Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P vs Dhani Ram on 27 May, 2025
( 2025:HHC:16066 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No.306 of 2010 Reserved on: 07.04.2025 Date of Decision: 27.05.2025.
State of H.P. ...Appellant/State.
Versus
Dhani Ram ...Respondent.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General.
For the Respondent : Mr. Manoj Thakur, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.04.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (H.P) (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the notice of accusation.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 294, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Sunita Devi (PW1), was running a shop in the village of Jaroda.
She went to deposit the water charges on 11.09.2005 at about 09:00 am in the courtyard of one Jagdish. Dhani Ram (the accused) was collecting the water charges. Satya Devi (PW5), Sheela Devi, Prakasho Devi, Sunder Ram (PW2), Pyare Lal and Ward Member Pushpa Devi (PW4) were also present on the spot. The accused started arguing with Sunita Devi (PW1) that her house had separate families and the water charges should be separately deposited by each family. This was objected to by the informant. The accused (Dhani Ram) started quarrelling with the informant. He abused and threatened her. He picked up a stick and entered into a scuffle with the informant's father-in-law. He removed his pants and inner garments and started acting indecently. The wife of the accused, Dhani Ram, took him to his home. The matter was reported to the police.
FIR (Ex-PW1/A) was registered. ASI Naresh Chand (PW7) 3 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex-PW7/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses, as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 294, 504 and 506 of IPC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
3. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. Sunita Devi (PW1) is the informant. Sundar Ram (PW2), Kartar Nath (PW3), Pushpa Devi (PW4) and Satya Devi (PW5) are the eyewitnesses. SI Duglu Ram (PW6) signed the FIR and filed the charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. ASI Naresh Chand (PW7) conducted the investigation.
4. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC denied the case in its entirety. He stated that a false case was made against him due to enmity.
Statement of Amar Nath (DW1) was recorded in defence.
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5. The learned Trial Court held that the incident had taken place on 11.09.2005, and the matter was reported to the police on 12.09.2005. No explanation was provided for the delay. The witnesses did not state the exact act done by the accused. Piare Lal, Sheela Devi and Prakasho Devi were not examined. The prosecution examined only the inimical witnesses. There were material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution case suspect. Hence, the accused was acquitted.
6. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was appreciated in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. Unrealistic standards were set to view the prosecution evidence. The reasoning of the learned Trial Court is not proper. Learned Trial Court discarded the testimonies of the witnesses without any plausible reason. The testimony of the informant was corroborated by other witnesses. The enmity by itself was not sufficient to discard the testimonies.
The statement of the defence witness was not believable and it did not inspire any confidence. The examination of the other 5 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) witnesses was not necessary and the prosecution case could not have been discarded due to the non-examination of the witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
7. I have heard Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Manoj Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
8. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant supported the prosecution version and her statement was corroborated by other witnesses. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the testimonies of the witnesses were not reliable.
The enmity could have put the Court on caution but was not sufficient to discard the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
9. Mr Manoj Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court 6 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) had rightly appreciated the evidence. There are discrepancies in the prosecution witnesses. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:
"11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the 7 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
"38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para
42) '42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.8
( 2025:HHC:16066 ) (3) Various expressions, such as "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows:
(SCC p. 584, para 8) 9 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) "8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal 10 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
12. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13. The informant, Sunita Devi (PW1), stated that she had gone to the Courtyard of Jagdish to deposit the water bills.
Other villagers including Pushpa Devi, Satya Devi & Sheela Devi were also present on the spot. Informant (PW1) deposited the water bills at about 11:00 am when she was told that she had three families and all the family members should deposit their water bills separately. She objected to by saying that she had one family and the water charges could not be deposited by different family members. Dhani Ram (accused) picked up a stick to beat her. He abused and threatened her. The accused removed his pants and undergarments and started behaving indecently. Her father-in-law visited the spot. The accused also quarrelled with him. The accused tried to insult her in the presence of everyone by acting indecently. She was stung by 11 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) the wasp, due to which she could not report the matter to the police on the same day. She reported the matter to the police on 12.09.2005.
