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[Cites 37, Cited by 0]

Tripura High Court

Sri Joy Kumar Reang vs The State Of Tripura on 12 June, 2020

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 TRI 395

Author: S.G. Chattopadhyay

Bench: S. Talapatra, S.G. Chattopadhyay

              HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                    AGARTALA

                   Crl. A (J) 71 of 2017

                          BEFORE

     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA
  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY

Sri Joy Kumar Reang,
son of late Dhanyaram Reang,
resident of Railong Para,
PS: Karbook, Gomati.

                                             ----Appellant(s)
                              Versus

The State of Tripura,

                                        ---- Respondent(s)

For Appellant(s) : Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Adv.


For Respondent(s)             : Mr. Ratan Datta,P.P.

Date of hearing               : 18.05.2020

Date of pronouncement : 12.06.2020 Yes No Whether fit for reporting :

 Judgment (Per S.G. Chattopadhyay, J) This appeal under section 374(2) Cr.P.C.
is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.04.2017 passed in Page 2 of 56 case No. ST 21 (ST/A) of 2014 by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur, Gomati judicial district whereby the accused appellant namely Joy Kumar Reang was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation. The appellant was also convicted and sentenced to R.I. for 1 (one) year under section 203 of the Indian Penal Code and it was ordered that both the sentences would run concurrently.
[2] The case of the prosecution which has led to the conviction and sentence of the accused appellant emerges out of FIR No. 03 of 2013 dated 16.02.2013 which was registered at Karbook police station in Gomati district on the basis of written ejahar lodged by the accused appellant himself alleging that at about 8PM on 15.02.2013 deceased Kharendra Reang, who was the husband of his sister, came to his house for taking rest on his way back home from Karbook market. While the deceased was Page 3 of 56 resting in his verandah 4/5 unknown miscreants in mask attacked him with dao (a sharp edged weapon) and sticks and killed him. While leaving, they left his dead body at a place located towards the north of his house.

[3] The officer-in-charge of the police station registered Karbook PS case No. 03 of 2013 under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code against unknown accused and endorsed the case to SI Sri Subir Malakar for investigation. Sri Malakar [PW-17] during his part of the investigation carried out search and seizure and examined the material witnesses of the case and recorded their statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. On 18.02.2013 the accused appellant was arrested. The exhibits were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. But, Sri Malakar [PW-17] could not complete the investigation because he was deputed to inservice training at Hyderabad. The investigation was completed by Sri Ramendra Debbarma [PW-22] who on completion of investigation submitted the Page 4 of 56 charge sheet against accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang for offence punishable under sections 302, 201, 203 & 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code for committing the murder of Kharendra Reang and also against his mother Smt. Fari Kanya Reang for offence punishable under sections 120 (B) & 201 of the Indian Penal Code for criminal conspiracy and concealment of evidence.

[4] After the case was committed to the court of learned Sessions Judge in Gomati judicial district, the trial commenced with the framing of charges against accused Joy Kumar Reang and his mother Smt. Fari Kanya Reang. The learned trial court framed the following charges of offence against them:

"Firstly:- That both of you, on or about the 15th day of February 2013, at about 2000 hours at Railong Para under P.S- Karbook, Dist- Gomati Tripura, infurtharence of common intention did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Kharendra Reang by Dao & Axe and both of you thereby committed an offence punishable Under Section-302 of I.P.C. read with section-34 of I.P.C. and within the cognizance of the Court of Session.
Secondly:- That both of you, on the same date, time and place, after committing murder had thrown the Dao and Axe in a Page 5 of 56 Pond with intent to cause disappearance of evidence of murder with intention of screening of the offender from legal punishment and both of you thereby committed an offence punishable Under Section- 201 of I.P.C. and within my cognizance.
Thirdly:- That both of you, on the same date, time and place after the offence of murder was committed, gave information on the same date at about 2100 hours respecting the said offence to Parameswar Reang, which you knew or believed to be false, and both of you thereby committed an offence punishable Under Section-203 of I.P.C. and within my cognizance.
Fourthly:- That on the same date, time and place both of you made a criminal conspiracy to commit murder of Kharendra Reang and as a result of criminal conspiracy you Sri Joy Kr. Reang assaulted him brutally with Dao and Axe and commit murder of Kharendra Reang by this way you have thereby committed an offence punishable Under Sectin-
                 120(B)    of    I.P.C.  and    within  my
                 cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said court on the said charges."

[5] In order to prove the charges as many as 22 (twenty two) witnesses were examined and 5 (five) documents were taken into evidence on behalf of the prosecution. One witness namely Dr. Milan Bhakta Jamatia was summoned and examined by the learned trial court as a court witness [CW-1] and the autopsy report submitted by him was taken into evidence as Exbt.C1. At the closure of the Page 6 of 56 prosecution evidence, accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. when he pleaded innocence and false implication. No incriminating materials were found against his mother accused Smt. Fari Kanya Reang and therefore, her examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. was dispensed with.

[6] On scrutiny of the evidence, the learned trial court returned the findings of conviction and sentence in respect of accused Joy Kumar Reang, as noted above, and acquitted his mother Smt. Fari Kanya Reang of the charges framed against her. Hence, this appeal challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang.

[7] We have heard the arguments advance by Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned advocate representing the accused appellant and Mr. Ratan Datta, learned public prosecutor appearing on behalf of the state respondent. Before we proceed to examine the merit of their arguments, let us have a look into the Page 7 of 56 evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution at the trial for the purpose of re-evaluation of those evidence.

