Kerala State Electricity Board Limited vs M/S Pooja Milk Foods (P) Ltd, Regd on 17 September, 2025

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Kerala High Court

Kerala State Electricity Board Limited vs M/S Pooja Milk Foods (P) Ltd, Regd on 17 September, 2025

These intra-court appeals call for a decision on the interpretation of modern legislation in the context of the policy of liberalisation protecting the interests of consumers of public utility services.

2. The appellant is the Kerala State Electricity Board and its officials (hereinafter referred to as the 'licensee'). The licensee approached this Court in a writ petition, challenging an order of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (hereinafter referred to as the 'CGRF'). CGRF is established by the licensee themselves as mandated under the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The statutory provision under Section 42(5) of the Act mandates licensees to establish a forum for redressal of grievances W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:5:- 2025:KER:69106 of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be specified by the State Commission. The State Commission is a statutory body constituted under Section 82 of the Act and known as the State Electricity Regulatory Commission.

3. The learned Single Judge who heard the matter accepted the objection raised by the respondent-consumer on the question related to maintainability. The learned Single Judge was of the view that CGRF is an institutional grievance redressal forum maintained by the licensee and in the light of the Regulation 27(5) of the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations 2005, (hereafter referred as the "2005 Regulations") a licensee is bound by awards/orders/directions of CGRF and it is not open for the licensee to challenge such awards, orders or directions of the CGRF by invoking writ remedies.

4. We heard the learned Standing Counsel for the Electricity Board, Shri Riji Rajendran, assisted by Adv. Mitha Sudhindran. The articulated arguments of the learned Standing Counsel in elaboration W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:6:- 2025:KER:69106 are to bring home the point that CGRF is a quasi-judicial body, statutorily constituted, and therefore, there is no difficulty in questioning such awards/orders/directions by invoking writ remedies. The learned Standing Counsel pointed out the nature and functions of CGRF while taking action on a complaint. He particularly pointed out the whole of Regulations 10 to 12 of the 2005 Regulations. Thus, the learned Standing Counsel argued that these Regulations show that CGRF is a statutorily constituted quasi-judicial body and will have to function independently of the licensee. He placed reliance on the following judgments of the Apex Court in High Court of M.P. v. Mahesh Prakash [(1995) 1 SCC 203], Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Reliance Energy Ltd. [(2007) 8 SCC 381], Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 578], Village Panchayat, Calangute v. Director of Panchayat [(2012) 7 SCC 550], Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India v. Delhi International Airport Ltd. [2024 KHC 6571], judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Central Power W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:7:- 2025:KER:69106 Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. v. The Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum of APCPDCL and Ors. [2019(1)ALD 257], judgment of the Madras High Court in The Executive Engineer and Ors. vs. Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Ors. [MANU/TN/5226/2023] and judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Eminent Sea Foods(P)Ltd v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Others [(2008) 2 KLT 294].

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/consumer, Shri C.K. Karunakaran, defending the impugned judgments, submitted that the statutory provision never contemplated licensee questioning the CGRF decision; and that is the reason that under Section 42(6) of the Act, the consumer alone is given the right to question the order of CGRF before the learned Ombudsman. He fairly agreed that the Ombudsman is an independent body and the decision of the Ombudsman can be questioned before this Court, invoking writ remedies. He placed reliance on the draft Electricity Bill, 2001, introduced in the Lok W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:8:- 2025:KER:69106 Sabha, wherein there was no provision for raising a grievance before the Ombudsman. The learned counsel further referred to the Standing Committee report on the bill. In that report, the Standing Committee noted that CGRF have to work under the licensee and as such, these forums may not be of help to consumers, and accordingly recommended the constitution of the Ombudsman to safeguard the interests of the consumers. It is an independent body. The Ombudsman was constituted as one more layer for the redressal of grievances of the consumer. It is particularly pointed out by the learned counsel Shri C.K. Karunakaran that the State Commission understood the importance of CGRF and also understood the error or mistake likely to be committed by CGRF, and accordingly inserted Regulation 12A of the 2005 Regulations to review the order of CGRF on the limited ground referred therein. This, according to the learned counsel, brings a finality to the order of CGRF as far as the licensee is concerned. He relied on judgments of the Apex Court in Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board [(1999) 5 SCC 590], Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corpn. [(2018) W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:9:- 2025:KER:69106 8 SCC 281] and Kerala SEB v. Thomas Joseph [(2023) 11 SCC 700], Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ram Kishori Gupta and others[2025 SCC OnLine SC 748], judgment of the Orissa High Court in Executive Engineer, Electrical (TPNODL), Balasore Electrical Division-II v. Raj Complex [2023 SCC OnLine Ori 2312] and judgment of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board and Others v. M/s. KSE Ltd. and Another [2012 (1) KLT 623].

