Karnataka High Court
Sri Sringeri Nelamau Samsthanam, ... vs State Of Karnataka And Others on 3 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: ILR1998KAR1532, 1998(2)KARLJ621
Author: Tirath S. Thakur
Bench: Tirath S. Thakur
ORDER
1. A question of considerable public importance arises for consideration in this writ petition. The question precisely is whether the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is in its application to what are known as Bombay Karnataka Areas of the present day State of Karnataka unconstitutional being discriminatory hence offensive to Article 14. In order to correctly appreciate the rival contentions urged at the Bar, it is necessary to briefly trace the historical background, in which the impugned enactment continues in its extra territorial application beyond the limits of the erstwhile State of Bombay now the State of Maharashtra.
2. Consequent upon the enactment of the States Reorganisation Act, State of Mysore-now the State of Karnataka was carved out as an independent administrative unit comprising the following:
(1) Areas included in the erstwhile Princely State of Mysore;
(2) Areas from the erstwhile State of Hyderabad presently known as the Hyderabad Karnataka areas;
(3) Areas from the erstwhile Madras presidency;
(4) Bombay Karnataka Areas that formed part of the State of Bombay before reorganisation; and (5) Areas comprising the State of Coorg, which was before independence directly administered by the British.
3. The reorganisation of the States and rearrangement of the administrative units were aimed at making such units linguistically homogeneous. In the process of reorganisation, regions which were governed by distinct laws were amalgamated to constitute the States in their present territorial configuration. with the result that such amalgamated areas comprising the States brought with them distinctly different laws, application whereof was continued by the Parliament enacting Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. The object underlying that provision, was to effectuate a quick transition without wasting time in any attempt to secure uniformity of laws which would have inevitably delayed the process of reorganisation. Section 119 was to provide for the interregnum between the reorganisation of the States and the time by which the Legislature of such States suitably amended, altered or modified such laws to make them uniform. The laws applicable to the regions that were merged in the new units were with that limited object in view continued on the grounds of necessity and expediency.
4. In the case of Karnataka, after reorganisation, apart from other laws applicable to the amalgamating regions from the adjoining States of Hyderabad, Madras and Bombay, laws dealing with religious and charitable endowments were also different. For instance in the old Mysore areas, religious and charitable institutions were governed by the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927. In the case of the old Madras areas of the State the law applicable was the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. Similarly, in the case of old Hyderabad areas of the State the law applicable was the Hyderabad Endowment Regulations, whereas in the erstwhile Coorg State Religious and Charitable Endowments were governed by the Coorg Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. In the case of areas that were taken out of what is now the State of Maharashtra also called the Bombay Karnataka Areas of the present day Karnataka, the religious and charitable institutions were governed by the provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It would thus appear that in respect of 5 different regions and areas that now constitute Karnataka, the laws relating to religious and charitable institutions and endowments are different. That is precisely how the Bombay Karnataka areas of the State of Karnataka are even now being governed by the Bombay Public Trusts Act as it existed on the date of reorganisation. Similarly, the Madras and Hyderabad Karnataka areas are being governed by the same provisions as were applicable to them before reorganisation. The only reason for the continued application of these laws which are in many respects different from each other is the philosophy underlying the provisions of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, which as noticed earlier was a transitory provision meant to bridge the gap between the reorganisation and the process of unification of the laws to be undertaken by the legislatures of the States concerned in due course.
