Delhi High Court
Ritu Garg & Anr. vs State & Ors. on 27 May, 2019
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 27th May, 2019
+ CS(OS) 602/2018
RITU GARG & ANR. ..... Plaintiffs
Through:Mr. L.K. Singh and Raj Kumar,
Advs.
Versus
STATE & ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Apoorv Khatar, Adv. for D-6.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. This "Petition under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956, for granting permission to transfer by sale the
undivided share of petitioner no.2 (minor) in the immovable built up
property bearing no.85, Anand Lok, New Delhi measuring 393 sq. yds." is
filed as a suit, pleading (i) that the plaintiff no.1 Ritu Garg is the mother
and natural guardian of the plaintiff no.2 Tara Garg aged about eleven
years; (ii) that the husband of the plaintiff no.1 and father of the plaintiff
no.2 died on 16th January, 2013; (iii) the defendants no.2&3 Nikhil Garg
and Neha Garg are the son and daughter respectively of the plaintiff no.1
and brother and sister respectively of the plaintiff no.2; (iv) that the
defendants no.4&5 Ashutosh Garg and Atul Garg are the brothers of the
husband of the plaintiff no.1; (v) that Brig. Manohar Lal Garg was the
owner of the property no.85, Anand Lok, New Delhi and died intestate on
18th December, 2014 leaving, Sudha Garg as his widow, defendants
no.4&5 as his sons and the plaintiffs and defendants no.2&3 as the heirs of
his pre-deceased son; the widow of Brig. Manohar Lal Garg also died on
8th August, 2015; (vi) that thus the plaintiff no.1 and her children i.e.
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plaintiff no.2 and defendants no.2&3 together have 1/3rd undivided share in
the property and each of the defendants no.4&5 have 1/3rd undivided share
in the property; (vii) that the minor, plaintiff no.2 has 1/4th out of 1/3rd share
i.e. 1/12th share in the said property; (viii) that the plaintiff no.1 along with
her children plaintiff no.2 and defendants no.2&3 is permanently settled at
Singapore; (ix) that the plaintiff no.2 is studying in a school in Singapore;
(x) that the plaintiffs and the defendants no.2 to 5 have decided to sell the
property aforesaid and defendant no.6 Vikas Srivastava has agreed to
purchase the property for Rs.22 crores and the plaintiffs and the defendants
no.2 to 5 have entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 5 th October, 2018
with the defendant no.6; and, (xi) that the plaintiff no.1 is agreeable to
deposit the sale proceeds of the share of the plaintiff no.2 in a Fixed
Deposit Receipt in the name of the plaintiff no.2.
2. The petition/suit came up first before the Joint Registrar of this Court
on 27th November, 2018 when notice thereof was ordered to be issued. The
order dated 11th January, 2019 records that the defendants no.2 to 6 had
been served. The order dated 8th March, 2019 records that the defendant
no.1 State had also been served but none appeared on its behalf.
3. The defendants no.2 to 5 have filed a written statement supporting
the petition. The defendant no.6 / purchaser also supports the petition.
4. The plaintiffs filed IA No.5298/2019 for direction to the defendant
no.1 to submit a report of valuation of the property and the said application
was allowed on 10th April, 2019 and the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hauz
Khas, New Delhi has vide Report dated 3rd May, 2019 reported the
valuation of the property as per prescribed circle rates as Rs.11,15,64,720/-.
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 2 of 18
5. The suit came up before this Court first (till then it was pending
before the Joint Registrar) on 20th May, 2019 when it was prima facie
observed that the suit, on the averments therein was not maintainable
before this Court and the jurisdiction was exclusively of the Guardianship
Judge in the District Court. Attention of the counsel for the plaintiffs was
invited to Section 8(5) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
read with Section 4 and 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
6. On request of the counsel for the plaintiffs, the hearing was
adjourned to 22nd May, 2019. On 22nd May, 2019 again, on request of the
counsel for the plaintiffs the hearing was adjourned to 27th May, 2019. The
counsel for the plaintiffs has been heard.