6. There is little scope for dispute regarding the nature and composition of the CGRF, which is a statutorily constituted forum. It is required to adopt a judicious approach in adjudicating complaints and to exercise powers akin to those of any other quasi-judicial body in resolving grievances. The orders, awards, or directions issued by the CGRF are executable in the same manner as provided under Regulation 27(5) of the 2005 Regulations.

7. While we appreciate the meticulous and well-prepared arguments of the learned Standing Counsel, Shri Riji Rajendran, that CGRF discharges a quasi-judicial function, but at the same time, we W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:10:- 2025:KER:69106 cannot remain oblivious to the jurisprudence evolved in protecting consumer rights through various international instruments, which call for an interpretation of statutory provisions in the light of liberalisation policy followed in this Country. Therefore, the precedents cited by the learned Standing Counsel for the Board may not have much relevance in deciding this matter, as we are deciding it from a different perspective of consumer protection and participation in public utility services. The question raised in this case is how a licensee is expected to respond to orders or awards of CGRF. Should they be viewed as decisions external to the licensee's powers and functions, or must they be regarded as institutional determinations that enable consumer participation in the decision-making process, thereby fostering trust in the governance of the licensee?

8. Modern legislation, introduced in the wake of liberalisation, expressly envisages consumer involvement in governance as a measure of accountability and transparency. The issue, therefore, is whether the creation of the CGRF constitutes an additional W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:11:- 2025:KER:69106 institutional layer designed to safeguard the consumer interests within the licensee's decision-making framework or not. To appreciate this fully, one must revisit the rationale and objectives underlying deregulation in this country at the threshold of liberalisation.

9. The deregulation of key sectors of industry, once under the sole control of the Government, had posed the biggest economic and political challenge to the states across the globe. Transition from a state monopoly to a fair competitive market requires structural reforms. In constitutional democracies, such a transformation is facilitated through legislation. Fair, transparent and competitive markets with active private participation are key objectives of the deregulation. Our country was not an exception to bring reforms to deregulate the key sectors such as Telecommunication, Electricity, Petroleum, Insurance, etc. Legislative attempts through various legislation were to balance the interests of the state with those of the public, who are the consumers of such sectors and the market interests of the private participants. The key objectives of the W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:12:- 2025:KER:69106 reforms, as referred to in various materials referred to hereinafter, are as follows:

● Consumer participation in institutional governance of public utility service providers.

● To bring transparency in the governance of public utility service providers.

● Fair decisions adhering to due procedure in the decision-making process in public utility services.

● A competitive market with private participation to ensure fair administrative decisions by such service providers. ● Enhancing accountability of public utility service providers. ● Equitable outcome from the decisions of such utility service providers.

● To encourage high levels of ethical conduct for those engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services (see The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection).

10. The deregulation of these sectors is a transformation from a monopoly to a competitive market with active private participation. W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:13:- 2025:KER:69106 The monopoly of the key sector in a constitutionally bound State is on the line of presumption that the State would act fairly and treat its citizens on equitable terms. The deregulation paved the way for private investors to come into the market as service providers. Deregulation had twin objectives - (i) the sectors controlled and managed by the State shall be made available to the citizens in an equitable manner through private participation; and (ii) the private investors, while remaining competitive, shall ensure efficiency of their service, including taking measures for protecting the interests of the consumers.

