Allahabad High Court
Hariom Sharma vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 5 August, 2021
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2021 ALL 2454
Bench: Pritinker Diwaker, Manju Rani Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 45 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 4898 of 2021 Petitioner :- Hariom Sharma Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Uttar Kumar Goswami Counsel for Respondent :- G.A. Hon'ble Pritinker Diwaker,J.
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
(Per:-Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashment of first information report dated 24th May, 2021 in respect of Crime No. 0036 of 2021, under Sections 185, 477-A, 409, 120-B and 420 of I.P.C. Police Station-Kakavan, District-Kanpur Nagar.
2. Heard Mr. Uttar Kumar Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. J.K. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. for the State-respondents.
3. The first information report has been lodged on 24th May, 2021 at 18:03 hrs by S.N. Khare against six named accused persons, namely, Rajesh Kumar, Surendra Kumar, Sohil Kumar, Accountant Atul Sharma, Hariom Sharma (petitioner herein) and Anuj Traders regarding financial irregularity and scam at Wheat Purchase Centre, P.C.F. Farmer Service Centres, Vishdhan, Sindhauli and Aroul. In the first information report, it has been alleged that in a surprise inspection carried out at the aforesaid farmer service centres, purchasing centre In-Charge, namely, Rajesh Kumar, Surendra Kumar and Shahil Kumar were present. It was informed by the concerned Centre In-charge that concerned records, government grants (Bardana), Stencil Machine were not available at the Centres. In their written statements, it has been stated that at the behest of Atul Sharma (Accountant), District Office, P.C.F. Kanpur Nagar and Hariom Sharma (petitioner herein), Regional Director, P.C.F., Kanpur Division, Kanpur, the work of purchasing of wheat is being carried out from Rice Mill (Anuj Traders, Vishdhan). On the basis of aforesaid statements, when the Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Registrar raided the place of Anuj Traders, Vishdhan, government bags of wheat containing 200 quintal (four gath i.e. each gath contains 50 kgs. of wheat) and stencils of aforesaid three centres were recovered and on the rice mill itself, purchase of wheat has been found to be done in the names of aforesaid three centres. On the basis of statements of concerned Centre In-charge and the raid carried out by the Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Registrar and the recovery made by them, the named accused persons, including the petitioner were found guilty of carrying out illegal government grants and purchase of wheat at the aforesaid three centres and the present first information report has been lodged.
4. In support of his case, learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced following arguments:
1. The petitioner, who is presently working as Regional Manager, P.C.F., Kanpur Division, Kanpur, is wholly innocent and has been falsely roped in the aforesaid case in collusion with some interested persons and he has no concern with the aforesaid crime.
2. The petitioner was not present at the place when the raid was carried out and the allegation levelled against the petitioner is based on false and concocted story in order to implicate him in the aforesaid case. The first information report itself discloses that till date no material evidence in respect of alleged allegation, which has been levelled against the petitioner, is available on record.
3. Prior to registering the first information report against the petitioner, respondent no.4 has not taken any approval or permission from the higher authorities qua the first information report against the government/public servant, therefore the same is per se illegal and arbitrary.
4. (I) Respondent no.4/informant, who has lodged the first information report, is much junior to the petitioner and he has no power to make the complaint against the petitioner like the present one.
(II) Only due to enmity and for harassing the petitioner, so that the image of the petitioner may be tarnished, respondent no.4 has lodged the impugned first information report falsely implicating him. As such, the impugned first information report is illegal, as the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the said report, is based on false and concocted story.
5. Perusal of the entire record indicates that the petitioner has not committed any offence under Sections 185, 477-A, 409, 120-B and 420 I.P.C., Police Station-Kakavan, District-Kanpur. Petitioner has no criminal antecedents to his credit except the present one.
On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is innocent, the contents of the impugned F.I.R. are concocted, tutored and vague in nature and the charges as alleged in the impugned F.I.R. are vague one, hence the impugned F.I.R. is liable to be quashed.
5.(I) Learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, opposed the prayer for quashing the impugned F.I.R. and has argued that on the complaint of the informant, S.N. Khare, who is said to be Additional District Cooperative Officer, Bilhore Tehsil In-charge, Bilhore, Kanpur Nagar, the impugned F.I.R. has been registered against six named accused persons including the petitioner herein, in which, there is specific allegation that on the advise of the petitioner and co-accused Atul Sharma, who is said to be the Accountant, District Office P.C.F., Kanpur Nagar, the work of purchase of wheat was being carried out from Anuj Trader, Vishdhan. On the raid, illegal government bags of 200 quintal wheat and stencils of the three centres referred to above have been recovered from Anuj Trader, Vishdhan. Therefore, when the matter is at the state of investigation, it cannot be said that the petitioner is innocent and allegations made in the impugned F.I.R. are mala fide, false, concocted or vague and the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case. He, therefore, submits that argument nos. 1 and 2 advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be examined at this stage.
