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Delhi District Court

M/S Samara India Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India And Ors on 31 October, 2023

          IN THE COURT OF MR. SATYABRATA PANDA, ADJ-04,
                 PATIALA HOUSE COURTS, NEW DELHI

CS No.84 of 2017
                                                              Date of institution: 06.12.2001
                                                              Date of arguments: 08.08.2023
                                                               Date of judgment: 31.10.2023

M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Director
Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan
office at B-35, Lajpat Nagar-II
New Delhi 110024                                                                .......Plaintiff

Vs.

1.     Union of India
       through the Ministry of Urban Development and
       Poverty Alleviation, through its Secretary,
       Government of India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi.

2.     Delhi Development Authority through its vide Chairman
       Vikas Sadan, near INA Market, New Delhi-110023

3.     Sh. Niranjan Singh

4.     Sh. Ranpat Singh
       Both sons of Late Sh. Chote Lal

5.     Sh. Amit Kumar Singh
       s/o Late Sh. Ran Singh
       (Defendant no.3 to 5 are r/o H.No.123, village Saidullajab,
        Tehsil, Mehrauli, New Delhi-110030

6.     Sh. Anil Kumar s/o Sh. Ram Phal

7.     Sh. Sumit Kumar s/o Sh. Ram Phal

8.     Sh. Sudhir Kumar s/o Sh. Ram Phal

       (defendants no.6 to 8 r/o F-311, Lado Sarai,
       New Delhi 110030)


      CS No.84 of 2017   M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors.         Page no.1
 9.    Sh. Manish s/o Sh. Rai Singh
      r/o H.No.122, Village Saidullajab, Tehsil Mehrauli
      New Delhi-110030.

                                                                       .........Defendants

                                        JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff company has filed the present suit seeking damages along with interest against the defendants no. 1 and 2. The case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint is as follows:

1.1. The plaintiff is engaged in the business of automobile dealership and has been running its business in the tradename of Samara Hyundai. The plaintiff had to maintain a workhouse-cum-workshop for the purpose of parking the vehicles supplied by the manufacturer and also for conducting pre-delivery inspection along with allied minor repairs and rectification of cars before sale of the vehicle to the customer.

The plaintiff was in search of a large space which would be suitable for its requirement. In response to the search conducted by the plaintiff, the defendants nos. 3 to 9 jointly contacted the plaintiff and offered the land along with semi- built-up structure thereon to the plaintiff for opening and running of the warehouse-cum-workshop for its cars after making addition/alteration/modification in the existing structure. The plaintiff was also assured by the defendants no. 3 to 9 that they had a clear title to the land in question and that fact was confirmed by the Khasra Girdawari pertaining to the said land for the year 1999-2000 confirming not only the ownership of the defendants no. 3 to 9 along with their other family members but also the existence of structures consisting CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.2 of rooms, shed, well, boundary wall etc. After verifying all the records as provided by the defendants no. 3 to 9, the plaintiff entered into three different lease agreements, being lease deed with the defendants no. 3 to 5 dated 14/08/1999, and with the defendants no.6 to 8 dated 12/08/1999, and with the defendant no.9 dated 14/08/1999 for areas of land admeasuring 900 sq. yd, 1050 sq. yd and 900 sq. yd, respectively, with the existing structures built thereon in the Khasra Nos. 275 and 285 in Village Said-ul-ajaib, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi 110030.

1.2. The defendants no. 3 to 9 had requested the plaintiff to advance them a certain sum of amount so that they could make additions, alterations, modifications and renovations of the existing structures to make it suitable and feasible for the use of the plaintiff. For the said purpose, a settled sum of Rs. 40 lakh was arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendants no.3 to 9 and it was further agreed that the payment of the said advance would be made in instalments keeping in view the progress of the renovation job. In this regard, the plaintiff made payments amounting to a total of Rs. 33,82,289/- to the defendants no. 3 to 9 for the renovation/modification work.

1.3. The plaintiff company also carried out various jobs connected with the installation of its machinery and equipment, renovation and beautification of the structures and office automatization to make the place ready for its use and to run its business for profit. A sum of Rs. 30,78,418.30 was spent by the plaintiff to carry out the above-said job and to convert the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.3 place into a warehouse-cum-workshop-cum-office having all the amenities and facilities required for the purposes of functioning from April, 2000 till 31/05/2000.

1.4. The said place was completely ready in all respects and as such the plaintiff company conducted an official inauguration on 31/05/2000 and started its business activities thereon with immediate effect. On 01/06/2000, the representative of the plaintiff namely Sh. U.S. Sahni, who along with others was present in the workshop since morning, was contacted by a big contingent of staff of the defendant no.2 at about 12:30 PM accompanied by a large number of police personnel and bulldozers headed by Mr. Aulakh from the defendant no.2 DDA claiming that the land belonged to the defendant no.2 and that the plaintiff had encroached on the government land and he has instructions to dispossess the occupants, whoever it may be, from the alleged government land and to evacuate the said land. On enquiry, he was unable to show any notice or any document containing any instructions and in an arbitrary and dictatorial manner he ordered his contingent of personnel not only to throw out the equipment and other contents lying therein but also to cause complete demolition of the entire structure without giving any opportunity to the plaintiff to remove its belongings to a safer place. However, with great persuasion, Mr. Aulakh allowed the plaintiff to remove its belongings, whatever the plaintiff could do within a short time of two hours. The plaintiff could only remove the computers, kit boxes and about 45 cars already parked inside the premises. Thereafter, Mr. Aulakh carried out complete CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.4 demolition of the structure on the land with the help of bulldozer and the contingent of the staff members. The aforesaid demolition had resulted in a total loss of the structures besides alterations, additions, modifications, renovations etc. including fitments, woodwork, aluminium panelling, furniture and fixtures amounting to Rs. 64,60,707/-. It is further stated that as per the valuation report of a government approved valuer during October 2000, the cost of the structure demolished by the defendant no.2 was assessed at Rs. 53,39,800/-.

1.5. The defendants no. 1 and 2 did not care either to verify from their own records that the land in question had not only been de-notified but the possession of the same was restored to the defendants no. 3 to 9 under the orders of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

1.6. No show-cause notice was ever issued either to the plaintiff or to the defendants no. 3 to 9 who were the actual owners of the premises. It is stated that the defendants no. 1 and 2 did not follow the due process of law so as to enable the plaintiff company or the defendants no. 3 to 9 to prove that the land in question was not government land and was in the lawful possession of the plaintiff company as a lessee of the defendants no. 3 to 9 for consideration. It is stated that the act of demolition by the defendants no. 1 and 2 was without any authority of law and was in flagrant violation of the rule of law.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.5 1.7. The plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendants nos. 1 and 2 on 28/04/2001 to the defendant through registered post which was duly served, but the defendants nos. 1 and 2 did not reply to the same.

2. On this basis, the plaintiff company has sought the recovery of damages of Rs. 64,60,707/- along with interest @ 18% p.a. from 01/06/2000 till the realisation.

3. The defendants nos. 3, 4, 5 and 9 have filed written statement in which they have supported the case of the plaintiff.

4. The defendant no.2 has filed written statement in its defence. It is stated in the written statement that in the guise of the present suit, the plaintiff was actually seeking a declaration that the subject property was not government land whereas the plaintiff was aware that the subject land was government land. It is further stated that there was no cause of action in favour of the plaintiff to file the present suit as the subject land belonged to the DDA. It is further stated that the suit for damages was not maintainable as the plaintiff was in possession of acquired land and the construction had been raised by the plaintiff etc. on acquired land which land belonged to the DDA. It is stated that since the land belonged to the DDA, the plaintiff had no authority to raise any construction or to be in possession of the same. It is further stated in the written statement that the land in question did not belong to the defendants no. 3 to 9 as alleged by the plaintiff. It is stated that the land in the suit fell under Khasra Nos. 275 and 285 of Vilalge Said-Ul-Ajaib, wherein the plaintiff had raised illegal and unlawful construction. The police CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.6 report against the raising of illegal and unlawful construction was made to the local police on 08/02/2000. It is stated that the land in question belonged to the DDA. It is stated that the according to the land revenue records, the Khasra No. 275 (4-07) and Khasra No.285/2 (1-16) was acquired vide Award No.13/87-88 and Khasra No.285/1 (0-07) was acquired vide Award No.149/86-87. It is stated that the physical possession of the aforesaid Khasra had been taken over by the DDA on 17/07/1987 and 23/09/1986, respectively. It is stated that the plaintiff had taken legal possession of the subject land which belonged to the DDA and the new construction raised by the plaintiff being illegal was got demolished by the DDA with the help of local police on 01/06/2000. The defendant no. 2 has denied in general the claim of the plaintiff regarding the amount of expenditure on the concerned property and the damages sought. It is further stated by the defendant no. 2 that the defendant was not required to give any notice/intimation to the encroacher on DDA land. It is stated that the defendant no.2 was authorised to get the property free of illegal encroachment and no notice was required for the same. On this basis, the defendant no.2 has denied the claim for damages and interest of the plaintiff and has prayed for dismissal of the suit.