IMPACT           OF       LIBERALISATION          POLICY   IN     DOMESTIC

LEGISLATION IN INDIA:

11. We shall refer to the various legislations in India which allow public participation in the governance or in the decision-making of the authorities/public utility service providers:

i. Telecom Sector - The internal grievance redressal system in the telecom sector is a two-tier mechanism consisting of Complaint Centres and an Appellate Authority. It is designed to ensure time- W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:14:- 2025:KER:69106 bound, transparent, and consumer-friendly redressal. This mechanism provides consumers with a structured path to escalate grievances within the service provider before approaching external forums such as the TDSAT or consumer courts. The consumer grievance redressal mechanism is governed by the Telecom Consumers Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012, as amended by TRAI from time to time. Regulation 3 of the above Regulations mandates every telecom service provider to set up an internal mechanism for consumer grievance redressal, prescribing the method in which the complaints must be handled and the time period for redressal. Regulation 9 provides for an Appellate Authority to hear appeals where a consumer is not satisfied with the redressal of their complaint by the Complaint Centre, and Regulation 10 mandates every service provider to establish an Appellate Authority in each licensed service area to hear appeals against consumer grievance decisions.

ii. Insurance sector - Internal grievance redressal mechanism is the first stage of dispute resolution before a policyholder approaches W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:15:- 2025:KER:69106 external forums such as the Insurance Ombudsman, Consumer Commissions or Courts. It is governed by the IRDAI (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2017. Annexure I of the IRDAI (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2017 prescribes the grievance redressal procedure for consumers to raise complaints against insurers. Every insurer must have a Grievance Redressal Officer (hereinafter referred to as "GRO") at each office or branch. The GRO is responsible for receiving, resolving, and recording grievances. The grievance redressal framework requires policyholders to first approach the GRO of the concerned insurer, intermediary, or regulated entity. If the response is unsatisfactory or absent, the complaint can be escalated to the IRDAI's Integrated Grievance Management System (IGMS), which facilitates re- examination and ensures resolution by the insurer. Further appeal is maintainable before the Ombudsman, established under the Insurance Ombudsman Rules, 2017.

iii. Petroleum and Natural Gas Sector - The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (hereinafter referred to as "PNGRB") W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:16:- 2025:KER:69106 was established under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006, as a statutory body to regulate downstream activities in the petroleum and natural gas sector. Section 11 of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 sets out the functions of the PNGRB, which include protecting the interests of consumers and entities engaged in petroleum and natural gas activities, promoting competitive markets, fostering fair trade and regulating technical standards, safety, and quality of service. iv. Banking Sector - The grievance redressal framework in the banking sector is designed to resolve consumer complaints within the bank itself before escalating to external forums such as the Banking Ombudsman (under the RBI Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021), Consumer Commissions, or Courts. The Reserve Bank of India, under powers conferred by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the RBI Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 has issued Reserve Bank of India (Internal Ombudsman) Directions, 2023, which mandates all banks (Scheduled Commercial Banks, RRBs, Cooperative Banks, and certain NBFCs) to establish an Internal Grievance Redressal W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:17:- 2025:KER:69106 Mechanism in the form of an Internal Ombudsman with a view to strengthen the internal grievance redressal system. v. Land acquisition - The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "LARR" Act) establishes a participatory mechanism for acquisition of land for public purpose by mandating consultation, consent and public hearings at various stages. The process begins with a Social Impact Assessment conducted in consultation with Gram Sabhas and local bodies, which includes public hearings and disclosure of reports to ensure transparency regarding the social and environmental consequences of the project as contemplated under Section 4 of the LARR Act. Following this, a preliminary notification is issued as provided under Section 11 of the LARR Act, and any person interested in the land may file objections within sixty days, as provided under Section 15 of the LARR Act, a provision modelled on the earlier Section 5A of the 1894 Act but broader in scope, allowing challenges not only to the public purpose and suitability of land but also to environmental W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:18:- 2025:KER:69106 and resettlement concerns. The Collector is bound to hear these objections and submit recommendations to the Government, which must take a final decision after considering both the Social Impact Assessment and the objections received. Only then can a formal declaration be made under Section 19 of the LARR Act, followed by the award of compensation and the preparation of rehabilitation and resettlement schemes in consultation with the Gram Sabha. Possession of the land can be taken only after full compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are provided, thereby embedding participatory safeguards at every stage of the acquisition process.

