Kerala High Court
National Insurance Company Limited vs Prashanth(Died) on 30 October, 2024
2024:KER:80595
MACA 3206/2021
1
"C.R"
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.
TH
WEDNESDAY, THE 30 DAY OF OCTOBER 2024 / 8TH KARTHIKA, 1946
MACA NO. 3206 OF 2021
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 31.03.2021 IN OPMV NO.1707 OF
2017 OF IV ADDITIONAL MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM.
APPELLANT/3RD RESPONDENT IN O.P.(MV):
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
HOSPITAL ROAD, KOLLAM, REPRESENTED BY ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER(LEGAL), KOCHI REGIONAL
OFFICE, OMANA BUILDING, NEW STREET,
KOCHI - 682 035.
BY ADVS.
P.G.JAYASHANKAR
P.K.RESHMA (KALARICKAL)
REVATHY P. MANOHARAN
S.RAJEEV
ANNS THANKU PAUL
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 IN O.P.(MV):
1 PRASHANTH(DIED)
S/O.RAJENDRA PRASAD, PUTHENVEETTIL VILA, SARADA
MUKKU, OONNIMOODU, POOTHAKULAM, KOLLAM - 691 302
REPRESENTED BY SOLE LEGAL HEIR (THE 2ND
RESPONDENT).
2 BABY
AGED 51 YEARS
W/O.RAJENDRA PRASAD, PUTHENVEETTIL VILA, SARADA
MUKKU, OONNIMOODU, POOTHAKULAM, KOLLAM - 691 302.
2024:KER:80595
MACA 3206/2021
2
3 MURALEEDHARA KURUP
S/O.BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, SOPANAM, PUNNAIKULAM,
POTHAKULAM, PARAVOOR, KOLLAM - 691 302.
4 ANANDU MURALI
S/O.MURALEEDHARA KURUP, SOPANAM, PUNNAKULAM,
POOTHAKULAM, PARAVOOR, KOLLAM - 691 302.
BY ADVS.
M.KIRANLAL
K.SIJU
ANJANA KANNATH
MANU RAMACHANDRAN
T.S.SARATH
R.RAJESH (VARKALA)
SAMEER M NAIR
V.M.VISHNU MOHAN
GEETHU KRISHNAN
HARSHA SUSAN SAM
THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
04.10.2024, THE COURT ON 30.10.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2024:KER:80595
MACA 3206/2021
3
"C.R"
EASWARAN S., J
..................................................
MACA No.3206 of 2021
..........................................
Dated this the 30th day of October, 2024
JUDGMENT
The appeal is preferred by the Insurance Company aggrieved by the Award dated 31.03.2021 in O.P. (MV)No.1707 of 2017 on the files of the IV th Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kollam.
2. The brief facts for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: The respondents 1 and 2 are the claimants in O.P. (MV)No.1707 of 2017. The 2 nd respondent is the mother of deceased Prasanth. On 17.06.2017 at 5 p.m, when Prasanth was travelling on a motorcycle bearing Registration No.KL-02- AX-4851 from west to east direction through Puthakulam - Oonninmoodu Junction, he fell down due to the veer off his motorcycle. In the meantime, another motorcycle bearing Registration No.KL-02-Z-9662 driven by the 2nd 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 4 respondent/4th respondent in the appeal in a rash and negligent manner came from east to west direction and hit the victim and ran over through his neck. Though Prasanth was taken to Medical College at Parippally, he was shifted to Ananthapuri Hospital for a specialised treatment. Later he was admitted to Medical College Hospital, Kollam, on 29.07.2017 and was an inpatient up to 16.09.2017 and on 16.01.2018, he died due to the grievous injuries sustained in the accident. The Paravur Police registered a case against the 2nd respondent/4th respondent in the appeal.
