Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief/Prin. ... vs Sushil Kumar And 4 Others on 10 June, 2025
Author: Saurabh Lavania
Bench: Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:35095-DB
Court No. - 2
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 256 of 2025
Appellant :- State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief/Prin. Secy. Dept. Horticulture And Food Processing And 3 Others
Respondent :- Sushil Kumar And 4 Others
Counsel for Appellant :- C.S.C.
Counsel for Respondent :- Anupama Bhadauria
Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi,J.
1. Heard Sri Rajesh Kumar Tiwari, learned Addl. C.S.C. on the application for condonation of delay.
2. In view of order proposed to be passed, issuance of notice to the respondents is hereby dispensed with.
3. Instant special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952 has been filed by the appellants assailing the order dated 03.10.2023 passed in Writ A No. 1908 of 2023 (Sushil Kumar and Others Vs. State of U.P. & Others).
4. For the sake of convenience, the order dated 03.10.2023 is extracted herein-under:-
"1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the State.
2. The petitioners, who were appointed in between the years 2004-2005 and are working as daily wagers, have approached this Court claiming that though they have been working and performing their duties as good as regular Gardeners in the Department but minimum of the pay scale is not being paid as settled by judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Sabha Shanker Dube Vs. Divisional Forest Officers and others; (2019) 12 Supreme Court Cases 297. The relevant Paragraph 12, thus, reads as under:-
12. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants-herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service.
3. A counter affidavit is filed by the respondent no.2/Director, Horticulture & Food Processing, U.P. Lucknow, taking a stand that the petitioners were engaged merely on daily wages and they have never been engaged against any post nor there is any appointment in favour of the petitioners, as such their evaluation of work and efficiency etc. is not checked in any manner and the petitioners were only on daily wage basis and performed different type of non-technical work.
4. In a similar dispute regarding same Department, in Writ'A' No.8812 of 2022, Jai Prakash Verma And Others Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Addl./Prin. Secy. Horticulture And Food Process. Deptt. Lko. And Others, the respondent no.2, was asked to file specific affidavit indicating that in case the said persons are not available to work which of the employees of the State Government would be performing the said duties. In the supplementary counter affidavit dated 8.2.2023, the respondent no.2/Director, Horticulture & Food Processing, in Paragraph 4 has stated that where daily rated labours are not available the work is performed by the regularly appointed Gardeners in the regular cadre in the Department.
5. It is not disputed by the respondent no.2/Director, Horticulture & Food Processing that the persons are working regularly since the year 2003-2012 and are performing the duties which in normal course would be performed by substantively appointed Garderners.
6. In the given facts and circumstances, the law settled by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Sabha Shanker Dube Vs. Divisional Forest Officers and others (Supra), the petitioners are entitled for being granted the minimum of the pay scale.
7. In view thereof, the respondents are directed to pay minimum of the pay scale to the petitioners forthwith for the post of Gardeners as revised from time to time.
8. The writ petition is allowed."
5. As per Stamp Reporter, the instant appeal was filed in the Registry of this court on 27.05.2025 with delay of 572 days.
6. The relevant paras of the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal, are extracted herein-under:-
"5. That the judgment and order dated 03.10.2023 was served to the department concerned and in pursuance to the same, a letter dated 25.11.2023 was written by the Director Horticulture, for seeking legal opinion by the Learned Chief Standing Counsel.
6. That in pursuance of the same, legal opinion was provided by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel on 04.12.2023.
7. That thereafter a letter was written by the Directorate to the State Government with a request to take decision with respect to the judgement and order dated 02.02.2024.
8. That thereafter the State Government wrote a letter to the law department for giving permission to file the special appeal and the permission was given by the Law department on 09.11.2024.
9. That the Director, wrote a letter dated 16.04.2025 to the Learned Chief Standing Counsel to allot the file to some Standing Counsel.
10. That in response, the Learned Chief Standing Counsel allotted the filed to the Additional Chief Standing Counsel on 22.04.2025 and the paperbook was provided to the ACSC from the office of CSC on 29.04.2025.
