Karnataka High Court
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College And ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 October, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR2005KANT50, ILR2005KAR1278, 2005(1)KARLJ118, AIR 2005 KARNATAKA 50, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 3493, (2005) ILR (KANT) 1278, (2005) 1 KANT LJ 118
Author: N. Kumar
Bench: N. Kumar, D.V. Shylendra Kumar
JUDGMENT N. Kumar, J.
1. These appeals are placed before me for my opinion, pursuant to an order dated 13-8-2004 passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, consequent to divergence of opinion between the two learned Judges who constituted the Division Bench. As the learned Judges did not state the point upon which they differed, it is necessary for me to ascertain the same before I give my opinion, in view of the decisions rendered by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Shriram Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Union of India and Ors., .
2. The facts in brief are as hereunder:
The first appellant is the medical college and the second appellant is its Principal. First appellant-institution is established by the people belonging to the Scheduled Caste. The first appellant-college was established in the year 1980 by the trust known as Ananda Social and Educational Trust. First appellant-college was maintained and administered by the Board of Trustees and the Governing Council till the litigation started which ultimately resulted in this Court appointing a committee to look after the management of the trust and the college, pending disposal of the proceedings before this Court. The college and the hospital occupies an area of 25 acres of land in a prominent place in Bangalore, catering to the needs of under previleged sections of the society. It is stated that right from the year 1981-82 till the year 1987-88, the percentage of SC and ST students admitted and trained in the college ranged from 30% to 40% and thereafter the college has maintained high percentage of the admission for the backward and downtrodden section. It is not in dispute that the Medical Council of India ('MCI' for short) by its order dated 22-11-1991 has fixed the intake of the college at 100. At the request of the college, the State Government by order dated 16-10-1991 increased the admission capacity from 100 to 120 which was later approved by the Union Government by its communication dated 6-8-1996 for a period of one year. However, MCI by its communication dated 5-5-1998 directed that admission shall not exceed 100 seats. MCI did not grant permission because of the absence of renewal of permission from the Central Government. After inspection, the Executive Committee of the MCI recommended to the Central Government not to renew the permission for increase of seats for the academic year 1998-99 on account of the deficiencies. The college made a representation. Even after considering the said representation, MCI stuck to its original recommendation. On 10-9-2002 the Central Government requested the MCI to carry out inspection of the college for increase of intake from 100 to 120 and submit recommendations. On 20th and 21st November, 2002, inspection was carried out. The inspection report was placed before the Executive Committee of MCI in its meeting held on 9-1-2003. On account of the deficiencies pointed out in the inspection report, MCI recommended to the Central Government, not to renew the permission for admission of students against increased intake from 100 to 120 for the academic year 2002-03. The decision was communicated to the Central Government. The Central Government by its letter dated 20-1-2003 informed the MCI that the college has informed the former that the deficiencies pointed out in the report have been complied with. Therefore, compliance verification inspection of the college was carried out on 10th and 11th March, 2003. Again the report was placed before the Executive Committee of MCI in the meeting held on 13-3-2003. Again as there was large number of deficiencies, MCI recommended to the Government not to renew the permission for the increased intake from 100 to 120 to the college as per letter dated 26-3-2003 Annexure-C. Another inspection was carried out on 9-8-2003 and the said report was also placed before the Executive Committee of the MCI as well as the ad hoc Committee appointed by the Supreme Court in the meeting held on 28-3-2003. As gross deficiencies were noticed, they advised the Government not to allow admissions for the first year MBBS course for the academic year 2003-04. It was also decided that if the deficiencies are not rectified, necessary action Under Section 19 of the Act will be considered by the MCI for recommending to the Central Government for derecognition. The said decision of the MCI was duly informed to the Competent Authority - i.e., the State of Karnataka. By letter dated 29-10-2003 MCI informed Rajiv Gandhi University that no admissions could be made to the college for the academic year 2004-05. Similar orders were passed stopping admission to the post-graduate degree and diploma courses in the college. The college wrote a letter dated 5-3-2004 informing the MCI that the college is now under the supervision of the committee appointed by the Hon'ble High Court and they need some time for removal of deficiencies, on the ground that finances are not available. On consideration of the said letter, MCI reiterated its earlier decision to stop admissions for the academic year 2004-05 for the undergraduate and post-graduate courses. After this, the appellants preferred writ petitions before this Court in W.P. Nos. 16923, 17396 and 17397 of 2004 seeking quashing of the orders dated 8-3-2004 and 9-3-2004 whereby the appellants were prevented from making admissions to both post-graduate and undergraduate courses in the college and for a declaration that action of the MCI was illegal, and arbitrary. They also sought for other consequential reliefs.
3. It was contended before the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid petitions that the MCI had no power or authority to stop admissions to the appellant-college and the impugned orders have been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore they are liable to be quashed. The learned Single Judge did not go into the legal issues. But on the facts of the case, it was held that MCI has committed no error whatsoever in issuing impugned orders. They are based on facts. In the light of the deficiencies pointed out to this Court, this Court cannot permit the college to admit students to the detriment of such students, the existing circumstances of the institution are not fully satisfactory and also, as the admission to the post-graduate course has come to an end on 1-4-2004, nothing can be done. However, for admissions to the undergraduate course, as there was still time, an opportunity was given to the appellants to place additional material before the MCI to show that the deficiencies are rectified and MCI was called upon to have the additional inspection and thereafter to proceeded to pass orders in accordance with law notwithstanding the refusal on the part of this Court to set aside the impugned order dated 8-4-2004. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge dated 30-4-2004, the present appeals are filed by the appellants.
4. In the appeal, following questions were formulated for consideration:
(1) Whether the Medical Council of India has the authority under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 ('Act' for short) to stop admissions in the second appellant-college?
(2) Whether the said action of the MCI stopping admissions to undergraduate and post-graduate courses in the second appellant-college is vitiated by vice of procedural impropriety, violation of principles of natural justice and fairness in action?
5. My esteemed learned Brother S.R. Nayak, J., on consideration of the contentions urged on behalf of both the parties and the decisions relied on by them, by a considered order held that Regulations 1993 and Regulations 1999 empowers the MCI to stop admissions only in respect of establishments of new medical college and such power is not available for the MCI with regard to the existing medical colleges which are already recognised. Section 19 of the Act does not confer power on the MCI to issue impugned directions stopping admissions even in a case where proceedings for withdrawal of admission has been initiated Under Section 19 of the Act. The MCI being a statutory authority, should trace its power to an authority granted by such statute, since its actions affect the rights of others who are governed by the statute, otherwise, its action would be condemned as ultra vires such statute. He further held that impugned directions came to be issued by the MCI in utter breach of principles of natural justice and lacking fairness of action and without application of mind. Therefore, he set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the writ petitions quashing the communications dated 8-3-2004, 9-3-2004 and 8-4-2004 as invalid and without authority of law.
