANGALA TOWN, MANDYA
DISTRICT, IN PARTICULAR THE VACANT SITE
BEARING MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT NO.2295 CARVED
OUT OF LAND IN SY.NO.399/P2 MENTIONED IN
SL.NO.7 OF THE NOTIFICATION AS PER ANNEXURES-
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE COMING ON FOR
PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
In these petitions, the petitioners have sought for the following reliefs:
a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the Preliminary and Final Notification issued by the 2nd Respondent on behalf of the Respondents in No.LAQ(2) 99/2011-2012 dated 14-11-2011 under Section 4 of Land acquisition Act and final notification issued in No.G.O.No.KumE51, Laq 2012, dated 28.07.2012. Under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, acquiring bits of lands situated at Nagamangala Town, Mandya District, in particular the vacant site bearing Municipal Assessment No.2295 carved out of land in Sy.No.399/P2 mentioned in Sl.No.7 of 13 the notification as per ANNEXURES-A and B respectively.
b) Issue such other Writ or order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case, to meet the ends of justice.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.
3. The material on record indicates that it is not in dispute that the impugned preliminary notification at Annexure-A was issued on 14.11.2011.
In pursuance thereof the final notification under Section 6(1) of the said of 1894 was issued on 28.07.2012. The present petitions were filed challenging both the impugned preliminary notification and final notification. Order sheet maintained by this Court discloses that no interim order/stay order/ restraint order was passed in faovur of the petitioners by this Court in respect of the schedule property.
144. It is not in dispute that the right to fair compensation and transparency in Right to Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014 and the same became applicable to the schedule property.
5. On 10.03.2014, this Court dismissed the present petitions on merits. Aggrieved by the same, petitioners preferred appeals in W.A.No.1152/2014 and connected matters before the Hon'ble Division Bench. By order dated 19.11.2014, the Hon'ble Division Bench permitted the appellants therein (petitioners herein) to withdraw the appeals reserving liberty in favour of the present petitioners to approach this Court by filing review petition seeking review of the earlier order dated 10.03.2014 passed by this Court. Pursuant thereto the petitioners filed review petition in R.P.No.1433/2014 and connected matters which came to be allowed by order dated 10.04.2015 15 and the present petitions were accordingly restored to file.
6. During pendency of these petitions after restoration, respondents have proceeded to pass impugned award dated 18.01.2016 which is also challenged by the petitioners by suitably amending the petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners points out that having regard to the disputed fact that the award was not passed within prescribed period of two years from the date of final notification under Section 6(1) dated 28.07.2012 as mandatorily required under Section 11(A) of the Act of 1894, the impugned notifications as well as award are liable to be quashed. It is submitted that even assuming that Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 is applicable to the facts of the present case in respect of schedule property, in view of Section 25 (1) of said Act, the award not 16 having been passed within a period of twelve months from the date of issuance of aforesaid final notification and the said period not having been extended by any writing and notified and uploaded on the website, the impugned award and instant proceedings deserve to be quashed on this ground also.
8. Per contra learned counsel for respondents submits that having regard to the undisputed fact that the present petitions are pending, from 2012 onwards, the question of award having not passed within the time stipulated either under Section 11 (A) of the Act of 1894 or Section 25 of Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 does not arise and petitions are liable to be dismissed.
9. In so far as the question with regard to exclusion of time on account of mere pendency of a writ petition without there being any interim 17 order/stay order/restraint order for the purpose of reckoning the period of two years stipulated under Section 11(A) of the Act of 1894 is concerned, the Apex Court in the case of Lokasewa Shikshan mandal v.s A.R. Munidhara Charitable Trust (2007) SCC 779 held as under:
10. Now it cannot be gainsaid that every State has power of eminent domain, which is the essential attribute of sovereignty. In exercise of the said power, the State can acquire private property of its subjects for a public purpose. The expression "public purpose" is defined in Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act. Section 4 enables the "appropriate Government" to issue "preliminary notification" if it appears to such Government that any land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose. Section 5-A of the Act then provides for hearing of objections against the proposed acquisition. Section 6 empowers the "appropriate Government" to issue "final notification". Such action, however, has to be taken after considering the report, if any, submitted by the Collector under Section 5-A of the Act. It also provides modes of publication of notification and contains a provision in sub-section (3) that such declaration "shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose". The law also provides for giving of notice to persons interested before taking over possession of land as also for payment of compensation. Section 11 of the Act deals with award of compensation by the Collector.