7. Section 8 titled „Powers of natural guardian‟ of Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 is as under:-
(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has
power, subject to the provisions of this section, to
do all acts which are necessary or reasonable
and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the
realization, protection or benefit of the minor's
estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the
minor by a personal covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the
previous permission of the court,--
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale,
gift, exchange or otherwise any part of
the immovable property of the minor; or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term
exceeding five years or for a term
extending more than one year beyond the
date on which the minor will attain
majority.
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 3 of 18
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural
guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the
minor or any person claiming under him.
(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural
guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-
section (2) except in case of necessity or for an
evident advantage to the minor.
(5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890),
shall apply to and in respect of an application for
obtaining the permission of the court under sub-
section (2) in all respects as if it were an
application for obtaining the permission of the
court under section 29 of that Act, and in
particular--
(a) proceedings in connection with the
application shall be deemed to be
proceedings under that Act within the
meaning of section 4A thereof.
(b) the court shall observe the procedure and
have the powers specified in sub-sections
(2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act;
and
(c) an appeal lie from an order of the court
refusing permission to the natural
guardian to do any of the acts mentioned
in sub-section (2) of this section to the
court to which appeals ordinarily lie from
the decisions of that court.
(6) In this section, "Court" means the city civil court
or a district court or a court empowered under
section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890
(8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of
which the application is made is situate, and
where the immovable property is situate within the
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 4 of 18
jurisdiction of more than one such court, means
the court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate."
(emphasis added)
8. Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act referred to in Section 8
supra is as under:-
"29. Limitation of powers of guardian of property
appointed or declared by the court - Where a person
other than a Collector, or than a guardian appointed
by will or other instrument, has been appointed or
declared by the court to be guardian of the property
of a ward, he shall not without the previous
permission of the court, -
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift,
exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable
property of his ward, or
(b) lease any part of that property for a term
exceeding five years or for any term extending
more than one year beyond the date on which the
ward will cease to be a minor."
9. Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act as aforesaid provides for
previous permission of the Court. Section 4(5) of the Guardians and Wards
Act defines „Court‟ as meaning:-
"(a) the District Court having jurisdiction to entertain
an application under this Act for an order
appointing or declaring a person to be a
guardian; or
(b) where a guardian has been appointed or declared
in pursuance of any such application-
(i) the court which, or the court of the officer
who, appointed or declared the guardian
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 5 of 18
or is under this Act deemed to have
appointed or declared the guardian; or
(ii) in any matter relating to the person of the
ward the District Court having jurisdiction
in the place where the ward for the time
being ordinarily resides; or.
(c) in respect of any proceeding transferred under
section 4A, the Court of the officer to whom such
proceeding has been transferred;"
10. However, Section 4(4) is as under:
"(4) "District Court" has the meaning assigned to
that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1882 (14 of 1882), and includes a High Court
in the exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction"
11. It is also deemed appropriate to hereunder set out Section 4A. The
same is as under:
"4A. Power to confer jurisdiction on
subordinate judicial officers and to transfer
proceedings to such officers - (1) The High Court
may, by general or special order, empower any
officer exercising original civil jurisdiction
subordinate to a district court, or authorize the
Judge of any District Court to empower any such
officer subordinate to him, to dispose of any
proceedings under this Act transferred to such
officer under the provisions of this section.
(2) The Judge of a district court may, by order in
writing, transfer at any stage any proceeding under
this Act pending in his Court for disposal to any
officer subordinate to him empowered under sub-
section (1).
(3) The Judge of a district court may at any stage
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 6 of 18
transfer to his own Court or to any officer
subordinate to him empowered under sub-section (1)
any proceeding under this Act pending in the Court
of any other such officer.
(4) When any proceedings are transferred under this
section in any case in which a guardian has been
appointed or declared, the Judge of the District
Court may , by order in writing, declare that the
Court of the Judge or officer to whom they are
transferred shall, for all or any of the purposes of
this Act, be deemed to be the Court which appointed
or declared the guardian."