HOW        INTERNATIONAL                  NORMS        INFLUENCED           DOMESTIC

LEGISLATION:

       12.      The      United          Nations      Guidelines     for    Consumer

Protection (UNGCP), 2015

       12.1.           The      United     Nations      Guidelines    for    Consumer

Protection serve as a key framework outlining the essential features of effective consumer protection laws, enforcement mechanisms, and W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:19:- 2025:KER:69106 redress systems when formulating domestic and regional laws, rules, and regulations. The guidelines also foster international cooperation in enforcement and promote the exchange of best practices in consumer protection. UNCTAD, a UN body, actively advances these guidelines and encourages Member States to raise awareness about how Governments, businesses, and civil society can contribute to strengthening consumer protection in both public and private service delivery.

12.2. The General Assembly first adopted the above guidelines in resolution 39/248 of 16 April 1985. The guidelines were expanded by the Economic and Social Council in resolution E/1999/INF/2/Add.2 of 26 July 1999 and were revised and adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 70/186 of 22 December 2015.

12.3. The specific portion of the guidelines related to consumer grievance redressal is extracted below:

"F. Dispute resolution and redress

37. Member States should encourage the development of fair, effective, transparent and impartial mechanisms to address consumer complaints through administrative, judicial and alternative dispute resolution, including for cross-border cases. Member States should establish or maintain legal and/or administrative measures to enable consumers W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:20:- 2025:KER:69106 or, as appropriate, relevant organizations to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, transparent, inexpensive and accessible. Such procedures should take particular account of the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. Member States should provide consumers with access to remedies that do not impose a cost, delay or undue burden on the economic value at stake and at the same time do not impose excessive or undue burdens on society and businesses.

38. Member States should encourage all businesses to resolve consumer disputes in an expeditious, fair, transparent, inexpensive, accessible and informal manner, and to establish voluntary mechanisms, including advisory services and informal complaints procedures, which can provide assistance to consumers.

39. Information on available redress and other dispute-resolving procedures should be made available to consumers. Access to dispute resolution and redress mechanisms, including alternative dispute resolution, should be enhanced, particularly in cross- border disputes.

40. Member States should ensure that collective resolution procedures are expeditious, transparent, fair, inexpensive and accessible to both consumers and businesses, including those pertaining to overindebtedness and bankruptcy cases.

41. Member States should cooperate with businesses and consumer groups in furthering consumer and business understanding of how to avoid disputes, of dispute resolution and redress mechanisms available to consumers and of where consumers can file complaints."

12.4. The specific principles outlined in the guidelines related to good business practice are extracted below:

"IV. Principles for good business practices

11. The principles that establish benchmarks for good business practices for conducting online and offline commercial activities with consumers are as follows:

(a) Fair and equitable treatment. Businesses should deal fairly and honestly with consumers at all stages of their relationship, so that it is an integral part of the business W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:21:- 2025:KER:69106 culture. Businesses should avoid practices that harm consumers, particularly with respect to vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers;

(b) Commercial behaviour. Businesses should not subject consumers to illegal, unethical, discriminatory or deceptive practices, such as abusive marketing tactics, abusive debt collection or other improper behaviour that may pose unnecessary risks or harm consumers. Businesses and their authorized agents should have due regard for the interests of consumers and responsibility for upholding consumer protection as an objective;