6. However, my esteemed learned Brother D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J., disagreeing with the aforesaid view upheld the decision of the MCI to direct the appellant-education society to stop admissions to the graduate medical course and other medical courses at its college does not suffer from lack of statutory support. He observed that a perusal of the scheme and the object of the Act, the role envisaged for MCI under the Act which is provided for Under Sections 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 10-A, 10-B, 10-C, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 19-A of the Act, the functions assigned to the Council under the Act, the Rules and Regulations framed under the Act and more particularly, the decision of the Supreme Court interpreting provisions of the Act and the Regulations will reveal the legal position. It was further observed that even if one has any lingering doubts as to the scope of this power, the nature of the function and the role of the Medical Council in the management of the profession of medicine and the maintenance of standards in medical education, and a look at the decision of the Supreme Court in Medical Council of India v. State of Karnataka, , should totally dispel such doubts.
7. The learned Judge was also of the view that though the decision was rendered in the context of disputes that arose subsequent to the amendment, it is not logical to think or hold that the law applies differently in respect of an institution that has been permitted to function or had been recognised prior to the amendment vis-a-vis institutions that have been permitted to function subsequent to the amending Act. The law as declared by the Supreme Court applies uniformly to all medical institutions which were started or recognised prior to the amending Act or started or recognised subsequent to the amending Act. It is not open to this Court to examine the scope and meaning of statutory provisions and vis-a-vis the question as to whether such provisions does or does not vest the MCI with power in the light of the statutory provisions having already come in for interpretation in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court. Therefore it was held that the decision of the MCI directing the appellant-education society to stop admissions to graduate medical course and other medical courses at its colleges, does not suffer from lack of statutory support.
8. On the second question it was held that it is always not necessary that an opportunity of hearing before the communication of order is a must in all situations. In a given situation, having regard to several circumstances prevailing, a post decisional opportunity is also one in compliance of the principles of natural justice, particularly where the decision is not one which is not a lasting one or a final one but one which is temporary in nature.
9. In the light of what is narrated above, the points upon which the learned Judges have differed can be stated as under:
(a) Whether the MCI has jurisdiction/power/duty to direct the recognised medical college to stop admission for a particular academic year on the ground that the said medical college does not possess requisite infrastructure for admitting students?
(b) If it is held that MCI has such jurisdiction/power/duty, whether the said order could be passed without hearing the affected college which had been granted permission and recognition?
10. Learned Counsel who appeared for the appellants challenging the impugned orders contended as under:
(a) The power to stop admission to a medical college by the MCI is traced to Section 10-A of the Act and in particular to the Second Explanation to Section 10-A and the regulation framed Under Section 10-A by the MCI. The said provisions will not empower the MCI to pass orders in respect of the medical colleges which were permitted to be established and recognised by the MCI prior to introduction of Section 10-A by Act No. 31 of 1993 which came into effect from 25-8-1992. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the MCI are one without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. Elaborating the said contention, it was urged that the opening words of the Explanation 2 makes it very clear that the admission capacity has to be understood for the purposes of Section 10-A only and therefore the words "may be fixed by the Council from time to time" contained in Explanation 2 cannot be extended to the colleges which do not fall Under Section 10-A.
(b) It was contended that Regulation 8 on which reliance was placed and in particular, the words "at any stage" contained in Regulation 8(3) only means, from the day the letter of intent is given and consequently permission is granted initially for a period of one year till the formal recognition of the medical college is granted. The words "at any stage" cannot be construed as conferring power on the MCI to exercise such power after formal recognition of the medical colleges Under Section 10-A or in respect of the medical colleges established prior to Section 10-A coming into operation. Further, it was submitted that the said power has to be exercised only in respect of a medical college to be established after Section 10-A came into operation.
(c) It was contended that the request before the MCI was to increase its admission capacity from the existing 100 to 120 and in that context, inspections were conducted, deficiencies were noticed and permission was refused. MCI could not have on the basis of the said material prevented the college from making admission to the original intake of 100 students and therefore, impugned orders passed are one without authority of law.
(d) It was also contended that in the absence of a specific provision in the MCI Act conferring power on MCI to order for stoppage of admission or withdrawal of such orders, a statutory authority like MCI cannot exercise power in total derogation of the statutory provisions especially when permission to establish a college and permission to withdraw recognition granted to the college vests with the Central Government.
(e) Lastly it was contended that the impugned orders are passed in violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the college has not been heard in the matter and therefore it is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and liable to be quashed.
11. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the MCI contended as under:
(a) Explanation 2 of Sub-section (1) of Section 10-A expressly casts an obligation on the part of MCI to fix admission capacity of a college from time to time for being admitted to such course. This statutory obligation empowers the MCI to review the availability of requisite infrastructure for imparting education in medical colleges to which they have already granted recognition and if it is found that the infrastructure is below the minimum standard, it has a statutory duty to prevent innocent students being admitted to such college. MCI has also a statutory obligation to co-ordinate and maintain all medical education institutions in the Country.
(b) There is no express bar to withdraw recognition under the Act. The statute provides that if MCI finds that any particular medical college does not satisfy the requirements prescribed by the Act, they can make recommendation to the Central Government and thereafter it is for the Central Government to act on the recommendation of the MCI and to initiate appropriate action Under Section 19 of the Act. In three judgments, the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 20 of the Act has held; having regard to the language employed in the said Section; that the power to be exercised by way of recommendation is directory and not mandatory in nature and it is open to the Government to accept or not to accept such recommendation and the same is not binding on the Government. However, the Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, , overruling the above said view which was taken earlier in the case of Ajay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, has held that the advise, suggestion, recommendation made by the MCI is binding and the Government cannot act contrary.
(c) The Supreme Court in the case of Medical Council of India, has expressly declared the law to the effect that no medical college can admit any student in excess of its admission capacity fixed by the Medical Council subject to any increase thereof as approved by the Central Government and Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C of the Act will prevail over Section 53(10) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 and Section 4(1)(b) of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984. It further held that the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was not correct in holding that admission capacity for the purpose of increase or decrease in each of the medical colleges has got to be determined on or before 1-6-1992 with reference to what had been fixed by the State Government or admission capacity fixed by the medical colleges and not with reference to the minimum standard of education regulations prescribed Under Section 19-A of the Act. It is held that future admissions will have to be on the basis of the capacity fixed or determined by the MCI. This is an express statement of law made by the Supreme Court interpreting Section 10-A of the Act and therefore the said question is no more an integra.
(d) The Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had restored the judgment of the learned Single Judge by express terms and the Supreme Court did not give any different reasoning than the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, by the operation of doctrine of merger, judgment of the learned Single Judge has merged in the judgment of the Supreme Court and the statement of law made by the learned Single Judge at paragraphs 50, 51, 52, 65 to 88 has become the law of the land and has become the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is no scope for any interpretation in these matters as they are all finally concluded.
(e) The Supreme Court in Madhu Singh's case, dealt with Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1) and has held that it is the Council which has to fix admission capacity from time to time for being admitted to the course. Therefore it is clear that Explanation 2 is not confined to Section 10-A(1) only. The Supreme Court placed literal interpretation on the provisions of the Act earlier and when the matter was referred to the Constitutional Bench, the Supreme Court has preferred purposive interpretation. If purposive interpretation is placed on Section 10-A(1) and the Explanation 2, it cannot be confined to Section 10-A only. The words "admission capacity" contained therein and the power of the MCI to fix the admission capacity from time to time applies to colleges established prior to Section 10-A and the MCI has the power to review each year the admission capacity of the colleges.