12. The counsel for the plaintiffs, at the outset contends that he had
before filing this suit, approached the District Judge only but the District
Judge held that since the immovable property, for sale of which permission
was sought, was of a value in excess of more than the maximum pecuniary
jurisdiction of the District Judge, he would not have jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction is of the High Court. However the counsel for the plaintiffs, on
being asked to show the order, has handed over the order dated 23 rd
October, 2018 of the District & Sessions Judge (South-East), Saket Courts,
New Delhi and which shows the counsel for the plaintiffs to have
withdrawn the suit/petition, to file the same in the High Court "keeping in
mind the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction". The counsel for the
plaintiffs of course contends that he so withdrew the petition on the learned
District Judge informing him that he did not have jurisdiction.
13. I only wish the learned District Judge, if so informing the counsel for
the plaintiffs, had also given his reasons therefor. It is also inexplicable
why the counsel for the plaintiffs, if of the belief that the District Judge had
jurisdiction, instead of satisfying the District Judge with respect thereto and
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 7 of 18
inviting a finding thereon, meekly withdrew the petition. Owing to the
same, this Court has been deprived of the reasons which prevailed for such
withdrawal of the petition.
14. I may also record that according to the plaint, the share of the minor
plaintiff no.2 in the property of the total value of Rs.22 crores is 1/12th i.e.
of Rs.1.83 crore which is less than the maximum pecuniary jurisdiction of
Rs.2 crores of the District Judge. Permission of the District Judge was
required only for sale of the share of the minor and thus only the valuation
thereof would determine the jurisdiction and not the value of the remaining
share in the property and for transacting wherewith no such permission was
necessary.
15. The counsel for the plaintiffs, to justify the maintainability of the
petition as a suit, in this Court has referred me to:
(i) Sathir Singh Vs. Rajbir Singh AIR 1954 P&H 274 (DB)
- therein a petition under Section 3 of the Guardians &
Wards Act, for appointment as guardian of person and
property of minor, was filed before the Circuit Bench of
the High Court of Punjab at Delhi, owing to the property
of the minor being at Delhi. In the written statement,
preliminary objection relating to jurisdiction was taken
inter alia on the ground that the Circuit Bench of the
High Court of Punjab at Delhi had no ordinary original
civil jurisdiction in guardianship matters. The petitioners
relied upon Clause 12 of the Letters Patent dated 31 st
March, 1919 under which the High Court at Lahore was
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 8 of 18
constituted and which under the provisions of the High
Courts (Punjab) Order of 1947, governed the High Court
of Punjab. It was noticed, (i) that vide Section 4(4) of the
Guardians and Wards Act, District Court included a High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction;
(ii) however no clause in the Letters Patent of the Lahore
High Court expressly conferred any powers of ordinary
original civil jurisdiction, as occurred in the Letters
Patent of the High Court of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras in
which ordinary original civil jurisdiction was conferred
on those Courts; (iii) there is nothing in the Guardians
and Wards Act which gives ordinary original jurisdiction
to the High Court to deal with petition filed under the
Act; and, (iv) thus the petition did not lie in the Circuit
Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi and had to be
first instituted in the District Court.
(ii) Bakshi Lochan Singh Vs. Jathedar Santokh Singh AIR
1971 Delhi 277 (DB) - this was a suit in the High Court
of Delhi under Section 92 of the CPC. The contention of
the defendant was that the suit did not lie in the High
Court, even though valuation thereof had been pleaded to
be above the then minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of the
High Court. Reliance was placed on Section 24 of the
Punjab Courts Act, 1918 which provided that the Court of
the District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court
or the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 9 of 18
District Court. It was held that, (a) a change was brought
about by the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, Section 5(2)
whereof vested ordinary original civil jurisdiction in the
High Court in civil suits the value of which exceeded
then Rs.50,000/-; (b) since the words "every suit" had
been used and a proceeding under Section 92 qualifies as
a suit and the plaintiffS had valued it above Rs.50,000/-,
the proceeding would lie before the High Court; (c) after
the coming into force of the Delhi High Court Act, the
High Court had become the principal civil Court of
original jurisdiction with respect to every suit value of
which exceeded Rs.50,000/-; and, (d) owing to the non-
obstante clause in Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court
Act, Court of the District Judge has ceased to remain the
principal civil court of original jurisdiction with respect
to any suit value of which exceeded Rs.50,000/-.
