Delhi District Court
Pooja vs Mohan Lal Katyal on 8 December, 2023
THE COURT OF SHRI DEEPAK SHERAWAT: SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE -CUM-
RENT CONTROLLER, KARKARDOOMA COURTS (SHAHDARA).
RC ARC 8/20
Ms. Pooja
W/o Late Sh. Ramesh Kumar
R/o B-6/6, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-110051. ............Petitioner.
VS
Sh. Mohan Lal Katyal
S/o Late Sh. Aya Ram
R/o Shop no. 9 & 10 on the ground floor
of property bearing no. A-4/27,
Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51. ...................Respondent.
Date of Institution : 06.01.2020.
Date of Reserving order : 19.08.2023.
Date of Judgment : 08.12.2023.
APPLICATION FOR EVICTION OF TENANT UNDER SECTION 14 (1)(E) R/W
SECTION 25 (B) OF DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT.
JUDGMENT
1. The present eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of respondent from the tenanted premises i.e. Shop no. 9 & 10, Ground Floor, Property bearing no. A-4/27, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 shown in green color in the site plan filed by the petitioner. Petitioner has stated that she is RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 1/19 owner of the above said property by virtue of the Registered Will dated 27.05.2011 executed by her deceased husband in her favor. It is stated that petitioner's husband had become owner of the property following the Registered Will dated 01.12.1992 executed in his favor by his mother. Petitioner has alleged that she along with her son Sh. Sunny Chawla want to open a big departmental store/general store in the above said property for which she bonafidely requires the tenanted shops along with other three shops which are also occupied by other tenants and against whom separate eviction petitions have been filed. It is stated that the petitioner and her son will carry out necessary changes and renovation in order to convert the shops into a departmental store/general store for the purpose of selling and displaying variety of goods. It is stated that there is a hall in the backside of the property which shall be used as a godown.
2. The petitioner has stated that she has following properties in her name:
A. One plot bearing no. C-1/1, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 which is a vacant plot with boundary wall having no construction there upon.
B. A built up residential property bearing no. B-6/6, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51. C. A residential property bearing no. B-5/9, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 which is under construction.
D. Two sub-units bearing no. S-61-D and S-61-G measuring 60.85 sq meters and 47.38 sq. meters respectively on second floor of shopping complex V3S, East Centre, Plot no. 12, District Center Lakshmi Nagar and these sub-units are on lease with tenant M/s Future Retail Limited/Big Bazar.
3. It is stated that petitioner and her son have no other reasonable or suitable built up commercial property in the near vicinity of applicant's residence which could be used by them for the purpose of opening the departmental store.
4. In written statement, respondents have stated that there is no bona fide need of the petitioner with regard to the shop and she has failed to disclose about the accommodations RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 2/19 available with her in her property bearing no. A-4/27, Krishna Nagar, Delhi. It is stated that petitioner's son Sh. Sunny Chawla is not dependent upon her in any manner and he is not even residing with her and he is earning handsomely from his independent business of cosmetics etc. being run in the name of M/s Stella at KG-1/346, Shop no. 2, Vikaspuri, New Delhi-18 and having GST IN no. 07ADUFS06781Z9. It is stated that in the said property petitioner is in occupation of shop no. 7 & 8 and a big hall which can be used as an additional space for her business. It is stated that these two shops are lying vacant and only some old ladies garments are found to be displayed on the front side show window of the said shops and petitioner has permitted some person to sell heating pads on the foot path in front of these two shops. It is stated that the aforesaid property is situated in a residential area and cannot be used for the purpose of running a departmental store and the roads surrounding the said property are also not wide enough for construction of the store and therefore, no building plan can be sanctioned by the Municipal Authority. It is further stated that she owns a 380 sq yds property i.e. property no. C-1/1, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 which was got vacated from tenant UCO Bank and which is lying vacant and the same is in commercial area and can be used by petitioner and her son for opening the store. It is further stated that petitioner is also having property bearing no. B-6/6 and B-5/9 at Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 situated in Prime Market in Krishna Nagar. It is further stated that petitioner also owns two showrooms on second floor of shopping complex V3S, Lakshmi Nagar which have been given on rent. It is further stated that petitioner is also owner of land measuring about 6 kila in Village Palla, Delhi. It is further stated that the Will dated 27.05.2011 on the basis of which the petitioner is claiming to be the owner of the property and the Will dated 01.12.1992 executed by the mother of the petitioner's husband are null and void in the absence of probate and petitioner's sisters namely Smt. Veena, Smt. Sashi Rani and Smt. Kamal Rani and Smt. Renu Bala are also co-owner of the property apart from the son and daughter of the petitioner. It is further stated that the petitioner is a senior citizen and suffering from various old age ailments which fact was admitted by her husband in his reply to the leave to defend filed by him in previous eviction petition titled as 'Ramesh Kumar Vs. Subhash Gupta and Ors.' and she or any of her family members have not been carrying on RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 3/19 any business in shop no. 7 & 8. It is further stated that petitioner has not disclosed her status, source of income and work experience in the petition. It is further stated that the petition has been filed to force the respondents to increase the rent.
