Madras High Court
Ramakrishna Mudaliar (Deceased) vs The Special Tahsildar on 30 July, 2010
Author: K.Chandru
Bench: K.Chandru
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 30.07.2010 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU A.S. Nos.14 and 15 of 2000, 24, 25, 34 to 43, 48 to 52, 54, 55,62 to 68, 70, 71, 73, 77, 78, 80, 82 to 86, 89 to 104,106 to 113,115 to 121,124 to 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 171 to 174, 255 to 308, 327, 352 to 382, 411 to 447, 488 to 493, 506 to 512, 522 to 530, 532 to 539, 558 to 588, 626,630 and 1147 of 2001 and 406 of 2002 and C.M.P.NOS.1815, 1803, 2014 to 2023, 2028 to 2032, 2034, 2035, 2042 to 2048, 2050, 2051, 2053, 2057, 2058, 2060, 2062 to 2066, 2069 to 2077, 2088 to 2094,2096 to 2103, 2105 to 2111, 2114 to 2147, 2149, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 4774 to 4827, 5618, 6597 to 6627,6730 to 6766,7918 to 7923, 8030 to 8036, 8107 to 8115, 8199 to 8206, 8547 to 8577, 9250, 9312 and 20827 of 2001 and 1094 of 2002 1.Ramakrishna Mudaliar (deceased) 2.Veeraraghava Mudaliar 3.Kanniammal 4.P.Vijayakrishnan 5.M.R.Chitra 6.M.S.Bagyalakshmi 7.M.S.Venkatesan 8.M.S.Aranganathan 9.M.R.Srinivasan 10.M.R.Suseela (Appellants 9 and 10 brought on record as LRs of deceased first appellant vide order dated 26.2.2010 in CMP No.9296 of 2002) .. Appellants in A.S.No.14 of 2000 Vs. 1.The Special Tahsildar, L.A.O.R.P. Scheme, Saidapet, Chennai-15. 2.Thiagarajan .. Respondents in A.S.No.14 of 2000 These Appeal Suits have been preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against the common judgment and decree made in several LAOPs starting from LAOP No.550 of 1986, dated 16.10.1998 on the file of the Sub Court, Thiruvallur. For Appellant : Mr.C.Hanumantha Rao For Respondents : MR.V.Ravi, Spl.G.P.(AS) for R-1 in all A.S. Mr.M.Venkatachapathy, SC for M/s.M.Sriram, D.Rajendran, R.Devaraj, Ramesh Venkatachalapathy in A.S.Nos.39,52,64,66,68, 359,363,366,412,507,558 and 572 of 2001 Mr.Sivakumar for M/s.S.Sivakumar & S.Ananth in A.S.No.119 of 2001 and M/s.C.M.Gunasekaran and T.S.Kani in A.S.No.173 of 2001 - - - - COMMON JUDGMENT
These batch of Appeal Suits were filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act by the appellants, challenging a common judgment and decree made in various LAOPs starting from 550 of 1986 and batch cases, dated 16.10.1998 rendered by the Sub Court, Thiruvallur.
2.In all the LAOPs, the court below rejected the claim of the appellants for their demand of payment of compensation on account of acquisition of lands for the purpose of setting up Manali Oil Refinery Project in the village of Manali coming under Saidapet Taluk. The Special Tahsildar-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Oil Refinery Project was the acquiring authority.
3.The State Government by an order in G.O.Ms.No.114 (ILC), dated 20.1.1965 approved the draft notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act from Manali and its adjoining villages. After following due procedure, various awards were passed starting from Award No.1 of 1986 for acquiring the lands. There was hardly any dispute regarding the quantum of compensation. However, since there was a dispute regarding the demand for compensation from various quarters, the amounts were deposited and the matter was referred to for determination under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said references were registered as various LAOPs starting from LAOP No.550 of 1986 by the Sub Court, Thiruvallur. On behalf of appellants, a claim statement was filed. The contesting respondents staked their claim on various grounds.