(iii) James Francis Dillon Vs. Holy Cross Social Service
Centre 1985 SCC OnLine Del 28 - this was a petition
under Sections 7 and 26 of the Guardians and Wards Act.
At the stage of admission of the petition itself, doubt was
raised as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain
the petition. It was held that, (a) under Section 4(4) of the
Guardians and Wards Act, District Court includes a High
Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction; (b) Delhi High Court was constituted under
the Delhi High Court Act, 1966; (c) the Delhi High Court
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 10 of 18
has ordinary original civil jurisdiction in civil suit, the
value of which exceeds Rs.1 lac (then); (d) the petition
under Sections 7 and 26 of the Guardians and Wards Act
did not fall in the said category; (e) it was thus required to
be seen what was the jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court of Punjab and for which one has to fall back upon
the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of
Adjudicature at Lahore and which had been interpreted in
Sathir Singh supra and it had been held that the Punjab
High Court did not have any ordinary original civil
jurisdiction to entertain the petition under the Guardians
and Wards Act; (f) extraordinary original jurisdiction of
the High Court cannot be clubbed to the ordinary original
civil jurisdiction. It was thus held that the Delhi High
Court had no ordinary original civil jurisdiction to
entertain a petition under Sections 7 and 26 of the
Guardians and Wards Act.
(iv) R.P. Sachdeva Vs. The State AIR 1986 Delhi 178 - the
same Hon‟ble Judge (Justice D.P. Wadhwa) who had
pronounced James Francis Dillon supra, in this case
held (i) that a petition for grant of succession certificate
under Sections 371(2)(bb) and 300 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 has to be filed in the Court of the
District Judge and not before the High Court of Delhi; (ii)
that the High Court of Delhi is not a principal Civil Court
of original jurisdiction; and, (iii) that the limited purpose
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 11 of 18
for which Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court confers
ordinary original civil jurisdiction and impliedly ousts the
corresponding jurisdiction of the District Judge, is in suits
the value of which exceeds Rs.50,000/- and owing thereto
the High Court does not become the principal Court of
ordinary original civil jurisdiction with respect to all
matters of the said value including matter in which
testamentary and interstate jurisdiction is invoked so as to
divest the District Judge of the jurisdiction to deal with
such matters.
(v) Goyal MG Gases P. Ltd. Vs. Griesheim GMBH 211
(2014) DLT 481 (DB) - the question for consideration
was whether the jurisdiction to execute a decree passed
by Courts in reciprocating territories, under Section 45A
of the CPC was of the High Court, if the decree sought to
be executed was in the sum of more than Rs.20 lacs,
being the then minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of the
High Court. It was held giving elaborate reasons that the
High Court of Delhi is not the District Court in terms of
Section 44A of the CPC.
16. I have considered the controversy.
17. Per Section 8(5) of the personal law applicable to the minor i.e. the
Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, the permission required under
Section 8(2) is to be sought in accordance with Section 29 of the Guardians
and Wards Act. Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act also merely
provides for "previous permission of the Court". However, Section 4(5)(a)
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 12 of 18
thereof defines the „Court‟ as a "District Court having jurisdiction to
entertain an application". Thus, reading Section 8(5) of the personal law
applicable to the minor with Section 29 and Section 4(5)(a) of the
Guardians and Wards Act, the petition lies only in the District Court.
18. However Section 4(4) of the Guardians and Wards Act defines
District Court as having "the meaning assigned to that expression in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 (14 of 1882) and includes a High Court in
the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction". The High Court of
Delhi has been vested with the ordinary original civil jurisdiction vide
Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. Thus, as far as Delhi is
concerned, the jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 29 of the
Guardians and Wards Act would be concurrently of the District Court as
well as the High Court. However in James Francis Dillon supra cited by
the counsel for the plaintiffs, it has been held that the ordinary original civil
jurisdiction of this Court is only in respect of suits of specified valuation
and not in respect of petitions under the Guardians and Wards Act. I have
not been able to find any judgment contrary thereto or otherwise on the said
aspect. Thus as per James Francis Dillon supra, by which I am bound, this
Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Guardians and
Wards Act and the jurisdiction is of the District Court. Since filing of the
application under Section 8(2) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is
governed by Guardians and Wards Act, this Court would not have
jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 8(2), as this petition is.
19. Once it is so, the petition is not maintainable in this Court.
20. Moreover, Section 8 of the Personal Law applicable to the minor,
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 13 of 18
though in Section 8(5) provides for the application under Section 8(2) to be
in accordance with Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, but in
Section 8(6) provides that for the purposes of Section 8, „Court‟ means
„City Civil Court or a District Court, or a Court empowered under Section
4A of the Guardians and Wards Act‟, making it clear that the application
for permission under Section 8(2), though required to be in accordance
with Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, has to be made to the
City Civil Court only and not to the High Court. Though Section 8(6) also
refers to Section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act but Section 4A only
empowers the High Court to, by general or special order empower any
officer exercising original civil jurisdiction subordinate to a District Court
or authorise any Judge of any District Court to empower any such officer
subordinate to him to dispose of any proceedings thereunder.
21. Thus an application for permission under Section 8(2) of the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act can be moved only before the City Civil
Court or any Court in the District which has been empowered by the High
Court under Section 4A of the Guardians & Wards Act to hear such
petitions. Section 8(6) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
restricts the making of an application under Section 8(2) before the High
Court.
22. Thus whichever way one looks, the petition does not lie in this
Court.
23. I may also refer to Mary Assumption Trinidade Vs. Vincent Manuel
Trinidade 1975 SCC OnLine Del 132, holding (i) that the mere fact that
Section 266 of the Indian Succession Act equates the power of the District
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 14 of 18
Judge in relation to proceedings for the grant of probate and Letters of
Administration with the powers that the District Judge would have in
relation to any suit or proceeding pending in his Court, does not obliterate
the distinction between ordinary civil jurisdiction of the District Judge and
the testamentary and intestate jurisdiction of that Court under the Indian
Succession Act; (ii) that Section 266 merely indicates the ambit of power
of the District Judge while dealing with matters in exercise of its
testamentary and intestate jurisdiction and the non obstante clause in
Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act operates only in relation to
provisions contained in any law with regard to jurisdiction of Courts vis-à-
vis suits and leaves other jurisdictions untouched; and, (iii) that the
argument that Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act ousts the
testamentary and intestate jurisdiction of the District Court ignores the
distinction between the original civil jurisdiction of a Court and the
ordinary original civil jurisdiction as also between the ordinary civil
jurisdiction and the testamentary and intestate jurisdiction.
24. Mention may also be made of N.T. Raju Vs. N. Jyotsna
MANU/AP/0248/1985 (DB), holding that (i) High Court does not come
within the definition of District Court exercising an ordinary original civil
jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 4(4) of the Guardians and Wards
Act; and, (ii) the High Court exercises Letters Patent jurisdiction under
Clause 17 of the Letters Patent of the High of Madras which is preserved in
its favour by Section 3 of the Guardians and Wards Act; and, (iii) such
jurisdiction is in the nature of special extraordinary civil jurisdiction and
the High Court and the District Judge do not exercise any concurrent
jurisdiction in strict sense.
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 15 of 18
25. The aforesaid judgments also carve out the difference between
original civil jurisdiction to entertain suits of specified pecuniary value and
ordinary original civil jurisdiction which would include the testamentary
and guardianship jurisdiction.