(f) Though Section 19 of the Act provides for de-recognition of the medical college for not complying with requirements of law as stipulated under the Act, that should be the last resort. When resorting to this extreme remedy, if pressure is brought upon the college to fulfil the legal requirements by stopping admissions in a particular academic year, that would serve the cause of the Act and would take care of innocent students. Therefore, it was contended that in the light of the aforesaid, argument that it cannot be said that MCI has no power or authority to pass the impugned order, on the contrary, a statutory duty is cast upon the MCI to Act in the manner it has acted. Therefore, action of the MCI does not call for any interference.
12. As could be noticed from the above that though elaborate arguments were addressed on behalf of both the parties and catena of judgments cited at the Bar in support of the respective contentions, leading to the two learned Judges differing in their opinion, the only point that arises for consideration is the power of MCI to pass impugned orders stopping admission to a medical college which was duly recognised prior to insertion of Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C of the Act and whether that power could be exercised in violation of principles of natural justice.
(emphasis supplied)
13. Point No. 1.-As the power of MCI is traced to Section 10-A of the Act, in particular, Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1), the regulations framed Under Section 10-A and Section 19 of the Act, keeping in mind the object of the Act and the responsibilities and functions envisaged under the Act to the MCI, it is necessary to find out whether these provisions do confer such a power on MCI.
14. Section 10-A(1) reads as under:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force.-
(a) no person shall establish a medical college; or
(b) no medical college shall:
(i) open a new or higher course of study or training (including a post-graduate course of study or training) which would enable a student of such course or training to qualify himself for the award of any recognised medical qualification; or
(ii) increase its admission capacity in any course of study or training (including a post-graduate course of study or training), except with the previous permissions of the Central Government obtained in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
Explanation 1.-For the purposes of this section, "person" includes any University or a trust but does not include the Central Government.
Explanation 2.-For the purposes of this section, "admission capacity" in relation to any course of study or training (including post-graduate course of study or training) in a medical college, means the maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time for being admitted to such course or training".
15. As is clear from the heading of section, it deals with permission for establishment of new medical college, new course of study, etc., .... After the introduction of Section 10-A by Act No. 31 of 1993 which came into effect on 27-8-1992, it provides that, (a) no person shall establish a medical college; (b) no medical college which has already been established and recognised, open a new or higher course of study or training; (c) shall increase its admission capacity in any course of study or training except with the previous permission of the Central Government obtained in accordance with the provisions of this section. Therefore, there is total prohibition for starting a medical college or starting new or higher course in the existing college or to increase admission capacity of a course of study or training in the existing college without previous permission of the Central Government. In other words, ultimate authority in these matters is the Central Government.
Explanation 2 clarifies the meaning of the words "admission capacity" which are contained in Section 10-A(1)(b)(ii). On the day these provisions were inserted in the Act, there were already in existence the colleges which had been only recognised. If such colleges were to request the Central Government for increase of their admission capacity, number of seats to be increased was dependent on existing capacity of the college, their infrastructure available for existing capacity. There was no uniformity in the existing capacity as earlier to introduction of Section 10-A, the Medical Council had fixed the intake, State Government had fixed the intake and increased the intake above the intake fixed by the Medical Council. In some cases, even the Universities had fixed the intake. Therefore, the question was after commencement of Section 10-A, if a request is made for increase in the admission capacity in the course of study, whether existing capacity as approved by which authority should be taken note of, was in doubt. It is to clarify the said ambiguity, this Explanation 2 was inserted. It specifically said, for the purpose of this Section i.e., Section 10-A(1) and in particular, 10-A(1)(b)(ii), where the words "admission capacity" is inserted to mean maximum number of students that will be fixed by the Council from time to time for being admitted to such course.
16. Sub-section (2) of Section 10-A provides that any person intending to establish a medical college, open a new or higher course or, wants increase in admission capacity, has to subn scheme in accordance with the provisions of Clause (b) to the Central Government. Such a scheme has to be in such form and contain such particulars and preferred in such manner and to be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. On submission of such scheme, Central Government shall refer the scheme to the Council for its recommendations. On receipt of such scheme, Council may obtain such other particulars as may be considered necessary by it from the person or the medical college concerned and if it is defective and does not contain necessary particulars, give an opportunity to the person or medical college concerned to rectify the defects. Council has to consider the scheme in the light of the factors referred to in Sub-section (7) of Section 10-A and thereafter submit a scheme together with its recommendations. Sub-section (4) of Section 10-A empowers the Central Government on consideration of the scheme and the recommendations of the Council and after obtaining any other particulars which they may feel it necessary from the college and after considering the factors mentioned in Sub-section (7) either approve or disapprove the scheme and if approved, it shall be a permission under Sub-section (1). Sub-section (5) provides for a deemed permission if the Central Government does not pass any orders within one year from the date of submission of the scheme. Sub-section (6) deals with the way in which time-limit specified in Sub-section (5) is computed. Sub-section (7) sets out the factors to be taken note of by the Council before making recommendation to the Central Government and the Central Government before passing an order under Sub-section (4) either approving or disapproving the scheme. Clause (a) of Sub-section (7) provides that the Council should make sure whether the proposed medical college or the existing medical college seeking to open a new or higher course of study or training is in a position to offer the minimum standards of medical education as prescribed by the Council Under Section 19-A or as the case may be Under Section 20 in the case of post-graduate medical education. Further, they have to make sure whether such person has necessary or adequate financial resources. They also should ensure the requirement in respect of staff, equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities. They should further ensure adequate hospital facilities, man power in the field of practice of medicine and whether arrangement has been made for programme drawn to impart proper training to students. They are at liberty to prescribe other requirements in addition to what is expressly provided.
17. Therefore the aforesaid provisions make it clear that neither the Central Government nor Medical Council of India has been conferred with any power to stop admissions of students to a medical college.
18. Learned Counsel for the Council contends that the words used in the Explanation 2 to the effect that admission capacity in relation to any course of study or training in medical college means the maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time includes not only fixing the intake of students being admitted to a medical college but it also implies that the Council has the power to stop admission to a medical college. In support of the said contention reliance is placed on Regulation 8. Therefore, the question would be whether such a power is conferred in the regulation and whether the interpretation sought to be placed is permissible. In turn it depends upon the question as to how the explanation has to be understood. The Supreme Court in the case of Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Limited v. Bank of Bihar, has held as under:
"Explanation must be read so as to harmonize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section, they should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the Section".
19. Further Supreme Court in Dattatreya Govind Mahajan and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., with regard to the role of an explanation observed as under in paragraph 9:
"It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. Ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and a mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention, it must be remembered that that the legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur, therefore even though the provision in question has been called an explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any prior consideration".
20. An Explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment. The meaning to be given to an explanation must depend upon its terms and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is inferred from the language used. But if the language of the explanation shows a purpose and a construction consistent with that 2purpose can be reasonably placed upon it, that construction will be preferred as against any other construction which does not fit in with the description or the avowed purpose. The explanation may be added to include something within or to exclude something from the ambit of the main enactment or connotation to some word occurring in it. An explanation, normally, should be so read, as to harmonize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. It is also possible that an explanation may have been added ex abnudanti cautela to allay groundless apprehensions.