(c) Disclosure and transparency. Businesses should provide complete, accurate and not misleading information regarding the goods and services, terms, conditions, applicable fees and final costs to enable consumers to take informed decisions. Businesses should ensure easy access to this information, especially to the key terms and conditions, regardless of the means of technology used;

(d) Education and awareness-raising. Businesses should, as appropriate, develop programmes and mechanisms to assist consumers to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to understand risks, including financial risks, to take informed decisions and to access competent and professional advice and assistance, preferably from an independent third party, when needed;

(e) Protection of privacy. Businesses should protect consumers' privacy through a combination of appropriate control, security, transparency and consent mechanisms relating to the collection and use of their personal data;

(f) Consumer complaints and disputes. Businesses should make available complaints-

handling mechanisms that provide consumers with expeditious, fair, transparent, inexpensive, accessible, speedy and effective dispute resolution without unnecessary cost or burden. Businesses should consider subscribing to domestic and international standards pertaining to internal complaints handling, alternative dispute resolution services and customer satisfaction codes."

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:22:- 2025:KER:69106 HOW DOES DEREGULATION EMPHASISE CONSUMER PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES

13. We shall now refer to principles related to consumer participation referred to in various literature:

13.1. In an article titled "Governance through public utilities models: a regional social interaction approach" by Immacolata Caruso and Tiziana Vitolo, presented at the 43rd Congress of the European Regional Science Association, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland, the authors propose a joint participation model for governance of public utility services as follows:

"Means such as participation, partnership, empowering and enabling, and community focus could be seen as fostering transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, accountability and equity...

It seems clear that the establishment of managerial models centred upon competition, more than once mentioned as a consequence of new processes involving public utilities, calls for industrial policies focused on governance substantially meaning, in this case, a "joint participation mechanism" aiming to the definition of the roles and prerogatives of the different subjects involved in the service management, i.e. the subjects of local authorities, company administrative and management bodies, and all the other stakeholders (such as consumers' associations, lobbying groups, unions, suppliers, W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:23:- 2025:KER:69106 citizens-service customers, etc.). It also calls for the setting up of instruments and mechanisms in order to support the integration between local authorities and associated companies."1 13.2. It is also pertinent to quote the following lines from the World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People, published by the World Bank:

"Too often, services fail poor people- in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of service provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor."2 13.3. In an article titled "Deregulation and Participation: An International Survey of Participation in Electricity Regulation" by Anil Hira, David Huxtable, and Alexandre Leger, the authors outline the following reasons to advocate for public participation in electricity sector regulation.

"Participation could lead to both greater enfranchisement and greater appreciation of 1 Immacolata Caruso & Tiziana Vitolo, Governance Through Public Utilities' Models: A Regional Social Interaction Approach (43rd Cong. of the Eur. Reg'l Sci. Ass'n, Univ. of Jyväskylä, 2003), available at :(PDF) Governance through ?public utilities? models: a regional social interaction approach (last visited Sept. 16, 2025).

World Development Report 2004 : Making services work for poor people - overview, World Bank Group, Available at : World Development Report 2004 : Making services work for poor people - Overview, (last visited Sept. 16, 2025).

