Karnataka High Court
Syed Matin Abbas vs State Of Karnataka on 21 January, 2026
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378
WP No. 57623 of 2017
HC-KAR
®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 57623 OF 2017 (LB-RES)
BETWEEN:
SYED MATIN ABBAS
S/O. SYED ABBAS,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT MASJID ROAD,
PIRIYAPATNA TOWNL,
MYSORE DIST.-571107
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. PRITHVI RAJ B.N., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPT. OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PANCHAYAT RAJ,
Digitally signed M.S. BUILDING,
by SHWETHA AMBEDKAR VEEDHI ,
RAGHAVENDRA
Location: HIGH BENGALURU-560001
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
MYSORE DISTRICT,
MYSORE-570005
3. THE CHIEF OFFICER
TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL,
PERIYAPATNA
MYSORE-570005.
...RESPONDENTS
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378
WP No. 57623 of 2017
HC-KAR
(BY SRI. SRI. V.G.BHANUPRAKASH, AAG A/W SMT. CHANDINI
SINGH, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI. M.B.PRABHAKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
CONSTITUION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 02.08.2017 PASSED BY THE RESP. NO.2 [VIDE
ANEXURE-A] AND CONSEQUENTLY SET-SIDE THE ORDER
DATED 27.11.2013 PASSED BY THE RESP. NO.3 [AT
ANNEXURE-B] AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
ORAL ORDER
1. Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:-
(i) "Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the Order dated 2-8-2017 passed by the Resp.No.2 (vide Annexure-A) and consequently set-side the Order dated 27-11-2013 passed by the Resp.No.3 (at Annexure-B);
(ii) In the event, if it is held that prior permission of the Government ought to have been taken before registering the sale certificate on 21-8-1991, direct the Resp.No.1 to accord its approval as required u/sec.72(2) of Karnataka Municipalities Act for the auction held on 20-8-1977 in respect of -3- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR property bearing Sy.No.123 (new Sy.No.123/2) of Periyapatna measuring 1 acre 7 gts;
(iii) Direct the Resp.No.2 to give his sanction for usage of aforesaid land for purposes other than specially assigned purpose (Pond-Katte) as required u/sec.71 of Land Revenue Act;
(iv) Pass such other writ, Order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity."
2. Respondent No.3 - the Chief Officer, Periyapatna Town Municipal Council, had issued a public notice proposing to conduct a public auction of three immovable properties belonging to the Municipal Council. Pursuant thereto, a public auction was conducted on 20.08.1977, in which the father of the petitioner participated and was declared the highest and successful bidder in respect of land bearing Survey No.123, subsequently renumbered as Survey No.123/2, measuring 1 acre 7 guntas, for a consideration of ₹5,030/-.
3. Though the auction had taken place in the year 1977, formal approval of the bid was accorded later, only -4- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR on 03.06.1988, the Town Municipal Council passed a resolution approving the auction bid in favour of the petitioner's father and resolved to register the property in his name.
4. Since registration did not immediately follow, the matter was thereafter placed before the Zilla Parishad, Mysuru, which, by its Official Memorandum dated 14.08.1991, approved the auction and sale in favour of the petitioner's father.
5. Consequent upon such approval, a sale certificate was executed on 21.08.1991 and duly registered as Document No.793/1991-92. Pursuant thereto, the khata of the property was mutated in the name of the petitioner's father, and his possession and title stood reflected in the municipal records.
6. The petitioner's father thereafter executed a registered gift deed dated 27.06.2013 in favour of the petitioner. Following the said gift, the khata was mutated in the petitioner's name. -5-
NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR
7. The petitioner applied for and was granted a plan sanction and building licence by the Municipal Council on 21.09.2013 for the construction of a school on the subject property.
8. At this stage, two individuals claiming to be public-
spirited persons raised objections alleging that the original auction and sale in favour of the petitioner's father were unauthorised and illegal. A complaint was filed before the Tahsildar, who conducted an enquiry and dismissed the complaint on 26.11.2013.
9. However, on the very next day, i.e., 27.11.2013, Respondent No.3 cancelled the building plan and licence granted to the petitioner, purportedly on the basis of the very same complaint.
10. Aggrieved by the cancellation of the licence, the petitioner preferred a revision before Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the revision, holding that the Municipal Council ought to have obtained prior -6- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR permission from the competent authority under Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, before auctioning the municipal property.
11. It is the said Order of the Deputy Commissioner that is presently under challenge before this Court.
12. The submission of Sri Prithvi Raj B.N., learned counsel for the petitioner is that:-
12.1. Respondent No.3 cancelled the building licence without issuing any notice or affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The cancellation order was thus passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, rendering the action ex facie arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
12.2. The sole subject matter of challenge before Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner -
was the Order cancelling the building licence. However, the Deputy Commissioner travelled completely beyond the scope of the revision -7- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR and adverted to an entirely different issue, namely, the alleged absence of prior permission under Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 before the auction conducted in the year 1977.
12.3. On that basis, the Deputy Commissioner proceeded not only to affirm the cancellation of the licence, but also to set aside the assessment and khata standing in the petitioner's name, which action could not have been undertaken without issuance of a prior notice to the petitioner and without such issues being the subject matter of the revision proceedings. The impugned Order is therefore vitiated by procedural impropriety and jurisdictional overreach.
12.4. No action has ever been initiated by the respondents to annul or invalidate the sale of the property, nor has any competent authority -8- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR passed an order cancelling the sale certificate or the gift deed in favour of the petitioner. Likewise, the khata stood mutated in favour of the petitioner and continued to remain so until it was interfered with by the Deputy Commissioner.
12.5. The only Order passed by Respondent No.3 pertained to the cancellation of the building licence. However, upon revision, the Deputy Commissioner went beyond the municipal action and purported to cancel the khata, despite the ownership and title continuing to vest with the petitioner. Such an exercise of power is wholly impermissible in law. 12.6. Any action, if at all permissible, ought to have been initiated within a reasonable period of time. The auction was conducted in 1977, approval was accorded in 1991, and the -9- NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR petitioner's title and possession have remained undisturbed for decades.