5. The petitioner-Math claims to be a branch of Sri Dakshinamya Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Sharada Peetham, Sringeri situate in a dense forest at Anebylu Hamlet nearly 16 miles from Sirsi and established nearly 700 years ago by the 12th Jagadguru His Holiness Vidyaranya Shankaracharya of Sringeri Peetham. The math is presided over by a Matadhipathi or Pecthadipathi, who is the spiritual head and Guru with the power to manage the math, its properties and incomes derived therefrom. The principal object of the math is to impart vedic knowledge to the students and to train Vedic Scholars. According to the petitioner, the present Matadipathi was appointed by His Holiness Jagadguru of Sri Sringeri Math on 30-4-1986 and continues as such ever since. Although the Math has been registered under tbe Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 on 31-1- 1958, yet according to the petitioner, the registration was wholly unnecessary and even mala fide in nature for the same brought the affairs of the math under the control of the authorities exercising powers under the Act, correspondingly reducing the Matadhipathi's position to that of a subordinate, affecting his right to manage the temporalities of the math, and making an inroad into its religious affairs. The petitioner's grievance is that ever since the present Matadhipathi has taken over, the authorities exercising powers under the provisions of tbe Act have continuously interfered with the affairs of the math and the exercise of the powers vested in the Matadhipathi. He has not been allowed to use the gold jewellery belonging to the math to adorn the deity on festival occasions like Navarathri etc. and prevented from removing the jewellery belonging to the math from the locker until orders are issued by the Assistant Commissioner to that effect. Besides the Charity Commissioner has raised a demand for payment of contribution from the math to the Public Trust Administration Fund and threatened action against the petitioner in case it failed to remit the amount. The math has in the above background assailed the constitutional validity of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 on precisely speaking two grounds. Firstly on the ground that the petitioner-Math being a branch of the Sringeri Math, the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 can have no application to the branch, as the principal seat of the Math at Sringeri, is beyond the limits of the area to which the Act applies. Secondly, it is contended that the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution as the same metes out a discriminatory treatment to maths located in the Bombay Karnataka Areas of the State as against those that are established in other parts. It is pointed out that maths established and functioning in the erstwhile old Mysore State were not subjected to the type of controls, restrictions and levies as are being exercised and imposed by the authorities in respect of maths situate in the Bombay Karnataka Areas. Maths under the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927 are in fact exempted from the application of the provisions of the Act except in certain situations which give such institutions working in the old Mysore areas considerable independence and freedom of Management and control of its religious and other affairs.
6. Apart from the statement of objections, which the respondents have filed, an application has been moved by Sri Ramachandra Bhat and 4 others claiming to be devotees of the petitioner-Math for being impleaded as party respondents to the writ petition. The application inter alia points out that Sri Neelamav Math located in Neelamav village in Siddapur Taluk of U.K. District is an independent math with most of the devotees belonging to Havyaka Community residing in Neelamav and the adjacent villages. It is urged that the math is presided over by a Virakota Sanyasi as its Matadhipathi. Succession to the Peetha of the math is from Guru to Shishya selected by the presiding Mathadipathi after consultation with the devotees, failing which the devotees select the Matadhipathi after consulting Matadhipathi of similar other maths. The registration of the math as a Public Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 has been justified by the impleading applicants. It is also stated that the devotees had to initiate proceedings for the removal of the current Matadhipathi on account of his neglect in the performance of duties attached to the position held by him. It is alleged that the main object behind the petitioner filing the present writ petition is to get a decision from this Court to the effect that petitioner-Math is a Branch of Sri Sringeri Math as though the right to manage its affairs vests in the Sringeri Math. A detailed reply to the writ petition has also been filed by the impleading applicants, in which it is inter alia pointed out that there is no Math by the name Sri Sringeri Neelamav Samsthanam and that the only math known to exist at Neelamav is the Neelamav Math. It is however admitted that Sri Narayanananda Swamiji is the Matadhipathi of the math although it is alleged that his appointment came as a result of the decision taken by the devotees and not by reason of an appointment made by Sri Sringeri Swamiji.
7. Mr. K. Parasaran, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Math, confined his submissions at the bar to only the legal aspect of the controversy raised in the petition. He urged that in order to determine the constitutionality of the provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, it was not necessary to go into the question whether Neelamav Math was a branch of Sringeri Math or an independent math as claimed by the impleading applicants. He urged that for the purposes of examining the constitutionality of the enactment, the petitioner would without prejudice to its rights and contentions proceed on the assumption that the petitioner-Math was an independent math unconnected in any manner with the Sringeri Math with a Matadhipathi as its head. In that view, therefore, it becomes wholly unnecessary for this Court to go into the question whether there is any working or other relationship between the Sringeri Math on the one hand and the petitioner on the other. It is also unnecessary to go into the question whether Matadhipathi of the petitioner-Math is appointed by the Sringeri Swamiji or by the devotees of the math.
