Delhi District Court
Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Mohan Goel on 18 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHILPI SINGH
ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, SOUTH
DISTRICT COURTS COMPLEX, SAKET, NEW DELHI
RC ARC No. 76/2010 & 6188/16
CNR No. DLST03-000053-2010
Mrs. Preeti Khanna
W/o Mr. Atul Khanna
R/o L-4, Green Park Main,
New Delhi
..............Petitioner
Versus
1. Mr. Mukesh Mohan Goel,
S/o Mr. Inder Sain Goel
2. Mr. Pradeep Mohan Goel,
S/o Mr. Inder Sain Goel
3. M/s I.S. Goel & Co. Pvt. Ltd.
Through its director
Mr. Mukesh Mohan Goel,
All R/o 16, Sunder Nagar Market,
New Delhi
....Respondents
Date of Institution : 19.05.2010
Date of Pronouncement : 18.11.2025
Decision : Allowed.
Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 1 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors
Digitally
signed by
SHILPI
SHILPI SINGH
SINGH Date:
2025.11.18
16:46:34
+0530
BRIEF FACTS:
1. Succinctly, the case of the petitioner is that her mother, Late Smt Pushpa Khanna (hereinafter called the original landlady) had let out one shop along with covered courtyard on the ground floor of property bearing number 16, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi (hereinafter called the tenanted premises) to the respondents, for non residential purpose, at a monthly rent of Rs. 605/- under the Delhi Rent Control Act and now, the petitioner, who is the only surviving heir of the original landlady, requires the tenanted premises for her bonafide commercial use as she has no other suitable option. As per the petitioner, her husband, Sh. Atul Khanna, is manager of Shri Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jeweller and she is desirous of starting a jewellery business from the tenanted premises by opening a franchisee of Shri Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jeweller. The petitioner submits that the jewellery business depends on product exposure and visibility to prospective customers and therefore, the location of the showroom matters and since, the tenanted premises are located at Sunder Nagar Main Market, which is visited by high end customers with considerable footfall; it has easy access and huge parking, therefore it is ideal place for her to start her business. The petitioner prays that respondents be evicted from tenanted premises as per the provision of 14 (1) (e) read with 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called DRC).
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2. Respondent no.1 and 2 filed the leave to defend on their behalf as well as on behalf of respondent no.3 I.e I.S Goel & Company, being the partners of respondent no.3. As per the respondents, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the petitioner as clause 13 of annexure 2, which is relied upon by the petitioner herself, permitted them to convert into a limited company, which was done by forming M/s I.S Goel & Co. Pvt Ltd. (hereinafter called the company), and the said fact was also informed to the original landlady, who accepted the rent on behalf of the company since June 1995. To further substantiate the same, the respondents said that time and again, in various litigation's filed by the original landlady and the petitioner herein, the said fact was asserted and therefore, in knowledge of the petitioner. The respondents said that suit bearing no. 441/2002 was filed by the original landlady against them at Tis Hazari Court wherein she alleged that respondent no.1 and 2 were the tenants and they are liable to pay the rent. The respondents submit that the said allegation was made despite the fact that the original landlady accepted rent from the company since June 1995, till June 2001 by en-cashing the cheques issued towards the payment of rent. The respondents allege that after the said period, the company tendered rent by filing petition u/s 27 of DRC as the original landlady refused to accept the same and despite serving notice in these petitions, the original landlady never appeared to receive the rent or deny the allegations made in the petition. The respondents have further spoken about Eviction petition bearing Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 3 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:47:24 +0530 number 63/2008 filed u/s 14 (1) (b) by the original landlord against all the respondents on the ground that respondent no.1 and 2 had sub let the tenanted premises to the company without her consent, which was contested by them on the same defence. As per the respondents, the original landlady accepted rent tendered by the company till July 2001 and it is only after the said period, that she refused to accept the rent. Lastly, the respondents also mentioned about an injunction suit filed by the petitioner against them before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi wherein the company was arrayed as a party, thereby submitting that the petitioner was also in the knowledge that I.S Goel & Co. Pvt Ltd. is the actual tenant.
3. The respondents have also stressed upon the fact that when the landlord seeks ejectment of the tenant for bonafide need, without there being any default on the part of tenant, the Court must balance the rights especially when it would cause hardships to the tenant in case of commercial property. The respondents submit that they have been occupying the tenanted premises since 1959 and they have been running their business and earning livelihood from it and the history of litigation explained above would show the original landlady and petitioner have at number of times harassed the respondents by filing frivolous litigation, without taking it to its logical end. As per the respondents, the present petition is also a step in the said direction.Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 4 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
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4. The respondents have also raised a question on the alleged bona fide need of the petitioner submitting that the business of jewellery is technical, which requires highly skilled people to judge the quality of gold, silver and diamond, requiring years of experience in the trade along with requirement of knowing the export-import policies of government, FEMA, Customs and labour laws, essential for the functioning of trade. Apart this, the respondents have said that an academic course form institute of Gem and Jewellery export Promotion Council is imperative to judge the jewellery, however, as per their allegation, the petitioner, being a 50 year old lady, has no such experience. The respondents submit that admission to the said allegation is also made by the petitioner in letter dated 04.02.2010, thereby implying that the need alleged by the petitioner is only a projection and is in fact impossible for her to execute. The respondents allege that this litigation is being pursued by the petitioner for and on behalf of Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jeweller, who are keen to get the tenanted premises in order to expand their own business at Sunder nagar, which otherwise would required huge investment. It is alleged that to avoid such expenditure, the husband of the petitioner, who is also a partner in Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jeweller, falsely created the letters of communication for franchisee. The respondents have questioned the mental and physical capability of petitioner to explore the venture of Jewellery business at her age, thereby suggesting that the intent of the petitioner is to permit Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jeweller to run their business from the tenanted premises. The Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 5 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:47:41 +0530 respondents have also alleged that with mala fide intent, the petitioner has created self serving evidence of the alleged letters exchanged between her and Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jeweller and they have also raised suspicion on the requirement of tenanted premises through these letters on the ground that the property offered by petitioner in these letters is 10 Sunder Nagar and not the tenanted premises. The respondents submit that they cannot be evicted from the tenanted premises on mere fanciful and artificial desire of the petitioner and that, the provisions of DRC permit eviction u/s 14 (1) (e) for residential requirement and not for commercial purpose. It is also submitted by the respondents that with the permission of the original landlady, they covered the rear courtyard and open compound upto first floor at their own cost, which amounts to creation of lease in perpetuity in their favour, thereby making the petition not maintainable. The respondent no.1 & 2 relied upon the following annexures:
i. Annexure A: Copy of plaint in suit bearing no. 441/2002 filed by original landlady against respondent no.1 & 2 in the Court of Ld. Senior Civil Judge.
ii. Annexure B: Copy of Written statement, supported with affidavit of respondent no.1 in suit bearing no. 441/2002. iii. Annexure C: Copy of a document which has 8 entries in tabulation form for the rent deposited by the company u/s 27 DRC.
iv. Annexure D: Copy of first page of petition in Eviction petition bearing no. 63/2008 filed by original landlady against Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 6 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:47:46 +0530 respondent no.1 and 2 and the company before Ld. ARC, along with copy of few daily orders which also has order dated 18.08.2009 observing that the petition is being dismissed in default.
v. Annexure E: Copy of petition bearing C.S (OS) No. 1840/2009 filed before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by the petitioner against respondent no.1 and 2 and the company seeking injunction along.
vi. Annexure F: Copy of order dated 12.07.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Court in C.S (OS) No. 1840/2009.
5. The petitioner filed the reply to the leave to defend application wherein she denied the allegations made and reiterated her need for the tenanted premises as a bona fide requirement, in consonance with what is explained in the petition. She further said that by way of leave to defend, the respondents have actually admitted their status as that of a tenant and her status as the heir of the original landlady is not in question and therefore, the relationship of landlord tenant stands established. She also denied that the original landlady was in knowledge of formation of the company or the pendency of petitions u/s 27 DRC. Th petitioner said that the reply of the respondents itself shows that they were in possession of the tenanted premises since 1959 and petitioner/ original landlady never disturbed their possession but now, she actually requires it for her need and thus, doctrine of comparative hardship, as pleaded by the respondents, is misconceived.
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She also said that petition u/s 14 (1) (e) is legally maintainable for commercial use as well and therefore, the defence taken by the respondents cannot sustain. The petitioner denied all the allegations raised including the defence setup for lease in perpetuity and prayed that the application for leave to defend should be dismissed.
6. Rejoinder was filed by the respondents to the reply of the petitioner wherein the allegations raised by the petitioner was denied and the defence taken by the respondents was re-asserted.
7. Vide order dated 04.06.2012, the leave to defend application was allowed on the ground of landlord tenant relationship and the bona fide need of the petitioner.
8. On 04.07.2012, Written statement was filed by the respondent no.1 & 2 submitting that the petition should be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for not complying with the provisions of DRC and for not filing the site plan. It is further alleged that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as in furtherance of agreement date 01.10.1989, company was constituted who continued to pay rent to the original landlady and deliberately, 64 rent receipts have been concealed by the petitioner. The respondents reiterated the allegations made in the application for leave to defend and further said that the letters relied upon by the petitioner would show that property bearing number 10 Sunder Nagar was offered, which is a reasonable alternate Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 8 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:47:57 +0530 accommodation and is also lying vacant, therefore, can be used by her if her plea of bona fide requirement is accepted. The respondent no.1 and 2 denied all the allegations made in the petition and prayed that the petition be dismissed.