18Section 11-A, as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) prescribes the period within which an award should be made by the Collector. The said section is material and may be quoted in extenso:
"11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.--(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation.--In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded."
11. Section 12 of the Act makes the award of the Collector final. We are not concerned with other provisions of the Act in the present matter.
12. Bare reading of Section 11-A leaves no room of doubt that the Collector is enjoined to make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. "If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land 19 shall lapse." Explanation to Section 11-A, however, states as to how period of two years should be counted. It clarifies that in computing the period of two years referred to in the section, the period during which any action or proceedings is stayed by an order of a court would be excluded. Whereas it is contended by the first respondent that the case on hand is governed by the main provision of Section 11-A, the argument of the appellant is that it is governed by the Explanation to the said provision.
13. Let us now consider the relevant decisions of this Court on the interpretation of the provision.
14. In Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [(1991) 4 SCC 531] a question came up for consideration before this Court probably for the first time. In that case, proceedings under the Act had been initiated for acquisition of land of the appellant and final notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 12-5-1988. The landowner challenged the notification by filing a petition in the High Court of Gujarat. A prayer was made for quashing the notification and acquisition proceedings. During the pendency and final disposal of the writ petition, interim relief of operation and implementation of the notification was also sought. The High Court, however, granted limited interim relief by restraining the authorities from taking possession of the land pending the writ petition. The Land Acquisition Officer then issued a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act for the purpose of determining compensation of land. The landowner in the inquiry inter alia contended that two years had lapsed after the publication 20 of final notification under Section 6 of the Act and, hence, no award could be passed as the proceedings had lapsed under Section 11-A. The contention of the landowner, however, was rejected by the authorities. The said decision was challenged by the landowner in the High Court by filing another petition contending that there was no stay of "further proceedings" by the Court restraining the authorities and hence it was obligatory on the authorities to proceed further under the Act. As it was not done, the award ought to have been made within two years as required by Section 11-A. As the award was not passed within a period stipulated by Section 11-A of the Act, it was barred by statutory limitation and the proceedings lapsed. The High Court rejected the contention observing that "the Explanation to Section 11-A is not confined to the staying of the making of the award pursuant to Section 6 of the notification, but it is widely worded and covers in its sweep the entire period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6, is stayed by a competent court". The award, therefore, could not be said to have been passed beyond the statutory period, concluded the High Court. The aggrieved landowner challenged the said decision in this Court.
15. This Court was called upon to consider whether the High Court was right in invoking the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act though limited interim relief was granted qua possession only and had not stayed "further proceedings". On behalf of the landowner, reliance was placed on a decision of the High Court of Kerala in S. Bavajan Sahib v. State of Kerala [AIR 1988 Ker 280] that the question of 21 taking possession of the land arises only when an award is passed under the Act except the cases covered by Section 17 (cases of urgency). When Section 17 of the Act was not invoked, the case would be governed by Section 11-A of the Act and not by Explanation thereto and if the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of final notification under Section 6 of the Act, the proceedings would lapse. This Court, however, negatived the contention, disagreed with the Kerala High Court view and observed:
(Yusufbhai case [(1991) 4 SCC 531] , SCC p. 535, para 7) "We find ourselves unable to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the aforesaid judgment."
The Court then considered the scheme of the Act and the phrase "any action or proceedings", to be taken in pursuance of the notification and held that even if limited interim relief was granted, the Explanation to Section 11-A would apply.
16. Interpreting the Explanation liberally, the Court stated: (Yusufbhai case [(1991) 4 SCC 531] , SCC p. 535, para 8) "8. The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why the 22 aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment."
17. In Govt. of T.N. v. Vasantha Bai [1995 Supp (2) SCC 423] , in a similar situation, this Court reiterated the principle laid down in Yusufbhai [(1991) 4 SCC 531] and observed that while calculating the period of limitation of two years for making an award under Section 11-A of the Act, the period during which action or proceedings were stayed by an order of the High Court would be excluded. It was held that even if there was stay as to dispossession only, it would tantamount to stay of further proceedings and the entire period had to be excluded.