4.Before the reference court, on behalf of the appellants (who are rival claimants), the first appellant Ramakrishna Mudaliar (since deceased) was examined as C.W.1. On behalf of original claimants (contesting respondents), M/s. Venugopal Pillai, Krishnamurthy and Thyagarajan were examined as C.W.2 to C.W.4. Since it is only a dispute for payment of compensation, the acquiring authority who is the first respondent in all appeals did not make any statement. On behalf of all claimants, 56 documents were filed. It is unfortunate that the Reference Court generally numbered all the exhibits as claimants' exhibits without indicating as to whose behalf those exhibits were filed.
5.The Reference Court on the basis of the evidence by a common judgment, dated 16.10.1998 rejected the demands of rival claimants, i.e. appellants herein and permitted the claimants who are contesting respondents to receive the compensation. It is as against this common judgment, these appeals were filed.
6.Pending the appeals, this court granted an interim stay of execution of judgment and decree passed by the court below. The result was the parties to which amounts were entitled to, could not enjoy the fruits of such Award of compensation for over 10 years. During the pendency of appeals, the first appellant died and his LRs were brought on record. Even though notice was ordered on all appeals, in number of cases, the contesting respondents are no more and no steps were taken to bring proper LRs. In some cases, contesting respondents are yet to be served and the appeals are not in complete shape. Likewise, in some cases, where notices were ordered, appellants had not paid processing fees so as to send notices to contesting respondents.
7.Since these appeals were of the years 2000 to 2002 and more than 9 years have elapsed and also the fact that the the order of the court below was of the year 1998 and the LAOPS of the year 1986, this court is not inclined to show any further indulgence. Under these circumstances, those appeal suits are liable to be rejected on a short ground.
8.In cases where there was contest and matters were argued, it is necessary to deal with the same on merits even though those appeals could also have been rejected on short technical ground. That in respect of some claims, the Award became final and that will operate as res judicata in respect of the other claims.
History of land acquisition:
9.Manali village in Saidapet Taluk was not taken over as an Inam Estate. But after the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was made by the State Government, the said village was taken over on 15.12.1966 under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1963, by G.O.Ms.No.3265, Revenue, dated 22.11.1966. Though soil classification and fixation of assessment were done, the proceedings for acquisition of those lands were not finalised. At that juncture, Ramakrishna Mudaliar (original first appellant) filed a writ petition before this court being W.P.No.2816 of 1966 questioning the validity and applicability of 1963 Act to Inam village which is Manali. Initially, this court granted stay of further proceedings of taking over Inam village. Though interim stay was granted from taking over the village, the State Government considered whether that can bar the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act to be completed. Therefore, the Government issued G.O.No.1111, Revenue, dated 3.6.1969 and directed the acquiring authority to pass an Award without waiting for the final decision in that writ petition.
10.Subsequently, the interim stay granted by this court was vacated and Manali village was taken over by the Government on 15.4.1970. The ryotwari settlement was introduced in Fasli 1382 (1.7.1972) and settlement proceedings were completed under 1963 Act during the year 1976. The contesting respondents filed applications for the grant of ryotwari patta in their favour. As against the order passed by the settlement authorities, the appellants filed appeals in various civil miscellaneous appeals before the Tribunal constituted under the 1963 Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by appellants and confirmed the orders of the settlement authorities. The appellants did not challenge those orders before the Special Appellate Tribunal (which is this high Court) under Section 46 of the 1963 Act. Thus, those proceedings came to an end on 31.7.1978.