8. I may all the same deal with an alternative submission that was urged on behalf of the impleading applicants viz., that no math like the one described in this petition is in existence, so that a challenge to the validity of the Act could not be maintained in its name. Two important facts that are not disputed belie this submission. It is not disputed by the impleading applicants that Narayanananda Swamiji is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, under whose control and management the affairs of the trust are being run. It is also not disputed that Narayanananda Swamiji has appointed an Attorney, through whom the math has filed the present writ petition. The description of the petitioner as Sri Sringeri Neela mav Samsthanam, Shriman Neelamav Math, Siddapur Taluk, Uttara Kannada sufficiently identifies the petitioner-Math as the one, registered in the name of Neelamav Math under the Act. According to Mr. Bhatta the words 'Sriman Neelamav Math' used in describing the petitioner before the Court were enough, The expression 'Sri Sringeri Neelamav Samsthanam' used by the petitioner was according to him unnecessary for a correct and true description of the math. Assuming that to be so, it cannot he disputed that the description of the math has been given even in the manner the same ought to have been given according to Mr. Bhatta. I cannot subscribe to the view that this petition should he dismissed only because the description of the petitioner has some surplusages in it. The Court has to look to the substance of the matter more than the form. The contention urged to the contrary must therefore fail.
9. That brings me to the principal ground of attack urged on behalf of the petitioner. It was argued by Mr. Parasuram that the continuance of different laws dealing with religious and charitable institutions within the State of Karnataka even 41 years after the State was reorganised was per se discriminatory. It was contended that maths situate similarly in the old Mysore areas were being treated differently and had in fact been exempted from most of the provisions of the law that was prevalent in that part of the State. The transitory protection available to such discriminatory laws under Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act could no longer be claimed by the respondents nor could there be any cause for making such discriminatory laws a permanent feature by allowing them to continue on the statute book. It was streneously urged that the State Legislature had not acted in the matter even 17 years after the Supreme Court had in the case of His Holiness Shri Swamiji of Sri Admar Mutt v Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department , expressed the pious hope that it would do so to remedy the situation, by bringing a suitable legislation on the subject.
10. Mr. Rangavittalachar on the other hand contended that the continuance of different laws in different geographical areas of the State was a necessity for historical reasons and that the very fact that different laws were applicable to different regions of the same State was not sufficient for declaring anyone of them to be discriminatory. He urged that the petitioner had failed to produce materials and provide data to show that the Bombay Public Trusts Act was in its application to the Bombay Karnataka areas is discriminatory in nature. In the absence of any such data, argued the learned Counsel, the provisions of the Bombay Act could not be declared to be discriminatory.
11. In Bhaiyalal Shukla v State of Madhya Pradesh, their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon two earlier decisions of that Court in Maharaj Kumar Prithvi Raj v State of Rajasthan, and State of Madhya Pradesh v Gwalior Sugar Company Limited, declared that different laws in different parts of a State could be sustained on the ground that the differences arose from historical reasons and that a geographical classification based on historical reasons was permissible. That view was followed by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited, where levy of agricultural income tax in the area comprising the former State of Bhopal even after its merger in the new State of Madhya Pradesh was questioned on the ground of being discriminatory as no such levy existed in the other parts of the State. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh upheld the plea of the petitioner, but on an appeal, that view was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court declared that continuance of the laws applicable to the amalgamating areas even after reorganisation of the States was not by itself discriminatory even though it resulted in differential treatment of persons, objects and transactions in the new State. Continuance of such laws was for the dual purpose of facilitating early formation of homogeneous units in the larger interest of the union while at the same time maintaining the distinctive character of each region till uniformity of laws was secured in branches, in which it was expedient to do so. The laws of the regions that were emerged in the new units had to be continued on the grounds of necessity and expediency. That object was achieved through the provisions of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. The new units were to consider in due course the special circumstances of the regions merged in them before launching a process of adoption of laws so as to make them reasonably uniform. Differential treatment arising out of the application of the laws so continued in different regions of the reorganised States did not, observed the Court, immediately attract the prohibition against discrimination, but warned that.-
"by the passage of time, considerations of necessity and expediency would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified classification of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease to be valid. A purely temporary provision which because of compelling forces justified differential treatment when the Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assume permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared. It would be impossible to lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution. That initially there was a valid geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful discrimination in view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into the continuance of the grounds on which the inequality could rationally be founded, and the change of circumstances, if any, which obliterated the compulsion of expediency and necessity existing at the time when the Reorganisation Act was enacted".