21. Therefore, it is to be seen as to what is the purpose of adding this explanation to Section 10-A(1). Whether, it is to explain the meaning of any word contained in the section or to clear any ambiguity in the section or to include or exclude something from its ambit or to allay any groundless apprehensions. Therefore it revolve round the interpretation to be placed on main section, namely, Section 10-A(1).
22. It is well-recognised that a Court while interpreting a statute should keep the purpose of the enactment in mind and every effort should be made to give effect to the said purpose so as to remedy the mischief or defect for which the law does not provide. The interpretation must depend upon the text and context. They are the bases of interpretation. The text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are importants. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. A bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intend devoid of concept of purpose and object will render the legislature insane. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature, but the intention of the legislature must be deduced from the language used and it has to be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Not only the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language used in the statute, thus paving attention to what has been said as also to what has not been said. Under the guise of purposive construction of a statute the Court cannot add words or read words into the section which the legislature has deliberately omitted to add. Then it would be case of the Court legislating and not interpreting which is its role.
23. In this background if we look into Section 10-A(1) of the Act, the Parliament has not conferred any power either on the Central Government or on the Council to stop admission for a medical college after formal recognition has been granted to the college for any reason whatsoever. This section only provides for grant of permission to start a medical college or permission to open a new or higher course in an existing medical college or increase the admission capacity in any course of study or training in an existing medical college. It does not speak of stopping of admission to a medical college at all. The words 'admission capacity' is used in Section 10-A(1)(b)(ii). Explaining the meaning of the said Phrase in the section, in this context, the opening words of Explanation 2 is of utmost significance. It opens with the words "for the purpose of this section". Then it proceeds to say the words 'admission capacity" means the maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time. This explanation has to be understood in this context that on the day Section 10-A was introduced into the Act already there were in existence several medical colleges in the country. The admission capacity of such medical colleges were fixed by the MCI, respective State Governments and in some cases the Universities to which those colleges were affiliated. Therefore, if any of those colleges were to make an application for increase in the admission capacity, the question would arise as to what is the admission capacity existing in that college, which is to be taken into consideration for granting increase in the admission capacity. There should be a bench mark and it is beyond that mark there could be an increase. There was a lot of controversy over who is the authority which is competent to decide the intake of a medical college. It is in this background when Section 10-A was introduced it was clarified that for the purpose of increase in the admission capacity of any college after these amended provisions came into force, it is the intake fixed by the Council which is decisive and not the intake fixed by the Government or the University. Further, it is made clear that after these amended provisions came into force the intake fixed by the MCI from time to time, should be taken as the benchmark for increase in the admission capacity as the sole criteria. Therefore this explanation was introduced only with the intention of clarifying any doubt about the basic intake which has to be taken note of while granting increase in such intake. By this explanation the legislature never intended to confer a power on the MCI to stop admission to a medical college. There is no indication in the entire Section 10-A about this legislative intent or purpose. If the words "may be fixed" by the Council from time to time is to be interpreted to mean that they have the power not to fix any intake at all, the context in which the explanation is added do not lead to such an interpretation. If such an interpretation is placed on those words it would be doing violence to the language employed in the Statute. It is totally impermissible. When the parliament in its wisdom advisedly has not provided for any such power being conferred on the Central Government itself in the aforesaid provision, it is unthinkable how by purposive interpretation such a power can be conferred on the statutory authority like MCI. Its role is to only submit recommendation to the Central Government for granting permission which has been bestowed with the responsibility of maintaining standards of education as contained in Section 19-A of the Act.
24. In fact it is well-settled that a statutory power must be exercised only by a person on whom it is conferred unless the statute, by express words or necessary implication, permits delegation, in which case it may also be exercised by the delegate, if delegation is made in terms of the statute. A statutory power, whether it be administrative or quasi-judicial, although conferred in wide terms has certain implied limitations the person on whom power is conferred must exercise it in good faith for furtherance of the object of the statute; he must not proceed upon a misconstruction of the statute; he would take into account the matters relevant for the exercise of power; he must not be influenced .by irrelevant matters and he must not act perversely. Conferment of quasi-judicial power further implies that the person concerned must follow rules of natural justice and must give reasons for making the order which is empowered to be made. Purely administrative bodies are also bound to act justly and fairly which may bring the requirement of natural justice, as also the duty to give reasons. A Statutory Authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity which is ab initio void. (See Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, . Therefore, it is clear that the statute do not provide any such power on the Central Government to stop admissions to a medical college. By no stretch of imagination can it be said a statutory authority like MCI which is a creature of the Act can exercise such power without such power being conferred under the Act. Therefore, when in the main section such a power is not conferred, the explanation appended to that section to give a meaning to the phrase used in the section cannot be construed as conferring such power.
25. Insofar as the power being conferred on the MCI under Regulation 8 is concerned, in order to appreciate such a contention it is necessary to look at the regulations where such power is conferred. In this regard reliance was placed on the Establishment of New Medical Colleges, Opening of Higher Courses of Study and Increase of Admission Capacity in Medical Colleges Regulations, 1993 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'Regulations 1993') and on the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999 (for short, 'Regulations 1999'). In Regulations 1993 reliance was placed on the following regulations:
The above permission to establish a new medical college and admit students will be granted initially for a period of one year and will be renewed on yearly basis subject to verification of the achievements of annual targets and revalidation of the performance bank guarantees. This process of renewal of permission will continue till such time the establishment of medical college and expansion of hospital facilities is completed and a formal recognition of the medical college by the Medical Council of India is granted. Further admissions are liable to be stopped at any stage unless requirements for various steps of development are to the satisfaction of the MCI.
26. The relevant provision in Regulations 1999 providing for stoppage of admission is contained in Regulation 8(3) which reads as under:
Permission to establish a medical college and admit students may be granted initially for a period of one year and may be renewed on yearly basis subject to verification of the achievements of annual targets. It shall be the responsibility of the person to apply to the MCI for the purpose of renewal six months prior to the expiry of the initial permission. This process of renewal of permission will continue till such time the establishment of the medical college and expansion of the hospital facility are completed and formal recognition to the medical college is granted. However, admission shall not be made at any stage unless requirements of the Council are fulfilled. The Central Government may at any stage convey deficiency to the applicant and provide him an opportunity and time to rectify the deficiencies.
27. Here it is to be noticed, that both these regulations are framed by the MCI in exercise of power conferred Under Section 10-A read with Section 33 of the Act with the previous approval of the Central Government. In the aforesaid regulations what has been done is to frame a scheme as provided Under Section 10-A(2)(a). The aforesaid two provisions are a part of the scheme which is framed for obtaining permission from the Central Government to establish a medical college. It is in that context when an application is made for establishing a medical college along with prescribed fee to the Central Government, the Central Government shall refer the scheme to the Council for its recommendation as contemplated Under Section 10-A(2)(a). After the Council recommends for grant of permission to an institution, the Central Government on such recommendation issues a letter of intent to set up new medical college with such conditions and modifications in the original proposal as may be considered necessary. In imposing such conditions and modifications the Central Government is governed by recommendations of the Council. Letter of intent also includes a clear-cut statement of primary requirements to be met in respect of buildings, infrastructural facilities, medical and allied equipments, faculty and staff. Permission may also define the annual targets as may be fixed by the Medical Council to be achieved by the person to commensurate with the intake of students during the following years. Such permission would be granted initially for a period of one year and is renewed on yearly basis subject to verification of the achievements of annual targets. An application for renewal is to be filed within six months prior to the expiry of the initial permission. This process of renewal of permission will continue till such time the establishment of the medical college and expansion of the hospital facilities are completed and a formal recognition that of the medical college is granted. It is between the period of initial permission till formal recognition the Council has been vested with the power to stop admissions to the medical college if requirements of the Council are not fulfilled. The words "at any stage" used in the aforesaid provision means between the initial permission till formal recognition. Therefore the power of the Council to stop admission under the aforesaid regulations is only in respect of an establishment of new medical colleges Under Section 10A and to be exercised at any stage between the stage of initial permission and formal recognition and not beyond the formal recognition. This provision cannot be interpreted to mean that the Council has the power to stop admission to all medical colleges i.e., medical colleges which are established prior to Section 10-A was introduced for which recognition has already been granted and medical colleges for which formal recognition has been given after Section 10-A came into force at any time. When such a power is not conferred on the Central Government under the Statute, the regulation framed under the Statute cannot confer such absolute power on a statutory authority like the Council. The fact that the regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be laid down before the legislature concerned does not confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory provisions themselves. Consequently, when the power to make regulations is confined to certain limits and made to flow in a well-defined canal within stipulated banks, as regards those actually made or shown and found to be not made within the confines but outside them, the Courts are bound to ignore them, when the question of their enforcement arises and the mere fact that there was no specific relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is shown and found to obviously and patently lacking. [See Bharathidasan University and Anr. v. All India Council for Technical Education and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2861 : (2001)8 SCC 676. The power to frame rules is conferred by the Act upon the State Government and that power may be exercised within the strict limits of the authority conferred. If in making a rule, the State transcends its authority, the rule will be invalid, for statutory rules made in exercise of delegated authority are valid and binding only if made within the limits of authority conferred. Validity of a rule whether it is declared to have effect as if enacted in the Act or otherwise is always open to challenge on the ground that it is unauthorised. [See Associated Cement Companies Limited v. P.N. Sharma and Anr., .
28. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, a regulation, providing for a power to direct stoppage of an admission on the MCI in case of a scheme, is made for obtaining permission from the Central Government for establishment of medical college, cannot be construed as conferring such power to stop admission to medical colleges of recognised institutions, where a formal recognition has been granted before the Amendment Act came into force or such a formal recognition has been granted in terms of Section 10-A. When no such power has been conferred on the Central Government under the Statute such wide powers cannot be conferred on the MCI by way of a regulation. When that being the case the reliance placed by the Council on these regulations as a source of power to stop admission to medical colleges has no substance in it.
29. Because of the specific words used in the regulation where a power is conferred on the MCI to stop admission to a medical college the Council wants to contend that those Regulations read with this explanation would give them the power to stop admission and power to fix the intake from time to time within its ambit to include the power to stop admission to the medical college. This argument ignores the context in which such a power to stop admission is provided in the regulation. The aforesaid regulation is a part of the Scheme/application for permission to the Council to establish a new medical college. As the regulations provide, the Central Government first issues a letter of intent to a person to start a medical college on the recommendation of the Council and calls upon him to comply with the requirements mentioned therein. Once that is complied with, then, permission to start the medical college is given only for a period of one year. The said permission is to be renewed every year for which an application is to be made within six months before the expiry of that year. This permission is renewed from year to year subject to the college complying with the requirements which are to be complied with. If such requirements are not complied with, the MCI which is the body which has to supervise these colleges to find out whether these legal requirements have been complied with or not, is vested with the power to stop admission to the college if those requirements are not complied. This power could be exercised by the MCI at any stage till a formal recognition is given to the college. In other words this power can be exercised by the MCI from the day the permission is granted initially till a formal recognition is given on the advice of the MCI to the college. It is during this interregnum that the MCI has to see that all necessary infrastructure required for the establishment of a medical college is complied with by the college. It is only on the MCI being satisfied about the availability of necessary infrastructure and on its recommendation, the Central Government issues a formal recognition. With the grant of formal recognition this power conferred on the MCI to stop admission to a medical college at any stage comes to an end. This regulation has nothing to do with the Explanation 2 which only defines the meaning of admission capacity contained in Section 10-A(1)(b)(ii) which deals with increase in the admission capacity in any course of study or training in a medical college to which a formal recognition has been given. Therefore, neither the Explanation 2 nor these regulations confer any power on the MCI to stop admission to a medical college to which a formal recognition has been given by the Central Government on the recommendation of the MCI.
30. If after such formal recognition if any deficiencies are found by the MCI, the MCI is not helpless. Section 19 of the Act deals with such a situation. If the Council or the visitors appointed by the Council finds that the course of study, examination or profession in requirement from candidates do not conform to the standards prescribed by the Council or staff equipment accommodating, training and other facilities, instructions and training provided by the said college do not conform to the standards prescribed by the Council, then the council shall make a representation to that effect to the Central Government. Therefore when the Statute expressly states on noticing the deficiencies as aforesaid the Council shall make a representation to the Central Government, the Council shall not act in any other manner than what is prescribed under the Act. Instead of making representation to the Central Government if the Council makes an order to stop admission such an action of the Council is not only without authority of law but it is contrary to the express provision contained in the Statute. Elaborate procedure is prescribed Under Section 19(2), (3) and (4) for the way in which such representation of the Council has to be considered by the Government and an opportunity to be given to erring medical college giving them an opportunity to rectify the defects or deficiencies and on their failure to take action against such institution. Therefore, when the MCI noticed the deficiencies in the appellant's college, they were under an obligation to make a representation to the effect to the Central Government as prescribed Under Section 19 of the Act. It is thereafter, the Central Government after considering such representation, may send to the State Government, in which the University or Medical Institution is situated and thereafter the State Government shall forward it along with such remarks as it think fit to the University or Medical Institution intimating the period within which the University or Medical Institution may submit its explanation to the State Government. On receipt of the explanation, the State Government shall make its recommendation to the Central Government. Thereafter, the Central Government after making such enquiry may by notification in the Official Gazette direct an entry shall be made to the appropriate schedule against the medical qualification declaring it recognised medical qualification only when granted before a specified date. Therefore, the Parliament in its wisdom has provided an elaborate procedure for taking action against the Universities or Medical Institutions which are not conforming to the specification prescribed by the Council. When once statutes prescribes a particular mode, this statutory authority under the Act is bound to exercise the power in the manner prescribed under the Statute. By implication, exercise of power by any other person, other than those persons or in any other manner is impliedly prohibited. The Statutory Authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity which is ab initio void.
31. It is settled law that if the statutes directs certain acts shall be done in a specified manner or by certain persons, their performance in any other manner other than specified or by any other person other than one specified is impliedly prohibited. Normally, the discretion entrusted by the Parliament to an administrative organ must be exercised by that organ itself.
32. It was next contended that the Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1) of the Act fell for consideration before this Court and this Court had interpreted the said Explanation 2 would apply to the institutions which were granted recognition even prior to coming into force of the amended provisions, which view though was not accepted by the Division Bench of this Court, the Supreme Court has reversed the view of the Division Bench and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge. It is in this connection, it becomes necessary to have a look at the orders of the learned Single Judge, Division Bench and the Supreme Court.
33. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of A Citizen of India v. State of Karnataka and Ors., laws observed thus:
"59. Having so held, the next question to be considered is that keeping in view the object of incorporating Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C in the Central Act and the language employed therein, what has to be the true connotation of the expression 'increase its admission capacity'.
60. According to the New Lexicon Webster Dictionary the word 'increase' means to become greater in size, amount, number, value, degree, etc. According to the Random House Dictionary the said term means to make greater in any respect, etc. According to Black's Law Dictionary it means enlargement, increment, addition, etc. Therefore, for ascertaining whether the admission capacity of any college is deemed to have been increased for the purpose of Section 10-A of the Central Act, there has to be a benchmark of admission capacity i.e., the standard thereof with which the increase therein can be compared with.
61. Now the material and the crucial question is as to whether the admission capacity of a medical college as fixed on or before 1-6-1992 by the State Government will form the benchmark for finding out the increase therein for the purpose of applying the regulatory provisions contained in Section 10-A of the Central Act or the admission capacities fixed by the Council, with reference to the minimum standard of medical education prescribed Under Section 19-A of the said Act, will form the benchmark for the said purpose.
62. In my opinion, the Parliament having fully delved into the said aspect, has very clearly provided that it is the admission capacity which has been fixed by the Council, will form the benchmark for the purpose of Section 10-A of the Central Act. It is so because of the Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1) of the said Act which provides that for the purpose of the said section "admission capacity" mean, the maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time for being admitted to the medical course in a given college. The Parliament has not given any credence to the admission capacities or intakes fixed by any State Government or the Universities which was for the obvious reasons, as noticed in the statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment, namely, that the State Governments were not adhering to the requirements of maintaining even the minimum standard of medical education while fixing the admission capacities and were working under various pressures. Therefore, it has to be conclusively held that it is the admission capacity which is fixed by the Council from time to time will form the benchmark for determining any increase therein for the purpose of Section 10-A(1) requiring previous permission from the Central Government and any violation thereof will visit the consequences envisaged Under Section 10-B(3) of the Central Act.
63. The next question is whether the admission capacity of a medical college determined by the Council in the 2nd Explanation to Section 10-A(1) is one time exercise or it can be so done from time to time i.e., more than once. In the aforesaid explanation the Parliament has expressly used Phrase 'time to time'. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that "in the interpretation of statutes the Court always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect" (See J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., ). It appears to me that the power to determine admission capacity from time to time has been advisedly provided in the 2nd Explanation to Section 10-A(1) and is well thought of measure to ensure maintenance of minimum standards by the medical college. It is for the reason that under the Scheme of Central Act, the power to inspect and supervise the maintenance of minimum standards has been conferred only on the Council. There is no such power with any other authority including the Central Government. Therefore, even after the grant of permission by the Central Government to increase the admission capacity, if subsequently the Council, pursuant to inspection and/or other relevant materials on records resolves that the infrastructure in college has fallen short of the required minimum standards entitling it to maintain the approved level of admission capacity, then the college cannot be permitted to admit students beyond the level unless it undertakes the statutory process contemplated Under Section 10-A(1) seeking approval of the Central Government for increasing its admission level. This inbuilt legislative mechanism of constant vigil and overseeing the infrastructural requirements expected of the medical colleges is salutary and is aptly befitting to the object of the Act. It also ensures that the discretion in the matters of determining the admission capacities is not concentrated in any one authority thereby which minimizes the chances of abuses in this regard".
34. Against the aforesaid judgment, an appeal was preferred to the Division Bench of this Court. On the aforesaid question, the Division Bench has held as under:
"17. We have pointed out that prior to coming into force of the IMC (Amendment) Act, neither Central Government nor the Medical Council of India had any powers to fix the admission capacity. It is only on coming into force of the Act, such powers are available to the IMC. Therefore, whatever minimum standards of medical education may have been prescribed Under Section 19-A of the Act, prior to coming into force of the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act would be only recommendatory in character by way of guidelines. It is only after the IMC (Amendment) Act has come into force if any determination has been made as to the admission capacity, that admission capacity will have to be taken into consideration. Thus, whatever prescriptions had been made by the State Government prior to coming into force of the Act will form the starting point (or benchmark as noticed by the learned Single Judge) for the purpose of Section 10-A of the Central Act. This position also become clear when we read Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1). Explanation 2 reads as follows:
"For the purpose of this section, admission capacity in relation to any course of study of training in medical college means the maximum number of students that may be fixed by the Council from time to time for being admitted to such course or training".
Fixing the number would arise only after the Indian Medical Council was empowered to do so. It cannot be read into the said provision that what standards had been prescribed by it Under Section 19-A of the Act would be the standard for the purpose of determining the admission capacity which are held to be only in the nature of guidelines or recommendatory in nature until the coming into force of the IMC (Amendment) Act. That admission capacity is to be determined with reference to Section 10-A and not with reference to Section 19-A of the Act. But, in determining whether the admission capacity is correct or not and whether it conforms to the standard prescribed by the Indian Medical Council or not, now it is certainly open to the Indian Medical Council to make inspection from time to time and determine whether the admission capacity of each college would conform to the standard prescribed by them, and thereby it can either decrease or increase as the case may be after following appropriate procedure thereto. If this is the correct interpretation to be placed on the provisions of the enactments now the question that arises for consideration is what would be the position in relation to colleges which have been established prior to 1-6-1992. The admission capacity in those cases had been fixed under the relevant State enactments. As long as the State enactments were not inconsistent with the Central enactments as noticed by the Supreme Court, it was impermissible for them to fix such admission capacity. If on the basis of such fixation admissions have been made, we do not think such admissions will however, have to be regulated on the basis of the capacity fixed or determined by the Indian Medical Council. To this limited extent, in our view, these appeals will have to be allowed and the order made by the learned Single Judge to that extent will therefore, have to be modified".