11.In the meanwhile, the Award enquiry was completed. The writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the acquisition of lands was also dismissed by this court in W.P.No.2816 of 1966 on 1.12.1969. The contesting respondents were in physical possession and enjoyment of the lands in question and were directly cultivating those lands. The acquiring authority, i.e. first respondent completed the acquisition proceedings and passed the Award. As against the Award passed by the acquiring authority, the State Government filed writ petitions before this court being W.P.No.489 of 1971 and batch cases and contended that the market value fixed by the acquiring authority was exorbitant and was done by fraudulent exercise of power. In those writ petitions, two acquiring authorities were named in their personal names and the appellants were also made as party respondents. Before this court, two contentions were raised, i.e. the State Government is estopped from contending that the market value fixed by the authorities were erroneous and that the writ petitions were not maintainable. This court by a final judgment, dated 20.6.1974 dismissed those writ petitions. This court held that the market value fixed by the authorities can still be questioned, but a writ petition challenging the Award passed by the acquiring authority was not maintainable since the subject matter of valuation can be referred for determination by a reference court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Order of Reference:
12.During the award enquiry, the appellants on one side (henceforth known as rival claimants) and contesting respondents on the other side, i.e. claimants, staked their claims to get the compensation. Therefore, the authority, referred the matter for determination under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The order passed by the authority reads as follows:
"...the land owners above mentioned have objected to the apportionment of any amount in favour of the Ex-land holder towards melwaram share and requested that the entire compensation be paid to them. Whereas the ex-land holder has claimed entire compensdation in favour of himself and his brothers as explained earlier. Since there is dispute in the apportionment of compensation, a reference to the court will be made under section 30 and the compensation 31(2) of the L.A. Act."
It was thereafter these separate references were registered and separate LAOP numbers were assigned.
Claim made by the Contesting Respondents:
13.Before the Reference Court, the claimants contended that lands in Manali village became an estate and it was notified on 15.12.1966 under Section 1(4) of the Tamil Nadi Act 26/1963. The challenge made by rival claimants was dismissed by this court in W.P.No.2816 of 1966. Subsequently, the area was surveyed and brought under settlement account. Notice under Form 5 was issued for an enquiry and interested persons were issued with Form 6 notices. During the course of the said enquiry, claimants and rival claimants appeared before the settlement authority. The village munsif and the other witnesses deposed before the settlement authority. The rival claimants though appeared through their staff never produced any documents. The settlement authority held that claimants are in possession of lands. They are cultivating the lands by paying necessary kist and cash. The kist receipts were also produced before the authorities. The authorities found that they were tenants covered by tenancy agreement having short term lease was not accepted and held that claimants (contesting respondents) are entitled for patta in respect of lands. The rival claimants being appellants appealed before the Tribunal. But it was also rejected on 31.7.1978. They are also in continuous possession of the lands for over a long period and cultivating the lands by putting their own physical labour. They were also having UDR patta.
14.It was also contended that in the settlement proceedings as well as before the Tribunal, Chengalpet, the rival claimants did not prove their title to the property. The possession with reference to the land acquisition was taken only from claimants. After settlement proceedings, the rival claimants had received compensation for loss of their right under the Inam Act 26/1961 and the present claim that they are owners of lands cannot be accepted.
The case put forth by rival claimants (Appellants) :
15.The appellants contended that Manali is Inam village and they are grantees of Shotriem from the Nizam of Hyderabad. The grant was given even before the advent of East India Company and they are Mirazdars of the village. They also owned Kidivaram right in respect of lands. In respect of Thumbivaram, tenants were given permission to cultivate and they are bayakarries. Under Section 9 of the Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, it was held that Inam would attract an Inam estate in terms of Section 2(7). As against the said decision, appellant's father filed an appeal before the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Madurai. The Estate Abolition Tribunal by its judgment, dated 28.11.1950 held that Manali and two other Inam estate are not Inam estate liable to be notified under Act 26/1948. Therefore, all lands in the village are private lands of Inamdars. The claimants never challenged and proved before any tribunal their right to have any ownership in the land. The Government did not collect any reduced rent from the tenants of appellants in terms of Tamil Nadu Act 30/1947. Therefore, when acquiring authorities took over the acquired lands, they ought to have paid compensation only to the true owners of lands, i.e. Appellants. The Act 26/1963 has no application to the case on hand. They were in possession and enjoyment of acquired land and possession was taken over only from them. They did not lose their occupancy right in terms of Section 6-A of the Madras Estate Land Act, 1968 and the lands are private lands in terms of Section 3(10)(b) of the Estate Land Act 1968. At no point of time, Kudivaram interest was taken over from them and given in favour of tenants. Therefore, they are eligible to get the entire compensation.