12.7. The respondents, having acquiesced to the sale, mutation, and subsequent transfer, are estopped from unsettling the petitioner's rights after such an inordinate delay. It is only by virtue of the impugned Order of the Deputy Commissioner that the petitioner's civil rights have been adversely affected for the first time. 12.8. In such circumstances, the petitioner submits that this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is clearly attracted, warranting interference to prevent manifest injustice. 12.9. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another vs. D.Narsing Rao and others, reported in 2015 (3) SCC 695, more particularly,
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR paragraph No.31 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority."
12.10. By placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. Narsing Rao, it is the submission of the petitioner that even in the absence of a prescribed period of limitation, statutory or discretionary powers cannot be exercised after an inordinate and unexplained
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR delay, particularly when such delay has resulted in the creation of vested or third-party rights. 12.11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that belated exercise of power is impermissible where it operates to unsettle long-standing rights, and that the doctrine of "reasonable period" must govern the exercise of such powers. Even in cases where fraud is alleged, the authority must act within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of such fraud, and not at its whim or convenience. 12.12. In the present case, no fraud is either pleaded or established against the petitioner. The auction, approval, execution of sale certificate, mutation of khata, and subsequent transfer in favour of the petitioner have all taken place openly, under official acts of public authorities, and have stood unquestioned for decades. Significantly, no notice alleging fraud or
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR illegality has ever been issued to the petitioner, nor has any competent authority initiated proceedings to annul the sale or the petitioner's title.
12.13. In the absence of fraud, and in the face of prolonged acquiescence by the respondents, the belated invocation of power by the Deputy Commissioner, resulting in adverse civil consequences to the petitioner, is squarely hit by the ratio laid down in D. Narsing Rao, and is liable to be interdicted by this Court. 12.14. He also relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Nestle India Ltd. and another reported in 2004 (6) SCC 465, more particularly paragraph No.25 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"25. In other words, promissory estoppel long recognised as a legitimate defence in equity was
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR held to found a cause of action against the Government, even when, and this needs to be emphasised, the representation sought to be enforced was legally invalid in the sense that it was made in a manner which was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by statute."
12.15. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nestle, it is the submission of the petitioner that where a public authority, by its clear representation or conduct, induces a party to act upon such representation to its detriment, the authority is bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel and cannot subsequently resile therefrom. 12.16. In the present case, the auction notification was admittedly issued by Respondent No.3, pursuant to which the petitioner's father participated in the auction, was declared the successful bidder, and paid the consideration amount for the subject property. It is submitted that but for the issuance of such auction
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR notification by Respondent No.3, the petitioner's father would not have participated in the auction nor altered his position by parting with valuable consideration. The essential ingredients for the invocation of promissory estoppel, representation, reliance, and alteration of position, are therefore fully satisfied.
12.17. Even assuming, without admitting, that there was any procedural irregularity or illegality on the part of Respondent No.3 in not obtaining prior permission under Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the consequences of such default cannot be visited upon the petitioner, who had no role whatsoever in the statutory obligation cast upon the municipal authority.
12.18. The principle of promissory estoppel, as elucidated in Nestle, applies with equal vigour
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR even where the authority's action is later alleged to be irregular, so long as enforcement of the promise does not compel the authority to act contrary to law, and where the citizen has acted bona fide and altered his position irreversibly. In the present case, enforcement of the representation does not require any act prohibited by statute; on the contrary, it seeks to prevent the State from undoing its own completed acts to the detriment of an innocent citizen.
12.19. The default, if any, in securing statutory permission was entirely attributable to Respondent No.3, and such default cannot extinguish the vested rights accrued in favour of the petitioner over several decades. To hold otherwise would be to permit the State to take advantage of its own wrong, which is impermissible in law.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 12.20. On these grounds, it is submitted that the writ petition deserves to be allowed.
13. Sri V.G.Bhanuprakash, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State would submit that:
13.1. The property in question is classified as B-
Kharab land, reserved for a "Katte" (pond), and was therefore required to be maintained as a water body for the benefit of the general public. Such land, forms part of public utility infrastructure and cannot be diverted for private ownership or private use. 13.2. The Town Municipal Council had no authority in law to alienate the said property, either by public auction or otherwise, having regard to its classification and public character. 13.3. Without prejudice to the above contention, it is submitted that even the alleged auction was
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR not conducted in accordance with law, inasmuch as the same was not preceded by a formal public notice, but was purportedly conducted only on the basis of a pamphlet, thereby lacking transparency and statutory compliance. On this basis, he contends that the transaction prima facie bears the taint of fraud. 13.4. It is in this context that the Deputy Commissioner, upon examination of the records, observed that prior permission under Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, had not been obtained before alienating municipal property. The absence of such mandatory approval, according to the respondents, vitiates the entire transaction and renders it void, justifying interference with consequential entries such as assessment and khata.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 13.5. The land forming the subject matter of the writ petition is required in public interest to be preserved and maintained as a pond, and that permitting private construction or personal use would defeat the very purpose for which the land stood reserved.
13.6. It is therefore contended that the petitioner cannot assert any right to construct upon or commercially exploit the said property, irrespective of the sale certificate or subsequent entries, as public interest must prevail over individual claims, particularly in respect of lands earmarked for public utility.
14. Sri.M.B.Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 would submit that:-
14.1. In terms of the grant order issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 06.10.1964 in favour of Respondent No.3, the land in question was
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR specifically required to be maintained as a pond (Katte). The respondents contend that the grant order, read as a whole, unmistakably reflects the intention of the Government that the land be preserved as a water body for public use.
14.2. There exists an interpolation in the grant order, in handwriting distinct from the rest of the document, suggesting that the grant was for formation of sites. According to the respondents, such interpolation is unauthorised and cannot override the substantive tenor of the grant, which mandates maintenance of the land as a pond.
14.3. He places reliance on Section 81 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, to contend that all properties not expressly reserved by the Government vest in and belong to the Municipal
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Council, to be held in trust and applied strictly in accordance with the purposes of the Act. 14.4. Particular emphasis is placed on clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 81, which provides that public streams, tanks, reservoirs, wells, and other water bodies vest in the Municipal Council. The Municipal Council, it is submitted, holds such properties in a fiduciary capacity as a trustee, and is duty-bound to protect and preserve them for public use, rather than alienate them for private benefit. 14.5. No contemporaneous records are available to demonstrate the manner in which the auction was conducted by Respondent No.3. The absence of official documentation, according to the respondents, clearly indicates that statutory procedure was not followed.