2318. In M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. [(2000) 4 SCC 322 : JT (2000) 5 SC 27] this Court held that as per Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act, the period of exclusion from time is the period during which "any action or proceedings" to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. Undoubtedly, one of the actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 is taking possession of the land though, such action is a post-award step in normal circumstances. Nonetheless, it is one of the actions to be adopted as a follow-up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged by Section 6 of the Act. Observing that the consequence mentioned in Section 11-A is a self-operating statutory process, the Court held that it can operate only when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. The consequences would step in only when there is fusion of all the conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay regarding any of the actions being taken pursuant to the declaration then the consequence of lapse would not happen.
19. This Court, therefore, concluded: (SCC p. 325, para 10) "10. Thus, the position is now well settled that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed."
20. Recently, in Bailamma v.
Poornaprajna House Building Coop. Society [(2006) 2 SCC 416 : JT (2006) 2 SC 108] it has been held that period of stay of any action 24 or proceedings taken in pursuance of the declaration would take out the matter from the main part to Section 11-A of the Act attracting the Explanation to the said section.
21. The Court stated: (SCC pp. 424-25, para 16) S "16. This Court emphasised the fact that Section 11-A was enacted with a view to prevent inordinate delay being made by the Land Acquisition Officer in making the award which deprived owners of the enjoyment of the property or to deal with the land whose possession has already been taken. Delay in making the award subjected the owner of the land to untold hardship. The objects and reasons for introducing Section 11-A into the Act were that 'the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them' and 'it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act within which the Collector should make his award under the Act'. The emphasis, therefore, was on the Collector making his award within the period prescribed. However, the legislature was also aware of the reality of the situation and was not oblivious of the fact that in many cases acquisition proceedings were stalled by stay orders obtained from courts of law by interested parties. It, therefore, became imperative that in computing the period of two years, the period during which an order of stay operated, which prevented the authorities from taking any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration, must be excluded. If such a 25 provision was not made, an acquisition proceeding could be easily defeated by obtaining an order of stay and prolonging the litigation thereafter. Explanation to Section 11-A was meant to deal with situations of this kind. The Explanation is in the widest possible terms which do not limit its operation to cases where an order of stay is obtained by a landowner alone. One can conceive of cases where apart from landowners others may be interested in stalling the land acquisition proceeding. It is no doubt true that in most of the reported decisions the party that obtained the stay order happened to be the owner of the land acquired. But that will not lead us to the conclusion that the Explanation applied only to cases where stay had been obtained by the owners of the land. There may be others who may be interested in obtaining an order of stay being aggrieved by the acquisition proceeding. It may be that on account of development of that area some persons in the vicinity may be adversely affected, or it may be for any other reason that persons in the locality are adversely affected by the project for which acquisition is being made. One can imagine many instances in which a person other than the owner may be interested in defeating the acquisition proceeding. Once an order of stay is obtained and the Government and the Collector are prevented from taking any further action pursuant to the declaration, they cannot be faulted for the delay, and therefore, the period during which the order of stay operates must be excluded. In a sense, operation of the order of stay provides a justification for the delay in taking further steps in the acquisition proceeding for which the authorities are not to blame."
2622. Dr. Dhavan strongly relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Kamla Pandey v. Collector, Agra [1989 AWC 686] . In that case, no award was passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of final notification under Section 6 of the Act. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the landowner that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 11-A of the Act. The Court, however, negatived the contention observing that it was a "technical plea" and the omission on the part of the authorities was that the "Special Land Acquisition Officer did not determine the compensation regarding the petitioner's plot" on the ground that the question whether the property should be exempted from acquisition was pending consideration before the State Government.
23. The Court then stated: (Kamla Pandey case [1989 AWC 686] , AWC p. 688, para 7) "The only question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner himself had requested for exemption of the land from acquisition or the Development Authority or the Collector on their own requested the Government to exempt the same from acquisition. The normal course of human conduct persuades us to think that it is the persons whose land or houses are being taken away who would be interested in getting the land exempted from acquisition. Ordinarily, no one likes expropriation even if he might get compensation in lieu of acquisition. We would, therefore, prefer to rely on the version of the Agra Development Authority that it was the petitioner and others at whose instance the matter was referred to the Government for the exemption of their 27 land. At any rate, there is nothing which might persuade us to accept the petitioners' version in preference to that of the Agra Development Authority."