12. The above was followed in Sri Vishwesha Thirtha Swamiar v State of Mysore and in His Holiness Shri Swamiji of Sri Admar Mutt's case, supra. In the latter case the challenge was to the continued application of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 in areas which earlier formed a part of the State of Madras. It was contended that the continued application of the Madras Act to a part of the State of Karnataka was unconstitutional and discriminatory as the inequality between temples and maths situate in South Canara to which the said Act applies and temples and maths situate elsewhere was patent. Speaking for the Court, Chandrachud, C.J., (as his Lordship then was), observed that an indefinite extension and application of unequal laws for all times to come, was bound to militate against their true character as temporary measures taken in order to serve a temporary purpose. The continued application of such laws would shake the very foundation of their constitutionality, the foundation being Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, which was meant to serve the limited purpose of giving reasonable time to the new units to consider the special circumstances obtaining in respect of diverse regions merged into it. The Court declared that the decision to withdraw the application of unequal laws to equals could not be delayed unreasonably because the relevance of historical reasons, which justified the application of unequal laws was bound to wear out with the passage of time. The Court applied the maxim 'Cessante Rations Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex', that is to say "reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself. Having said so, two reasons which dissuaded the Court from striking down the impugned legislation in that case were (1) that the period under consideration was just 5 or 6 years after the passing of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and (2) that there was no data to decide the question whether the impugned legislation did make any hostile discrimination. The Court all the same struck a note of caution, which it is fruitful to extract in extenso for it has a direct bearing on the question that arises for consideration in this writ petition.
"But that is how the matter stands today. Twenty three years have gone by since the States Reorganisation Act was passed but unhappily, no serious effort has been made by the State Legislature to introduce any legislation --apart from two abortive attempts in 1963 and 1977 -- to remove the inequality between the temples and Mutts situated in the South Kanara District and those situated in other areas of Karnataka. Inequality is so clearly writ large on the face of the impugned statute in its application to the District of South Kanara only, that it is perilously near the periphery of unconstitutionality. We have restrained ourselves from declaring the law as inapplicable to the District of South Kanara from today but we would like to make it clear that if the Karnataka Legislature does not act promptly and remove the inequality arising out of the application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the District of South Kanara only, the Act will have to suffer a serious and successful challenge in the not distant future. We do hope that the Government of Karnataka will act promptly and move an appropriate legislation, say, within a year or so. A comprehensive legislation which will apply to all temples and Mutts in Karnataka, which are equally situated in the context of the levy of fee, may perhaps afford a satisfactory solution to the problem. This, however, is a tentative view-point because we have not investigated whether the Madras Act of 1951, particularly Section 76(1) thereof, is a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that would involve the violation of Article 14. Facts in regard thereto may have to be explored, if and when occasion arises".
(emphasis supplied)
13. The development of law on the subject has therefore gradually favoured the proposition that what was once a non-discriminatory piece of legislation may in the course of time become discriminatory and be exposed to a successful challenge on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. Just because the enactment was constitutionally valid at the time the same was brought into existence would not mean that the same would be immune from a challenge on the ground of unconstitutionality at a later point of time. Historical considerations, on which such geographical classifications were accepted could not provide a sound basis for discriminatory laws to continue for all times to come. Such historical considerations would wear out with passage of time exposing the provisions, which were accepted by the system as a transitory phase to serious challenge of constitutionality -- Narottam Kishore Deb Varman and Others v Union of India and Another and Motor General Traders and Another v State of Andhra Pradesh and Others.