14.6. No formal public notice was issued prior to the auction, and at best, a pamphlet was circulated,
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR which does not meet the requirements of a lawful and transparent public auction. 14.7. Additionally, it is pointed out that while the auction is said to have been conducted in the year 1977, the consideration amount was paid only in 1988, after a delay of nearly eleven years, and that permission of the Zilla Parishad was sought only thereafter. Such a sequence, it is contended, further casts serious doubt on the bona fides and legality of the transaction. 14.8. In the above factual and legal backdrop, it is clear that the petitioner's father abused the administrative machinery to secure a property meant for public use for his personal benefit. The land, according to the respondents, belongs to the general public and was required to be retained and preserved by the Municipal Council in its capacity as trustee.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 14.9. Permitting private ownership or private construction on such land, it is contended, would defeat both the conditions of the original grant and the statutory trust obligations imposed upon the Municipal Council under the Act.
14.10. In this regard, he invokes the Doctrine of Public Trust by relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.C.Mehta vs. Kamal Nath and others1, more particularly, paragraph Nos.23, 24, 25, 31, 33 and 34 which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"23. The notion that the public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristic is finding its way into the law of the land. The need to protect the environment and ecology has been summed up by David B. Hunter (University of Michigan) in an article titled An ecological perspective on property : A call for judicial protection of the public's interest in environmentally critical resources published in Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 12 1988, p. 311 is in the following words:
1 (1997) 1 SCC 388
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR "Another major ecological tenet is that the world is finite. The earth can support only so many people and only so much human activity before limits are reached. This lesson was driven home by the oil crisis of the 1970s as well as by the pesticide scare of the 1960s. The current deterioration of the ozone layer is another vivid example of the complex, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic effects posed by our disregard of the environmental limits to economic growth. The absolute finiteness of the environment, when coupled with human dependency on the environment, leads to the unquestionable result that human activities will at some point be constrained.
'[H]uman activity finds in the natural world its external limits. In short, the environment imposes constraints on our freedom; these constraints are not the product of value choices but of the scientific imperative of the environment's limitations. Reliance on improving technology can delay temporarily, but not forever, the inevitable constraints. There is a limit to the capacity of the environment to service ... growth, both in providing raw materials and in assimilating by-product wastes due to consumption. The largesse of technology can only postpone or disguise the inevitable.' Professor Barbara Ward has written of this ecological imperative in particularly vivid language:
'We can forget moral imperatives. But today the morals of respect and care and modesty come to us in a form we cannot evade. We cannot cheat on DNA. We cannot get round photosynthesis. We cannot say I am not going to give a damn about phytoplankton. All these tiny mechanisms provide the preconditions of our planetary life. To say we do not care is to say in the most literal sense that "we choose death".
There is a commonly-recognised link between laws and social values, but to ecologists a balance between laws and values is not alone sufficient to ensure a stable relationship between humans and
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR their environment. Laws and values must also contend with the constraints imposed by the outside environment. Unfortunately, current legal doctrine rarely accounts for such constraints, and thus environmental stability is threatened.
Historically, we have changed the environment to fit our conceptions of property. We have fenced, plowed and paved. The environment has proven malleable and to a large extent still is. But there is a limit to this malleability, and certain types of ecologically important resources -- for example, wetlands and riparian forests -- can no longer be destroyed without enormous long-term effects on environmental and therefore social stability. To ecologists, the need for preserving sensitive resources does not reflect value choices but rather is the necessary result of objective observations of the laws of nature.
In sum, ecologists view the environmental sciences as providing us with certain laws of nature. These laws, just like our own laws, restrict our freedom of conduct and choice. Unlike our laws, the laws of nature cannot be changed by legislative fiat; they are imposed on us by the natural world. An understanding of the laws of nature must therefore inform all of our social institutions."
24. The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the "Doctrine of the Public Trust".
It was founded on the ideas that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore, forests and the air were held by Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. Our contemporary concern about "the environment"
bear a very close conceptual relationship to this legal doctrine. Under the Roman law these resources were either owned by no one (res nullious) or by every one in common (res communious). Under the English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant these properties to private owners if the effect was to interfere with the public interests
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR in navigation or fishing. Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of the public. Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan -- proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine -- in an erudite article "Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law : Effective Judicial Intervention", Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, has given the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine as under:
"The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law -- the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasised. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties -- such as the seashore, highways, and running water -- 'perpetual use was dedicated to the public', it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the State apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government."
25. The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. According to
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Professor Sax the Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions on governmental authority:
"Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust : first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third the property must be maintained for particular types of uses."
31. Professor Sax stated the scope of the public trust doctrine in the following words:
"If any of the analysis in this Article makes sense, it is clear that the judicial techniques developed in public trust cases need not be limited either to these few conventional interests or to questions of disposition of public properties. Public trust problems are found whenever governmental regulation comes into question, and they occur in a wide range of situations in which diffused public interests need protection against tightly organised groups with clear and immediate goals. Thus, it seems that the delicate mixture of procedural and substantive protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust cases would be equally applicable and equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and strip mining of wetland filling on private lands in a State where governmental permits are required."
33. It is no doubt correct that the public trust doctrine under the English common law extended only to certain traditional uses such as navigation, commerce and fishing. But the American Courts in recent cases have expanded the concept of the public trust doctrine. The observations of the Supreme Court of California in Mono Lake case [33 Cal 3d 419] clearly show the judicial concern in protecting all ecologically important lands, for example fresh water, wetlands or riparian forests.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR The observations of the Court in Mono Lake case [33 Cal 3d 419] to the effect that the protection of ecological values is among the purposes of public trust, may give rise to an argument that the ecology and the environment protection is a relevant factor to determine which lands, waters or airs are protected by the public trust doctrine. The Courts in United States are finally beginning to adopt this reasoning and are expanding the public trust to encompass new types of lands and waters. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi [108 SCt 791 (1988)] the United States Supreme Court upheld Mississippi's extension of public trust doctrine to lands underlying non-navigable tidal areas. The majority judgment adopted ecological concepts to determine which lands can be considered tide lands. Phillips Petroleum case [108 SCt 791 (1988)] assumes importance because the Supreme Court expanded the public trust doctrine to identify the tide lands not on commercial considerations but on ecological concepts. We see no reason why the public trust doctrine should not be expanded to include all ecosystems operating in our natural resources.