24. It was also observed that when the landowner himself contributed to the delay in making the award by approaching the Government against acquisition, the proceedings could not be quashed.
25. The Court said: (Kamla Pandey case [1989 AWC 686] , AWC p. 689, para 8) "The omission was not a fraud on the statute but was clearly bona fide based on the consideration that there was a move afoot for the release of the land from acquisition. Moreover, the persons who would be hit by the quashing of the acquisition proceedings are not before us. To quash the proceedings in this state of things would not, in our considered view, be appropriate. It would defeat the larger public interest if we were to quash the proceedings on the technicality, assuming that the omission to make an award in respect of the petitioners' land within time produced the effect of vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings."
26. Apart from the fact that the above decision has no binding effect, the question is no longer res integra and had been finally settled by this Court in Yusufbhai [(1991) 4 SCC 531] and reiterated from time to time. In our opinion, therefore, the above decision is of no help to the appellant.
27. In our considered opinion, Dr. Dhavan is also not right in contending that as interim 28 relief was granted, the case was covered by Explanation to Section 11-A and not by the main provision of Section 11-A. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the nature of order passed by the High Court when the acquisition proceedings were challenged by the first respondent. Now from the record, it is clear that the first respondent filed Writ Petition No. 810 of 1986 in the High Court on 2-4-1986. On 30-4-1986, the Court admitted the petition by issuing rule and the following order was passed:
"Rule. To be put up with connected matter. Rule on stay. Liberty to move Vacation Judge."
(emphasis supplied)
28. It is, thus, clear that the petition was admitted by issuing rule nisi. Rule was also issued on stay. In our opinion, however, the learned counsel for the first respondent is right in contending that the Court had not granted stay against "any proceeding". Merely rule was issued on the prayer of stay made by the petitioner in the petition.
29. The matter then came up before the Court on 31-7-1986 for hearing on rule on stay and following order was passed:
"Respondent 3 if proceeds with the construction of building that will be subject to the decision of this petition."
30. Dr. Dhavan vehemently contended that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that on 30-4-1986, no actual stay was granted by the Court, interim relief was granted on 31-7-1986. He also drew our 29 attention to the communication of the order by the Registry to the appellant herein, usually known as writ issued in pursuance of an order passed by the Court. The communication inter alia stated:
"Upon reading the petition of the applicant presented to this High Court of Judicature, Bombay on 21-4-1986 praying that to restrain Respondent 2 and its institutions and its employees, agents, servants, etc. from changing the nature of the lands admeasuring 0.59 from Survey Nos. 186/4A and 187/3A as referred by the award purported to be dated 27-2-1986 in Land Acquisition Case No. LAQ/Malkapur/4/1977-78 at Annexure L are concerned till the decision of this petition and further to refrain them from making any construction or changes therein till the decision of this petition...."
31. Then quoting the order of the Court, it was stated:
"It is hereby accordingly directed that if you proceed with the construction of building, that will be subject to the decision of this petition."
32. Dr. Dhavan submitted that it was an interim order communicated by the Assistant Registrar of the High Court to the appellant.
33. Upon reading the writ also, there is no doubt in our minds that the above communication by the Registry of the High Court did not state that acquisition proceedings were stayed by the Court. The writ, in our opinion, was in consonance with the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and expressly stated that if the 30 appellant will proceed with the construction of building, it will be subject to the decision of the petition. The above communication thus does not take the case of the appellant anywhere.
34. It was then argued by Dr. Dhavan that the Land Acquisition Officer was of the view that the acquisition proceedings could not continue due to stay granted by the Court and he proceeded to dispatch the relevant files to the Government Advocate of the High Court. For that, the counsel invited our attention to the facts stated in the judgment that though there was no specific order from the Court, a letter was issued by an officer of the Government Pleader to the Land Acquisition Officer to send the record of the case. The Court, however, observed that the case file relating to the land bearing Survey No. 187/3A was never sent by the Land Acquisition Officer and the file which was sent related to acquisition of land bearing Survey No. 186/4A.
