Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
R K Mishra vs Union Of India on 3 February, 2026
(Reserved on 20.01.2026
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad
Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 330/01710/2018
In
Review Application No. 330/00042/2018
In
Original Application NO. 330/01570/2010
This the 03rd day of February, 2026.
Present
Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
R.K. Mishra aged about 68 years son of late S.D. Mishra, R/o 298 'U'
Block Nirala Nagar, Kanpur -14.
...........Applicant
By Advocate: Sri S.K. Kushwaha
Versus
1. Union of India through the Secretary, Department of Post, Govt.
MANISH KUMAR
of India, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-1.
SRIVASTAVA 2. The Sr. Superintendent of Post Office, Kanpur City Dn., Kanpur
-1.
Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey
ORDER
I have heard Shri Santosh Kumar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the review applicant, and Shri Vinod Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the review respondents.
2. The present Review Application has been filed by the applicant on 23.05.2018 under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, read with Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking review of the order dated 28.03.2018 passed in OA No. 1570/2010. Along with the Review Application, the applicant has also filed MA No. 330/01710/2018 seeking condonation of delay in filing the Review Application.
23. As per Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, a Review Application is required to be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
4. In the Misc. Application for condonation of delay, the review applicant has stated that the final order in the Original Application was pronounced on 28.03.2018 and the certified copy of the said order could be prepared only on 06.04.2018. The Review Application was filed on 23.05.2018, resulting in a delay of 25 days. It has been submitted that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. It is further stated that the applicant is residing at Kanpur and could not contact his counsel within time. It has also been contended that the grievance relates to recovery of gratuity, which gives rise to a recurring cause of action. On these grounds, prayer has been made to condone the delay.Learned counsel for the review applicant has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Surendra Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, Writ-A No. 5564 of 2023, decided on 24.08.2023.
MANISH KUMAR 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has opposed SRIVASTAVA the Misc. Application for condonation of delay. It has been submitted that the reasons assigned by the applicant do not constitute sufficient cause. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Narasimha Rao vs. Regional Joint Director of School Education, 2005 (4) SLR 720. He has also relied upon the judgments of this Tribunal in Union of India & Others vs. Surya Bhan Singh & Others, RA No. 109/2015 in OA No. 982/2011, decided on 13.10.2015, and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 1997 SC 3277.
6. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The core issue which arises for consideration is whether the delay of 25 days in filing the present Review Application can be condoned by this Tribunal.
38. The Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Surendra Kumar (supra) has held that Tribunal has the jurisdiction to condone such delay by applying the principles underlying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided sufficient cause is shown. The operative portion of aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:-
"(46). Accordingly, this Court observes that the judgments of Full Benches of Hon'ble High Court of Orissa, Hon'ble High Court of Kolkata and Hon'ble High Court of Kerala are relevant law on the issue. Hence, this Court holds that an application for condonation of delay in Review Application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 is maintainable and accordingly, it is held that the Tribunal can condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if it is satisfied that sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time has been supplemented.
(47) As a sequitur, we hereby allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow, in review Application No. 20/2016 in Re: Original Application No. 561/2005 and accordingly restore the review application along with the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner to its original file.
MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA (48) It is also directed that the Review Application and Condonation of Delay Application be decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow on its own merits.
(49) This Court makes it clear that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and respective parties are permitted to agitate all their grounds and submission before the learned Tribunal, as may be permissible to them under law.