5. The plaintiff has filed replication to the written statement of the defendant no. 2, in which the plaintiff has denied in general the averments made in the written statement and has reiterated the averments made in the plaint.

6. Vide order dated 15/12/2004, the following issues were framed in the suit:

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.7

1. Whether the suit has been instituted by a duly authorised person? If so, its effect? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any amount towards damages? If so, as to what amount? OPP

3. Whether the suit land has been acquired? Onus on parties

4. What right, if any, does the plaintiff have on the suit land? OPP

5. Whether the demolition carried out by the defendant no.

2 at the site is illegal? Onus on parties

6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the damages, if awarded? If so, at what rate? OPP

7. Relief

7. In support of its case, the plaintiff has examined PW1 Mr. Rajneesh Wadhawan to prove the case of the plaintiff in general and PW-2 Mr. U.S Sahni and PW-3 Sh. Niranjan Singh to prove the damages. The plaintiff's witnesses were cross-examined by the defendant no.2. The plaintiff has also relied upon the documentary evidence filed in the suit.

8. In support of its case, the defendant no.2 has examined its director Mr. S.P Padhy as D2W1 and he has tendered his affidavit in evidence as Ex.D2W1/A. He was cross-examined by the plaintiff.

9. The ld. counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the relevant pleadings and evidence in support of the plaintiff and has submitted that the plaintiff has been able to prove its case as pleaded in the plaint and CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.8 is entitled to decree. It is submitted that the plaintiff has been able to show that the suit has been instituted by a duly authorised person. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has been able to show that although there had been land acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land, subsequently, the land acquisition proceedings were set aside by the Hon'ble High Court. It is submitted that as such, the defendants no. 3 to 9 were the owners of the subject suit land. It is further submitted that the plaintiff was in possession of the subject property as lessee. It is submitted that the demolition carried out by the defendant no. 2 was illegal in as much as neither was the subject land under the ownership of the DDA and nor did the DDA follow the due process of law in the demolition. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has been able to prove the quantum of loss suffered by way of the evidence led by the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff would be entitled to decree.

10. It is only the defendant no.2 who has contested the suit. The learned counsel for the defendant no.2 has referred to the relevant pleadings and evidence in support of the defendant no.2 and has submitted that the suit ought to be dismissed.

11. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and I have perused the record.

12. My issue-wise findings are as follows.

Re: Limitation

13. The defendants have not raised the objection of limitation in their written statement and neither was any issue framed on the point of CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.9 limitation. Even in the written submissions, the defendant no.2 has not raised any objection of limitation. However, at the time of oral arguments, the learned counsel for the defendant no.2 has made submissions on the point of limitation and has submitted that the objection of limitation ought to be seen by the Court even if not specifically raised.

14. The ld. counsel for the defendant no.2 has relied upon Section 53-B of the Delhi Development Authority Act and has submitted that the cause of action for filing of the suit arose on 01/06/2000 when the demolition was carried out by the defendant no.2 at the site. It is submitted that in terms of Section 53-B (2) of the DDA Act, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit within 6 months from 01/06/2000. It is submitted that admittedly the suit having been filed in December 2001 was barred by limitation.

15. Section 53-B of the Delhi Development Authority Act is extracted hereunder:

"53B. Notice to be given of suits.--

(1) No suit shall be instituted against the Authority, or any member hereof, or any of its officers or other employees, or any person acting under the directions of the Authority or any member or any officer or other employee of the Authority in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or regulation made thereunder until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Authority, left at its office, and in any other case, delivered to, or left at the office or place of abode of, the person to be sued and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of relief CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.10 sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of residence of the intending plaintiff and unless the plaint contains a statement that such notice has been so left or delivered.

(2) No suit such as is described in sub-section (1) shall, unless it is a suit for recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises.

(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to apply to a suit in which the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the institution of the suit."

16. Normally, a suit for damages and compensation would have a period of limitation of 3 years from the date of the cause of action. In the present case, the demolition took place on 01/06/2000 and the suit has been filed sometime on 24/12/2001. As such, the suit would be well within limitation taking a period of 3 years as the limitation period.

17. The defendant no.2 has sought to rely upon section 53-B of the DDA Act to claim that the suit was barred in as much as the suit was supposed to have been filed within six months from 01/06/2000. However, the defendant no.2 has not raised any such objection in its written statement. No issue was framed on the point of bar of the suit under Section 53-B of the DDA Act. Section 53-B is a special provision which bars the institution of suits after expiry of 6 months from the date of cause of action. This special provision is really for the benefit of the defendant no.2 and otherwise curtails the normal period of limitation which would be longer. When the defendant CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.11 no.2 has not specifically raised the objection of limitation of 6 months under Section 53-B in its written statement and even no issue has been framed on the same, it would be deemed that the defendant no.2 had waived the special limitation period of 6 months under Section 53-B and had accepted that the ordinary limitation period of 3 years would be applicable. Thus, once having waived the application of the special period of limitation, the defendant no.2 cannot now at the stage of final oral arguments turn around and invoke the special period of limitation of 6 months. The special provision which curtails the ordinary period of limitation in favour of an authority would be applicable only if an objection to this effect is raised by the authority. In case no objection is raised at the time of filing of written statement or even at the time of framing of issues, then it would be deemed that the authority i.e. the defendant no.2, has waived the special shorter period of limitation and in such case the ordinary period of limitation would apply.

18. Even otherwise, I find that the issue of application of the special period of limitation under Section 53-B of the DDA Act was not a pure question of law but was a mixed question of law and fact and as such the defendants were required to specifically plead the objection in their written statement so that an issue could have been framed on the point and the parties would have led evidence. Admittedly, in the present case, there was no show-cause notice issued to the plaintiff who was in occupation of the subject property and there were no orders of demolition. As such, whether the act of demolition was an act done or purported to have been done in pursuance of the DDA Act or any rule or regulation made thereunder were mixed questions of fact and law and were not simply pure questions of law.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.12 As such, having not raised any objection in its written statement and there being no issue framed on the point of limitation or regarding applicability of Section 53-B of the DDA Act, the defendant no.2 cannot at the stage of final arguments raise the issue of bar of Section 53-B of the DDA Act.

19. Further, even from the evidence on record, I find that it cannot be said that the act of the defendant no.2 in demolishing the structure on the subject land was an act committed under the DDA Act or even an act purported to have been committed under the DDA Act. Admittedly, there was no show-cause notice issued nor are there any demolition orders which were passed by the defendant no.2 authority. The defendant no.2 has failed to show under what authority under the DDA Act or even under what purported authority it was acting when the structure was demolished. As held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Fresh Assets v. DDA 2015 SCC Online Del 11245, the provision under Section 53-B of the DDA Act being a provision restricting the larger period of limitation has to be strictly construed. When the demolition action has been carried out without either giving any show-cause notice or even without any order for demolition by the defendant no.2 authority under the DDA Act, then the demolition action cannot be held to be "any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or regulation made thereunder" within the meaning of Section 53-B of the DDA Act.