14. In the instant case, the provisions of the Bombay Act have continued and so have the Madras and the Hyderabad Acts in their application to the State of Karnataka even 40 years after the State was reorganised. The Karnataka Legislature has not even after the lapse of 17 years since the observations made by the Supreme Court in Admar Mutt's case, supra, passed a uniform legislation to remove the inequalities arising out of the application of different laws to different areas in the State of Karnataka and the religious and charitable institutions established therein. The comprehensive legislation, which the Supreme Court had expected to be brought in relation to religious and charitable institutions continues to be a distant dream even today. No headway seems to have been made in the intervening period to create even flicker of a hope for any such legislation to take birth in the near future. It is in these circumstances difficult to continue the presumption of constitutionality of such diverse legislations on the touch stone of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. That provision was never meant to be either a permanent feature or protest the diverse and materially different legislations against the challenge of unconstitutionality on the ground of discrimination for all times to come. A gap of 41 years is a long enough period even in the life of a nation, for any Court to declare that a temporary arrangement could never have been meant to stretch itself for that long. The provisions of the Bombay Act can therefore no longer be sustained for their constitutionality only on the beneficence of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act.
15. It is time now to examine whether there is any material difference between the Scheme underlying the Bombay Act in its application to the Bombay Karnataka areas as against other enactments that are applicable to the remaining areas of the State, It is essential to do so because it was argued on behalf of the respondents that there was no material difference between the legal position as it applies to Bombay Karnataka areas and that applicable to the remaining regions so as to constitute a differential treatment offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution. As noticed earlier, the State is presently governed by five different enactments insofar as charitable and religious institutions are concerned. These laws are materially different from each other, but for the purposes of demonstrating the legitimacy of this contention, it would be enough if we compare the provisions of the Bombay Act with those of the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927 applicable at present to the old Mysore areas of the State. Section 24 of the latter Act specifically excludes maths and other institutions of similar nature from the provisions of Chapters II and III. Chapter II of the Act deals with control and management of Muzrai Institutions whereas Chapter III relates to public religious and charitable institutions other than Muzrai Institutions. It is noteworthy that Section 14 appearing in Chapter III of the Act empowers the Government to undertake either temporarily or permanently the management of a public religious and charitable institution in the situations enumerated therein. By reason of the provisions of Section 24, however, the power vested under Section 14 are not available to the Government in the case of maths or properties owned or possessed by them. Section 25 of the Act, however, empowers the State Government to take over the management of any maths in certain situations which are by their very nature exceptional in character. The power to take over is exercisable only when the Matadhipathi or the head of the institution voluntarily applies for such help and places the institution and its property under the management of the Government or when he is dead or has left the country and has not been heard of for more than seven years and has not made legal and satisfactory arrangements for carrying on of the ordinary business of the institution and there is no successor duly appointed, according to law, or custom applicable to succession of the office. And lastly, when he is a minor without a duly appointed guardian, fit and willing to act as such, or is by reason of physical or mental infirmity unable to manage the affairs of the institution. The only other situation, in which the Government may take over the management of a math or similar other institution is where a complaint is received by it in writing by the disciples or other persons interested in the math and the Government has reason to believe that the Matadhipathi or the head of the institution has been grossly mismanaging the property of the institution or has alienated or is attempting to alienate the whole or any part of such property for improper purposes. In any such event, the Government has the power under Section 26 of the Act to order an enquiry by a Committee of not less than 3 persons, one atleast of whom shall be a disciple of or a person interested in the math. It is only upon the completion of the enquiry by the Committee and the receipt of the report by the Government, that it may take over the management of the institution or pass such other orders as may be deemed fit concerning its affairs and properties. The Scheme of the Mysore Act therefore in its application to maths and similar other institutions is limited to the provisions contained in Chapter IV comprising Sections 24 to 31, which provide for Government intervention only in exceptional situations or in a situation where a statutory enquiry conducted under Sections 26 and 27 of the Act has established gross mismanagement of the property of the institution or attempts to alienate whole or any part of the property by the Matadhipathi or the head of any such institution. It is noteworthy that except Chapter IV of the Mysore Act, the maths and similar other institutions headed by Matadhipathis, who are entitled by law or general or particular usage to exercise the powers of management or ownership are free from any State or other regulatory control under the Act in so far as the management of the affairs of the maths are concerned.