34. Our legal system -- based on English common law -- includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership." 14.11. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, it is submitted that the Public
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Trust Doctrine is an integral part of Indian environmental and constitutional jurisprudence. The doctrine rests on the foundational principle that certain natural resources such as air, sea, water, forests, rivers, lakes, and other water bodies are of such paramount importance to the community at large that they cannot be subjected to private ownership or commercial exploitation.
14.12. It is contended that such resources vest in the State or in public authorities, not as absolute owners, but as trustees for the benefit of the general public, and that the State and its instrumentalities are under a legal and constitutional obligation to protect, preserve, and maintain these resources.
14.13. Applying the said doctrine to the facts of the present case, it is submitted that the land in question, being a pond (Katte) / water body,
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR squarely attracts the Public Trust Doctrine and, therefore, could not have been alienated in favour of a private individual, either by auction or otherwise. Any such alienation, it is urged, is void ab initio and unenforceable, irrespective of the passage of time or subsequent entries in revenue or municipal records.
14.14. His submission is that admittedly the sale having occurred for a sum of ₹5,030/- is more than the permissible limit of ₹5,000/- under Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Act as it then existed in the year 1977. Said Sub- Section (2) of Section 72 of the Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"72. Competency of municipal council to lease, sell and contract -
(1) ......
(2) No free grant of immovable property whatever may be its value, no grant for an upset price and no lease for a term exceeding five years, and no sale or other transfer of immovable property exceeding [twenty-five thousand]1 rupees in value, shall be valid unless the previous sanction of the Government is obtained."
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 14.15. By placing reliance on Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, it is submitted that any sale or transfer of immovable property belonging to a Municipal Council, where the consideration exceeds ₹5,000/-, mandatorily requires prior approval of the Government.
14.16. In the present case, the respondents contend that no such approval of the Government was ever obtained. Instead, Respondent No.3 is stated to have conducted the auction by merely circulating pamphlets, and thereafter sought and obtained approval from the Zilla Parishad, Mysuru. It is submitted that the Zilla Parishad is not the competent authority under Section 72(2) to accord approval for alienation of municipal property, and any such approval is wholly without jurisdiction.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 14.17. Accordingly, it is contended that the auction sale, having been conducted in contravention of the mandatory statutory requirement of prior Government approval, is void and unenforceable, and that all consequential actions, including execution of the sale certificate and mutation of khata, are legally unsustainable.
14.18. In this regard, he relies upon the decision in the case of Sri.A.S.Parameshwaraiah & Others vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in ILR 2010 Kar 997, more particularly paragraph Nos.12 and 15 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"12. It is for achieving the said object, the legislature in its wisdom has enacted under sub- Section (2) of Section 72 of the Act, the mandatory procedure to be followed while disposing of the property of a Municipality. There has to be distinct demarcated approach by the Municipality/local body, when compared with a disposal of a private property. When a property of an authority is disposed of, there should be an invitation for participation in public auction to ensure
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR transparency, obtain maximum return and to be free from any bias or discrimination.
15. It is not in dispute that, the appellants have made use of the property for expansion of their business and have enjoyed the same for more than two decades on the basis of the vitiated proceedings, which were tailor made to suit the convenience of the appellants. Indisputedly, the property is a commercial property situated in a prominent locality of Holenarasipura. There being no grant in favour of the appellants in accordance with law and since the property has already been made use by the appellaints on account of misuse of the power by the 1st appellant, Learned Single Judge was justified in directing the Director of Municipal Administration to conduct an enquiry with regard to the damages payable by the appellants for the illegal use of the public property and to recover the amount in a manner known to law. Starting facts have come to the notice of the Court, which was on account of misuse of office by the 1st appellant to obtain grant of the property belonging to the Municipal Council. Since it is a public property and revenue, in the circumstances of the case, directions issued by the Learned Single Judge cannot be found fault with." 14.19. By placing reliance on the decision in A.S. Parameshwaraiah, it is submitted that public property belonging to a Town Municipal Council can be alienated only by way of a transparent public auction, and not through any private arrangement or opaque process. The requirement of public auction, it is urged, flows
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR from the principles of fairness, transparency, and maximisation of public revenue, which govern the disposal of public assets. 14.20. In the present case, the respondents contend that no reliable or contemporaneous documents are available to establish that a lawful public auction was ever conducted by Respondent No.3. Even assuming that an auction was held, there is no material on record to indicate who participated in such auction, the number of bidders, or whether the process was competitive and transparent.
14.21. On this premise, it is submitted that the alleged auction cannot be recognised as a valid public auction in the eye of law, and that the purported alienation of municipal property in favour of the petitioner's father is liable to be declared invalid.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 14.22. He also relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan P. Sonu vs. State of Karnataka reported in ILR 1992 Kar 1219, more particularly, paragraph Nos.1 and 5 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"1. The appellant had purchased property measuring 14′ × 50′ at the junction of Middle School road and the then Telephone Exchange road in Shikaripur town. There was, adjacent to the property so purchased, vacant land (now called the 'said land') and measuring 5′ × 50′. The said land belonged to the Town Municipal Council, Shikaripur. On 9th March 1983 the appellant applied to the Town Municipal Council for allotment to him of the said land. Upon the application, a resolution was passed on 17th May 1983. It was resolved that the said land lacked public demand since it was not an independent site but was useful only to the property belonging to the appellant. Hence, to enable the Municipal Council to obtain income therefor, it was recommended that the said land be granted to the appellant. The recommendation was forwarded to the State Government. The State Government, on 15th March 1984, accorded sanction under Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 to the allotment of the said land to the appellant "at the market price of Rs.1425/-".
5. Section 72 is a further safeguard. Publicity given to the proposal of a Municipal Council to dispose of property rights under Rule 39 would attract offers from persons interested in acquiring such rights and these offers would enable the State Government to decide whether the sanction of the State Government that is contemplated by Section 72
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR should or should not be given. Rule 39 is, therefore, complementary to Section 72 and both operate together."
14.23. By placing reliance on the decision in Mohan P. Sonu, it is submitted that prior permission under Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, is a mandatory precondition for any sale or alienation of immovable property belonging to a Municipal Council, where the value exceeds the statutory threshold.
