Karnataka High Court
M. R. Venkatesh vs The State Of Karnataka on 22 October, 2018
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
W.P.NO. 24368/2018
C/W
W.P.NOS. 24365/2018, 25844/2018 & 25900/2018
(GM-RES)
IN W.P.NO.24368/2018
BETWEEN:
M.R. VENKATESH
S/O M.K. RANGASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
GROUND FLOOR, UNITY BUILDING
SAMPANGIRAMANAGAR
NEAR CORPORATION
BANGALORE.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.LAKSHMINARAYANA, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI. L. SRINIVASA BABU, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
VIDHANASOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT
2
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.UDAY HOLLA, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W
SRI. V. SREENIDHI, AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 28.05.2018 AND ORDER
DATED 30.05.2018 MARKED AS ANNEXURE-D AND E AS
ARBITRARY, ILLEGAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14 AND 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
IN W.P.NO.24365/2018
BETWEEN:
A. MUNIYAPPA
S/O LATE ANNAYYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
DOOR NO.C-2, ITI TOWNSHIP
Y' ROAD, DOORAVANI NAGAR
BANGALORE-560 036.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.LAKSHMINARAYANA, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI. L. SRINIVASA BABU, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
VIDHANASOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
3
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT
VIKASSOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.UDAY HOLLA, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W
SRI. V. SREENIDHI, AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 28.05.2018 AND 29.05.2018
VIDE ANNEXURE-F AND G AS ARBITRARY, ILLEGAL,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14
AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
IN W.P.NO.25844/2018
BETWEEN:
JAGANATH
S/O RAMACHANDRA JAMADAR
H.NO.8-9-270/1
GURU NANAK COLONY
MAIN ROAD, BIDAR-585401.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.LAKSHMINARAYANA, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI. PRAVEEN RAIKOTE, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
VIDHANASOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
4
2. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
BACKWAR CLASS WELFARE DEPARTMENT
VIKASSOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.UDAY HOLLA, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W
SRI. V. SREENIDHI, AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER AT ANNEXURE-C DATED
30.05.2018 VIDE NO HIM VA KA 156 BCA 2018.
IN W.P.NO.25900/2018
BETWEEN:
O. SHANKAR
S/O LATE OBAIAH
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
CHAIRMAN,
DR. BABU JAGAJIVAN RAM LEATHER
INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LTD., HEAD OFFICE
AT NO.17/15, OBLONG BLOCK
2ND FLOOR, UNITY BUILDING
J.C. ROAD, BANGALORE-560002
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT. PRAMILA NESARGI A/W
SMT. KAVYA SREE G.S, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
5
VIDHANASOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIEAL WELFARE
VIKASSOUDHA
BENGALURU-560001.
3. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS DEPUTY SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
VIKASA SOUDHA
BANGALORE-560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.UDAY HOLLA, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W
SRI. V. SREENIDHI, AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH
THE UNOFFICIAL NOTE DATED 28.05.2018 PASSED BY
THE RESPONDENT NO.3 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C
AND THE NOTIFICATION DATED 29.05.2018 ISSUED BY
THE RESPONDENT NO.2 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-D.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
6
ORDER
Petitioner in W.P.No.24368/2018 has filed an application - I.A.No.1/2018 to produce additional document namely, order dated 02.11.2016 appointing the petitioner as Chairman of Karnataka Safai Karmachari Commission. Accepting the reasons stated in the affidavit supporting the application, said document is received on record as Annexure-F. I.A.No.1/2018 is hereby allowed.
2. Petitioners who had been appointed as Chairman of Karnataka State Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, Safai Karmachari Commission, Nijasharana Ambigara Chowdaiah Development Limited and Dr.Babu Jagajeevan Rao Leather Industries Development Corporation under the Acts/Memorandum and Articles of Association by orders dated 02.11.2016 and 7 03.02.2018 have preferred these writ petitions assailing the order dated 28.05.2018/30.05.2018 passed by the appropriate Government whereunder their appointments/nomination as Chairman have been cancelled.