16. Placed in juxtaposition, the Scheme underlying the Bombay Public Trusts Act is entirely different. This can be demonstrated by a brief reference to some of the provisions of the Act, which deal with the major features of the said scheme. Section 3 of the Bombay Act empowers the State Government to appoint a Charity Commissioner to exercise powers and perform duties and functions conferred under the provisions of the Act. The powers exercisable by the Charity Commissioner are detailed in Section 69 and include the power to direct a special audit of the accounts of a Public Trust under Section 33, the power to enter and inspect any trust property, to call for and inspect any proceedings of the trustees and to call for any written statement, account or report from them, or any person connected with a Public Trust and the power to hold an enquiry in regard to any loss caused to a Public Trust under Section 40 and to order a surcharge under Section 41. The term Public Trust has been defined to mean an express or constructive trust for either a public, religious or charitable purpose or both including a temple, a math, a wakf, a charity or any other place of public religious worship including religious or charitable endowments. In terms of Section 18, the trustees of a Public Trust to which the Act applies are duty bound to make an application for registration of the trust, whereas under Section 22 of the Act, the trustee is within the period prescribed obliged to report any change or proposed change in the trust to the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner. Section 31 of the Act bars suits for enforcement of any right on behalf of a Public Trust if the trust has not been registered under the Act. Under Chapter V of the Act, the trustees are obliged to keep regular accounts in such form as may be approved by the Charity Commissioner and to balance the same and get them audited annually in terms of Sections 32 and 33 of the Act. Chapter VI of the Act deals with the control of Public Trusts and empowers under Section 37 the Charity Commissioner to enter and inspect or cause to be entered on and inspect any property belonging to a trust, to call for and inspect any proceedings of the trustees of any Public Trust and any book of accounts or document in the possession or under the control of the trustees or any person connected with the trust. Section 40 of the Act empowers the Charity Commissioner to determine the amount of loss caused to a Public Trust and the amount which any of the trustees or any person connected with the Public Trust is liable to be applied to the Public Trust. Under Section 41 of the Act, the Charity Commissioner can hold any person liable to pay to the Public Trust any amount for the loss caused to the trust and any such order made by him is subject to Section 72 of the Act final and conclusive. In terms of Section 47, the Charity Commissioner can suspend, remove or discharge trustees and vest the property of the trust in new trustees on any one of the grounds stipulated therein, whereas Section 50 deals with suits by or against or relating to Public Trust or trustees. Section 51 provides for consent of the Charity Commissioner to be obtained before institution of suits of the nature specified in Section 50 whereas Section 52 excludes the application of Sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code to Public Trusts, Section 57 provides for establishing a fund to be called a Public Trusts Administration Fund, whereas Section 58 obliges the Public Trusts to pay into the said fund such contributions as are prescribed annually. Non-payment of any such contribution is made penal by Section 59. So also the violation of the provisions of Sections 18(1) and (4), 18(7), 22, 29, 32, 35 and 59 of the Act are in terms of Section 66 of the Act made punishable. Section 67 provides for the consequences of contravention of any other provisions of the Act or failure without reasonable cause to comply with any order passed or direction issued under the provisions of the Act by the Charity Commissioner or the Joint, Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner and makes them punishable with fine.
17. It would thus appear that the entire scheme underlying the Bombay Act is different. A math under the said Act is as good a Public Trust as a temple, a wakf or any other charitable institution. It is subjected to the same regulatory and other statutory controls as can be exercised by the authorities under the Act qua other religious and charitable institutions registered thereunder. In particular, the Bombay Act provides for compulsory registration of every math as a Public Trust under the Act and makes the violation of the said requirement punishable. Similarly, the Bombay Act obliges the trustees to maintain accounts in the manner prescribed and approved by the Charity Commissioner and to invest the trust money in the manner prescribed by Section 35 and makes any violation with the said applications punishable. So also the failure to contribute the prescribed amount under Section 59 is made an offence punishable with fine. All these provisions and features are peculiar to the Bombay Act and do not have any equivalent in the Mysore Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. The philosophy under the latter Act appears to be leave the maths to manage their own affairs except in situations where it is absolutely necessary to intervene such as the situations envisaged by Sections 25 and 26 of the said Act. That however is not so under the Bombay Act, which treats the maths on an equal footing with other Public Trusts and subjects them to the rigors of the Act without any exception. The question therefore is whether maths that are similarly circumstanced and established for the same purpose can be subjected to a differential treatment in regard to the management of its affairs including the properties owned by it and incomes flowing from the same. As an abstract proposition of law, it cannot be disputed that a mere differential treatment by reason of the law making different provisions does not offend Article 14. So also merely because similar institutions, subjects or persons are treated differently by different enactments whether passed simultaneously or at different points of time would not per se constitute a discrimination, subject to an all important caveat viz., that the differential treatment is on account of some intelligible differentia between the subjects, institutions or the persons that are grouped together and those left out of the group. Stated differently, classification made for purpose of applying different provisions of law or scheme underlying such laws to institutions, persons or subjects must be valid.