5. In evidence, PW-1 Smt. Pooja, plaintiff has appeared as a witness and she has reiterated the averments of the plaint in her affidavit Ex. PW-1/A and she has relied upon the following documents:
I. Site plan, Ex. PW-1/1, II. Photocopy of registered Will dated 01.12.1992, Ex. PW-1/2 (OSR),
III. Photocopy of registered Will dated 27.05.2011, Ex. PW-1/3 (OSR).
6. In defense the defendant has appeared as RW-1, reiterating the facts of the case in his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A and he has relied upon the following documents:
I. Site Plan, Ex. RW-1/1, II. Receipt dated 26.04.2013, Ex. RW-1/2,
III. Copy of MCD Adhoc Application form dated 27.12.2006, Ex. RW-1/3, IV. Application for furnishing for registration of mixed use and annual mixed use charges for retail shop, Ex. RW-1/4, V. GST invoice, Ex. RW-1/5, VI. Visiting card and photograph of Stella Store belongs to son of the petitioner, Mark A & B. VII. Photographs of shop of petitioner, Mark C (Colly).
7. I have heard arguments and perused the record.
8. Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the protection prescribed under the Act to the tenant may be dispensed with and eviction of the tenant may be granted. Apart RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 4/19 from the landlord tenant relationship, requirement under section 14 1 (e) of the Act is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be evidence on three grounds, namely, (i) status of petitioner as owner and landlord (ii) the requirement being bona fide and (iii)the non-availability of a reasonably suitable accommodation. These triple of requirements or conditions are to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.
9. In the present case, petitioner has founded her claim of ownership with regard to the tenanted premises on two wills. The first will has been brought in evidnece as Ex PW1/2. The said will was executed by Smt. Laxmi Devi, mother in law of petitioner, in favour of petitioner's husand Sh. Ramesh Kumar on 01/12/1992 whereby the property in question was bequeathed by former to the latter. It is a registered will. Respondents have admitted in their written statment that Smt Laxmi Devi was initial owner of the property. It follows that after the demise of Smt Lakshmi Devi, her son, who was husband of the petitioner, Sh. Ramesh Kumar became owner of the property by virtue of the aforesaid will who further made a registered will dated 27/05/2011 in favour of his wife, i.e petitioner. The said will is proved as Ex PW1/3. The respondents have alleged that the Wills Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/3 have not been proved according to law and the two attesting witnesses namely Sh. Deepak Chand and Sh. Gopi have not been examined by the petitioner. Respondents' objection is not sustainable. Both the Wills are Registered Wills and there is presumption in favor of the registered documents that such documents are validly executed. Reference may be had to cases Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608; Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Zabar, AIR 2010 SC
211. Besides the presumption on a registered document that it is validly executed, there is also a presumption that the "transaction is a genuine one" (Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, 2009- 5 SCC 713.). The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who questions the same. In this case, respondents have not produced any evidence to show that the Will Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/3 are not genuine documents and the respondents have failed to rebut the presumption. In any case, the present matter is not about the genuiness or otherwise of the above said Wills and the petitioner was not required to RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 5/19 prove these Wills by calling the attesting witnesses. Thus, the apparent conclusion is that petitioner is the owner of the property which comprises of the tenanted shop.
10. Respondents have alleged that petitioner is merely a co-owner in the property and her failure to implead her sisters who are also co-owners of the said property is fatal to the petition and takes away right of the petitioner to seek eviction of the respondents. The contention is not acceptable. In Om Prakash & Anrs. vs Mishri Lal (Deceased) [Civil Appeal No.4309 of 2017] decided on 21/03/2017, the Supreme Court has observed :
"32. It is no longer res integra and is settled by this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 184, Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 and India Umberalla Manufacturing Co. and Ors. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 that a suit for eviction of a tenant can be maintained by one of the co-owners and it would be no defence to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. The judicially propounded proposition is that when the property forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several co-owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and thus it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property and that he can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object."
