State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Care Health Insurance Limited Through ... vs Sanjay Gupta S/O. Ramakishan Gupta on 16 February, 2026
1
BEFORE THE TELANGANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION : HYDERABAD.
FA.NO.305/2025 AGAINST ORDERS IN CC.NO.61/2024,
DISTRICT CONSUMER COMMISSION-I, HYDERABAD
Between :
Care Health Insurance Co.Ltd., (Formerly known as Religare
Health Insurance Ltd.)
Office at 5th Floor, 19 Chawla House,
Nehru Palace, New Delhi - 110 019.
Represented by its Managing Director.
........ Appellant/Opp.Party
And
Sanjay Gupta, S/o.Late Ramakishan Gupta,
Aged: 61 years, Occ: Business,
R/o.Flat No.101, H.No.8-2-580,
Road No.8, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.
Telangana - 500034.
....... Respondent/Complainant
Counsel for the Appellant/Opp.Party : M/s.N.Srinath Rao
Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant: M/s. Ganu & Co
QUORUM:
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE DR.G.RADHA RANI ...... PRESIDENT
&
HON'BLE SMT. MEENA RAMANATHAN ...... MEMBER (NON-JUDCIAL)
MONDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND TWENTY SIX
*******
Order : (Per Smt.Dr.G. Radha Rani, Hon'ble President)
1.This petition is filed by the Appellant/Opposite Party under Section 41 of Consumer Protection Act, praying this Commission to set aside the order dated 24.02.2025 in CC.No.61 of 2024 on the file of District Consumer Redressal Forum-I, Hyderabad and pass such other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
2. In view of dismissal of FAIA.No.1049/2025, the appeal is rejected.
Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by her, corrected by me and pronounced by us in the Open Court on this the 16th day of February, 2026.
Sd/- Sd/-
PRESIDENT MEMBER-NJ
Dt: 16.02.2026
UC*
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BEFORE THE TELANGANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION : HYDERABAD.
FAIA.NO.1049/2025 IN FA.NO.305/2025 AGAINST ORDERS IN CC.NO.61/2024, DISTRICT CONSUMER COMMISSION-I, HYDERABAD Between :
Care Health Insurance Co.Ltd., (Formerly known as Religare Health Insurance Ltd.) Office at 5th Floor, 19 Chawla House, Nehru Palace, New Delhi - 110 019.
Represented by Managing Director.
........ Petitioner/Appellant/Opp.Party And Sanjay Gupta, S/o.Late Ramakishan Gupta, Aged: 61 years, Occ: Business, R/o.Flat No.101, H.No.8-2-580, Road No.8, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.
Telangana - 500034.
....... Respondent/Complainant Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant/Opp.Party: M/s.N.Srinath Rao Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant : M/s. Ganu & Co QUORUM:
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE DR.G.RADHA RANI ...... PRESIDENT & HON'BLE SMT. MEENA RAMANATHAN ...... MEMBER (NON-JUDCIAL) MONDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND TWENTY SIX ******* Order : (Per Smt.Dr.G. Radha Rani, Hon'ble President)
1. This petition is filed by the Petitioner/Appellant/Opposite Party under Section 41(1) of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 81 days in filing the appeal.
2. The Corporate Legal Manager (Legal) of the Appellant Company filed an affidavit in support of the petition submitting 3 that aggrieved by the award passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I, Hyderabad in CC.No.61/2024 the present appeal is filed. The copy of the award was received by their office on third week of 2025. After receipt of the order, they requested their advocate to appear before the District Commission to give his opinion on the chance of filing the appeal. He submitted his opinion in the fourth week of March 2025. Thereafter, the Petitioner instructed the finance stream to prepare the statutory D.D. amount. However, the same was prepared in the name of the District Commission and the same was sent to their advocate.
Their advocate intimated them that should be in the name of the Registrar, TSCDRC, Hyderabad. After the same was prepared, he obtained necessary approvals from the concerned officers for filing the appeal and sent the file to their advocate at Hyderabad for preparing the appeal. In the meantime, the time for filing the appeal expired. Hence, there was a delay in filing the appeal which was neither wilful nor wanton but on account of the said circumstances and prayed to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
3. Notice was issued to the Respondent/Complainant. The Respondent/Complainant filed counter through their counsel contending that the Petitioner miserably failed to explain sufficient cause for seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. As per the settled principles, the Petitioner has to explain each and every day's delay, but a perusal of the affidavit shows that the same was filed in a casual manner. The Petitioner failed to explain the inordinate delay in filing the present application. No plausible 4 reasons were given by the Petitioner for delay and prayed to dismiss the appeal with exemplary costs.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned counsel for the Respondent. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Inder Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 Live Law (SC) 339 and of the Hon'ble NCDRC in Second Appeal No.180/2025 with IA.No.5026 & 5027/2025 dated 07.05.2025.