Decision by the Reference Court :
16.The Reference Court found that the appellants did not establish that they are in possession and enjoyment of properties consequent upon partition among family members in terms of Section C(2). They had not produced any kist receipt to prove the same. CW.1 Ramakrishna Mudaliar in his evidence admitted that rents were not collected from contesting respondents. In terms of Ex.C.56, it is found that the appellants had received compensation for abolition of Inam under Act 26/1963. C.W.1 feigned ignorance about the appeal being filed against settlement proceedings. Though a claim was made that they were cultivating the entire 300 acres and certain properties were sold, no document was produced including Adangal. The court below also found that C.W.1 though claimed that they were cultivating the lands, they had not produced any document to show that they were paying Agricultural Income Tax. Therefore, as a matter of fact, it was found that the appellants were not in direct cultivation of lands. On the other hand, after going through the documents and evidence of C.W.2 Venugopala Piullai, the court below found that as against patta proceedings, appeals were filed and the same were rejected by the Tribunal and no further appeals were filed to the Special Appellate Tribunal, i.e. this High Court.
17.The contesting respondents had also filed patta in their favour as well as kist receipts. Ex.C.54 shows that after proceedings issued by the Survey and Settlement Director, compensation was received by the appellants for abolition of Inam estate. C.W.3 Krishnamurthy had filed documents to show that he had purchased the property on 10.10.1923 which was marked as Exs.C.20,21 and 22. The ryotwari patta and the assessment receipt show that it is the contesting respondents who are in enjoyment of lands in question. The court below also found that Ex.C.25 was an encumbrance certificate for the periods from 1926 to 1938 showing their ownership. Ex.C.26 is a copy of SLR. Exs.C.27 and 28 are orders passed by the settlement officer. Exs.C.29 and 30 are pattas. Thereore, it held that there has been proper proceedings by the settlement authorities. The appeal filed in CMA No.105 of 1977 was also rejected in terms of Ex.C.31 and no second appeal was filed before the Special Appellate Tribunal.
18.The chitta register is filed as Ex.C.32 and having obtained compensation in terms of the 1963 Act for abolition of Inam, the very same persons, i.e. Appellants cannot ask for second compensation as if owners of lands. Even under UDR scheme, notices were given only to contesting respondents for grant of UDR pattas and the same was filed as Ex.C.37. Under these circumstances, the court below found that going by sale deed, chitta, adangal, kist and assessment receipts clearly show that it is the contesting respondents who are owners and they are in possession and enjoyment of lands. They are also directly cultivating the lands. It is under these circumstances, the Reference Court passed the judgment rejecting the claim of appellants and directed the acquiring authority to grant compensation to contesting respondents.
Case of the Appellants :
19.Assailing this judgment, Mr.C.Hanumantha Rao, learned counsel for appellants in all appeals contended that orders passed in Revenue Appeal Nos.264,265 and 266 of 1950 by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Madurai, dated 28.11.1950 will show that Manali village is an exempted village and not covered by the Inam Estate Land Act. The appellants are Egaboga Mirazdars of three villages including Manali. They also owned Kudivaram rights and no other person can claim right in those villages. Therefore, it cannot be held to be an Inam Estate. Since this order was not challenged and became final, they need not produce any other document to show their ownership of the lands, which are acquired by the first respondent.
20.They also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aluru Kondayya and others Vs. Singaraju Rama Rao and others reported in AIR 1966 SC 681. The Supreme Court while dealing with the history of the land tenure in South India as well as the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, in paragraphs 22 and 23 observed as follows:
22. The Legislature with a view to define the relations between landlords and tenants in inam villages promulgated Madras Act 1 of 1908. The material part of Section 6(1) as amended by Madras Act 8 of 1934 and 18 of 1936 provided:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.