20. Further, even assuming that Section 53-B of the DDA Act were to apply, I find that the suit cannot be said to be barred under the said provision. In Fresh Assets v. DDA 2015 SCC Online Del 11245, the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.13 plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of money towards the interest on the principal sum. The principal sum had been refunded on 29/01/2013. Under the Limitation Act, the period of three years for filing of the suit was to be reckoned from 31/01/2013 which would expire on 29/01/2016. In this case, the statutory notice under Section 80 CPC read with Section 53-B DDA Act was sent on 15/10/2013. The Hon'ble High Court held that even if Section 53-B were to apply, calculated from 15/10/2013, the period of two months would expire on 14/12/2013 and the period of six months for instituting the suit would expire on 13/06/2014, which would further extend till the reopening of the Courts after summer vacation. It was held in that case that the suit having been filed on 30/06/2014 upon reopening of the Courts would be within limitation even applying Section 53-B of the DDA Act. Thus, the Hon'ble High Court has interpreted the period of six months limitation for institution of the suit under Section 53-B of the DDA Act in such manner. In the present case, the plaintiff had issued legal notice to the defendants on 28/04/2001 through registered post. The period of two months from 28/04/2001 would expire on 27/06/2001, and the period of six months therefrom for filing the suit would have expired from six months therefrom i.e. on 26/12/2001. The present suit having been filed on 24/12/2001 would thus, in any case be within time even assuming that Section 53-B of the Limitation Act were to apply.

21. Accordingly, the objection of the defendant no.2 of limitation under Section 53-B of the DDA Act is rejected.

Issue 1: Whether the suit has been instituted by a duly authorised person? If so it's effect? OPP CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.14

22. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the present suit has been validly instituted by Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan who was duly authorised to institute the suit as a director in the plaintiff company. The plaintiff has relied upon the certified true copy of the resolution of the board of directors of the plaintiff company held on 06/10/2001 being Ex.PW-1/2, authorising Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan as director to institute the suit. The Ex.PW-1/2 being a true copy of the resolution has been signed by the director Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to the testimony of Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan as PW-1. PW-1 has testified during his cross-examination that he was always present at all the board meetings where the resolutions have been passed by the board of directors. He has also testified that there was a register where the minutes of all the resolutions and board meetings were recorded. He has denied the suggestion that there was no resolution passed in his favour to institute the present suit.

23. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant no.2 has submitted that the plaintiff has been unable to prove that the suit was instituted by a person duly authorised. The learned counsel for the defendant no.2 has submitted that in his cross-examination, PW-2 has stated that he did not recollect if the resolution authorising him to institute the suit was signed by all the directors present in the meeting and that he needed to see the document, and that without checking the record he could not answer how many directors attended the meeting dated 06/10/2001. Upon being shown the resolution dated 06/10/2001, PW-2 stated that it was correct that the resolution had been signed by him and that he was the chairman of CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.15 the board of directors and that he has signed it and that the presence of other directors was marked in the attendance register who concurred with the resolution. The learned counsel for the defendant no.2 has submitted that the board resolution was only signed by the PW-2 and not by the other directors and as such the board resolution was not valid.

24. Ex.PW-1/2 is a certified true copy of the board resolution dated 06/10/2001. Perhaps, since the Ex.PW-1/2 was only a certified true copy, the same was only signed by PW-1 Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan and not by the other directors. PW-1 has denied the suggestion that there was no resolution passed in his favour to institute the present suit. He has also testified that he had signed the resolution as chairman of the board of directors and that the presence of the other directors was marked in the attendance register who concurred with the resolution. On a balance of probabilities, it is held that the plaintiff has proved that there was a resolution passed on 06/10/2001 by the board of directors authorising Mr. Rajnish Wadhawan to institute the present suit. Accordingly, it is held that the suit has been instituted by a duly authorised person. The Issue No.1 is answered accordingly.

Issue 3: Whether the suit land has been acquired? Onus on parties

25. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that sometime in the 1980s, land acquisition proceedings were carried out in respect of lands in various villages including the subject land and then ultimately the acquisition proceedings were quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Ld. counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.16 relevant judicial proceedings in this regard. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendants no. 6 to 8 had duly returned the compensation received by them along with interest in respect of their portion of the subject land being Khasra No.275. In this regard, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No. 3133/2000. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendants no. 3 to 5 and 9 never received any compensation in the land acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to the testimony of the defendant no. 3 who was called by the plaintiff as a witness as PW-

3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble High Court, the revenue records in the form of Khatoni were also amended to reflect the true and correct ownership of the land. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to Ex.PW-1/9 being Khatoni for the year 1998- 1999 pertaining to Khasra No. 285 and has submitted that as per the Ex.PW-1/9, the owners of the land pertaining to Khasra No.285 were the defendants no. 3 to 5 and 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to Ex.PW-1/10 being Khatoni for the year 1998- 1999 pertaining to Khasra No. 275 and has submitted that as per the Ex.PW-1/10, the owner of the land pertaining to Khasra No.275 was Sh. Ram Phool who was the father of the defendants no. 6 to 8. It is further submitted that it was the admitted position that at the time of the demolition it was the plaintiff who was in possession of the subject land and structure thereon as a tenant. It is submitted that the possession of the plaintiff also shows that the possession had never been taken by the defendants no. 1 and 2 and that the defendants nos. 3 to 9 were the owners of the land. It is submitted that, thus, the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.17 plaintiff has been able to discharge the burden of proving that the acquisition proceedings stood quashed and that the defendants no. 3 to 9 were the owners of the subject land. It is submitted that the defendant no. 2 has failed to lead any evidence to prove its defence.

26. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant no. 2 that the defendant no. 2 has duly proved the acquisition of the land through the testimony of the defendant's witness Sh. S.P. Padhy as D2W1 and the documents produced by the said witness as Ex.D2W-1/1 to Ex.D2W-1/4. It is submitted that D2W1 has deposed in terms of his affidavit in evidence Ex.D2W- 1/A and has proved the two awards as Ex.D2W-1/1 and Ex.D2W- 1/2, respectively, and the possession taken reports dated 17/07/1987 and 23/09/1986 as Ex.D2W-1/3 and Ex.D2W-1/4, respectively. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant no. 2 that the land was acquired by the defendant no. 2 under the aforesaid awards and the physical possession was also taken in terms of the aforesaid possession reports. It is submitted that the land in question belongs to the defendant no. 2 and no other person had any right, title or interest in the same. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has been unable to show that the defendants no. 3 to 9 had complied with the conditions laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, and as such since there was no compliance, the plaintiff had been unable to show that the land in question had reverted to the defendants no. 3 to

9.

27. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant no. 2 that the judgement dated 15/05/1989 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the Writ Petition (Civil) No.51/89 was not in absolute terms CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.18 but was conditional inasmuch as the Hon'ble High Court had clearly directed that those landowners who had received the compensation would return the same with interest and would also return the alternate plot, if any, obtained by them. It is submitted that, thus, it was clear that in case the possession had been taken by the government, the same be restored only on fulfilment of the aforesaid conditions. It is submitted that, thus, it was mandatory for the plaintiff and the defendants no. 3 to 9 to prove that they had not received any compensation against the land acquired by the government and also had not received any alternate allotment/plot in view of the land having been acquired, and, in the alternative that the defendant no. 3 to 9 had returned the compensation amount received by them against the land acquisition along with interest @ 12% p.a. within a period of 2 months, and in case they had taken alternate plot then that the same had been surrendered. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant no. 2 that the plaintiff had been unable to show in the present suit that the aforesaid conditions had been met with. It is submitted that as such the possession remained with the defendant no. 2 and neither the defendants no. 3 to 9 nor the plaintiff had any right, title or interest in the suit property.

28. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties on this issue.