[8] Sri Parameswar Reang [PW-1] is the cousin brother of accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang who along with his wife came to meet Joy Kumar Reang on 15.02.2013 i.e. date of occurrence. The PW is the only eye witness to have seen the deceased alive in the house of the appellant. He has given graphic details of the fact. The PW stated that at about 5 O'clock in the afternoon he saw Kharendra Reang entering into the house of Joy Kumar Reang. After coming to the house of the accused appellant, the deceased had taken his seat in the verandah and started speaking to the accused appellant on political issues. The PW was also sitting there. After a while the PW returned back home. A few hours thereafter the appellant met the PW in his house and informed him that some unknown persons had killed the deceased. The PW then advised the appellant to inform the wife of the deceased and immediately Page 8 of 56 thereafter the PW along with some other villagers went to the house of the appellant and there he saw the dead body of the deceased. His head was severed from his body. The PW had the impression that the deceased was killed by the appellant himself and in presence of the PW, the appellant also confessed his guilt before the "Chowdhury" (Village Head of the Reang community). The PW also stated in his examination in chief that when the deceased went to the house of the appellant, the wife, mother and younger brother of the appellant were also present in his house.

The PW was confronted with cross examination. He stated in his cross examination that the distance between his house and the house of the appellant was only 200 cubits and soon after receiving the information about the murder of the deceased, he went to the spot where he had seen Jukti Reang and Dharmajoy Reang of his village. According to the PW, police came 15 minutes after his arrival at the spot. It was stated by the PW in his Page 9 of 56 cross that Dasendra Reang informed police. He categorically stated in the cross that he had seen the dead body of the deceased on the road which is accessed by many people. It was further stated by the PW in cross that appellant Joy Kumar Reang was physically handicapped and he was a lame person. It was elicited from the PW in cross that the fact that the appellant confessed his guilt and that he visited the house of the appellant and saw the appellant having parlance with the deceased sitting in the verandah of his hut were not stated by him when his statement was recorded by the IO under section 161 Cr.P.C.

[9] Sri Birendra Reang [PW-2], an adjoining neighbor of the appellant also supported the evidence of PW-1 regarding recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the house of the appellant and confession of guilt by the appellant. The PW has stated in his examination in chief that deceased was known to him. The PW further stated that on 15.02.2013 at 9 O'clock in the evening, the appellant Page 10 of 56 met him in his house and informed him that 2/3 unknown persons killed the deceased and left his dead body on the road. The PW immediately rushed to the spot where he saw the dead body of the deceased and found that his throat was cut. The PW also had also seen blood in the hands of the appellant who confessed that the deceased was killed by him. It was also stated by the PW in his examination in chief that appellant Joy Kumar Reang, his wife and mother absconded after the occurrence. No other PW has supported the fact that the accused, his mother and wife had absconded after the occurrence.

In his cross examination, the PW confirmed that he gave statement to police after the occurrence when he stated that he had seen blood in the hands of the appellant who also confessed that he had killed the deceased. The cross examiner had drawn attention of the PW to his previous statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. where no such statement was found. The PW denied in cross that he Page 11 of 56 did not make such statement to police. He had also stated in his cross examination that he saw the dead body of deceased lying on road and the road was accessed by the people of the locality. [10] Smt. Jukti Reang [PW-3] aged 42 years, is the wife of the deceased. She testified before the trial court on 21.01.2015 and stated in her examination in chief that 2 years back her husband Kharendra Reang on his way back home from market entered into the house of appellant and the appellant cut down her husband and after cutting him down the appellant met the PW at her home and informed her about the death of her husband. The PW also stated that appellant confessed in presence of others that he had killed her husband Kharendra Reang. The PW also told the court at the trial that when she went to the house of the appellant after the occurrence, she saw blood stain in his house. She also saw the dead body of her husband. The PW further stated in her examination in chief that the appellant killed her husband with axe and dao and after killing him the Page 12 of 56 appellant had thrown the dao and axe in the nearby pond and he brought out the weapons in presence of public.

The PW was put to cross examination and in her cross examination she told that she gave statement to police 2 years back when she told that the appellant met her at her home and informed her that he had killed her husband. The PW also confirmed in cross that she stated to police that she had seen blood stain in the house of the appellant. The PW denied that the appellant did not confess his guilt publicly. She also denied the suggestion put to her on behalf of the accused appellant that the accused did not bring out the dao and axe from the pond. She categorically stated in her cross examination that the dead body of her husband was lying in the courtyard of the appellant. [11] Smt. Archana Reang [PW-4] is the daughter of the deceased Kharendra Reang and PW-3 Smt. Jukti Reang. She went to the spot along with her mother and sister in court the lady supported the Page 13 of 56 testimony of her mother and sister. She straight away told the court in her examination in chief that on 15.02.2013 while her father was returning back home from market he went to the house of the appellant and the appellant cut down her father and killed him. The PW also told in her examination in chief that she went to the house of the appellant along with her sister and mother after the appellant informed them that her father was killed by 3/4 unknown persons. The PW saw blood stain in the hands of the appellant and also in his house. According to the PW, the dead body of her father was seen by her lying in the courtyard of the house of the appellant and the appellant confessed his guilt that he had committed murder of her father.