Explanation (1).For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression every ryot now in possession shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act.
Explanation (2)-(3) * * * Section 3 sub-section (2) defined the expression estate within the meaning of the Act and insofar as it is material for this case, it provided as originally enacted:
In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context Estate Means
(a) any permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari;
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector;
(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;
(d) any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been made, confirmed, or recognised by the British Government, or any separated part of such village;
(e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified above in clauses (a), (b) and (q) which is held on a permanent under-tenure. Kudivararn is a Tamil word, which signifies the cultivators share in the produce of land as distinguished from the landlords share received by him as rent, which is called melvaram. Kudivararn has acquired a secondary meaning, it means the cultivators interest in the land, and melvaram the landlords interest in the land. The definition of estate in clause (d) gave rise to considerable litigation which called for determination of two questions: (1) whether there was a grant of the whole village so as to make the area granted an estate; and (2) whether the landlord to whom the land was granted owned the kudivaram. In cases which came before the Courts it appeared that apart from the grant which was claimed to be a grant of an estate, there were in each village other grants, religious, service and personal, and evidence about the commencement of these minor grants and the terms on which they were granted was not forthcoming.
23. In G. Narayanaswami Nayudu v. N. Subramanyam 2 in a suit filed by the receiver of the Nidadaole estate for possession of certain lands the tenant claimed that he had acquired occupancy rights under Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908. There were in the village minor inams of three classes: archaka service inams, village service inams, and dharandaya inams, and there was no evidence whether the grant to the plaintiffs estate of the village was made first, or whether the minor inams were granted first. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff estate that inasmuch as there were minor inams in the village, the Venkatapuram agraharam could not be said to be a village of which the land revenue had been granted as inam within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act. The Court rejected that contention and observed:
The definition in sub-section 2, clause (d) was obviously intended to exclude from the definition of Estate what are known as minor inams, namely, particular extends of land in a particular village as contrasted with the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter are known as whole inam villages. The existence of minor mains, in whole inam villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the definition of Estate almost all the agraharam, shrotriyam and mokhasa villages will be excluded.
This certainly cannot have been the intention of the legislature. These minor inams are generally granted for service to be rendered to the village or to the owner and that seems to be the nature of the minor inams in this case. The Court therefore held that Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act excludes from the definition of estate minor inams, and a grant which purports to be a grant of a whole inam village is an estate within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 3(2), even though it may be found that there are lands held by grantees under minor inams. The Legislature in 1936 substituted for clause (d) of Section 3(2) the following clause by the Madras Estates Land. (Third Amendment) Act,. 18 of 1936:
(d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees.
21.In paragraph 31, the Supreme Court further observed as follows:
31. Section 23 was added by Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act 18 of 1936. It reads:
Where in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not an estate within the meaning of this Act as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that such village or part was an estate. The presumption under Section 23 in terms applies only to cases in which the question whether an inam village was an estate before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. Under the Act, before it was amended in 1936, a grant of a village could be deemed a grant of an estate where only melvaram was granted to the inamdar and not where both the melvaram and the kudivaram were granted. By enacting Section 23 the Legislature intended to declare that in determining whether under a grant of an inam village both varama were granted or only the melvaram was granted, it shall be presumed, until the contrary was shown, that such village or part thereof was an estate, that is, only the melvaram was granted. Under the Act before its amendment, one of the conditions of the applicability of Section 3(2)(d) was that the grant in favour of the inamdar was only of the melvaram, and that it did not include the kudivaram. and the Legislature by Section 23 as amended provided that in a dispute arising between the landlord and tenant whether an inam village was or was not an estate, it was to be presumed that it was only of the melvaram...."
22.He further referred to a division bench judgment of this court in Vedaranyeswaraswami Devastyhanam by its Executive Officer, Vedaranyam, Nagai Q.M. District Vs. A.C.Dharma Devi and othes reported in 2003-1-LW.663 for the purpose of contending that the person holding ryotwari patta before introduction of Inam Abolition Act can be subjected to provisions of the 1963 Act and his rights can be abolished by virtue of the Act. In fact, far from abolition to so-called Inam, the claim of persons entitled to grant of ryotwari patta has to be examined and settled.