5. The learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand relied upon the judgment of the State Commission in M/s.Max New York Life Insurance Company Limited Vs. Narender Amirchetty and another and of the Hon'ble NCDRC in RP.No.1250/2017 arising from the above said case wherein the order passed by the State Commission was confirmed. He further relied upon the order of the Hon'ble NCDRC in Revision Petition No.1429/2016 in Soudharya Jewellers Vs. Paidi Jaganadha Rao dated 26.12.2022 and of the Hon'ble NCDRC in FA.No.1737/2018 in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Vs. Rajesh Kumar G.Patel dated 08.04.2024.
6. Now the point for consideration is:
Whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay of 81 days in filing the appeal by the Petitioner?
7. The Hon'ble NCDRC in its judgment in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Vs. Rajesh Kumar G.Patel dated 08.04.2024, had extracted the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex 5 Court in the case of Baswaraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl.Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510 as under:
"Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd., V. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; LalaMatadin V. A.Narayanan AIR 1970 SC 1952; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412)."
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lexsedlex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by 6 this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature".
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 held that:
"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that negligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."
9. Particularly with regard to the Consumer Complaints, the Hon'ble Apex Court in State Bank of India Vs. B.S. Agriculture Industries (I) (2009) 5 SCC 121 held that:
"It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires the consumer forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, „shall not admit a complaint‟ occurring in Section 24A is sort of a legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within the limitation period prescribed thereunder.
As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section 24A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would 7 be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside."
10. In Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, he Hon'ble Supreme Court has advised the Consumer Forums to keep in mind while dealing with such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras."
11. In almost a similar fact situation, this State Commission in M/s.Max New York Life Insurance Company Limited Vs. Narender Amirchetty and another, wherein the appeal was filed with a delay of 74 days, the State Commission observed thus:
"The Petitioner was not diligent enough in pursuing the matter and kept quiet and slept for days together and had come with the present application seeking to condone the whopping delay of 74 days. No bonafides are shown to accept the version of the Petitioner/Appellant to condone the abnormal, exorbitant and whopping delay of 74 days in filing the appeal. The Petitioner is an Insurance Company with all the technological instruments and implements of fast communication under its command and also the men at its disposal. Therefore, it is nothing wrong to expect such a big entity to act in a swift and speedy manner with earnest alacrity in all its decisions and acts. The cause for the delay shown by the Petitioner appears to be superficial without any evidence. This Commission do not see any reasonable ground to accept the version of the Petitioner. It is a battle between a tiny individual and powerful entity wherein the condonation of such delay and laxity would render, the object of the Act fully negated."
The said judgment was approved by the Hon'ble NCDRC in RP.No.1250/2017.
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12. Under Section-41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date of the order. The proviso permits condonation of delay only if "sufficient cause" is shown. The limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act is strict as the Act is intended for speedy redressal of consumer disputes. Though the delay of 81 days in filing an appeal is not extremely long, but it is more than double the prescribed period. Such delay requires strict scrutiny, specific and satisfactory explanation and day-to-day details. But the Insurance Company failed to discharge the said burden laid upon them. The affidavit filed by the Manager (legal) of the Petitioner Company only speaks about the delay in obtaining legal opinion and instructing the finance team to prepare the statutory D.D. amount and that it was wrongly prepared first in the name of the District Commission and subsequently in the name of the Registrar, TSCDRC, Hyderabad. Such grounds do not constitute sufficient cause.
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Post Master General Vs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 held that: Government departments and public bodies cannot seek special indulgence for administrative delay. The Insurance Company is a commercial entity with structure legal department and deals with several hundreds and thousands of cases every day. The internal delay reflects negligence but not sufficient cause and no day-to-day explanation was given by the Petitioner-Insurance Company. Liberal approach does not mean condoning negligence or inaction, the Insurance Company as a dedicated legal sale with panel 9 advocates and a regular litigant before the Consumer Fora. Hence, the plea of procedural delay lacks bonafides.
14. In the result, we consider it fit to dismiss the petition filed for condonation of delay. Consequently, the appeal is rejected.
Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed and typed by her, corrected by me and pronounced by us in the Open Court on this the 16th day of February, 2026.
Sd/ Sd/-
PRESIDENT MEMBER-NJ
Dt: 16.02.2026
UC*