The PW was confronted with cross examination. She stated in cross that she did not make any statement to the police to the effect that the appellant had killed her father. She, however, denied the suggestion thrown on behalf of the defence that the appellant did not cut down her Page 14 of 56 father. Similarly, she admitted in cross that she did not make statement to the police that she had seen blood stain in the hands of the appellant and also in his hut. But, she denied the fact that she did not see blood stain on the hands of the appellant and also in his hut. The PW also stated that she did not make statement to the police to the effect that accused confessed his guilt but she denied the fact that accused did not confess his guilt publicly. [12] Smt. Aruna Reang [PW-5] aged 19 years is another daughter of the deceased who also supported the evidence of her mother and sister and she stated in her examination in chief recorded on 21.01.2015 that 2 years back her father died in the courtyard of the appellant and the appellant confessed that he had killed her father. The PW categorically stated that initially the appellant told that other people attacked her father and killed him but on coming to the house of the appellant she saw the dead body of her father lying in the courtyard of the appellant. The PW had also seen blood stain on Page 15 of 56 the body of appellant and in his hut and the appellant also confessed his that he killed her father with dao and axe.

The PW was cross examined on behalf of the accused at length and in her cross examination the PW, the youngest daughter of the deceased, told that she made statement to police to the effect that appellant confessed his guilt publicly and he also confessed that he had killed her father by dao and axe. Her attention was drawn to her police statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. and no such statement was found there.

[13] Sri Gachiram Reang [PW-6] is another adjoining neighbor of the accused appellant who has stated in his examination in chief that on 06.02.2013 he went to the house of the appellant where he had seen axe and dao. The appellant had shown the weapons to the PW and during investigation, police seized those weapons including a pair of chappal and blood stain in his presence and the PW signed seizure list as a witness to the seizure and he identified his Page 16 of 56 signature on the seizure list marked as Exbt.P.2/1. The PW categorically stated in his examination in chief that the blood stain was collected from the mud wall of the house of the appellant.

In cross examination, the PW stated that he made statement to the police to the effect that he witnessed the seizure of dao and axe and the appellant had confessed his guilt that he killed the deceased. When his attention was drawn to his police statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. no such statement was found there.

[14] Sri Abhiram Reang [PW-7], a neighbor of the accused appellant was present in the house of the appellant on 18.02.2013 when police visited the house and seized the wearing apparels of Joy Kumar Reang in his presence. The PW signed the seizure list as a witness to the seizure. The PW also stated in his examination in chief that he saw the appellant bringing out the axe and dao from the nearby pond. The PW had seen dry blood stains on the axe and dao Page 17 of 56 which were seized by police in his presence and as a witness to the seizure he signed the seizure list.

In his cross examination, he denied the suggestion of the appellant that no seizure was made in his presence.

[15] Sri Dharmajoy Reang [PW-8] is also a neighbor of the accused appellant. On 15.02.2013, appellant Joy Kumar Reang informed him that some unknown persons killed Kharendra Reang. Soon thereafter, the PW along with other inmates of his house arrived at the house of the appellant and saw the dead body of Kharendra Reang at the down part of the house of the appellant. Police came and prepared the inquest report and the PW signed the inquest report as a witness. The PW also stated that Joy Kumar Reang confessed his guilt that he had killed Kharendra Reang.

In his cross examination, the PW stated that he made statement to Police that the appellant confessed his guilt. Attention of PW was drawn to his Page 18 of 56 police statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. No such statement of him was found there. [16] Sri Sukramani Debbarma [PW-9] used to carry on business with deceased Kharendra Reang. The PW stated that Kharendra Reang was murdered but he could not say who murdered him. The PW, however, categorically stated in his examination in chief that he saw the dead body of Kharendra Reang in the house of the appellant.

[17] Sri Apurba Krishna Chakraborty [PW-10] aged 34 years, is a civil servant by occupation. The PW has stated in his examination in chief that on 18.02.2013 when he was posted as Deputy Collector at Karbook, he conducted the enquiry in respect of the unnatural death of Kharendra Reang and during such enquiry, he recorded the statement of the accused appellant who confessed that he killed Kharendra Reang. Such statement of the appellant recorded by the PW was taken into evidence as Exbt.P.5.

Page 19 of 56

During his cross examination it was suggested to the PW on behalf of the accused that the appellant did not confess his guilt to the PW and the PW denied the suggestion. He also denied that he applied force to procure the signature of the appellant on his statement recorded by the PW. [18] Sri Chandan Datta [PW-11] is a constable of police, who witnessed the seizure of one CD which contained confession of guilt of the appellant. He identified his signature on the seizure list during the trial which was marked as Exbt.P.2/1.

In cross, the PW denied that the CD was not seized in his presence.

[19] Sri Sajanta Reang [PW-12] is the uncle of the deceased, who is also the cousin of the appellant and the "Chowdhury" of the area. The PW testified before the trial court on 30.01.2015 and stated that 12/14 years back in a meeting, Dhanyaram Reang, father of the appellant was condemned for burning cattle and deceased Kharendra Reang participated in the meeting in which the father of the appellant was Page 20 of 56 so condemned. As a result thereof, the appellant was annoyed with him. The PW further stated in his examination in chief that the appellant informed him about the death of Kharendra Reang and at that time PW had seen blood stain in his clothes. On his query, the appellant told him that some unknown miscreants had killed Kharendra Reang. When police came, the appellant confessed his guilt and at his instance the axe and dao which were used as weapon of offence were discovered from the nearby pond. The appellant told the PW that he had killed the deceased with dao and axe.