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:24:- 2025:KER:69106 the complexity and trade-offs of decision making by the public. Moreover, recent studies point to the effectiveness of consumer influence to balance industrial and labor union influence, even in nonprivatized systems (Cummins, Phillips, and Tennyson). A number of emerging empirical studies also suggest that decisions tend to be of greater quality when stakeholders are directly included (Beirele 2000). Carl Mitcham suggests several reasons for the need for direct participation, as opposed to relying primarily on experts to represent public interests (Mitcham). First, experts cannot escape from public influence. Experts are in the milieu of the public discourse in the media, and so are subject to ongoing value discussions. Moreover, all decisions of consequence, by definition, have public consequences. Second, without public participation, it may be difficult to undertake decisions that bear important consequences, as the phenomenon of NIMBY (not in my backyard) illustrates. Third, experts have built-in interests that differ from the public's. Experts often come from elite backgrounds, and receive their livelihood by playing a reinforcing role to established systems of power (Hira 1998). Fourth, including the public will lead to better outcomes (Fischer 2000; Waugh; Williams and Matheny). This idea stems from the expectation that decisions will be more "sustainable" because the public will be aware of, and ready to deal with the consequences. As Frank Fischer points out, complex democratic decision making has to consider the sociological values and legitimation, as well as the technical merits of an issue to be sustainable (Fischer 2000, 140). In sum, while experts are needed, direct public participation is also a vital component for sustainable and democratic regulation."3 13.4. In a policy research working paper titled "Transforming Electricity Governance in India: Has India's Power Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?" prepared by Ashish 3 Hira, A., Huxtable, D. and Leger, A., Deregulation and participation: An international survey of participation in electricity regulation, 18(1) Governance 53 (2005). W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:25:- 2025:KER:69106 Khanna, Daljit Singh, Ashwini K Swain and Mudit Narain, published by the World Bank Group, the authors emphasise the need for active and effective consumer engagement in the regulatory process as follows:

"Electricity regulators are primarily drawn from retired bureaucrats, who come in with their own perspectives and biases. Moreover, with the mandate to rationalise electricity tariffs and balance competing interests in the sector, the regulators seem to be less trusted by consumers, and consequently, there is low social acceptance of their decisions. Consumer participation is thus necessary to ensure representation of public interest and ensure social acceptance to regulatory decisions. While building consumers' trust in the regulatory system, it also contributes to institutional and democratic legitimacy of the independent regulators. Moreover, in the absence of public inputs, regulators often make major decisions on behalf of the consumers, "on the basis of limited information" (Littlechild, 2008: 33). Active and effective consumer engagement in the regulatory process would be able to address the information asymmetry and improve regulatory decision making."4 Further, the authors point out the different levels of participation that can be incorporated in a regulatory mechanism, particularly with regard to the electricity sector, as follows:

"Participation is not something that any system either has in the regulatory framework or does not. There are varying levels of participation, and there is a spectrum of the 4 Khanna, A., Singh, D., Swain, A.K. and Narain, M., Transforming Electricity Governance in India: Has India's Power Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?. Available at: Transforming Electricity Governance in India: Has India's Power Sector Regulation Enabled Consumers' Power?, (last visited Sept. 16, 2025).

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:26:- 2025:KER:69106 level and quality of consumer participation. Analyzing citizen participation, Arnstein (1969) presented a ladder of participation with eight rungs/levels, which can be put into three broad categories: non-participation, tokenism, and citizen power. While 'citizen power' is the most desirable in the ideal world, it may not be feasible to achieve in the real world, especially in the case of technical decision making. The desired goals of transparency and accountability in technical decision-making at the macro level may be better achieved through informing, consultation and placation, without much transaction cost."5 13.5. The above literature clearly points out the shift in the regulatory philosophy of public utility services, showing how consumer protection and participation have become integral components of regulation.

THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION POLICY ON ELECTRICITY LAWS AND CONSUMERS:

14. The Electricity Act, 2003, replaced the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The preamble of the Electricity Act 2003 proclaims that, it is an Act to consolidate the laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to the development of electricity industry, promoting competition therein, protecting interest of 5 Id W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:27:- 2025:KER:69106 consumers, supply of electricity to all areas, rationalization of electricity tariff, ensuring transparent policies regarding subsidies, promotion of efficient and environmentally benign policies, etc.

15. The Electricity Act, 2003, deregulated the distribution of electricity in India. Section 14 of the Act refers to the licence regime, and Section 15 of the Act refers to the procedure for granting a licence. Licensee is defined as a person who has been granted a licence under Section 14. Thus, it is clear that any person who complies with the statutory requirements is entitled to a license. The Act deregulated the electricity service by enabling private players to provide the service. The question of whether the consumer is allowed to participate in the governance of electricity distribution will have to be answered based on the provisions of the Act. Part VI of the Act contemplates the regulatory procedure for the distribution of electricity. It is appropriate to refer to Section 42(1) of Part VI of the Act, which reads thus:

"Section 42. (Duties of distribution licensee and open access):-

(1) It shall be the duty of a distribution licensee to develop and maintain an efficient, .