14. The victim has not stated in her statement that she was annoyed by the act of the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818, that mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient to prove the offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC, it must be proved further that it was to the annoyance of others. Where no one had spoken about the obscene words and annoyance, the ingredients of Section 294 of IPC are not satisfied. It was observed:
"9. To prove the offence under Section 294 IPC, the mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient, but there must be further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words; they felt annoyed, and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellant-accused an- noyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b) IPC are made out."
15. No witness stated that he/she was annoyed by the act of the accused. Kartar Nath (PW3) stated that the incident was seen by the people, who shut their eyes due to the shame.
12( 2025:HHC:16066 ) Pushpa Devi (PW4) stated that villagers were present and the accused had done this act in their presence. Satya Devi (PW5) stated that she went to her home due to shame. Hence, the requirement that the accused had annoyed the others is not satisfied.
16. Sundar Ram (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that the accused had not removed his pants. Kartar Nath (PW3) stated in his cross-examination that the accused had danced in a naked condition. Pushpa Devi (PW4) stated that the accused had removed the zip of his pants and hold his private part. Satya Devi (PW5) stated that the accused unzipped his pants and took out his private part. She specifically stated in her cross-examination that the accused had not removed his pants and volunteered to say that the accused had only unzipped his pants. Thus, it is apparent that the witnesses have made different statements regarding the act done by the accused. This difference is regarding the manner of committing the indecent act. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding the version of the prosecution witnesses because of the discrepancies.
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17. The notice of accusation was also put to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 504 & 506 of the IPC. The ingredients of Section 504 & 506 of IPC were explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 238 as under: -
18. A two-judge Bench of this Court, speaking through one of us, J.B. Pardiwala, Justice, in its decision in Mo- hammad Wajid v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 2340/2023 decided on August 8, 2023), explained what constitutes an offence of criminal intimidation. We quote the relevant paragraphs from the said decision as under: --
"23. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal In- timidation, Insult and Annoyance.
Section 503 reads thus: -
"Section 503. Criminal intimidation. -- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or repu- tation of anyone in whom that person is inter- ested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation. --A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threat- ened is interested is within this section.
Illustration 14 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) A, for the purpose of inducing B to refrain from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."
Section 504 reads thus: --
"Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace. --Whoever inten- tionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
Section 506 reads thus: --
"Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimida- tion. -- Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprison- ment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprison- ment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either descrip- tion for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
24. An offence under Section 503 has the following essentials: --
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested.
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2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such per- son insulted to breach the peace or intentionally in- sulting a person knowing it to be likely that the per- son insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive lan- guage is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the per- son insulted to break the peace or to commit an of- fence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the in- sulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the of- fender. In judging whether particular abusive lan- guage is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult 16 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an of- fence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that: --
"To constitute an offence under Sec-
tion 504, I.P.C., it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds."
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the alle- gations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to con- stitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably be said to have been disclosed, but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations 17 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) with respect to the offence punishable under Sec- tion 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a dif- ferent perspective. In the FIR, all that the first infor- mant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the es- sential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to in- tentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to an intentional insult. In the ab- sence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."
18. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: -
21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the 18 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-
49) "11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint.
In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have."
22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44:
19( 2025:HHC:16066 ) (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] , SCC p. 49) "13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC."
23. In another judgment, i.e. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132], this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and
506. In the above case also, a case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28) "11.*** A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the 20 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "criminal intimidation". The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public, and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC." In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC.
24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the 21 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours arrived there, the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation, taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715].
19. This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v.
State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275 wherein it was observed:
"19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a refer- ence in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 44, wherein the Court discussed the essential in- gredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held as follows:
--
"13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following in-
gredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a 22 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provoca- tion will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredi- ents of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to war- rant a conviction under Section 504 IPC."
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the com- plaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Sec- tion 504 IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capa- ble of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while exam- ining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings un- der Section 504 IPC." (emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant so as to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or 23 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) words capable of provoking him/her to commit breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC.