29. From the record it is borne that sometime in the 1980s, land acquisition proceedings were initiated in respect of lands in various villages in South Delhi. The land acquisition proceedings were challenged by way of various writ petitions. The Hon'ble High CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.19 Court of Delhi (Division Bench) quashed the land acquisition proceedings concerning eleven villages (Chhatarpur, Satbari, Maidan Garhi, Shayoorpur, Rajpur Khurd, Neb Sarai, Khirkee, Devli, Khanpur, Tughlakabad and Tigri) vide judgment dated 18/11/1988 passed in Balak Ram Gupta v. U.O.I. (C.W.P. 1639/1985) [reported as B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB) : (1989) 16 DRJ 225 (SN)]. Later, relying on the judgment in the B.R. Gupta case (1989) 37 DLT 150, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi (Single Judge) in CWP Nos. 2567-2568/1987 decided on 09/03/1989 accorded the same treatment to Village Saidul Azab. Subsequently, various land owners, including the defendants no. 3 to 9 herein, had filed writ petitions before the Hon'ble High Court with the grievance that in spite of the judgment quashing the land acquisition proceedings, the respondent authorities were trying to take possession of the land. The writ petitions filed by the defendants no. 3 to 9 were CWP No. 894/1989 in respect of Khasra No. 275 and CWP No. 990/1989 in respect of Khasra No. 285 in the village Said-ul-ajaib. The aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court (Division Bench) vide order dated 15/05/1989 (reported as Balbir Singh v. Union of India 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB) : 1990 LACC 256 : 1990 LACC 265), and is extracted hereunder in extenso:

"This order will dispose of C.Ws. 1373-75/89, 1376/89, 1378-79/89, 1377/89, 1112-13/89, 1126/89, 1281/89, 1065- 71/89, 2823/88, 51/89, 388/89, 907/89,903/89,945/89,965/89, 1008-9/89, 1598/88, 1252-58′89, 1250/89, 894/89, 517/89, 518/89, 495/89, 545/89, 569/89, 578/89, 980-88/89, 989- 992/89, 2602/88, 2601/88, 2842/88, 2841/88, 2840/88, 2813/88, 2814./88, 2815/88,2816/88,2817/88, 1114-1121/89, CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.20 1082-83/89, 1081/89,1072-79/89, 1386/89, 1362/89, 1380/89. Proceedings u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act right upto the stage of Award relating to villages, namely, Khan Pur, Deoli @ Devli, Tugblakabad, Khirkee, Neb Sarai, Said-ula Ajaib, Tigri, Shayoor Pur, Satbari, Chattar Pur, Raj Pur Khurd, Maidan Ghari, have been quashed by a Division Bench of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta v. U.O.I. C.W.P. 1639/1985 decided on 14th October, 1988/18th November. 1988. Prayer of the petitioners is that in spite of that Judgment, the respondents are trying to take possession of the land.

2. The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi Development Authority have taken up a very fair stand before us. Their contention is that certain land owners have received compensation and as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land till the compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date they received the payment till the date they have refunded the amount. The contention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further stated by learned counsel for the respondents that no effort would be made to take possession of any land from anybody and the possession already taken of these lands will be restored back to the land owners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if made with interest. It is further contended that in certain cases, the land owners have been allotted alternate plots in lieu of their land having been acquired and in those cases the alternate plots must be surrendered before the land owners can take advantage of the quashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioner accepts this suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct that the possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed except in cases where the compensation has been received by the land owners or alternate plots have been allotted until the compensation amount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for the petitioners agree that the land owners who have received compensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrender the same as indicated CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.21 above within two months from today. All other land owners who have neither received compensation nor any alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the way they like and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents. Delhi Administration will see to it that the Revenue records are amended accordingly. The proper authority i.e. the Land Acquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with 12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of the alternate plots when and if offered. The writ petitions are disposed of in these terms."

30. The authorities challenged the aforesaid order of the Hon'ble High Court before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the challenge came to be dismissed vide order dated 20/09/1991 passed in CA Nos. 3801- 46/1991 and CA No. 3847/1991 [reported as Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh/Union of India v. Balbir Singh, (1997) 5 SCC 430)]. The said order is extracted hereunder in extenso:

"1. These petitions, though bulky, show much ado about nothing. 73 writ petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on 18-11-1988 vide judgment reported as B.R. Gupta v. Union of India [(1989) 37 DLT 150] . Undeniably the petitioners then approaching that Court were from eleven villages affected by notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and none of those petitioners had challenged the acquisition in Village Saidul Azab, though it was one of the chain villages covered in the acquisition. It is true that Village Saidul Azab did figure to be mentioned in the judgment but apparently as a detail in the appreciation of facts. Later relying on the judgment in Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150] a Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in CWs Nos. 2567-2568 of 1987 decided on 9-3-1989 accorded the same treatment to Village Saidul Azab. Resultantly, by these two decisions notification under Section 6 relating to 12 villages in its entirety stood quashed.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.22

2. Another batch of petitions CW No. 1373 of 1989 etc. came up before another Division Bench of the High Court in which grievance voiced by the writ petitioners was that despite notification under Section 6 of the Act relating to the villages in which their lands were situated (being part of 12 villages) having been quashed the judgment of the High Court was not being followed and the writ petitioners were about to be dispossessed. To grant appropriate relief, the High Court on 15-5-1989 when confronting the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority, on the subject, observed as follows:

"The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi Development Authority have taken up a very fair stand before us. Their contention is that certain landowners have received compensation and as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land till the compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date they received the payment till the date they have refunded the amount. The contention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further stated by learned counsel for the respondents that no effort would be made to take possession of any land from anybody and the possession already taken of these lands will be restored back to the landowners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if made with interest. It is further contended that in certain cases, the landowners have been allotted alternate plots in lieu of their land having been acquired and in those cases, the alternate plots must be surrendered before the landowners can take advantage of the quashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioner accepts this suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct that the possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed except in cases where the compensation has been received by the landowners or alternate plots have been CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.23 allotted, until the compensation amount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for the petitioners agree that the landowners who have received compensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrender the same as indicated above within two months from today. All other landowners who have neither received compensation nor any alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the way they like and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents. Delhi Administration will see to it that the revenue records are amended accordingly. The proper authority, i.e., the Land Acquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with 12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of the alternate plots when and if offered. The writ petitions are disposed of in these terms."

3. The Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority sought a review of the said order on the ground that their counsel appearing then was not authorised to make a concession which concession seemingly was evident as suggested. The High Court on 5-7-1990 saw through the gimmick of words and viewed that the counsel had rather made a contention and not a concession, being cognizant that the notification under Section 6 had been quashed and it was prudent to retrieve the situation keeping in view the ground realities which had intervened in the meantime such as the obligation to return compensation, change of possessions, etc. These aspects have adequately been noticed by the High Court in its judgment and order afore-extracted. Hence these special leave petitions.

4. It has been asserted with vehemence that the High Court fell in error in CW No. 1373 of 1989 and batch cases in treating notification under Section 6 relating to Village Saidul Azab to have been quashed by the Division Bench of that Court in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150] . There is CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.24 undisputably an obvious factual error in that judgment of the High Court. Therefore, this warrants special leave to be granted. Having granted it, we resort to the order passed by the learned Single Judge afore-referred to in which notification under Section 6 relating to Village Saidul Azab too had been quashed. If we use this information in the judgment under appeal as also in the review order of the High Court, we get to the conclusion that the notification under Section 6 relating to 12 villages had been quashed and thus all necessary consequences arising therefrom had to follow. The order of the High Court afore-extracted had become unexceptionable and obviously non-reviewable for there was nothing to review. On this analysis there remains nothing in these appeals which are dismissed, but in the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

31. Thus, so much is very clear from the order dated 20/09/1991 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Balbir Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430), that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the village Saidul Azaib had been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi (Single Judge) relying on the judgment in the B.R. Gupta case (1989) 37 DLT 150.

32. The submission of the learned counsel for the defendant no.2 to the effect that the defendant no.2 had become the owner of the land through the land acquisition and that the defendants nos. 3 to 9 were not the owners is, thus, without any merit. Once the land acquisition proceedings stood quashed, there can be no question of the defendant no.2 to claim itself as owner of the lands in question on the basis of the land acquisition proceedings.

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33. The reliance placed by the ld. counsel for the defendant no.2 upon the order dated 15/05/1989 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi is completely misplaced. By the said order, the Hon'ble High Court had only directed "that the possession of the petitioners therein would not be disturbed except in cases where the compensation had been received by the land owners or alternate plots had been allotted, until the compensation amount and the alternate plot was surrendered", and that "[A]ll land owners who had neither received compensation nor any alternate plot were free to deal with their lands the way they liked and their possession would not be disturbed by the respondents". Thus, the order dated 15/05/1989 was only on the aspect of return of possession to the land owners upon return of the compensation or the alternative plot, and did not hold that the land acquisition proceedings would remain valid or that the defendant no.2 would be the owner of the land till the compensation or alternative plot was returned. Once the land acquisition proceedings had been quashed, there was no question of the defendant no.2 becoming owner of the land.