BRIEF BACKGROUND:
3. In W.P.No.24365/2018 and W.P.24368/2018, respective petitioners were nominated as Chairman of the Karnataka State Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes and Safai Karmachari Commission respectively by notification dated 02.11.2016. Their nominations were made by the appropriate Government by virtue of the power vested under the Karnataka State Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Act and Karnataka State Safai Karmachari's Act, 2013. Their nominations have been cancelled by the impugned order dated 28.05.2018
- Annexure-D and Annexure-F respectively in general 8 and notification dated 30.05.2018/29.05.2018 -
Annexures-E & G respectively issued thereunder.
4. Likewise, the petitioners in W.P.No.25844/2018 & W.P.No.25900/2018 who had been appointed as the Chairman of the Nigama and Development Corporation referred to herein above by order dated 03.02.2018 and 02.11.2016 respectively have been removed or in other words, their nominations have been cancelled by notification dated 30.05.2018 and 29.05.2018 - Annexure-C and Annexure-D respectively. Their appointments were made by virtue of power vested to the Government under Memorandum and Articles of Association governing the said Nigam/Corporation which are registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956.
5. Hence, these writ petitioners are assailing or questioning their removal contending interalia that their 9 nomination/appointment is for a fixed period and the appropriate Government has no power to remove them before they could complete the term of office for which they were appointed.
6. I have heard the arguments of Sri V Lakshminarayana, Smt.Pramila Nesargi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri L Srinivas Babu and Smt.Kavyashri G.S., Sri Praveen Raikote, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners and Sri Udaya Holla, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of respondent-State.
7. It is the contention of Sri V Lakshminarayana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioners that under the orders of appointment, eight persons had been nominated to different Nigams/Corporations, etc. and by impugned orders, only four persons have been removed and as such, it is 10 discriminatory. He would elaborate his submission by contending that the petitioners were appointed and not nominated and as such, Section 4 of the respective enactments by exercise of the power under which the petitioners have been removed would not be applicable. He would also elaborate his submission by contending that impugned orders are violative of principles of natural justice since no notice was issued prior to their removal and even otherwise, the contingencies provided under Section 4(3)(a) to (e) of the Act is not attracted and as such, the order of removal is without jurisdiction. He would also submit that the decision for removal can be taken only by the Government consisting of council of Ministers and there being no Council of Ministers, the decision to remove the petitioners is bad in law. He would also contend that 'doctrine of pleasure' under which petitioners have been removed is to be read as co-terminus with the period 11 prescribed under section 4 of the Act and unless the contingencies contemplated under section 4(3)(a) to (e) would arise, question of removing the petitioners for the post to which they were appointed would not arise. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following judgments:
(1) (2016)6 SCC 1:
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER VS.
BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL AND
ANOHTER
(2) ILR 2017 KAR 2439:
MR. K.C. SHANKARE GOWDA VS. THE
STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, VETERINARY AND FISHERIES DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS (3) (2010)13 SCC 586:
MEHAR SINGH SAINI, CHAIRMAN HARYANA PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION AND OTHERS, IN RE (4) (2017)7 SCC 221:
MANGALAM ORGANICS LIMITED VS.
UNION OF INDIA
(5) (2018)11 SCC 734:
TECHI TAGI TARA VS. REJENDRA SINGH BHANDARI AND OTHERS 12 (6) (2001)7 SCC 126:
S.R. CHAUDHURI VS. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS (7) (2017)1 SCC 283:
CHEVITI VENKANNA YADAV VS. STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS (8) (2010)6 SCC 331:
B.P. SINGHAL VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (9) (2015)7 SCC 1:
COMMON CAUSE VS. UNION OF INDIA (10) (2010)12 SCC 448:
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS.