Contentions of the Respondents :
23.Per contra, Mr.M.venkatachalapathy, Senior counsel appearing for some of the contesting respondents contended that in the absence of any other evidence disclosing title of either party, the patta standing in the name of persons can be taken as good record on possession and authority under Section 30 in deciding the rights of parties in terms of pattadar. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this court in Lakshmana Gounder Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) Salem and others reported in 2003 (1) LACC 277. The following passages found in paragraphs 10 and 12 may be reproduced below:
"10.The Act 26/63 provides for acquisition of rights of the land holders in inam estates in the State of Tamil Nadu and the introduction of ryotwari settlement in such estates. Under sec.3(b) of Act 26/63, on the date of notification of taking over of the estate and the interests of the land holders therein would completely extinguish except the sites on which buildings have been erected either by the land holder or by any other person. Such rights have been separately dealt in sec.15 of the said Act. Under sec.9, in the case of an existing inam estate, the land owner shall with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta and such person should be owning an estate or a part thereof or a person entitled to collect rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor in title or by any order of a competent court or by any provision of law. Under sec.10 of the said Act, in the case of existing inam estate, every ryot shall with effect on and from the notified date be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of his lands. Under sec.11, ryotwari patta can be issued on the basis of personal cultivation in certain cases. Sec.12 contemplates the determination of land in which a person is entitled to ryotwari patta. In this case, the officer, on examination of the claim of the parties has issued patta in favour of respondents 2 and 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein has preferred an appeal under sec.12(2) before the Inam Abolition Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal directing for issuance of joint patta in the name of the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 which is evident from Ex.A14. Later, the Tahsildar issued regular patta Exs.B2 and B3 in favour of respondents 2 and 3 each to an extent of 3.73.5 acres. The balance extent is 1.76 acres as both sides have admitted the total extent as 9.23 acres. The appellant has not challenged the said Exs.B2 and B3 till date.
12. A patta is a record of possession represents a distinct fractional part of lands. The said presumption has its roots in the system of land tenure and in the custom of the area in which the lands are situate. Each pattadar manages his lands and pays fixed share of the Government Revenue. Entries in revenue records are not conclusive, but their importance in a case for possession cannot be denied, until contrary is shown. Though one cannot challenge the entry in revenue records as incorrect but can always impugn it as having been made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Followed the decision in Vishwa Vijay Bharathi Vs. Fakhrul Hassan and others reported in ((1976) 3 SCC 642). In this case, the Apex Court has held the entries in the Revenue records generally to be accepted at their face value and Courts should not embark upon an appellate enquiry into their correctness. But, the presumption of correctness can apply to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. When, in a particular case, facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone will decide the right of the parties.
On the basis of this, he submitted that since before the Reference Court, the appellants had failed to prove their entitlement, they cannot rely upon the decisions cited out of context.
Issue for consideration :
24.In the light of the rival contentions, it has to be seen whether the appellants have made out any case for interfering with the judgment passed by the reference court?
What the law says?
25.The jurisdiction of the reference court under Section 30 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in several decisions which may be usefully referred to.
26.In case of dispute the power to be exercised by the reference court under Section 30 had been dealt with by the Supreme court vide its judgment in Arulmighu Lakshminarasimhaswamy Temple Singirigudi v. Union of India reported in (1996) 6 SCC 408. The following passages found in paragraph 2 may be extracted herebelow:
"2. ...... The question, therefore, would be: what would be the proper procedure to be adopted in case of dispute as to the title of the land acquired under the Act? The learned Single Judge declared title of the petitioner in the writ petition and the Division Bench directed the civil court to decide the title. Both views are obviously erroneous in law. The Land Acquisition Officer has to determine the extent of the land, the persons entitled to compensation and the compensation to be determined under Section 23(1) of the Act. If he finds that there is any dispute as to the person entitled to receive the compensation, necessarily he has to deposit the amount under Section 31 of the Act into the court to which reference would lie. On such a dispute having arisen, he has to make a reference to the court under Section 30 of the Act to decide the dispute between the competing persons who set up rival title to the compensation. Under those circumstances, the only legal course open is that a direction be issued to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 30 to decide the inter se title to receive the compensation either by the appellant or by the fourth respondent, as the case may be and the Reference Court would decide the matter in accordance with law."