34. In any case, I find that the plaintiff has been able to show on a balance of probabilities that the defendants nos. 6 to 8 had returned the compensation received and the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9 had not received any compensation.

35. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi had passed the order dated 16/11/2005 in WPC No. 3133/2000 entitled as Shmey Singh v. Union of India, in which the predecessor in interest of the defendants nos. 6 to 8, Sh. Ram Phool, was one of the petitioners. It would be appropriate to extract the order in extenso:

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.26 "1. At the hearing held on 11.11.2005, learned counsel for the parties did not press for the relief pertaining to claim for compensation.

2. Prayers made in the two writ petitions are as under:

WP(C) 3133/2000:

i) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents, in particular respondent No. 2 and 5, to forthwith desist from carrying out any demolition on land bearing Khasra No. 275 (4-7) and to prevent from carrying out any further demolition on the land adjoining land adjoining the land in question i.e. bearing Khasra No. 258 (24-5), 262(6-4) situated at Village Saidulajaib under Hauz Khas Tehsil, New Delhi.

ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to compensate the petitioners for the financial loss caused on account of their land after the same had been got assessed by the SDM, Tehsildar.

iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere or in any manner obstruct the petitioners or their tenants from carrying out their legal and authorised business activities from the structures existing on the land in question.

iv) Issue an appropriate direction permitting the petitioners to re-built the structures which has been illegally demolished by the respondents.

v) Pass any other or such order/s as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.27 WP(C) 3160/2000:

i) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents, in particular respondent No. 2 and 6, to forthwith restrain from carrying out any demolition on land bearing Khasra No. 261(7-13), 264(6-7), 153 (1-16), 64(4-12), 93 (6-7), 151 (2-17), 371/184/214 (2-15), 383/212/ 213 (4-8), 389/215 (3-0.13), 183/212 (1-0.7), 187 (2-0.1), 186 (0-.6) all situated at Village Saidulajaib under Hauz Khas Tehsil, New Delhi.

ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere or in any manner obstruct the petitioners or their tenants from carrying out their legal and authorised business activities from the structures existing on the land in question.

iii) Pass any other or such order/s as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

3. I need not, therefore, decide qua prayer No. 2.

4. Petitioners in WP(C) 3133/2000 plead that they had earlier on filed WP(C) 894/89. Petitioners in WP(C) 3160/2000 plead that they had earlier on filed WP(C) 2823/88. This fact has not been denied by the respondents in the counter affidavit.

5. The two writ petitions, along with a batch of other writ petitions were disposed of by a Division bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 16.5.1989. The order reads as under:

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.28 "Present: Mr. N.S.Vashisht for the petitioner.

Mr. Atul Jain for respondent No. 1.

Mr. Muni Lal Jain for respondent 4.

CW. No. 51/89 & C.M. 70/89 This order will disposed of Cws.1373-75/89, 1376/89, 1378- 79/89, 1112-13/89, 1377/89, 1126/89, 1281/89, 1065-71/89, 2823/88, 51/89, 388/89, 907/89, 903/89, 945/89, 965/89, 1008-9/89, 1598/88, 1252-58/89, 1250/89, 894/89, 517/89, 518/89, 495/89, 545/89, 569/89, 578/89, 980/89, 989- 992/89, 2602/88, 2601/88, 2842/88, 2841/88, 2840/88, 2813/88, 2814/88, 2815/88, 2816/88, 2817/88, 1114-1121/89, 1082-83/89, 1081/89, 1072-79/89, 1386/89, 1362/89, 1380/89.

Proceedings under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act right up to the stage of Award relating to villages, namely, Khan Pur, Saida-ul- Ajaib, Tigri, Shayoor Pur, Setbari, Chattar Pur, Raj Pur Khurd, Maidan Ghari, have been quashed by a Division Bench of this court in Balak Ram Gupta v. U.O.I. CWP. No. 1639/85, decided on 14th October,1988/18th November,1988. The prayer of the petitioners is that in spite of that judgment, the respondents are trying to take possession of the land.

The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi Development Authority have taken up a very fair stand before us. Their contention is that certain land owners have received compensation and as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land till the compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date they received the payment till the date they have refunded the amount. The contention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further stated by learned counsel CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.29 for the respondents that no effort would be made to take possession of any land from anybody and the possession already taken of these lands will be restored back to the land owners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if made with interest. It is further contended that in certain cases, the land owners have been allotted alternative plots in lieu of their land having been acquired and in those cases, the alternative plots must be surrendered before the land owners can take advantage of the quashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioners accepts this suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct that the possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed except in cases where the compensation has been received by the land owners or alternate plots have been allotted, until the compensation amount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for the petitioners agree that the land owners who have received compensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrender the same as indicated above within two months from today. All other land owners who have neither received compensation nor any alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the way their like and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents. Delhi Administration will see to it that the Revenue records are amended accordingly. The proper authority i.e. The Land Acquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with 12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of the alternate plots when and if ordered. The writ petitions are disposed of in these terms."

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.30

6. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid order dated 16.5.1989 has attained finality.

7. As per the petitioners, in compliance with the directions issued vide order dated 16.5.1989, being a condition precedent for the acquisition to be quashed, they returned the compensation received by them together with interest as directed. Accordingly, claim of the petitioners is that the respondents cannot dispossess them from the writ lands.

8. In proof of having returned the compensation received, writ petitioners of WP(C) 3160/2000 have filed as Annexure P.4 a communication addressed on 27.1.1994 by the LAC to the Tehsildar, Mehrauli stating that the compensation received for the lands in question by the bhumidars has been returned together with interest. Said document is an admitted document. Further, the writ petitioners have filed Annexure PR-1 being certificates issued by the Syndicate Bank on which bank the pay orders were drawn when refund was made, to the effect that the amounts covered by the pay order were credited to the saving bank account maintained with the State Bank of India, Tis Hazari by the LAC. The writ petitioners of WP(C) No. 3133/2000 have likewise filed as Annexure P.1 a certificate issued by the Central Bank of India which certifies that the bankers' cheque issued by the Central Bank of India have been encashed by the LAC.

9. Issue raised in the counter affidavit that in view of subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhey Ram's case and Gurdeep Singh Uban's case, is a non-issue for the reason, admittedly, judgment and order dated 16.5.1989 noted above has attained finality.

10. On the issue whether acquisition was complete when possession was taken over and therefore cannot be questioned, suffice would it be to note that qua the lands involved in WP(C) No. 3160/2000, evidenced by Annexure P.3, being the order dated 2.8.1994 passed by the Financial Commissioner in case No. 398/1994-CA, it is evident that as of said date possession was with the land owners for the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.31 reason proceedings under Section 81 pertaining to non- agricultural use of land were pending in revision against the land owners where the allegation was that they have put agricultural land to non-agricultural use. Further, revenue record establishes continued possession of the petitioners.

11. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. Prayers 1 and 3 are granted in favor of the writ petitioners in WP(C) No. 3133/2000. Prayer 1 and 2 are granted in the other writ petition.

12. No costs."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

36. Thus, the plaintiff has been able to show that the predecessor-in-

interest of the defendants nos. 6 to 8 had returned the compensation. Vide the order dated 16/11/2005 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WPC No. 3133/2000 (Shmey Singh v. Union of India), the prayers 1 and 3 were allowed as follows:

"i) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents, in particular respondent No. 2 and 5, to forthwith desist from carrying out any demolition on land bearing Khasra No. 275 (4-7) and to prevent from carrying out any further demolition on the land adjoining land adjoining the land in question i.e. bearing Khasra No. 258 (24-5), 262(6-4) situated at Village Saidulajaib under Hauz Khas Tehsil, New Delhi.", and "iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or an appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere or in any manner obstruct the petitioners or their tenants from carrying out their legal and authorised business activities from the structures existing on the land in question."