35. The appellant also referred to a letter dated 27-6-2000 written by the President of the appellant Mandal to the Land Acquisition Officer seeking information on the file movement of the acquisition proceedings in the High Court which was replied by the Land Acquisition Officer vide his letter dated 20-7- 2000 stating therein that the proceedings were stayed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 810 of 1986. From the letter, it is clear that it pertained to the proceedings of Survey No. 186/4A. But even otherwise, the order passed by the Court was abundantly clear. No stay was granted by the Court, and hence, it could not be said that Explanation to Section 11-A got attracted and such period would be 31 excluded from computing the period of two years.
36. It may also be stated that the High Court decided the petition on 14-3-2000 whereas the letter on which reliance is placed by the appellant was written by the appellant Mandal to the Land Acquisition Officer on 27- 6-2000 and the reply was sent by the Land Acquisition Officer on 20-7-2000 -- both after the disposal of the writ petition in the High Court.
37. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in observing that even if order dated 30-4-1986, issuing rule on stay would mean that the Court had granted stay of proceedings (though no stay was granted on that date), the rule on stay was disposed of on 31-7-1986 clarifying that any construction would be subject to the decision of the petition. Thereafter there was no question of any stay in the matter and as such the case was squarely covered by main part of Section 11-A of the Act.
38. It was urged that the term "stay" was interpreted by this Court very widely and it was held that even if stay was limited to maintenance of status quo or against dispossession of the owner, extension of period of limitation would apply. There is no dispute about the said proposition of law. It is also immaterial and irrelevant as to which party had obtained such stay. The only question is whether there was any stay by the High Court. In the case at hand, to us, the High Court was right and wholly justified in holding that there was no stay of any proceeding and hence, Explanation to Section 11-A had no application. If it is so, it cannot 32 be held that the High Court had committed an error of law or misconstrued Section 11-A by holding that since award was not made within a period of two years from the date of publication of final notification under Section 6 of the Act, the proceedings lapsed. Since the order passed by the High Court impugned in the present appeal by the appellant is in consonance with law, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
10. As held by the Apex Court, in the absence of any interim order/stay order/restraint order passed in favour of the petitioners during the pendency of the writ petition, there was no impediment or obstacle for the respondents, to pass an award or proceed to pass the award within the period of two years from the date of issuance of final notification. In other words, having regard to the provisions contended in Section 11(A) of the Act, coupled with the decision of the Apex Court in Lokasewa Shikshan mandal v.s A.R. Munidhara Charitable Trust quoted supra, I am of the considered opinion that since the award has been passed on 18.01.2016 beyond the period of two years as prescribed under Section 11(A), in the absence of 33 any restraint order/interim order/stay order, in these petitions the impugned award, notifications and acquisitions proceedings deserve to be quashed.
11. In so far as the applicability of the new Act is concerned, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Murlidhar and another V.s State of Maharashtra has held as under:
"4) We have considered submissions. The following dates are not disputed.
1) Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued on 11/09/2012; 2) Declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1984 is issued on 19/03/2013 and 3) No award was passed till this Court passed order on 05/05/2015 in the present Writ Petition.
5) As per Section 11-A of the Act 1894, the award has to be passed within period of 2 years form the declaration under Section 6.
Two years lapsed on 18/03/2015
6) Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013 lays down that if no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is made, then all provisions of this Act relating to determination of compensation apply.
7) No doubt there was stay to the notification issued by the State under Schedule-I regarding determination of the 34 compensation. However, there was no stay to the passing of the award by this Court. There was no impediment for the respondents to pass award. The said notification was subsequently quashed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 09/03/2015.
8) Even as per Section 25 of the Act of 2013, the award under the said Act is to be made within period of 12 months from the date of publication under Section 19, unless otherwise time is extended. Even as per the said stipulation the award is not passed. Even if we consider declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 to be the relevant date the award is not passed within stipulated period.
9) Taking the case either way, under any of the statutes i.e., under Acquisition Act of 1894 or under new Act of 2013, the acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed.
10) In the result, the acquisition proceeding pursuant to the impugned declaration are quashed and set aside. However, the present order would not be an impediment for the respondent to initiate fresh acquisition in accordance with law. Rule is accordingly made absolute. No costs".