(II) So far as argument no.3 advanced on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, in reply, learned A.G.A. for the State submits that no prior permission or approval from the higher authorities is required before registering the first information report against a public/government servant.
(III) Elaborating the aforesaid submission, learned A.G.A. has referred to Section 197 of Cr.P.C., wherein it has been provided that only at the stage of cognizance against a public/government servant, prior permission or approval from the higher authorities/State, as the case may, is required. Therefore, the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no legs to stand.
(IV) In regard to argument no.4 (I) advanced on behalf of the petitioner, learned A.G.A. submits that it is settled law that every person has a right to lodge a first information report against a person, who in his presence, commits a non-bailable or cognizable offence. Therefore, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that since respondent no.4 is junior to the petitioner, he has no power to make any complaint against him, has no legs to stand.
(V) To the other argument made on behalf of the petitioner i.e., No. 4 (II) that due to enmity and harassing the petitioner as well as tarnishing his image, respondent no.4 has made false complaint against the petitioner, learned A.G.A. submits that the same cannot be accepted, as there is nothing on record, which establishes that there is any enmity or any rivalry between the petitioner and respondent no.4.
(VI) So far as argument no.5 advanced on behalf the petitioner is concerned, learned A.G.A. submits that at the stage of investigation, it cannot be examined as to whether the petitioner is involved in the commission of the alleged offence or not.
On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid, learned A.G.A. submits that from perusal of the impugned F.I.R. it cannot be said that no cognizable offence is made out, hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. We have examined the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned AGA and also gone through the material brought on record.
7. Normally, this Court would have issued notice to respondent no.4, but no purpose would be served by keeping this petition pending, inasmuch as the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.G.A. for the State agree that this petition may be disposed of at this stage, without issuing notice to respondent no.4 as well as without calling for any further affidavits.
8. Before entering into the merits of the case set up by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.G.A. for the State, it would be worthwhile to reproduce the offences, which are alleged to have been committed by the named accused persons in the first information report including the petitioner herein, which are being quoted herein below:
"185. Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant.--Whoever, at any sale of property held by the lawful authority of a public servant, as such, purchases or bids for any property on account of any person, whether himself or any other, whom he knows to be under a legal incapacity to purchase that property at that sale, or bids for such property not intending to perform the obligations under which he lays himself by such bidding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both.
477A. Falsification of accounts.--Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any 2[book, electronic record, paper, writing], valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in, any such 2[book, electronic record, paper, writing], valuable security or account, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation.--It shall be sufficient in any charge under this section to allege a general intent to defraud without naming any particular person intended to be defrauded or specifying any particular sum of money intended to be the subject of the fraud, or any particular day on which the offence was committed.]
409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.--Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.--
(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, 2[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
9. The legal position on the issue of quashing of FIR or criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
10. The Apex Court rendered in the case of the State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani and Others reported in 2017 (2) SCC 779, wherein in paragraph nos. 13 and 23, it has been observed as follows:
"13.There can be no dispute over the proposition that inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no denial of the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
23..............What needs to be stated here is that the States where Section 438 CrPC has not been deleted and kept on the statute book, the High Court should be well advised that while entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC, exercise judicial restraint. We may hasten to clarify that the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law, but it is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order of the present nature while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is not appropriate to stay the investigation. This kind of order is really inappropriate and unseemly. It has no sanction in law. The Courts should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court on the drop of a hat to file an application for quashing of launching an FIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim order. It is the obligation of the court to keep such unprincipled and unethical litigants at bay. "
11. In the latest judgment, the Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, considered the powers of the High Court, while adjudicating a petition for quashing of FIR under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited (supra), the appellants challenged an interim order issued by the Bombay High Court, in a quashing petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution. The Bombay High Court issued an interim order directing that "no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioners in respect of the said FIR". While examining the correctness of the said interim order, the Apex Court in para-80 has held as under :
"80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ''rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."
12. Keeping in mind the aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court, we find that in the instant case, it transpires from the impugned F.I.R. that on the complaint of the informant, S.N. Khare, who is said to be Additional District Cooperative Officer, Bilhore Tehsil In-charge, Bilhore, Kanpur Nagar, the impugned F.I.R. has been registered against six named accused persons including the petitioner herein, in which, there is specific allegation that on the advise of the petitioner and co-accused Atul Sharma, who is said to be the Accountant, District Office P.C.F., Kanpur Nagar, the work of purchase of wheat was being carried out from Anuj Trader, Vishdhan. On the raid, illegal government bags of 200 quintal wheat and stencils of the three centres referred to above have been recovered from Anuj Trader, Vishdhan. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. More so, from perusal of the entire pleadings of the writ petition, it transpires that there is question of facts, which cannot be examined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in writ jurisdiction.
13. It is well settled that this Court has to eschew itself from embarking upon a roving enquiry into the last details of the case. It is also not advisable to adjudge whether the case shall ultimately end in submission of charge sheet and then eventually in conviction or not. Only a prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of sufficient ingredients constituting the offence is required in order to see whether the F.I.R. requires to be investigated or deserves quashing. The ambit of investigation into the alleged offence is an independent area of operation and does not call for interference in the same, except in rarest of rare cases.