In his cross examination, the PW stated that he made statement to the police during investigation of the case to the effect that the appellant confessed his guilt and that the weapons of offence were discovered from a pond in presence of the PW and at the instance of the accused. When the attention of the witness was drawn to his police statement recorded by IO under section 161 Cr.P.C, no such statement was found.

Page 21 of 56

[20] Sri Lakhajoy Reang [PW-13] is a neighbor of the deceased who told the court that on 15.03.2013 Kharendra Reang was killed by the appellant because the appellant's father was once insulted by the deceased for burning cattle. The PW had seen the dead body of the deceased in the down part of the house of the appellant.

In his cross examination, the PW stated that police did not record his statement. The PW denied the fact that the deceased did not insult the father of the appellant and it was not a revengeful act on the part of the appellant.

[21] Sri Dasendra Reang [PW-14] is another neighbor of the deceased as well as of the accused appellant. On 15.02.2013 at about 8 O'clock in the evening, the PW along with his co-villagers went to the house of the appellant after knowing about the death of the deceased and he saw the dead body of the deceased in front of the house of the appellant and the appellant told him that unknown miscreants Page 22 of 56 had killed the deceased. Police came and arrested the appellant.

In cross examination, the PW stated that the appellant made his statement at the PO in presence all those who were present there. [22] Sri Bidhan Ch. Jamatia [PW-15], aged 47 years, is a government servant who has stated in his examination in chief that Subir Malakar, Sub Inspector of police, who is one of the investigating officers of this case, seized a camera in the presence of the PW and procured his signature on the seizure list.

In his cross examination, the PW stated that the appellant was in custody at that time. [23] Dr. Sabyasachi Nath [PW-16] was the Scientific Officer at the State Forensic Science Laboratory on 11.03.2013. On that day, he received the exhibits in connection with Karbook PS case No. 3 of 2013 from SDPO, Karbook and examined those exhibits from 14.03.2013 to 22.05.2013. On examination, the PW detected blood stain of human Page 23 of 56 origin on exhibits A [dry blood stain collected from the mud wall and floor of the PO], A1 [dry blood stain collected from the ditch at the PO], A2 [dry blood stain collected from lemon tree at the PO], C [liquid blood sample of deceased], E [full shirt of the deceased bearing light brown stain] and E1 [lungi of the deceased] and the blood group of exhibits A, A1, A2, C, E and E1 could be determined as "B" group. He identified his report at the trial as Exbt.P.4.

In cross examination, the PW stated that no blood stain was found on the wearing apparels of the appellant and on the axe and dao.

[24] Sri Subir Malakar [PW-17] is a Sub Inspector of Police, who was initially entrusted with the investigation of the case. In his examination in chief, the PW stated that on 16.02.2013, the officer- in- charge of his police station entrusted the present case to him for investigation. During investigation, he visited the placed of occurrence, prepared site plan along with index thereof and carried out the search and seizure of the wearing apparels of the accused Page 24 of 56 appellant and those of the deceased. He also collected and seized blood stain from crime scene, weapon of offence and other incriminating materials. Besides, he recorded the police statements of the material witnesses and got the autopsy of the deceased conducted by the medical officer and arranged for sending the exhibits to Forensic Science Laboratory. Thereafter, the PW was deputed for training and he was asked to handover the case docket to another investigating officer.

In his cross examination, the PW stated that during his part of the investigation, no witness told him that the accused confessed his guilt. [25] Sri Budhunjoy Reang [PW-18] has stated in his examination in chief that after hearing about the murder of Kharendra Reang, he went to the house of the appellant where the appellant confessed his guilt. The Appellant told him that the deceased had taken liquor in his house and thereafter he struck the deceased with an axe and the deceased succumbed to the blow.

Page 25 of 56

In his cross examination, the PW stated that his vehicle was hired by the office of the Deputy Collector and Magistrate. The PW also denied that the accused did not confess his guilt before the PW. [26] Sri Nitai Roy [PW-19] is a government servant who was posted as a police constable at Karbook police station at the material time.

The PW stated in his cross examination that blood sample and viscera of the deceased were collected and seized in his presence at rural hospital, Karbook and he signed the seizure list as a witness. [27] Sri Sushil Reang [PW-20] accompanied the Deputy Collector and Magistrate namely Apurba Chakraborty [PW-10] to the house of the accused appellant on 12.02.2013 when PW-10 recorded the confessional statement of the accused appellant. The PW has stated that the accused confessed his guilt that he committed murder of Kharendra Reang. The PW had done the video recording of the confession of the accused and handed over the CD to PW-10. Page 26 of 56

In his cross examination, PW has stated that his video recording shop is not registered. The PW also stated in cross that there was no authorization letter from the Deputy Collector and Magistrate with him for doing the video recording of the confession of the accused. The PW denied the fact that the accused appellant did not make his confession of guilt in his presence.

[28] Sri Suman Kr. Chakraborty [PW-21] was the Deputy Director in the chemical division of the State Forensic Science Laboratory on 14.03.2013. He received two exhibits marked as Exbt.D & D/1 from the biology division of the Forensic Laboratory. Exbt.D was part of the liver and Exbt.D/1 was part of the stomach of the deceased. The PW examined the exhibits in his laboratory from 23.03.2013 to 28.03.2013 and found ethyl alcohol in Exbt.D/1. Exbt.D was negative for presence of common poisons and ethyl alcohol. The PW identified his report as Exbt.P/4.

Page 27 of 56

His cross examination was declined on behalf of the prosecution.