21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wa- jid v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, while dis- cussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for con- sidering the circumstances wherein, an abusive lan- guage takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: --
"28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used inten- tionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-con- trol or having been subjected to abject terror by the of- fender. In judging whether particular abusive lan- guage is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or 24 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or tempera- ment of the complainant.
29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary ele- ment of being likely to incite the person insulted to com- mit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other el- ement of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposi- tion that no one commits an offence under Sec- tion 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant." (emphasis supplied)
22. Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rude- ness or insolence does not amount to an intentional in- sult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Further- more, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.
23. Section 504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus- being the intentional insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea, i.e., the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the per- son insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should 'intentionally insult' the other per- son with the intention or knowledge that the provoca- tion caused by such insult is likely to result in the com- mission of breach of public peace or any other offence 25 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes 'in- tentional insult' with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, in- tention or knowledge on the part of accused person that his actions of making 'intentional insult' have the po- tential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.
24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an 'intention to insult' is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Fur- ther, 'intentional insult' must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.
25. It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The 'intentional insult' and provocation must be so proxi- mate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break pub- lic peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of 'intentional insult' causing provocation, to draw culpability under Sec- tion 504, IPC would depend upon the facts and circum- stances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is suffi- cient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable per- son, i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reason- able person to break peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC."
21. Criminal intimidation is provided in Section 503 of IPC as under: -
503. Criminal intimidation 26 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section.
22. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have been with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. The complainant did not state that any alarm was caused in her mind. She has not stated that she was prevented from doing something, which she was legally bound to do or omit to do something, which she was bound to do. Hence, the necessary ingredient of Section 506 of IPC is not satisfied.
23. It was laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed:
27( 2025:HHC:16066 ) "21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimida-
tion can be made out, it must be established prima facie, that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case), intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i. e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the peti- tioner believed to be his exclusive property would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation."
24. Similar is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar (supra) wherein it was held at page 209:-
"25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is of- fence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maha- rashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the com- plainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the follow- ing:
"... The prosecution must prove:
(i) That the accused threatened some person.
(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, rep-
utation or property of someone in whom he was in- terested;
(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat." (emphasis supplied) 28 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.
25. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the accused had caused an alarm to the informant or had caused her to do anything which she would not have been done or omitted to do anything which she would have done but for the threat. No person deposed that he was alarmed by any threat. No person deposed that the accused had insulted him/her and he/she was provoked to commit a breach of peace. Therefore, the ingredients of Sections 504 & 506 of the IPC were not satisfied.
26. The matter was reported to the police after the lapse of more than 24 hours, and an explanation was provided by the informant that she was stung by the wasps. Therefore, she could not go to the police station to report the matter.
However, there is nothing to prove this fact. No medical prescription showing this fact was brought on record. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay.
It was observed:
29( 2025:HHC:16066 ) "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 Crpc, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has 30 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."
27. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: -
"12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1]."
28. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653 wherein it was observed on page 182:
"14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an 31 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version.
15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction."
29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case due to the delay in reporting the matter to the police.
30. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that she was not on visiting terms with the accused and litigation was pending between her and the accused for 5-6 years. Sunder Ram (PW2) also stated that the accused had filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Meera Devi, which was pending in the Court. Kartar Nath (PW3) admitted that he had a civil case with the accused over Abadi Deh. Pushpa Devi (PW4) stated in her cross-examination that the accused had filed a criminal case against her. Satya Devi (PW5) admitted in her cross-examination that she is not on visiting terms with 32 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) the accused. She does not attend the marriages. Therefore, the prosecution had examined the inimical witnesses.
31. There is no rule that the testimonies of inimical witnesses cannot be relied upon. However, considering the delay in reporting the matter to the police and the discrepancies in their testimonies, the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the statements of the prosecution witnesses.
32. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view which could have been taken based upon the evidence led before it, and this Court will not interfere with the same while deciding an appeal against acquittal.
33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed.
34. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with 33 ( 2025:HHC:16066 ) stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
35. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th May, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)