14. Keeping in view the aforesaid law and considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, we are of the view that the submissions made by the learned A.G.A. for the State, to the argument nos. 1,2, 4 (II) and 5, advanced on behalf of the petitioner, have substance.
15. So far as the submission made by the learned A.G.A. to the argument no.3 advanced on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, it would be relevant to reproduce Section 197 Cr.P.C., which is being quoted herein below:
"197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:
1. Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted.
(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
(3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub- section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub- section will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government" were substituted.
(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.
(4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held."
16. From a simple reading of Section 197 Cr.P.C., it is apparently clear that no court or magistrate shall take cognizance against a public servant without prior permission or sanction from his/her higher authorities or State, as the case may. Therefore, the submission made by the learned A.G.A. has also substance.
17. In respect of argument no. 4 (I) advanced on behalf of the petitioners, we have also found substance in the submission made by the learned A.G.A. for the State that every person has a right to file a complaint against a public servant.
18. The Apex Court in the case of Sheo Nandan Paswan Vesus State of Bihar & Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 877, specifically in paragraph-14, has observed as follows:
"...................... It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, [1984] 2 SCC 500 this Court pointed out that "punishment of the offender in the interests of the society being one of the objects behind penal statute enact- ed for larger goods of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed of lettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi". This Court observed that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Now if any citizen can lodge a first information report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus standi to do so cannot be questioned, we do not see why a citizen who finds that a prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn, cannot oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiator of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. Here in the present case, the offences charged against Dr. Jagannath Misra and others are offences of corruption, criminal breach of trust etc. and therefore any person who is interested in cleanliness of public administration and public morality would be entitled to file a complaint, as held by this Court in R.S. Nayak v.A.R. Antulay (supra) and equally he would be entitled to oppose the withdrawal of such prosecution if it is already instituted. ............."
19. In Subramanian Swamy Versus Manmohan Singh & Another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 64, the Apex Court has held that there is no restriction on a private citizen to file complaint against a public servant. The Apex Court has also held that locus standi of a private citizen is, therefore, not excluded. In paragraph nos. 72 and 73, the Apex Court has held as follows:
"72. The right of private citizen to file a complaint against a corrupt public servant must be equated with his right to access the Court in order to set the criminal law in motion against a corrupt public official. This right of access, a Constitutional right should not be burdened with unreasonable fetters. When a private citizen approaches a court of law against a corrupt public servant who is highly placed, what is at stake is not only a vindication of personal grievance of that citizen but also the question of bringing orderliness in society and maintaining equal balance in the rule of law.
73. It was pointed out by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 288 at page 315:
"......It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak this Court pointed out that (SCC p. 509, para 6) "punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi......"
(Emphasis added)
20. In view of the aforesaid, it is crystal clear that every person has a right to lodge a first information report against a person, who in his presence, commits a non-bailable or cognizable offence. Therefore, the informant of the present case, namely, S.N. Khare, who is also none other than the public servant holding the post of Additional District Cooperative Officer, Bilhore Tehsil In-charge, Bilhore, Kanpur Nagar, had every right to make a complaint for lodging of first information report against the accused persons including the petitioner.
21. We are of the considered view that the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner call for determination on questions of fact, which may be adequately discerned either through proper investigation or which may be adjudicated upon only by the trial court and even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into only by the trial Court in case a charge sheet is submitted in this case. A perusal of the record makes out a prima facie offence at this stage and there appears to be sufficient ground for investigation of the case.
22. In view of the aforesaid, considering the allegations made in the FIR and material brought on record, it cannot be said that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, rather there appears to be sufficient ground for investigation of the matter. More so, learned Counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any irregularity in lodging the impugned F.I.R. and also not placed any document(s) so as to interfere in the instant case in the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we do not find any justification to quash the impugned F.I.R.
23. The petition lacks substance and is, accordingly, dismissed.
24. It is needless to state that the petitioner is having remedy to move an appropriate application for anticipatory bail before the competent Court as provided under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if so desires.
25. The learned A.G.A. is obliged to produce a copy of this order before the concerned police station and also before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur Nagar.
26. It is made clear that this Court has observed nothing on the merits of the case and investigation is to be carried out strictly in accordance with law on the basis of material so collected by the investigation agency.
27. The party shall file a computer generated copy of this order downloaded from the official website of High Court Allahabad, self attested by the petitioner alongwith a self attested identity proof of the said person (preferably Aadhar Card) mentioning the mobile number to which the said Aadhar Card is linked.
28. The concerned Court/Authority/Official shall verify the authenticity of such computerized copy of the order from the official website of High Court Allahabad and shall make a declaration of such verification in writing.
(Manju Rani Chauhan, J.) (Pritinker Diwaker, J.)
Order Date :- 5.8.2021
Sushil/-