27.The Supreme court once again dealt with Section 30 in its subsequent decision in P.K. Sreekantan v. P. Sreekumaran Nair reported in (2006) 13 SCC 574. In paragraphs 12 and 13, it was held as follows:
"12. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran (2003 (5) SCC 561) the question related to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act vis-`-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit.....
13. Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor ((1855) 6 MIA 134(PC)), wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. (See Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra (1979 (2) SCC 572))
28.Holding that the reference court did not have original jurisdiction and it derives its power only from reference, the Supreme Court in its decision in Muthavalli of Sha Madhari Diwan Wakf v. Syed Zindasha reported in (2009) 12 SCC 280 further in paragraph 13 observed as follows:
"13. A Reference Court is not a court of original jurisdiction. It derives jurisdiction only in terms of the order of reference. The Act being a self-contained code, the manner in which the reference is to be made and the statement required to be made by the Collector has been specified in Section 19 of the Act. The lis between the parties to the reference meaning thereby a person interested and the State is with regard to the quantum of compensation. No other question can be raised therein. The Reference Court exercises a limited jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction from the terms of reference."
Findings :
29.In the present case, apart from the possession and direct cultivation by contesting respondents, the court below also found that they have patta under settlement authorities and a challenge made to the proceedings of the settlement authorities were negatived by the Tribunal constituted under the Act 26/1963. The appellants did not even challenge the same by way of an appeal provided to the Special Appellate Tribunal. It also found that for the abolition of Inam, the appellants had received compensation which was not denied by them. To prove that they were in possession and cultivation, they had not filed any acceptable document. It also found that certain respondents had purchased the lands in their own names. The encumbrance certificate also shows that they are owners. The fact that they are cultivating the lands were proved by chitta, adangal as well as by kist receipts. These findings of fact cannot be negatived.
30.Further, under the Tamil Nadu Act 26/1963, under Section 68, it has been held that the decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal shall be binding on parties in any proceedings or suit proceedings and they will operate as res judicata. Under Section 71, finality has been given to orders passed under the provisions of the Act and to that extent, the jurisdiction of courts in questioning the authority's order has been barred. However, the provisions of the Act viz-a-viz power of the civil court to determine the title of parties came to be considered in certain decisions of this court and the Supreme Court.
31.In N.Krishna Chettiar alias Krishnaswami and others Vs. C.Subbiah Ambalam and another reported in 1996 (I) MLJ 213, this court in paragraph 18 observed as follows:
"18.In State of Tamil Nadu V Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, AIR 1986 SC 794 the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide questions of title is not ousted even though patta was granted under the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid decisions, it is not possible for the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners herein to contend that after the patta was issued by the Settlement Officer, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted in the matter of deciding the title. This decision was not over-ruled by the Supreme Court in the later decision in Vetticherugheu Village Pahchayat V. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu (1991) 2 SCR 531 : AIR 1991 SCW 1303."