SHAKUNTLA AND OTHERS
8. Smt.Pramila Nesargi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Smt.Kavyasri for petitioners would contend that the term of office prescribed under Section 4 would be for the said fixed period and before the completion of the said period, if the appropriate Government intends to exercise its 'pleasure' to remove them, the contingencies prescribed thereunder to hold such person as disqualified would come into play, which 13 situation alone would give the power to the appropriate Government to exercise the 'doctrine of pleasure'. She would submit that in the instant case, no such situation has arisen and even without assailing any reason, the 'doctrine of pleasure' has been applied to remove the petitioners and hence, it is liable to be quashed. She would very heavily rely upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.P.SINGHAL vs UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER reported in (2010)6 SCC 331 in support of her contention, apart from relying upon the following judgments:
(1) (2012)5 K.L.J. 116:
KHUSRO QURAISHI VS. STATE OF
KARNATAKA BY MINORITY WELFARE
DEPARTMENT
(2) (2012)6 SCC 502:
BRIJ MOHAN LAL VS. UNION OF
INDIA AND OTHERS
9. Sri Praveen Kumar Raikote, learned
Advocate appearing for petitioner in
14
W.P.No.25844/2018 would support the arguments
advanced by the learned Senior Advocates and he would supplement his argument by contending that there was no Government in place as provided under Article 164 of the Constitution of India when the impugned orders of removal of petitioners came to be passed and as such, it suffers from want of jurisdiction. Hence, by relying upon the following judgments, he prays for allowing of writ petition:
(1) (2008)7 SCC 117
PANCHAM CHAND AND OTHERS
Vs. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AND OTHERS
10. Per contra, Sri Udaya Holla, learned
Advocate General appearing for respondent-State would support the impugned orders and contend that petitioners in W.P.No.24365/2018 & 24368/2018 had been appointed under the Acts of the respective Corporation/Commission and Section 4 of the 15 respective enactments clearly providing for exercise of the power of 'doctrine of pleasure' by the appropriate Government, same has been exercised and petitioners have been removed. He would also submit that insofar as other two petitioners are concerned, they have been appointed as per the extant regulations provided under the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Corporation/Nigam which are incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and the said regulation providing for the appropriate Government to appoint the Chairman until further orders would not mean that such appointment can be for any fixed period or for eternity. Hence, he contends that the removal of petitioners are in consonance with the statutory provisions governing such appointment/nomination and there is no infirmity whatsoever calling for interference by this Court. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following judgments: 16
(1) (2001)2 SCC 441 KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORATE vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (2) ILR 1987 KAR 1555 (DB) SANGAPPA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA (3) ILR 2008 KAR 1722 SYED MUDIR AGHA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY AND OTHERS (4) ILR 1993 KAR 3119 (DB) SADANANDAIAH vs STATE OF KARNATAKA (5) ILR 1990 KAR 214 (DB) ANJUMAN-E-ISLAM vs KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKFS (6) ILR 2000 KAR 4989 H RAJAIAH & OTHERS vs STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS (7) (2013)5 KAR.LJ 519 A.M.BHASKAR & OTHERS vs STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS Hence, he prays for rejection of the writ petitions.
11. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the records, 17 it would emerge there from that petitioners herein were appointed as Chairman of the respective Commission/Nigam/Corporation under the orders dated 02.11.2016 (petitioners in W.P.No.24365/2018 & 24368/2018 and 25900/2018) and 03.02.2018 (petitioner in W.P.No.25844/2018).
12. Insofar as the petitioners in W.P.No.24365/2018 & 24368/2018 are concerned, the records would disclose that they were appointed by the appropriate Government by virtue of the power vested under Section 4 of Karnataka State Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Act, 2002 and Karnataka State Commission for Safai Karmachari's Act, 2013. A bare reading of Section 4 of these two enactments would disclose that such appointment would be for a term not exceeding three years as may be specified by the State Government. 18
13. Section 4 of the respective enactments would commence with the expression "subject to the pleasure of the State Government". Thus, it is clearly evident from a plain reading of the said provision in the respective enactments that "doctrine of pleasure" has been made applicable insofar as appointment to the Commission or Nigam as the case may be. The 'doctrine of pleasure' is an uncontrolled one unless it is subject to any other statutory provisions. The latin term for "doctrine of pleasure" is "durante bene placito"
(during pleasure) meaning that the tenure of office is at pleasure. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA vs TULSIRAM PATEL reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 had explained "the pleasure doctrine" as under:
"The concept of civil service is not new or of recent origin. Governments - whether monarchial, dictatorial or republican - have to function; and for carrying on the administration and the varied functions of the government a large number of persons 19 are required and have always been required, whether they are constituted in the form of a civil service or not. Every kingdom and country of the world throughout history had a group of persons who helped the ruler to administer the land, whether according to modern notions we may call that group a civil service or not, because it is not possible for one man by himself to rule and govern the land and look after and supervise all the details of administration. As it was throughout history so it has been in England and in India.