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.32

37. Thus, not only is it recorded that the compensation had been returned but mandamus was also passed against the respondents from carrying out any demolition or interfering or obstructing the petitioners or their tenants from carrying out their activities from the structures existing on the land.

38. The Ex.PW-1/9 and Ex.PW-1/10 being the Khatoni/revenue records pertaining to Khasra No. 275 and 285, respectively, show that the defendants nos. 3 to 9 as owners of the suit land. It is relevant that in its order dated 15/05/1989, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi had directed the authorities to suitably amend the revenue records. The defendants nos. 3 to 9, all being shown in the revenue records as the owners would mean that in all likelihood the defendants nos. 3 to 9 had returned the compensation received, if any, or would not have received compensation at all in the first place.

39. Also, the admitted position is that at the time of the demolition it was the plaintiff who was in physical possession of the suit land as a tenant and it was not the defendant nos.1 and 2 which were in possession. Hence, the actual physical possession of the subject land had not been taken over by the defendant no.2. In all likelihood, the physical possession would not have been taken over as the defendants nos. 3 to 9 had either returned the compensation received, if any, or they had not have received compensation at all in the first place. The defendant no.3 has deposed as PW-3 that no compensation had been taken and, in the facts and circumstances, it is quite probable that the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9 would not have taken any compensation.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.33

40. The burden shifted upon the defendant no.2 to clearly prove its defence that that the defendants nos. 3 to 9 had taken compensation or any alternative plot of land and had not returned the same. This was for the defendant no.2 to clearly prove. However, the defendant no.2 has not led any evidence in this respect.

41. Hence, I would hold that on a balance of probabilities, the plaintiff has been able to show that the defendants nos. 6 to 8 had returned the compensation received and the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9 had not received any compensation.

42. I am aware that in the plaint the plaintiff has pleaded that all the defendants nos. 3 to 9 had returned the compensation with interest and it is not stated that the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9 had never taken any compensation. However, in the face of the Khatoni/revenue records showing the defendants nos. 3 to 9 as owners and the fact of actual physical possession with the plaintiff as tenant as well as the deposition of defendant no.3 as witness, and on the face of absolutely no evidence on the part of the defendant no.2 to show that any compensation was taken by the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9, I would accept the submission of the plaintiff that in fact the defendants nos. 3 to 5 and 9 had never taken any compensation. The plaintiff was only a tenant in the subject land and may not have been completely aware as to the exact position of whether the defendants nos. 3 to 9 had taken compensation. When the things have come out in the evidence, then even if the plaint has stated something contrary it would not be fatal to the case of the plaintiff.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.34

43. Accordingly, it is held that although the subject land had initially been acquired, however, subsequently the acquisition proceedings were quashed and the subject land continued to vest in the defendants nos. 3 to 9. The Issue No.3 is answered accordingly.

Issue 4. What right, if any, does the plaintiff have in the suit land? OPP

44. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon three lease agreements being lease agreement dated 14/08/1999 with the defendants no. 3 to 5 being Ex.PW-1/3, lease agreement dated 12/08/1999 with the defendants no. 6 to 8 being Ex.PW-1/4 and lease agreement dated 01/03/2000 with the defendant no. 9 being Ex.PW-1/5, and has submitted that the plaintiff has proved that the plaintiff was a lessee in the subject property under the defendants no. 3 to 9 as lessors. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant no. 2 has objected to the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 as being inadmissible in evidence for lack of stamping as well as registration.

45. In rebuttal, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the aforesaid lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3 to 1/5 were already admitted in evidence on 16/11/2005 during the examination in chief of PW-1 without any objection as to stamping by the defendant no.2. The ld. counsel has relied upon section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act and has submitted that once the lease deeds were admitted in evidence, subsequently, the defendant could not raise the objection as to non-admissibility on account of lack of adequate stamping. In CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.35 this regard, reliance is placed upon the following case laws: Suresh Kumar V. Satish Mehra and Anr. 2012 SCC OnlineDel 4091, Javer Chand vs. Pukhraj Surana AIR 1961 SC 1655. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further submitted that even apart from the aforesaid lease deeds, there was other evidence to prove the factum of the lease between the plaintiff and the defendants no. 3 to 9. It is submitted that merely because the lease deeds were unstamped and unregistered, the same would not come in the way of the Court to determine whether there was in fact the lease otherwise than through such deeds. In this regard, reliance is placed upon NIIT Institute of Information Technology Vs. West Star Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (2009) ILR 5 Delhi 394. The ld. counsel for the plaintiff has further submitted that in any case the factum of tenancy was proved as the lease was admitted by the defendants no. 3 to 5 and 9 in their written statement.

46. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties.

47. The objection of the defendant no.2 regarding inadmissibility of the lease agreements deserves to be sustained. The lease agreements purport to be for periods of more than one year and as such were compulsorily registrable. It is also the undisputed position that the proper stamp duty was also not paid in respect of these lease agreements. The submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the objection as to stamping cannot be taken in as much as the lease deeds had been exhibited at the time of recording of evidence and as such had already been admitted in evidence, is without merit. A perusal of the recording of the evidence on 16/11/2005 shows that CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.36 at the time of recording of evidence before the local Commissioner, the lease agreements were marked as exhibits subject to the objection of the defendant no. 2 as to mode of proof as well as exhibiting of the document. The objection as to exhibition of the document would also include the objection as to inadmissibility due to inadequate stamping. As such, the mere marking of the document as an exhibit would not mean that the document had been admitted in evidence, inasmuch as the objection was kept open. Accordingly, the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 being inadequately stamped, would be inadmissible in evidence for all purposes. Even assuming that the objection as to stamping was not available to the defendant no. 2 as the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 were already exhibited, even otherwise, the lease agreements were compulsorily registrable and were inadmissible for want of registration and could not be relied upon to prove the lease arrangement between the parties. The proof of the factum of lease would not be a collateral purpose for which the lease agreements could be relied upon.

48. However, although it is held that the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 are inadmissible in evidence, the plaintiff has otherwise been able to show that there was a lease arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendants no.3 to 9. The defendants no.3 to 5 and 9 have admitted the factum of lease in the written statement. The defendant no.3 as PW-3 has also deposed that the suit land was given on lease to the plaintiff. This would be sufficient to show that the plaintiff was occupying the subject property in the capacity of a tenant. In the result, it is held that the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 are inadmissible in evidence CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.37 for want of stamping as well as registration to show any right of the plaintiff in the suit land. However, the factum of the plaintiff being a tenant on the suit land has otherwise come out de hors the lease agreements. Issue No.4 is answered accordingly.

Issue 5. Whether the demolition carried out by the defendant no. 2 at the site is illegal? Onus on parties

49. The primary defence of the defendant no.2 as to the legality of the demolition was that the demolition was justified as the suit land belonged to the defendant no.2. In view of my decision in respect of Issue No. 3, the suit land cannot be said to be under the ownership of the defendant no.2. Hence, the defence raised by the defendant no. 2 that the demolition was justified as the defendant no.2 was the owner of the land fails and is accordingly rejected.

50. The other defence taken by the defendant no. 2 is to the effect that there was no requirement for any show-cause notice. This stand of the defendant no.2 also deserves to be rejected. The subject land and structure thereon did not belong to the defendant no.2 as already held in the decision regarding the Issue No. 3. In terms of provisions of Section 30 of the Delhi Development Authority Act, the defendant no. 2 was under an obligation to issue a show-cause notice to the occupiers of the concerned property prior to any demolition activity. Section 30 of the DDA Act is reproduced hereunder:

"30. Order of demolition of building.--

(1) Where any development has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.38 permission, approval or sanction referred to in section 12 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted,--

(i) in relation to a development area, any officer of the Authority empowered by it in this behalf,

(ii) in relation to any other area within the local limits of a local authority, the competent authority thereof, may, in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under this Act, make an order, directing that such development shall be removed by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner thereof or by the person at whose instance the development has been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed, within such period (not being less than five days and more than fifteen days from the date on which a copy of the order of removal, with a brief statement of the reasons therefor, has been delivered to the owner or that person) as may be specified in the order and on his failure to comply with the order, the officer of the Authority or, as the case may be, the competent authority may remove or cause to be removed the development and the expenses of such removal shall be recovered from the owner or the person at whose instance the development was commenced or was being carried out or was completed as arrears of land revenue:

Provided that no such order shall be made unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made.