[29] Sri Ramendra Debbarma [PW-22] is the Sub Inspector of police, who conducted the last part of the investigation of the case. The PW has stated in his examination in chief that first part of the investigation was conducted by SI Sri Subir Malakar [PW-17] and during his part of investigation the PW only submitted the charge sheet against accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang and his mother Smt. Fari Kanya Reang.

In his cross examination, the PW admitted that the CD containing the confession of the accused appellant was not sent for Forensic test. [30] We have already noted that Dr. Milan Bhakta Jamatia, who conducted the autopsy of the deceased at Natun Bazar Rural Hospital at Amarpur Sub-Division on 02.01.2013 was summoned by the court as a court witness and he was examined as CW-1. The witness stated in his examination in chief that the dead body of Kharendra Reang was Page 28 of 56 identified by the appellant and police constable [PW- 19] and that PW on autopsy found the following injuries on the dead body of deceased Kharendra Reang:

"1. Incised wound in the front side of the neck, from the lower level of 6th cervical vertebra of measurement 4 cm (length) x 2 cm (depth),
2. Incised wound in the chin of measurement 3 cm (length) x 2 cm (depth), involving mandibular region,
3. Incised wound from below left ear to chin of measurement 4 cm (length) x 3 cm (depth)
4. Incised wound in scapular region involving 1/3rd clavicle bone, of measurement 4 cm (length) x 2 cm (depth),
5. Incised wound in left wrist joint involving radius and ulna bone, of measurement 4 cm x 2 cm x 1 cm.
6. One incised wound in left forearm involving radius and ulna bone, of measurement 2 cm x 1 cm,
7. One incised wound in right parietal region of measurement 5 cm (length) x 3 cm (width) x 4 cm (depth)."

The PW stated further in his examination in chief that the cause of death was due to hemorrhagic shock due to mechanical injuries. The PW further stated in his examination in chief that though he did not mention in his report whether the injuries were homicidal or suicidal in nature, it Page 29 of 56 appeared to him that those were homicidal in nature. He identified his report as Exbt.C.1.

In his cross examination, he denied that his opinion recorded in his report was not correct. [31] Challenging the legality of the trial court's judgment, Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the accused appellant has argued that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the chain of circumstances not being proved, trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence is erroneous and as such it is liable to be dismissed. It is further argued by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel that the learned trial judge seems to have returned the judgment of conviction only on the ground that the accused and deceased were last seen together without seeking further corroboration which is totally erroneous. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Kanhaiya Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in Page 30 of 56 (2014) 4 SCC 715 and in Digamber Vaishnav & Anr. Vs. State of Chattisgarh reported in (2019) 4 SCC 522 and also in Anjan Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Assam reported in (2017) 14 SCC 359.

It is further argued by learned counsel that learned trial court did not appreciate the fact that the appellant himself informed the wife of the deceased and their relatives and also the villagers immediately after occurrence instead of fleeing away from the place of occurrence which is a sound proof of his innocence. Further contention on behalf of the appellant is that prosecution could not attribute any motive to the accused appellant for committing the murder of deceased Kharendra Reang and according to Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel, on account of absence of proof of motive particularly when it is clear that the deceased was a close relative of the accused [sister's husband] and they were in cordial relationship, the order of conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside.

Page 31 of 56

[32] Mr. Ratan Datta, learned public prosecutor appearing on behalf of the state respondent on the other hand had supported the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court and argued that the learned trial court after proper scrutiny and evaluation of the prosecution evidence and other incriminating materials on record has returned the finding of conviction of the accused appellant and as such the judgment of the learned trial court does not call for any interference in appeal. While arguing on behalf of the respondent, learned public prosecutor had taken us to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and argued that consistent evidence of the wife of the deceased and his daughter corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses having established the charge of murder against accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang, the learned trial court rightly found the accused appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him for the offence. Learned counsel, therefore, urges this court to maintain the findings of conviction and Page 32 of 56 sentence returned by the learned trial court and dismiss the appeal.

[33] We have noticed that the issues which have been agitated before us were also agitated on behalf of the accused appellant before the trial court. The trial court's judgment demonstrate that the evidence of extra judicial confession and evidence leading to discovery adduced on behalf of the prosecution at the trial were discarded by the learned trial judge and the conviction was founded on the evidence of last seen together supported and corroborated by other incriminating circumstances. The learned trial judge considered the issue in a detailed manner and relying on the decision of the apex court in Harivadan Babubhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2013) 7 SCC 45 and Madhu Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2014) 12 SCC 419 and on scrutiny of the evidence reached the conclusion that the murder of Kharendra Reang was committed by none other than the appellant. The relevant Page 33 of 56 findings of the learned trial judge in paragraph 12 of the judgment reads as follows:

"As already discussed above, the accused Joy Kumar Reang was lastly seen with the deceased in his house prior to the murder of the deceased and blood stain was also found in his house and lemon plant situated in his house which means the incident happened inside the house of the accused. But the accused did not offer any explanation about the same and during his examination under section 313, Cr.P.C, he simply chooses to give bald denials. There is also no contra evidence that prior to the death of the deceased, he was seen with somebody else or that he had left the house of the accused. All these circumstance bring the irresistible conclusion that the accused Joy Kumar Reang was responsible for the death of the deceased."