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:28:- 2025:KER:69106 co-ordinated and economical distribution system in his area of supply and to supply electricity in accordance with the provisions contained in this Act."

16. As seen from Section 42(1), the law intended to achieve the following through a licensee:

i. Develop and maintain an efficient distribution system. ii. A coordinated and economical distribution system. iii Supply electricity in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act.

This is the Regulatory Scheme for the distribution of electricity.

17. It is in the light of the above scheme that one must consider Section 42(5). Section 42(5) reads thus:

"42(5). Every distribution licensee shall, within six months from the appointed date or date of grant of licence, whichever is earlier, establish a forum for redressal of grievances of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be specified by the State Commission."

The Scheme of Regulation itself mandates that each licensee has to establish a Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. Since it is part of the institutional scheme of governance of the licensee, the Parliament thought of having another independent layer for the consumer to raise their grievance. Accordingly, in Section 42(6) of the Act, it is provided as follows:

"42(6). Any consumer who is aggrieved by non-redressal of his grievances under W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:29:- 2025:KER:69106 sub-section (5) may make a representation for the redressal of his grievance to an authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the State Commission."

18. Composition of CGRF is given under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations 2005, which consists of three members, including a Chairperson. The Chairperson and one member are appointed by the licensee from among qualified persons with expertise in electrical engineering, finance, law, or administration in the power sector, possessing ability, integrity, and standing. The third member is nominated by the Commission for one year from among persons with a degree in any discipline, proven integrity and familiarity with consumer affairs, and who is not and has never been an employee of the licensee. From this composition itself, it is clear that the members of the CGRF are not wholly distinct from the licensee, and therefore, the CGRF is not an entity independent of the licensee. The composition of the CGRF is further widened under the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:30:- 2025:KER:69106 Ombudsman) Regulations, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the "

2023 Regulation"), constituted by four members including a chairperson appointed by the licensee, a licensee member appointed by the licensee, a law member appointed by the licensee and a consumer/prosumer member nominated by the licensee who is within the jurisdiction of the forum. The mandate for consumer representation within the CGRF under the 2023 Regulations points out the participatory approach embedded in the grievance redressal mechanism under the CGRF.

19. The learned Standing Counsel, Shri Riji Rajendran, referred to the 2023 Regulations, which replaced the 2005 Regulations, and pointed out that an internal mechanism has been provided at the officer level. According to him, this would indicate that the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) is an external mechanism for redressal of consumer grievances. We find this argument unsustainable. The constitution of the Internal Grievance Redressal Cell (hereinafter, "IGRC") at the officer level was intended to decentralise the functioning of the CGRF, which operates at the W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:31:- 2025:KER:69106 regional level. The 2023 Regulations replaced the 2005 Regulations; though the 2023 Regulations do not apply to this case, referring to it is necessary in the light of our earlier finding that the CGRF is part of the regulatory scheme of the licensee. The 2023 Regulations introduced another layer of grievance redressal at the lowest level, through a designated officer, to ensure prompt resolution of complaints. This mechanism, termed the IGRC, does not create a distinct or parallel forum but operates as part of the same internal grievance redressal scheme. Though the parent Act does not expressly envisage a three-tier system, the 2023 Regulations provide for two layers of internal grievance redressal: first at the IGRC, and then at the CGRF. The IGRC has been structured in the most decentralised manner at the officer level, while the CGRF continues to function regionally. In Kerala, the CGRFs are located at Kottarakkara, Ernakulam, and Kozhikode, covering the South, Central, and North zones, respectively. It was therefore thought necessary by the State Regulatory Commission to introduce an officer-level mechanism to increase accessibility. It must also be W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:32:- 2025:KER:69106 noted that under Regulation 17(2) of the 2023 Regulations, a consumer has the option to approach either the IGRC or the CGRF directly. The nature of the complaint before both is the same. If the consumer is dissatisfied with the decision of the IGRC, he may place the very same complaint before the CGRF. This shows that the IGRC is not a separate forum but rather a decentralised extension of the CGRF. Thus, the CGRF is also an internal mechanism within the regulatory framework, and the grievance redressal scheme is common to both IGRC and CGRF. The mere difference in composition between the IGRC and CGRF does not render them distinct in character under the statutory scheme. Section 42(5) of the Act contemplates a mechanism for consumer grievance redressal; if such a mechanism provides two levels--one at the officer level and the other at the regional level, they both remain internal. The introduction of two levels is meant only to remove barriers of distance and to make grievance redressal more accessible to the consumer.