9. The petitioner moved an application under order 1 Rule 10 CPC to implead the company on the ground that since the respondents took the plea that the company is the tenant, it is imperative to add it. The respondents objected to the application but vide order dated 15.02.2016, the application was allowed impleading the company as respondent no.3 and dropping the partnership from array of parties.
10. After the said order, amended petition was filed which was permitted to be taken on record and reply of respondent no.3 I.e the company was filed. The defence of respondent no.3 was similar to the defence taken by respondent no.1 and 2 and therefore, the same is not being repeated for the sake of brevity. The company also objected to the impleadment on the ground that it has no concern with the allegations made in the petition as it came into existence long after Ex PW-1/1 I.e the rent agreement was executed between the petitioner and respondent no.1 and 2. In reply, the petitioner denied all these allegations.
11. Reply was filed by the petitioner to the WS wherein she denied the allegations made against her and said that the tenancy was created in Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 9 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:48:05 +0530 the favour of respondent no.1 and 2, who had then constituted a partnership. She reaffirmed the allegations made by her in the plaint.
12. During evidence, PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 appeared as witnesses in Petitioner's evidence and they reaffirmed the allegations made in the plaint; why the petitioner now requires the tenanted premises; the experience of the petitioner in the field of jewellery and her participation in exhibitions with her husband/PW-2 and her prospective agreement with Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jewellers, which is run by PW-3 to open a franchisee from the tenanted premises. The witnesses relied on their evidence by way of affidavit I.e Ex PW-1/A, Ex PW-2/A and Ex PW-3/A. The petitioner further relied on the following documents:
i. Ex PW-1/1 I.e agreement dated 01.10.1999. ii. Ex PW-1/2 I.e Site plan of tenanted premises. iii. Ex PW-1/3 I.e Letter dated 04.02.2010. iv. Ex PW-1/4 I.e response dated 13.03.2010 from PW-3 (objected on mode of proof).
v. Ex PW-1/5 I.e Letter dated 31.03.2010. vi. Ex PW-1/6 I.e letter dated 04.04.2010 from PW-3 (objected on mode of proof).
13. PW-2 also relied on Ex PW-1/6 and PW-3 relied on Ex PW-1/4 and Ex PW-1/6 and they along with petitioner, during cross examination explained on how the tenancy was created; how petitioner is the sole Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 10 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:11 +0530 heir and became subsequent landlady; how the tenanted premises were discussed as a viable option with PW-3 to start the business; how the premises were inspected and the business of PW-3 and his association with PW-2 and PW-1. The witnesses had denied suggestions put to them.
14. RW-1 appeared on behalf of respondents during evidence and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit I.e Ex RW-1/A along with site plan I.e Ex RW-1/1. RW-1 reiterated the allegation that the need projected is fraudulent; the letters relied are forged and doctored; there is alternate suitable accommodation available with the petitioner at 10 Sunder Nagar but the same is not disclosed by her and since the petitioner is not aware of the status of tenanted premises, how it looks from inside, whether notice for sealing was sent and the fact that there is no suitability report towards the alleged inspection, the petitioners cannot be said to have inspected the premises and come to the conclusion that it is suitable for the alleged business of PW-1. The respondent has alleged that petitioner has no experience in the field of Gem & Jewellery and she has actually filed this petition for Bhagwan Das Khanna & Jewellers in order for them to occupy the premises. During cross examination, RW-1 explained how the partnership changed into a company, that he is also a director of M/s Oriental Travels Pvt Ltd. Which operates from Marina Hotel, Connaught Place. RW-1 also filed the site plan which was exhibited as Ex RW-1/P1, Ex RW-1/P2 I.e copy of documents depicting the rent deposited u/s 27 Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 11 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:17 +0530 DRC; Ex RW-1/P3 I.e copy of balance sheet of the company; Mark RW-1/P5 I.e copy of balance sheet of company for year ending 2023; Ex RW-1/P7 I.e certified copy of balance sheet of company for year ending 01.03.2022 and he was confronted with surviving member certificate of the original landlady and letter from Gem & Jewellery export promotion council dated 30.12.2023. Both these documents were marked as Mark RW-1/P4 and Mark R1/P4, which was eventually marked as Mark R1/P6. The witness objected to the documents confronted but admitted that there is no particular age to start a business; that goodwill and transparency matters for a business to succeed; that business can be expanded at any age and its not mandatory to be associated with a business entity to open a franchisee. RW-1 also admitted that he himself has no such document to show that a certificate is mandatory from Gem & Jewellery council to start a business in the said field and he has no personal knowledge that any course or academic qualification is required to start the business. RW-1 also admitted that 10 Sunder nagar is owned by the petitioner but for the tenanted premises, he did not clearly answer the said question and rather said its as per the deed placed on record. RW-1 could not point out the alleged rent receipts which would depict the payment of rent by cheque by the company and said that the documents were with his previous council who expired. RW-1 said that his information qua absolute ownership of petitioner for 10 Sunder Nagar is based on information gathered by him from local source. He also admitted that he did not pay the house tax for the tenanted Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 12 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:22 +0530 premises and explained that it was the responsibility of the owner. RW-1 also admitted that in Ex RW-1/P5, under note 17, rent is not actually paid but shown to be payable to original landlady. RW-1 also denied the suggestions put to him.
FINAL ARGUMENTS:
15. During final arguments, the Ld. counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the petition was filed u/s 14 (1) (e) r/w 25B of DRC Act, 1958, the petitioner, who is the landlord was required to prove two things:
i) Bonafide requirement.
ii) No other suitable alternate accommodation.
16. As per the Ld. counsel for the petitioner, the title of the petitioner as the landlord is not in dispute and even the landlord tenant relationship is not disputed per se and the ground taken by the respondents is that wrong tenant was impleaded. The Ld. counsel explained that this issue was based on the identity of the tenant, which was brought in question by the tenant himself on the ground that respondent no.3 is not a partnership concern but a private limited company. The Ld. counsel said that the identity of the petitioner as the landlord was never questioned and in fact, the same was admitted by the respondents in the written statement, at reply to para 19 of the petition. He further said that order dated 15.02.2016 confirms the said question raised by the respondents as I.S. Goel & Company was added as the party, thereby Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 13 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:27 +0530 resting his issue for good. The Ld. counsel said that in the application filed u/o 1 Rule 10 CPC, pursuant to which respondent I.S. Goel & Company was impleaded as the party, it was observed that respondent no.1 is one of the director of the company and, since it is the defence of the respondents themselves that subsequent tenancy was within the knowledge of the original landlady, who is also accepting the rent on behalf of the company, the impleadment order settles the question on landlord tenant relationship raised by the respondents. The Ld. Counsel said that the respondents cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time as, once the respondents raised the ground of not impleading the necessary party i.e. respondent no.3/ IS Goel & Co. without questioning the status of petitioner as landlady and once order was passed impleading the said party, a new case could not have been setup in the Written Statement by them questioning the status of the petitioner as the landlady. In addition to this, the Ld. counsel said that in the cross examination of the petitioner, her relation with the original landlord/her mother was never questioned and no such suggestion was put to her to show that she is not the sole surviving heir of the original landlady, as pleaded, therefore, the title of the petitioner as the landlady is not in dispute.
17. With respect to the question of bonafide need of the landlady, the Ld. counsel for the petitioner said that the letter exchanged between the landlady and Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller, which are placed on record would show the intention of landlady to set up a business of Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 14 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:48:32 +0530 franchise of the above-mentioned jewellery store. The Ld. counsel explained that one of the question raised by the respondents was that the case of setting up the business of franchise is a sham ground taken by the petitioner only to evict the respondents but he said that it is a settled law, that once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established, the tenant cannot dictate terms on the landlord as to how the property is to be used and whether the landlord is competent to use the property in such manner. The Ld. Counsel relied on the judgment passed by The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Santosh Bhutani and ors. Vs Savitri Devi, RC Rev 251/2020; Manika Rani Ghosh & Anr vs Dharwinder Kaur, RC Rev 512/2012 and Manmohan Singh vs Arjun Uppal, RC Rev 117/2016. The Ld. counsel also pointed out the letters exchanged between the petitioner and Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller to prove the intention of the petitioner and he said that the recipient of letter is also a witness to the case, thereby proving the need of the petitioner. The Ld. counsel clarified that the witness of petitioner/her husband clarified in his cross examination that it was his opinion to Bhagwan Das Jeweller to not open a franchisee, which was based on his general opinion due to the downfall in the business of jewellery but he said that the said opinion did not bind the petitioner in exploring the prospect of opening a franchisee of Bhagwan Das Jeweller at the tenanted premises. As per the Ld. counsel, agreeing with the said submission would amount to dictation of terms by the tenant on the landlord. In addition to this, the Ld. counsel also clarified that franchisee is never taken for the benefit of franchisor and the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 15 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:38 +0530 current status of the business of franchisor has no bearing on the prospective franchisee that can be opened.
18. The Ld. Counsel said that cross examination of PW-1 dated 30.03.2022 shows how the tenanted premises is required by the petitioner to open the franchisee of Bhagwan Das Jeweller and, that the defence of the respondents is based on the suggestions given to the petitioner that the communication made between her and Bhagwan Das Jeweller is forged but the said suggestion has been denied in the cross examination. It was submitted that in case the sender and recipient of letter admit the letter, filing of postal receipt is not a sine qua non to prove the communication. As per the Ld. Counsel, filing and proof of postal receipt only raises a presumption that letters were sent but where, the said fact is not in dispute and admission is given by the sender and the receiver, which in this case is PW-1 and PW-3, non filing of postal receipt does not disprove the communication made. In support of the said argument, the Ld. Counsel relied on the judgment passed y Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Hari Prakash vs Delhi Development Authority, RSA 60/2014.
19. The Ld. Counsel also based the said argument on the principles laid down u/s 59 of Evidence Act i.e. "All facts, except the contents of documents and electronic record, may be proved by oral evidence". As per the counsel, postal receipts do not prove the contents of document i.e. the letters relied upon and since the letters are themselves filed and, Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 16 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:48:43 +0530 the sender and recipient of these letters have admitted the contents, absence of postal receipt could not suggest that the document/letters are not proved. Section 27 of General Clauses Act was also discussed by the counsel to explain that the said section only establishes a legal presumption that a document sent by registered post is deemed to be served at the time it would normally be delivered in the ordinary course of post, unless proven otherwise, thus, establishing that postal receipts only prove the factum of presumption towards delivery and not the proof of contents of document. With respect to the conjecture raised by the respondent that why would the petitioner communicate through letters when she was residing at the same property where the owner of Bhagwan Das Jeweller was residing, the Ld. counsel said that letters were not the only mode through which communication was made as previously, the parties i.e. PW1 and PW3 discussed the said prospect verbally as well. To substantiate the same, the Ld. counsel relied upon the examination-in-chief and cross examination of PW3.
20. With respect to the objection raised by the respondents for the different property numbers mentioned in the letters through which the communication was established between the petitioner and Bhagwan Das Jeweller, the Ld. counsel explained that the same was a typographical error. He further said that clarification qua the said error could not be given in the amended petition filed by the petitioner as Section 25B of DRC Act has a set format and eventually, the said error was explained in the evidence by way of affidavit and cross Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 17 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:48 +0530 examination of the petitioner. The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Prithipal Singh vs Satpal Singh (dead) through LR's, SLP (c) No. 19921 of 2006 was filed in support.
21. It was also argued on behalf of the petitioner that she herself comes from a reputed family of Jeweller and now, her children are settled abroad and therefore, it is appropriate time for her to explore and settle in the business of jewellery. In response to the objection of the respondent that the business of jewellery is tricky and requires expertise, which the petitioner being a housewife does not possess, the Ld. counsel relied upon cross examination of RW1 dated 12.04.2024 to show that a degree is not required in order to run the said business.
22. Lastly, with respect to the availability of alternate accommodation i.e. 10, Sunder Nagar, the Ld. counsel said that the said property is not a commercial property and the tenanted premises is in a locality where other jewellery shops are located, thereby making it a lucrative location to run the store. He further explained that the remaining two floors in the tenanted premises are under litigation and even otherwise, the requirement of the petitioner is for ground floor. The Ld. counsel also explained that the ground floor of property bearing no.10, Sunder Nagar was not owned by the original landlady and therefore, did not devolve upon the petitioner but rather on her cousin, thereby implying that the only available option with the petitioner for her bonafide need is the tenanted premises.
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23. Per contra, the Ld. counsel for the respondents submitted that the memo of parties originally filed by the petitioner was bad in law as the petitioner was in knowledge that I.S. Goel & Company is the tenant and not I.S.Goel Partnership. He said that the said observation can also be made out from the fact that CS no.1840/2009 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in September 2009, which was in the knowledge of the petitioner and the petition before this Court was filed on 05.07.2010, therefore, intentionally, the actual tenant i.e. the company was not made a party by the petitioner.
24. For the bonafide need of the petitioner, the Ld. counsel said that the said need is projected by the petitioner for Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller. It is alleged by the respondents that the petitioner has filed this petition at behest of Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller whose intention is to get the tenanted premises. As per the Ld. counsel, since 1934, Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller never gave any franchisee, as can be seen from the cross examination of PW3. The Ld. counsel said that till date, there is only one store of Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller in Delhi and the alleged business of creation of franchisee by the petitioner is a false creation only to get the property for Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller. The Ld. counsel relied on the examination of PW-2 to show that the business of Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller was not doing well and therefore, in such circumstance, a prudent person would not open a franchisee. He further said that the knowledge and Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 19 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:48:58 +0530 expertise of the petitioner is not sufficient to run the business of jewellery and because, legally, Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller, being a firm cannot be a dependent of the petitioner, therefore, under the garb of need of Bhagwan Das Khanna Jeweller, the bonafide need of petitioner is projected.
25. The Ld. counsel for respondent raised serious questions on the communication made between PW-1 and PW-3 through the letters. He said that PW-3 is the paternal uncle father-in-law of PW-1 and therefore, the communication through letters is itself questionable and, considering that in Ex. PW1/5, the commercial space discussed between the petitioner and PW-3 was with respect to 10, Sunder Nagar, thus, filing of petition for 16, Sunder Nagar without any explanation in the amended petition for the alleged typographical error shows the malafide of the petitioner. As per the Ld. counsel for respondent, PW-3 never visited the tenanted premises, as can be seen from the letters exchanged between petitioner and him and, petitioner can therefore not be permitted to explain the discrepancy in the property number as despite having the opportunity to explain the same in the amended petition, she chose not to do the same. The Ld. counsel said that evidence cannot be lead beyond pleadings, especially in the said circumstance as it has a major bearing on the merits of the petition. It is also alleged that not filing of postal receipt by the petitioner for the letters exchanged between her and PW-3, which are the basis for her bonafide need and also considering that the letters were exchanged Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 20 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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within family staying at the same house, creates serious doubts in the existence of these letters. The Ld. counsel said that throughout the case of the petitioner was that the communication was made through these letters which were sent by post and it is only when the respondents questioned on the absence of postal receipt, a ground was created to show that non-filing of postal receipt does not affect the admissibility of content of these letters. The Ld. counsel also alleged that the petitioner could have brought a case that her husband, who would otherwise be the dependent as per DRC Act had the bonafide need for the tenanted premises but instead, the petitioner chose to project her bonafide need without any evidence in support of it, which should not be permitted by the Court.
26. In addition to above, the Ld. counsel for respondent also raised objection on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove the site plan of the tenanted premises, as per law and therefore, the site plan relied by the respondents, which was also admitted by the petitioner will have to be considered as the correct one. He said that PW-3 was not aware with the site plan of the tenanted premises as the discussion was never made for the tenanted premises but rather, for 10, Sunder Nagar and, the tenanted premises was never physically seen by him. He said that the alleged typographical error with the property number was brought 9 years after filing of the petition and therefore, should not be permitted. The Ld. counsel also said that no new fact can be raised after the pleadings are filed and therefore, the explanation given by the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 21 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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petitioner cannot be accepted. In response to this, the Ld. counsel for petitioner said that the LR certificate on the basis of which the petitioner proved that she is the heir of the original landlady is not a foreign document as in the pleadings, throughout petitioner has alleged the same and it is not disputed by respondent that she is the daughter of original landlady with whom they executed Ex PW-1/1. Reliance was placed by the Ld. Counsel on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Andul Wahid vs Nilofer & Ors, Civil APpeal No. 8146 of 2023 and the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Subhash Chander vs Bhagwan Yadav, CM (M) No. 171/2009.
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE:
27. I have heard the arguments and perused the record. I shall now proceed to give issue wise finding in this case. The three main issues of the present petition are:
a) Relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
b) Bona fide need of the petitioner.
c) Availability of suitable alternate accommodation.
28. 1st issue- Relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties:
a) The foremost requirement of a petition under DRC is to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Vide order Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 22 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:49:14 +0530 dated 04.06.2012, the Ld. Predecessor observed that the said relationship between the parties is a triable issue and accordingly, leave to defend was permitted on this ground. Now if the leave to defend and written statement of the respondent no.1 and 2 is seen, the ground raised is that the tenancy was never created in favour of respondent no.1 and 2 individually, but in the name of the partnership I.e M/s I.S Goel & Co. It is further averred that as per clause 13 of Mark A1, the tenants were permitted to constitute themselves into a company and respondent no.1 and 2 along with Smt Urmila Goel would be collectively and individually guarantors for payment of rent and fulfillment of terms of Mark A1. As per the respondents, the said option was exercised and respondent no.3 I.e the Company was created, who was paying the rent to the original landlady since June 1995. To corroborate the said averment, when RW-1 was examined, he said that he can produce the requisite documents proving the deposition of rent by the company. RW-1 then tendered copy of written statement filed by him in suit no. 441 of 2002 I.e Mark RW-1/P2. On the last page of the said document, a tabular record can be seen which records the detail of petitions filed by IS Goel & Co. U/s 27 of DRC beginning from the period 01.07.2001 to 29.02.2008. Mark RW-1/P2 is a scanned copy and therefore, secondary piece of evidence and the admissibility of this document would depend upon the fulfillment of requirements laid down u/s 65 of Evidence Act. Primary evidence, secondary evidence, circumstances in which secondary Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 23 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:49:20 +0530 evidence can be filed, public document and certified copy of public documents, are all concepts which have been described in Evidence act. The requisite sections are explained herein below:
i. Section 61 of the evidence act says how the proof of contents of documents can be given- " The contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence."
ii. Section 63 of Evidence act has described what all are secondary evidence- " Secondary evidence means and includes-
1. certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
2. copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
3. copies made from or compared with the original;
4. counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
5. oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it."
iii. Section 65 of the Evidence act lays down the cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given-
Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 24 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors
Digitally
signed by
SHILPI SHILPI SINGH
Date:
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"Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases-
1. When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such a person does not produce it;
2. When the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
3. When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
4. When the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
5. When the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74.
6. When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in, to be given in evidence;
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7. When the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
iv. Section 74 defines Public documents. The following documents are public documents as mentioned in the act :-
1. Documents forming the acts or records of the acts:
a) of the sovereign authority;
b) of official bodies and tribunals; and
c) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of private documents v. Section 76 defines what are Certified copies of public documents:
1. Every [public officer] [A Village-officer in the Punjab has been declared for the purposes of this Act to be a public officer having the custody of a public document-see the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 1887 (17 of 1887), Section 151(2).] having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 26 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.
2. Explanation: Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty is authorized to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.
vi. Section 77 explains when proof of documents can be given by production of certified copies: " Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or part of the public documents of which they purport to be copies."
vii. Section 79 lays down the Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies: " The Court shall presume [to be genuine] every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy or other document, which is by Law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact, and which purports to be duly certified by any officer [of the Central Government or of a State Government, or by any officer [in the State of Jammu and Kashmir] who is duly authorized thereto by the Central Government]"
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b) In addition to these sections, the law on primary and secondary evidence has also been explained by their lordships in Vijay vs Union of India & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 4910 of 2023. The judgment passed by the constitution bench of the Hon'ble Court was also quoted in the case of Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v.
Purya,14 (5-Judge Bench) wherein it was held:
"law requires Primary evidence to be given first, and secondary evidence may be given in the absence of primary/original evidence when a proper explanation of its absence has been given. The terms "primary and secondary evidence" apply to the kinds of proof that may be given to the contents of a document, irrespective of the purpose for which such contents, when proved, may be received." It was further held that, "Section 63 of the Evidence Act gives an exhaustive definition declaring that secondary evidence "means and includes" the five kinds of evidence mentioned therein and Section 65 of the Evidence Act allows secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition, or contents of documents under the circumstances therein mentioned. It provides for the circumstances in which secondary evidence can be used when the original document is unavailable or inaccessible. It is imperative to adhere to the principles outlined in these sections, including the proper documentation and authentication, to successfully produce secondary evidence in legal proceedings."
c) The above sections and the law settled on this point would show that Mark RW-1/P2 is a secondary evidence tendered without the reason for non availability of primary evidence. Though the document is alleged to be court record and the proof of payment of rent is the alleged challans tendered before the Court by the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 28 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:49:48 +0530 respondent no.3 u/s 27 DRC, therefore, not filing of certified copy of the available public records itself answers the question as to why this document cannot be admitted into evidence. In any case, the question in this petition is not eviction on the ground of non payment of rent but, bona fide need of the landlady. Mark RW-1/P2 was relied by the respondents to prove that respondent no.3 company is the tenant and respondent no.1 and 2 do not have landlord tenant relationship with the petitioner, however, in the absence of cogent explanation for placing reliance on secondary evidence, this document does not support the said version of the respondents.
d) If the remaining pleadings and evidence is seen, it has been admitted by the respondents throughout that earlier, the tenanted premises was given to them when they constituted a partnership and later, by virtue of clause 13 of Ex PW-1/1, they converted into a limited company. Ex PW-1/1 was admitted into evidence after original was produced by the petitioner and the same was even relied by the respondents when PW-1 was subjected to cross examination. Reading of this document would show that it was a contract executed between the original landlady and respondent no.1 and 2, who were the partners of M/s IS Goel & Co. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed in Dhanasingh Prabhu v.
Chandrasekar, SLP (Cr.) 5706 of 2024 the fundamental differences between partnership firms and companies. At the outset, Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 29 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:49:53 +0530 the Court emphasised that unlike companies, which are separate juristic entities with perpetual succession and limited liability, partnership firms are merely "compendious terms" for their partners. The Court relied on Section 45 of the Partnership Act, 19326 and observed that a partnership is defined as "the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all". The Court also noted that persons who enter into partnership are individually called "partners" and collectively "a firm". The Hon'ble Court relied on several precedents such as Aron Salomon (Pauper) v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.7, Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT8, Dulichand Laxminarayan v. CIT and CIT v. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai and observed that a partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Companies Act, does not possess a separate legal personality and the firm's name is only a compendious reference for describing its partners.
e) The logical corollary of the above judgment when applied to the facts of this case would imply that respondent no.1 and 2 were the persons with whom the original landlady entered into a contract through Ex PW-1/1 as the firm itself had no separate identity.
Later, due to clause 13 of the said document, respondent no.1 and 2 converted the partnership into limited company but they along with Smt Urmila Goel collectively agreed to be guarantor for the payment of rent. Legally, respondent no.3 company became the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 30 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:49:58 +0530 tenant of the original landlady but respondent no.1 and 2, being directors and also responsible for payment of rent are a necessary party to the petition. Respondents have asserted their possession on the tenanted premises on the basis of Ex PW-1/1 which clearly shows that they are responsible as guarantors for the rent on behalf of respondent no.3 company, thus, being the directors of respondent no.3 company and with their own admission in leave to defend, they share a relationship of tenant with the petitioner, which she derived through original landlady.
f) The next objection of respondents is that since the original landlady and the petitioner were aware that respondent no.3 is the actual tenant, therefore, not impleading the company as a party in the original petition was bad in law. The Ld. Counsel for the respondent said that CS no. 441/2002, E-63/2008 and CS (OS) No. 1840 of 2009 would show that the original landlady and the petitioner were always aware that respondent no.3 is the tenant, yet the present petition was filed without impleading it. In support of the same, copy of these petitions were filed with the pleadings of the respondents and in reply, the petitioner never admitted the allegations made on her through the reliance placed by the respondents on these petitions and said that the petitiones were never disposed off on merit. Speaking of these documents legally, as they were never tendered by the respondents, they are inadmissible in evidence, however, for the sake of argument, if it Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 31 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:50:04 +0530 is considered that petitioner was aware of the same, the fact that application under order 1 rule 10 CPC filed by the petitioner to implead respondent no.3 company was allowed and the trial is done on merits, which includes the defence of respondent no.3 company as well, non impleadment of the company in original petition now has no bearing on the merits of the case. It is a settled principle that misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the suit and it is a mere irregularity which is covered by sections 99 and of the Code. To elucidate, Rule 13 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure says, "All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived."
g) Thus, where the objection is taken but the plaintiff declines to add the necessary party, it is only then he/she cannot subsequently be allowed in appeal to rectify the error by applying the amendment.
In the facts of this case, when the objection was taken, application was moved and allowed by the Court and therefore, the said objection cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit or call it bad in law. Further, Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that no suit shall defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 32 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:08 +0530 matters of controversy so far as the regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The said order in the act additionally supports the averment of the petitioner that the court cannot dismiss a suit solely based upon the ground of non impleadment of a necessary party. Once the said defect is rectified, the petitioner is entitled to contest for the relief prayed in the petition.
h) During final arguments, the Ld. Counsel for respondents was specifically questioned if there is any case law which supports the argument that if intentionally also, a party does not add a necessary party but later the said party is impleaded, would it mean that the petition should be dismissed. In response, the ld. Counsel said that a supporting judgment will be filed, however, no such judgment was filed or law was brought into the knowledge of the Court. On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for petitioner relied on the judgment passed by Hon'ble SC of India in Lohia Properties (P) Ltd, Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Assam vs Atmaram Kumar to support his averment of admission of the status of petitioner as the landlord and the respondents as the tenants by the respondents themselves.
It was held in the above mentioned judgment:
"What is stated in the above is, what amount to admit a fact on pleading while Rule 3 of Order 8 requires that the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth....14. Rule 5 provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the written statement shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. What Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 33 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:13 +0530 this rule says is, that any allegation of fact must either be denied specifically or by a necessary implication or there should be at least a statement that the fact is not admitted. If the plea is not taken in that manner, then the allegation shall be taken to be admitted."
i) As per the Ld. Counsel for petitioner, at para 19 of the amended petition, it is explained how the petitioner became the landlady and in response to the same, neither in the leave to defend nor in the written statement, respondents have denied the title of the petitioner as the landlady. The Ld. Counsel for petitioner pointed out para 13 and 14 of Lohia Properties (supra) judgment to show that if an allegation in the petition is not specifically denied, it shall be taken to be admitted. When the said submission is seen with the response of respondents in the written statement, it is submitted in the written statement that contents of para 19 need no reply. The said submission in written statement is self explanatory to say that the averment of the petitioner as landlady has not been denied. To further substantiate the same, PW-1 also reiterated this fact during her evidence that originally, the tenancy was created in the name of respondent no.1 and 2, who signed on Ex PW-1/1 not just as partners, but as tenants themselves and later, the company was added. RW-1 was also confronted with Mark RW-1/P4 to show that petitioner is the sole surviving heir of the original landlady. The said document was questioned on the mode of proof and admissibility but the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner said that during cross examination, a new document can be brought on record to Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 34 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:19 +0530 bring out contradictions. He relied on the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Subhash Chander vs Bhagwan Yadav, C.M (M) No. 171/2009 and of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Mohammed Abdul Wahid vs Nilofer & Ors, SLP (c) No. 14445 of 2021, wherein it was held:
"11. The legislative intent behind order 7 Rule 14(4) and Order 8 Rule 1A(4) and Order 13 Rule 1(3) appears to be to permit an element of surprise, which is very important in the cross examination of witnesses. A litigant may well be of the opinion that if the document on the basis whereof he seeks to demolish the case of the adversary is filed on the court record along with pleadings or before framing of issues, with resultant knowledge to the adversary, the adversary may come prepared with his replies thereto. On the contrary, if permitted to show/produce the document owing to element of surprise, the adversary or witness, may blurt out the truth."