In England, all public officers and servants of the Crown hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown and their services can be terminated at will without assigning any cause. By the expression 'the pleasure doctrine' is conveyed this right of the Crown. This right is, however, subject to what may be provided otherwise by legislation passed by Parliament because in the United Kingdom Parliament has legislative sovereignty.
xxx xxx In India, the pleasure doctrine has received constitutional sanction by being enacted in Article 310(1). Unlike in the United Kingdom, in India it is not subject to any law made by Parliament but is subject only to what is expressly provided by the Constitution.
The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a government servant. 'Tenure' 20 means 'manner, conditions or term of holding something' according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and 'terms of holding; title; authority' according to the Oxford English Dictionary. It, therefore, means the period for which an incumbent of office holds it. It is for this reason that the statement of law relating to the pleasure doctrine in England is given in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 8, para 1106, under the heading 'Tenure of office'.
The position that the pleasure doctrine is not based upon any special prerogative of the Crown but upon public policy has been accepted by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Babu Ram Upadhya (1961)2 SCR 679, 696; AIR 1961 SC 751 at page
759) and Moti Ram Deka vs. General Manager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, Pandu, (1964)5 SCR 683, 734-5: (AIR 1964 SC 600 at Pp.620-21."
14. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of ANJUMAN-E-ISLAM vs KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKFS reported in ILR 1990 KAR 214 has held that power to appoint carries with it the power to dismiss or remove. It has been held that 'doctrine pleasure' would be applicable in the absence of any statutory restriction. 21
15. In the case of SADANANDAIAH vs STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in ILR 1993 KAR. 3119 the Division Bench has held if the members are nominated by the Government to an Urban Development Authority, no reasons are required to be furnished for their removal. In fact, it has been held that such members hold the office for a period of three years subject to 'pleasure' of the Government. The Divisin Bench in the said case was examining Section 5 & 6 of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 which provides for "term of office and conditions of service of members" and "removal of member". It came to be held as under:
6. A mere look at the Sections show that only on certain contingency a Member can be removed by the Government. None of such contingencies is even alleged to have existed in the case of Appellant. Therefore Section 6 is out of question. When Section 5 is read with sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3 it becomes clear that it is the Local Authority's privilege to appoint an elected Member from amongst its Members to represent it on the Board of Urban Development Authority, as per sub-section (1) 22 of Section 3 of the Act. But that has never happened so far as the Appellant is concerned.
It is his own case that he was not elected from amongst the Members of the Local Authority by the Local Authority itself to represent it on the Board. But as a First Member of the Authority he was appointed by the Government in exercise of its powers under sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. Once that happened it becomes obvious that the Government was the nominating Authority so far as the Appellant was concerned and not the local body. Once this conclusion is reached Section 5(1) squarely gets attracted as it in turn provides the Chairman and other Members of the Authority shall hold office for a period of three years from the date on which they assume office subject to the pleasure of the Government. If the Government is the Appointing Authority for the Appellant, the pleasure doctrine will apply fully qua him and if the Government at any stage withdraws that pleasure he has to make room for his successor. It is of course true that the pleasure of the Government cannot be exercised malafide. From the facts of the present case, it is impossible to hold that the withdrawal of the pleasure for continuation of the Appellant as the nominated member of the Board, is an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the Government. The reason is obvious. As a First Member the Appellant was nominated by the Government under Proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, as elected member of the local Authority, at that stage was not available.
8. The learned Counsel for appellant was not right when he contended that it is the pleasure of the Municipality and not the 23 Government which has resulted in the order ANNEXURE-F. Order ANNEXURE-F is passed by the Government, which had appointed the Appellant and it is that Appointing Authority which has modified the appointment order made earlier and has withdrawn it. If the earlier order was based on the pleasure of the Government as the Appointing Authority and the same Authority can subsequently on a rationale and reasonable ground withdraw that pleasure and ask the appellant to vacate his seat. It is to be kept in view that for exercise of pleasure by the Government, no reasons are necessary but of course the action should not be malafide one. On the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the action was arbitrary or malafide. The Proviso to Section 5 of the Act, on which learned Counsel for appellant placed reliance also cannot be of any assistance to him. From a reading of Proviso to Section 5, it becomes clear that once a person holds an office as a Member of Urban Development Authority under Section 3, normally the tenure of office would be three years from the date he assumes office as a Member but that tenure can get curtailed in the following contingencies:--
1) When the Government in exercise of its powers under section 5(1) of the Act validly terminates the membership;
2) When the concerned member is removed under section 6 of the Act;
3) When the concerned representative of the local Authority who has become a Member of the Board under section 3(3)(i) ceases to be a Councillor of that Local Authority, and 24
4) When Local Authority whose representative is in the Board is superseded.