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:33:- 2025:KER:69106

20. Further, if IGRC is considered as an internal mechanism, necessarily, CGRF must also be considered as an internal mechanism, as the constitution of both is for the same purpose. And it is also seen from the proviso to Regulation 4(4) of the 2023 Regulations that it is not mandatory for all the licensees other than KSEB to establish IGRC for the time being. Thus, it is clear that the constitution of IGRC and CGRF has been envisaged as an internal mechanism under the regulatory scheme and decisions/awards of such a forum cannot be treated as an external decision of the licensee.

21. The Ombudsman appointed under Section 42(6) of the Act is an independent statutory authority designated by the State Commission. A plain reading of Section 42(6) shows that the Legislature never intended to confer upon the licensee a right to challenge the decision of the CGRF. The consumer alone is given the right to question the decision of CGRF. The legislative intent is therefore clear. Though the CGRF functions as a quasi-judicial body, its decisions, awards, and orders must be treated as decisions of the W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:34:- 2025:KER:69106 licensee itself in the realm of governance relating to electricity distribution. They are integral to the institutional decision-making of the licensee and not separable from it. Consequently, the licensee can be said to be aggrieved only when a decision is rendered independently of it, and not otherwise. It is possible that the CGRF may pass an erroneous order. Such an order, no doubt, may be reviewed under Regulation 12A of the 2005 Regulations on the limited grounds referred therein. However, once rendered, a decision of the CGRF binds the licensee and forms part of its institutional governance. Only in an extreme case, where the CGRF acts contrary to statutory provisions, without jurisdiction, or in excess of its authority, would its order lose the character of being a decision within the licensee's governance framework. Such an order would instead be a colourable exercise of power, running contrary to the objectives of the Electricity Act. In such exceptional circumstances, the licensee may question the validity of the order. But this cannot extend to cases where the challenge is only to the merits of the order of the CGRF.

W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:35:- 2025:KER:69106 Thus, we affirm the judgments of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

Sd/-

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE Sd/-

HARISANKAR V. MENON, JUDGE ms W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:36:- 2025:KER:69106 APPENDIX OF WA 1096/2024 PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure A A TRUE COPY OF RP 534 OF 2023 IN WP(C) 25898 OF 2015 W.A Nos. 1096 of 2024 and 1963 of 2025 -:37:- 2025:KER:69106 APPENDIX OF WA 1963/2025 PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure-1 A COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE KSERC DATED 21- 06-2010 REGARDING TARIFF APPLICABILITY TO LT-MILK PROCESSING UNITS.

RESPONDENT ANNEXURES Annexure R1(d) True extracts of relevant portion from the speech of the Hon'ble Minister for Power made in the Lok Sabha on 08.04.2003.

Annexure R1 (c) True extracts of relevant portion from the Report of the Standing Committee on Energy (2002) of Thirteenth Lok Sabha on Electricity Bill 2001, presented to Lok Sabha on 19.12.2002 Annexure R1 (a) True Copy of Order dated 01.09.2008 of the Kerala State Electricity Regulatory Commission in DP No. 39 of 2008 and connected cases.

Annexure R1 (b) True extracts of relevant portion of Electricity Bill, 2001

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