"Save and except the cross-examination part of a civil suit, at no other point shall such confrontation be allowed, without such document having accompanied the plaint or written statement filed before the court. For this purpose, reference be made to Order VII Rule 14(4)(This Rule speaks of the plaintiff necessarily listing in his plaint and, producing before the court, the documents upon which they seek to place reliance, in support of his claim. Sub-rule 4 exempts from this obligation documents produced for the limited purpose of cross-examination or to jog the memory of a witness), Order VIII Rule 1A(4)(a) (This Rule speaks of the defendant necessarily listing in his Written Statement and, producing before the court the documents upon which they seek to place reliance, in defense of his claim for set- off or counterclaim. Sub-rule 4 exempts from this obligation documents produced for the limited purpose of cross-examination or to jog the memory of a witness) and Order XIII Rule 1(3) (This Rule speaks of either party or their pleaders obligatorily producing, Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 35 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:50:26 +0530 post the settlement of issues in a Suit, the documentary evidence upon which reliance is placed. Sub-rule 3 exempts from this obligation documents produced for the limited purpose of cross-examination or to jog the memory of a witness), all three of which, while dealing with the production of documents, by the plaintiff, defendant and in general, respectively, exempt documents to be produced for the limited purpose of cross-examination or jogging the memory of the witness. 32. In light of the above discussion, and the answer in the negative to the first question before this court, meaning thereby that there is no difference between a party to a suit as a witness and a witness simpliciter- the second issue in this appeal, in view of the provisions noticed above, production of documents for both a party to the suit and a witness as the case may be, at the stage of cross-examination, is permissible within law."
j) A reading of the principle laid down in the above two judgments would show that a new document, if it relates to the pleadings made in the case by the respective party, can be put to another party or its witness in order to bring out the contradiction. The contradiction in this case being the proof of title of petitioner to the tenanted premises as the landlady. By way of Ex RW-1/P4, the petitioner intended to show that she is the only surviving heir and though, the mandate of law laid down in these two judgments permits the petitioner to put such document, however, it has to be in compliance with the principles of primary and secondary evidence, as explained above. The document was objected by the respondents and it is a digitally signed electronic evidence, without the accompanying certificate under the evidence act and without Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 36 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:32 +0530 the certification of the department and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. However, the cross examination of RW-1 assisted the case of the petitioner qua her submission of being the heir of the original landlady as at one place, RW-1 has said that he is not aware who is the owner of tenanted premises and later, he said that the petitioner is the owner of alleged alternate accommodation I.e 10 sunder nagar. The said fact is being mentioned as in the pleadings, the stand of the respondents has been that 10 sunder nagar is in possession of the petitioner as it fell in the share of petitioner, being the heir of original landlady. Thus, since the ownership of original landlady and Ex PW-1/1 is not questioned and RW-1 admits the status of petitioner as heir to the remaining property of the original landlady, the consequent analogy would be that her status as the heir of the remaining property of the landlady cannot be questioned.
k) It is noteworthy to mention at this stage that inadmissibility of Ex RW-1/P4 does not leave the said fact in a limbo. The said document was in addition to the averments made in the pleading, which as mentioned above are not specifically denied. As can be seen from the extract of pleadings mentioned above, in the leave to defend, respondent no.1 and 2 admitted that after conversion into a company, respondent no.3 became the tenant. Para 19 of the plaint is also not denied by any of the respondents therefore, considering the admission made by RW-1 in his cross examination qua the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 37 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:50:37 +0530 ownership of petitioner, the status of petitioner as landlady is not in question anymore.
l) Furthermore, though the respondents have disputed the title of the petitioner over the tenanted premises, they not disclosed as to who is the owner and landlord of the tenanted premises, if not the petitioner herein. Reliance is being placed on the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Meenakshi Vs Ramesh Khanna and Anr. 60 (1995) DLT 524:
"Mere denial of ownership is no denial at all. It has to be something more. For this, first and foremost thing which has always been considered as a good guide is does that tenant say who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner? In the present case, the tenant does not say anything except denying petitioner's ownership. The tenant is completely silent on this aspect. Merely by saying that the petitioner is not the owner, the tenant is trying to ensure that the case drags on for years for trial. If leave is granted on the basis of such vague pleas, it will encourage the tenants to deny ownership of the petitioner in every case."
m) Further, in judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Leela Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held the following:
"It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on record the documents by which she became owner. The attornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour as well as an admission made Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 38 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:50:42 +0530 by the tenant by filing petition under section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act acknowledgement the landlordship of landlady.... The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in-interest. Accordingly, in view of the provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act, he is estopped from challenging the title of the petitioner..... If the transfer of the landlord's title is valid, and even if the tenancy is not attorned in favour of the transferee, the lease continues. Thus, a transferee of the landlord's rights, steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. Even though it has been admitted by the respondent that rent for the tenanted premises had been paid to the petitioner, attornment in favour of the new landlord is unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the landlord's rights and there is no such statutory requirement. Reference may be made to the case of Hajee K. Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR 1984 Ker 113. In the case of Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta vs. Vishvanath Bhikaji MogulAIR 1997 SC 2437, it was held that attornment by tenant is not necessary though it is desirable. Mere non-payment of rent by tenant even for a considerably long period does not extinguish the landlord-tenant relationship. The possession of a tenant cannot be adverse to his landlord. The petitioner is therefore, the landlord and owner of the tenanted premises.
n) Reading of the above judgments and the facts put forth in this case along with the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it can be said without doubt that the respondents herein are the tenants of the tenanted premises and the petitioner, being the heir of the original landlady, stepped into the shoes of landlady for the tenanted premises.Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 39 of 66
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29. 2nd & 3rd Issue: The issue of Bona fide need of the petitioner and availability of suitable alternate accommodation are being appreciated together as the facts and evidence are interconnected.
a) First, coming to the question of bona fide need of the petitioner, PW-1 has asserted in her pleadings and the evidence that the tenanted premises is required as she intends to start a jewellery business. As per the petitioner, her husband is a manager in Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers, which is well known jewellery brand, enjoying considerable goodwill and she is desirous of setting up a franchisee of Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers. The petitioner has said that the business of jewellery is founded on product exposure and visibility to prospective customers and therefore, the business heavily relies on product exposure and visibility to prospective customers and since the tenanted premises is located in the main market of Sunder Nagar, which has considerable footfall of high end customers, it is ideal for her business and she has no other suitable alternate accommodation for the said purpose. During her evidence also, PW-1 reiterated the same and additionally explained that the tenanted premises is 18 feet plus with good parking space and covered verandah, which provides additional benefit during summers and rainy season. She further said that at the time of filing of the petition, her children grew old and did not require much attention from her and since her husband already has experience in this field, he will be her constant Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 40 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:53 +0530 source of help and encouragement. The petitioner said that she is educated and she has constantly participated with Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers in their jewellery shows for last 15 years and for 20 years, she has been cued in the said business. She also said that being the landlady, she is the best judge of her requirement and neither the tenant nor the Court can dictate terms on her qua her requirement. To counter her, the respondents alleged that the need reflected is fictitious and the petitioner has filed the petition in order for Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers to expand their business.
As per the respondents, the business of jewellery is ticklish and technical and requires highly skilled people to judge the mineral along with the expertise to understand the trade, which includes knowledge of FEMA, customs, labour laws etc and a certificate from Gem & Jewellery export promotion council and since the petitioner has no such knowledge and know how, her need cannot be said to be bona fide as it clearly indicates her intention to get the premises for Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers. PW-2 also supported the version of petitioner on this aspect and explained that though the petitioner did not deal with customers at Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers and neither was she employed with the said firm but as per PW-2, the petitioner used to accompany him and acted as a consultant in jewellery exhibitions overseas. Even PW-3 corroborated the said submission when these questions were put to him. On the other hand, when RW-1 was questioned on these points during his cross examination, he admitted that jewellers like Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 41 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:50:58 +0530 B.N Jewels and Alok Lodha Jewllers operate in the same vicinity. RW-1 did not know if Gem & Jewellery council was conducting any professional degree courses for the business of jewellery but he said that it does conduct courses for promotion of Gem & Jewellery. The witness however admitted that he himself has no knowledge in handling, procuring or selling of jewellery or, if it was mandatory to have an academic qualification to run such business. He further admitted that his allegation of petitioner not having knowledge to run the business was based on the averment of petitioner in her pleadings that she does not have any qualification from any such institution. PW-2 also said that it may not be mandatory to have any such certificate from Gem & Jewellery council to run the business and that, there is no such age for beginning any business or any requirement to be associated with any business entity to open a franchisee.
b) Now if the version of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 is seen vis a vis the version of RW-1, it would show that the respondent himself admitted that there is no such requirement of a certificate;
association with any business entity or any age to run the business of jewellery, thereby disproving his own allegation made in the pleadings and the evidence. Further, the petitioner explained in detail why the tenanted premises is perfect to start her business and that, with the experience of her husband; her own association in jewellery business and with her current status where she is now Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 42 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:06 +0530 free from the phase of mother hood, the time and place is ideal for her to begin her career.