3. The Insurance Company contested the claim before the Tribunal by filing a written statement stating that the accident happened at a spot which was 1.74 metres north from the southern tar end of the road, which was having a total width of 5.5 meters and therefore, it was obvious that the deceased was negligent while driving the motorcycle resulting in the accident. The claimants contended that the deceased Prasanth was employed in Qatar as a Marble Technician. The total income of the deceased was claimed at 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 5 Rs.30,000/- per month. Exts.A1 to A29 were produced on the side of the claimants. RW1 was examined on the side of the respondents. The Tribunal on the analysis of the evidence on record, concluded that there was no negligence on the side of the deceased and thus rejected the contention of the Insurance Company. The Tribunal based on the documents on record which proved that the deceased was having a residency permit in Qatar came to the conclusion that Rs.30,000/- is the monthly income of the deceased and accordingly fixed the compensation granting Rs.57,78,756/- in total. Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company has come up in appeal.
4. Heard P.G.Jayashankar - learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.M.Kiranlal - learned counsel for the claimants.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant raised the following submissions:
i. The income fixed by the Tribunal at Rs.30,000/- is without any basis. No evidence is available before the 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 6 Tribunal to conclude that the deceased was earning Rs.30,000/- per month as a Marble Technician.
ii. The Tribunal erred egregiously in fastening the liability on the appellant - insurer, especially since the deceased was also equally negligent in driving the motorcycle that resulted in the accident.
iii. In so far as the age of the deceased is concerned, admittedly, the deceased had crossed the age of 25 and hence the multiplier taken by the Tribunal is incorrect and the correct multiplier to be taken was '17'.
iv. The interest awarded by the Tribunal is also exorbitant.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants submitted that the income fixed by the Tribunal is perfectly correct. The evidence before the Tribunal showed that the deceased was having a residency permit in Qatar and also the details of the visa also disclosed that he was a Marble Technician in Qatar. Even in the absence of any evidence to show that he was earning a monthly income of 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 7 Rs.30,000/-, the Tribunal is justified in fixing the income, since the income of the Marble Technician cannot be equated with that of a person working in the State. In so far as the multiplier applied is concerned, the learned counsel for the claimants submitted that, going by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC)], the Tribunal had correctly applied the multiplier and hence no interference is called for.
7. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar.
8. In so far as the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, this Court will have to necessarily see as to whether the finding of the Tribunal fixing the income of the deceased at Rs.30,000/- is correct or not. The learned counsel for the appellant started his argument by pointing out that the application filed before the Tribunal, in which the income was claimed at Rs.20,000/- per month. However, on a perusal of the records, it is evident that in the 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 8 application, necessary corrections were effected in the column which evidenced the details of income and it is shown as Rs.30,000/-. Though the learned counsel raised serious dispute with regard to the manner in which the said correction was effected without proper notice to the Insurance Company, this Court is not impressed by the aforesaid argument. It is to be noted that, irrespective of the income which is claimed by the claimants in their application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act ,1988, it is always open for the Tribunal to fix an appropriate income based on which the compensation is to be calculated. Therefore, this Court finds no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company, in so far as the correction of the figures made in the application before the Tribunal.
9. Having said so, this Court will have to necessarily see whether the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased was earning Rs.30,000/- was correct or not. It is to be noted that the mother of the deceased had preferred the application. While preferring the application, all possible documents which 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 9 were available with them have been produced before the Tribunal. Ext.A24 is the copy of the visa dated 28.09.2015, Ext.A25 is the original passport, Ext.A26 is the residency permit and Ext.A28 is also a copy of the residential identity. These documents unequivocally prove that the deceased was working in Qatar and he had come to his native place and at that point of time, the accident occurred. Even otherwise, the documents as stated above would necessarily show that he was working as a Marble Technician in a reputed company in Qatar.
10. Now coming to the question of fixation of the notional income of the deceased, it is now settled that while preferring claim petitions before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the claimants may not be in a position to state precisely the monthly income which the deceased was drawing at the time of the accident. If the Courts and Tribunals are to insist on strict proof regarding the proof of income, then necessarily the claimants cannot sustain their plea before the Tribunal. Therefore, considering the salutary 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 10 principles enshrined while granting the compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, this Court has no hesitation to hold that strict proof of evidence need not be insisted on the side of the claimants to prove their notional income.
11. Having found that the deceased was working as a Marble Technician in Qatar, what should be the notional income to be fixed in the case of the deceased has to be considered by this Court. The learned counsel for the claimants placed before this Court a notification issued by the State of Kerala under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for the year 2016. The said notification reveals that, in so far as a skilled worker is concerned, an amount of Rs.604/- is fixed as a minimum wage for a day. If 26 days is calculated then necessarily the notional income would come to nearly Rs.15,704/-. However, the learned counsel for the claimants further pointed out that the notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, in respect of a skilled worker in the State, has been produced only for a comparative 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 11 assessment of the minimum wage that is applicable in the State. The same may not be however taken as sacrosanct for the purpose of fixing the notional income of a skilled worker working abroad. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the minimum wage applicable for a skilled worker in Qatar which was valid up to March 2021. The notification which has been placed for consideration of this Court reveals that the minimum wage which is applicable to the skilled workers in Qatar is 1000 QAR per month. Along with it 500 QAR is also granted as house allowance and 300 QAR as food allowance, thus totalling to 1800 QAR. The learned counsel for the claimant submits that if the same is converted to Indian rupees, approximately the amount would be nearly 40,000. The learned counsel further added that these materials were placed before this Court only to have a comparative assessment of the notional income which was prevailing in the State of Kerala and as well as in Qatar.
12. It is pertinent to mention that the minimum wages payable in Qatar during 2017-2024 remained as 1800 and 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 12 when converted to Indian Rupee it comes to 40,729. This is the exact point which the Learned Counsel for the claimants wanted to buttress. On a cumulative assessment of the aforesaid contentions, this Court is of the considered opinion that, since the claimants having undoubtedly proved the occupation of the deceased Prasanth. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company that there is no evidence to prove that he was working as a Marble Technician, cannot be accepted. The necessary corollary is that the notional income has to be fixed in respect of a skilled worker who is working abroad, in terms of the minimum wages applicable to that country. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in fixing the amount considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no illegality or impropriety in the finding rendered by the Tribunal that the deceased was drawing a monthly income of Rs.30,000/-. Therefore this Court holds that whenever the question of fixation of notional income of a 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 13 person working abroad arises before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunals, the tribunals should not calculate income based on the minimum wages applicable in the state but should necessarily fix the notional income corresponding to the minimum wages prevalent in the country where the claimant or the deceased as the case may be was working. If such rates are not available then the endeavour of the tribunals should always be to fix a reasonable amount well above the minimum wages prevalent in the state. To hold otherwise would be a complete injustice to the cause.
13. In so far as the second contention of the appellant is concerned, this Court has to consider whether the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the deceased. No doubt the Insurance Company had raised this point in their written statement. It was further contended that the accident occurred at a point 1.74 metres north from the southern tar end of the road, which was having a width of 5.5 metres and therefore, prima facie, it showed negligence on the part of the deceased. However, it is pertinent to note that no evidence 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 14 was adduced on the side of the Insurance Company to prove the said fact. Even otherwise, at the best, it could be concluded that the deceased was overtaking while he was driving. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Lal Anand and Others v. Narendra Kumar and Others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1900] held that merely because a person was overtaking at the time of the accident, that by itself will not constitute negligence on his side. Following the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has to be concluded that no negligence can be attributed on the side of the deceased.
14. Going forward to the next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal ought not have adopted a multiplier of '18' since the deceased had already crossed the age of 25, it is to be noted that the date of birth of the deceased is 09.08.1991 and the accident was on 17.06.2017. Therefore, admittedly, as on the date of the accident, the deceased had not completed the age of 26. However, the learned counsel further pointed out that for applying the table of multiplier as fixed by the Hon'ble 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 15 Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (supra), the deceased need not have attained the age of 26 at the time of the accident. It is sufficient that if he has completed the age of 25, the multiplier changes. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of Rajasthan and Others [(1986) 4 SCC 59], Shashikala and Ors v. Gangalakshmamma and Ors [(2015) 9 SCC 150] and judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Soniayamma Mathew and Others v. Pandi Raja and Others [Neutral citation: 2017/KER/15338]. The decision of this Court, either to accept the findings of the Tribunal, or to interfere with the same, in so far as fixation of the multiplier is concerned, will ultimately depend upon the applicability of the judgments cited across the Bar by the learned counsel for the appellant.
15. In Prabhu Dayal Sesma (supra), the question arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards the attainment of age of the appellant for the recruitment to the 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 16 Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955. In terms of the conditions of eligibility, an applicant should have attained the age of 21, but not attained the age of 28 on the first day of the August of the year. By following the provisions of Section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in computing the age of a person, the day on which he was born is to be included as whole day and he shall be deemed to have attained the majority, if he falls within the first paragraph of Section 3, at the beginning of the 21 st anniversary of that day and if he falls within the second paragraph of Section 3 at the beginning of 18 th anniversary of that date. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a legal day commences 12 O'clock midnight continues until the same hour the following night. Following the aforesaid interpretation it was held that the appellant therein, who was born in 02.01.1956, had attained the age of 28 years at the midnight of 12 O'clock on 01.01.1984. On the next day i.e. 02.01.1984, the appellant would be one day more than 28 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 17 years, thereby disentitling him to be considered for selection.
16. In Shashikala (supra), an exactly similar issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide on the applicability of the table of multiplier formulated by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (supra). Paragraph 17 of the said judgment reads as under.
"The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia inserting Section 163A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163A of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of Rs.3,000/- to Rs.40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs.40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the application is under section 163A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs.40,000/-, by applying the formula :
(2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability are excluded when the claim is under section 163A of MV Act. There are however discrepancies/errors in the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule Table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for cases where 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 18 a higher multiplier of 18 is applicable and a larger compensation with reference to cases where a lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is applicable. From the quantum of compensation specified in the table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the `multiplier' figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 & 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5. Another noticeable incongruity is, having prescribed the notional minimum income of non-earning persons as Rs.15,000/- per annum, the table prescribes the compensation payable even in cases where the annual income ranges between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12000/-. This leads to an anomalous position in regard to applications under Section 163A of MV Act, as the compensation will be higher in cases where the deceased was idle and not having any income, than in cases where the deceased was honestly earning an income ranging between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12,000/- per annum. Be that as it may. "
A reading of the above paragraph leaves no room for doubt regarding the calculation of the age for the applicability of the multiplier. Even in the case at hand before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the date of birth of the deceased as 16.06.1961 and having crossed 45 years, five months and 28 days, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the High Court having adopted the multiplier for the age of 45 instead of 46.
17. In Soniyamma Mathew (supra), however, a Division Bench considered the impact of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shashikala (supra) and held 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 19 otherwise. Paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Division Bench reads as under.
"The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the grievance of the claimants are two-fold. The first one is that the Tribunal ought to have adopted the multiplier '15', instead of '14'. Reliance is sought to be placed on paragraph 16 of the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in Shashikala and Others v. Gangalakshmamma ((2015) 9 SCC 150), which is extracted below :
"Insofar as appropriate multiplier, the date of birth of the deceased as per driving licence was 16.6.1961. On the date of accident, ie., 14.12.2006 the deceased was aged 45 years 5 months and 28 days and the Tribunal has taken the age as 46 years. Since the deceased has completed only 45 years, the High Court has rightly taken the age of the deceased as 45 years and adopted multiplier of '14' which is the appropriate multiplier and the same is maintained. Total loss of dependency is calculated at Rs.16,82,310/-."
On going through the said verdict, this Court is of the view that the said decision does not come to the rescue of the appellants/petitioners as to any declaration of law to the effect that, even if a person has crossed the age of 25, 30, 35, 40 as the case may be, the appropriate multiplier has to be reckoned as applicable upto reaching that age. The admitted fact remains that the deceased has crossed the age of 40 years and he was running on 41 years. The higher multiplier '15' is applicable only upto the stage of reaching 40 years. Since the deceased had crossed the age of 40, the appropriate multiplier can only be '14' and not '15'. The course pursued by the Tribunal does not warrant any interference." The learned counsel for the Insurance Company vehemently pointed out that, going by the judgment of the Division Bench, the finding of the Tribunal that the multiplier to be applied is '18' cannot be sustained. Since the Division Bench 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 20 had considered the impact of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shashikala (supra), according to the learned counsel the principles laid down by the Division Bench has to be followed.
18. At first blush, the said argument may be appealing. However, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has its own drawbacks. This Court must notice that even going by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma (supra) and also going by the judgment in Shashikala (supra), the irresistible conclusion that is possible is that the person cannot be said to have attained a particular age unless he crosses 12 O'clock in the midnight. On applying the said ratio, and also taking note of the fact that the date of birth of the deceased was 09.08.1991, unless he crosses 12 O'clock in the midnight on 19.08.2017, he will not attain 26 years.
19. An incongruous situation will arise if the argument of the learned counsel for the insurance company is accepted. There would be vacuum at ages of 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 21 65 in selecting the multiplier. This exactly was the point dealt by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Meera P.O. and another v. Ananda P.Naik and others [2022 (1) KHC 591]. A similar argument of the insurance company was rejected by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid judgment. Paragraph 37 of the judgment reads as under:
"A reading of the table in Sarla Verma leaves no room for any speculation that it is only when the deceased/injured completes the age of 51 years, the multiplier would shift from '13' to '11' and not when the deceased/injured attains the age of 50 years and runs the said age till the previous night of his 51st birthday. (Read the interpretation given by the Honourable Supreme Court in Prabhu Dayal Sesma vs. State of Rajasthan and others [(1986) 4 SCC 59] on the Indian Majority Act, 1875 and this Court in Jaison V.George vs. State of Kerala [2019 (5) KHC 115] on the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2005, while computing the age of a person). In other words, the sine qua non to select the multiplier is the attainment of the specified age mentioned in the table and not the running of the age into the next group. It is also apposite to note, in Pranay Sethi, the age for awarding future prospects is segregated into three groups i.e., 16 ‒ 39, 40 ‒ 49 and 50 ‒
59. Therefore, if the argument of the learned Counsel for the Insurer is to be accepted, the same vacuum would also arise at the ages of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50, 55, 60 and 65 in selecting the multiplier and the ages of 39, 49 and 59 for awarding future prospects. This Court is bound to follow the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court as enshrined under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and not to give a different interpretation or tinker with the well settled enunciation. "
20. In Kamala v. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd [2024 KHC OnLine 791], this Court (ES.J) had 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 22 occasion to consider the issue regarding the applicability of the multiplier qua the age of the claimant. Following the judgment of this Court in Meera P.O. (supra), it was held that since the deceased had crossed only 15 days after attaining 50 years at the time of the death, the correct multiplier could be adopted as '13' instead of '11', as adopted by the Tribunal therein.
21. No doubt, in Meera P.O (supra) and Kamala (supra) this Court did not notice the decision of the Division bench in Soniyamma Mathew (supra). This is precisely the principal argument of Sri P.G. Jayashankar, learned counsel for the appellant. So the question before this Court would be, if the decision of the Division Bench in Soniyamma Mathew (supra) was brought to the notice of this Court, whether the decision could have been different . The answer would be emphatic "NO". This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the question of law stands settled by the decision of the Apex Court in Sashikala (supra). On a plain reading of the decision the Division Bench of this Court it is clear that the 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 23 Bench had gone against the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the respectful view of this Court, it is bound to apply the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and not otherwise. It is settled law that in so far as the law binding precedents is concerned, as enshrined under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, decision rendered by the Apex Court will be the law of the land and the High Court is certainly bound by the same. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that it is bound to follow the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shashikala (supra), which is the law of the land.
22. The result of the above discussion leads to an irresistible conclusion that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant based on the judgment of the Division Bench in Soniayamma Mathew (supra) has to be rejected.
23. Coming to the last question of the interest awarded by the Tribunal, though the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the Tribunal could not have fixed 9% 2024:KER:80595 MACA 3206/2021 24 interest over the compensation amount. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, deals with power of the tribunals to grant interest. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 reads as under:
"Section 171 --Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf."
So it cannot be said that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant interest in addition to the compensation. To contend otherwise is not only fallacious but preposterous. When this provision was pointed to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant, he fairly submitted that the company does not press for an adjudication on the said issue. Hence the said question is not answered.
In the result, this Court is of the considered view that the appeal lacks merits and accordingly, liable to be dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
EASWARAN S., JUDGE ACR