35. Aggrieved by the aforesaid portion of the order of the Division Bench the MCI prefeired an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Medical Council of India, has formulated the point for consideration in the following manner:
"2. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has put a question mark on the authority of the Medical Council of India (for short, "the Medical Council") the appellant in its judgment dated 16-7-1997 to fix intake for admission of students to various medical colleges in the State of Karnataka. The Medical Council is aggrieved by the part of the impugned judgment where the Division Bench held that prior to insertion Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C in the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (for short, "the Medical Council Act") by the Amending Act 31 of 1993, neither the Central Government nor the Medical Council could fix the admission capacity in the medical colleges in the State and that this authority to determine the admission capacity in the Medical colleges vested in the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (for short, "the Karnataka Universities Act") and the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee") Act, 1984 (for short, "Karnataka Capitation Fee Act"). The Division Bench however, held that after the amendment of the Indian Medical Council Act by insertion of Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C, the two State enactments would yield to the provisions of the Medical Council Act to the extent of repugnancy and that now the power to fix admission capacity rests with the Medical Council. The Division Bench said that admission capacity for purpose of increase or decrease in each of the colleges, has got to be determined as on or before 1-6-1992 with reference to what had been fixed by the State Government or that fixed by the medical colleges and not with reference to the minimum standard of education regulations prescribed Under Section 19-A of the Medical Council Act by the Medical Council which is said were only "recommendatory" as held in State of Madhya Pradesh v Nivedita Jain, . Thus, according to the Division Bench, future admission will, however have to be regulated on the basis of the capacity fixed or determined by the Medical Council as provisions of Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C are prospective".
"29. A medical student requires gruelling study and that can be done only if proper facilities are available in a medical college and the hospital attached to it has to be well-equipped and the teaching faculty and doctors have to be competent enough that when a medical student comes out, he is perfect in the science of treatment of human beings and is not found wanting in any way. The country does not want half-backed medical professionals coming out of medical colleges and when they did not have full facilities of teaching and were not exposed to the patients and their ailments during the course of their study. . . .".
"30. Having thus held that it is the Medical Council which can prescribe the number of students to be admitted in medical courses in a medical college or institution, it is the Central Government alone which can direct increase in the number of admissions but only on the recommendation of the Medical Council. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in his view that no medical college can admit any student in excess of its admission capacity fixed by the Medical Council subject to any increase thereof as approved by the Central Government and that Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C will prevail over Section 53(10) of the State Universities Act and Section 4(1)(b) of the State Capitation Fee Act. To say that the number of students as permitted by the State Government and/or the University before 1-6-1992 could continue would be allowing an illegality to perpetuate for all time to come. The Division Bench, in our opinion, in the impugned judgment was not correct in holding that admission capacity for the purpose of increase or decrease in each of the medical colleges/institutions has got to be determined as on or before 1-6-1992 with reference to what had been fixed by the State Government or the admission capacity fixed by the medical colleges and not with reference to the minimum standard of education prescribed Under Section 19-A of the Medical Council Act which the Division Bench said were only recommendatory. Nivedita Jain's case does not say that all the regulations framed by the Medical Council with the previous approval of the Central Government are directory or recommendatory. It is not that only future admissions will have to be regulated on the basis of the capacity fixed or determined by the Medical Council. The plea of the State Government that power to regulate admission to medical colleges is the prarogative of the State has to be rejected".
36. A reading of the aforesaid judgments make it clear that the question whether the Medical Council of India has the power to stop admissions to medical colleges on the ground that there are some deficiencies in the infrastructure of the college was not gone into at all. On the contrary, the question involved in these proceedings is which is the authority under the Act to decide the intake of a medical college. It was held that it is the Central Government, who, on the recommendations of the Medical Council of India, would decide the intake of a medical college and neither the State Government nor the University has any say in the matter. Further, the judgment held that the Explanation 2 equally applies to institutions which were established prior to coming into force of the amended provisions to which formal recognition has already been granted. Therefore, the contention that the issue involved in this writ petition was involved in the aforesaid proceedings and with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point, there was no scope for interpretation by this Court is without any substance.
37. Similarly, relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Dr. Preeti Srivastava, wherein the Supreme Court interpreted Section 20 of the Act by placing what is known as purposive interpretation on the aforesaid provisions, it was contended that this Court can also place purposive interpretation when it is interpreting any of the provisions of this Act.
38. In order to appreciate this contentions, it is necessary to know what the Supreme Court has said in Dr. Preeti Srivastava's case. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Singh, after examining Section 20 of the Act, held that the power of the Medical Council of India to prescribe standards of Post-Graduate Medical Education Under Section 20 are only for the guidance of the Universities and since the said Section 20 also refers to powers of the Council to advise Universities in the matter of securing uniform standards for P.G. Medical Education throughout India, the entire power Under Section 20 of the Act was purely advisory. Secondly, it was held that it is not of a binding character on the Central Government. It is in the context of aforesaid judgment, the Constitution Bench did not agree with the interpretation put on Section 20 of the Act. Thereafter, they proceeded to hold that Section 20(1) of the Act is in three parts. The first part provides that the Council may prescribe standards of post-graduate medical education for the guidance of Universities. The second part of Sub-section (1) says that the Council may advise Universities in the matter of securing uniform standards for post graduate medical education throughout. The last part of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act enables the Central Government to constitute from amongst the members of the Council, a Post-graduate Medical Education Committee. The first part of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act empowers the Council to prescribe standards of Post-graduate Medical Education for the guidance of the Universities. Therefore, the Universities have to be guided by the programmes accordingly. The scheme of the Act does not give an option to the Universities to follow or not to follow the standards laid down by the Indian Medical Council. They referred to Sections 16, 17 and 19 of the Act and when dealing with Section 19-A of the Act they held that Section 19-A enables the Council to prescribe minimum standards of medical education required for granting recognised medical qualifications other than the post-graduate medical qualifications by the Universities or Medical Institutions, while Section 20 gives to power to Council to prescribe Minimum standards of Post-Graduate Medical education, the Universities must necessarily be guided by the standards prescribed Under Section 20(1) if their degrees or diplomas are to be recognised under Medical Council of India Act. Ultimately, the Court disagreed with and overruled the ratio laid down in the Ajay Kumar's case, to the effect that the standards of Post-Graduate Medical Education prescribed by the Medical Council of India are merely directory and Universities are not bound to comply with the said standards so prescribed. Similarly, the Court overruled the ratio, by disagreeing with the reasoning given by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nivedita Jain, by holding that the Medical Council of India has been set up as an expert body to control the minimum standards of medical education and to regulate their observance. It has implicit power to supervise the qualifications or eligibility standards for admission into medical institutions. There is, under the Act an overall vigilance by the Medical Council to prevent Sub-standards entrance qualifications for medical courses. These observations held to apply equally to the Post-graduate Medical courses. In fact, that is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Medical Council of India , which they affirmed.
39. Therefore, it is clear that what the Supreme Court considered in the aforesaid judgment was as regards the use of the word "advise" Under Section 21 of the Act and whether it is directory or mandatory. It was held to be directory by the earlier decision of the Supreme Court which view was overruled by holding it as mandatory and binding on the Universities and Central Government by adopting what is known as purposive construction.
40. It is thus clear that first, in the said judgment, Section 10-A or Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1) or the regulations on which reliance placed did not fall for consideration. Secondly, by adopting purposive construction, the word 'advice' has been held to be mandatory and not directory. In other words, while interpreting any other provision of the Act, if similar words denoting that they are directory fell for consideration the Court has to bear in mind the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment and in appropriate cases, it could also place interpretation by holding that these words are mandatory. But, when words are not there in any section, under the guise of purposive construction the Court cannot interpret the same by adding words to the section, which the legislature never intended. Then it would be legislation by the Court which is impermissible. In fact, under these circumstances, it is necessary to bear in mind the law which the Supreme Court has laid down as regards interpretation of its judgment. The Supreme Court in the case of R.L. Jain v. Delhi Development Authority, has held that.-
"A decision is an Authority only for what it actually decides - It is the ratio and not every observations found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein that is relevant".