11. That thereafter, the pairokar concerned contacted the Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and the pairokar concerned was advised to provide the being finalization is being filed without any further delay."
7. Considered the aforesaid as also the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the applicant-appellants, who submitted that proper explanation has been given for condoning the delay in the instant appeal, and the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the respondents and perused the records.
8. This Court is of the view that at this stage, the issue of limitation has to be considered and as such this Court is only considering the facts which are relevant for answering the question as to "whether explanation given in the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is just and proper".
9. The aforesaid is in view of the law settled. As per settled law for the purposes of condonation of delay, the concerned party has to explain sufficient cause for not approaching the court/authority concerned within time prescribed under the statutory provision.
10. The law on the issue of dealing with the applications for condonation of delay is well settled. This Court as also Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments have held that an opportunity of hearing should be given and the hearing should not be shut down and in the said judgments, it is also settled that liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented and non pedantic approach should be taken by the Courts concerned while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned. The Courts concerned while dealing with such applications should also consider the fact that whether the delay has sufficiently been explained or not. The manner of exercising discretion in matters relating to condonation of delay is fairly well settled and it has been consistently held that while exercising discretion in such matters, the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963, should be construed in a liberal manner and in the absence of anything showing malafide or deliberate delay as dilatory tactics, the Court should normally condone the delay. It is also settled principle of law that the discretion if exercised by the Courts concerned then the Appellate Courts should not interfere in the discretion exercised by the Courts concerned, if the discretion so exercised has been exercised judicially and not arbitrarily.
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramji Dass and others v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496 has held that as far as possible, Courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. In that case the appeal was filed against an ex-parte decree after eight years and the District Court as well as the High Court had rejected the matter on the ground of delay. However, setting aside the order of the High Court, Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
"... we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that the order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interest of Justice which always informs the power under S. 115 C.P.C. ..."
12. The manner of exercising discretion by Courts in matters relating to condonation of delay was subject matter of consideration in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy; (1998) 7 SCC 123, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366."
13. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nefar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, the issue before the Apex Court was that whether the High Court rightly condoned the delay of 2449 days in challenging the interim order dated 25.02.2004, which was duly communicated to the authorities and even for compliance of the same, the District Inspector of Schools, Howrah on 24.01.2006, directed the school authorities to comply with the directions issued vide order dated 25.02.2004. The Apex Court after considering the earlier judgments allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court, condoning the delay. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), the Apex Court in para 21 of the judgment culled out the principles on the issue of condoning the delay, which are as under:-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (4) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."
14. In the case of Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-
"6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained everyday by the courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim [(1939-40) 67 IA 416: (1941) 53 LW 212: AIR 1941 PC 6), relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that:
A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.
8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556: AIR 1998 SC 2276], the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."
9. While considering a similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649 (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450] laid down various principles inter alia: (SCC pp. 658-59, paras 21-22) *** "21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
*** 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
*** 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
10. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone."
15. On the issue of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More reported in (2019) 6 SCC 387, observed as under:-
"15. It is a fairly well-settled law that "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bona fides could be imputable to the appellant. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri (B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, (2012) 12 SCC 693: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 546], this Court held as under:
6. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay."
16. Observing that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, in N.Balakrishnan V. M.Krishnamurthy [N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123], this Court held as under:-
"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time........."
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Dabra Versus Pyare Lal and others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, on the issue of dealing with an application for condonation of delay, observed as under:-
"12. This Court, while emphasizing the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the case of Mahant Bikram Dass Chela v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh (1977)4 SCC 69 has held:
"21. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day's delay. These and similar considerations which influence the decision of Section 5 applications are out of place in cases where the appeal itself is preferred within the period of limitation but there is an irregularity in presenting it. Thus, in the instant case, there was по occasion to invoke the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, or of Rule 4, Chapter I of the High Court Rules. If the Division Bench were aware that Rule 3 of Chapter 2-C is directory, it would have treated the appeal as having been filed within the period of limitation, rendering it inapposite to consider whether the delay caused in filing the appeal could be condoned."
13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 has held as under:-
"16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases liberal approach, justice-oriented approach and cause for the advancement of 'substantial fustice cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation. Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a 'sufficient cause' for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party."