32.Subsequently, a Full Bench of this court in Srinivasan and others Vs. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District by its Executive Officer, Pettavaithalai Devasthanam and 5 others reported in 1998 II MLJ 722 after referring to the earlier decision, in paragraphs 14 and 15 observed as follows:
"14.....A careful analysis of the scheme underlying these Abolition laws would go to show that the vesting on abolition under everyone of these legislations is subject to the pre-existing rights of the occupants, except in respect of what are knwon as public or comunal properties, meant for common use and the grant of patta has been always considered and held to be in recognition of their pre-existing rights. The provisions relating to abolition and vesting, of the properties do not have the effect of obliterating or destroying such pre-existing rights, if any, except in respect of public or comunal properties and the rights which entitle a person to preferentially get patta under these legislations, and the same could not be equated to the grant of patta by way of assignment under the Revenue Standing Orders or under rules of assignment outside the scope of the statutory enactments. Similarly, a meticulous analysis of the scheme underlying the provisions of the Act dealing with the nature of rights dealt with by the various authorities, the manner in which such authorities adjudicate such rights and the consequences of such adjudication, disclose that they do not mean and even intend to be a substitute or alternate mode or resolution of the ordinary civil right of a citizen or for that matter persons asserting competing claims, in their attempt to project a claim for patta. Consequently, in our view, the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu V. Ramalinga Swamingal Madam, AIR 1986 SC 794 : 98 LW 849, R.Manicka Naicker v. Elumalai Naicker, (1995) 4 SCC 156 : (1995) I L.W. 731 and Sayyed Ali V. A.P.Wakf Board, Hyderabad, (1998) 2 SCC 642 and that of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramanujam Katiyyar V. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal, (1988) 2 LW 513 and of a learned single Judge of this Court in Samsuddin Rowther V. Avvammal, (1992) 1 LW 207 would squarely apply and govern the case and consequently (it has to be necessarily held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot be held to have been completely ousted or barred at any rate in respect of adjudication of claims of title and questions or issues which are not obliged or required to be adjudicated for the purpose of enforcement of these laws which have, as their object and aim, to implement ryotwari settlement in the areas governed by them.
15.Further, the mere fact that the orders passed or decisions rendered under these Acts were given finality for the purposes of those Acts or that the issues, which they are obliged or required to be decided, when so decided are ordained to bind the parties to the proceedings or their privies and successors-in-interest applying the principles of res judicata does not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court once and for all. It is by now well settled that even in cases where finality is accorded to any decision or order, there are certain well settled exceptions and proved the existence of such exceptional factors, the Civil Court is entitled to nullify any or all such decisions. Similarly, even in cases where the principles of res judicata are rendered applicable, the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court to go into the question and find out whether the necessary ingredients to apply the principles of res judicata exist in a given case or not cannot be denied to the Civil Court and from the mere fact of according finality to the orders or decisions rendered under the Act or the application of the principles of res judicata a total or complete bar or ouster of the jursidction of the Civil Courts for all and any purpose cannot be automatically inferred or implied. Before a plea of res judicata can be given effect to, it must be sufficiently pleaded and established that the litigating parties must be the same, that the subject matter of the suit and the other proceedings also are identical, that the questions arising in the suit and the other proceedings were directly and substantially in issue and the same was finally decided and that too by an authority or court of competent jurisdiction."
33.Though it has been held that Section 68 will operate as res judicata in a regularly constituted civil suit, the appellants have not instituted any such suit for any declaration of their title to the properties. On the other hand, before the reference court which is empowered to decide the matter due to reference made by the acquiring authority, the appellants did not lead any evidence about their so-called title by taking advantage of interpretation of Act 26/1963 made by the courts. But, in the present case, the order passed by the Tribunal in various CMAs filed by the appellants before the court of Chengalpattu can certainly be put against appellants. Even otherwise with reference to findings of fact regarding their possession and direct cultivation, no evidence was let in. Therefore, the contentions raised by appellants cannot be countenanced by this court.
Result :
34.In view of the above legal precedents and the factual matrix involved in this case, this court is not willing to upset the well considered judgment rendered by the court below. Therefore, all appeals are liable to be dismissed not only on the ground of merits, but also in cases where parties were not served and where in respect of dead persons, no LRs were brought on record, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on additional grounds. Accordingly, all Appeal Suits will stand dismissed. However, under the peculiar circumstances of the cases, parties are allowed to bear their own costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand dismissed.
vvk To 1..The Special Tahsildar, L.A.O.R.P. Scheme, Saidapet, Chennai-15. 2.The Sub Court, Tiruvallur