(1A) If any development in an area other than a development area has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the master plan or zonal development plan or without the approval or sanction referred to in section 12 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such approval or sanction has been granted and the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.39 competent authority has failed to remove or cause to be removed the development within the time that may be specified in this behalf by the Lieutenant Governor of the National capital territory of Delhi, the Lieutenant Governor may, after observing such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made in this behalf, direct any officer to remove or cause to be removed such development and that officer shall be bound to carry out such direction and any expenses of such removal may be recovered from the owner or the person at whose instance the development was commenced or was being carried out or was completed as arrears of land revenue.

(2A) Any person aggrieved by the direction of the Lieutenant Governor under sub-section (1A) may appeal to the Central Government within thirty days from the date thereof, and the Central Government may after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person aggrieved, either allow or dismiss the appeal or may reverse or vary any part of the direction.

(3) The decision of the Central Government on the appeal and subject only to such decision, the direction under sub-section (1A), shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court.

(4) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other provision relating to demolition of buildings contained in any other law for the time being in force."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

51. A perusal of section 30 shows that for any demolition to take place there must be first be an order passed directing the owner or the person concerned to remove the development within the time prescribed in the order and it is only after there is a failure to remove the development that the authority could proceed to demolish the building. Under section 30, no order for demolition shall be made CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.40 unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made. Thus, it was mandatory for the defendant no.2 to issue show cause notice to the owners or to the plaintiff who was tenant in the subject property before passing any order for demolition. It was also mandatory for the defendant no.2 to pass an order for demolition before carrying out any demolition. Even otherwise, being a public authority, it was incumbent upon the defendant no.2 to issue a show- cause notice to the occupiers of the subject land before passing any demolition order. Admittedly, in the present case, no show-cause notice was ever given to the plaintiff or the defendants nos. 3 to 9 of the demolition which was illegal. Furthermore, the defendant no.2 has been unable to show that there was even any order passed by the competent authority in the defendant no.2 organisation sanctioning the demolition. Thus, the demolition has been carried out without any show-cause notice and without any order being passed for demolition. It is well settled that when a statute describes or requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. (See Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1993 SCR (3) 522, 1993 SCC (3) 161) However, contrary to the statute, in the present case, the defendant no.2 neither gave any show-cause notice to the owners or the plaintiff, nor any opportunity of hearing, nor passed any order for demolition. This makes the action of the defendant no. 2 in demolishing the building completely arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the DDA Act and illegal. It appears that some officers of the defendant no.2 were acting on their own whims and fancies and gave a complete go-by to the provisions of the statute. This also makes the motive behind the demolition action by the officers of the CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.41 defendant no.2 of the concerned property to be highly suspect and mala fide.

52. Furthermore, the demolition by the defendant no.2 was also in complete violation of the order dated 16/11/2005 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WPC No. 3133/2000 (Shmey Singh v. Union of India) and even as such was illegal.

53. In the result, it is held that the demolition carried out by the defendant no.2 was illegal. The Issue No.5 is answered accordingly.

Issue 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any amount towards damages? If so, as to what amount? OPP

54. Now, coming to the issue of damages. The Issue No.5 has already been decided against the defendant no.2 and it is held that the demolition was illegal and contrary to law. The plaintiff has also been able to show that it was in occupation of the suit land in the capacity of a tenant and the Issue No. 4 has been answered accordingly. The plaintiff would thus be entitled to damages as it has directly suffered loss on account the illegal demolition action of the defendant no.2. The question is as to what would be the quantification of the damages.

55. The plaintiff has claimed total damages of Rs. 64,60,707/- due to the demolition. The damages have been claimed under two heads. The first claim for damages is of Rs. 33,82,289/- which was in respect of the advance rent paid by the plaintiff to the defendants no. 3 to 9. The second claim for damages is of Rs. 30,78,418.30 in respect of CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.42 the loss suffered by the plaintiff in terms of the destruction of the installed machinery and equipment and the renovated structure.

56. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint that a sum of Rs. 33,82,289/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendants no. 3 to 9 as advance rent to make additions, alterations, modifications and renovation of the existing structure to make it suitable and feasible for use of the plaintiff. It is submitted that the defendants no. 3 to 5 and 9 have in the written statement admitted the averments made in the plaint. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further submitted that the plaintiff has proved through its ledger accounts being Ex.PW-1/6, Ex.PW-1/7 and Ex.PW-1/8 that a total amount of Rs. 33,82,289/- had been paid to the defendants no. 3 to 9 towards advance rent. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also referred to the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 and has submitted that as per the lease agreements, the plaintiff was to pay advance rent to the defendants no. 3 to 9 in order to provide finances to carry out the renovation. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that even if the lease agreements were not registered, the terms regarding payment of advance rent would be a collateral purpose and the lease agreements can be looked at to prove the terms of payment of advance rent.

57. Insofar as the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-

1/5 are concerned, I have already held that these lease agreements would be inadmissible in evidence due to lack of stamping and registration. As such, the lease agreements cannot be relied upon to look into the terms thereof. The lack of stamping would be a CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.43 complete bar to look into the lease agreements. Even assuming that the objection regarding stamping was not available to the defendant no. 2 as the lease agreements had been exhibited, even otherwise the lease agreements remained inadmissible due to lack of registration. The terms regarding payment of advance rent cannot be termed as collateral purpose which could be looked at as the terms regarding payment of advance rent would be integral to the lease. Thus, the lease agreements Ex.PW-1/3, Ex.PW-1/4 and Ex.PW-1/5 have to be completely ignored.

58. The plaintiff has relied upon the ledger accounts Ex.PW-1/6, Ex.PW-

1/7 and Ex.PW-1/8 as well as the testimony of PW-1 to prove that the plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs. 33,82,289/- to the defendants no. 3 to 9 towards advance rent which was utilised by the owners for the purposes of renovating the structure. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendants no. 3 to 9 had renovated the structure accordingly. It is the case of the plaintiff that subsequently when the structure was demolished by the defendant no. 2, the plaintiff suffered loss of Rs. 33,82,289/- which had been already paid to the defendants nos. 3 to 9. The plaintiff has claimed that it had paid amount of Rs. 33,82,289/- to the defendants no. 3 to 9 towards advance rent for the purposes of renovating the structure. To prove this, the plaintiff has relied upon its ledger accounts and testimony of PW-1. However, I find that there is absolutely no corroboration of this through the defendants nos. 3 to 9. The defendant no.3 was called as a witness by the plaintiff as PW-3. However, I find that in his examination-in-chief, the plaintiff has not questioned him at all regarding the payment of advances for renovation of the property. Thus, there is absolutely no deposition by the defendant no.3 CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.44 regarding having received advance amounts from the plaintiff for renovation and use of such funds actually in renovation. The defendants nos. 4 to 9 were never called as witnesses by the plaintiff. There is absolutely no evidence led by the plaintiff to show as to how much expenditure the defendants nos. 3 to 9 incurred in renovating the structure and in what manner such expenditure was incurred. The onus was ultimately on the plaintiff to show the expenses incurred in the renovation by the owners. Mere entries in the ledger account of the plaintiff showing payments made to the defendants no. 3 to 9 would not be sufficient to show that these payments were made towards renovation of the structure and that the payments were actually utilised by the defendants nos. 3 to 9 for renovation of the structure. The onus was ultimately on the plaintiff to prove the damages and without there being anything more than the ledger entries, I would hold that the onus has not been discharged by the plaintiff.