c) Next, the respondents also questioned the need of the petitioner on the lucrativeness of the franchisee business, as set up by her, by questioning the petitioner and her witness on the soundness of the business of Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers. PW-2 in response said that Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers did not open any new stores in last 10 years as they are very choosy as a brand and his advice to the firm was to go slow in light of slow expansion in the business of jewellery since 2010. Similarly, PW-3 also admitted that since the year 1935, Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers never allowed anyone to use its name or open a franchisee. On the basis of these submissions, the respondents alleged during final arguments that the answers of the witnesses would indicate that till date, no fanchisee is opened by Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers despite other big players in the jewellery business, yet, for some unexplained reason, they have chosen to give their first franchisee to the petitioner. The Ld. Counsel for the petitioner countered these arguments by stating that the profitability of the business of franchiser has no bearing on the prospect of the firm entering into a contract of franchisee. When the said answer of the petitioner is seen with the purpose of franchisee agreement, which in turn provides benefit to the franchiser to generate income by the use of their trade name and know how and, the fact that the witnesses Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 43 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:12 +0530 have categorically explained that Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers is a close family knit business and because the petitioner is a part of their family, the possibility of them agreeing for exploring the said prospect with the petitioner cannot be completely ruled out. Further, consideration on this point in depth by the Court would amount to the Court judging the need of the petitioner and, assessing the existence of such agreement between the petitioner and Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers with viability of such agreement for Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers, which as stated above in Santosh Bhutani's judgment (supra) is impermissible. In order to support the contention that tenant cannot dictate terms on the landlord, the petitioner relied on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Santosh Bhutani and ors. Vs Savitri Devi, RC Rev 251/2020, wherein it was held: "The law is well settled that a tenant cannot dictate to the landlord as to how he should accommodate itself, or dictate to the landlord his choice of accommodation. This position has been reiterated in numerous of judgments of the Supreme Court". The petitioner also relied on the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Manika Rani Ghosh & Anr vs Dharwinder Kaur, RC Rev 512/2012 and Manmohan Singh vs Arjun Uppal, RC Rev 117/2016 to show that the Court cannot examine the viability of the business intended to be explored by the landlord, his/her prior experience or qualification. It was held in both of these judgments:Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 44 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:21 +0530 "It is often contended by the tenants that the landlord has no prior business experience, capacity or that the suit premises are not suitable for the business proposed by the landlord. For instance, similar contentions were raised by the tenants before this Court in the case of Shashi Kant Jain v. Tilak Raj Salooja & Anr., R. C. Rev. 167/2010 and have been refuted. Such allegations whereby the tenant tries to raise questions regarding the age of the landlord or lack of business experience or suitability of the suit shop for the business proposed by the landlord and which are invariably vague do not consist a triable issue. The tenants/petitioners made assertions before the Ld. RC regarding the landlady possessing alternative properties, but were unable to furnish sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate the allegations. There is no dispute that the business cannot be profitably carried from the residential premises and thus, the plea that the landlady could start the business form her residence is untenable. Moreover, it is not for this Court to examine the viability of the business at the suit premises or assess if it may be a profitable venture for the landlady."
"Landlords are not required to possess or to show any prior experience to start a new business and additionally they are also not bound to start the same business. No prior business experience is required by the landlord."
d) A bare reading of the above mentioned judgments along with the facts of the case would show that it is not for the landlady to show her expertise or experience in the field in which she intends to setup her business and it is not even mandatory for her to have a professional qualification. In fact, the law prohibits the assessment by the tenant or the Court about the qualification, profitability and manner in which the landlord should use his premises. The only Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 45 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:26 +0530 onus on the landlord is to show that tenanted premises are required for bona fide use and thus, the said objections raised by the respondents have no bearing on the merits of the case.
e) In addition to this, the respondents also questioned the petitioner witnesses on the area where Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers currently operates from; the alleged dispute of Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers with uncle of PW-2 and whether PW-3 was informed of the other alternate accommodations with the petitioner.
The petitioner and her witnesses clarified that Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers is operating from South Extension part I and there are jewellery shops running from the said area and areas close by, like Defence Colony and outer ring road, including from the first floors. They further clarified that a dispute arose between Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers and uncle of PW-2 wherein the said uncle was restricted to use the name of the firm but it was admitted that the said dispute is still pending. PW-2 and PW-3 also admitted that the suitability of the tenanted premises was ascertained by PW-2 on the basis of his suitability report, which he was authorized to prepare by PW-3, who had the authority to do so being the partner of Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers firm. The Ld. counsel for the respondents made a conjecture that the said answers of the petitioner and her witnesses would show that suitability report is not on record and there is no concrete evidence to say that tenanted premises is the only premises available with the petitioner Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 46 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:31 +0530 to run the alleged business. On careful appreciation of this fact, it can be said that though the suitability report is not on record but again, presence of jewellery shop in the area where Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers operates or the fact that there is some dispute of the firm with one of its family member would not be a ground for the Court to presume that the need reflected by the petitioner is not bona fide, especially considering the fact that relationship of landlady and tenant is proved between the parties. The petition u/s 14 (1) (e) requires the petitioner to claim a premises wherein he/she has a better right than the tenant, and that, the said premises is best suited for her requirement. The petitioner cannot be expected to search for shops in an area where she has no property in her name or be presumed to have connived with PW-2 and 3 only because she expressed her desire to run the business from tenanted premises without permitting Bhagwan Dass Khanna Jewellers to explore all other accommodation available with her at Sunder Nagar. The case setup by the petitioner is that the locality where the tenanted premises is situated and the floor at which it is situated is best suited for her need and thus, the tenant or the Court cannot comment otherwise, unless proved. As, the respondents herein have only raised certain questions on availability of alternate accommodation with the petitioner without proving on the scale of preponderance of probability that such alleged accommodations are equally suited for the need of the petitioner and her agenda behind filing the said petition is to intentionally Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 47 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:36 +0530 evict the respondents male fide from the tenanted premises, the said allegation cannot be accepted at face value without corroborative admissible evidence.
f) Apart the above, the respondents herein have also questioned the bona fide need on the premise that the petitioner and PW-2 and PW-3 are not even aware of the exact site plan of the tenanted premises. The petitioner had brought the original site plan when the copy was objected and the said document was then exhibited as Ex PW-1/2, thus the objection of the counsel for respondents on mode of proof was rectified by the petitioner at this stage. As far the admissibility is concerned, PW-1 admitted that she saw the premises from outside but she could not remember as to who prepared the site plan and whether he saw the premises from inside.
She however said that as per her knowledge, Ex PW-1/2 is correct but she couldn't say how many rooms/ cabin/ bathroom etc were in the premises. PW-2 was also examined on the said point and he admitted that he did not see the tenanted premises from inside but he gave the suitability report as sought by PW-3. The said report was asked to be shown by the respondents but PW-2 said that the same is not on record. PW-3 also admitted that he never visited the tenanted premises as he had sent PW-2 to see the same and prepare the report. The witnesses were also questioned about their knowledge qua sealing of first and second floor of the tenanted premises and issuance of show cause notice by MCD for sealing of Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 48 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:51:41 +0530 the tenanted premises. While PW-2 and PW-3 said they were not informed about the same by the petitioner, the petitioner said that she was not brought into knowledge about any such alleged sealing and to the best of her knowledge, the tenanted premises received the notice due to non payment of statutory taxes. PW-1 also denied that the site plan filed by the respondent no.1 is the correct site plan.
g) The Ld. Counsel for respondent argued that since the site plan of petitioner was not reliable, the site plan relied by respondent is admissible. Mark R1 is a copy of the site plan prepared by the respondent and not obtained from official site plans prepared by the concerned authority and therefore, the onus was still on the respondent to show that Mark R1 in such case is admissible.
However, if for the sake of argument, Mark R1 is considered, it would still not prove that need of the petitioner is fictitious as her bona fide need is not based on the interior of the shop but the location, parking, kind of customers and visibility. To elaborate, the petitioner and her witnesses were questioned on interior of the premises; who was in possession of remaining floors of the tenanted premises and, the alleged alternate accommodation in order to show that the petitioner wasn't aware of the details of the tenanted premises and falsely alleged the bona fide need only to fraudulently dispossess the respondents. During cross examination, petitioner, PW-2 and PW-3 answered these questions wherein, all Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 49 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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three of them admitted that they did not visit the tenanted premises from inside but PW-1 did clarify that she has been visiting the premises regularly since 2010 and saw it from outside. Further, PW-3 also admitted that he did not visit 10 Sunder Nagar but he also clarified that he authorized PW-2 to do so. As stated above, PW-2 also admitted that he did not visit the tenanted premises from inside nor did he know who was in possession of the first floor of the said property or if jewellery shops were being run from the first floor at Sunder Nagar but whether the said answers are sufficient to raise doubts is a question yet to be decided?