11. As such, a co-owner is fully entitled to seek eviction of a tenant in his/her own right. In any event, the respondents have admitted that they are paying rent to the petitioner, RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 6/19 though they have stated that petitioner is merely a rent collector and receiving rent on behalf of all the co-owners. Thus, from the admission of the respondents, it is evident that petitioner falls in the category of landlord within the ambit of Section 2 (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as she is receiving the rent. Thus, there cannot be any dispute about the fact that petitioner is the owner as well as the landlord in respect of the tenanted premises.
12. Otherwise also, the term "owner" as used in the section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act does not connote the same meaning as in the case of a title suit for property. The petitioner need not prove the absolute ownership. This interpretation of the word "owner" has been accepted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma and others v. Smt. Ved Prabha and Others (1987) 4 SCC 193. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the word "owner" occurring in clause
(e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) is not used in the sense of absolute owner. It is only used in contradistinction with a landlord as defined, who is not an owner but holds the property for the benefit of another person. A landlord as defined, who is holding the property for himself and for his own benefit and not for the benefit of another person, is certainly the owner/ landlord. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Kanwal Kishore Chopra v. O.P. Dwivedi and others AIR 1978 Delhi 53.
13. From the testimony of PW-1, it is clear that the property in question has now devolved upon the petitioner by virtue of documents executed by her husband i.e. the Will dated 27.05.2011 and the respondent is precluded from gainsaying the title of the petitioner. The law as to estoppel of a tenant has been expounded u/s 116 of the Indian Evidence Act which, inter alia, predicates that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of tenancy, be permitted to deny that landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, title to such property. In Om Prakash & Anrs. vs Mishri Lal (Deceased) supra, the Supreme Court has observed :
"34. That a tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his landlord through whom he claims tenancy, as is enshrined in Section 116 of RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 7/19 the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is so well-settled a legal postulation that no decision need be cited to further consolidate the same. This enunciation, amongst others is reiterated by this Court in S. Thangappan vs. P. Padmavathy (1999) 7 SCC 474 and Bhogadi Kannababu and Ors. vs. Vuggina Pydamma and others (2006) 5 SCC 532. In any view of the matter, the appellants, being the son of Bhola Nath, who at all relevant time, was the landlord vis-à-vis the original defendant and the respondents in terms of Section 3(j) of the Act, their status as landlords for the purpose of eviction under the Act, could not have been questioned so as to non suit them for want of locus."
14. In the present case, the mother-in-law of the petitioner had purchased the property and the previous owner had inducted the respondents as tenant and the property in question has come down by succession from her mother-in-law to the petitioner. The estoppel of a tenant is primarily in relation to his landlord who had let him into possession and that, accordingly, such tenant is not precluded from questioning the alleged derivative title of a person claiming to be the successor to, or assignee of, the property, for want of proof of the vestitive facts on which the claim for attornment is based. However, even in such cases of derivative titles, the tenant may be estoppel from the denying the title of the landlord on the ground of attornment or payment of rent. Similar view was expressed by Judicial Committee in Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd. [AIR 1937 PC 251]. Their Lordships observed:
"The principle does not apply to dis-entitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, though in such cases there may be other grounds of estoppel e.g., by attornment, acceptance of rent etc......"RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 8/19
15. The said decision has been followed by the Apex Court in Tej Bhan Madan vs IInd ADJ, (1988) 3 SCC 137. In the present case, respondents have conceded this fact in their written statement that they are presently paying rent to the petitioner and consequently, they are estopped from denying the title of the petitioner which is derived by her from the Registered Will. Thus, it is established that petitioner is the landlord as well as owner of the property.
16. The other factor that the need of the petitioner in respect of the tenanted premises is bona fide and not based on mere whims or desire under the pretext of own requirement or use is also borne by the evidence. The petitioner wants to open a departmental store where she along with her son Mr. Sunny Chawla can work and earn income. The respondents have stated that petitioner's son Sh. Sunny Chawla is running his own independent business in the name and style of M/s Stella at KG-1/346, Shop no. 2, Vikaspuri, New Delhi-18 and having GSTIN no. 07ADUFS06781Z9. However, the respondents, in this respect, have merely relied upon visiting card and photograph of the Stella Store Mark-A & Mark-B which have not been proved properly and the said visiting card and photograph are by no means sufficient proof that the store is being run by petitioner's son. Further, the respondent has not brought in evidence any material to show in whose name GSTIN number exists. As such, there is no proof that M/s Stella is being run by petitioner's son. Respondent has failed to prove this fact and mere assertion is not sufficient.