59. Even otherwise, for other reasons also, I am unable to accept the claim of the plaintiff for damages of the amount of Rs. 33,82,289/-. As per the own case of the plaintiff, the amount of Rs. 33,82,289/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendants no. 3 to 9 as advance rent. Upon demolition of the subject property, the lease became frustrated and it was for the plaintiff to claim refund of the advance rent from the defendants no. 3 to 9. The structure on the land vested in the defendants nos. 3 to 9 and any loss for demolition of the structure was suffered by the said defendants and it was for these defendants to claim any such losses. At best, it can be said that the loss to the plaintiff was really the loss caused to the plaintiff due to losing the leasehold rights over the subject property and the opportunity cost CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.45 which would have been incurred in taking a new lease and shifting to a new premises. However, the plaintiff has not quantified its loss in such manner. It is also not possible to quantify the loss of the leasehold rights in the present case in as much as the lease agreements are inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the claim of the plaintiff for amount of Rs. 33,82,289/- towards the advance rent paid to the defendant no. 3 to 9 is rejected.

60. Now coming to the second part of the claim for damages. The plaintiff has claimed sum of Rs. 30,78,418.30 towards the loss of renovation carried out by the plaintiff independently at the demised premises. The plaintiff has along with the plaint filed a statement Ex.PW-1/8 of expenditure incurred by the plaintiff since 01/04/1999 in the renovation of the workshop on the demised premises amounting to a total of Rs. 30,78,418.30. To prove the said claim, the plaintiff has relied upon the testimony of PW-2 Mr. U.S. Sahni who was the manager (administration) with the plaintiff company since 1998 as well as the documentary evidence Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 comprising of bills, invoices and vouchers. The plaintiff has also relied upon valuation report Ex.PW-1/14 which is the report of an independent expert valuer which has quantified the loss on account of the demolition as Rs. 53,39,800/-.

61. The ld. counsel for the defendant no.2 has submitted that the testimony of PW-2 as well as the documentary evidence Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 was unreliable and that the plaintiff had sought to include in the calculation of damages, the expenses incurred by the plaintiff at its other sites/workshops into the statement of expenditure with respect to the demised premises in the present case.

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.46 It is further submitted by the ld. counsel for the defendant no.2 that the valuation report Ex.PW-1/14 relied upon by the plaintiff has not been proved in as much as the author of the valuation report was never called as a witness by the plaintiff. It is submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the plaintiff for failure to bring the author of the valuation report in the witness box. It is submitted that the claim for damages ought to be dismissed as a result.

62. In so far as the Valuation Report Ex.PW-1/14 is concerned, I agree with the submission of the defendant that the same cannot be said to have been proved by the plaintiff. Admittedly, the author of the valuation report Ex.PW-1/14 never came into the witness box to prove the report. The plaintiff was bound to call the independent valuer who was the author of the report Ex.PW-1/14 in order to prove the report. The plaintiff has failed to explain as to why the valuer was not called as a witness when the plaintiff was relying upon his valuation report Ex.PW-1/14. The Ex.PW-1/14 as a report of an independent expert valuer would have been a crucial piece of evidence in the assessment of damages and there is no explanation from the plaintiff's side as to the omission to examine the valuer. The objection of the defendant no.2 that the report Ex.PW-1/14 was not proved by calling the author thereof deserves to be sustained.

63. However, in so far as the testimony of PW-2 Mr. U.S. Sahni and the documentary evidence Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 is concerned, I do not agree with the submission of the defendant no.2 that this evidence ought to be discarded as unreliable. I have perused the testimony of PW-2 and his testimony has not been dented in such CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.47 manner in the cross-examination for it to be termed as unreliable. This evidence is definitely relevant and can be considered in the assessment of the damages. PW-2 Mr. U.S. Sahni has tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex.PW-2/A. He was cross-examined by the defendants. PW-2 has deposed that he was working as a manager (administration) with the plaintiff company since 1998 and had been looking after the work of renovation of the warehouse-cum- workshop-cum-office at the subject property. He has deposed that he was actively involved in all the purchase work of the building, electrical and other material related to the workshop since the month of December 1999 onwards for carrying out the renovation and modification work to make the workshop-cum-office workable for the plaintiff company. He has relied upon the bills, invoices and vouchers being Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 and has deposed that the plaintiff company had incurred expenditure of Rs. 30,78,418.30 in the renovation of the subject property to make it working for its business. He has deposed that the payments were made against the bills and vouchers by the plaintiff through him against the original bills and original vouchers prepared by him or his staff. He has deposed that the payments were made from the account of the plaintiff company. He has denied the suggestion that the plaintiff had incurred the expenses elsewhere but had shown the expenses in the account of the workshop at the demised premises.

64. The plaintiff's evidence through the testimony of PW-2 and documentary evidence of bills, invoices and vouchers Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 to quantify the damages at Rs. 30,78,418.30 can be taken into consideration in the assessment of damages. It has come out from the plaintiff's evidence that the workhouse-cum-workshop-

CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.48 cum-office of the plaintiff at the demised premises was ready for inauguration when it was demolished by the defendant no.2. It has also come out from the plaintiff's evidence that there were as many as 45 cars inside the demised premises which had to be removed at the time of demolition by the defendant no.2. The photographs of the demolition filed along with the plaint also show that the demolished premises were fairly large. Thus, the plaintiff's workshop was fairly large and it can reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff must have incurred good expenditure in installing machinery and equipment and in renovating the building. It has come out in the plaintiff's evidence that the demolition was carried out by the defendant no.2 without any notice or warning and that the plaintiff could only remove computers, kit boxes and about 45 cars from the demised premises and that the defendant no.2 demolished the entire structure and there was complete loss of the goods, equipment, furniture, fixtures etc. in the premises. On the basis of the evidence on record, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the plaintiff would have incurred some good amount of loss on account of the demolition. The defendant no.2 has led absolutely no evidence to show that the damages claimed by the plaintiff were unreasonable or that the plaintiff could not have at all incurred the expenditure on the subject premises which it was claiming. The plaintiff would be entitled to reasonable compensation for the loss caused to it by the illegal act of demolition by the defendant no.2. Furthermore, the defendant no.2 has acted in a completely arbitrary and irresponsible manner in demolishing the plaintiff's workshop at the demised premises without any show-cause notice or warning or opportunity of hearing. The defendant no.2 also completely flouted the provisions of the DDA Act in carrying out the demolition without any demolition CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.49 order having been passed under the Act. Furthermore, the demolition was in the teeth of the orders prohibiting demolition passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WPC No. 3133/2000 (Shmey Singh v. Union of India) and even as such was illegal. The conduct of the concerned officers of the defendant no.2 in not issuing any show cause notice to the owners or the plaintiff and in demolishing the structure without even passing any demolition order reeks of malice and mala fides. The illegal action of the defendant no.2 in neither issuing any show-cause notice nor passing any demolishing order appears to have been done deliberately and mala fide only to make the plaintiff incapable of taking any remedial proceedings under the law to challenge any proposed demolition. The demolition was without notice and without warning and without any order passed in this regard. The demolition was sudden and abrupt and without sanction of law. Even as such, the case calls for exemplary damages against the defendant no.2. The plaintiff has through the testimony of PW-2 and documentary evidence of bills, invoices and vouchers Ex.PW-2/1 to Ex.PW-2/179 sought to quantify the damages at Rs. 30,78,418.30 which I have taken into consideration. However, taking into account that the plaintiff has failed to examine the author of the valuation report and there is no explanation given for not calling the independent valuer into the witness box, I would award the damages on a more conservative side. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, I consider it reasonable to award damages to the tune of Rs. 20,00,000/- to the plaintiff against the defendant no.2. The Issue No. 2 is answered accordingly.

Issue 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the damages, if awarded? If so, at what rate? OPP CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.50

65. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable to grant the plaintiff interest @ 9% p.a. on the damages of Rs. 20,00,000/- from the date of the legal notice i.e. 28/04/2001 till actual realisation. The Issue No.6 is answered accordingly.

Relief:

66. Accordingly, decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant no.2 only for sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- towards damages along with interest @ 9% p.a. from 28/04/2001 till actual realisation. Costs are decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant no.2. Pleader's fee is computed as Rs. 50,000/-.

Let the decree sheet be drawn up accordingly.

Judgment pronounced in open Court.

File be consigned to record room.

(SATYABRATA PANDA) Additional District Judge-04 Judge Code- DL01057 PHC/New Delhi/31.10.2023 CS No.84 of 2017 M/s Samara India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & ors. Page no.51