14.24. It is further submitted that disposal of public property must be preceded by adequate and effective publicity, ordinarily by way of a public notice, so as to invite participation from all eligible and interested persons and to ensure transparency and fairness in the process. Circulation of pamphlets, according to the respondents, does not satisfy the statutory or
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR constitutional requirements governing disposal of public assets.
14.25. In the present case, it is contended that no prior Government approval was obtained, and that the alleged auction was conducted without issuing a public notice, but merely by circulating pamphlets. As such, the essential requirements of a lawful public auction were not fulfilled, rendering the purported sale void and unenforceable.
14.26. He relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of Satish vs. Vice Chancellor reported in ILR 1994 Kar 1191, more particularly paragraph No.7 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:-
"7. But whether such Mandamus can be sought? Firstly, the person seeking a Mandamus, should have a legal right to the performance, by the Authority, of a public duty imposed by law. No one has a right to claim performance of an unlawful or illegal act. Secondly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not intended to perpetuate illegalities, but to strike at them. On the ground that grant of benefit of an illegality to only a few would amount to discrimination, a Court cannot direct an Authority to
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR repeat the illegality or extend the benefit of the illegality to others. If a person who has a legal right is denied the benefit of it, while others having a similar right are given the benefit of such right, then there is discrimination, and a Mandamus may be issued to ensure that he also gets a similar benefit. But, if a person who does not have a right is given a benefit contrary to law, then the illegal act itself will be struck down and there can never be a Mandamus to repeat the illegal act to favour others. To put it differently, if a person having a legal and enforceable right is denied the benefit of it, by non-performance of a public duty, then the Court will grant 'constructive' or 'positive' relief by way of a Mandamus directing the Authority to perform the required act; on the other hand, if a person, not having a legal right, is granted a benefit contrary to law, then the Court will grant a 'destructive' or 'corrective' relief by issue of a Certiorari, striking down the illegal action. Neither sympathy nor any enormity of the discrimination or arbitrariness alleged, can persuade a Court to issue a Mandamus to perform or perpetuate an illegality. Irrespective of the circumstances or hardship likely to be caused, the Court will have to always examine and be satisfied before granting a Mandamus, that the direction being issued by the Court will not require the Authority to do an act contrary to or prohibited by law, or for doing which the Authority has no jurisdiction or power. It is relevant to refer to three Decisions of the Supreme Court to illustrate the above legal position."
14.27. By placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Satish, he submits that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to perpetuate or legitimise an illegality. It is contended that a writ of
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR mandamus can be issued only where the petitioner establishes a legal and enforceable right and a corresponding public duty cast upon the authority.
14.28. The ratio laid down in Satish clearly postulates that:
14.28.1. No person has a right to seek performance of an unlawful or illegal act;
14.28.2. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction are meant to strike down illegalities, not to extend or regularise them;
14.28.3. Even on grounds of alleged discrimination or hardship, the Court cannot direct repetition or continuation of an illegality; and 14.29. Relying on the aforesaid principle, he submits that the prayers sought by the petitioner are not maintainable in law. In particular, prayer
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR No.2, whereby the petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents to grant approval under Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, is wholly misconceived.
14.30. Section 72(2) mandates prior approval of the Government before alienation of municipal property, and not post-facto approval after the transaction has been completed. Granting such a direction at this stage, after several decades, would be directly contrary to the statutory scheme, and would amount to the Court compelling the authorities to commit or regularise an illegality, which is expressly impermissible in view of the law laid down in Satish.
14.31. His submission is that the writ court cannot issue a mandamus directing the authority to do something which the statute does not permit,
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR nor can it validate a transaction which is void for want of statutory compliance. 14.32. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner has himself admitted that the land is reserved for a pond / katte, a public purpose. Despite such admission, the petitioner is seeking a change of land use under Section 71 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, which, according to the respondents, is impermissible in law when the land stands reserved for a public utility. 14.33. Grant of such a relief, it is urged, would not only violate the conditions of the original grant and the statutory trust obligations of the Municipal Council, but would also amount to perpetuating further illegalities. 14.34. On these grounds, he submits that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR
15. Heard Sri.Prithvi Raj B.N., learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.V.G.Bhanuprakash, learned Additional Advocate General along with Smt.Chandini Singh, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri.M.B.Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 and perused the records.
16. The points that would arise for determination are:-
i. Whether the statutory procedure prescribed under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and the applicable rules were duly followed by the concerned authorities, in particular Respondent No.3, prior to conducting the auction of the subject property in the year 1977?
ii. Whether the Order passed by Respondent No.3, cancelling the building licence granted in favour of the petitioner, is valid, sustainable in law, and in conformity with the principles of natural justice? iii. Whether the Order passed by Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner -
cancelling the khata standing in the name of the petitioner is within jurisdiction,
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR legally tenable, and in accordance with law?
iv. What Order?
17. I answer the above points as follows:
18. Answer to Point no.1: Whether the statutory procedure prescribed under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and the applicable rules were duly followed by the concerned authorities, in particular Respondent No.3, prior to conducting the auction of the subject property in the year 1977?
18.1. Considerable arguments have been advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General and learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.3 contending that the statutory procedure was not followed prior to the sale of the subject property. Broadly, the said arguments fall into two categories:
18.1.1. Non-compliance with Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Act, 1964, inasmuch as prior Government approval was not obtained; and 18.1.2. Non-alienability of the land itself, on the premise that the land was reserved for a public purpose, namely a katte/pond, and therefore could not have been sold by public auction or otherwise.
18.2. Insofar as the first limb of the contention is concerned, reliance has been placed on the decisions in Mohan P. Sonu and A.S. Parameshwaraiah, to contend that in the absence of prior sanction as mandated under Section 72(2) of the Act, no sale of municipal property could have legally taken place. 18.3. A plain reading of Sub-Section (2) of Section 72 of the Act, as reproduced earlier, would indicate that no sale or other transfer of immovable property exceeding ₹5,000/- in value shall be
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR valid unless the previous sanction of the Government is obtained.