[34] The ground of first attack on behalf of the appellant is that the learned trial court erroneously found the accused guilty of murder on the solitary circumstance of last seen together and the failure of the appellant to offer an explanation in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. It was contended by learned counsel that in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, unless the total chain of circumstances is proved satisfactorily, mere circumstance of last seen together and failure of the accused to explain the circumstance in his statement Page 34 of 56 recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot lead to conviction. In support of his contention Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Kanhaiya Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715 wherein the Apex Court discussed the issue and laid down the following principle of law:

"The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant."

[vide paragraph 12] [35] Learned counsel also relied on Digamber Vaishnav & Anr. Vs. State of Chattisgarh reported in (2019) 4 SCC 522, wherein the Apex Court vide paragraph 40 and 42 of the judgment reiterated the same principle laid down in Kanhaiya Lal (cited supra) and held as follows:

"40. The prosecution has relied upon the evidence of PW 8 to show that the accused and victims were last seen together. It is settled that the circumstance of last seen together cannot by itself form the basis of holding accused guilty of offence. If there is any credible evidence that just before or immediately Page 35 of 56 prior to the death of the victims, they were last seen along with the accused at or near about the place of occurrence, the needle of suspicion would certainly point to the accused being the culprits and this would be one of the strong factors or circumstances inculpating them with the alleged crime purported on the victims. However, if the last seen evidence does not inspire the confidence or is not trust worthy, there can be no conviction. To constitute the last seen together factor as an incriminating circumstance, there must be close proximity between the time of seeing and recovery of dead body.
42. In Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715, the Court has reiterated that the last seen together does not by itself lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. It is held thus:
"12... The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant"."

[36] Reliance was also placed in a later decision of the Apex Court in Anjan Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 14 SCC 359 wherein the badly mutilated body of the 24 years' old deceased was discovered on the railway track and the accusation against the appellants was that they killed the deceased after committing rape on her in a tea estate and thereafter they had thrown Page 36 of 56 away her body on the railway track near the tea estate. They were acquitted by the trial court. But in appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court's order on the ground that they were last seen together and the accused appellants failed to explain and exculpate themselves. When the matter came up before the Apex Court, it was found that no other circumstances relied upon by the prosecution except the circumstance of last seen together were proved and on that ground the apex court acquitted the appellants of the charge of murder. Learned counsel of the appellant had taken us to paragraph 23 of the judgment and contended that the same analogy applies in the present context for their resemblance. In the said judgment the apex court had held as under:

"23. It is clear from the above that in a case where the other links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the guilt of the accused, the circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In the absence of proof of other circumstance, the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation cannot be made the basis of conviction. The other judgments on this point that are Page 37 of 56 cited by Mr. Venkataramani do not take a different view and, thus, need not be adverted to. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran in support of his submission that the circumstance of last seen together would be a relevant circumstance in a case where there was no possibility of any other persons meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of crime in the intervening period. It was held in the above judgment as under: (SCC p. 776, para 34) "34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after (sic of) a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straitjacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author of the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of Page 38 of 56 circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting of approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case."

[37] We have noted that the learned trial court did not reach the conclusion of guilt of the appellant merely on the basis of the evidence of last seen together. While appreciating the evidence the learned trial court also referred to and appreciated the other incriminating circumstances available on record against the accused appellant and came to the conclusion of his guilt after recording its finding that all the links in the chain of circumstances were proved. The learned trial court also derived support from the decisions of the Apex Court in Harivadan Babubhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2013) 7 SCC 45 and Madhu alias Madhuranatha & Anr. Vs. Page 39 of 56 State of Karnataka reported in (2014) 12 SCC 419 for drawing up the conclusion.

In Harivadan Babubhai Patel (cited supra), the dead body and other incriminating articles were discovered at the behest of one of the appellants and it was also established that the appellants and the deceased were last seen together and though all the incriminating circumstances pointing to their guilt were put to them, they did not offer any explanation under section 313 Cr.P.C except choosing the mode of denial. The apex court in that case sustained the conviction under section 302 IPC and held that when attention of the accused is drawn to the incriminating circumstances that inculpated him in the crime and he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the same can be counted as providing a missing link for building the chain of circumstances [vide para 28].

[38] In Madhu alias Madhuranatha (cited supra), which has also been relied upon by the learned trial court for drawing up conclusion of guilt of the Page 40 of 56 accused appellant, the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused appellants and his dead body was also recovered pursuant to their statement and the accused appellants also made extra judicial confession and there were circumstances of conclusive nature against them but when the circumstances were put to them they failed to offer any explanation in their statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. The Apex Court upheld the conviction of the appellants and in paragraph 24 of the judgment held as follows:

"A number of witnesses have deposed of seeing the deceased in the company of the appellants before the incident. In cases where the accused was last seen with the deceased victim (last seen- together theory) just before the incident, it becomes the duty of the accused to explain the circumstances under which the death of the victim occurred. (Vide:
Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra.)"

[39] Having applied the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions of the Apex Court, the learned trial court held that in the given case appellant Joy Kumar Reang was last seen together with the deceased and the other incriminating materials established during Page 41 of 56 trial also supported his involvement in the murder of the deceased and the appellant failed to explain the circumstances in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. and pursuant thereto the learned trial court found him guilty and convicted him. In these circumstances, the appellant cannot derive any benefit from the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant.