18. Again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkumar Choudhary reported in 2024 INSC 932 has held as under:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer ((2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant.
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir (2024) SCC OnLine SC 489 wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold."
19. The practice of challenging order by State and in higher court with delay has been deprecated by Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and other vs. Bherulal, 2020 (10) SCC 654 wherein the Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 663 days and held that such action on part of the State authority is merely to obtain order of dismissal to save their skin. The Apex Court has further held as under:
3. No doubt, some leewav is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107). This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:
"12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies. their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay." Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.
8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.
(emphasis supplied)
20. The Apex Court in the case of Government of Maharasthra (Water Resource Department vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC online SC 233, where in paragraph nos. 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61, the Apex Court has held as under:
57. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770: AIR 1970 SC 1953], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1: AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24: AIR 2012 SC 1629].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201].)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907].)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 2002 SCC (Cri) 830: AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
58. Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 ["Postmaster General"], as follows:
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in al matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
59. The decision in Postmaster General (supra) has been followed in the following subsequent judgments of this Court:
i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592 at paragraphs 8-8.2;
ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422 at paragraphs 2-3;
iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 at paragraphs 11-13; and
iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 at paragraphs 3-4.
60. In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667, this Court referred to Postmaster General (supra), and held as follows:
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up."
61. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows:
"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by s. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party ог its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under s. 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under s. 5 without reference to s. 14."
(emphasis supplied)
21. A reference may also be made to judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Odisha vs. Sunanda Mahakud, 2021 SCC online SC 384, wherein the Apex Court has held has under:
3. "There is no doubt that these are cases including the present one where the Government machinery has acted in a inefficient manner or it is a deliberate endeavour. In either of the two situations, this court ought not to come to the rescue of the petitioner. No doubt, some leeway is given for Government inefficiency but with the technological advancement now the judicial view prevalent earlier when such facilities were not available has been over taken by the elucidation of the legal principles in the judgment of this Court in the Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563. We have discussed these aspects in SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bheru Lal decided on 15.10.2020 and thus, see no reason to repeat the same again.
4. In the present case, the State Government has not even taken the trouble of citing any reason or excuse nor any dates given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought. The objective of such an exercise has also been elucidated by us in the aforesaid judgment where we have categorized such cases as "certificate cases".
5. The object of such cases appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say nothing could done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is mere completion of formality to give a quietus to the litigation and save the skin of the officers who may be at fault by not taking action in prescribed time. If the state government feels that they have suffered losses, then it must fix responsibility on concerned officers for their inaction but that ironically never happens. These matters are preferred on a presumption as if this Court will condone the delay in every case, if the State Government is able to say something on merits. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate impose costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates On Record Welfare Fund. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing both the Writ Appeal and the Special Leave Petition and a certificate of recovery be also filed in this Court within the same period of time.
6. The Special Leave Petition(s) is/are dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid"
(emphasis supplied)
22. Vide judgment of the Apex Court dated 04.02.2021, the Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin, which was preferred with the delay of 532 days from the date of rejection of restoration application and 6616 days from the date of original order.
23. A division bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of State of U.P. v. Khushnoor Khan, 2021 SCC Online All 164, in paragraph nos. 12, 13, 14, 17 and 20 observed as under:
12. Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again has not only expressed words of caution in respect of casual manner in which the State Authorities approach the Courts without any plausible ground for condonation of delay but has even counselled the State Authorities in this regard. Regard may be had at this juncture to the latest pronouncement made by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 04.02.2021 while dismissing the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 19846/2020, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, which was preferred with the delay of 532 days from the date of rejection of restoration application and 6616 days from the date of original order and made certain observations are quoted below:
"We have heard learned Additional Solicitor General for some time and must note that the only error which seems to have occurred in the impugned order is of noticing that it is not an illiterate litigant because the manner in which the Government is prosecuting its appeal reflects nothing better! The mighty Government of India is manned with large legal department having numerous officers and Advocates. The excuse given for the delay is, to say the least, preposterous. We have repeatedly being counselling through our orders various Government departments, State Governments and other public authorities that they must learn to file appeals in time and set their house in order so far as the legal department is concerned, more so as technology assists them. This appears to be falling on deaf ears despite costs having been imposed in number of matters with the direction to recover it from the officers responsible for the delay as we are of the view that these officers must be made accountable. It has not had any salutary effect and that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes the cake!"