18.4. The sequence of events, which is not in dispute, discloses that:
18.4.1. the public auction was conducted on 20.08.1977;
18.4.2. the Town Municipal Council passed a resolution approving the auction on 03.06.1988;
18.4.3. the Zilla Parishad, Mysuru, accorded approval on 14.08.1991; and 18.4.4. the sale certificate was executed on 21.08.1991.
18.5. It is contended that at no stage, either prior to the auction, prior to the municipal resolution, prior to the Zilla Parishad approval, or prior to execution of the sale certificate, was prior
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Government sanction under Section 72(2) obtained.
18.6. The above contention proceeds on the premise that the consideration amount of ₹5,030/-, being ₹30/- in excess of the statutory threshold, mandatorily required prior Government approval.
18.7. While that statutory requirement cannot be disputed, what is of significance is that the obligation to obtain such prior sanction squarely rested upon Respondent No.3 - the Municipal Council, and not upon the bidder or purchaser. The petitioner or his father had no statutory role or control in securing such approval. 18.8. The material on record, including the correspondence exchanged between the authorities, clearly indicates that the Municipal Council approved the auction by resolution and thereafter sought approval from the Zilla
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Parishad, which granted such approval. The failure, if any, to approach the Government for prior sanction is entirely attributable to the official respondents.
18.9. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that there is any violation of Section 72(2) of the Act attributable to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-title. Any lapse in compliance with the statutory requirement was an administrative omission on the part of Respondent No.3, and such omission cannot, by itself, be used to non-suit the petitioner, particularly after the sale certificate continues to subsist and has never been annulled in accordance with law.
18.10. Coming to the second limb of the contention namely, that the land was reserved for a katte/pond and therefore could not have been alienated, it is necessary to note that no
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR independent proceedings have ever been initiated by the respondents to cancel the sale of the property in favour of the petitioner's father or to annul the sale certificate. 18.11. The proceedings which culminated in the present lis originated solely from the cancellation of the building licence, and the revision before the Deputy Commissioner arose only from that cancellation.
18.12. It is trite that an authority cannot, in the guise of defending its action in a revision petition, take a new stand and on that basis pass orders having serious adverse civil consequences, particularly when no notice, enquiry, or independent proceedings have been initiated against the citizen in respect of the alleged illegality.
18.13. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner, while exercising revisional jurisdiction over the
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR cancellation of a building licence, travelled far beyond the scope of the proceedings and proceeded to cancel the khata on grounds relating to the very alienability of the land, an issue which was never the subject matter of any independent action by the respondents. 18.14. Though the submissions advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General and learned counsel for Respondent No.3 on the Public Trust Doctrine and the nature of the land as a water body raise issues of public importance, such issues could have been examined only in appropriate proceedings initiated for that purpose, and not as a collateral defence in a revision arising out of cancellation of a building licence. 18.15. In that view of the matter, I'am of the considered opinion that neither the alleged non- compliance with Sub-Section (2) of Section 72
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR of the Act nor the invocation of the Public Trust Doctrine could have been relied upon by Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner, to cancel the khata standing in the name of the petitioner, especially when the sale certificate continues to remain valid and unchallenged. 18.16. Accordingly, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the procedural lapses, if any, on the part of the municipal authorities cannot be used, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to invalidate the petitioner's rights in the manner sought to be done.
19. Answer to Point No.2:- Whether the Order passed by Respondent No.3, cancelling the building licence granted in favour of the petitioner, is valid, sustainable in law, and in conformity with the principles of natural justice?
19.1. Vide Annexure-B dated 27.11.2013, Respondent No.3 issued what is described as a notice-cum-order cancelling the building licence
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR granted in favour of the petitioner. Though styled as a notice, a bare reading of Annexure- B makes it abundantly clear that it is not a show-cause notice proposing action, but a final and operative order cancelling the licence with immediate effect.
19.2. The said order is stated to have been passed on the basis of complaints received from certain individuals questioning the legality of the petitioner's title and the grant of licence. 19.3. It is an admitted and undisputed fact that prior to passing the order dated 27.11.2013, no notice whatsoever was issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to show cause as to why the building licence should not be cancelled. The petitioner was neither furnished with the contents of the complaints nor informed of the allegations made against him.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 19.4. There is also no material placed on record to indicate that any opportunity of personal hearing was afforded, or that any explanation or reply was either sought from or considered by Respondent No.3 before taking the impugned decision.
19.5. The cancellation of a building licence, which had already been granted after due scrutiny by the competent authority, undoubtedly results in serious civil consequences to the licensee. Such cancellation not only affects the petitioner's right to proceed with construction but also has direct implications on the use and enjoyment of property and the investments already made. 19.6. It is settled law that whenever an administrative or quasi-judicial decision entails adverse civil consequences, strict adherence to the principles of natural justice is mandatory, unless expressly excluded by statute. No such
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR exclusion is either pleaded or demonstrated in the present case.
19.7. The principle of audi alteram partem that no person shall be condemned unheard is not a mere procedural formality, but a fundamental facet of fair play in action. Compliance with natural justice enables the authority to arrive at a just and informed decision and ensures that arbitrary exercise of power is checked. 19.8. In the present case, Respondent No.3 has dispensed with this foundational requirement altogether, thereby rendering the decision- making process fundamentally flawed. 19.9. The contention that the order was necessitated by complaints received from third parties does not advance the case of the respondents. Receipt of a complaint cannot, by itself, justify immediate adverse action against a citizen
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR without first putting the affected party on notice and affording an opportunity of explanation. 19.10. Even assuming that Respondent No.3 possessed the jurisdiction to cancel the licence, such jurisdiction could be exercised only after following due process of law. Jurisdiction coupled with power does not imply freedom from procedure; rather, the exercise of power must conform to legally recognised procedural safeguards.
19.11. The order dated 27.11.2013 does not disclose any independent application of mind to the petitioner's case. It neither records reasons as to why the licence deserved cancellation nor demonstrates consideration of any material that could have been placed by the petitioner had he been heard.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 19.12. The order, therefore, suffers not only from procedural impropriety, but also from non- application of mind, further vitiating its legality. 19.13. It is in this background that the petitioner was constrained to challenge Annexure-B before Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner. However, the illegality inherent in Annexure-B is of such a nature that it cannot be cured in appellate or revisional proceedings, as the defect goes to the very root of the decision- making process.