[40] With regard to the proof of extra judicial confession it was contended before us on behalf of the prosecution that the confession made by the accused appellant before his neighbors and relatives should also have been relied upon by the learned trial court. The judgment of the learned trial court demonstrates that the extra judicial confession made by the accused appellant has been excluded by the trial court mainly on the ground that such confession was made in presence of police and moreover, when the witnesses were confronted in cross examination they told the court that during investigation they also stated to the police investigator that the accused Page 42 of 56 appellant made such confession of guilt to them but when their attention was drawn to their police statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., it was found that no such statement was recorded. The omission was recorded by court and later it was confirmed by the investigating police officer [PW-17]. Pursuant to such variations in their police statement and deposition before the court, the learned trial court discarded their evidence.

[41] We are in agreement with the views of the learned trial court that the confessional statement [Exbt.5] of the accused appellant recorded by the Executive Magistrate [PW-10] during the police custody of the appellant is not an admissible piece of evidence because law is now well settled that the expression "magistrate" appearing in section 26 of the Evidence Act can only mean a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate and as such the learned trial court rightly discarded such statement as being inadmissible. But, leaving aside such statement [Exbt.5], the appellant seems to have also Page 43 of 56 confessed to PW-1 [his cousin brother], PW-2 [his cousin brother], PW-3 [his sister], PW-4 [his niece], PW-5 [his niece], PW-6 [his neighbor], PW-8 [his neighbor], PW-12 [his neighbor and "Chowdhury" of their village], PW-13 [his neighbor] and PW-18 [a driver known to the appellant] that he killed the deceased and such confession was made by him before he was arrested by police. We have noted above that the learned trial court disbelieved them only because of the variation appearing in their police statement and their testimony in court. In our considered view, such variation cannot be dubbed as an improvement made with any sinister motive. Moreover, no such omission was recorded in respect of PW-18, Budhunjoy Reang, who also told that the appellant confessed that he killed Kharendra Reang and before his murder Kharendra Reang consumed alcohol sitting in the verandah of his hut. The fact that Kharendra Reang consumed alcohol at the relevant time was established by the Forensic report [Exbt.P.4] of PW-21 which has confirmed presence of Page 44 of 56 ethyl alcohol in the stomach of the deceased. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-18. Similarly, in respect of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-12 and PW-13 we have come across no evidence to believe that these witnesses were even remotely inimical to the accused appellant and as such no intention can be attributed to them to make a false statement before the court implicating the accused particularly when they were his neighbors and relatives. Moreover, the fact that they implicated no other member of the family of the appellant also indicate their integrity and truthfulness and also the fact that they had no animosity against the family of the accused appellant.

[42] To appreciate whether in the given context, the extra judicial confession of the appellant, as recorded at the trial, can be accepted by us, we may gainfully refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Sahadevan & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2012) 6 SCC 403 in which the Apex Court after referring to some of its earlier judgments on the Page 45 of 56 issue and after making an analysis of those judgments stated the principles which would make extra judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. The Apex Court in the said judgment vide. para 15-16 has held as under:

"15.Now, we may examine some judgments of this Court dealing with this aspect.
15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p.265, para 10) "10... An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance."

15.2. In Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N., the Court held that: (SCC p. 162, para 8) "8... It is well settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession." 15.3. Again in Kavita v. State of T.N., the Court stated the dictum that: (SCC p. 109, para 4) "4... There is no doubt that conviction can be based on extrajudicial confession, but it is well settled that in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. It is to be proved just like any other fact and the value thereof depends upon veracity of the witnesses to whom it is made."

Page 46 of 56

15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram stated the principle that : (SCC p. 192, para 19) "19... An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made."

The Court further expressed the view that: (SCC p. 192, para 19):

"19... Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused..."

15.5. In Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B., the Court, while holding the placing of reliance on extra-judicial confession by the lower courts in absence of other corroborating material as unjustified, observed: (SCC pp. 265-66, paras 87 &

89) "87...Confession ordinarily is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted upon. Confession may under certain circumstances and subject to law laid down by the superior judiciary from time to time form the basis for conviction. It is, however, trite that for the said purpose the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the confession; and; (iii) corroboration."

"89... A detailed confession which would otherwise be within the special knowledge of the accused may itself be not sufficient to raise a presumption that confession is a truthful one. Main features of a confession are required to be verified.
Page 47 of 56
If it is not done, no conviction can be based only on the sole basis thereof."

15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan held that : (SCC p. 611, paras 29-30) "29... There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41) : AIR paras 41 & 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.] "30... In the present case, the extra- judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872."

15.7. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra-judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v.

State of Gujarat, held as under: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 53) "53... It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. When an extra-judicial confession is retracted by an accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must invariably accept the retraction. But at the same time it is unsafe for the court to rely on the retracted confession, unless, the court on a consideration of the entire evidence comes to a definite conclusion that the retracted confession is true." 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the Page 48 of 56 crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. [Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. and Pancho v. State of Haryana.

The principles

16. Upon a proper analysis of the above- referred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra- judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused:

i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.
ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.
iii) It should inspire confidence.
iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value, if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law."

[43] On apprisal of the evidence on record in the light of the principles of law enunciated by the Page 49 of 56 Apex Court in the judgment cited above, we are of the considered view that the evidence of extra judicial confession of the appellant supported by the proof of other incriminating circumstances available on record against the appellant qualify the tests laid down by the Apex Court in Sahadevan's case for accepting the extra judicial confession made by the appellant of this case.