17. The respondent have also raised the contention that the relationship between the petitioner and her son is not cordial and her son is not even residing with her and therefore, the need of the petitioner to start a departmental store with her son is merely a ruse to take possession of the tenanted premises from the respondents. Respondents have also contended that the son of the petitioner Sh. Sunny Chawla is not dependent upon her. However, these contentions are also meritless. The petitioner is owner of the tenanted premises and she has the capacity to provide space for the business of her son and being the mother, she is under a moral obligation to establish and settle her son in life.
RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 9/1918. In Kuldeep Singh Baweja Vs. Amarjeet Singh Khurana, RC.REV. 411/2019 & CM APPL. 13514/2022 decided on 11.07.2022, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed as under:
13. The need of the Landlord to establish his son, even when the relationship between his son and his second wife are strained, cannot be said to be not bona fide and in fact it is themoral obligation of a father to establish his sonand settle him in life.It is also well-settled that in case the Landlord does not use the tenanted premises for the purpose of opening a Bar-be-cue shop for his son, it is always open for the Tenant to invoke Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, to get back the possession of the tenanted premises. Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, affords adequate protection to the Tenant against unscrupulous landlords who get the tenanted premises vacatedon the false premise that the property is requiredfor their bona fide need or for the need of other persons who are dependent on the landlord.
19. The Apex Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397, has observed as under:
"24. ........ Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be the obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the court shall with RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 10/19 circumspection inquire: (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close interrelation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by the landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act."
20. Similarly, the respondents have alleged that son of the petitioner is not dependent upon her for his financial needs and he is operating his own independent business. The word 'dependent' in Section 14 (1)(e) of the Act cannot be construed as meaning nothing but wholly dependent upon the landlord in the sense not earning at all and being entirely dependent on the parents for board, lodging and food and in a catena of cases the term 'dependent' has been interpreted to mean somebody not wholly independent or self- supporting and in a position to set up separate business. Thus, the petitioner's son may be earning but if he is not in a position to set up an independent business of his own, he is a dependent on the petitioner. In C.L. Davar Vs. Amarnath, 1962 (64) PLR 521, similar view has been expressed. Again, in Inderjeet Singh Vs. Harish Chandra Bhutani 192 (2012) DLT 124, it is held that for the purpose of Clause 14 (1)(e) of the Act, the children of the landlord shall be deemed to be dependent on the landlord for the purpose of setting up of their RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 11/19 business and their requirement will be considered to be bona fide. Therefore, a person who is partially dependent upon the landlord for reasonable necessities of life is also included within the ambit of the term 'dependent' as envisaged under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
21. In Anil Kumar Gupta v. Deepika Verma, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12847, it has been defined what constitutes as a 'dependent' in terms of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:
" 12. Customarily or in common parlance a dependent would be defined as any person who is reliant on another either for financial or physical support for sustenance of life. It is pertinent to note that the word dependent or as to what constitutes a family has nowhere been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act. Rather, the legislators consciously and deliberately have used the words "any member of family dependent on the landlord" instead of defining a clear degree of relations so as to construe a wider meaning to the aforesaid words as man is a social creature and part of a complex societal system involving myriad of relations from which he cannot be isolated. It is significant to understand that the dependency is not restricted to financial or physical but will also include emotional reliance on another person. Reliance in this regard is placed on the findings of this court in Jhalani Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. B.K. Soni; AIR 1994 Delhi 167, wherein the court observed that the social set up of our society is such where a married daughter continues to enjoy a place of pride in her maternal home and therefore while considering the requirement of the landlord her married daughter and her expected visits cannot be lost sight of. Similarly in Sain Dass v. Madan Lal; 1972 Ren CJ (SN) 8 (Delhi), it is held that the word "himself" has to be construed to mean "himself" as cohabiting with his family members with whom he is normally accustomed to live. Therefore, contrary to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner financial or physical incapacitation cannot be the sole premises for determining dependency on another.RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 12/19
22. The Honorable Supreme Court in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. The Nagpur Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 1192 while interpreting the word "Family" observed as under:
"But the expression „family‟ has according to the contest in which it occurs, a variable connotation. It does not in the setting of the rules postulate the existence of relationship either of blood or by marriage between the persons residing in the tenement Even a single person may be regarded as a family, and a master and servant would also be so regarded."