Therefore, it cannot be said that once the Proviso operates the pleasure doctrine as engrafted by Section 5(1) of the Act would be out of picture.
16. In fact, in the case of H RAJAIAH & OTHERS vs STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in ILR 2000 KAR 4989, the co-ordinate Bench headed by His Lordship Justice T.S.Thakur as he then was, while examining the attack on the principle of 'doctrine of pleasure' has held that it is neither a relic of feudal age nor a special prerogative of the Crown and said 'doctrine' has found its acceptability even in democratic set ups on the ground of public good.
17. It is also held by a co-ordinate Bench in the case of A.N.BHASKAR VS STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2013)5 Kar.LJ 519 that where 'pleasure doctrine' has been invoked and the members are removed without notice, question of issuing notice or 25 the principles of natural justice being attracted would be inapplicable. In fact, this principle also receives reinforcement by the authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORATE vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS reported in (2001)2 SCC 441 wherein it has been held that removal of a nominated trustee from office of State Government at any time, trustee need not be heard. Once 'doctrine of pleasure' applies, natural justice does not apply.
18. Keeping the above stated authoritative law laid down in mind and facts on hand are examined, it would disclose that appointment of petitioners in W.P.Nos.24365/2018 & 24368/2018 was by virtue of the power vested under Section 4 of the respective enactments as already noticed herein. When the 'pleasure doctrine' finds a place in the statutory provision itself namely, Section 4 would indicate that 26 said doctrine has been incorporated in the enactment as the public policy commands and public interest/good demands namely, said doctrine should be there in the statutory provision. In fact, under Article 75(2) of the Constitution of India, the Ministers of the Central Government hold office during the 'pleasure' of the President and under Article 164(1), the Ministers in the State will hold office during the 'pleasure' of the Governor. Thus, there is constitutional sanction for 'pleasure doctrine' in India.
19. In the light of aforestated analysis, it would clearly emerge there from that in the instant case, impugned orders which have been passed by the appropriate Government is by virtue of the said 'pleasure doctrine' being available to it and as such impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity either in law or on facts calling for interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, these two writ petitions namely, 27 W.P.Nos.24365/2018 & 24368/2018 are liable to be rejected.
20. Insofar as the other two writ petitions namely, W.P.Nos.25844/2018 and 25900/2018 are concerned, it would disclose that the petitioners had been appointed/nominated as the Chairman of the respective Corporations which have been incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
21. In W.P.No.25844/2018, petitioner has produced the Memorandum and Articles of Association at Annexure-B. A perusal of the same would disclose that under Article 28(i) the Government is empowered to appoint the Chairman of the Company for the period to be determined under the order of appointment and to hold the office for such period. The notification dated 03.02.2018 appointing the petitioner would disclose that such appointment is "until further orders" and by 28 the impugned order dated 30.05.2018 - Annexure-C, the appropriate Government has appointed the Secretary to Government, Backward Classes Welfare Department, Government of Karnataka as Chairman of Nigam with effect from 28.05.2018 and on 30.05.2018 he has already taken charge.
22. Even in the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.25900/2018, petitioner had been appointed as Chairman of the Nigam on 02.11.2016 - Annexure-A which was "until further orders" and under the impugned order, the Additional Chief Secretary, Backward Classes Welfare Department has been appointed as the President of the Nigam which again is by virtue of the Memorandum and Articles of Association providing for the same. The said power exercised by the State cannot be held or construed as one without jurisdiction.
29
23. For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER (1) Writ petitions are hereby dismissed. (2) No order as to costs.
SD/-
JUDGE *sp