[44] The chain of circumstances that the deceased was murdered on 15.02.2013 and he was last seen together with the appellant in his house immediately before his death and that his dead body was discovered in the house of the appellant immediately after he was killed and also the fact that the appellant made extra judicial confession to his relatives and neighbors before he was arrested by police have been established. It has also been established that the deceased consumed alcohol sitting in the verandah of the appellant's hut immediately before his death because as per the evidence of PW-18, Budhunjoy Reang, the accused Page 50 of 56 appellant confessed to him that before he killed the deceased, the deceased consumed alcohol sitting in his verandah which has been confirmed by the Forensic expert [PW-21] in his report [Exbt.P/4]. As per Exbt.P/4, ethyl alcohol was found in the stomach of the deceased in Forensic examination. Blood stain of human origin was also found on the mud wall of the said hut of the appellant and the blood stain found from the mud wall and the blood stain found from the wearing apparel of the deceased were of the same blood group "B" which has been confirmed by the Forensic report [Exbt.P/4]. The fact that the deceased was killed in the verandah of the hut of the accused is thus convincingly proved by the Forensic report [Exbt.P/4] supported by the evidence of PW-3, 4 & 5 and the seizure of dry blood stain from the mud wall and floor of the hut of the appellant proved by the seizure list [Exbt.2 series].

[45] When the statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. the whole incriminating circumstances were put to him by the Page 51 of 56 learned trial court in a very legible manner with a view to enable the accused appellant to explain those circumstances, but the appellant could not offer any explanation and he only pleaded his innocence and false implication. Evidently, the dead body of the deceased was discovered from the precincts of his house and he was last seen with the deceased and also there were convincing proof of other incriminating circumstances suggesting his involvement in the crime. The appellant therefore cannot avoid the burden cast upon him under section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, he only pleaded innocence and false implication and thereby failed to discharge his burden. To appreciate the effect of such failure of the accused from a right perspective, we will be benefited by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Deonandan Mishra Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 SC 801 wherein it has been observed by the Apex Court vide. (para 9 of the judgment) that the circumstance of last seen together coupled with lack of satisfactory explanation Page 52 of 56 by the accused is a very strong circumstance against him.

"9. It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. But in a case like this where the various links as stated above have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the accused as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation, which if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain."

[46] Similarly, the Apex Court in Rajender Vs. State [NCT of Delhi] reported in (2019) 10 SCC 623 has observed that such failure on the part of the accused to explain the circumstances provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. The Apex Court in the said judgment vide. paragraph 12.2.4 has held as follows:

"Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the burden of proof for any fact that is especially within the knowledge of a person lies upon such person. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he Page 53 of 56 parted company with the deceased. In other words, he must furnish an explanation that appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory, and if he fails to offer such an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, the burden cast upon him under Section 106 is not discharged.
Particularly in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, such failure by itself can provide an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. This, however, does not mean that Section 106 shifts the burden of proof of a criminal trial on the accused. Such burden always rests on the prosecution. Section 106 only lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his/her knowledge and which cannot support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce an explanation as an additional link which completes the chain of incriminating circumstances."
[47] We have also taken note of the submission on behalf of the appellant that there is no evidence as to the motive of the appellant for killing the deceased who is a close relation of him and in absence of motive the accused cannot be convicted particularly when the case is based on circumstantial evidence. In the case in hand, PW-12, Sajanta Reang, who is the "Chowdhury"(Village Head of the Reang community) stated in his examination in chief that father of the appellant was once condemned by Page 54 of 56 the deceased in a meeting for burning cattle. PW-13, Lakhajoy Reang supported PW-12 and stated in his examination in chief that the appellant confessed to him that he murdered the deceased as the deceased once insulted his father for burning cattle. In our considered view, such evidence is not acceptable for lack of corroboration.
[48] We are not in disagreement with learned counsel of the appellant that proof of motive for committing the crime assumes great importance and particularly in the given situation. But, motive being a psychological phenomenon, its proof is not expected in all cases and there is no impediment under the law to find the accused guilty in absence of the proof of motive, if the case is otherwise proved against him. In this regard, the Apex Court in Nathuni Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1997 SC 1808 held as follows:
"Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind of another. Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act. Such impelling cause need not necessarily be proportionally grave to do grave crimes.
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Many a murders have been committed without any known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. Though, it is a sound proposition that every criminal act is done with a motive, it is unsound to suggest that no such criminal act can be presumed unless motive is proved. After all motive is a psychological phenomenon. Mere fact that prosecution failed to translate that mental disposition of the accused into evidence does not mean that no such mental Condition existed in the mind of the assailant. In some cases, it may not be difficult to establish motive through direct evidence. While in some other cases inferences from circumstances may help in discerning the mental propensity of the person concerned. There may also be cases in which it is not possible to disinter the mental transaction of the accused which would have impelled him to act. No proof can be expected in all Cases as to how the mind of the accused worked in a particular situation. Sometimes, it may appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to any inference adverse to the prosecution.
[vide paragraph 17] [49] A reading of the above passage would clearly show that in a case, where all links in the chain of circumstances have been established leading to the irresistible conclusion of the guilt of the accused, he cannot be held to be innocent only for absence of the proof of motive.
[50] Therefore, having considered the facts & circumstances of the case, the evidence on record Page 56 of 56 and the submissions of learned counsel representing the parties and keeping in mind the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court in the judgments cited above, we are of the considered view that the learned trial court after proper appreciation of evidence rightly came to the conclusion that accused appellant Joy Kumar Reang was guilty of the charges of offence punishable under sections 302 and 203 IPC and rightly convicted and sentenced him for the offence. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and accordingly the appeal stands dismissed.
Send back the LC record.
              JUDGE                                     JUDGE




Rudradeep