19.14. An order passed in violation of natural justice is voidable at the instance of the affected party, and ordinarily warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19.15. In view of the foregoing discussion, I'am of the considered opinion that the order dated 27.11.2013 passed by Respondent No.3
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR cancelling the building licence granted in favour of the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law, being in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and fair procedure.
19.16. Accordingly, I answer Point No.2 by holding that the order at Annexure-B dated 27.11.2013 passed by Respondent No.3 cancelling the building licence granted in favour of the petitioner is invalid and unsustainable in law, as it is not in conformity with the principles of natural justice, and is therefore liable to be quashed.
20. Answer to Point No.3:- Whether the Order passed by Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner - cancelling the khata standing in the name of the petitioner is within jurisdiction, legally tenable, and in accordance with law?
20.1. Insofar as the order dated 02.08.2017, passed by Respondent No.2 - the Deputy
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Commissioner, cancelling the khata standing in the name of the petitioner (Annexure-A), is concerned, it is necessary at the threshold to appreciate the jurisdictional setting in which the said order came to be passed. The impugned order arose not out of any independent proceedings initiated by the State or the Municipal authorities, but in a revision petition instituted by the petitioner himself, challenging the order of Respondent No.3 cancelling the building licence, which issue has already been dealt with while answering Point No.2. 20.2. The nature and scope of the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner are therefore of critical relevance in determining the legality of the impugned action.
20.3. The revisional proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner were confined to examining the correctness, legality, and propriety of the order
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR cancelling the building licence. The Deputy Commissioner was not seized of any proceedings questioning:
20.3.1. the validity of the auction held in 1977, 20.3.2. the legality of the sale certificate issued in 1991, 20.3.3. the mutation of khata in favour of the petitioner or his predecessor-in-title, or 20.3.4. the subsistence of the petitioner's title.
20.4. Nevertheless, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Deputy Commissioner proceeded to examine alleged violations of Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, as well as the nature of the land as B-Kharab / pond land, and on that basis cancelled the khata standing in the petitioner's name.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.5. It is trite that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and corrective in nature, confined to the subject matter of the order under challenge. It cannot be used as a tool to:
20.5.1. initiate fresh proceedings, 20.5.2. adjudicate issues never put to the affected party, 20.5.3. or impose adverse civil consequences on grounds which were never the subject of prior notice or enquiry.
20.6. The impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner clearly travels beyond the scope of the revision and converts revisional scrutiny into an original adjudication, which is impermissible in law.
20.7. As already observed while answering Point No.1, there is no independent action initiated
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR by the respondents alleging that the petitioner or his predecessor-in-title violated Section 72(2) of the Act, or that the land in question, being reserved for a public purpose, was incapable of alienation.
20.8. No proceedings have been initiated for:
20.8.1. cancellation of the sale certificate, 20.8.2. resumption of land, 20.8.3. declaration of the transaction as void, 20.8.4. or eviction of the petitioner in accordance with law.
20.9. In the absence of any such independent statutory proceedings, the Deputy Commissioner could not have assumed original jurisdiction to cancel the khata merely because the matter was incidentally before him in a revision petition.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.10. The cancellation of khata has serious civil consequences. Though khata is not a document of title, it is a statutory recognition of possession and enjoyment, and its cancellation affects:
20.10.1. the petitioner's ability to deal with the property, 20.10.2. obtain licences or permissions, 20.10.3. pay taxes, 20.10.4. and exercise proprietary incidents associated with possession.
20.11. Such consequences cannot be imposed without due process, and certainly not through a collateral order passed in proceedings where the petitioner was never put on notice that his khata or title would be examined.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.12. I'am therefore of the considered view that the Deputy Commissioner, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, acted in excess of jurisdiction, in breach of procedural fairness, and in violation of settled principles governing administrative and quasi-judicial powers. 20.13. The impugned order thus suffers from jurisdictional error, procedural impropriety, and non-application of mind, rendering it legally unsustainable.
20.14. Another aspect of relevance is the conduct of the official respondents over an extended period of time. The auction was held in 1977, the sale certificate was issued in 1991, and the petitioner's rights stood recognised in municipal and revenue records for decades. 20.15. Even after the alleged illegality came to light in 2013, the respondents:
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.15.1. cancelled the building licence, 20.15.2. allowed the matter to linger in revision and writ proceedings, 20.15.3. but did not initiate any independent action to challenge the sale or resume the land.
20.16. This prolonged inaction militates against the respondents' present stand and reinforces the conclusion that the impugned cancellation of khata was a belated, ad hoc, and legally impermissible exercise of power.
20.17. Much reliance has been placed by the respondents on Section 81 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, particularly sub-
section (2) thereof, which provides that certain categories of properties, including public tanks and water bodies, vest in the Municipal Council
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR and are to be held by it as a trustee. Section 81 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
81. Municipal property.--(1) Every municipal council may for the purpose of this Act, acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, whether within or without the limits of the municipal area (2) All property of the nature herein specified, and not being specially reserved by the Government, shall be vested in and belong to the municipal council and shall, together with all other property of whatsoever nature or kind not being specially reserved by the Government, which may become vested in the municipal council, be under its direction, management and control and shall be held and applied by it as trustee, subject to the provisions and for the purposes of this Act, that is to say,--
(a) all public town-walls, gates, markets, slaughter houses, manure and night-soil depots, and public buildings of every description;
(b) all public streams, tanks, reservoirs, cisterns, wells, springs, aqueducts, conduits, tunnels, pipes, pumps and other water works and all bridges, buildings, engines, works, materials and things connected therewith, or appertaining thereto, and also any adjacent land not being private property appertaining to any public tank or well;
(c) all public sewers and drains, and all sewers, drains, tunnels, culverts, gutters and water courses, in, alongside or under any street, and all works, materials and things appertaining thereto, as also all dust, dirt, dung, ashes, refuse, animal matter or filth or rubbish of any kind collected by the municipal council from the streets, houses, privies, sewers, cess-pools or elsewhere;
(d) all public lamps, lamp-posts and apparatus connected therewith, or appertaining thereto;
(e) all lands and buildings transferred to it by the Government, by gift or otherwise, for local public purposes;
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR
(f) all public streets and the pavement, stones and other materials thereof and also all trees, erections, materials, implements and things provided for such streets:
Provided that lands transferred to the municipal council by the Government under clause
(e) shall not, unless otherwise expressly provided in the instrument of transfer, belong by right of ownership to the municipal council but shall vest in it subject to the terms and conditions of the transfer, and on the contravention of any of the said terms or conditions, the lands with all things attached thereto, including all fixures and structures thereon, shall vest in the Government and it shall be lawful for the Government to resume possession thereof.