12. This Court in the context of Section 11 (A) of Apex Court (1994) 5 SCC 686 is held as under:
"5. Its bare reading indicates and emphasises the limitation within which the award should be made and has been statutorily determined, namely, the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the 35 declaration. It is common knowledge that after declaration was published, years used to roll by to make the award and the owners of the lands were put to great hardship. Parliament intended to relieve the owners of the lands from this hardship and pegging of the price prevailing as on date of publication of Section 4 (1) notification. It is, therefore, a mandatory duty cast on the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award strictly in accordance with the limitation under Section 11-A. If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. In other words, on expiry of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration unless the proviso is attracted, if no award is made in the meantime, in the eye of law the proceedings initiated under Section 4 (1) of the act culminated in the declaration made under Section 6 shall stand lapsed and no proceedings, in the eye of law thereafter do exist, to take further action.
In ILR 2016 KAR 1170 is held as under:
7. The second question that arises for my consideration is whether the award is passed within tow years from the date of the publication of the final notification. Section 11A of the said Act states that the Deputy Commissioner shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.
8. Admittedly the award in the eyes of law is passed on 04.01.2013. It is sought to be 36 contended by the respondents that the SLAO has prepared the award on 15.11.2012 itself and that the Government has approved the same on 29.11.2012 and that the award notice under Section 12(2) dates back to preparation of the award by the SLAO.
9. Such a contention is wholly unacceptable. When the proposed award made by the SLAO is within the statutory period and is communicated to the Government for approval but no approval is granted by the Government within the statutory period, the entire proceedings lapse.
Such proposed award cannot be treated as an award. In saying so, I am fortified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER vs. RAJIV GUPTA AND ANOTHER.
10. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that if the authorized officer grants approval to the award beyond two years from the date of the publication of the declaration, it does not amount to complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 11A of the said Act. The relevant portions of paragraph No.6 of its decision in the case of MRS.MARGARIDA GOMES PEREIRA vs.STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS is extracted hereinbelow:
"6...........
In the said case, before the Apex Court, the collector was required to make the award on or before 21-12-1992. He made the proposed award on 20-12-1992 and communicated the same to the Commissioner for his approval. Since his prior approval was not given before the expiry of 21st December 1992, it was held that there is no award made 37 by the land Acquisition Officer. It was further pointed out by the Apex court that in the eye of law, the proposed award of the Collector under S.11-A is mandatory, on expiry of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings under Act stood lapsed.........".
11. Emphasizing the imperative need to make the award without delay, the Apex Court has this to say in the case of K.KRISHNA REDDY AND OTHERS vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR:
"12........... After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even open half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interest of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined with-out loss of time.........."
12. It is also helpful to refer to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of TUKARAM KANA JOSHI AND OTHERS vs. M.I.D.C. AND OTHERS, wherein it is held that even under valid acquisition proceedings, 38 there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest and to make the payment of the requisition compensation.
13. Thus on both the grounds, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be invalidated. The impugned notifications are quashed in so far as they pertain to the petitioners' lands. However, it is made clear that the quashing of the impugned notifications would not come in the way of the authorities restoring to the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings afresh, if there is any need fro the land for any public purpose. There is nothing like estoppel in the acquisition matters. But nobody can be deprived of his property without following the due process of law".
13. As already contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners if the Act of 1894 was applicable to the impugned award, notifications and proceedings, the award not having been passed within the stipulated period of two years from the date of the final notification dated 28.07.2012 would render the same vitiated and illegal. Even otherwise under provisions of the new Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 39 2013, the award not having been passed within stipulated period of twelve months and in the absence of any extension of time by the Government, impugned acquisition stands lapsed and deserved to be quashed under the new Act also.
14. In the result, I pass the following order, the impugned preliminary notification at Annexure-
A dated 14.11.2011, final notification dated 28.07.2012 and the impugned award dated 18.01.2016 and impugned acquisition proceedings pursuant thereto are hereby quashed in so far as the subjects lands of the petitioners are concerned.
15. Liberty is reserved in favour of the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law and no opinion is expressed in this regard.
With the aforesaid directions, all the petitions stand allowed.
40In view of the disposal of these petitions, interim applications, if any, does not survive for consideration, and the same stands disposed of.
Sd/-
JUDGE gpg/-