23. Therefore, the words used under S.14(1)(e), are any member of family dependent on him" which would certainly include the son of the petitioner who in the instant matter is dependent on his mother landlady and they are physically, emotionally and financially inter- dependent.
24. In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that petitioner's son Sh. Sunny Chawla is having any commercial property in his name from where he can start his own business. All the properties mentioned or described by the petitioner or the respondents stand in the name of the petitioner. Respondents have not brought in evidence any document or other proof to show that Sh. Sunny Chawla owns any property independently. In the circumstances, petitioner's son is wholly dependent upon her to arrange for the space for his business and since petitioner owns a number of properties including the tenanted premises, she will naturally be inclined to provide to her son the space for his business from such properties. At the same time, she is also morally obligated to do so.
25. There is also no evidence to show that the petitioner is having any other reasonably suitable accommodation which may satisfy her need. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Arora Vs. Asha Rani, AIR 1998, SC 3012 has observed that if landlord has other reasonably suitable accommodation, then necessarily it would mean that the landlord does RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 13/19 not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona fide and further inquiry would be whether that premises is more suitable than the suit premises. Again, in Deena Nath Vs. Puran Lal, AIR 2001 SC 2655, it is held that in the case of bona fide need of the landlord, the statutory mandate requires that there must be a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bona fide and this has been made clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. It was further said that this requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation.
26. In the present case, petitioner herself has mentioned in the petition that she is in possession of the following properties:
A. One plot bearing no. C-1/1, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 which is a vacant plot with boundary wall having no construction there upon.
B. A built up residential property bearing no. B-6/6, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51. C. A residential property bearing no. B-5/9, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 which is under construction.
D. Two sub-units bearing no. S-61-D and S-61-G measuring 60.85 sq meters and 47.38 sq. meters respectively on second floor of shopping complex V3S, East Centre, Plot no. 12, District Center Lakshmi Nagar and these sub-units are on lease with tenant M/s Future Retail Limited/Big Bazar.
27. The petitioner has satisfactorily explained as to how these other available properties are not suitable for the purpose of opening departmental store. These properties are either residential properties or vacant land which cannot be used for the purpose of doing any business. The respondents have merely reiterated these properties in their written statement as well as in the evidence of RW-1 and they have failed to introduce any other property which might be suitable for the purpose for which the petitioner requires the tenanted premises. In the said properties the properties bearing no. B-6/6, Krishna Nagar, Delhi is a RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 14/19 residential property which cannot be used for commercial purpose, property bearing no. B- 5/9, Krishna Nagar, Delhi is under construction for raising four residential floors and as such the same cannot be put to any commercial use and the respondents have not brought on record any evidence to show that this property is constructed one and suitable for commercial activities. Property bearing no. C-1/1, Krishna Nagar, Delhi is a vacant plot which cannot be used to do any business even if the same is fit for commercial activities. The two showrooms/units bearing no. S-61-D and S-61-G at V3S, East Center, Lakshmi Nagar is already on lease with M/s Future Retail and is of no use to the petitioner for starting her business. The respondents' plea that petitioner has concealed about these above said properties is misconceived because petitioner has given a full disclosure of the description of these properties in the petition as well as in her evidence. The petitioner has even disclosed that she is in possession of two shops bearing no. 7 & 8 and one hall at the ground floor in the said property. Petitioner has clearly mentioned that she needs all the shops including shop no. 7 & 8, tenanted premises and shops in occupation of other tenants at the ground floor at the said property to renovate them and make necessary alterations in the said shops to join them together to make a single unit for a common purpose of opening a departmental/general store. It is alleged by the respondents that the petitioner is also having seven kila land in Village Palla, Delhi but this property is an agricultural land where no departmental store can be run. The petitioner, while deposing as PW-1 has explained all these facts in her cross-examination whereas, the respondent has failed to point out any alternative suitable accommodation which may be available to the petitioner for starting the departmental store.