(50) There shall be no order as to cost"
9. Recently, the issue regarding the power of the Tribunal to condone delay in filing a Review Application decided by this Tribunal in Misc. Application No. 3133/2025 in Review Application No. 39/2017 (Arising out of OA No. 688 of 2010) - Vinod Kumar Vs. Union of India and others wherein the Tribunal has held as under:-
"3. We have heard the counsel for parties on the delay condonation application as well as review application. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the statement made before the Bench with regard to 4 the O.A. becomes infructuous was not consented with the applicant and in fact he wish to pursue the O.A. on merit persistently and accordingly after getting information and legal opinion, the review application has been filed at belated stage. He submitted that the applicant was suffering severely on account of slip disk in his spinal cord since the month of January, 2017 and he has approached the counsel after getting some relief. However, his counsel has not given the proper advice within time for filing the review and after engaging another Advocate, Shri Manoj Kumar Pandey, the review application was drafted along with delay condonation application. From the record, it transpires that the O.A. was dismissed as become infructuous vide Order dated 03.01.2017 and the review application was filed on 11.09.2017. Therefore, delay is of about 08 months. The Hon'ble High Court while considering the Order dated 08.01.2019 observed the rule position with regard to condonation of delay in para-12 and 13 and allowed the Writ Petition and Order dated 08.01.2019 was set aside with the direction upon this Tribunal to consider the delay condonation application on its own merit and decide the review application. From the observation of the Hon'ble High Court in para-12 and 13 of its Judgment, it is apparent that the provision of limitation for 6 review prescribed under Rule 17 of Central Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1987 is '30' days MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA and further observation is that the power given to this Tribunal to exercise the power of Civil Court under Section 22 Sub Rule (3) Sub Rule (f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In view of said observation and the grounds stated in para-5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit accompanied with the delay condonation application, we find that the delay has been sufficiently explained and accordingly the delay condonation application (MA No. 3133/2025) is allowed. The delay in filing the review application is condoned.
4. The review application has been filed with several grounds. However, the ground (M) is relevant with regard to submission of the counsel that the O.A. has become infructuous as the specific pleadings have been taken that the applicant was getting due pension and the fact that the recovery as suggested vide order dated 11.11.2005 was not made by the respondents from the applicant's salary/pension which is a correct fact as per instructions of applicant, but the counsel could not place the fact before this Tribunal while receiving the reduced pension and reduced salary being result on account of denial of pay protection due to lack of communication with the applicant. Considering the grounds taken by the applicant in Ground (M), we are of the opinion to recall the Order 5 dated 03.01.2017 passed by this Tribunal. Accordingly, Review Application No. 39 of 2017 is allowed and the Order dated 03.01.2017 is recalled. All pending MAs related to delay condonation application and review application stand disposed of".
10. In rebuttal, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ajit Babu (supra) has observed that if such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. For better appreciation, the relevant portion of aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:
"In the present case, the view taken by the Tribunal that the only remedy available to the affected persons is to file a Review of the judgment which affects them and not to file a fresh application under Section 19 of the Act. Section 22(3)(f) of the Act empowers the Tribunal to review its decisions. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure and Rules) (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") provides that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order sought to be reviewed. Ordinarily, right of MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA review is available only to those who are party to a case. However, even if we give wider meaning to the expression "a person feeling aggrieved" occurring in Section 22 of the Act whether such person aggrieved can seek review by opening the whole case decided by the Tribunal. The right of review is not a right of appeal where all questions decided are open to challenge. The right of review is possible only on limited grounds, mentioned in Order 47 of these Code of Civil Procedure. Although strictly speaking the Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable to the tribunals but the principles contained therein surely have to extended. Otherwise there being no limitation on the power of review it would be an appeal and there would be no certainty of finality of a decision. Besides that, the right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation. The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. A party in whose favour a decision has been given can not monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should been to law suits and if the view of the tribunal is accepted the proceedings 6 in a case will never come to an end. We, therefore, find that a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure if filed within the period of limitation."
11. The matter of condonation of delay of review application came up before the Full Bench of Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G.Narasimha Rao (supra). The matter was also examined by the Full Bench with reference to Section 22(3)(f) of the AT Act, 1985 and other relevant provisions of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, provisions of the Limitation Act etc. and it is held as under:-
"11. Even assuming that the Limitation Act is not expressly excluded by the Administrative Tribunals Act or the Rules made thereunder, we have to see whether the scheme of the special law i.e. in this case Administrative Tribunals Act/Rules and the nature of remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern all the matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is found that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. In our view, even in case the Act/Rules does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to 22 of Limitation Act by an express reference, it would none the less has to be examined whether and to MANISH KUMAR what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the SRIVASTAVA subject matter and the scheme of the Act/Rules exclude their operations. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act envisage that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Whereas Rule 19 of the Rules which gives an preemptory command that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order of which the review is sought.