h) The petitioner, PW-2 and PW-3 were also questioned on the remaining floors at 16 Sunder Nagar/ Tenanted premises and at 10 Sunder Nagar. The petitioner admitted that she owns the first and second floor of property bearing number 10 Sunder Nagar as well, which ad measures 850 sq yards, however, she said that she is not the owner as the ground floor is jointly owned by Mr Atul Khanna, who is her cousin and one Mr Amit Khanna. The petitioner admitted that the remaining two floors of 10 Sunder Nagar are in her possession and are vacant and she regularly visits the premises but she wasn't aware of status of ground floor. She also denied that entire ground, first and second floor of the said property was given to one Devna, who is allegedly running a guest house from there. She further denied the suggestion that ground floor of the said property was owned by her mother or that PW-3 never saw the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 50 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:51:51 +0530 tenanted premises. Similarly, for Tenanted premises, the petitioner explained that it is constructed in two and a half floors and the first and half of second floor is in possession of one Mr Sanjay Narang and Rachna Narang, who are also her tenants for commercial purpose against whom, she has already initiated proceedings for eviction due to non payment of rent. PW-2 corroborated the version of PW-1 qua the owners of ground floor of 10 Sunder Nagar and that, PW-1 is also the owner of 10 Sunder Nagar but he wasn't aware who was in possession of first floor of 16 Sunder Nagar/ tenanted premises or ground floor of 10 Sunder Nagar. PW-3 on the other hand said that the authorization of visiting the tenanted premises was given to PW-2 and since he wasn't concerned with the remaining floors of the tenanted premises or of 10 Sunder nagar, therefore, he wasn't aware of the owners or who was in possession. Now, when all these answers are appreciated, it can be seen that the intent of the respondents is to show that the petitioner and her witnesses never visited the tenanted premises or saw it from inside and therefore, the need projected for bona fide requirement cannot be considered as they are themselves not aware of the dimensions of the property, its current status and whether it will be suitable for the alleged business of PW-1. Logically, the inference being drawn by the respondents cannot be said to be completely out of picture, however, the said logic, as per law, is required to be supported with evidence. The answers given by the witnesses to these questions are actually on the conjectures raised Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 51 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:51:57 +0530 by the respondents and in order to rely on them, the respondents should have furnished some proof that the first and second floor of the tenanted premises is sealed,; there is a subsisting notice for sealing the tenanted premises itself or that the tenanted premises is not of size or at an area suitable for the business alleged by the petitioner. RW-1 appeared as a witness and he had an opportunity to prove these allegations but during his cross examination, he said that his knowledge about the availability of 10 Sunder Nagar as alternate accommodation is based on information gathered from local source, thereby implying that the allegation is actually hearsay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi vs Ashutosh Agnihotri & Anr, AIR 2011 SC 760 held that:
" 18.The word `evidence' is used in common parlance in three different senses : (a) as equivalent to relevant (b) as equivalent to proof and (c) as equivalent to the material, on the basis of which courts come to a conclusion about the existence or non-existence of disputed facts. Though, in the definition of the word "evidence" given in Section 3 of the Evidence Act one finds only oral and documentary evidence, this word is also used in phrases such as : best evidence, circumstantial evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence, secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial evidence, etc. The idea of best evidence is implicit in the Evidence Act. Evidence under the Act, consists of statements made by a witness or contained in a document. If it is a case of oral evidence, the Act requires that only that person who has actually perceived something by that sense, by which it is capable of perception, should make the statement about it and no one else. If it is documentary Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 52 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 16:52:04 2025.11.18 +0530 evidence, the Evidence Act requires that ordinarily the original should be produced, because a copy may contain omissions or mistakes of a deliberate or accidental nature. These principles are expressed in Sections 60 and 64 of the Evidence Act.....19.The term `hearsay' is used with reference to what is done or written as well as to what is spoken and in its legal sense, it denotes that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person. The word `hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say. Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else and sometimes it is treated as nearly synonymous with irrelevant. The sayings and doings of third person are, as a rule, irrelevant, so that no proof of them can be admitted. Every act done or spoken which is relevant on any ground must be proved by someone who saw it with his own eyes and heard it with his own ears.....21.Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person, whose statement is relied upon, into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross- examination. The phrase "hearsay evidence" is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under the Indian Law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted. That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross-examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 53 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:52:09 +0530 better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind of a Judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practiced with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible...22.The reasons why hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence are: (a) the person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility, i.e., every witness must give his testimony, under such circumstance, as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying "I do not know, but so and so told me", (b) truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition and (c) if permitted, gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying "someone told me that...........". It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus statement of witnesses based on information received from others is inadmissible."
i) The ratio laid down in the above judgment, when applied to the allegations of the respondents would show that all these allegations could not reach the status of proved pieces of evidence as they fell within the ambit of hearsay evidence. Hence, in the absence of any such supporting document, the material on record only suggests that the petitioner and PW-2 did not see the shop from inside but as per the case of PW-1, her requirement stands satisfied from the tenanted premises due to its location along with the availability of parking space. Thus, the objections raised on site plan and the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 54 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:52:15 +0530 alleged availability of alternate accommodation do not stand proved by the respondents.
j) It is also apt to mention that Section 14 (1) (e) DRC deals with bona fide need of the landlord, which in the facts of this case has been explained by the petitioner in her petition. To say that absence of suitability report of PW-2 on record or that the premises were not seen from inside by PW-2 or PW-3 or that other jewellery shops were operating from different floors in the same area, cannot be said to be basis on which the bona fide need of the petitioner should be adjudicated. All these factors are only relevant for the case of the respondent to show that bona fide need has not been proved but as mentioned above, without any concrete proof, statements by themselves cannot grant benefit to the respondents.
In the present case, PW-1 has sought the tenanted premises to start her business by collaborating with PW-3 and the unique selling point in the proposal of PW-1 to PW-3, as can be seen from the petition, is the location at Sunder Nagar Main Market along with the fact that the tenanted premises is situated on the ground floor; the area is visited by high end customers with good footfall and there is parking space available. If after assessing these things, PW-3 was willing to explore the opportunity of business with PW-1, filing of assessment report or detailed inspection of tenanted premises from inside or, the knowledge of petitioner and her witnesses qua the alleged notice of sealing etc wouldn't mean that Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 55 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:52:34 +0530 bona fide need of the petitioner stands disproved. The need of the petitioner has to be seen as per her requirement and neither the tenant nor the Court can say that just because jewellery shop were allegedly operating from other floors, the need of the petitioner is not bona fide. In any case, since all these conjectures were not admitted by the petitioner and her witnesses and their stand had been firm throughout that the tenanted premises was the one required by the petitioner and agreed upon by PW-3, the allegations of the respondents cannot be said to be proved.
k) On the same lines, the respondents also questioned Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6 relied upon by the petitioner and alleged that these letters are doctored only to fraudulently substantiate the alleged need of petitioner. As per the respondents, if these letters are seen, it would show that PW-3, in reply to the query raised by the petitioner to start the business, she has mentioned about availability of shop no.10, Sunder Nagar and not the tenanted premises, however, surprisingly, in response to the offer, PW-2 and 3 confirmed to have seen the tenanted premises and approved it. The respondents have alleged that this itself shows that the letters are manipulated and they have been filed as self serving evidence to support the case of the petitioner. As per the respondents, in Ex PW-1/5, there is no typographical error in the property number as had that been the case, the petitioner or PW-2 or PW-3 would have clarified the same at some point time of time. The Ld. Counsel for Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 56 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:52:39 +0530 the respondents stressed upon the fact that in the present case, pleadings took years to complete and the petitioner was given opportunity to amend the petition, yet the alleged typographical error was never clarified and it is only after 9 years, that too during the stage of evidence when the petitioner and her witnesses were cross examined, the said statement was given. To support his argument, the Ld. Counsel pointed out the cross examination of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 wherein PW-2 and PW-3 admitted that the said clarification is not a part of their affidavit in chief.
l) The submission of counsel for respondents has raised objection on the mode of proof and admissibility of these letters, which requires appreciation by the Court. It is correct that the submission qua typographical error did come for the first time during evidence but then, it cannot be forgotten that the evidence is not be read in isolation but with the contents of petition. In the petition, the tenanted premises is described as 16 Sunder Nagar and in Ex PW-1/6, PW-3 confirmed to have seen 16 Sunder Nagar. The clarification furnished is that the error was discussed verbally between the parties after which, the tenanted premises were seen.
The case put forth by the petitioner is that since she and PW-3 confirmed the exchange of Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6, they being the authors of the document have furnished primary evidence and thus, non filing of postal receipts or answering the said question at the stage of cross examination does not disprove her case. The Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 57 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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principle on primary and secondary evidence (supra), as discussed above would show that the best piece of evidence is primary evidence. Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6 are filed in original, though the mode of proof of Ex PW-1/4 and Ex PW-1/6 was objected. The respondents alleged that these letters were never exchanged and therefore no postal receipts exist due to which they have not been filed. The petitioner and her witnesses denied the said allegation and to counter the same, the Ld. Counsel for petitioner argued during final arguments that the sender and recipient of these letters have admitted the factum of exchange of letters, which as per the rules of evidence satisfies the rule of best piece of evidence and, they being the authors can prove the creation of document as well as its contents, thus non filing of postal receipt has no bearing on mode of proof and admissibility of these documents.As per the Ld. Counsel, postal receipt only creates a presumption that letter was sent but it does not prove the contents, which in this case has anyway been done by PW-1 and PW-3. To support this contention, the Ld. Counsel relied on the judgment passed by The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Shri Hari Prakash vs Delhi Development Authority, decided on 15.02.2017:
" Despite the fact that DDA has not filed any postal receipt, AD Card in respect of above communications, these have admittedly been received by the appellant/plaintiff and duly responded. Exhibit PW-1/4, the relinquishment deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff has been executed in the year 2005 i.e. after about 17 years of death of recommendee Sh.Udai Singh....The documentary evidence placed on record by the Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 58 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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parties clearly established that it was not a case of 'no communication' to the recommendee or his legal heirs about the allotments made by the DDA under the policy....In view of deposition of PW-1 in para No.5 of the affidavit wherein all the allotments have been duly mentioned and his cross examination that the notice Ex.PW1/10 was received by elder member of the family, presumption of service of the communications can be drawn under Section 114(f) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It may also be noted that the appellant/plaintiff failed to rebut this presumption by leading any evidence to the contrary."
m) As per the Ld. Counsel, the above judgment clarifies that by way of presumption under section 114 of Evidence act and the admission of PW-1 and PW-3 qua the exchange of letters, the allegation that non filing of postal receipt altogether disproves the existence of these letters cannot be accepted. The Ld. Counsel for the respondent was specifically asked by the Court if he is relying on any supporting law to show that non filing of postal receipts would mean that communication altogether can be discarded but he failed to file any such judgment. In such circumstance, since the creator of the documents admitted the creation and the contents, it cannot be said that Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6 are inadmissible. Further, the subsequent explanation of typographical error in the cross examination; the fact that Ex PW-1/6 confirms that premises explored was 16 Sunder Nagar along with the fact that petition is filed for the said premises, proves the contention of the petitioner that requirement discussed with PW-3 was for the tenanted premises.
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Mohal Goel & Ors
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SHILPI SINGH
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n) In addition to above, if the evidence of PW-2 is seen, it would
show that during his cross examination, he was never questioned on Ex PW-1/6 and, the only question was that 16 Sunder Nagar is nowhere mentioned in Ex PW-1/3 and Ex PW-1/5. PW-2 and PW-3, both denied the suggestion that these letters are fabricated and PW-3 additionally clarified that the said typographical mistake was informed by PW-1 verbally. Both PW-2 and PW-3 were then questioned on their relation with PW-1 by respondent no.1 to examine how the alleged verbal communication was made. PW-2 said that he and his wife/PW-1 and, PW-3 stay on the same address and they used to have common kitchen till 1995. The said statement was also confirmed by PW-3 and he further clarified that he used to meet PW-1 on a day to day basis, for almost half an hour to one hour and they used to discuss business and family matters. When all these answers are read with Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6, it cannot be ruled out that there is a possibility that the alleged typographical error could have been clarified by PW-1 to PW-3 in their day to day meeting at their common house, after which, PW-3 confirmed the tenanted premises to suit his need in Ex PW-1/6. To presume otherwise, the respondents should have filed some evidence or a judgment to show that a cumulative reading of the letters with the pleadings, which are proved through the authors of these letters is not reliable as an answer to the alleged typographical error.
Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 60 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors
Digitally
signed by
SHILPI SHILPI SINGH
Date:
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16:52:58
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o) The petitioner has proved through admissible evidence that she is the landlady of the tenanted premises. She has also proved the communication made between her and PW-3 through Ex PW-1/3 to Ex PW-1/6 and therefore, a presumption exists in her favour for the bona fide need explained in the petition. Under DRC, rent controller cannot presume that the landlord does not require the premises for bona fide need as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sarla Ahuja vs United India Insurance Company Ltd dated 27 October, 1998:
" The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fide of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."
p) The above judgment reiterates the principle that need of the landlord cannot be questioned on conjectures raised by the tenant as a strong presumption is raised in his/her favour and it is for the tenant to prove that the need projected is not bona fide.
Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 61 of 66Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 2025.11.18 16:53:03 +0530 Unsupported allegations cannot in any circumstance help the tenant rebut this presumption. The afctual matrix would show that the respondent in this case though filed Annexure A to Annexure F but during evidence, RW-1 admitted that original receipts for alleged payment of rent by the company by way of cheques and the proof petitions filed u/s 27 DRC Act is not available with him. Remaining documents relied are photocopies, which are not even certified and according to the discussion made above with respect to admissibility of primary and secondary evidence, these petitions are also not admissible. Furthermore, if benefit is given to the respondents that previously also, petitions were filed by original landlady against them, like suit bearing no. 441/2002 for recovery of rent; Eviction petition bearing number 63/2008 u/s 14 (1) (b) DRC and an injunction suit by the petitioner herself before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, it would automatically not bar filing of the present petition against the respondents, unless the previous one's were decided on merit and the circumstances did not change. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held in Sandeep Kumar vs Nihal Chand, pronounced on 10 October, 2025:
" Similarly, the filing/ rejection of similar eviction petitions inter se the same parties and involving the very same subject premises are also insignificant as the reason(s)/ cause(s) for eviction may be a factor for consideration, but it is dependent upon the facts and circumstances involved in a given case, and thus has to be decided accordingly. This is because each of the said factors, especially the requirement of a landlord, the timeline and the changing reason(s), being not static, are recurring and evolving. Another relevant factor is that there is Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 62 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI Date:
SINGH SINGH 16:53:08 2025.11.18 +0530 also no bar of any kind in the DRC Act which precludes any landlord like the one involved herein from initiating fresh eviction proceeding on such grounds. The dismissal of a prior eviction petition, and that too whence the landlord sought possession of the subject premises on a different ground, did not ipso facto close the doors to the landlord for filing another eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act like the present one later on, for all times to come, which would in effect result in making the tenant supreme. Therefore, if in the subsequent proceeding, if the requirement of the landlord is established to be bona fide, honest, fair and worthy, eviction order shall follow. Reliance in this regard is placed upon N.R. Narayan Swamy v. B. Francis Jagan33, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- "6. In our view, the High Court ought to have considered the fact that in eviction proceedings under the Rent Act the ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent is a recurring cause and, therefore, landlord is not precluded from instituting fresh proceeding. In an eviction suit on the ground of bona fide requirement the genuineness of the said ground is to be decided on the basis of requirement on the AIR 2001 SC 2469 date of the suit. Further, even if a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is filed and is dismissed it cannot be held that once a question of necessity is decided against the landlord he will not have bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. In the subsequent proceedings, if such claim is established by cogent evidence adduced by the landlord, decree for possession could be passed."
q) Lastly, coming to the contention of the respondent on the ground of comparative hardship, they said that for commercial property, their right towards livelihood is required to be kept in mind while passing an order. Perusal of the cross examination of RW-1 would show that he admitted running a sister concern of respondent no.3, Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 63 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date: SINGH 2025.11.18 16:53:14 +0530 thereby implying that his livelihood is not solely dependant on location of respondent no.3 at the tenanted premises. In any case, the said principle was considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Bosco Joseph vs. Raj Kumar, RC Rev 259/2016 and the Hon'ble Court held:
"17. Unlike a few of the Rent Control statutes where comparative hardship is one of the tests that a Rent Controller applies, under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, there is no test of comparative requirement. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, all that has to be shown is that the tenanted premises is bona fide required by the Landlord or by any member of the family who is dependent on the Landlord for the said premises or that other member of the family for whose benefit the premises is sought for is dependent on him and no other reasonably suitable accommodation is available. There is no test of comparative hardship in the Delhi Rent Control Act....."
r) Next, coming to the submission of the respondents that during the course of tenancy, since they covered the courtyard at their expense, it essentially meant creation of perpetual lease in their favour, it can be seen that the petitioner admitted during her cross examination that when the tenancy was created, the tenanted premises consisted of one shop with open back courtyard and later, when Ex PW-1/1 was executed, the respondents expressed their desire to cover the back courtyard upto first floor, which was permitted by the original landlady. The expense for construction is also admitted to be borne by the respondents themselves, however, to say that a tenant, who has admitted his status to be that of the tenant is entitled to claim possession for eternity belies logic and Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 64 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH Date:
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good faith. Admittedly, the respondents wanted to cover the open courtyard and since the original landlady at that time had no need for the premises, she permitted them to do so. The original landlady merely agreed to the request of the tenants who were in possession and since they wanted to do the construction for their need, it was agreed that they will bear the expense but to say that by construction, which they did willingly, they get a right on the tenanted premises for perpetuity is unimaginable.
s) The respondents have also said that DRC was created for bona fide need of the landlord for residential purpose and thus, recovery cannot be made for commercial usage. The said contention has been laid to rest by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By Lrs vs Union Of India & Another, AIR 2008 SC 3148:
"In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only."Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 65 of 66
Mohal Goel & Ors Digitally signed by SHILPI SHILPI SINGH SINGH Date:
2025.11.18 16:53:25 +0530 RELIEF:
30. Thus, in light of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner has successfully proved the relationship of landlady and tenant between her and the respondents, along with her bona fide need for the tenanted premises. Accordingly, issue no.1 and 2 are decided in her favour. The respondents on the other hand failed to prove that the petitioner has any alternate suitable accommodation and therefore, issue no.3 is decided against them. The respondents are consequently directed to vacate the tenanted premises I.e one shop along with covered courtyard on the ground floor of property bearing number 16, Sunder Nagar Market, New Delhi.
31. The above said order shall however not be executed before expiry of six months from the date of the order.
32. Parties to bear their respective cost.
33. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by SHILPISHILPI SINGH Date: SINGH 2025.11.18 16:53:31 +0530 Announced in the open Court (SHILPI SINGH) on 18.11.2025 ACJ-CCJ-ARC/South, Saket Court/Delhi Eviction Petition No. 76/2010 Ms Preeti Khanna vs Mukesh Page 66 of 66 Mohal Goel & Ors