28. The plea taken by the respondent that petitioner has not got any permission or sanction from the concerned authority i.e. the MCD for construction of the departmental store is also misconceived because this issue does not concern the respondent and does not affect the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. Besides, the fact that an eviction petition was previously also filed by petitioner's husband is not relevant because the said petition was withdrawn having become infructous after the death of the petitioner's husband.
RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 15/1929. Moreover, the tenanted premises is being used for commercial purpose from the very inception and the petitioner and her son and other family members are permanently settled in the property comprising the tenanted premises. The bona fide need is not for additional accommodation for setting up new business or extending existing business. The respondents have got an adequate and effective opportunity to disprove the case of the petitioner as set up against them and prove their own case but they have failed to do so.
30. In any case, it is for the petitioner to decide in which of the properties which are available to her, she wants to set up her business and the respondents who are tenants cannot be allowed to dictate their terms to her. The Apex Court in Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610, has reiterated that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms of establishing a business to the landlord and advise him as to what he should do and what he should not do. The relevant portion of the aforementioned judgment has been reproduced as follows :
"6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant 1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that the landlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from which eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also not the tenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted premises after obtaining possession thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistent with the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on different businesses and further that the landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 16/19 principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business. (emphasis supplied)
31. Similarly, this Court in Anil Jain v. Bhagwan Shankar Khanna, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3855, has held as follows :
"11 (c)....This Court is in agreement with the reasoning and finding of the learned ARC. Moreover, it is well settled that a landlord is the best judge of his requirement. It is neither open for the Court or for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord. Furthermore, the contention of the tenant that the son in the past never intended to start such a business and that too from a small bye lane situated in old Delhi which has no potential for such business is without any merit. A tenant cannot be permitted to dictate terms to the landlord as to the suitability of the premises for purposes under which the eviction is sought. Therefore, the finding of the learned ARC does not warrant any interference by this Court."
32. In this case, respondents have failed to demonstrate that there exists an alternative reasonably suitable accommodation available with the petitioner. The respondents cannot compel the petitioner to accommodate at the place which is lesser in any way than the place which is sought to be evicted. The petitioner has given full description of the properties which are available with her and she has established by her evidence that the premises are not suitable for the purpose for which she requires the tenanted premises.
33. In Kundan Lal Mahesh Chand Vs. Padam Chand Jain RC Rev 89/2019 decided on 10.03.2023, the High Court of Delhi while relying upon Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd AIR 1999 SC 100, Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 17/19 778 & Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja, (2004) 15 SCC 610 has held that the law is also well settled that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how he should accommodate itself. Further, mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is bona fide.
34. Therefore, the averments made by the tenant must have some substance and must be supported by some material. Mere assertions made by a tenant in respect of landlords ownership of other properties and in respect of alternative accommodation are not sufficient.
35. In Babu Lal Vs. Atul Kumar, 2014 VII AD (Delhi) 128 observations in para 9 thereof which read to the effect:
9. Another argument brought forward by the tenant was that the landlord did not need the accommodation as claimed as they had sufficient space available with them. It is settled law that tenant is not one to dictate to the judiciary as to how it can use the property. Such liberty is not vested with either the Court or the tenant. This Court and the Supreme Court has held time and again that the landlord, once having shown that he genuinely needs the property, there can be no interference on how the property should be put to use. The Supreme Court in Prativa Devi v T. V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 held:
"2. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own........There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property."
The Supreme Court in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs) v Traders and RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 18/19 Agencies (1996)5 SCC 344 held that the landlord has liberty to occupy the premises so tenanted if the premises he is occupying is insecure or inconvenient. Under any circumstances, the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement.
36. Last but not the least, if the petitioner fails to use the tenanted premises for the purpose of opening a departmental/general store, the respondent has got an adequate remedy under Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act to retrieve the possession of the tenanted premises from the petitioner.
37. Accordingly, eviction order is passed in favor of petitioner and against the respondent thereby directing the latter to vacate the tenanted premises i.e. Shop no. 9 & 10, Ground Floor, Property bearing no. A-4/27, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-51 shown in green color in the site plan EX.PW1/1 filed by the petitioner in terms of Section 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. However, as per stipulation u/s 14 (7) DRC Act, the petitioner shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of this order.
Typed to the dictation directly (Deepak Sherawat)
corrected and pronounced in SCJ/RC (Shahdara)
the open court on this 8th day Karkardooma Courts,
of December, 2023 Delhi/08.12.2023.
RC ARC 08/20 Page no. 19/19