26. The effect, on the controversy, of the Family Courts Act, 1984, has
also crossed my mind. However, the explanation (g) of Section 7 thereof
vests jurisdiction in the Family Court, only in a suit or a proceeding in
relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of or access to any
minor and does not vest any jurisdiction with respect to the property of the
minor. Thus the option of approaching the Family Court is not available to
the plaintiffs.
27. I have also considered, whether the proceedings under Section 8(2)
of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 have to be by way of a
suit. The same does not provide so. Rather, Section 8(5) refers to "an
application for obtaining the permission of the Court under sub-section (2)
........". The Guardians and Wards Act also does not prescribe the
proceedings permitted thereunder by way of a suit and only provide for an
„application‟ or „a petition‟ to be filed.
28. The Court Fees Act, 1870 and the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 also are
not found to be providing for valuation for the purposes of court fees and
jurisdiction of a suit under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act
or under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act.
Instead, Schedule-II of the Court Fees Act provides for fixed court fees on
applications/petitions of the nature described therein including under
specified statutes. Though the same also does not provide for an application
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 16 of 18
or petition under the Guardians and Wards Act or under Section 8(2) of the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, but on the parity thereof, when the
statute provides for an application/petition to be filed for previous
permission of the Court, there is no reason to hold the same to be by way of
a suit and the proceeding has to be by nature of an application/petition
only.
29. The proceeding is thus liable to be dismissed on this ground also.
30. However at the same time it cannot be ignored that the plaintiffs,
though also owing to their own fault, of withdrawing the petition from the
Court of appropriate jurisdiction merely on being told to do so, have also
been the sufferers of the judicial process. When they approached the
District Judge, the District Judge, merely on impressions and without
studying the law, raised questions about the maintainability thereof before
the District Court. When the plaintiffs approached this Court, the Joint
Registrar, perhaps guided by the order of the District Judge, entertained the
petition, without realizing that the same did not lie before this Court and
forgetting that the Joint Registrar acts as the delegatee of the High Court
and not as a subordinate of the District Judge. The entire process of the
petition, has now been undergone. I am loath to now ask the plaintiffs to
undergo the process again before the Court of appropriate jurisdiction,
especially when from the pleadings of the plaintiffs and no objections filed
by the siblings and paternal uncle of the minor, it is evident that the petition
has to be allowed. On the basis of the material on record, I am satisfied
that sale proposed is for evident advantage of the minor plaintiff No.2. The
plaintiff No.2 has only a 1/12th undivided share in the property. Once
CS(OS) 602/2018 Page 17 of 18
others, having remaining share in the property have decided to sell, and to
which there is no impediment, retaining the said 1/12 th share by plaintiffs
will not be of advantage. On the contrary, the price of the share of
plaintiffs can earn returns for the plaintiffs.
31. I therefore, in exercise of parens patriae and supervisory jurisdiction
of this Court, choose to, notwithstanding the above finding of law, entertain
the petition and allow the same.
32. The petition is thus allowed, granting permission to the plaintiff no.1
Ritu Garg, to sell the entire 1/12th share of the minor / plaintiff no.2 Tara
Garg in property bearing No.85, Anand Lok, New Delhi for the
consideration of the share of the plaintiff no.2 of not less than Rs.1.83
crores and on the condition that (i) the monetary share of the plaintiff no.2
shall be proportionate to the share of others in the property; (ii) entire share
of the plaintiff no.2, without any deductions whatsoever, shall be received
from the purchaser(s) of the property in the name of the plaintiff no.2 and
shall be deposited with a nationalized bank in the name of the plaintiff no.2
and under the guardianship of plaintiff no.1 and for the period of minority
of the plaintiff no.2 and shall not be dealt with without the permission of
the Court; and, (iii) the plaintiff no.2, upon attaining majority, shall be
entitled to intimate the bank and deal with the monies as may be deemed
appropriate by her.
The petition / suit is disposed of.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
MAY 27, 2019/„pp‟/gsr..
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