18. Now it is well-settled that for a classification to be declared valid, it must satisfy two conditions viz,
(i) That the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and
(ii) That the differentia must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
19. Stated conversely, if the classification is not based on any rational differentia or if the differentia does not have any relation with the object underlying the Act, the same would offend the equal protection clause contained in Article 14. Decisions on the point are a legion, and I see no need for multiplying authority, in support of the above proposition which is now accepted as a self evident truth. The equal protection clause in Article 14, owes its origin to the American Constitution and is understood both in America and India to mean the absence of any arbitrary discrimination by the laws themselves or in their administration. None should be favoured and none should be placed under any disadvantage in circumstances which admit of no reasonable justification for a different treatment. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali, equal protection means the right to equal treatment in similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed by the laws.
20. let us then examine, whether the impugned Act satisfies the requirements of a valid classification. The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the then State of Bombay. After reorganisation the law has continued as though the same was enacted by the State of Karnataka. As observed earlier, the historical reasons for the existence of different laws in different regions of the State having ceased to provide the life support for their continuance, the continued application of such diverse laws shall have to be justified on some other rational basis. In other words, the classification of maths and other charitable institutions in the Bombay Karnataka areas, for purpose of applying to them a legal scheme which is materially different from the ones prevelant in any other part of the State must not only be based on a rational differentia between institutions established in Bombay Karnataka areas, as against those established in other parts of the State, but such a classification must bear a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned enactment. Now if the object of the Bombay Act is to provide for better administration of the trusts in the State, as indeed is the position even with the other four enactments applicable to other regions, then there is no reason why maths and similar other institutions established and functioning in the Bombay Karnataka area alone should be subjected to the type of regulatory and other controls, while similar institutions for instance in old Mysore areas of the State, do not suffer such control. It is nobody's case that maths in Bombay Karnataka areas are in any way different from those that are established in the other part of the State. The concept of maths owes its origin to 8th Century A.D. when the great Hindu thinker and reformer Adi Shankaracharya established four maths in the four corners of the Indian Peninsula, namely; Kalika Math at Dwarka in the West, the Joytir math at Badrinath in the North, the Goverdhan math at Jagannath in the East and the Sarda Math at Sringeri (Mysore) in the South. These maths were meant to inculcate knowledge of the Shastras and the Vedas from generation to generation. They were centres of learning established to perpetuate Vedanta and strengthen the Doctrine of Non-dualistic Philosophy which Shankara preached. In due course, similar other maths and institutions were established in other parts of country also which have flourished, from one generation of gurus to the other. The purpose and the philosophy underlying these institutions continues to be to impart religious education and train scholars for preparation of the tenets of Hindu religion. It is not therefore possible to distinguish one math from the other on the basis of any rational or intelligible differentia. They are all religious centres with no philosophical or functional difference, capable of providing a sound basis for a valid classification distinguishing one group from the other. Except the historial reasons, by which maths in Bombay Karnataka areas were treated differently by the law, there is no other reason why that differential treatment should continue qua similar institutions in other parts of the State. Historial reasons could but temporarily justify such treatment. That justification has, worn out with passage of time, without a uniform law having been brought to remove the inequalities. The Bombay Act in the above backdrop violates the equal protection clause contained in Article 14, and is therefore unconstitutional in its application to the State of Karnataka.
21. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed, and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, in its application to the State of Karnataka is struck down as unconstitutional. The respondents shall stand restrained from taking any steps or action against the petitioner trust on the strength of the provisions of the said Act. The parties are however left to bear their own costs.