(3) It shall be competent to the Government from time to time, by notification, to take over any property vested or vesting in the municipal council under this section on such terms as the Government may determine 20.18. There can be no quarrel with the statutory position that where land is reserved as a pond or water body, the Municipal Council holds it in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the general public. However, the existence of such a statutory obligation does not dispense with the requirement of following due process while seeking to undo transactions which have attained finality.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.19. If indeed the land was incapable of alienation and the original transaction violated the trusteeship obligations under Section 81(2), the law requires the authorities to:
20.19.1. initiate proper proceedings, 20.19.2. issue notice to all affected parties, 20.19.3. conduct an enquiry, 20.19.4. determine responsibility, 20.19.5. and pass reasoned orders in accordance with law.
20.20. What the law does not permit is selective or collateral deprivation of rights, particularly by cancelling khata alone, while allowing the sale certificate to subsist.
20.21. The Public Trust Doctrine, as expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v.
Kamal Nath, undoubtedly imposes a
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR constitutional and statutory duty upon the State and its instrumentalities to protect public resources. However, that doctrine cannot be invoked in a manner that bypasses statutory procedure or principles of natural justice, nor can it be used to legitimise procedurally flawed actions.
20.22. Public interest must be pursued through lawful means, not by arbitrary administrative shortcuts.
20.23. In view of the above, while I find the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner to be unsustainable and liable to be set aside, it is equally necessary to ensure that the statutory obligations under Section 81(2) of the Act are not rendered illusory. According I issue the following:
General Directions
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.24. In view of the findings recorded while answering Point Nos.1 to 3, this Court finds that properties belonging to the State and to the citizens in common, as described under Section 81 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, are not being maintained and protected in the manner mandated by law. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that general directions are required to be issued to ensure uniform, lawful, and effective implementation of the said provision across the State.
20.25. All Municipal Councils are hereby directed to strictly implement Section 81 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, recognising that the properties enumerated under Section 81(2)(a) to (f) vest in the Municipal Council only in a fiduciary capacity as trustee and not as absolute owner, and that such properties shall
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR be held, managed, and applied solely for the purposes of the Act.
20.26. The Principal Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj (RDPR) is hereby designated as the Administrative Nodal Authority and shall be responsible for policy oversight, inter-departmental coordination, enforcement, and fixation of accountability. 20.27. The Principal Secretary, Department of e-
Governance is hereby designated as the Technology Nodal Authority and shall be responsible for digital enablement, system integrity, interoperability between departments, and maintenance of audit trails. 20.28. The State Government shall:
20.28.1. constitute a State-Level Section 81 Implementation Committee within a
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of this order; and 20.28.2. ensure constitution of District Municipal Trust Property Committees under the Chairmanship of the respective Deputy Commissioners within a period of forty- five (45) days.
20.29. All Municipal Councils shall, within a period of ninety (90) days, prepare and upload a comprehensive inventory of all properties falling under Section 81(2) of the Act, after correlating municipal records, revenue records, grant orders, and town planning documents. 20.30. The properties so identified shall thereafter be:
20.30.1. classified and risk-graded;
20.30.2. physically demarcated on the ground;
and
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.30.3. geo-tagged using GIS technology, 20.31. Revenue records, including RTCs, and municipal records shall clearly reflect the classification "Municipal Trust Property - Section 81, Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964", and no alteration thereto shall be effected without issuance of notice, conduct of enquiry, and passing of reasoned orders, strictly in accordance with law.
20.32. The District Committees shall conduct time-
bound audits of:
20.32.1. past sales, leases, grants, or transfers, including those governed by Section 72 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964;
20.32.2. encroachments or unauthorised constructions; and
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR 20.32.3. impermissible change of land use. 20.33. It is however made clear that no coercive or corrective action shall be taken except through independent statutory proceedings, after issuance of notice, affording opportunity of hearing, and passing of reasoned orders. 20.34. No property falling under Section 81 shall be sold, leased, or otherwise alienated except in strict compliance with Section 72(2) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and with express Government approval, wherever such approval is required.
20.35. The State Government shall establish and operationalise the Municipal Trust Property Management System (MTPMS) as the single source of truth for all Section 81 properties, integrating Bhoomi, Mojini, e-Municipalities, Sakala, ULMS etc., and shall assign a Trust
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR Property Identification Number (TPIN) to each such property.
20.36. A public digital portal shall be maintained displaying municipality-wise trust properties, and mechanisms shall be provided for citizen reporting of encroachments or misuse, subject to appropriate safeguards against abuse. 20.37. Municipal Councils shall submit quarterly compliance reports, District Committees shall submit bi-annual reports, and the State-Level Committee shall place an annual State Trust Property Status Report before the Government. 20.38. Responsibility shall be fixed on officers found to have facilitated illegal alienation, encroachment, or misuse of trust properties, and disciplinary or other action shall be initiated against them in accordance with law. 20.39. The directions issued herein are institutional and prospective in nature and shall not be
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR construed as validating or invalidating any transaction involved in the present writ petition, which has been decided on its own facts. 20.40. Accordingly, I answer Point No.3 by holding that the order dated 02.08.2017 passed by Respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner - cancelling the khata standing in the name of the petitioner is without jurisdiction, legally untenable, violative of due process, and liable to be set aside.
21. Answer to Point No.4:- What order?
21.1. In view of my answers to point Nos.1 to 4, I pass the following:-
ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed.
ii. The Order dated 27.11.2013 passed by respondent No.3 at Annexure B is quashed. iii. The Order dated 02.08.2017 passed by respondent No.2 at Annexure A is quashed.
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NC: 2026:KHC:3378 WP No. 57623 of 2017 HC-KAR iv. Liberty is however reserved to the respondents to take such action as may be permissible under law.
v. Though the above petition is disposed, re-list on 26.03.2026 to report compliance with the above general directions.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE MH/-
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 12