13. In the case of Central Tibetan Schools Admin (supra) while observing that the appellant therein had approached the Court in casual manner without any cogent ground for condonation of delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the cases of Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., reported in [(2012) 3 SCC 563] and also the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, reported in [(2010) 8 SCC 685: AIR 2010 SC 3043]. Relevant extract of the said judgment in the case of Central Tibetan Schools Admin (supra) runs as under:
In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No. 9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No. 22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]. The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563. Despite this, there seems to be a little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.
14. In the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the advancement in modern technology and observed that the claim of seeking condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. In the said case, it was further observed by Hon'ble Apex Court that all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities need to be informed that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for delay, there is no need to accept usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
17. When we examine the explanation of delay of 1730 days in filing the review petition from the date of judgment dated 19.04.2016 which has been sought to be reviewed and delay of 1335 days from the date of dismissal of Special Leave Petition on 05.07.2017, what we find is that the State has once again sought shelter in usual slow pace of State machinery in preparation of office notes, movement of files, non-availability of certain necessary information, non-availability of concerned officials/officers etc. The said explanation cannot be said to be sufficient in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra). The State while seeking condonation of delay in this case has gone even to the extent of taking ground of certain "unavoidable" and "unspoken" circumstances. In our considered opinion such "unavoidable" and "unspoken" circumstances cannot be taken shelter of to claim condonation of delay in approaching the Courts. In fact the course adopted by the State in preferring the review petition reflects gross negligence and inaction which in our considered opinion cannot be said to be bona fide. We are aware that a liberal view needs to be adopted by the Courts to advance substantial justice. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, what we find is that the approach of the State all along has been casual and that of manifest negligence. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Living Media India Ltd. (supra), law of limitation binds every one including the Government.
20. In the light of the discussions made above, the review petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay."
(emphasis supplied)
24. It may further be mentioned that High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of State of M.P. v. Ramprakash Tyagi, MANU/MP/0566/2021 while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bheru Lal (supra) refused to condone the delay of 967 days. Same view was taken by High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the case of JK Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Kamal Builders, MANU/JK/0252/2021.
25. The relevant portion of the judgment and order dated 28.11.2023 passed by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s) 24926 of 2023, School Education Department & ors. v. Sarita Mishra & anr., being is extracted hereunder:
"The special leave petition has been filed with a delay of 283 days in filing and 121 days in refiling the special leave petition against an order dismissing a Writ Appeal filed after delay of 994 days: so much for the efficiency of the department! We have categorized all such cases as "certificate cases". The objective is to see that the department washes its hands off for its non performance to obtain dismissal from this Court.
We fail to appreciate such a scenario. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgments in the State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bheru Lal [SLP [C] Diary No.9217/2020 decided on 15.10.2020] and The State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda [SLP [C] Diary No.22605/2020 decided on 11.01.2021]. The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563.
Looking to the delay not only before the High Court and further delay before us, we dismiss the special leave petition as time barred with a costs of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited with the Supreme Court Group 'C' (Non-Clerical) Employees Welfare Association."
26. In this case the delay is of about 572 days. This Court considered the explanation given in the application, quoted in para 6 of this judgment, in the light of the law enunciated on the issue of condonation of delay.
27. Upon due consideration of aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the explanation given by the applicant-appellants for the purposes of condoning the delay of 572 days in filing the appeal, is vague and is not sufficient, as to explain the delay for the period w.e.f. 02.02.2024 to 09.11.2024 and 09.11.2024 to 16.04.2025 no explanation has been given, which could be deduced from para 6 of this judgment.
28. For the reasons aforesaid, the present application for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. Consequently, special appeal is also dismissed. Cost made easy.
(Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.) (Saurabh Lavania, J.) Order Date :- 10.06.2025 A.Nigam