12. Even otherwise the provisions of the Limitation Act which unless expressly excluded would be attracted can be made applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act/Rules, but the same is not what Section 29(2) of the Act says because it provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded all of them are applicable whether those sections are applicable or not is not determined by the terms of those sections, but by their applicability or inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. Section 6 of Limitation Act, which provides for the extension of the period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person who is either minor or insane or an idiot, is inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act/Rules. Similarly Sections 7 to 24 are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of filing of applications and the procedure to be followed under the Act/Rules. The applicability of those provisions has, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of limitation Act but by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 and the Rules made thereunder relating to the filing of original applications and review applications and their disposal to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the 7 provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of the Act.
13. Rule 19 is couched in negative form and disables the person from seeking review under Section 22(e)(f) of the Act, in case review is not filed within 30 days of the order. However, in the Act nowhere it is stated the method or manner or time limit to file such review except Rule 19. In view of the same, the power of Tribunal to condone the delay under Section 21 of the Act is applicable only to the applications filed under Section 19, but the same cannot be made applicable to the review sought under Section 22(3)(f). Sub-section (1) of Section 22 puts an embargo on exercise of such power by the Tribunal, namely that the power of the Tribunal shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and of any rules made by the Central Government. In the absence of any provisions prescribed for condoning the delay either in the Act or in the Rules, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay in taking aid and assistance of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the premise that Limitation Act is made applicable in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act.
14. In the view we have taken, we answer the reference holding that the Administrative Tribunals Act and the Rules made thereunder are impliedly infer that the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay by taking aid and assistance of either Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act or Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act".
12. Thus, the right of review is available, if such an application is filed within the period of limitation. The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA such a power to review is permitted without any limitation then no decision would be final because the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of the party feeling adversely affected by the said decision.
13. It is an admitted position that Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 prescribes a limitation period of 30 days for filing a Review Application from the date of receipt of the order sought to be reviewed.
14. The issue relating to condonation of delay in filing a Review Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal has been the subject-matter of consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by various High Courts.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu (supra) has clearly held that the right of review is not an inherent right and can be exercised only within the strict limits prescribed under law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that a Review Application 8 must be filed within the period of limitation and that allowing review beyond limitation would destroy the finality of judicial decisions, which is against public policy.
16. Further, the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court, in G. Narasimha Rao (supra) decided by a Full Bench, has categorically held that the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay in filing a Review Application. The Full Bench has held that Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 is mandatory in nature and that the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 5 thereof are not applicable to Review Applications filed under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
17. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment of a Full Bench has greater binding force and prevails over a judgment of a Division Bench. Moreover, the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India is binding on all courts and tribunals.
18. Though reliance has been placed by the review applicant on MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Surendra Kumar (supra), the said judgment is of a Division Bench and cannot override the binding law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu (supra) and the Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Narasimha Rao (supra).
19. This Tribunal is bound to follow the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the authoritative pronouncement of a Full Bench. Therefore, the contention of the review applicant that the delay can be condoned by applying the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be accepted.
20. Even otherwise, the reasons assigned by the review applicant, namely late receipt of certified copy, inability to contact counsel, and residence at Kanpur, do not constitute sufficient cause. These are general explanations and do not justify deviation from the mandatory limitation prescribed under Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. The plea that the matter relates to recovery of gratuity and 9 involves a recurring cause of action is also of no assistance, as limitation for filing a Review Application is governed strictly by Rule 17 and cannot be relaxed.
21. In view of the above discussion, this Tribunal holds that it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the Review Application and that the Misc. Application seeking condonation of delay is not maintainable in law.
22. Accordingly, MA No. 330/01710/2018 seeking condonation of delay is rejected. As a consequence thereof, the Review Application is also dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Mohan Pyare) Member (J) Manish/-
MANISH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA