Madras High Court
Koya Moideen vs The District Forest Officer on 28 May, 2015
Author: V.Dhanapalan
Bench: V.Dhanapalan, G.Chockalingam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 28-05-2015
(Judgment reserved on 29.04.2015)
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM
S.T.A.Nos.2 to 11, 14 and 15 of 2009, 1 to 6 of 2011,
3 of 2006, 4 of 2000, 7 of 2007, 2 of 2004, 21 and 23 of 2003,
2 and 3 of 2012 and 1 and 2 of 2008
1. Koya Moideen
2. Amina
3. Katheeja
4. Ayisha
5. Imbichi Beevi
6. Moosa
7. Siddique
Appellants 1 to 7 represented by their
Power of Attorney Marakkar, the 8th appellant
8. Marakkar .. Appellants in S.T.A.No.2 of 2009
Vs.
1. The District Forest Officer,
Gudalur Division, Gudalur, The Nilgiris.
2. The Assistant Settlement Officer,
Tarapuram. ...Respondents in S.T.A.No.2 of 2009
Special Tribunal Appeal No.2 of 2009 filed under Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969) against the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2009 in C.M.A.No.6 of 1999 on the file of the District Court-cum-Janman Estates Abolition Tribunal, The Nilgiris at Udhagamandalam, against the order dated 09.11.1998 in Roc.8/1883/93 on the file of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Dharapuram.
For appellants
in S.T.A.Nos.2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10 and 11 of 2009 and 1 to 6 of 2011: Mr.T.Srinivasaraghavan
For appellants in S.T.A.Nos.3 of 2006
and 4 and 5 of 2009 : Mr.K.Alagiriswamy, Senior Counsel
for Mr.R.Kannan
For appellants in S.T.A.Nos.4 of 2000
and 7 of 2007 : Mr.M.Venkatachalapathy,
Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Sriram
For appellants in S.T.A.No.2 of 2004: Mr.Srinath Sridevan
For appellants in S.T.A.No.23 of 2003: Mr.S.K.Raghunathan
For appellants in S.T.A.Nos.14 & 15 of 2009 :
Mr.K.V.Subramaniam,
Senior Counsel for
Mr.M.A.Abdul Wahab
For appellants in S.T.A.Nos.2 & 3 of 2012: Mr.R.Singaravelan
For appellants in S.T.A.Nos.1 & 2 of 2008: Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan,
Senior Counsel for
Mr.J.Ravindran
For appellants in S.T.A.No.21 of 2003: Mr.S.Gomathynayagam,
Addl. Advocate General
assisted by
Mr.M.K.Subramnaim, Spl.G.P
For respondent-1 in S.T.A.Nos.2, 8, 9,
4, 7, 14 of 2009, 1 of 2008 & 2 of 2012,
Respondent No.2 in S.T.A.No.4 of 2000,
Respondent No.3 in S.T.A.Nos.1 to 6 of 2011
and Respondent No.5 in S.T.A.No23 of 2003:
: Mr.S.Gomathynayagam,
Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Mr.M.K.Subramnaim, Spl.G.P
For Respondent No.1 in S.T.A.Nos.3 of 2009,
10 of 2009, 11 of 2009, 1 to 6 of 2011, 3 of 2006,
5 of 2009, 7 of 2007, 6 of 2009, 3 of 2012,
2 of 2008 and 15 of 2009,
Respondent No.2 in S.T.A.No.2 of 2004,
Respondent No.4 in S.T.A.Nos.1 to 6 of 2011
and 23 of 2003 and
Respondent No.3 in S.T.A.No.4 of 2000:
: Mr.S.Gomathynayagam,
Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Mr.M.Venugopal, Spl.G.P
For Respondent No.1 in
S.T.A.No.4 of 2000 and 2 of 2004
For Respondent No.2 in
S.T.A.Nos.2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 8, 9, 10 & 11 of 2009,
1 to 6 of 2011, 3 of 2006, 7 of 2007,
2 and 3 of 2012 and 1 and 2 of 2008,
For Respondent No.3 in
S.T.A.Nos.14 and 15 of 2009
: Mr.S.Gomathynayagam,
Addl. Advocate General, assisted by Mr.M.Venugopal, Spl.G.P
Mr.M.Venugopal, Spl.G.P.
For Respondent No.3 in S.T.A.Nos.6 and 7 of 2009 : Mr.K.Govindan
For Respondent No.4 in S.T.A.No.4 of 2000
and Respondent No.5 in S.T.A.Nos.1 to 6 of 2011: Mr.A.V.Ilango,
(for Joint Receiver)
For Respondent No.6 in S.T.A.No.4 of 2000 : Mr.I.Paul Noble Devakumar
For Respondent No.2 in S.T.A.Nos.14 and 15 of 2009: Mr.R.Singaravelan
For Respondent Nos.3 to 6 in
S.T.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2012 : Mr.K.V.Subramaniam,
Senior Counsel for
M/s.K.V.Subramaniam Associates
For Respondents in S.T.A.No.21 of 2003: Mr.S.Parthasarathy,
Senior Counsel for
Mr.P.Duraisamy
JUDGMENT
V.DHANAPALAN,J These Special Tribunal Appeals (for short, 'STAs') arise out of the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court (Tribunal), in confirming or setting aside the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, who granted or rejected the Ryotwari patta in favour of the appellants/individuals/Companies, who have filed these STAs. One STA in S.T.A.No.21 of 2003 is filed by the Government challenging the grant of Ryotwari patta. The details are tabulated hereunder:
S.T.A.No. First Appellate Court (Tribunal) case No., i.e. C.M.A.No. Subject
2 of 2009 (by individual) 6 of 1999 Grant of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was set aside by the First Appellate Court (Tribunal) 3 of 2009 (by individual) 10 of 1999
-do-
8 of 2009 (by individual) 1 of 1999
-do-
9 of 2009 (by individual) 2 of 1999
-do-
10 of 2009 (by individual) 14 of 1999
-do-
11 of 2009 (by individual) 18 of 1999
-do-
1 to 6 of 2011 (by individual) 37 to 41 of 2008 and 101 of 2009 Rejection of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was confirmed by the first appellate Court (Tribunal) 3 of 2006 (by individual) 13 of 2005
-do-
5 of 2009 (by individual) 12 of 1999 Grant of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was set aside by the First Appellate Court (Tribunal) 4 of 2009 (by individual) 5 of 1999
-do-
4 of 2000 (by individual) 30 of 1992 Rejection of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was confirmed by the first appellate Court (Tribunal) 7 of 2007 (by individual) I.A.No.94 of 2006 in C.M.A.FR.No.2813 of 2006 (condone delay petition in filing CMA)
-do-
7 of 2009 (by individual) 7 of 1999 Grant of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was set aside by the First Appellate Court (Tribunal) 6 of 2009 (by individual) 15 of 1999
-do-
2 of 2004 (by individual) 22 of 1995 Rejection of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was confirmed by the first appellate Court (Tribunal) 23 of 2003 (by Company) 20 of 1999 Grant of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was set aside by the First Appellate Court (Tribunal) 14 of 2009 (by individual) 3 of 1999
-do-
15 of 2009 (by individual) 17 of 1999
-do-
2 of 2012 (by individual) 3 of 1999
-do-
3 of 2012 (by individual) 17 of 1999
-do-
1 of 2008 (by Company) 16 of 1999
-do-
2 of 2008 (by Company) 9 of 1999
-do-
21 of 2003 (by Government) 47 of 1988 Grant of Ryotwari patta by the Original Authority, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court (Tribunal)
2. For the purpose of convenience, it is useful to refer the pleadings in a nut-shell in S.T.A.No.2 of 2009, which are almost common in all the other appeals.
3. The case of the individuals/Companies (appellants herein) before the Settlement Officer is that the Village(s) in question were notified in the Government Orders and were taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969, i.e. Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Patta) Act, 1969 and the said action was challenged before the Government authorities and appealed against, and ultimately, respective extent of land(s) were declared as "Forest" under Section 53 of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969. Upon enquiry by the Government Officer, it revealed that the respective extent of land(s) came into possession of the appellants by sale deeds / by legacy through inheritance and they had been paying the rent / land revenue to Jenmi (land owner) until the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969 came into force. Subsequently, after legal battle before the Government authorities, the land(s) in question vested with the appellants/individuals/Companies. The Tahsildar concerned filed counter affidavit and objected to the vesting of possession of the land(s) by the appellants and they also raised the ground of limitation and contended that the appellants are not in possession of the entire extent of land(s) in question. It is stated that on the direction of this Court in W.P.No.13384 of 1987, dated 01.09.1997, the Assistant Settlement Officer disposed of the remanded enquiry proceedings, in which the appellants pleaded for grant of patta. In the meanwhile, the Tahsildar reported that the land(s) in question were Government land(s), which were handed over to the Forest Department, which is in actual possession and hence, they objected for grant of patta to the appellants. Upon inspection of the land(s) by the Assistant Settlement Officer, with surveyors and the appellants, and on enquiry, it revealed that the suit land(s) were cultivated by the predecessors of the appellants and they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the land(s) since purchase and they have also filed land revenue receipts and Adangal extracts to prove their possession. The Assistant Settlement Officer ultimately concluded that the suit land(s) are not "forest" lands as claimed by the appellants and the same are not in possession of the Forest Department. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Assistant Settlement Officer and as per Section 12(1) of the said Tami Nadu Act 24 of 1969, the Assistant Settlement Officer (original authority) granted Ryotwari patta as claimed by the appellants/individuals/Companies to certain extent of land(s) and the remaining portions were directed to be kept as being vested with the Revenue Department. In some cases, upon not being satisfied with the case of the appellants/individuals/Companies, the Assistant Settlement Officer (original authority) upon enquiry and inspection, found that the appellants are not in possession and enjoyment of the land(s) in question and accordingly rejected the claim of the appellants for grant of Ryotwari patta as per the provisions of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969.
4. Challenging the above grant of Ryotwari patta or rejection of Ryotwari patta, respective parties, i.e. Government as well as individuals/Companies went on appeals before the first appellate Court (Tribunal), which upon hearing the parties and considering the evidence available on record, confirmed/set aside the orders of the original authority (Assistant Settlement Officer) who granted/rejected Ryotwari patta, against which, the present STAs are filed by the individuals/Companies and one STA is filed by the Government challenging the grant of Ryotwari patta.
5. Learned Senior Counsels/counsels appearing for the appellants/individuals/Companies contended that the respondent/Government (State) is not the claimant for Ryotwari patta under Sections 9 and 10 of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969 and hence, they have no right of appeal before the first appellate Court (Tribunal), that the District Forest Officer is not a person who can represent the State Government and as per the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, only the Secretary to Government or the District Collector can represent the State in the appeal(s), that the Assistant Settlement Officer found that the appellants/individuals/Companies and their predecessors-in-interest were in possession and enjoyment of the land(s) in question, which were never classified as "forest lands" and they were only Revenue lands, which came to be in possession of the appellants/individuals/Companies from the Government after coming into force of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969 and hence they are entitled to patta, as in most of the cases, they inherited the properties by legacy/succession, that the Adangal extracts show that the appellants are in possession, that no Notification was issued under the Tamil Nadu Forest Act in respect of the subject land(s) alleged to be "forest" land(s) and that the finding of the first appellate Court (Tribunal) that the patta proceedings in some cases, are barred by limitation is erroneous and hence, they prayed for allowing the STAs. In support of the above contentions, learned Senior Counsels/counsels for the appellants relied on the following decisions:
(i) Bhagwan Sahai Vs. Divisional Forest Officer (AIR (34) 1947 Patna 264):
"2. ... In the circumstances, it seems to me that the prosecution has failed to prove that the petitioners were acting dishonestly within the meaning of the Penal Code when they were removing the timber for the use of the proprietor of the Dhanwar Estate. A question has been raised me if the onus on this point is on the prosecution or on the defence. The learned Government Advocate has contended before me that it was for the petitioners to prove that they had acted under the orders of the proprietor of the Dhanwar Estate and that the timber was required for the repair of the bhandar house of the proprietor. I am of the view that "dishonestly" being an essential ingredient of the offence of theft, it was initially for the prosecution to prove that the petitioners had acted dishonestly so as to come within the mischief of the offence of theft. This the prosecution has failed to do.
(ii) Mansid Oraon and another Vs. The King (AIR 1951 PATNA 380):
"2. This is merely one of the many instances to which this Court has continually invited Government's attention to the utter carelessness with which prosecutions in this province are conducted. Neither the Public Prosecutors nor the magistracy seem to take the slightest care to bring on to record those notifications and orders which are essential for proving that the accused has acted in contravention of the law. Until they do so, it seems to be a waste of public time and money to prosecute at all, because whenever convictions are challenged in this Court they have to be set aside when there are omissions of this nature."
(iii) M/s.Solar Works Vs. E.S.I.Corpn., Madras (1964 (2) MLJ 223) (Division Bench of Madras High Court):
"We have heard the learned Counsel for the Employees (Messrs. Solar Works), learned Counsel for the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, the learned Advocate-General as Amicus curiae and learned Government Pleader. We have no doubt whatever that the view expressed by Venkataraman, J., is correct, and that the rule, as it stands cannot be supported upon the delegation of powers conferred by the Act in favour of the State, in order to make Rules for the purposes of Act.
The point is really quite simple, and may be precisely expressed in the following form. Where an Act itself does not provide for limitation with reference to a particular matter and the delegation of power to make Rules is conferred by a section of the Act which does not, expressly or impliedly, relate to the power to prescribe time, the authority to which the power is delegated, namely, the State in this case, cannot make a rule prescribing limitation. This is because, even under the Constitution (Article 145(I)(c)) where the Supreme Court is authorised to make Rules for the practice and procedure of the Court, there is specific reference to a power to prescribe limitation for applications to Court. ..."
(iv) Thiruvengadam Vs. Muthu Chettiar (1969 (1) MLJ 143): (Division Bench of Madras High Court):
Learned Government Pleader contended that the appellant, in any case, cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person. Though, on the view which we have already expressed, this question does not require to be considered, nevertheless we may briefly express our view. A person can be said to be aggrieved, if apart from the general interest such a person, as a member, as a member of the public, may have, he has a particular or special interest in the subject-matter supposed to be wrongly decided. In S.M.Transport Vs. Raman and Raman, which arose under the provisions of the Madras Motor Vehicles Act, this Court after referring to the observations of Earl of Reading, C.J., in Rex v. Richmond Confirming Authority Ex parte, Howitt, and also Rex Vs. Groom Ex parte, Cobbold, laid down the true principle in these words:
"The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered."
We do not see how, in that sense, the appellant can be said to be aggrieved in the matter of grant or refused of licence to the first respondent under Section 5. He purports to be a trustee or worshipper of the temple. He is not a rival applicant for a rice mill permit nor is he the owner of a rice mill, nor, as far as we are able to see, is he interested in the matters specified in Section 5(4) of the Act. It is true the averment is that the running of a rice mill 65 feet away from the temple may cause inconvenience to the worshipping public and also may affect the temple building. Whether it is so or not, that is not a consequence which is directly connected with or flows from the rice mill licence. ..."
(v) The Nilambur Kovilagam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1971 (1) MLJ 255) (Division Bench of Madras High Court):
"10. We have made this extensive review which, as we think, establish (1) judicial decisions over a long period, and, therefore, the Government, recognised that the janmi was the proprietary right in the soil subject only to pay of revenue: (2) janmam right in the proprietor has never been since Secretary of State v. Ashtamurthi, interfered with in the settlement or resettlement; (3) the settlement and resettlement were meant merely for fixing revenue which was not on the actual basis of net produce or on the principles applicable to ryotwari assessment; (4) the system of darkhast and razinama (relinquishment) was given up after 1888, and if janmam land was waste it was not assessed; (5) the registration from 1894, was both of private janmam and Government janmam and they were classified separately; private janmi paid no janmabhogam but an occupier of Government Janmam land paid janmabhogam; (6) the Janmabhogam collected by the Government and the revenue paid to it were regarded as distinct entities and the janmabhogam was collected in addition to the revenue, though both the items of charge were after the resettlement were merged into one; (7) pattas were given to janmis from 1894; but they were only for the purpose of revenue and could not legally interfere with the private proprietary right of the janmi in his janmam lands and (8) the principle of settlement as finally adopted and the resettlement did not in any way affect the land tenures obtaining in the District and caused no prejudice to the proprietary right of the landholders. We are of the view, therefore, that private janmam lands have not through the settlement and resettlement been converted into ryotwari lands. As a result, janmam lands in the Wynaad constitute janmam estate to which the provisions of the Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act are applicable. We are also of the view that because of Article 31-A (2)(a)(i) of the Constitution, janmam right is an estate for the purpose of the Article and the Act its therefore protected by Article 31-A(1) from an attack based on violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31."
(vi) Balmadies Plantations Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1974 (1) MLJ (SC) 1):
"15. ... Janmam lands are covered by clause (2) (a) (i) of Article 31 A. Forest area, which is part of such janmam land would like the remaining janmam lands, constitute an estate, and it would not be necessary in such a case to show that the forest land is held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. All lands which are part of a janmam estate of a janmi in the States of Madras and Kerala would constitute estate as mentioned in clause (2)(a) (i) of Article 31A of the Constitution. As janmam lands fall under clause (2) (a) (i), it is not essential to show that the requirements of clause (2)(a)(iii) too are satisfied for such lands and it would make no difference whether forests are a part of the janmam lands."
"16. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the acquisition of the lands in question is for agrarian reform. It is well established that in order to invoke the protection of Article 31-A, it has to be shown that the acquisition of the estate was with a view to implement agrarian reform. The said article is confined only to agrarian reform and its provisions would apply only to a law made for the acquisition by the, State of any rights therein or for extinguishment or modification of such rights if such acquisition, extinguishment or modification is connected with agrarian reform [see P.Vajravelu Mudaliar Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (1964 (2) SCJ 703 : 1964 (2) MLJ (SC) 173 : AIR 1965 SC 1017)."
"20. We, therefore, hold that the acquisition of the forests on the janmam land is not protected by Article 31A. It has not been shown to us that if the protection of Article 31 A is taken off, the acquisition of forests can otherwise be justified. We, therefore, are of the view that the provisions of section 3 of the Act in so far as they relate to the transfer of forests in the janmam estates in question are violative of the Constitution. As such, we strike down those provisions to that extent. Invalidity of the provisions relating to the transfer of forests would not, however, affect the validity of the other provisions of the Act as the two are distinct and severable."
(vii) M.Chayanna Vs. K.Narayana (AIR 1979 SC 1320):
"6. Now the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands which were included or ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date and on the landholder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of lands which belonged to him before the notified date as his private lands. The Act makes express provision for the determination of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the alleged private lands. If there is provision for the determination of the claims of a landholder for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of his alleged private lands, surely, in an Act aimed at the abolition of intermediary and the introduction of ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for the determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta. Section 56(1) is clearly such a provision. But, in Cherukuru Muthayya Vs. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya (AIR 1974 Andh Pra 85) (FB) it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under Section 56(1)(c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held that Section 56(1)(c) occurred so closely on the heels of Section 55 and Section 56(1)(a) and (b), that the applicability of Section 56(1)(c) must be held to be "intimately and integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that Sections 55 and 56(1)(a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading "Miscellaneous", and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench overlooked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion. The anomaly is that while express provision is found in Section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari pattas, there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provision to the bounds of Sections 55 and 56(1)(a) and (b) on the ground of contextual interpretation. Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya was wrongly decided insofar as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Section 55 and Section 56(1)(a) and (b). We do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.Munnaswami Naidu Vs. R.Venkata Reddi (AIR 1978 Andhra Pra 200) except to add that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.
7. In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna Vs. Sriramamurty (1958 (1) Andh Pra WR 420):
"Where a special Tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation ofthat Act, then except so far as is otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunals jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta. When a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act."
(viii) Thammanna Vs. K.Veera Reddy (AIR 1981 SC 116):
"28. If an appellant, who is an aggrieved person under Section 116-C of the Act, has got a right to withdraw or abandon his appeal unconditionally, a fortiori, he has every right not to file an appeal against the dismissal of his election petition, much less has any other respondent who never joined the contest in the election petition, a right to file an appeal if the aggrieved party does not do so. In other words, the principle that an election petition is a representative action on behalf of the whole body of electors in the constituency, has a very limited application to the extent it has been incorporated in Sections 109 to 116 of the Act, and its application cannot be extended to appeals under the Act."
(ix) T.N.Godavarman Thirumulkpad Vs. Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 1228 = 1997 (2) SCC 267 ):
"5. ...
IV. For the State of Tamil Nadu:
5. As far as the trees already cut, prior to the interim orders of this Court dated December 11, 1995 are concerned, the same may be permitted to be removed provided they were not so felled for Janmam land. The State Government would verify these trees and mark them suitably to ensure that this order is duly complied with. For the present, this is being permitted as a one-time measure.
6. Insofar as felling of any trees in Janmam lands is concerned (whether in plantations or otherwise), the ban on felling will operate subject to any order made in the Civil Appeals Nos. 367 to 375 of 1977 in CAs Nos. 1344-45 of 1976. After the order is made in those civil appeals on the IAs pending therein, if necessary, this aspect may be re-examined. ......"
(x) Kousalya Ammal Vs. Valliammai Ammal and another (1998 (1) L.W. 208) (Madras High Court):
"15 Therefore on consideration of the entire materials placed before me and of the arguments advanced by both sides, I am of the view that the document in question can certainly be looked into for collateral purposes, namely, for the purpose of proving the plaintiff's character of possession. No prejudice should be caused to the respondent by marking the document. Mere marking the document does not prove any of the recitals of the document itself. The truth of the document had to be independently proved. It is always open to the respondent to contend that he did not execute the documents at all and that even for a collateral purpose, it cannot be relied on. The revision therefore succeeds."
(xi) I.R.Coelho Vs. State of T.N (1999 (7) SCC 580):
"5. The Constitution Bench that had decided Waman Rao (Waman Rao Vs. Union of India - 1981 (2) SCC 362 : 1981 (2) SCR 1) also decided the case of Bhim Singh Vs. Union of India (1981 (1) SCC 166). The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was the subject-matter of the decision. It had been inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act. Tulzapurkar,J held the entire Act to be unconstitutional. The other four learned Judges agreed with him to the extent that a part of Section 27(1) of the Act was unconstitutional. Section 27(1) read thus:
"27.(1): Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5 and sub-section (4) of Section 10, no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise, any urban or urbanisable land with a building (whether constructed before or after the commencement of this Act) or a portion only of such building for a period of ten years of such commencement or from the date on which the building is constructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. Tulzapurkar.J, Krishna Iyer,J and A.P.Sen,J, delivered separate judgments. Chandrachud,C.J, on behalf of himself and Bhagwati,J, stated that they would deliver a detailed judgment later; but later, they passed an order stating that they had gone through the judgment of Krishna Iyer,J and found that there was nothing that they could usefully add to it. Tulzapurkar,J struck down Section 27(1) for the reason that it did not adequately control the arbitrary exercise of the power to grant or refuse the permission. The provision was found by him to be violative of Article 14 and was, therefore, struck down as being ultra vires and unconstitutional. A.P. Sen,J took the view that there was no justification for the freezing of transactions by way of sale, mortgage, gift or lease of vacant land or building for a period exceeding ten years even though such land, with or without building thereon, fell within the ceiling limits. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed to a citizen under Article 19(1)(f) carried with it the right not to hold any property. It was difficult to appreciate how a citizen could be compelled to own property against his will. If vacant land owned by a person fell within the ceiling limits for an urban agglomeration, he was outside the purview of the Act and could not be governed by any of the provisions of the Act. It was, therefore, held by the learned Judge that the provisions of Section 27(1) were invalid insofar as they sought to affect a citizens right to dispose of his urban property in an urban agglomeration within the ceiling limits. Krishna Iyer, J. did not discuss the provisions of Section 27(1), but he agreed with the learned Chief Justice "regarding the partial invalidation of Section 27(1)". The learned Chief Justice had said in his brief earlier order that Section 27(1) was invalid insofar as it imposed a restriction on the transfer of any urban or urbanisable property within the ceiling area. Such property was transferable without the constraints mentioned in Section 27(1)."
(xii) Kunjammal @ P.J.Aleyamma Vs. Mrs.Mariammal Iype and another (2001 (2) L.W. 212): (Madras High Court) "42. It is well settled that the Court has inherent power to remand, further this Court cannot repose on inherent powers if the case falls under any one or more of the express provisions under the Code. The present case, as already pointed out, will not fall under Rules 24 to 27 of Order 41 (CPC). Therefore, it at all this Court has to exercise its inherent power to remand to render substantial justice."
"46. It is the essence of the judgment, it is important after due observance of judicial process (i.e.) the Court passing the orders, observes atleast the minimal requirements of natural justice and one of them being impartial person acting fairly and without bias and in good faith. This is definitely wanting in this case and the case of bias is made out. The judgment, which is a result of bias or one of impartiality is a nullity and the trial, it is well settled is a coram non-judice. To put it plainly, a biased judgment or verdict is no judgment in the eye of law."
(xiii) The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd. Vs. The Deputy Director, Mundanthurai Kazhakadu Sanctuary and another (2003 (1) L.W. 276 ) (Madras High Court):
"48. No public authority can be restrained from performing their legal duties envisaged under an Act. If any action thus taken by the concerned authority is violative of any of the statutory or Constitutional provisions, it is always open to the aggrieved person to question the same in accordance with law. More over, the enquiry under the provisions of the Chapter II of the Forest Act is under progress and there is no justification for stalling proceedings. The rights of the petitioners are adequately ensured considering that the petitioner has every right to project their grievances before the Forest Settlement Officer, before whom the enquiry is at present pending. The petitioner is also entitled for a hearing. The petitioner can raise all grounds against the proposals under Forest Act or under the Wild Life Protection Act before the appropriate authorities who would be discharging quasi judicial function, and is bound to give reasons for passing any order. The order to be passed under the Forest Act is also subject to an appellate remedy before the District Court under Section 14 of the Forest Act.
49. Even in the context of the claims of the petitioner on the basis of the provisions of Act 1 of 1908 and Act 26 of 1948, it is up to the petitioners to pursue his remedies/rights flowing under the said Acts before the appropriate forum and the respondents herein are not the appropriate authorities who could deal with any of the claims of the petitioner, under Act 1 of 1908 or Act 26 of 1948. The respondents cannot be restrained from discharging their functions under Forest Act and Wild Life Protection Act when the petitioner/company has not yet taken any proceeding under Act 1 of 1908 and Act 26 of 1948. I have already held that in the absence of necessary parties, it is not possible to go into the claims arising under the said two Acts."
(xiv) Chief Conservator of Forests Vs. Collector (AIR 2003 SC 1805 ):
"12. The question that needs to be addressed is, whether the Chief Conservator of Forests as the appellant-petitioner in the writ petition/appeal is a mere misdescription for the State of Andhra Pradesh or whether it is a case of non-joinder of the State of Andhra Pradesh a necessary party. In a lis dealing with the property of a State, there can be no dispute that the State is the necessary party and should be impleaded as provided in Article 300 of the Constitution and Section 79 CPC viz. in the name of the State/Union of India, as the case may be, lest the suit will be bad for non-joinder of the necessary party. Every post in the hierarchy of the posts in the government set-up, from the lowest to the highest, is not recognised as a juristic person nor can the State be treated as represented when a suit/proceeding is in the name of such offices/posts or the officers holding such posts, therefore, in the absence of the State in the array of parties, the cause will be defeated for non-joinder of a necessary party to the lis, in any court or tribunal. We make it clear that this principle does not apply to a case where an official of the Government acts as a statutory authority and sues or pursues further proceeding in its name because in that event, it will not be a suit or proceeding for or on behalf of a State/Union of India but by the statutory authority as such."
(xv) The Special Commissioner and Director of Survey and Settlement Vs. M.Arumugam (2007 (4) CTC 538) (FB) (Madras High Court):
"10. In David Pillai Vs. The Settlement Officer, Madurai (W.A.No.1296 of 1986, decided on 18.07.1989) (supra), the Division Bench (consisting of the Officiating Chief Justice S.Mohan (as he then was) and S.Ramalingam,J) after detailed examination of the scheme of the Act held that the Director has power to revise or cancel the order passed by the Settlement Officer in suo motu exercise of power under Section 5(2) of the Act and the period of limitation prescribed by the rules. The Bench observed:
"Therefore, when a power is conferred upon the Director under Section 5(2) of the Act to revise or cancel an order passed by the Settlement Officer, such a power could be exercised suo motu. The exercise of that power by the Director would not in any manner be vitiated merely because the power is sought to be exercised after a considerable length of time. If one were to bear in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision cited supra and if the orders made by the competent authorities under the Act are only for the limited purposes of the Act to identify a person, who is liable to pay the tax or the kist, as the case may be, and no adjudication regarding title to the land is involved, then the conferment of power under Section 5(2) of the Act to revise suo motu any order passed by his subordinate without the limitation of time can very well be understood and justified. If the Director of Survey and Settlements comes to know that, contrary to the Scheme of the Act or due to misrepresentation on fraud played, patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the Act, then to set right that mistake, the Director should be enabled to exercise his powers so as to effectuate the Scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. In view of the above conclusion, the contention of the appellant that the Director of Survey and Settlements has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal beyond a period of two months and the orders of the Settlement Officer are deemed to have become final for all purposes cannot be sustained."
11. The judgment in David Pillai's case was brought to the knowledge of the Division Bench which heard R.Ramadoss's case (The Director of Survey and Settlement Vs. R.Ramadoss - 1992 (2) LW 265), and the Division Bench held that the question that arose in David Pillai's case was only with regard to condonation of delay and therefore, the observations made in regard to Section 5(2) are not binding. A reading of the judgment in David Pillai's case makes us to conclude differently. Of course, the question was, whether the appellate authority ought to have condoned the delay, and the Division Bench found that there was no reason for interference. Then, they proceeded to look at the same question from a different perspective and in that context, they construed Section 5(2) and held that considering the purpose of the Act, the suo motu revisionary power must be held to exist to effectuate the scheme of the Act and to implement the purpose behind the Act. The reasons which prevailed upon the Division Bench in David Pillai's case are in consonance with the observations of the Supreme Court in the judgments mentioned above, though they arose under different enactments."
(xvi) Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. Vs. State of T.N (2010 (10) SCC 96):
"27. Similarly, "egalitarian equality" is a much wider concept. It is an overarching principle. Take the case of acquisition of forests. Forests in India are an important part of environment. They constitute national asset. In various judgments of this Court delivered by the Forest Bench of this Court in T.N.Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India (Writ Petition No. 202 of 1995), it has been held that "inter-generational equity" is part of Article 21 of the Constitution.
28. What is inter-generational equity? The present generation is answerable to the next generation by giving to the next generation a good environment. We are answerable to the next generation and if deforestation takes place rampantly then inter-generational equity would stand violated.
29. The doctrine of sustainable development also forms part of Article 21 of the Constitution. The "precautionary principle" and the "polluter pays principle" flow from the core value in Article 21.
30. The important point to be noted is that in this case we are concerned with vesting of forests in the State. When we talk about inter-generational equity and sustainable development, we are elevating an ordinary principle of equality to the level of overarching principle. Equality doctrine has various facets. It is in this sense that in I.R.Coelho case (I.R.Coelho Vs. State of T.N - 2007 (2) SCC 1), this Court has read Article 21 with Article 14. The above example indicates that when it comes to preservation of forests as well as environment vis-`-vis development, one has to look at the constitutional amendment not from the point of view of formal equality or equality enshrined in Article 14 but on a much wider platform of an egalitarian equality which includes the concept of "inclusive growth". It is in that sense that this Court has used the expression Article 21 read with Article 14 in I.R. Coelho case. Therefore, it is only that breach of the principle of equality which is of the character of destroying the basic framework of the Constitution which will not be protected by Article 31-B. If every breach of Article 14, however, egregious, is held to be unprotected by Article 31-B, there would be no purpose in protection by Article 31-B. (xvii) T.N.Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India (2014 (6) SCC 150):
"4. The petitioner also highlighted that although the national policy has provided that 33% of the land mass of India shall be covered with forests, the present extent of the forest covered areas was below 15%. The natural rain forest cover was only around 5%. Such meager forest cover had led to the enactment of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Statement of objects and reasons of the aforesaid Act is as follows:-
(1) Deforestation causes ecological imbalance and leads to environmental deterioration. Deforestation had been taking place on a large scale in the country and it had caused widespread concern.
(2) With a view to checking further deforestation, the President promulgated on the 25th October, 1980, the Forest (Conservation) Ordinance, 1980. The Ordinance made the prior approval of the Central government necessary for de- reservation of reserved forests and for use of forest-land for non-forest purposes. The Ordinance also provided for the constitution of an advisory committee to advise the Central Government with regard to grant of such approval.
5. Apart from pointing out the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the petitioner also protested that the population living in the areas mentioned above is being deprived of the right to live in a clean and pollution free environment and, therefore, their fundamental rights protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are being violated. The petitioner pointed out that the preservation and protection of forests is recognized as essential for maintaining a clean and pollution free environment. He further pointed out that the rain forests, which are found only in the southern part of the Western Ghats contain several rarest species of plants and animals and also the main source of water supply to the rivers flowing from the Ghats. The large scale denuding of the green cover on the Western Ghats has resulted in shortage of water in the rivers and has adversely affected the people living on the water flowing from the rivers."
"9. In this writ petition, Interlocutory Applications have been filed seeking either general or specific directions in relation to various issues concerning the protection and improvement of environment. The subjects covered by Interlocutory Applications at various stages ranged from protection of existing forest cover; improvement in the forest cover; protection of lakes, rivers and wild life; and protection of flora and fauna and the ecological system of the country. This Court has been continuously monitoring the enforcement of the protected measures directed to be taken by the various Central/State authorities on the basis of the recommendations made by the relevant expert bodies."
"35. Upon consideration of the entire matter at length, we accept the recommendations made by CEC reproduced above. We, however, modify Direction 11(iv) as under:
The National CAMPA Advisory Council (NCAC) will finalise and issue guidelines before 1-5-2014 regarding the activities for which the use of the CAMPA funds will not be permissible (such as foreign study tours) and the activities for which a ceiling on the use of the CAMPA funds will apply (such as purchase of vehicles and construction of residential/office buildings).
These guidelines will be strictly followed by the State CAMPA.
The same shall be treated as directions of this Court. The order dated 10-7-2009 is modified accordingly."
6. Learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by the learned Special Government Pleaders, appearing for the State, contended that the Assistant Settlement Officer (original authority) conducted suo-motu enquiry and declared that the land(s) in question are correlating to respective forest poramboke land(s), that the extent of land(s) in question are disputed land(s), that in view of passing of the Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969, the abovesaid disputed land(s) vested with the Tamil Nadu Government, as they were declared as "forest poramboke land(s)", that since the forest officials failed to protect the said disputed land(s) which were declared as forest poramboke land(s), the predecessors of the appellants attempted to grab the same, that merely because the order passed by the Director of Survey and Settlement reached finality and not questioned by the officials, it cannot be considered that the appellants were in possession of the disputed land(s) during the crucial period, that the legal predecessors of the appellants claimed the disputed land(s) which are admittedly Jenmam Estate lands, taken over by the Government, that in W.P.No.22178 of 1993, by order dated 06.04.1994, this Court observed that the land(s) in question are the Government land(s) and were under the control of the Forest Department, that the first appellate Court (Tribunal) disbelieved the Adangal extracts and other related receipts and held that the house tax receipts did not relate to the crucial period, that the appellants did not prove that their parents/predecessors were in actual possession and enjoyment of the disputed land(s) during the crucial period, that the disputed land(s) were declared as "Reserve Forest" as per the Government Order, that by passing the Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969 (Gudalur Jenmam Act), the Government of Tamil Nadu took the entire Jenmam Estate lands, which included the disputed land(s), that no application for Ryotwari patta was filed by the parents/predecessors of the appellants (claimants) as per Rule 8 of the Gudalur Jenmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules under Form No.4 within six months from 27.11.1994 being the date on which the Government of Tamil Nadu took over the entire Jenmam Estate lands, including the disputed land(s), that the first appellate Court (Tribunal) rightly concluded that the claim made by the appellants is clearly barred by limitation, that the documents relied on by the appellants were not proved by them in the manner known to law, and hence the first appellate Court (Tribunal) rightly allowed the appeals by setting aside the orders of the original authority (Assistant Settlement Officer) in granting Ryotwari patta to the appellants, which may not be interfered with by this Court in these STAs.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material documents available on record.
8. If the land(s) of the appellants/individuals/Companies are held to be Janmam lands and constitute Janmam Estate as defined under the Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 (Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969), the provisions of the Act will apply to the lands, and as Janmam lands, they will be an Estate within the inclusive definition of the term under Article 31-A(2) of the Constitution of India and the said Act will also receive the protection under Article 31-A(I) of the Constitution. But, if, on the other hand, as alleged by the appellants/individuals/Companies, the Janmam land(s), in course of time, became Ryotwari land(s), the said Act will have no application to them.
9. Relevant provisions of law to be examined are as under:
The Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969:
Section 2:
....
(2): "appointed day" means the date appointed by the Government under sub-section (4) of Section 1.
(7) "janmi" means a person entitled to the absolute proprietorship of land and includes a trustee in respect thereof;
(11) "tenant" means as verumpattamdar as defined in sub-clause (a) of clause (29) of section 3 of the Malabar Tenancy Act;
Section 8. The janmi shall will effect on and from the appointed day, be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of all lands proved to have been cultivated by the janmi himself, or by the members of his trawad, tavazhi, illom or family or by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st day of June 1969.
Section 9: (1) Every tenant shall, with effect on and from the appointed day, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the lands in his occupation:
Provided that such land is proved to have been cultivated by the tenant himself or by the members of his tarwad, tavazhi, illom or family or by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st day of June 1969;
Provided further that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a panmi on or after the 1st day of June 1961 shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no tenant shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of any land under sub-section (1), if such tenant has voluntarily abandoned or relinquished his rights in respect of such land on or before the date of the decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) of Section 12.
Section 10(1): Where no person is entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of a land in a janmam estate under section 8 or section 9 and the land vests in the Government, a person who had been personally cultivating such land for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st day of June 1969 shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of that land:
Section 11: Notwithstanding anything contained in section 8 and 10 no ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of any land falling under any of the categories specified below and situated within the limits of a janmam estate:
(a) forests;
(b) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage, surplus or irrigation channels;
Section 12:(1) The Settlement Officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), inquire into the claims of any person for a ryotwari patta under this Act in respect of any land in a janmam estate and decide in respect of which land the claim should be allowed.
(2)(a) Before holding the enquiry under the sub-section (1), the Settlement Officer shall give notice in the prescribed manner to the janmi and to the Tahsildar of the Taluk or the Deputy Tahsildar of the sub-taluk in which the land is situated;
(b) The Settlement Officer shall also publish in the prescribed manner in the Village the notice referred to in clause (a) and after giving the parties who appear before him an opportunity to be heard and to adduce their evidence, give his decision.
(3) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (2), the Government may within one year from the date of the decision and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within three months of the said date, appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that the Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding two months for the filing of any such appeal:
Section 13: (1)(a) Every person, whether a janmi or not who becomes entitled to a ryotwari patta under this Act other than under section (10) in respect of any land shall, for each fasli year commence in with the fasli year commence in with the fasli year in which the appointed day falls;
Section 17: (1)(a) Where at any time before the appointed day the janmi was created by way of lease, rights in any lands for purposes of cultivation of plantation crops, the Government may, if in their opinion, it is in the public concerned terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date thereof.
Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time.
(2) The Government may, if in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any right continued, under this section.
The Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules, 1974 Rule 8: Enquiry into claims under sections 8, 9 or 10(1): Every application for grant of ryotwari patta in respect of any land under sections 8, 9 or 10 shall be in Form No.4 and shall be either presented in person or sent by registered post, to the Settlement Officer, within six months from the appointed day.
(2) Every such application shall be signed and verified by the applicant and restricted to lands in the holdings in a single village.
Rule 25: Time barred application, appeal or revision petition to be dismissed:
(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules, every application made and every appeal and revision petition presented to the authorities or officers having jurisdiction under the Act and these rules, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the Act and these rules, shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence."
10. Before going into the merits of the case, we would like to trace upon the origin and history of Janmam lands. The Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969, i.e. Tamil Nadu Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Patta) Act, 1969, is intended to provide for acquisition of the rights of the Janmis in Janman Estates in Gudalur Taluk of the Nilgiris District and the introduction of Ryotwari settlement in such Estates. The statement of objects and reasons of the said Act refers that in pursuance of the policy of abolition of all intermediaries between the Government and the actual cultivators, the Zamindari, under-tenure and Inam Estates and all Minor Inams, leaseholds, etc., had been abolished under the various Legislative measures and all these lands had been converted into Ryotwari lands by the grant of patta to the persons entitled thereto. But all the same, the special system of land holding known as the Janmi system, was still in vogue in the said Gudalur Taluk of the Nilgirs District. Thus, it is clear that the said Act was enacted to abolish the Janman Estates tenure and introduce in these lands the Ryotwari system of tenure in favour of the persons cultivating the lands, either as Janman, as tenant or any other third person, who is neither a Jenmi nor a tenant, but has been in possession of Janman land(s) and personally cultivating it.
11. According to the definition of 'Estate' under Article 31-A(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, any Janmam right in the State of Tamil Nadu also constitutes an Estate. The said objects of the Act also show that the Government decided to abolish the system of Janmam tenure on payment of compensation to the Janmis at the rate of 20 times the average net annual income derived by them from the Janmam Estate and that the Jenmi and the Verumpattamdar would be entitled to Ryotwari patta for any land on proof of personal cultivation for three agricultural years and that if no Janmi or Verumpattamdar was entitled to patta, any other person who had cultivated the land for three agricultural years, would be entitled to such patta. The said Act is exactly on the pattern of the Act relating to the abolition of Zamindaris and Inams. By Section 3 of the said Act, every Janmam Estate, on and from the notified date, shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances. The following other provisions of the said Act provide for grant of Ryotwari pattas, survey and settlement of Janmam Estates, determination and payment of compensation and miscellaneous matters. "Appointed day" under the said Act means the date appointed by the Government under Section 1(4) of the said Act, which says that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government, may by Notification, appoint. The expression "Janmi" is defined in Section 2(7) of the said Act to mean a person entitled to the absolute proprietorship of the land and includes a Trustee in respect thereof and Section 2(6) defines a "Janman Estate" as any parcel or parcels of land included in the holding of a Jenmi. A Janmi is an absolute proprietor of the soil, subject only to the liability to pay the land revenue having probably come into being some time after 1802. The 'tenant' dealt with in Section 9 of the said Act, is any person who has been allowed by the Jenmi to enjoy his Janman land(s) for agricultural purposes in consideration of paying rent.
12. By introduction of the settlement and re-settlement in Gudalur Taluk, Janman lands in the Taluk are to become Ryotwari lands. Since the Janmi is really the proprietor, he can oust any person holding a patta from Government and retain the land himself, subject only to his liability to pay the revenue and he therefore is and has a legal right to be the landholder within the meaning of Section 1 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The registration of the Janmi as the 'landholder' being compulsory at law, the settlement with him was the only legal course. At the same time, the Government desired it to be widely made known that the principle of settlement which was finally adopted, did not in any way affect the land tenures obtaining in the District, that it would not in any way disturb the prevailing relations between the landlords and tenants, nor prejudice the proprietary rights of the land owners. On the one hand, the clear and unequivocal registration of all Janmam titles, will facilitate the realisation, in a manner recognised by law, of the Revenue to which Government is entitled, and on the other hand, the adjustment of terms between the landlords and tenants and the modifications thereof inevitable on the introduction of the settlement, will, as heretofore, remain matters of contract; but certainty of proprietary right and consequent grounds for litigation will be minimised, the security of the landlords and tenants alike being thereby promoted. The re-settlement was introduced in 1926-27. One of the special features of the re-settlement were classified as 'new holdings' and 'old holdings' and on all the lands on which Janmabhogam was collected and on all the Government assessed waste lands, the taram assessment and Janmabhogam were amalgamated and a consolidated assessment was fixed, and all future assignments of the Government waste lands were to be at these rates. Private Janman wet lands and the Government Janman wet lands were registered as 'permanent wet' and failure to cultivate such lands could not create any right to remission of assessment on them, unless their registered holders had relinquished before the prescribed date all their rights in them. With reference to the dry lands, private Janman lands under regular occupation from year to year and Government Janman lands were classed as 'developed' and all the other lands as 'undeveloped' for the purpose of assessment and a consolidated rate of assessment took the place of the charges separately made under the heads 'taram assessment' and Janmabhogam paid in respect of Government Janman lands. It is to be noted that the State Government is the absolute owner of the Gudalur Janman Lands notified under the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969.
13. The Government recognised that the Janmi was the proprietor who had the absolute proprietary right in the soil, subject only to payment of Revenue, that the Janmam right in the proprietor has never been since this Court earlier interfered with in the settlement or re-settlement; that the settlement and re-settlement were meant merely for fixing the Revenue, which was not on the actual basis of net produce or on the principles applicable to Ryotwari assessment, that the system of Darkhast and Razinama (relinquishment) was given up after 1888, and if Janman land was waste, it was not assessed, that the registration from 1894, was both of private Janman and Government Janman and they were classified separately, that the private Janmi paid no Janmabhogam, but an occupier of Government Janman land paid Janmabhogam, that the Janmabhogam collected by the Government and the Revenue paid to it were regarded as distinct entitites and the Janmabhogam was collected in addition to the Revenue, though both the items of charge were after the re-settlement were merged into one, that the pattas were given to Janmis from 1894, but they were only for the purpose of Revenue and could not legally interfere with the private proprietary right of the Janmi in his Janmam lands and that the principle of settlement as finally adopted and the re-settlement did not in any way affect the land tenures obtaining in the District and caused no prejudice to the proprietary right of the landholders. It is also to be noted that the private Janman lands have not through the settlement and re-settlement been converted into Ryotwari lands, as a result, the Janman lands in the Wynaad constituted Janman Estate, to which the provisions of the said Act are applicable. Because of Article 31-A(2)(i) of the Constitution of India, the Janmam right is an Estate for the purpose of the Article and that the said Act is protected by Article 31-A(1) from an attack based on violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India.
14. With regard to the dispute that the land(s) in question are forest land(s), it is to be noted that the Forest (Conservation) Act was enacted to check further deforestation, which ultimately resulted in ecological imbalance and therefore, the provisions made therein for the conservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, apply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification thereof. It is an undisputed fact that the forest in our country is an important and vital component to sustain the life support system on this planet and for various reasons, our forest is being slowly depleted. At the same time, as part of our developmental activities, some areas of the forest have to be used for non-forest purposes. The economic development shall not be at the cost of the complete degradation of the forest or the environment and eco-system provided by the green area of the forest. The word "forest" must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest (Conservation) Act. The term "forest land" occurring in Section 2 therein will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record, irrespective of the ownership. In view of the meaning of the word "forest" in the Forest (Conservation) Act, prior approval of the Central Government is required for any non-forest activity within the area of any "forest". In accordance with Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, all on-going activity within any forest in any State throughout the country, without the prior approval of the Central Government, must get ceased forthwith and it is therefore clear that the running of saw mills, etc., of any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and mining of any mineral, are non-forest purposes and are therefore not permissible without prior approval of the Central Government. Accordingly, any such activity is prima-facie violation of the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, and every State Government must promptly ensure the total cessation of all such activities forthwith, as held by the Supreme Court in various decisions.
15. Therefore, it is considered by the Supreme Court as to whether the user agency of such land, is required for developmental activities to compensate for the diversion of the forest and on the recommendations of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), it is decided by the Supreme Court that the user agency shall be required to make payment of the net present value (NPV) of such diverted land so as to utilise the same for getting back in the long run which are lost by such diversion. In the decision reported in 2006 (1) SCC 1 (T.N.Godavarman Thirumulpad (87) Vs. Union of India), the Supreme Court accepted the report of the CEC including the scheme submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the CEC made recommendations on that aspect of the matter, with certain exemptions for payment of NPV in various areas like schools, hospitals, etc.
16. With the above background, if we look into the case on hand, it is seen that admittedly, at all times, some of the land(s) in question always vested with the Government (State) and some vested in the individuals, some of whom are appellants herein, but the appellants/individuals/Companies have not established their ownership by title before the original authority-Settlement Tahsildar, without giving any room for doubt and hence, they have lost their case before the first appellate Court (Tribunal), which on the basis of the documents available on record, rightly appreciated the facts and applied the law and dismissed the appeals filed by the individuals/appellants herein, with which, we find no ground made out to interfere. It is pertinent to note that due inspection and enquiry was conducted by the original authority (Settlement Officer) before vesting the land(s) to the individuals.
17. Upon considering the claim of the appellants/individuals, it is seen that the State Government is duly represented by the Settlement Officer concerned in these cases. The Government is the claimant for the Ryotwari patta under the provisions of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969. It is proved by the evidence on record that the land(s) in question are classified as "forest lands" in some cases and they vest with the Government. It is seen that the predecessors of the appellants/individuals attempted to grab the land(s) during the crucial period. The appellants/individuals did not prove that their parents/predecessors were in actual possession of the land(s) during the relevant period, as the disputed land(s) were declared as "Reserve Forest" as per the Government Order and that by passing of the said Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1969, the Government took the entire Janman Estate land(s), which included the disputed land(s). Since the parents/predecessors of the appellants/claimants did not apply for pattas as per Rule 8 of the Rules, i.e. the Gudalur Janman Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules, 1974, which were framed under the said Act, within stipulated period, as rightly concluded by the first appellate Court (Tribunal), the claim of the appellants/individuals/Companies/claimants, is clearly barred by limitation, coupled with the fact that the document(s) have not been proved by them in accordance with law beyond reasonable doubt.
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the irresistible conclusion is that the appellants/individuals/Companies are not entitled to the relief sought for in these STAs. Accordingly, these STAs. are liable to be dismissed, confirming the rejection of pattas. However, as the Government has proved its case by preponderance of all probabilities by filing S.T.A.No.21 of 2003 against the confirmation of patta by the Tribunal in favour of the company, in our considered opinion, the same has to be allowed.
19. In the result, all the STAs. filed by the appellants/individuals/Companies, are dismissed. S.T.A.No.21 of 2003 filed by the Government is allowed. No costs. The Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
(V.D.P.J) (G.C.J)
28-05-2015
Index: Yes
Internet: Yes
aeb/cs
V.DHANAPALAN,J
and
G.CHOCKALINGAM,J
cs
Judgment
in
S.T.A.No.2 of 2009, etc. batch
28-05-2015