41. Further, the Apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and Ors., has held that-
"Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not be read as Euclid's Theorems nor as provisions of the Statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not be construed as Statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a Statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions, but the discussions is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret Statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of Statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as Statutes".
42. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the contention that in the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court, the point in controversy in this case has been dealt with and pronounced and therefore, there is no scope for this Court to interpret Section 10-A is without any substance. In both the cases, the question whether the MCI has power to stop admissions to medical college was not even remotely considered. Under these circumstances, no inference or support to be drawn from these judgments.
43. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, it is clear that neither Section 10-A(1) of the Act nor Explanation 2 to Section 10-A(1) nor the regulations framed Under Section 10-A in respect of establishing of new medical college, would confer any power on the MCI to stop admissions to medical college for which formal recognition has been granted prior to and after coming into force of the amendment Act. Consequently, the impugned order passed directing the petitioner-college to stop admission for the academic year 2004-05 cannot be sustained and accordingly it is liable to be quashed.
44. It was next contended that if ultimately, the power were be to exercised, by the Central Government, it has serious consequences, which is not desirable. Under these circumstances, the MCI is vested with the power to pass order stopping the students from being admitted to the medical college as interim measure and therefore the said provision did not come in the way of MCI exercising of passing any such interim orders. It is well-settled that interim order is granted in aid of main relief, thereby it is clear that the authorities which passes interim order should also have the jurisdiction to pass final order. If the authorities has no jurisdiction to pass final order the question of passing of interim order does not arise. The power of withdrawal of recognition lies Under Section 19 of the Act with the Central Government which is to be exercised on the recommendation of the MCI after notice to the State Government, University concerned and to the Medical Institution. When that being the scheme of the Act, the MCI did not possess the power to pass any interim order.
45. In fact, during the course of hearing of the appeal, learned Counsel has placed on record the report showing the deficiencies which the Inspection Committee noticed during the course of hearing of this appeal. Based on the compliance report dated 15-9-2004, the MCI passed order dated 22-9-2004 reiterating the earlier stand. When the MCI has no jurisdiction or power to pass an order stopping admission of students to a medical college for the academic year, the order passed on 22-9-2004 also would be one without jurisdiction though the said order was passed at the request of the college. Therefore, there is no substance in the said contentions.
46. Point No. 2.-In view of the findings on Point No. 1 that the MCI has no power to pass order, the answer to this question loses importance. However, the material on record discloses that the appellant-college made a request for enhancing the intake capacity from 100 to 120. It is in this context, the Committee sent its team to inspect the college to find out as to whether the Institution possessed of necessary infrastructure to teach the additional intake which they have sought for. The material on record further discloses that the Committee has pointed out the deficiencies; thereafter the college rectified the deficiencies; the Committee again came and found that the deficiencies still persists; again the college was asked to rectify the deficiencies and ultimately the MCI not being satisfied with the compliance report, has proceeded to pass the impugned order.
47. The entire matter which was before the MCI was as regards grant of additional intake of 20 students to the undergraduate course and the question was not whether the 100 students, which was the fixed intake by the MCI, do have the infrastructure. If the MCI is of the opinion that the necessary infrastructure is not sufficient to grant permission to increase the admission capacity as it is clear from the correspondence made throughout, it should have confined its recommendation or order to the said issue only. Both parties concentrated only on the question whether the additional 20 seats should be granted or not. The last inspection was with reference to finding out whether the infrastructure available would meet the requirement of intake of 100 students. In this regard, it was contended that such inspection was made without notice to the appellant and it was a surprise visit that too on a holiday and they dispute the correctness of the report. On the contrary, the MCI rely on the representations made by the Chairman of the Committee constituted by this Court to run the institutions and contended that said representation contains admission regarding deficiencies.
48. From this, one thing is clear that before passing the order, the MCI did not put the appellant on notice to the effect that they have found the deficiencies even in respect of admission capacity of 100 students and neither explanation was called for nor they were given an opportunity after so notifying either to rectify the deficiencies failing which they would be constrained to pass order which they have passed.
49. It is required to be noticed that on any given day, in a medical college there will be 4 batches. If on the ground of insufficient infrastructure, admission to the first year MBBS course has to be prevented, and if the infrastructure available is found to be sufficient to teach 3 batches which are higher classes, by stoppage of admission, the income to the college to run institution is seriously affected which will also seriously affect the running the institution smoothly in respect of remaining 3 batches.
50. Under these circumstances, such an order would have serious consequences not only affecting the institution but would also affect the interest of students who are pursuing their studies in the said college. When power of that nature is sought to be exercised, it is the minimum requirement of law that the affected persons should be heard and should be given an opportunity not only to explain as to why action should not be taken, but an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies pointed out by them and only thereafter, in spite of such opportunity being given, the deficiencies are not rectified, it could be said, that the authorities which are vested with the power to maintain minimum standards of medical education could initiate any proceedings in pursuant to the statutory obligation cast on them and if such power is vested in them they would be justified in passing any such order.
51. Admittedly, in this case, the principles of natural justice have been violated. The impugned order passed is not in the nature of interim order. It would have the effect of permanently preventing one batch of students from being admitted to the college. It would have a cascading effect on the entire institution itself. In this regard, it is useful to quote the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, wherein it has been held that.-
"It is well-settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided, will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice".
Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, it is quashed.
52. For the foregoing reasons, my answer to the points of difference is as under:
(i) The MCI has no power to stop admission of students to a recognised medical college Under Section 10-A of the Act for any academic year.
(ii) The principles, of natural justice are to be mandatorily followed before passing any order of nature which the MCI has passed in the instant case.
53. This appeal was preferred by the Chairman of the Committee Constituted by this Court in writ petitions filed challenging the appointment of administrator by the rival factions of the management. Several orders have been passed from time to time by the Division Bench. The said writ petitions were withdrawn by filing a memo. Thereafter, several orders have been passed from time to time relieving the Chairman of his responsibilities and one such latest order dated 27-9-2004 permitting handing over of charges of the institution to the hands of trustees. The order has been passed during hearing of these proceedings. Therefore, Counsel appearing for the trustees has also been heard in the matter and they have filed an affidavit of one by name B.L. Nanjundaswamy, founder trustee, who has undertaken on behalf of the trustees to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 crore immediately and promised to deposit one more crore within a period of one month for exclusive utilisation of expenditure for running the college or institution. Accordingly, one crore has been deposited in the name of Principal of 2nd respondent-college drawn on Ananda Co-operative Bank Limited on 7-10-2004 to show their bona fides with a request to permit them to admit students for the first year MBBS Course in accordance with law. In the light of the above opinion of mine, the Registry is directed to place the matter before the Division Bench for further orders.
ORDER
54. N. Kumar, J., has concurred with S.R. Nayak, J. In that view of the matter, a writ shall issue to the respondents in terms of the opinion of the majority.